# PAKISTAN

## Baluchis

Activity: 1947-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* There are some references to a Baloch movement pre-dating Pakistan’s independence. Grare (2013: 7) argues that some historians peg it to the late 19th century, while others argue that nationalist contention started closer to Pakistan’s independence. In line with the latter position, Minahan (2002: 257) argues that nationalist organizations began to put forward demands for autonomy and reunification of all Baluch populated territories in the 1930s. Similarly, according to Breseeg (2004: 221-222), the first organized activity dates to the late 1920s/early 1930s: namely, according to Breseeg, Anjuman-e Ittehad-eBalochan (Organization for the Unity of Baloch) was formed in the late 1920s; Anjuman had varied goals, but ultimately they aspired at a united independent Baluchistan. Anjuman operated openly as of 1931, having started out as a clandestine organization in 1920 under a different name, Young Baloch (Breseeg 2004: 221-222). The aims of Young Baloch are not clear. While it is possible that there was organized political activity already before 1931, 1931 is used as start date since this is the first clear-cut evidence of separatist activity we found.
* In 1937 the Kalat State National Party was formed, a Baloch nationalist party (Siddiqi 2012: 57). We code the Baloch movement from 1947, the year of Pakistan’s independence. As we found no evidence of separatist violence prior to 1947, we denote prior non-violent activity.
* In August 1947, the Khan of Kalat declared his Khalat independent from Pakistan. Khalat was forcibly annexed to Pakistan after a couple of months (we found no evidence that would allow us to code a LVIOLSD phase, however) (Grare 2013: 7).
* In 1958, the Khanate of Kalat again declared Balochistan independent from Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 258).
* In 1971 the government agreed to negotiations on Baluch autonomy, but then arrested Baluch leaders when they arrived to negotiate. Suspecting Baluch intentions to follow Bangladesh’s lead in secession, Pakistani authorities then clamped down on Baluch nationalist and autonomist organizations. In response rebellion broke out in 1973 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 35, 223ff; Hewitt et al. 2008; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2005; Minahan 1996: 57ff, 2002: 255ff; MAR; MRGI 1990: 294; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019; Siddiqi 2012; UCDP/PRIO).
* The movement is ongoing as of 2020. Three important representatives of the movement are the Free Baloch Movement, the Baloch Republican Party, and the Baloch National Movement (the leaders of all three groups are in exile). Furthermore, rebel groups including the Baloch Liberation Army ( BLA) continue to operate and use violent tactics to achieve independence (Kelkar 2022). [start date: 1931; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Demands vary from increased autonomy to outright secession, and it is not fully clear which is dominant (and at which points in time).
  + In 1947, Kalat declared independence, but the remaining three quarters of Balochistan seem to have acceded Pakistan without such contention.
  + Titus & Swidler (2000) suggest that the drive for independence was rather marginal.
  + Grare (2013: 5), on the other hand, notes that many of the most active organizations favor independence.
  + Minorities at Risk is quite ambiguous by saying on the one hand that “[t]he demands of most Baluch groups, conventional and militant, center on Baluch autonomy and Baluch control over resources, although some radical Baluchis demand full independence”, but on the other hand noting the “violent separatism of the 1970s” which “apparently had disappeared” by the late 1990s.
  + Ahmad (2014) suggests that since 1947 there has always been an at times more and at times less popular independence movement, which has become increasingly popular in recent years.
  + The Baloch Republican Party (BRP), one of the main representatives of the movement, makes claims for independence (Hashim 2013). Similarly, independence is the demand made by armed Baloch separatist groups such as the BLA (Baloch Liberation Army) (Mishra 2022).
* Overall, there has been continued contention for independence. It is not clear whether independence was the dominant claim throughout, but in line with the codebook, if there is ambiguity, the more radical claim is coded. [1947-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1931; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Balochis in Pakistan matches today’s Balochistan province, although parts of the movement have also made claims for a greater Balochistan that includes parts of Iran and Afghanistan (Roth 2015: 303). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* August 15, 1947, the Khan of Kalat declared Kalat (around a quarter of Balochistan) independent (Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2012: 258); however, Kalat was not fully integrated with Pakistan (this came only in 1948), thus we do not code this declaration.
* In 1958, the Khanate of Kalat again declared Balochistan independent from Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 258). [1958: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* In the 1950s and 1960s there were several uprisings. The MAR quinquennial rebellion score is three in 1965-1969 (“local rebellion”). However, case study evidence suggests that there was nothing close to rebellion until 1973. Hence, 1947-1972 are coded NVIOLSD.
* The HVIOLSD coding for 1973-1977 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). UCDP/PRIO also codes all of those years except 1973. Qualitative evidence from the University of Central Arkansas conflict database corroborates the 1973 start date, however.
* The University of Central Arkansas conflict database suggests there were only around a dozen additional deaths until 2000, when bombings and shelling by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) caused the deaths of 35 government soldiers and 5 civilians. This is corroborated by the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, which suggests that the BLA was formed in 2000 and engaged in terrorist activities that year. We found no further reports of activities of BLA in 2001-2002; in 2003, BLA began attacks again, but based on the evidence we found, the number of casualties was below 25. We do not code 2000 as LVIOLSD as we found no evidence for deaths on the BLA side, suggesting the reciprocity criterion may not be met. UCDP/PRIO does not include the episode.
* UCDP/PRIO suggests that there were more than 25 battle-related deaths in 2004 and Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code an ongoing civil war over Balochistan starting in 2006. According to UCDP/PRIO, there was sustained fighting in 2005 with 18 battle-related deaths; thus, we extend the LVIOLSD code to 2005.
  + Note: Marshall & Gurr (2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) report that armed conflict that started already in 2003, but we could not find corroborating evidence (e.g., see SATP: https://www.satp.org/terrorist-groups/fatalities/pakistan-balochistan\_balochistan-liberation-army-bla).
* [1947-1972: NVIOLSD; 1973-1977: HVIOLSD; 1978-2003: NVIOLSD; 2004-2005: LVIOLSD; 2006-ongoing: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Baluchis’ homeland is divided between Pakistan and Iran. The Baluchi region was occupied by the British in the early 19th century. Baluchistan was divided into a northern British protectorate (Kalat) and tribal states. The Baluchis retained considerable autonomy under resident British advisors. There were multiple uprisings from Baluchi activist groups. In 1947, three of the four Baluch regions joined Pakistan. Kalat joined Pakistan in 1948 (see below).
* Under the British, the Baluchis had enjoyed considerable autonomy. With the accession to Pakistan, Baluchistan lost much of its autonomy (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 577). While federal in name, Pakistan had an effectively unitary system (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). [1947: autonomy restriction]
  + Upon the partition of India, there was a serious possibility that part of Baluchistan would attain separate independence. According to Minority Rights Group International, on August 4, 1947, an agreement was signed between the British and Pakistan governments to recognize Kalat state (around a quarter of the Baluchis’ homeland) as a free and independent state. Siddiqi (2012: 59), in contrast, suggests that the agreement was ambiguous in its recognition of Baluchi independence, though unambiguous in Pakistan’s recognition that the Baluchis would retain autonomy in independent Pakistan. August 15, the Khan of Kalat declared independence (Minority Rights Group International). At this time, the fate of the remaining three quarters of British Baluchistan was already decided: they would join Pakistan (Siddiqi 2012: 59). Sensing military action against Kalat, the Khan finally decided to merge Kalat with Pakistan in March 1948 (Siddiqi 2012: 60). This implied a loss of autonomy; we code this along with the 1947 restriction.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1948 the Pakistani government made Urdu the sole official language (most Baluchis speak Baluch). [1948: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1955, when the One Unit system was inaugurated, Baluchistan was merged with West Pakistan, implying a further reduction of the already very limited autonomy (Wasim 2012; Titus & Swidler 2000: 51). [1955: autonomy restriction]
* Upon the abolition of the One-Unit system in 1970, Baluchistan attained provincial status and was thereby granted limited autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project). However, the government immediately imposed governor’s rule, so we do not code a concession.
* In 1971, Islamabad agreed to negotiations over increased sovereignty for Baluchistan, but then arrested Baluch leaders when they arrived to negotiate. Suspecting Baluch intentions to follow Bangladesh’s lead in secession, Pakistani authorities then clamped down on Baluch nationalist and autonomist organizations (Minahan 2002: 258). Crackdowns are not coded as autonomy restrictions.
* In 1972 martial law was lifted and governor’s rule that had been invoked since the end of the One Unit system in 1970 was lifted. This is not normally coded as a concession, but in this case, the limited autonomy that had been granted in 1970 first became active at this point. [1972: autonomy concession]
* In 1973, Bhutto dismissed Balochistan’s provincial government and installed governor’s rule (Mushtaq 2009: 291; Titus & Swidler 2009: 60). [1973: autonomy restriction]
  + The narrative in the University of Central Arkansas conflict database suggests that governor’s rule was imposed on February 12, 1973, and that the insurgency began three months later in May 1973. This suggests that the restriction preceded the violence onset in the same year.
* In 1974 governor’s rule was lifted. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* But shortly thereafter governor’s rule was re-instated. [1974: autonomy restriction]
* In 1976, the Sardari tribal chief system was abolished (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 577). [1976: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1976 Balochistan’s government was reinstated (Mushtaq 2009). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* Yet shortly thereafter, when Zia took over from Bhutto in 1977, he re-instated martial law and governor’s rule throughout the country. All provincial assemblies were dissolved (Adeney 2007: 114). [1977: autonomy restriction]
  + The coup took place in July of 1977 and the 1973-1977 civil war ended after that (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). Therefore, the restriction occurred before the war termination.
* Only in 1985 governor’s rule was lifted again (Adeney 2007: 114). This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook. In this case, governor’s rule was lifted after 8 years only, making this an ambiguous coding decision.
* In 1999, the civilian government was overthrown in a military coup. New strongman Musharraf introduced governor’s rule in all provinces (Rizvi 2000: 213). The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the chief minister removed. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The traditionally centralist military went on to further limit provincial autonomy (Minahan 2002: 259; Mushtaq 2009: 291). In 2001 the military regime enacted the Local Government Ordinance, a plan to devolve powers to the local (rather than the regional) level (Mezzera et al. 2010: 10). The devolution plan essentially was an exercise in domestic public diplomacy meant to strengthen the military regime. Various provisions ensured that there was no real devolution. In contrast, the law even strengthened the ties between the centre and the local governments (Mezzera et al. 2010: 39). Since the law bypassed the provinces, all provinces except Punjab perceived the devolution plan as a manoeuvre aimed at increased centralization (Grare 2013: 11). [2001: autonomy restriction]
* Governor’s rule was lifted in 2002. This is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* The 17th Amendment to the constitution, enacted in 2003, implied further centralization (Mushtaq 2009: 291). [2003: autonomy restriction]
* In November 2009, the government presented to parliament a 39-point plan for a more autonomous Balochistan, the so-called “Balochistan Package” (Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package). Among other things, the package promised greater provincial control over natural resources and a reform of the federal resources allocation mechanism. The Pakistani parliament adopted the Balochistan Package in December 2009. It was, however, never implemented because all major stakeholders in the Baloch nationalist movement had formally rejected the plan (Grare 2013: 12).
* After the end of Musharraf’s rule president Zardari went on to reverse some of the centralizing policies of his predecessor. In 2010 the 18th Amendment to the constitution was adopted, which devolved authority to the provinces, among other things. Competencies concerning the regulation of marriages, contracts, firearms possession, labor, educational curriculums, environmental pollution, bankruptcy and 40 other diverse areas were devolved to the provinces. The 18th amendment also promised the regions increased financial resources (Cookman 2010) and established the Balochistan High Court at Mingora and Turbat (Rana 2020: 67). [2010: autonomy concession]
* In January 2013 governor’s rule was installed in Balochistan for a total of four months (Butt 2013). [2013: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* While federal in name, Pakistan has had an effectively unitary system ever since 1947 (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). Hence, we do not code a period of regional autonomy, even if Balochistan has had provincial status for most of 1947-2012. This follows EPR practice. [no autonomy]
  + Arguably, the Khanate of Kalat retained some autonomy until its accession in 1948, but most Baluch territories had already joined Pakistan in 1947. Thus we do not code autonomy in 1947/1948.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1947, the Baluchi territory became part of Pakistan (some of it – Kalat – only in 1948). [1947, 1948: host change (new)]
* The Baloch territories had enjoyed considerable autonomy under the British, which was lost upon the merge with Pakistan. We code major changes in 1947 and 1948 to reflect the fact that the Khanate of Kalat only joined Pakistan in 1948. [1947, 1948: revocation of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Baluchis |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Baluchis |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77001000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1947-1973: powerless; 1974-1977: discriminated; 1978-1999: powerless; 2000-2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* When Pakistan gained independence, only parts of the Baloch territories had formally been part of Pakistan. The Khanate of Kalat formally joined Pakistan only in March 1948, thus the group size should increase in 1949. This is not reflected in EPR, which applies the same group size (1%) throughout 1947-1971. We found no population estimate of the Khanate of Khalat. The Khanate of Khalate comprises about a quarter of the Pakistani Baluchistan. Thus for 1947-1948 we use a group size estimate of .0075. [1947-1948: 0.0075: 1949-1971: 0.01; 1972-2020: 0.03]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 255), the majority of Pakistan’s Baluchis is located in Balochistan, where they comprise approx. 70% of the local population. MAR also suggests that they are spatially concentrated in Balochistan. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are numerically significant Baloch groups in neighboring Iran and Afghanistan according to both EPR and MAR, as well as Minahan (2002: 255), who furthermore mentions kin in Gulf States, India, and Turkmenistan. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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## Bengalis

Activity: 1949-1971

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1949, the All-Pakistani Awami Muslim League broke away from the pro-centralization and pro-partition Muslim League and began to advocate increased autonomy for the Bengalis. In 1950, another group, the East Bengal Muslim League, also began to demand that “maximum autonomy” be granted to East Pakistan. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1949. Disagreements over language and the constitution paralleled conflicts over how the government should be formed and who would control it, and it was these conflicts that ultimately led to secession in 1971. Since the 1971 war led to the independence of Bangladesh, we code an end to the self-determination movement in 1971 (Alam 1991; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 35f, 223ff; Keesing’s; Khan 1985; Sisson 1990). [start date: 1949; end date: 1971]

**Dominant claim**

* The Awami League, the most important organization associated with the movement, advocated increased autonomy until well into 1971. The League had broken away from the Muslim Leage in 1949 and began to advocate autonomy. In 1966, the leader of the party, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, famously called for a loose federal system with each region having its own armed forces and currency (six points) (Lambert 1959: 50; Pavkovic 2007: 105). Effectively the Awami League’s claim was for a confederation. This changed in 1971 when the war over independence broke out. But since we code the situation on January 1st, the Bengali movement is coded as autonomist throughout. [1949-1971: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Following the launch of military operations by West Pakistan against East Pakistan, the Awami League set up a government in exile and proclaimed independence of East Pakistan on 26th March 1971, backed up my a guerilla force called the Mukti Brotherhood (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 36). [start date: 1971; end date: 1971]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Bengalis is the Bangladesh state, which used to be the territory of East Pakistan. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Awami League leaders proclaimed the independence of East Pakistan on 26th March, 1971 (BBC). [1971: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD coding for 1971 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). [1949-1970: NVIOLSD; 1971: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* What today is Bangladesh had been a vast kingdom spanning all the way to Afghanistan. Hinduism was the dominant religion until Islam was introduced in the 12th century. Subsequent conquests by different Muslim armies helped spread Islam (Minahan 2012: 33). The religious divide slowly crystallized into eastern Muslim Bengal and western Hindu Bengal. The East India company gained taxation rights in 1757 following the defeat of the last independent Bengali ruler by the British. British Bengal was established in 1766 (Minahan 2012: 34). In 1905 the Bengali land was separated into Muslim (today’s Bangladesh) and Hindu-dominated (today in India) territories. Seven years later Bengal was re-unified. The Bengalis played a major role in the Indian independence movement. Upon partition, the Muslim part of Bangladesh was merged with today’s Pakistan – despite wide support for a united and independent Bengal among Muslim Bengalis. Eastern Bengal was renamed East Pakistan, divided from Pakistani Bengal by a large swath of Indian territory (Minahan 2012: 35). Under the British, the Bengalis had enjoyed considerable autonomy. With the accession to Pakistan, Bangladesh lost much of its autonomy. While federal in name, Pakistan had an effectively unitary system (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). [1947: autonomy restriction]
* In 1948 the Pakistani government (dominated by West Pakistan) made Urdu the sole official language against stark opposition from Bengalis (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 36). This sparked violent protests in Bengal. [1948: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In the 1954 provincial elections the ruling party, the Muslim League, lost most of the seats in 1954. The emerging opposition government was dismissed after only 56 days. Governor’s rule was imposed in East Pakistan in May 1954 (Khan 1985: 843; Pavkovic 2007: 105). [1954: autonomy restriction]
* Governor’s rule was lifted in August 1955 (Let’s Start Thinking). The lifting of a short-term imposition of direct rule is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* After years of conflict, the central government relented and granted official status to the Bengali language in the 1956 constitution (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 36). [1956: cultural rights concession]
* In June 1958 governor’s rule was imposed in East Pakistan (Let’s Start Thinking). Yet, Governor’s rule lasted only two months and was lifted in August 1958 and (Let’s Start Thinking). In keeping with the codebook, we do not code this as a restriction.
* However, shortly thereafter there was a coup that led to the dissolution of all assemblies, including East Pakistan’s, and centralization of power (Heitzman & Worden 1989; Lambert 1959: 53). This constitutes a restriction. [1958: autonomy restriction]
* The 1962 constitution ended martial law but made few concessions to Bangladesh other than that (Heitzman & Worden 1989).
* In 1969, after another coup, martial law was reinstated. The one-man-one-vote system Bangladesh was advocating was introduced. But this cannot be seen as an autonomy concession as it concerns the center.
* After a bloody war, Bangladesh attained independence in December 1971. This is not coded as a concession since Pakistan did not recognize Bangladesh’s independence until 1972 (Coggins 2011: 445).

**Regional autonomy**

* While federal in name, Pakistan has had an effectively unitary system ever since 1947 (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). Hence, we do not code a period of regional autonomy, even if East Pakistan was a federal province. This follows EPR practice.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Pakistan attained independence in 1947, implying a host change. But this was two years before the start date and thus not coded.
* [1971: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bengalis |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bengali |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77002000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1947-1971: discriminated]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.55]

**Regional concentration**

* According to EPR, the Bengalis made up approx. 50% of Pakistan’s population, almost all concentrated in today’s Bangladesh, where they make up >98% of the population according to post-independence figures. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There is numerically significant kin (Bengalis) in India according to EPR. [kin in adjacent country]

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## Pashtuns

Activity: 1947-2020

**General notes**

* The Pashtuns are also referred to as Pathans.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1707 the Durrani Sultanate of Afghanistan was formed, thus uniting the Pashtuns. The British took hold of the eastern bit of the Pashtun territory in 1849, thus dividing the Pashtun territory (Minahan 2002: 1538). The Pashtun lands became a source of continual threats to British control. However, the Pashtuns’ resistance to British colonialism is difficult to see as an ongoing, organized movement for the self-determination of Pakistan’s Pashtuns as a whole; most often, these were rather local rebellions by certain Pashtun tribes.[[1]](#footnote-1)
* The first pan-Pashtun political organization in British India we have found is the Frontier Congress (Khudai Khidmatgar) that was formed in 1929. Khudai Khidmatgar was a social reformist and anti-colonial movement committed to the independence of a united India. Khudai Khidmatgar was strongly opposed to the partition of India, and at least initially did not make claims for Pashtun independence (Ghufran 2009: 1095-1096). This changed once India’s partition became imminent after WWII, when Khudai Khidmatgar won widespread support with demands for a separate status (Ghufran 2009: 1097; Minahan 2002: 1539). According to Khan (2003: 11-12), the first formal call for separate independence was made in June 1947, thus the start date. Since the movement started shortly before Pakistan’s independence, we note prior non-violent activity.
* In the run-up to the partition, the Afghan government had proposed a referendum to be held in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where most of Pakistan’s Pashtuns live, involving the options of joining Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, or separate independence. In July 1947, a referendum was indeed held, but it involved only two options: joining India or joining Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 1540-1541). The vote came out in favor of Pakistan. Khudai Khidmatgar was unwilling to recognize the result given the omission of the options of separate independence and union with Afghanistan. Pakistan attained independence in August 1947. Soon after the partition, when it realized that an independent Pushtunistan is unattainable, Khudai Khidmatgar shifted its demand to autonomy within Pakistan (Ghufar 2009: 1098; Mushtaq 2009: 283; Khan 2003: 12-13). Nevertheless, in 1948 it was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned.
* This did not end the movement, as the Pashtun demands for increased self-rule resumed shortly. According to Minahan (2002: 1540), “[t]he Pakistani government, unable to subdue fully the rebellious tribes, finally adopted the earlier practice of paying local chiefs to keep the peace. Pushtun separatism, supported by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, continued to destabilize the region in the 1950s and 1960s.” According to Ahmed & Khan (2022: 223), the National Awami Party (NAP) was founded by nationalist Pashtun, Bengal, and Baloch leaders, who all were demanding provincial autonomy for their respective provinces. The NAP was disbanded after the 1958 coup, but was revived in March 1964. In 1967, it fragmented into the NAP (Bhasani) and NAP (Wali); the latter was pro-Soviet while the former was pro-China. In 1969, NAP (Bhasani) organized a mass movement. During the 1970s and 1980s, both the NAP (Bhasani) and the NAP (Wali) had fragmented into many different parties and factions.
* In 1972, the NAP formed a coalition with Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). The coalition lasted until 1973. During that period, NAP “moved away from Pashto…Instead, the NAP chose to declare Urdu the official language of the NWFP and assured the PPP’s leadership that it would support Pakistan’s integrity and had left the Pushtunistan issue behind” (Rahman 1995). However, Rahman notes that “Pashto did…remain an issue in the legislative assembly. The fact that members of the NAP took their oath in Pashto and delivered speeches in it, politicized the language issues” (Rahman 1995).
* In 1975 the NAP was again banned and it remained in this condition until December 30, 1985 when President Zia removed martial law, restored the fundamental rights safeguarded under the constitution, and lifted the Bhutto government’s declaration of emergency powers, which had been in effect since 1975. In 1976, NAP members had founded the National Democratic Party, which became “the *de facto* successor of the defunct NAP.”
* The first months of 1986 witnessed a rebirth of political activity throughout Pakistan, including political activity by the NAP. The National Democratic Party merged with Baloch and Sindhi nationalist parties to form the Awami National Party (ANP). The ANP remained active in Pakistani politics by 2020.
* According to Shah (2019), the movement declined in the 1980s and 1990s, but “The call to create an independent Pashtun homeland (Pashtunistan) for all Pashtuns irrespective of tribal affiliations/groupings and including Pashtuns from both sides of the Durand Line, had been a persistent feature of their [i.e., Pashtun nationalists’] politics” (also see Ahmed & Khan 2022: 224).
* The Pakistani Taliban have been active in the country since 2003. 2007 saw the official formation of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an Islamist terrorist/insurgent group which is waging jihad against the “infidel” state of Pakistan. The TTP have set up their own administrations in parts of Pakistan, particularly Waziristan (Roth 2015: 308) where the Pakistani Taliban proclaimed the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan which effectively administers the southern half of the ethnic-Pashtun-dominated Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The TTP’s main goal is the installation of sharia law in Pakistan; however, there are separatist undercurrents. For example, Siddique (2010) suggests that the TTP does not accept the Durand Line which is separating Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2021, Muhammad Khurasani, the TTP’s spokesperson, declared that the TTP is fighting to win back the Pashtun’s autonomy (Basit 2021).
* In 2018 the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), a non-violent protest movement was founded. The group campaigns against abuses carried out by Pakistan’s military and government authorities against the Pashtuns. The PTM has received international attention, but while it is described as nationalist, we could not find clear evidence that the group has made claims for self-rule (Afzal 2020; Kugelman and Weinstein 2021). [start date: 1947; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The first pan-Pashtun political organization in British India we have found is the Frontier Congress (Khudai Khidmatgar) that was formed in 1929. Khudai Khidmatgar was a social reformist and anti-colonial movement committed to the independence of a united India. Khudai Khidmatgar was strongly opposed to the partition of India, and at least initially did not make claims for Pashtun independence (Ghufran 2009: 1095-1096). This changed once India’s partition became imminent after WWII, when Khudai Khidmatgar won widespread support with demands for a separate status (Ghufran 2009: 1097; Minahan 2002: 1539). According to Khan (2003: 11-12), the first formal call for separate independence was made in June 1947. Khudai Khidmatgar was unwilling to recognize the result of the 1947 referendum, which led to the merger with Pakistan, given the omission of the options of separate independence and union with Afghanistan. Minahan (2002: 1540) reports that Pashtun nationalists declared the Pashtun territories independent shortly after Pakistan’s independence. Thus, we code an independence claim in 1947. [1947: independence claim]
* Soon after the partition, when it realized that an independent Pushtunistan is unattainable, Khudai Khidmatgar shifted its demand to autonomy within Pakistan (Ghufar 2009: 1098; Mushtaq 2009: 283; Khan 2003: 12-13). Nevertheless, in 1948 it was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned. However, Pashtun demands for regional autonomy resumed shortly and “thereafter played a vital role in [the Pashtuns’] relationship with the central government” (Minahan 2002: 1540). While Pakistan’s government fears Pashtun irredentism, for the most part representatives of the movement and in particular the National Awami Party have restricted themselves to autonomy claims (see e.g. Khan 2003: 13; Achakzai 2010). MAR describes the Pashtuns as autonomist, too, and so does Minahan (2002: 1542). [1948-2020: autonomy claim]
  + Note: we do not code a sub-state secession during the one-unit system because there effectively was no autonomous sub-state to separate from.

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1947; end date: 1947]

**Irredentist claims**

* Irredentist claims and activity are largely organized from Afghanistan (Minahan, 2002: 1541), therefore no irredentist claims are coded. [no irredentist claims]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Pashtuns consists of their homeland in the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan and the Tribal Areas, but also some territory in southern and eastern Afghanistan (Minahan 2002: 1536; Roth 2015: 302). Following SDM’s coding rules on cross-border claims, we only code those territories within the borders of Pakistan, according to a map published by the CIA (1980).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Minahan (2002: 1540) reports a Pashtun declaration that declared an independent Pushtunistan in the NWFP on September 2, 1947. According to Minahan, the declaration was part of a “terrorist campaign” initiated by Pashtun nationalists shotly after Pakistan’s independence that was quickly suppressed by Pakistani troops. Pakistan had attained independence in mid-August 1947. We found no other source that notes this declaration, but given the quite detailed narrative in Minahan, we nonetheless code it. [1947: independence declaration]
* Minahan (2016: 486) suggests that an independent Islamic Emirate of Waziristan was declared in 2006; we could not find corroborating evidence.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Minahan (2002: 1540) reports a “terrorist campaign” that was launched by Pashtuns against the newly independent Pakistan in 1947, but we found no indication of casualties and thus 1947 is coded as NVIOLSD.
* MAR’s quinquennial MAR rebellion score is 4 in 1960-1964 and 6 from 1980-1984, indicating “small-scale” and “large-scale” guerilla activity, respectively. Yet, MAR’s coding notes do not make clear the exact goals, dates, or casualty rates of these rebellions. UCDP/PRIO does not include either of those episodes. Minahan (2002: 1540) reports that Pashtun tribes rose up in 1960 to defeat an incursion of Afghan troops, which could explain the first of MAR’s coding decisions; as this episode is not targeted at the Pakistani state, it would not qualify independently of casualty numbers, which are not reported by Minahan. We could not find more information on 1980-1984. We code NVIOLSD throughout those years.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code an ongoing civil war involving the Pakistani Taliban from 2006 onward. The Pakistani Taliban’s main goal is the establishment of sharia law in Pakistan, but they have also made claims for increased autonomy (see above). We code HVIOLSD in 2006-2020 while noting that the violence is ambiguous due to mixed motives.
  + The MAR anti-rebellion scores is 5 in 2004-2005, indicating “intermediate guerilla activity”. The coding notes suggest that this is mostly due to violence by the Pakistani Taliban. Yet, according to various annual casualty statistics reported in the SSW coding notes from sources including UCDP/PRIO and SATP, the number of deaths was too limited in 2004-2005.
* [1947-2005: NVIOLSD; 2006-ongoing: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1707 the Durrani Sultanate of Afghanistan was formed, thus uniting the Pashtuns. The British took hold of the eastern bit of the Pashtun territory in 1849, thus dividing the Pashtun territory (Minahan 2002: 1538). The Pashtun lands became a source of continual threats to British control. A key problem had been that the border between Afghanistan (a British protectorate since the Second Anglo-Afghan war in 1878-1880) and British India was not demarcated. Thus, in 1893, the UK forced Afghanistan to agree to a demarcation line (the Durand line). Having failed to militarily subdue the Pashtuns, in 1901, the British created a semi-autonomous region for the Pashtuns, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Minahan 2002: 1539). Waziristan, another Pashtun territory, was not even considered part of British India and thus more or less left to its own devices, though formally under British sovereignty (Barfield 2007: 1, 4).
* The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 introduced provincial democracy in India, but the NWFP was excluded from the experiment and traditional tribal rule continued (Minahan 2002: 1539). Only later, the first elections were held (not clear when, but there were elections in the 1930s and 1940s).
* The first pan-Pashtun political organization in British India we have found is the Frontier Congress (Khudai Khidmatgar) that was formed in 1929. Khudai Khidmatgar was a social reformist and anti-colonial movement committed to the independence of a united India. Khudai Khidmatgar was strongly opposed to the partition of India, and at least initially did not make claims for Pashtun independence (Ghufran 2009: 1095-1096). This changed once India’s partition became imminent after WWII, when Khudai Khidmatgar won widespread support with demands for a separate status (Ghufran 2009: 1097; Minahan 2002: 1539). According to Khan (2003: 11-12), the first formal call for separate independence was made in June 1947. In the run-up to the partition, the Afghan government had proposed a referendum to be held in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where most of Pakistan’s Pashtuns live, involving the options of joining Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, or separate independence. In July 1947, a referendum was indeed held, but it involved only two options: joining India or joining Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 1540-1541). The vote came out in favor of Pakistan. Thus the NWFP became part of Pakistan, upon promises that its autonomomy would be upheld. Waziristan was merged with Pakistan, too.
* The granting of a referendum could be seen as a concession, but contrary to the wishes of the claimants it did not include the options they desired. Thus we do not code a concession due to the referendum.
* With the accession to Pakistan, the NWFP entered a highly centralized system and lost much of its autonomy. While federal in name, Pakistan effectively had a unitary system (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). [1947: autonomy restriction]
  + Note: parts of the Pashtun territories, including Waziristan, still retained a high share of autonomy as they became a federally-administered area, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in continuance of British policy.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1948 the Pakistani government made Urdu the sole official language (most Pashtuns speak Pashto). [1948: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1955, the NWFP lost provincial status and was merged with West Pakistan (One Unit system) (Wasim 2012). [1955: autonomy restriction]
* Upon the abolition of the One-Unit system in 1970, the North West Frontier Province re-attained provincial status and thereby limited autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project). ). However, the government immediately imposed governor’s rule, so we do not code a concession.
* In 1972 martial law was lifted and governor’s rule that had been invoked since the end of the One Unit system in 1970 was lifted. This is not normally coded as a concession, but in this case, the limited autonomy that had been granted in 1970 first became active at this point. [1972: autonomy concession]
* In mid-February 1975 governor’s rule was installed in NWFP. The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the chief minister removed. Yet, Governor’s rule was removed less than three months later, in early May 1975. We do not code this as a restriction in line with the codebook.
* When Zia took over from Bhutto in 1977, he re-instated martial law and governor’s rule throughout the country. All provincial assemblies were dissolved (Adeney 2007: 114). [1977: autonomy restriction]
* Only in 1985 governor’s rule was lifted again (Adeney 2007: 114). The lifting of a short-term imposition of direct rule is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook. In this case, governor’s rule was lifted after 8 years only, making this an ambiguous coding decision.
* Governor’s rule was installed in February 1994. The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the chief minister removed. Governor’s rule was lifted again only two months later, in April 1994. We do not code this as a restriction in line with the codebook.
* In 1999, the civilian government was overthrown in a military coup. New strongman Musharraf introduced governor’s rule in all provinces (Rizvi 2000: 213). The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the chief minister removed. [1999: autonomy restriction]
* The traditionally centralist military went on to further limit provincial autonomy (Minahan 2002: 259; Mushtaq 2009: 291). In 2001 the military regime enacted the Local Government Ordinance, a plan to devolve powers to the local (rather than the regional) level (Mezzera et al. 2010: 10). The devolution plan essentially was an exercise in domestic public diplomacy meant to strengthen the military regime. Various provisions ensured that there was no real devolution. In contrast, the law even strengthened the ties between the centre and the local governments (Mezzera et al. 2010: 39). Since the law bypassed the provinces, all provinces except Punjab perceived the devolution plan as a manoeuvre aimed at increased centralization (Grare 2013: 11). [2001: autonomy restriction]
* Governor’s rule was lifted in 2002. The lifting of a short-term imposition of direct rule is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* The 17th Amendment to the constitution, enacted in 2003, implied further centralization (Mushtaq 2009: 291). [2003: autonomy restriction]
* Minorities at Risk furthermore notes that the central government imposed economic blockades against NWFP and FATA in the name of “counter terrorism”. We found no sufficient evicence as to when these blockades were initiated but the autonomy restrictions coded in 2001 and 2003 should reflect this.
* After the end of Musharraf’s rule president Zardari went on to reverse some of the centralizing policies of his predecessor. In 2010 the 18th Amendment to the constitution was adopted, which devolved authority to the provinces, among other things. Competencies concerning the regulation of marriages, contracts, firearms possession, labor, educational curriculums, environmental pollution, bankruptcy and 40 other diverse areas were devolved to the provinces. The 18th amendment also promised the regions increased financial resources (Cookman 2010). Furthermore, in 2010 the NWFP was renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (Achakzai 2010). [2010: autonomy concession]
* The 25th amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan merged the FATA areas with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province (Cheema and Yousaf 2020). Prior to the 25th amendment, the FATA had been a semi-autonomous region so the merger with KP and integration restricts the autonomy of the FATA (Zubair 2018). [2018: autonomy restriction]
* Furthermore, in 2018 the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was abolished (Ali 2018: 3, 8). The FCR had restricted the rights of FATA inhabitants, allowing the government to enact collective punishment, displace villages without compensation, and arrest individuals without charges (Akins 2018). We do not code a concession because the FCR mostly refers to political repression and not to ethnic rights.

**Regional autonomy**

* While federal in name, Pakistan has had an effectively unitary system ever since 1947 (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). Only the federally administered areas (FATA) retained autonomy, where only a minority of the Pashtun population resides (FATA had a population of roughly 3 million in 1998 and the former NWFP a population of roughly 28 million as of 2014). In 2018, FATA areas were merged with KP. Hence, we do not code a period of regional autonomy, even if the NWFP has had provincial status for most of 1947-2020. This follows EPR practice. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1540), Pakistan’s control of the Pashtun areas has been rather limited, but not to an extent that would suggest a de-facto independence coding. In particular, Pakistan was in control of strategic assets such as streets and garrisons.
* The Pakistani Taliban erected parallel structures in some areas of Pakistan, in particular Waziristan (Roth 2015: 308). However, these only cover a comparatively small share of Pashtun areas.
  + Note: Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) from 2007-2009 established a so-called Islamic Emirate of Waziristan. Some governance structures were established such as courts and prisons in the areas under TTP control in North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Orakzai, Bajaur, Khyberand Swat but they were crushed by government forces in 2016 (Qazi 2022).

**Major territorial changes**

* The Pashtuns became part of Pakistan in 1947, implying a host change. [1947: host change (new)]
* Furthermore, with the accession to Pakistan, the formerly reasonably autonomous NWFP was stripped of most of its autonomy (see above). [1947: revocation of autonomy]
  + Note: the federally administered FATA, populated mostly by Pashtuns similarly to the NWFP, though retained its autonomy.
* While the NWFP re-gained some of its autonomy with the abolishment of the One-Unit system in 1970, autonomy has remained too limited to warrant the coding of a major change.
* The FATA region lost its autonomy in 2018 (Naseem 2022 – also see above). [2018: revocation of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Pashtuns |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Pashtuns |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77004000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1947-1971: junior partner; 1972-1977: powerless; 1978-1988: junior partner; 1989-1999: powerless; 2000-2013: junior partner; 2014-2018: powerless; 2019-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1947-1971: 0.04; 1972-2020: 0.15]

**Regional concentration**

* Though his figures are in part incompatible, Minahan (2002: 1536) clearly suggests that an absolute majority of Pakistan’s Pashtuns are located in Pakistan’s northwest, where they comprise an overwhelming majority of the local population. This is in line with information provided by MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR there is numerically significant kin in Afghanistan; MAR and Minahan (2002: 1536) suggest the same. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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## Saraikis

Activity: 1969-2020

**General notes**

* This movement relates to a linguistic group in Pakistan, the Saraikis, and in particular to, Bahawalpur a region within the Saraiki homeland. The Saraikis make up about ten per cent of Pakistan’s population. According to Javaid (2009), the Bahawalpuris make up about half of the Saraiki population, or about 5.6 per cent of Pakistan’s population. Thus many Saraikis also live in adjacent provinces and some make claims for a larger Saraikistan encompassing not only the former Bahawalpur.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Upon partition, the largely Saraiki-speaking Bahawalpur (a princely state prior to independence) decided to merge with Pakistan, and was granted province status in 1951. In 1955, when the One Unit system was inaugurated, Bahawalpur was merged with West Pakistan. The leaders of Bahawalpur were promised that Bahawalpur would be a province once again if the One Unit system were to be abolished. At a time when it was clear that the One Unit system was not working, on November 22, 1969, the parties of Bahawalpur passed a unanimous resolution to stress upon the government that Bahawalpur be made a separate province. However, and despite the earlier promise, when the One Unit system was ended in 1970, Bahawalpur was merged with Punjab.
* The Bahawalpur Awami Party was founded with the aim of re-establishing Bahawalpur as a separate province and gaining more control over natural resources. We code the start date in 1969, when the Bahawalpur parties declared their support for province status. Since then, there were repeated calls for a separate Saraiki province as well as for increased autonomy. The movement appears ongoing, though it has to be noted that it was driven underground by the military leadership of Pakistan (Abbasi 2013; Feyyaz 2011; Javaid 2009; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 2012; Roofi 2013; SWADO; Siraiki Awaaz; The Nation 2012).
* The movement was ongoing as of 2020 (Birmani 2022; Devlin 2022; Mughal 2020: 294). The Saraiki Province movement gained more momentum after the the 18th constitutional amendment was adopted in 2010 (Asif et al. 2019: 41). The demand for a separate Saraiki or Southern Punjab province is based on the cultural marginalization of Saraiki language and culture and that economic disparities exist between Southern Punjab and the rest of the Punjab (Mughal 2020: 229).
* Note that the movement is divided over the territorial contours of a Saraiki province. While some make claims for the reinstatement of the Bahawalpur province, others contend for a larger Saraikistan that would also include parts of neighboring provinces. The Saraiki self-determination claim regained prominent in 2009, when the World Bank gave Pakistan a large loan in order to expand the road network, but none of the money was apportioned for projects in the Saraiki area. [start date: 1969; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Throughout, the Saraikis demanded their own province as well as increased provincial autonomy (Javaid 2009; Wasim 2012; Abbasi 2013). According to Minahan (2016: 368), independence claims were also made; however, the dominant claim is for an autonomous province within Pakistan (Akhtar et al. 2021: 1608). Since Pakistan’s regions do not have a significant degree of autonomy, this is best translated as a claim for increased autonomy. Note that the movement is divided over the territorial contours of a Saraiki province. While some make claims for the reinstatement of the Bahawalpur province, others contend for a larger Saraikistan that would also include parts of neighboring provinces. [1969-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Minahan (2016: 368) notes that “In 2010 nationalists proposed independence for Saraikistan, to include the Saraiki districts of Punjab, northern Baluchistan, eastern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and northern Sindh”. However, we were unable to find corroborating evidence, so no independence claim is coded. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Saraikis consists of the historic province of Bahawalpur that had existed from 1951-1955 (Roth 2015), which corresponds to the current third-level administrative boundaries of the region. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The kingdom of Bahawalpur, largely populated by Saraikis, allied with the British in the early 19th century, a tie that grew stronger as the Saraikis began to rebel against the Bahawalpur king (Minahan 2012: 284). Prior to the partition of India, Bahalawalpur was a princely state. Upon partition, Bahawalpur decided to merge with Pakistan through a supplementary instrument of accession. In 1948 the Pakistani government made Urdu the sole official language (most Bahawalpuris speak Saraiki). Bahawalpur was granted province status in 1951. Bahawalpur had a provincial assembly, an election commission, a provincial secretariat, revenue board, an independent public service commission, a high court and government’s printing press with defined provincial boundaries and there were more than 40,000 state employees. In 1955, when the One Unit system was inaugurated, Bahawalpur was merged with West Pakistan, though with a promise that it would regain provincial status if the One-Unit system were to be abolished (Wasim 2012). We found no concession or restriction in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Upon the abolition of the One-Unit system, Bahalawalpur was merged with Punjab in 1970, despite the 1955 promise that it would regain provincial status if the One-Unit system were to be abolished (Wasim 2012). However, Bahawalpur had already lost provincial status in 1951, so this is not a change in self-rule.

**Regional autonomy**

* Bahalawalpur was part of West Pakistan (province) until the abolition of the system in 1970, whereupon it was merged with Punjab. It is a “division” of Punjab, but this does not come with noteworthy powers (Javaid 2009). Note that Pakistan’s provinces cannot be considered autonomous either, since while federal in name, Pakistan has had an effectively unitary system ever since 1947 (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Saraikis |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Punjabi |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77005000 |

**Power access**

* In EPR, the Saraiki-speakers are merged with the Punjabi-speakers to the Punjabi group, which is coded as senior partner throughout due to its influential position in particular in the army (the most important player in Pakistan). The Saraikis are less influential in Pakistan’s politics, according to Roofi & Alqama (2013: 158). Also Umbreen (2009: 44, 48) suggests that the Saraiki-speakers, including those in Bahawalpur, are under-represented in the Pakistani government. Still, the Saraikis appear to have a certain influence. Critically, the Saraiki-speaking areas, and in particular Bahawalpur, are well represented in the Pakistani army, which ruled the country directly or indirectly for most of the time since independence (Fair & Nawaz 2011). Hence, we code the Saraikis as junior partner throughout. [1969-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2012) reports an estimate of about 15.2 million Saraikis. Pakistan’s total population in 2012 was approximately 180 millions according to the World Bank. [0.0844]
  + Note: this matches rather well with Roofi & Alqama (2013: 158), according to whom the Saraikis make up about 15 per cent of the Punjabi group and thus about ten per cent of Pakistan’s population.

**Regional concentration**

* Population data is somewhat difficult to get by. We consulted fine-grained data from the 1998 census (see United States Census Bureau). We found that a majority of the Saraikis (approx. 14 millon in total, more than 11 million in the named districts) resides in the following contiguous districts: Bahawalpur (rough estimates of the number of Saraiki speakers in millions in brackets: 1.5), Rahim Yar Khan (2), Muzaffargarh (2.3), Rajanpur (0.8), Multan (1.9), Lodhran (0.8), Layyah (0.7), and Dera Ghazi Khan (1.3). The total population of these eight districts was 16.3 million; Saraiki-speakers made up 69% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Saraiki-speakers in neighboring India, though their number is too limited (70,000 according to Ethnologue). The umbrella Punjabi group in EPR, of which the Saraikis form part, has kin according to EPR, the Punjabi Sikhs, but they speak Punjabi and not Saraiki. [no kin]

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## Sindhis

Activity: 1967-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first Sindhi autonomist organization, the Sindh United Front, was established in 1967 (Sathananthan 2000: 236), hence the start date.
* Over the coming years, both claims for autonomy and outright secession were made. The autonomist route was defended by Rasul Bakhsh Palijo’s political party Awami Tehreek which was founded in 1970 while secession was supported by the Jiye Sindh Mahaz political party, which was led by G.M. Sayed and formed in 1971 (Levesque 2021: 20).
* In 1986 another self-determination organization was founded, the Sind-Baluchistan Patriotic Front (SBPF).
* Several other Sindh separatist political parties have been active, too, most notably the Sindh Taraqqi Pasand Party, but in recent years also the Sindh National Party, the Sindh National Front, and the Sindh United Party (SUP).
* The movement is ongoing (Global Voices 2012; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 521ff, 2002: 1732ff; MAR; Mushtaq 2009; Sathananthan 2000; Trofimov 2008).
* Several Sindhi parties that advocate for autonomy remain active in Pakistan including Awami Tehreek and the SUP (Tunio 2022). Therefore, we continue to code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 1967; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1735), Minorities at Risk, and Mustaq (2009: 284) the dominant claim is increased autonomy. However, Sindhi nationalism took a “separatist turn” in the 1970s and leaders like G.M Sayed began to advocate for a separate Sindhi homeland called Sindhu Desh (Heinkel 2022: 326). Other separatist groups emerged such as Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz which was founded in 1995 and the Sindh National Party founded in 2006. In the 1990s the Sindhi nationalist movement fragmented into smaller groups such as Awami Tehreek (AT), and the Sind Taraqi Pasand Party (STPP) and these groups advocate for greater autonomy rather than a separate homeland (Faiz 2021: 191). Overall, there was a lot of fragmentation, but it seems that autonomy was the dominant claim from 1967-2014 [1967-2014: autonomy claim].
* In March 2014, a “Sindh Freedom March” was held in Karachi under the banner of a Jeay Sindh Qomi Mahaz (JSQM), a Sindh freedom secessionist party, and around 5 million people marched to demand a separate, independent status for Sindh province. Other Sindh rights political parties joined the march including Sindh United Party (SUP), Sindh National Party (SNP), Jeay Sindh Mohaz (JSM), Sindh Tarqi Passand Party (STPP), Qaumi Awami Tehreek (QAT) in support of Sindh independence (Shah 2014). There are still competing claims amongst Sindhi political groups and Sindhi nationalists are usually in competition with the PPP (Faiz 2021: 118). Despite these competing claims, it now seems that the majority of Sindhi political parties have begun to push separatist agendas in 2014. Therefore, we code independence as the dominant claim. [2015-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* Although not a dominant claim, there has been a politically significant claim for independence. The independence movement started during the 1970s as Sindhi nationalists sought to outbid each other. This produced independence claims by G. M. Sayed during the Bhutto period (Heinkel 2022: 326). Sayed was a heavyweight in the Sindhi nationalist movement, who founded the Jiye Sind Mahaz in 1971 (Faiz 2021: 112; Levesque 2021: 20). JSM is noted to have consistently agitated for independence with particularly strong support among university students during the 1970s-80s, but saw some fragmentation in the 1990s (Levesque 2021: 20-23). By 1995 the main group claiming for independence formed, Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM), who have been persistenly active (Faiz 2021: 113). After 2014, independence became the dominant claim for the SDM (see above). [start date: 1971; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Sindhis are the Sind provinces (also sometimes Sindh) in southeast Pakistan (Minahan 2002: 1973). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Sindhis’ quinquennial MAR rebellion score is 4 from 1980-1984. However, the aim of the rebellion concerned the center according to MAR coding notes: “[t]he execution of Z.A. Bhutto in 1979 by the Punjabi general Ziaul Haq further exacerbated tension between the two ethnic groups and led to a political situation that has counter-posed Sindhi-led civilian movements against a Punjabi-led military establishment for control of the Pakistan government bureaucracy.” Thus, we do not code violence over self-determination.
* The Sindhis were involved in inter-communal violence in the late 1980s up to the mid-1990s (MAR). In particular, in October 1988, 245 persons were killed in clashes between the separatist Long Live Sind Front and Mohajirs, the other principal inhabitants of the region. In May 1990 approximately 300 people were killed in such clashes. Since this is inter-ethnic strife, we do not code LVIOLSD.
* Moreover, the Sindhis were involved in the 1994-99 civil war coded in Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). However, the insurgency was mounted by the Mohajir MQM and the violence involving the Sindhis is classified as inter-ethnic strife.
* Since 2010, the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA), has been active in the Sindh province of Pakistan. The group wants the Sindh province to become independent and have carried out low-intensity attacks in the past including blowing up train tracks. In 2020, the SRA claimed responsibility for four explosions that killed four people and in July 2020 they claimed responsibility for a grenade attack in Karachi (Khan 2020). In August 2020, the SRA claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on a rally which injured 39 people (Hassan and Ali 2020). The group remains active but we found no evidence that the 25-deaths threshold was met. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Sindhi lands were incorporated into British India in 1842-1843. The conquered Sindh states were added to Bombay Province.Upon partition, the Sindhi land was added to Pakistan. With the accession to Pakistan, the Sindhis entered a highly centralized system and lost much of their autonomy. While federal in name, Pakistan had an effectively unitary system (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). In 1948 the Pakistani government (dominated by West Pakistan) made Urdu the sole official language (most Sindhis speak Sindhi). There was governor’s rule in Sindh 1951-1953. In 1955, Sindh lost provincial status and was merged with West Pakistan (One Unit system) (Wasim 2012).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Upon the abolition of the One-Unit system in 1970, the North West Frontier Province re-attained provincial status and thereby limited autonomy (Minorities at Risk Project). However, the government immediately imposed governor’s rule, so we do not code a concession.
* In 1972 martial law was lifted and governor’s rule that had been invoked since the end of the One Unit system in 1970 was lifted. This is not normally coded as a concession, but in this case, the limited autonomy that had been granted in 1970 first became active at this point. [1972: autonomy concession]
* When Zia took over from Bhutto in 1977, he re-instated martial law and governor’s rule throughout the country. All provincial assemblies were dissolved (Adeney 2007: 114). [1977: autonomy restriction]
* Only in 1985 governor’s rule was lifted again (Adeney 2007: 114). The lifting of a short-term imposition of direct rule is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook. In this case, governor’s rule was lifted after 8 years only, making this an ambiguous coding decision.
* In June 1988 the center imposed direct governor’s rule upon Sindh. The provincial assemblies were dissolved and the chief minister removed, Governor’s rule was lifted two months later already, in August 1988 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief\_Minister\_of\_Sindh). This is not coded in line with the codebook due to the short duration of governor’s rule.
* In 1998 Sindh was put under direct federal rule to curb lawlessness and terrorism (Minahan 2002: 1737). [1998: autonomy restriction]
* In 1999, the civilian government was overthrown in a military coup. New strongman Musharraf introduced governor’s rule in all provinces (Rizvi 2000: 213). We do not code a restriction since governor’s rule had already been imposed upon Sindh in 1998.
* The traditionally centralist military went on to further limit provincial autonomy (Minahan 2002: 259; Mushtaq 2009: 291). In 2001 the military regime enacted the Local Government Ordinance, a plan to devolve powers to the local (rather than the regional) level (Mezzera et al. 2010: 10). The devolution plan essentially was an exercise in domestic public diplomacy meant to strengthen the military regime. Various provisions ensured that there was no real devolution. In contrast, the law even strengthened the ties between the centre and the local governments (Mezzera et al. 2010: 39). Since the law bypassed the provinces, all provinces except Punjab perceived the devolution plan as a manoeuvre aimed at increased centralization (Grare 2013: 11). [2001: autonomy restriction]
* Governor’s rule was lifted in 2002. The lifting of a short-term imposition of direct rule is not coded as a concession in line with the codebook.
* The 17th Amendment to the constitution, enacted in 2003, implied further centralization (Mushtaq 2009: 291). [2003: autonomy restriction]
* After the end of Musharraf’s rule president Zardari went on to reverse some of the centralizing policies of his predecessor. In 2010 the 18th Amendment to the constitution was adopted, which devolved authority to the provinces, among other things. Competencies concerning the regulation of marriages, contracts, firearms possession, labor, educational curriculums, environmental pollution, bankruptcy and 40 other diverse areas were devolved to the provinces. The 18th amendment also promised the regions increased financial resources (Cookman 2010). [2010: autonomy concession]
* In 2011 the PPP government repealed the 2001 Local Government Ordinance and restored the old commissionarate system. Facing some backlash for this, the PPP introduced the Sindh Peoples Local Government Ordinance (SPLGO) facilitating the conversion of Karachi’s five district headquarters into a metropolitan corporation led by a mayor and introduced a dual system of local government. Sindhi nationalists interpreted the SPLGO as a plan to partition Sindh (Faiz 2021: 167, 169). However, overall, the Sindh’s level of autonomy does not seem to have been affected in a meaningful way; and in keeping with general coding rules, local government reforms are not coded.
  + In 2013 the PPP introduced the Sindh Local Government Act 2013 (SLGA), which centralized municipal powers (Rid and Murtaza 2018: 42; Cheema 2022; Daily Times 2022). Again, we do not code local government reforms.

**Regional autonomy**

* While federal in name, Pakistan has had an effectively unitary system ever since 1947 (Kundi & Jahangir 2002; Mushtaq 2009). Hence, we do not code a period of regional autonomy, even if Balochistan has had provincial status for most of 1947-2012. This follows EPR practice.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Sindhis |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Sindhi |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 77006000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1967-1971: powerless; 1972-1977: junior partner; 1978-1988: powerless; 1989-1999: junior partner; 2000-2008: powerless; 2009-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1967-1971: 0.04; 1972-2020: 0.14]

**Regional concentration**

* Minahan (2002: 1732) argues that the Sindhis are concentrated in their homeland, Sindh, but lost their absolute majority there, and now make up only 46%. Minahan argues that this resulted from a number of different immigration flows since 1947. According to Minahan (2002: 1734), in 1947 95% of Sindh’s population was Sindhi, but by 1951 over 50% of the urban population in Sindh constituted of Mohajirs. According to Minahan, this dramatic change was a result of the partition, which made Hindu Sindhis leave; Muslim Urdu-speaking Mohajirs filled their positions. Immigration flows continued to depress the Sindhis’ share in the province, mainly due to Pashtuns and Baluchis from other parts of Pakistan settling in Sindh. In 1991, another spike in immigration resulted from the repatriation of 250,000 Pakistanis “stranded” in Bangladesh (Minahan 2002: 1736).
* Though rich in detail, Minahan’s account is wrong when it comes to the loss of the absolute majority. According to the 1998 census, approx. 98% of Sindhi speakers resided in Sindh, where they made up 60% of the local population (see <http://www.pbs.gov.pk/population-tables>). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are 1.7 million Sindhi speakers in India (2001 census) and 3 million ethnic Sindhis according to Ethnologue. [kin in neighboring country]

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1. The following provides a short overview of the Pashtuns’ long history of resistance to British colonial rule. Between 1849-1902, the British undertook a total of 54 expeditions against the Pashtun tribes, at least two of which rose to the level of war (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 237). In 1863, the British fought a war against Pashtun tribes to secure the borders of the growing Indian colony (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 237-238). On the other hand, in 1897-1898 local Pashtuns unsuccessfully rebelled against British rule (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 276-277). A key problem had been that the border between Afghanistan (a British protectorate since the Second Anglo-Afghan war in 1878-1880) and British India was not demarcated. Thus, in 1893, the UK forced Afghanistan to agree to a demarcation line (the Durand line). Discontent with the borders had prompted the rebellion in 1897-1898. Having failed to militarily subdue the Pashtuns, in 1901, the British created a semi-autonomous region for the Pashtuns, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Minahan 2002: 1539). After the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, Afghanistan, where many Pashtuns reside, became independent again, though the UK was able to reaffirm the Duran Line. In this context, another rebellion took place in Waziristan, a tribal territory formally outside of colonial British India but under British sovereignty (Barfield 2007: 1, 4): In 1919-1920, Pashtun tribes in Waziristan rebelled against British rule, though without success. Since Waziristan had been outside of colonial British India, COW considers this an “imperial” war (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 299-300). In 1936-1938, Waziristian again rebelled “against potential British rule”, which COW again considers an “imperial” war (Sarkees & Wayman 2010: 310). Note: when Pakistan became independent in 1947, Waziristan was merged with Pakistan, though with a very high share of autonomy. Pashtun resistance to British rule continued during WWII, forcing the British to divert units to fight Pashtun uprisings (Minahan 2002: 1539). Note as well: Afghanistan repeatedly made irredentist claims on Pashtun territories outside its borders. For instance, in 1944, Afghanistan’s government notified the governor of British India of its interest in the Pashtun area (Minahan 2002: 1539). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)