# PHILIPPINES

## Igorots (Cordillerans)

Activity: 1984-2020

**General notes**

* The terms Igorots and Cordillerans are used to collectively refer to a number of tribal groups including the Bontoc, Ibaloy, Ifugao, Apayao/Isneg, Kalinga, and Tinggians. The Igorots reside in the mountainous north and central Luzon areas in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR).

**Movement start and end dates**

* During the 1970s, encroachments by the logging industry coupled with Manila's attempt to build a series of hydroelectric dams activated tribal opposition. Along with engaging in protests, some group members joined the Communist Party of the Philippines’ military wing, the New People's Army (NPA), which was waging an anti-government rebellion. But by the early 1980s, Igorot members began to defect from the NPA, and founded the Cordillera People’s Congress in June 1984, calling for the establishment of an autonomous region (Walter 2009: 182). Moreover, in 1986 the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) was founded. We code 1984 as the start of the movement.
* Following the 1986 peace agreement (see below), the first step toward regional autonomy occurred the next year when the Cordillera Administrative Region was established. Two agencies, the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly, were charged with the task of preparing the region for autonomous rule. Plebiscites were held in 1990 and in 1998 in the CAR to determine whether the residents supported the creation of an autonomous region. However, this proposition was widely rejected by both the lowland Filipinos and the highland groups. In each referendum, only one province supported autonomy. President Estrada terminated the two agencies mandated with helping to implement autonomous rule in 2000. (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Hewitt et al. 2008; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; Minahan 2002; MAR; Walter 2009).
* The main organization representing the interests of Cordillerans, Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), remains active as of 2022 and continues to make autonomy claims (Cordillera Peoples Alliance 2022). [start date: 1984; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Igorot movement demands autonomy (e.g., Walter 2009; Ferrer 2005: 122). No other claim was found. [1984-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Igorots and Cordillerans forms the Cordillera Administrative Region. The region is situated on the northern Luzon island and is composed of the provinces Benguet, Ifugao, Apayao, Abra, Kalinga, and Mountain Province (Minahan 2002: 474, 477). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) code armed conflict from 1976-1986 while MAR points to an even longer period of rebellion as its quinquennial rebellion score is 4 (out of 7) in 1975-1984 and the annual rebellion score, which is available from 1985, is 5 between 1985 and 1987, 4 in 1988, and 3 in 1989-1993, pointing to small-scale to intermediate guerilla activity or a “local reebellion”, depending on the year. We investigated this case using qualitative sources.
* As Marschall & Gurr make clear, the 1976-1986 rebellion code is related to violence conducted by the New People’s Army (NPA), i.e., a Communist insurgency. Igorot rebels did participate in theCommunist insurgency; however, the NPA does not only consist of Igorots. As noted above, our evidence would suggest that Igoros only started making self-rule claims in 1984, when they split from the NPA and formed the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA). In 1986, the CPLA entered into talks with the government and on December 15, 1986 a peace agreement that included greater self-rule was reached. It is possible that CPLA engaged in separatist violence between 1984-1986. Walter (2009: 185) does not report any substantial violence and we could not find any indications in other sources, though the evidence is very thin. UCDP/PRIO notably does not code an armed conflict over Cordillera. Overall, based on the available evidence, we judged that the 25-deaths threshold was likely not met.
* Separatist violence occurred sporadically in subsequent years, but fatalities do not meet the threshold for a LVIOLSD coding. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Igorots were not treated particularly badly; they themselves showed an interest in assimilation into the dominant Filipino culture (Walter 2009: 173). Many Igorots converted to Christian belief. Still, the Igorots have suffered from the status of English and Tagalog as the only official languages of the Philippines. Minority Rights Group International notes that language, religion, and educational policies discriminate against Moros and inidigenous peoples, given that until recently schooling was entirely in English and Tagalog (Igorots speak various dialects of Ilocano, see Minahan 2002: 475) with a Christian-slanted curriculum. Two development policies, both initiated by the center in the 1970s, became the immediate catalysts of the movement; first, Marcos gave control over extensive land to outsiders in order to increase logging and pulp production, and second the construction of four hydroelectric dams, which threatened to inundate Igorot land (Walter 2009: 181). The Chico dam project was freezed in 1981 after the World Bank withdrew its funding (in response to Igorot protest).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1986 the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) entered into talks with the government and on December 15, 1986 a peace agreement that included greater self-rule was reached (Mount Data Peace Agreement). Following the 1986 agreement, the first step toward regional autonomy occurred the next year when the Cordillera Administrative Region was established. The Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) was established a common institutional roof for five Igorot provinces. However, the CAR is not much more than an administrative entity, and did not confer much autonomy to Igorots (Rood 1991: 522-523). The 1987 constitution provided for the establishment of an autonomous government in Cordillera (Rood 1991: 591; Bertrand 2011: 859). In October 1989, Republic Act 6766 was adopted, mandating the transfer of significant competencies to the CAR (legislative assembly, local governor and judiciary, power to raise taxes; see Walter 2009; 188), even if less competencies were transferred compared to what was initially envisaged). Similar to the developments with the Moros, Aquino demanded that a referendum be held. Unlike the Moros, Cordillerans agreed to this procedure, even if some factions campaigned against the proposal since they deemed the autonomy offer too limited (Ferrer 2005: 132). The vote was held in 1990; only a single province voted yes (Ifugao; Walter 2009: 188). According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 72), the proposal was seen as too limited. We code a single autonomy concession in 1986, the year the process began. [1986: autonomy concession]
* With only one province voting yes, the government was left with the somewhat perplexing task of implementing autonomy for a single province (Rood 1991: 541). First steps were taken and the Congress passed RA 6861 providing for the election of regional officials for the autonomous region. However, Alexander Ordillo, a member of the Cordilleran Tribal Federation, appealed against the setting-up of autonomy in a single province (the Cordilleran movement was very divided on the autonomy proposal, see Ferrer 2005). In 1990 the Supreme Court ruled that a single province cannot make up an autonomous region, and that the original CAR would remain in effect (Walter 2009: 188). We code this as a restriction since the rule appears not to have been part of the earlier deal between the government and the SDM. [1990: autonomy restriction]
* The 1987 constitution recognized indigenous rights. These were, however, only given effect in 1997 with the adoption of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (Philippines Indigenous Peoples ICERD 2009: i). According to Bertrand (2011: 860) the 1997 law constituted a major breakthrough, since “it gave [the Cordillerans] legal measures to protect their rights to ancestral lands, exploitation of natural resources, their traditional ways of life, customs, and socio-political structures. Mining, logging, or other development projects on ancestral domains could only be pursued with the consent of indigenous communities.” However, implementation of the act was somewhat slow (Bertrand 2011: 860-861; Minority Rights Group International). Still the act addressed land claims by indigenous groups and thus qualifies as an autonomy concession. Moreover, in December 1997, another autonomy law was passed (Minahan 2002: 477-478; Ferrer 2005: 131-134). The law was, once again, subject to a referendum (it is unclear whether Cordilleran organizations agreed to this procedure; overall, the whole process was dominated by the center, see Ferre 2005: 133, but still, it appears much more consensual than analogous developments regarding Mindanao). We code an autonomy concession in 1997 due to the adoption of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act and the legislation offering autonomy to Cordillerans. [1997: autonomy concession]
* In the ensuing 1998 referendum, only one province voted yes (Apoyo). According to Minahan (2002), most Cordilleran voters voted for the Autonomous Region, but were outvoted by non-Cordilleran groups. It seems, however, that also some factions of the indigenous movement campaigned for a no. Given the 1990 Supreme Court ruling (wherein it was ruled that a single province cannot constitute an autonomous region), the fact that only one province voted yes led to the rejection of the referendum. Autonomy was off the table. We do not code a restriction because this rule had been clearly spelt out by the Constitutional Court way before the referendum, in 1990 (see above).

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Igorots (Cordillerans) |
| *Scenario* | No match/n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Indigenous |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 84002000 |

**Power access**

* “Igorots” is an umbrella term given to indigenous tribes living in Northern Luzon, Philippines. There are also other indigenous communities in the Philippines, and EPR codes an umbrella ‘Indigenous’ group. EPR codes the Christian Lowlanders (Filipinos) as dominant throughout since the highest executive posts circulate among Christian lowlanders and representation of other groups is minimal. Indigenous are coded as powerless, and there are no signs that the Igorots are explicitly discriminated against. Hence, we apply the ‘powerless’ code to the Igorots as well (and extend it to 1984-1985, when EPR considers the Indigenous as irrelevant). [1984-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 474) notes that there are approximately 1.68 million Igorots in the Philippines in 2002. Combined with the World Bank’s 2002 population estimate of the Philippines (80.95 million), this yields a group size estimate of .02075355. [0.0208]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 474), >60% of the Igorots reside in the Cordillera area, where they make up 74% of the local population. This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No kin according to MAR. According to Minahan (2002: 474), there are “sizeable” Igorot communities in Hawaii, but these are below the threshold. [no kin]
  + Note: The Igorots are of “Malay descent” according to Minahan, but they do not speak Malay.

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## Moros

Activity: 1968-2020

**General notes**

* The history of the Moro insurgency is a complex one, and led to numerous peace negotiations, initiatives and agreements, most of which were not fully implemented. The process can be described as “two steps forward, one step back.” The below summary tries to capture the most important peace initiatives.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first Moro self-determination movement, the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), was launched in 1968 by radical Islamic leaders calling for independence from the Philippines and the creation of a Moro nation. We therefore peg the start date of the movement to 1968. The movement is ongoing as of 2020 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996, 2002, 2016; MAR; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019; UCDP/PRIO). [start date: 1968; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Santos (2005: 6), the dominant claim articulated by the Moros has oscillated between independence and autonomy since the inception of the movement in 1968. From 1968 to 1976 when the Tripoli agreement was signed, independence was the movement’s agenda. Hence we code an independence claim until and including 1976, following the first of January rule. [1968-1976: independence claim]
* The signing of the Tripoli Agreement in December 1976 represents a major juncture in the Moro campaign since it coincided with a moderation of the Moro National Liberation Front’s (MNLF) claim. Autonomy and implementation of the Tripoli agreement became the movement’s major claim (see Santos 2005: 7). [1977-1998: autonomy claim]
* After Marcos’ failure to implement the 1976 Tripoli agreement, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) split from the most important organization fighting for Moro sovereignty, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF; see Tuminez 2001: 81). The MILF is more radical in its demands, and aims at an independent Islamic state. After the 1996 Jakarta agreement, the MNLF was significantly weakened by internal divisions and the ‘unilateral’, incomplete implementation of the agreement by the centre. According to Santos (2005: 3) and Tan (2003), the MILF became the main bearer of the Moro movement at least since the Estrada administration took over in 1998. Thus, we code an independence claim for 1999-2010, following the first of January rule. [1999-2010: independence claim]
* In 2010, the MILF dropped its independence claim and subsequently aspired to autonomy (Teves 2010). The MILF continued to be the most important organization associated with the Moro movement after 2010, with the MNLF still weakened by factionalism. After the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 2014, the dominant claim remains the autonomy claim as MILF had been lobbying to ratify the decisions listed in the 2014 peace agreement, particularly regarding the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019). [2011-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Independence was the dominant claim in 1968-1976. UCDP notes that MILF broke away from MNLF immediately after the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and continued to make independence claims independence claim. Minahan (2002: 1324f) also suggests a continuous independence claim.
* In 2010, also MILF dropped its independence claim (see above). However, other organizations continued to make claims for independence.
  + Abbu Sayyaf, which has been active since the early 1990s, has made claims for the establishment of an independent caliphate in Mindanao, and has remained active as of 2022 (Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation 2022).
  + In addition, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement broke away from MILF in 2011 and rejected MILF’s dropping of the independence claim (UCDP). The group joined IS in 2016, but continued to be focused on the establishment of an independent Islamic state for the Muslim minority in Mindanao (CISC 2022). [start date: 1968; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Moros consists of the islands Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu (Gowing 1979: 190-192). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.
* According to the 2014 peace agreement, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindano consists of the western half of Mindinao (not the whole island anymore) and islands to the west and south, and adjacent provinces. MILF has been pushing for the ratification of the agreement ever since, and thus we code this territory as their claimed territory from 2015 onwards (Minahan 2016: 282; International Crisis Group 2022). We code the latter claim using GADM, i.e., the Bangsamoro Administrative Divisions (as they stand at the time of writing in 2023).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1974, Nur Misuari, the chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), issued an independence declaration (Man 1974) [1974: independence declaration]
* In January 2012, the MNLF appears to have issued another independence declaration. By 2012, the main organization representing the movement was MILF and not MNLF (see under ‘claims’), but MNLF continues to be a significant player. Hence we code an independence declaration in 2012. [2012: independence declaration]
* MNLF issued another independence declaration in 2013, which was followed by an attack on Zamboanga city (GMA News 2013). [2013: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The LVIOLSD coding for 1970 follows UCDP/PRIO. Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code an ongoing civil war from 1971 onwards. [1968-1969: NVIOLSD; 1970: LVIOLSD; 1971-ongoing: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Moros have a history of independence and resisted the Spanish attempt at colonialization. However, Moro autonomy did not outlive the American administration; by 1913, the US military had effectively subdued Moro resistance, leading to the abolishing of the Moro’s sovereignty (Tuminez 2007: 78; Minahan 2002: 1323). Before the Philippines were granted independence in 1946, Moro leaders petitioned the US government several times (1921, 1924, and 1935) to keep Mindanao separate from the Christian Philippines, but the demand was turned down (Tuminez 2007: 78). In 1905, the US administration declared all unregistered lands as public land, opening the possibility of Christian migration into Mindanao. Resettlement programs began in 1911 and were continued by the independent Philippines, and brought in significant numbers of Christian settlers into Mindanao. Today, Muslims make up the majority in only a (small) part of Mindanao (Tuminez 2007: 78; Gutierrez & Borras 2004: 7-8). Freedom of religion is constitutionally protected in the Philippines ever since the American administration took over in 1898 (Boyle & Sheen 1997: 233), and some Muslim children were allowed to visit Muslim schools. Indeed, McKenna (1998: 133) notes that one could observe a surge in mosque-building and the establishment of Islamic schools (madrasahs) in the 1960s. But there was a clear policy of assimilation vis-à-vis the Muslim minority (Noble 1976: 406). Minority Rights Group International notes that language, religion, and educational policies discriminate against Moros and inidigenous peoples, given that until recently schooling was entirely in English and Tagalog (Moros speak dialects of Malay, see Minahan 2002: 1322) with a Christian-slanted curriculum. Tagalog and English remain the only languages up to today. According to Tuminez (2007: 80): “[b]y the 1960s, Moros were clearly a second-class minority in the Philippines. National textbooks did not cover their history, and the majority population denigrated Moro culture and religion.” Mindanao did not have territorial autonomy after independence. However, it had enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy with traditional Muslim rulers in power until Ferdinand Marcos assumed power in 1965 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 197). [1965: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In the late 1960s, President Marcos passed a series of laws that legitimized the expropriation of Muslim-owned private lands by the government to meet the demands of Christian settlers and farmers. Many Muslims lost their lands (Islam 2003: 201; Walter 2009: 172). We do not code this as a restriction since the expropriations concerned private land, and are hence difficult to reconcile with our definition of an autonomy restriction.
* In response to the Communist and the Moro insurgency, President Marcos proclaimed martial law in September 1972 (Tuminez 2007: 80; Walter 2009: 180). According to Noble (1976: 411-412), the declaration of martial law led to centralization, leaving power almost exclusively in the (Christian) hands of the Marcos regime. Political parties, including Muslim political parties, were prohibited (McKenna 1998: 157). We code an autonomy restriction in 1972 due to the centralization of powers. [1972: autonomy restriction]
* In 1976 (negotiations had begun in January 1975 upon strong petroleum pressure by Muslim countries), the Moro rebels and the Marcos regime, under the aegis of the Libyan Government, signed a comprehensive peace agreement – the Tripoli agreement – which promised the Moros autonomy in thirteen provinces and nine cities. The agreement respected Philippines sovereignty and territorial integrity (foreign policy, national defense, and mines and mineral resources would be under the central government), but promised the Moros far-reaching autonomy: autonomy over the judicial system, education, administration, the economic and financial system, special regional security forces, a legislative assembly, and an executive council, as well as the allowance of Sharia law. Furthermore, it was agreed to establish a provisional government to be appointed by the President (Santos 2005; Tuminez 2007: 80; Walter 2009: 183; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 197).
* Talks on the implementation of the Tripoli agreement began in February 1977, and soon broke down over widely disparate interpretations of the agreement. Marcos moved to implement the agreement unilaterally and under his own terms, principally by creating two special autonomous regions, one for Central Mindanao and the other for Sulu. Marcos insisted on a broad plebiscite on Moro autonomy (in accordance with the Philippine constitution), which though was not foreseen in the Tripoli agreement, and violated Moro interests because they no longer comprised the majority in most of Mindanao due to the Philippines’ long-standing policy of resettling Christians to Mindanao (Santos 2005; Walter 2009: 184). The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the core vehicle of the Moro insurgency at the time, explicitly opposed Marcos ‘implementation’ of the agreement. According to McKenna (1998: 168), “the “autonomous” regional governments devised by the Marcos administration in the South have been aptly described as “essentially hollow, and productive of cynicism, frustration, and resentment (Noble 1983: 49). The governing bodies of the nominally autonomous regions were cosmetic creations with no real legislative authority and no independent operating budget. They were headed by martial law collaborators and rebel defectors, many of whom were datus and all of whom were absent from the province more often than not, usually in Manila pursuing separate careers or looking after business interests. By 1983, the regional governments had developed a layer of bureaucracy that employed a number of college-educated Muslims, but the great majority of Muslims were completely unaffected by the new regional administrations.” Since Marcos’ implementation of the Tripoli Agreement fell way short of what was agreed, we do not code a concession.
* In 1981, Ferdinand Marcos lifted martial law, and in 1984 the Philippines army began to withdraw from Mindanao to fight the communist insurgency. Still, little appears to have changed as Muslims loyal to the regime remained in power in Mindanao (McKenna 1998: 163, 234). We do not code a concession.
* After the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, the new President Corazon Aquino promised to implement the Tripoli agreement and opened talks with the MNLF, leading to the Jeddah Accord in January 1987. The Jeddah Accord deviated from the Tripoli agreement, and promised the Moros (in line with their demands) autonomy over 23 provinces all in all, “subject to democratic processes” (Santos 2005: 7-8). The 1987 accord set the broad road to autonomy. The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created in 1989, and this time, autonomy was also implemented (Walter 2009: 187). We code an autonomy concession in 1987, since this is when the Jeddah Accord was signed, which paved the road to autonomy. [1987: autonomy concession]
  + The new Philippines constitution, ratified in 1987, did not only set out the broad road to autonomy, but also defined what is meant by the notion of the “democratic processes” by explicitly demanding the holding of a plebiscite before autonomy is granted to a province. This passage was fiercely opposed by the Moros, given the Christian majority in much of Mindanao due to the government’s relocation policies, and can be seen as a unilateral act with the aim to curb the geographical scope of Moro autonomy (Santos 2005: 7-8). This could be conceived an autonomy restriction, but we deem the requirement of a plebiscite too ambiguous to be coded. Unsuprisingly, the vote which was held in 1989 (neither the MNLF nor the MILF played any role in the design or conduct of the vote) resulted in only four provinces joining the ARMM. Thus, the resulting autonomous region was much smaller compared to the one envisioned in the 1976 Truipoli agreement, and, critically, the earlier Jeddah Accord that was signed in 1987, which had promised autonomy over 23 provinces (Tuminez 2007: 80; McKennan 1998: 246). Still, there was an increase in autonomy.
* Aquino’s successor, Fidel Ramos, began new negotiations with the Moro separatists soon after assuming power, leading to a comprehensive peace agreement with the MNLF (at the time still the dominant separatist organization) in 1996: the Jakarta agreement. The 1996 agreement promised the full implementation of the 1976 Tripoli agreement, and paved the way for the demobilization of the MNLF army (Tuminez 2007: 81). Furthermore, it led to the establishment of a transitional Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development in October 1996, chaired by the former MNLF commander Nur Misuari, and finally to the expansion of autonomy in 2001 (Santos 2005: 8; Tuminez 2007: 81; Minahan 2002: 1325).
  + However, once again, the Philippines government did not stick to its promises, and resorted to a unilateral “implementation” of the peace agreement. First, it did not provide the resources it had promised for the Southern Philippines Development Council. Then, the Estrada government (1998-2001), which had initially been conciliatory, began to take a hard stance on the Moro separatists and in 2000 initiated a policy of ‘all-out-war’ against what by then was the most important Moro separatist faction, the MILF (Walter 2009: 192). Waging war is not a restriction as defined in the codebook, but we do not code a concession in 1996 due to the lack of implementation of the Jakarta agreement.
* Arroyo succeeded Estrada after the latter’s removal from office in January 2001. Arroyo initially took a somewhat more conciliatory approach. Still, the Arroyo administration appears to have not adequately consulted with the Moro leaders before passing the new Organic Act for Mindanao, Republic Act 9054 in March 2001 (Tuminez 2007: 81-82; Santos 2005: 16), and the end result appears to fall short of what was promised earlier on. The 2001 agreement formally restricted Moro representation in the central government to “as far as practicable” and “whenever feasible”. Concerning regional autonomy, the 2001 Act failed to grant Mindanao fiscal independence – Mindanao essentially remained fiscally dependent on the central government despite limited powers of taxation. In 2001, more than 95 per cent of Mindanao’s budget came from the central government. Also in other areas, the extent of devolution did not match up to earlier promises. Critically, the expansion of the geographical scope of the Mindanao autonomy was once again made subject to plebiscite. Predictably, this led to only one new province joining the ARMM (the Tripoli agreement, which the 1996 Jakarta Agreement promised to fully implement, promised 13; see Tuminez 2007: 81; Santos 2005: 16). Still, there was a moderate increase in autonomy. [2001: autonomy concession]
* After completion of the peace negotiations with the MNLF, President Ramos began to negotiate with the second important Moro rebel organization, the MILF, in 1997 (Santos 2005: 17). This led to a provisional peace agreement in 2012 (an earlier provisional agreement was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2008), which though was not much more than a general framework. Since the 2012 agreement was rather loose and provisional, we do not code a concession.
* A comprehensive peace agreement was signed in 2014, which integrated all the major agreements signed in the previous 17 years, leading to the decommission of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces and the establishment of an autonomous Bangsamoro. Furthermore, the negotiating parties listed 81 powers in total, and 58 of them were devolved to the Bangsamoro, 14 are shared by the Bangsamoro and the central government (Sabillo 2014). Following the 2014 agreement, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority was founded in 2019. [2014: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1989, the Organic Act establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was adopted, and the entity was officially established in 1990. The entity is much smaller compared to the one envisaged in the 1976 Tripoli agreement, and also falls short of the competencies promised back in 1976. However, this time there was at least some actual devolution (Walter 2009). We code regional autonomy for 1991 onwards, following the first of January rule. [1991-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* The rebels controlled certain areas of Mindanao, but the Philippine government does not appear to have fully lost control (e.g., Mindanao participated in the 1986 elections, and Marcos successfully installed leaders loyal to his regime in Mindanao). Hence, we do not code a period of de-facto independence.

**Major territorial changes**

* In 1989, the Organic Act establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was adopted, and the entity was officially established in 1990. The entity is much smaller compared to the one envisaged in the 1976 Tripoli agreement, and also falls short of the competencies promised back in 1976. However, this time there was at least some actual devolution (Walter 2009). [1990: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Moros |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Moro |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 84003000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Self-excluded = powerless. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.051]

**Regional concentration**

* The Moros constitute a minority in what they generally see as their homeland (see Minahan 2002: 1321), but the threshold is fulfilled if we look at a more narrowly defined territory.
  + The Moros make up a majority in the five provinces which constitute the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM): Sulu (98.32%), Tawi-Tawi (96.83%), Lanao del Sur (94%), Maguindanao (81.73%), and Basilan (79.56%). Combined, there are 3.236 million Morors in the ARMM (2010 Census). The second Muslim-majority region is SOCCSKSARGEN, which adjoins the ARMM and which has an estimated Muslim population of around 2 million. Combined, ARMM and SOCCSKSARGEN make up a majority of the entire Muslim population in the Philippines, which is why we code them as regionally concentrated. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR there are no kin groups. However, according to Minahan (2002: 1322), the Moros are closely related to the peoples from nearby Borneo, in particular the Dayaks (approx. 6 million). Moreover, Minahan (2002: 1321) estimates that there are between 300,000 and 500,000 Moros in Malaysia and Indonesia. [kin in neighboring country]

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