# SOMALIA

## Hiiranis

Activity: 2000-2020

**General notes**

* The main representative of this movement is the local de facto government (Roth 2015: 263). Hiiraan falls within Hirshabelle state, which is home to different sub-clans of the Hawiye clan (OCHA 2014; Kassim Sheikh 2017).

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to the New Humanitarian (2000): “Hasan Abdulle Qalad, governor of the Hiiraan Region, south-central Somalia, announced on 20 December [2000] in Beled Weyne that an autonomous regional government had been set up in Hiiraan”. The aspiration at the time was that “the autonomous government would exist along similar lines as the self-declared Republic of Somaliland”; however, Qalad had limited control over the entirety of Hiiraan and support for Qalad was “divided, even within his own sub-clan”.
* The movement is ongoing. Roth (2015:263) describes Hiiraan State (also known as Hiran State) as “self-proclaimed” and as running “its own affairs”. He also notes that Mogadishu does not recognize it. Mahmood (2022) writes that “lingering grievances from the 2020 political cycle continue to stoke separatist sentiments” in Hiiraan. [start date: 2000; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant goal of the movement seems to be recognition as a federal state (Mahmood 2022; Roth 2015). We code a sub-state secession claim from 2017 onward because Hiiran formally became part of Hirshabelle State in 2016. [2000-2016: autonomy claim; 2017-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* According to the New Humanitarian (2000), there was an aspiration to exist “along similar lines as the self-declared Republic of Somaliland”. While Somaliland clearly strives for independence, this statement is too open-ended for us to code an independence movement. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The claimed territory is the Hiiraan region (see map in Roth (2015:252) of Somalia. We code this claim using GIS data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In the 1880s and 1890s, both the UK and Italy purchased land along what is now the coast of Somalia; British Somaliland was established in the northern third of the country, and the larger Italian Somaliland covered the remainder of what is now claimed by the Federal Republic of Somalia (Roth, 2015:260). In 1960, Italian Somaliland merged with British Somaliland to create the Republic of Somalia (Roth, 2015:260; Minahan, 2016:185; Minahan, 2002:809; Hoehne, 2019:231).
* In 1969, the elected government of the United Republic of Somalia was overthrown by Mohamed Siad Barre and his Supreme Revolutionary Council (Thomas and Falola, 2020:204; Roth, 2015:261; Minahan, 2002:809; Hoehne, 2019:231-2). Somalia became the Somali Democratic Republic, and a dictatorship (Roth, 2015:261). Barre ‘quickly ended regional autonomy within Somalia’ (Minahan, 2002:809).
* In 1977, Somalia unsuccessfully waged a war against Ethiopia in an attempt to annex the Ogaden, an ethnically Somali landlocked region. In the 1980s, the country suffered economic collapse and famine, exacerbated by the decline of the Soviet Union which had supported Barre’s regime (Roth, 2015:261; Hoehne, 2019:232). Barre accepted structural reforms in return for aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); this crushed the ability of Somalian peasant agriculturalists to compete economically, fomenting broad opposition to the regime.
* In 1990, the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the Somali National Movement (SNM) proclaimed a united movement dedicated to overthrowing Barre (Thomas and Falola, 2020:207). In December of that year, USC fighters forced their way into Mogadishu and Barre fled the country in January 1991. The leader of the USC was declared interim president. The country slid towards civil war as a competing faction within the USC moved to counter the new president, Ali Mahdi (Thomas and Falola, 2020:207). After the overthrow of Barre, ‘the Somali state effectively ceased to function as an administrative ideological, juridical and territorial entity’ (Bradbury et al., 2003:456).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 2004, a Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) was formed in exile in Nairobi. While it struggled to gain a foothold beyond Mogadishu, its constitution provided for the ‘right of regions to establish themselves as fully self-governing states within a nominally unified Somalia’ (it is worth noting, though, that ‘the power sharing accords first brokered in late 2004 ha[ve] produced a series of governments, but with no ratified constitution, little consensus on the structure of the government, little capacity to govern, and the avoidance of engagement with underlying conflict drivers by the political elite’ (Menkhaus, 2018:3)). The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), established in 2012, is largely based on the deal struck in 2004 (Menkhaus, 2018: 6). However, Roth (2015:263) writes that Mogadishu does not recognize Hiiraan State; therefore, this does not constitute an autonomy concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Following de facto independence. [2002-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* Roth (2015: 263) argues that Hiiran is a de facto state that runs its own affairs. The start date of de facto independence is not clear, however. According to the New Humanitarian (2000), the separatists declared autonomy in 2000 but had only limited control. Lacking a clearer indication, we code de facto independence from 2002 onward, assuming the separatist established greater control at some point in 2001. [2002-2020: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* See above. [2001: establishment of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Hiiranis |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Somali |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 52001000 |

**Power access**

* Elmi (2021:101) notes that, ‘upon the establishment of the third republic of Somalia in 2000, hundreds of Somalis met in Djibouti and agreed to a tribal or clan-based power-sharing formula’. Through this formula, ‘the four armed clans (Darod, Digil and Mirifle, Dir, and Hawiye) [received] equal shares of 61 seats while many unarmed clans were given 31 seats’. This formula is often called the 4.5 clan-based power-sharing agreement; however, the date on which it was first activated is 2004 (Menkhaus, 2018:3). As noted above, Hiiraan is dominated by the Hawiye clan; however, we deem this movement to be territorially based as opposed to clan-based and Hiiraan is not formally recognized as a Federal Member State of Somalia. We therefore code the movement as being powerless. [2000-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Roth (2015:263) describes the population of Hiiraan State as ‘unknown’. Somali authorities carried out a population estimation survey between October 2013 and March 2014 which estimated that there are 520,685 people in Hiiraan (with 81,379 in urban areas, 135,537 in rural areas, 252,609 nomads, and 51,160 internally displaced persons (IDPs)) (UNPF 2014:25, 31). However, it should be noted that these data derive from an estimation survey as opposed to a census (which was deemed too costly and dangerous to conduct) (UNPF 2014:26). The World Bank pegs Somalia’s population at 13.42 million in 2014, suggesting the following group size. [0.0388]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the OCHA (2014), Hiiraan predominantly comprises members of the Hawiye clan (with members of the Reewin clan also present). The Hawiye clan is also dominant in other regions of Somalia, including Galgaduud, Mudug, Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba (and are also present in Gedo, Bay and Bekool); yet, as this is a regional movement, of Hawiyes in Hiiran, we code regional concentration. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for transborder kin. [no kin]

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## Isaaqs

Activity: 1981-2020

**General notes**

* This movement relates to today’s de facto independent Somaliland.

**Movement start and end dates**

* We found some inconclusive evidence of separatist activity in the 1960s.
  + Hussein (1994: 24-25) reports that Northerners felt disadvantaged after the union with the South in 1960/1961, which manifested itself in the referendum on the constitution in June 1961: the north featured an abysmally low turnout and the majority of those voting voted against the constitution (and thus union with the south). This paved the way for an attempted military coup in 1961 (in the former British colony of Somaliland). The coup, which had “unmistakable secessionist objectives”, failed and enjoyed little support.
  + Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 274) report a secessionist rebellion that broke out in Hargeysa (the capital of today’s Somailand) in 1963, which resulted in several deaths before order was restored in 1965.
  + In partial agreement with Hewitt & Cheetham, MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is four from 1960-1964. However, this code is somewhat ambiguous as in the MAR coding notes it says that “[t]he various clans in the country lived in relative peace for nine years after independence.”
  + Neither the 1961 nor the 1963 episode are mentioned in other sources we consulted. Jacquin’s (2002: 189-250) relatively detailed account, for instance, does not make mention of them; Minahan (2002: 809), Spears (2003), Kaplan (2008), and MAR do not make mention of them either (though MAR codes a low-level rebellion, see above); UCDP/PRIO does not report an armed conflict, nor do Marshall & Gurr (2003) note separatist activity.
* In sum, it is possible that there was separatist activity already in the 1960s, but the evidence we found is inconclusive and insufficient to code a phase of activity. Thus, we do not code activity in the 1960s.
* We do, however, code activity from 1981 onwards, the year the Somali National Movement (SNM) emerged. The SNM was founded primarily by Isaaq intellectuals and, initially, its leadership was based in the UK before its headquarters were transferred to Ethiopia where the movement began making forays into northern Somalia as the political leadership forged alliances with other dissident fronts (Thomas and Falola, 2020:205-6; Hoehne, 2019:232). In its initial phase the SNM remained dedicated to the concept of Somalia but wished to overthrow Siad Barre (Thomas and Falola, 2020: 205; Hoehne, 2019:232; Bradbury et al., 2003:457). However, Bradbury et al. (2003:457) report that the SNM propagated ‘a future vision of a united Somalia […] with a more devolved form of government’. Minahan (2002:809) broadly corroborates this account, though he states that the SNM ‘openly espoused separatism’ from the start.
* The movement is ongoing (Adam 1994; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Jacquin 2002; Kaplan 2008; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996, 2002, 2016; MAR; Roth 2015: 261; Spears 2003). [start date: 1981; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* At the time of its formation in 1981, the SNM purportedly remained dedicated to the concept of Somalia but wished to overthrow Siad Barre (Thomas and Falola, 2020:205; Hoehne, 2019:232; Bradbury et al., 2003:457). Bradbury et al. (2003:457), however, note that the SNM propagated ‘a future vision of a united Somalia […] with a more devolved form of government’. Minahan (2002: 809) broadly corroborates this account, though he states that the SNM ‘openly espoused separatism’ from the start. We rely on the more detailed case-specific sources and code an autonomy claim in the initial period.
* After the ousting of Siad Barre in early 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM) declared the independence of Somaliland. Since then, Somaliland has been de facto independent and has aimed for international recognition. [1981-1991: autonomy claim; 1992-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Somali National Movement (SNM) is the de facto independent Somaliland (Roth 2015). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In the absence of a national government following the overthrow of Barre in 1991, the SNM declared the north-west of Somalia to be politically separate from the rest of the country, and under the administration of the SNM. The Republic of Somaliland was declared (Thomas and Falola, 2020:208; Minahan, 2016:185; Minahan, 2002:810; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:274; Bradbury et al., 2003:456). [1991: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The SNM was one of the most important insurgent groups in the ensuing civil war. UCDP/PRIO suggests that SNM was involved in a minor war against the Somali government in every year between 1983 and 1987, with the exception of 1985, though there appears to have been sustained fighting in that year. We code LVIOLSD throughout 1983-1987.
* Violence escalated in 1988. The HVIOLSD code for 1988-1991 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). [1981-1982: NVIOLSD; 1983-1987: LVIOLSD; 1988-1991: HVIOLSD]
  + We flag the violence in 1981-1991 as ambiguous, i.e., over mixed motives. According to UCDP/PRIO, SNM’s main goal during the 1980s was to overthrow President Barre and establish a representative democracy. Fearon & Laitin (2003) do not note separatism as a motive for the SNM’s insurgency, either, though other sources clearly highlight the SNM’s desire to have autonomy and later even independence (see above).
* MAR continues to code the Issaqs with a rebellion score of 3 (“local rebellion”) through to 2003 except for a single year, 2002. Yet, no other source reports separatist violence involving the Issaqs and MAR notes that “[o]ften the subject of repression during Siad Barre’s [rein], the Issaq took the opportunity of Somalia’s collapse to secede from the state. As a result, the Issaq have largely been able to avoid the death and anarchy that plagued Somalia for much of the 1990s, although sub-clan fighting between those who supported Ali Tour and those who supported Mohamed Hajo Ibrahim Egal did occur sporadically in the early 1990s.” UCDP/PRIO reports non-state conflicts between different Issaq factions during these years, but no separatist violence. Therefore, 1992-2003 is coded with NVIOLSD. [1992-2003: NVIOLSD]
* 2004 saw an escalation of fighting between Somaliland and Puntland after forces of the latter had taken control of the town of Las Anod in Dember 2003. UCDP/PRIO records 34 battle-related deaths in 2004. Puntland can be considered a government actor since 2004 (see Puntland Darods). [2004: LVIOLSD]
* In 2012, there were clashes between Somaliland and forces of Khatumo administration, which sought to break away from Somaliland as it was opposed to Somaliland’s secession (UCDP/PRIO). We treat this as a non-state conflict and hence do not code separatist violence.
* In January 2018, heavy fighting broke out as Somaliland forces captured the Puntland controlled town of Tukaraq in Sool region. Even more intense fighting occurred in May 2018. Overall, UCDP suggests more than 120 battle-related deaths in 2018. The fighting was between forces associated with Somaliland and Puntland. [2005-2017: NVIOLSD; 2018: LVIOLSD; 2019-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In the 1880s and 1890s, both the UK and Italy purchased land along what is now the coast of Somalia; British Somaliland was established in the northern third of the country, and the larger Italian Somaliland covered the remainder of what is now claimed by the Federal Republic of Somalia (Roth, 2015:260). In 1960, Italian Somaliland merged with British Somaliland to create the Republic of Somalia (Roth, 2015:260; Minahan, 2016:185; Minahan, 2002:809; Hoehne, 2019:231). The north of Somalia was dominated by the Isaaq clan which accounted for approximately 70% of the population (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000: 274).
* Thomas and Falola (2020: 204) suggest that ‘the seeds of the reform movement that would eventually coalesce into the Somali National Movement and the separation of Somaliland from Somalia were planted in 1969’; in that year, the elected government of the United Republic of Somalia was overthrown by Mohamed Siad Barre and his Supreme Revolutionary Council (Thomas and Falola, 2020: 204; Roth, 2015:261; Minahan, 2002:809; Hoehne, 2019: 231-2). Somalia became the Somali Democratic Republic, and a dictatorship (Roth, 2015: 261).
* Barre ‘quickly ended regional autonomy within Somalia’ (Minahan, 2002: 809). This would constitute a restriction but took place prior to the ten-year period before the movement’s inclusion in the dataset.
* In 1977, Somalia unsuccessfully waged a war against Ethiopia in an attempt to annex the Ogaden, an ethnically Somali landlocked region. In the 1980s, the country suffered economic collapse and famine, exacerbated by the decline of the Soviet Union which had supported Barre’s regime (Roth, 2015:261; Hoehne, 2019: 232). Barre accepted structural reforms in return for aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); this crushed the ability of Somalian peasant agriculturalists to compete economically, fomenting broad opposition to the regime.
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1988, Barre and Ethiopia agreed to end their hostilities which meant the SNM could no longer enjoy a safe haven in Ethiopia. The SNM ‘responded with a massive offensive against northern Somalia in May 1988’; Barre’s government retaliated with a ‘savage counteroffensive’. The struggle continued until March 1989, provoking a flood of refugees in Ethiopia (Thomas and Falola, 2020: 206; Minahan, 2002: 809; Hoehne, 2019: 232). Minahan (2002: 809) frames the initial SNM offensive as being prompted by the Isaaq’s frustration with Barre’s preferential treatment of his own clan and with ‘economic injustice’. The brutal response of Barre’s Somali Armed Forces ‘turned the sympathies of the north fully toward the SNM’ (Thomas and Falola, 2020: 206; Minahan, 2002: 809). The insurgency persisted (Thomas and Falola, 2020: 207). Minahan (2002: 809) characterises the insurgency as a ‘separatist revolt’. Outbreaks of violence, however, do not constitute restrictions according to the coding instructions.
* In 1990, the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the SNM proclaimed a united movement dedicated to overthrowing Barre (Thomas and Falola, 2020:207). In December of that year, USC fighters forced their way into Mogadishu and Barre fled the country in January 1991. The SNM was taken by surprise when the leader of the USC was declared interim president. The country slid towards civil war as a competing faction within the USC moved to counter the new president, Ali Mahdi (Thomas and Falola, 2020:207).
* In the absence of a national government, the SNM declared the north-west of Somalia to be politically separate from the rest of the country, and under the administration of the SNM. The Republic of Somaliland was declared (Thomas and Falola, 2020:208; Minahan, 2016:185; Minahan, 2002:810; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:274; Bradbury et al., 2003:456). Thomas and Falola (2020:203) suggest that ‘it was only the collapse of the rest of the state into a deadly civil war and its inability to effectively reintegrate that convinced the people of Somaliland that they not only could but should remain a separate political body’. Hoehne (2019:230) agrees, commenting that the SNM initially took control of north-west Somalia not for reasons related to secessionism but due to the civil war, and that this separation then mutated into ‘forceful demands for independence’. Indeed, in 1991, the SNM leadership was not in favour of secession; ‘the guerrilla leaders wanted to change the political system of Somalia, not split the country’ and it was the ‘rank and file of the movement’ which was in favour of secession (Hoehne, 2019:233; see also: Bradbury et al., 2003:457). We do not code a concession if a group attains de facto independence.
* After the overthrow of Barre, ‘the Somali state effectively ceased to function as an administrative ideological, juridical and territorial entity’ (Bradbury et al., 2003:456). Nevertheless, political forces outside Somaliland have largely seemed to implicitly accept the de facto independence of Somaliland. However, we do not code a concession if there is evidence that the centre implicitly accepts the separatists’ de facto independent status.
* The Somaliland Special Arrangement (SSA) was enacted in 2013. According to the government of Somaliland, the agreement enables ‘Somaliland to take ownership of its development agenda’ (Government of Somaliland, 2014:2). Yet, the actual degree of autonomy conferred seems questionable. International Crisis Group (2020), for example, describes the main purpose as allowing international assistance to flow directly to Somaliland. Overall, this agreement was more about coordination of donors and not aspects of self-rule. We do not code a concession.
  + Related to this: In 2018, Mogadishu rejected the continuation of the SSA (International Crisis Group, 2020). This was first announced in June 2018 (https://twitter.com/AbdirahmanCumar/status/1009396237060202498).

**Regional autonomy**

* See above and below (due to de facto independence). [1992-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* In the absence of a national government following the overthrow of Barre in 1991, the SNM declared the north-west of Somalia to be politically separate from the rest of the country, and under the administration of the SNM. The Republic of Somaliland was declared, which has since retained its de facto independent status (Thomas and Falola, 2020:208; Minahan, 2016:185; Minahan, 2002:810; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:274; Bradbury et al., 2003:456). This is reflected from 1992 onwards due to the 1 January rule. [1992-2020: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* See above. [1991: establishment of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Isaaqs |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Somali |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 52001000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code Somalia with the argument that politics are tribe-based in Somalia and ethnicity therefore irrelevant. MAR suggests that the government under Siad Barre was dominated by southern clans. In the first year of this movement, the Isaaqs proceeded to establish their own, de facto independent state. In line with the codebook, we consider the Isaaqs powerless during de facto independence. [1981-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 806), there were ca. 2.6 mio Isaaqs in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti in 2002. He does not provide a figure for Somalia only. MAR suggests a relative group size of 21%, which would correspond to ca. 2 million Isaaqs in Somalia in 2002. [0.21]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 806), the Isaaqs made up 72% of Somaliland’s population of 2.8 million in 2002. This suggests that a clear majority of all Isaaqs – including those in Djibouti and Ethiopia – lived in Somaliland in 2002 (cf. Group size). [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* There are Isaaqs in Ethiopia and Djibouti (Minahan 2002: 806). According to evidence cited by Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Board, the Isaaqs make up ca 20% of Djibouti’s population of ca 700,000 in 2000 and 1 mio by 2020. The number of Isaaqs in Ethiopia also likely surpasses the 100k numeric threshold (cf. Minahan 2002: 806). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Puntland Darods

Activity: 1998-2004

**General notes**

* The Puntland Darods are also referred to as Majeerteens.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Throughout the 1990s, representatives of Puntland had participated in several conferences dedicated to rebuilding Somalia but, when these did not yield results, the people and the political leaders in north-east Somalia decided to create their own administration (Hoehne 2019:240).
* In 1998, the area of Puntland in the northeast of Somalia declared itself autonomous (although not independent) as the “State of Puntland,” with its capital at Garowe. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1998. Puntland declared it would remain autonomous until a federated Somali state was established (Hoehne 2019: 240; Minahan 2002: 1145; Thomas & Falola, 2020: 226).
* Abdullayi Yusuf, Puntland’s original president, ruled until mid-2001. In November 2001, a convention of elders, in a process disputed by Abdullayi, selected Colonel Jama Ali Jama to succeed him. Forces loyal to Abdullayi, who had retreated to Galkayo, attacked Garowe in November, resulting in a *de facto* division of Puntland.
* In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) was formed, and in 2012 Puntland officially became an autonomous member state of the Federal Republic of Somalia. We code the end of the movement in 2004 as Puntland’s claim to autonomy was at least in principle accepted by then and can no longer be seen as a claim for a significant re-definition of a state’s institutional set-up beyond that (Elmi 2021; Menkhaus, 2018). [start date: 1998; end date: 2004]

**Dominant claim**

* The claim is for autonomy (Hoehne 2019: 240; Minahan 2002: 1145; Thomas & Falola, 2020: 226). [1998-2004: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Puntland Darods is the autonomous region of the Puntland State of Somalia with its capital Garowe in northeastern Somalia (Roth 2015). A map can be found in Roth (2015: 252). We code the claim based on that map, using data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1998, the breakaway region of Puntland was formed following a constitutional convention (Thomas and Falola, 2020:226; Minahan, 2002:1145; Hoehne, 2019:240). [1998: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Violence associated with this movement stem from warring clans rather than fatalities from the movement for autonomy, and thus we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Puntland encompasses the north-east portion of Somalia (Thomas and Falola, 2020:226). The Majeerteen sub-group of the Darod clan make up the vast majority of Puntland’s population (Roth, 2015:262).
* The Darod, similarly to the Isaaq, suffered under Barre (Roth, 2015:262). In 1978, the Majeerteen revolted against Barre’s dictatorship, led by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF); Barre’s troops retaliated by killing many civilians in the region (Minahan, 2002:1147).
* The Majeerteen joined with other resistance fronts to drive Barre from power in 1991. As the country collapsed into civil war, the Majeerteen ‘began to distance themselves from central and southern Somalia’ (Minahan, 2002:1147).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the first year we cover in the dataset.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 2004, a Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) was formed in exile in Nairobi. While it struggled to gain a foothold beyond Mogadishu, its constitution provided for the ‘right of regions to establish themselves as fully self-governing states within a nominally unified Somalia’. Elmi (2021:101) notes that, ‘upon the establishment of the third republic of Somalia in 2000, hundreds of Somalis met in Djibouti and agreed to a tribal or clan-based power-sharing formula’. Through this formula, ‘the four armed clans (Darod, Digil and Mirifle, Dir, and Hawiye) [received] equal shares of 61 seats while many unarmed clans were given 31 seats’. This formula is often called the 4.5 clan-based power-sharing agreement; however, the date on which it was first activated is 2004 (Menkhaus, 2018:3). It is worth noting, though, that ‘the power sharing accords first brokered in late 2004 ha[ve] produced a series of governments, but with no ratified constitution, little consensus on the structure of the government, little capacity to govern, and the avoidance of engagement with underlying conflict drivers by the political elite’ (Menkhaus, 2018:3). Indeed, according to UCDP (n.d.), Puntland only ‘officially’ became ‘a member state of the Federal Republic of Somalia’ in 2012. The FGS, established in 2012, is largely based on the deal struck in 2004 (Menkhaus, 2018: 6). [2004: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* See above and below (due to de facto independence). [1998-2004: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* In 1998, the breakaway region of Puntland was formed following a constitutional convention (Thomas and Falola, 2020:226; Minahan, 2002:1145; Hoehne, 2019:240). Throughout the 1990s, representatives of the SSF had participated in several conferences dedicated to rebuilding Somalia but, when these did not yield results, the people and the political leaders in north-east Somalia decided to create their own administration (Hoehne, 2019:240). [1999-2004: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* [1998: establishment of de facto independence]
* [2004: abolishment of de facto independence, establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Puntland Darods |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Somali |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 52001000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code Somalia with the argument that politics is tribe-based in Somalia and ethnicity irrelevant. We code the Puntland Darods as powerless in 1998-2004, given they self-excluded from the central government. [1998-2004: powerless]
* In 2004, a power-sharing agreement came into effect. Elmi notes that, ‘upon the establishment of the third republic of Somalia in 2000, hundreds of Somalis met in Djibouti and agreed to a tribal or clan-based power-sharing formula’. Through this formula, ‘the four armed clans (Darod, Digil and Mirifle, Dir, and Hawiye) [received] equal shares of 61 seats while many unarmed clans were given 31 seats’. This formula is often called the 4.5 clan-based power-sharing agreement. The agreement was first activated in 2004 (Menkhaus, 2018:3). On this basis, we consider the Puntland Darods as senior partners after 2004.

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1145), there were ca 1.4 mio Puntland Darods in Somalia in 2002. Somalia’s population was ca 9.5 mio in 2002 according to the World Bank. [0.1474]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 806), the Puntland Darods made up 86% of Puntland’s population of 1.6 million in 2002, where almost all Puntland Darods resided. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for Puntland Darod communities outside Somalia >100k. There are Darod and Somali communities outside of Somalia, but we do not code these as kin because they have kinship ties to Darods/Somalis in Somalia more generally and not just the Puntland Darods. The Darods are Somalia’s largest clan group. [no kin]

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## Ximan and Xeebis

Activity: 2008-2014

**General notes**

* Ximan and Xeeb is also referred to as Himan and Heeb.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Roth (2015: 263) reports that Ximan and Xeeb state (also called Himan and Heeb) is a de facto state that aspires to be part of a federal Somalia. Shortland and Varese (2014:757) offer support but little further detail: ‘following the creation of Galmudug in 2006 [which was supposed to include Ximan and Xeeb], disaffected sub-clans crated the state of Himan-and-Heeb with its capital as Adado in 2008’. Mosley (2015:12) also supports the contention that there is local administration in the state but does not offer further information. The evidence we have collected suggests that Himan and Heeb agreed to join Galmudug (an existing federal state) in 2014 (UNSOM 2014; Horseed Media 2014; Garowe Online 2014). We found no claims for separate statehood thereafter, and therefore code an end to the movement in that year. [start date: 2008; end date: 2014]

**Dominant claim**

* The claim of the movement is to become a federal state separate from Galmudug (Roth 2015: 263). [2008-2014: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed is the Ximan and Xeeb state in Somalia (Roth 2015: 252). We code this claim based on a map from Wikipedia, which matches the map in Roth, but is of slightly higher resolution: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Himan_and_Heeb>. We code this claim as ambiguous since all map material we could find has relatively low spatial precision.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In the 1880s and 1890s, both the UK and Italy purchased land along what is now the coast of Somalia; British Somaliland was established in the northern third of the country, and the larger Italian Somaliland covered the remainder of what is now claimed by the Federal Republic of Somalia (Roth, 2015:260). In 1960, Italian Somaliland merged with British Somaliland to create the Republic of Somalia (Roth, 2015:260; Minahan, 2016:185; Minahan, 2002:809; Hoehne, 2019:231).
* In 1969, the elected government of the United Republic of Somalia was overthrown by Mohamed Siad Barre and his Supreme Revolutionary Council (Thomas and Falola, 2020:204; Roth, 2015:261; Minahan, 2002:809; Hoehne, 2019:231-2). Somalia became the Somali Democratic Republic, and a dictatorship (Roth, 2015:261). Barre ‘quickly ended regional autonomy within Somalia’ (Minahan, 2002:809).
* In 1977, Somalia unsuccessfully waged a war against Ethiopia in an attempt to annex the Ogaden, an ethnically Somali landlocked region. In the 1980s, the country suffered economic collapse and famine, exacerbated by the decline of the Soviet Union which had supported Barre’s regime (Roth, 2015:261; Hoehne, 2019:232). Barre accepted structural reforms in return for aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); this crushed the ability of Somalian peasant agriculturalists to compete economically, fomenting broad opposition to the regime.
* In 1990, the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the Somali National Movement (SNM) proclaimed a united movement dedicated to overthrowing Barre (Thomas and Falola, 2020:207). In December of that year, USC fighters forced their way into Mogadishu and Barre fled the country in January 1991. The leader of the USC was declared interim president. The country slid towards civil war as a competing faction within the USC moved to counter the new president, Ali Mahdi (Thomas and Falola, 2020:207). After the overthrow of Barre, ‘the Somali state effectively ceased to function as an administrative ideological, juridical and territorial entity’ (Bradbury et al., 2003: 456).
* In 2004, a Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) was formed in exile in Nairobi. While it struggled to gain a foothold beyond Mogadishu, its constitution provided for the ‘right of regions to establish themselves as fully self-governing states within a nominally unified Somalia’ (it is worth noting, though, that ‘the power sharing accords first brokered in late 2004 ha[ve] produced a series of governments, but with no ratified constitution, little consensus on the structure of the government, little capacity to govern, and the avoidance of engagement with underlying conflict drivers by the political elite’ (Menkhaus, 2018:3)). The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), established in 2012, is largely based on the deal struck in 2004 (Menkhaus, 2018: 6). However, Ximan and Xeeb was not foreseen as a federal state, so we do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In August 2014, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia, Nicholas Kay, released a statement in which he ‘welcomed the addition of Himan and Heeb as a signatory to an agreement in principle to form a regional administration in central Somalia’ (UNSOM, 2014). The ‘other stakeholders’ are not specified in the press release; however, it would appear that, according to Somali media sources, Himan and Heeb representatives acquiesced to joining the Galmudug State at this point (Horseed Media, 2014; Garowe Online, 2014); for instance, the Garowe Online (2014) article reads: the ‘Somalia government hosted Gal Mudug authorities, local administration of Himan and Heeb, and the paramilitary group of Ahlu Sunah Wal Jamea in Mogadishu in July’ and ‘Federal Government of Somalia has endorsed central Somalia state after lengthy discussion in Mogadishu’. In mid-2015, UNSOM noted that, since the agreement in 2014, ‘the parties to the agreement have worked towards reconciliation and the political process of establishing an interim administration in the central regions’ (UNSOM, 2015). We found no evidence to suggest that this gave Ximan and Xeeb a recognized measure of autonomy, and so do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Because of de facto independence. [2009-2014: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* According to Roth (2015:263), Ximan and Xeeb is ‘de facto independent’ while Mosley (2015:12) implies that there is local administration in the state. We therefore code de facto independence from 2009, the year after Ximan and Xeeb was declared. In 2014, Ximan and Xeeb agreed to integrate with Galmudug, suggesting an end to de facto independence. [2009-2014: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* See above. [2008: establishment of de facto independence; 2014: de facto independence abolished]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ximan and Xeeb |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Somali |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 52001000 |

**Power access**

* In 2004, a Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) was formed in exile in Nairobi. While it struggled to gain a foothold beyond Mogadishu, its constitution provided for the ‘right of regions to establish themselves as fully self-governing states within a nominally unified Somalia’. However, Roth (2015:263) notes that Mogadishu does not recognize the self-proclaimed Hiiraan state and it was not one of Somalia’s Federal Member States (FMSs). We therefore code the movement as being powerless. As noted below, Galguduug (in which Ximan and Xeeb is located) is dominated by the Hawiye clan (OCHA, 2014); however, we deem this movement to be territorially based as opposed to clan-based and Ximan and Xeeb is not formally recognized as a Federal Member State of Somalia. We therefore code the movement as being powerless. [2008-2014: powerless]

**Group size**

* Roth (2015:263) claims that the population of Ximan and Xeeb state is unknown. Somali authorities carried out a population estimation survey between October 2013 and March 2014; however, Ximan and Xeeb state was not included (UNPF 2014). Wikipedia cites a 2014 estimate of 812,000. The World Bank pegs Somalia’s population at 13.42 million in 2014, suggesting the following group size. [0.0605]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the OCHA (2014), Galguduug (in which Ximan and Xeeb is located) predominantly comprises members of the Hawiye clan. The Hawiye clan is also dominant in other regions of Somalia, including Galgaduud, Mudug, Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba (and is also present in Gedo, Bay and Bekool). As this is a regional movement of Hawiyes in Ximan and Xeeb, we code regional concentration. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for transborder kin. [no kin]

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