# SPAIN

## Alavese

Activity: 1989-2005

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Alava is one of the three provinces that jointly make up the Basque Country. Support for Basque nationalism is comparatively low in this region where only approximately 14% of its approximately 320,000 inhabitants speak Basque (Alavanet; Baztarrika 2008: 18).
* In 1989 a regionalist anti-Basque nationalist party was formed, Alavesa Unity (UA) (Schrijver 2006: 109), thus the start date. UA was an offshoot of the Partido Popular that was popular in the 1990s, when it scored up to twenty per cent of the vote in regional elections in the Basque Country (Schrijver 2006: 107). The party was opposed to Basque separatism and Spanish-nationalist. In addition, UA was “foralist”, that is, it made claims for Alavesan self-government and the set-up of its own autonomous community within Spain with traditional “foral” rights akin to Navarra (Douglass 1998: 92; Nuñez 2000: 129-130). Moreover, the UA mobilized against allegedly “colonial” policies by Basque nationalists. UA dissolved in 2005, thus the end date. [start date: 1989; end date: 2005]

**Dominant claim**

* The main organization associated with this movement is Alavesa Unity (UA). UA was formed in 1989 (Schrijver 2006: 109). UA was an offshoot of the Partido Popular that was popular in the 1990s, when it scored up to twenty per cent of the vote in regional elections in the Basque Country (Schrijver 2006: 107). The party was opposed to Basque separatism and Spanish-nationalist. The UA mobilized against allegedly “colonial” policies by Basque nationalists. In addition, UA was “foralist”, that is, it made claims for Alavese self-government and the set-up of its own autonomous community within Spain with traditional “foral” rights akin to Navarra (Douglass 1998: 92; Nuñez 2000: 129-130). In our coding scheme, this translates to a sub-state secession claim (separation from the Basque Country, an already autonomous entity). UA dissolved in 2005, thus the end date. [1989-2005: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Alavesa Unity is Araba/Álava (formerly solely Álava), which is one of the three provinces of the Basque Country in Spain. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UA members were targeted by ETA terrorism but we found no evidence of violence emerging from UA crossing the LVIOLSD threshold. Hence, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The movement is associated with Spanish-speakers in Alava, one of the three provinces that together form the Basque Country (the other two are Biscay and Gipuzkoa). Spanish-speakers in Alava make up a majority of the local population (approx. 280,000/320,000; see below). The 1979 autonomy statute gave the Basque Country a significant degree of autonomy (Minahan 2002: 287; Minorities at Risk Project). The Spanish-speaking Alavese make up but about a seventh of the Basque Country’s population and thus did not profit that much from the autonomy setting, especially because the Basque regional government has been dominated by the Basque-nationalist PNV (Colomer 1998: 43; World Elections 2012). Also, the statute meant the end of Spanish (Castilian) dominance; Spanish and Basque attained co-official status. However, compared to other Spanish provinces, the three Basque provinces, including Alava, got a significantly better deal: unlike other Spanish provinces, the three Basque provinces retained an elected government and were granted the right to collect and distribute taxes (World Elections 2012). Moreover, note that the three provinces are also the electoral constituencies for the regional elections. Each province elects the same number of seats (25). This is notable since they differ considerably in terms of size; the (generally less Basque-nationalist) Alava has only about 320,000 while the largest (and much more Basque-nationalist) Biscay has more than a million. We code an autonomy concession in 1979 due to the (limited) fiscal autonomy that was granted to the three Basque provinces, including Alava. [1979: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

* The Basque Country enjoys autonomy, but Alavese representation in the regional government appears too limited to warrant an autonomy code. Even if small Alava can elect 25 MPs just like the other two provinces (see above), the Basque-nationalist PNV has governed the Basque Country throughout the movement’s activities (Colomer 1998: 43; World Elections 2012).
* Meanwhile, the province of Alava (where the Alavese dominate, see above) has a certain degree of fiscal autonomy: as noted above, unlike other Spanish provinces, the three Basque provinces retained an elected government and were granted the right to collect and distribute taxes (World Elections 2012). However, the Basque provinces’ autonomy appears too limited to warrant an autonomy code. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Alavese |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Spanish |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 23001000 |

**Power access**

* In EPR, the Castilian-speaking Alavese are subsumed under the Spanish. Despite the Alavese’ small relative size, we found evidence of representation in the national cabinet: Jaime Mayor Oreja was Spain’s Interior Minister from 1996-2001 under Aznar (1996-2004). It is somewhat ambiguous whether Oreja can be considered Alavese. While he at the time represented the Alava constituency in the national parliament (1996-2000), he was born in Gipuzkoa, another Basque province, and at times he had also represented Gipuzkoa in the national Cortes (parliament). At still other times he had also represented Biscay, the third and last Basque province. Still, we apply a junior partner code, also because Oreja, as an outspoken anti-Basque-nationalist and conservative, supported at least some of the claims brought forward by the Alavese movement. [1989-2005: junior partner]

**Group size**

* Alava is one of the three provinces that jointly make up the Basque Country. The organization associated with this movement made Spanish-nationalist and foralist claims, thus we associate it with Spanish (Castilian)-speakers in Alava (we found no exact figures regarding self-identified Alavese). In Alava, approximately 14% of the local population speaks Basque according to a 2006 survey (Baztarrika 2008: 18); we consider the remaining 86% Castlian-speakers. The 2011 census pegged Alava’s population to 323,000. The 2011 census estimated Spain’s population as 46,815,916. [0.0059]

**Regional concentration**

* We found no exact figures regarding the number of self-identified Alavese, but it appears likely that the threshold for territorial concentration is met. This movement relates to Castilians in Alava, and more than 80% in this region speak Spanish (see above). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for numerically significant transnational kin. [no kin]
  + Note: The Leonese speak Spanish. We do not code Spanish speakers in other countries (e.g. Latin America) as kin, mainly because this is a movement by Spanish speakers directed, at least to some extent, against a Spanish-dominated state.

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## Andalusians

Activity: 1976-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* We code the start date in 1976, coinciding with the first party congress of the Alianza Socialista de Andalucia (ASA).
  + According to Roth (2015:77) ASA was founded in 1971 and is known today as the Andalusian Party (Partido Andalucista, or PA). However, the evidence we found suggests that ASA did not immediately make self-rule claims. According to Martinez (1976), ASA held its first congress in 1976, when a decision was made to become a pollical party and, for the first time, statements were made regarding self-rule (‘la autogestion’).
* In 1977 more than a million Andalusians took to the streets to demonstrate for Andalusian autonomy (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 22). That same year, the Socialist Party of Andalusia (PSA) was legalized. According to Jerez Mir (1985:205), the PSA officially declared itself “nationalist” in 1979.
* PSA fought the 1979 general elections on a moderate regionalist manifesto, securing five seats in the Congress of Deputies. It won two seats in the Catalan assembly in March 1980 and three seats in the Andalusian assembly in May 1982 (with 5.4% of the vote).
* Another SD organization, the Liberation Front of Andalusia, was active between 1978 and 1980, when it was dissolved. Between 1986 and 1989, another SD organization, Andalusian Liberation, was active (Roth 2015: 77f).
* The Socialist Party of Andalusia remained the main representative of this movement, and the party adopted its present name, Andalusian Party (Partido Andalucista, PA), at its fifth congress in February 1984. In the 1986 Andalusian elections it was reduced to two seats, but slightly raised its vote share in the 1987 local elections.
* The PA regained national representation in 1989, winning two lower house seats, and advanced strongly to 10 seats in the Andalusian regional assembly in 1990. However, it again lost its national seats in 1993 and fell back to three regional seats in 1994.
* In the 1996 elections the PA again failed at national level while improving to four seats in the Andalusian assembly. The party contested the June 1999 European elections as part of the European Coalition (Coalición Europea, CE) of regional parties, winning one of the CE's two seats. In March 2000 the party regained national representation, winning one lower house seat with 0.9% of the vote (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 22, 279f; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 2002: 109ff; Partido Andalucista).
* In 2015, Partido Andalucista (PA) dissolved (Andalucia n.d.). However, another, organization – Andalusian Nation – continued to make claims for increased SD. Andalusian Nation was founded in 1991 and remained active as of 2020 (Nacion Andaluza n.d.; for a brief discussion of Andalusian Nation, see also: Roth 2015:78). It should be noted, though, that public support is limited; at the 2018 Andalusian regional election, Andalusian Nation received just 5,015 votes (0.14%). [start date: 1976; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The main organization associated with the movement, the Partido Andalucista (until 1984 called the Socialist Party of Andalusia), is seeking increased autonomy but not independence (Hombrado 2008; Minahan 2002: 113).
* The PA dissolved in 2015 and after this the only representative of the movement is an organization called Andalusian Nation, which demands independence (Nacion Andaluza n.d.). [1976-2015: autonomy claim; 2016-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* There are several organizations making claims for outright independence, though it is worth noting that support for independence is limited. The start date is coded in 1978 due to the formation of the Liberation Front of Andalusia, which remained active until 1980 and advocated independence. Between 1986 and 1989, Andalusian Liberation, was active, which also advocated independence. (Roth 2015: 77f). Andalusian Nation was founded in 1991, remained active as of 2020, and also demanded independence (Nacion Andaluza n.d.). The information is re whether independence claims actually ended in 1980 or 1989 is limited, so we code an ongoing movement. [start date: 1978; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Andalusians is the Andalusia autonomous community in southern Spain which consists of the following eight provinces: Almería, Cádiz, Córdoba, Granada, Huelva, Jaén, Málaga, and Seville (Minahan 2002: 851). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No separatist violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* During the Second Republic, Andalusia was set to become autonomous. This became obsolete with Franco amounting to power in 1936/1939. Franco’s Spain was heavily centralized, and Andalusian culture and language was repressed (Minahan 2002: 113).
* In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). [1975: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1978 constitution foresaw the devolution of significant competencies to several regions, including Andalusia. In 1978 Andalusia achieved a pre-autonomous status. [1978: autonomy concession]
* The Spanish constitution foresaw both a fast and a slow track to autonomy. The fast track implied immediate devolution of a comprehensive set of competencies, while the slow track foresaw more limited devolution (slow track regions could gain more competencies after five years; Keating & Wilson 2009: 539; Aparico n.d.). In principle, the fast track was reserved to the historic nations (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia). Andalusia was denied the status as a historic nation. Even so, other regions could also go with the fast track, but under very restrictive provisions, including that fast-track autonomy is endorsed by an absolute majority in each province (district) in a referendum. Andalusia was the only of the non-historic nations to stage such a referendum in late February 1980. Andalusia did not meet the harsh requirements – designed to prohibit any of the non-historic nations to go with the fast track – but only barely so: at a turnout of 64 per cent, more than 94 per cent endorsed fast-track autonomy, and the absolute majority required was missed in just one province and by a mere 20,000 votes. After inter-party negotiations, Andalusia was allowed to jump on the fast track, even if it formally did not meet the constitutional requirements. In 1981, the national government accepted Andalusia’s Autonomy Statute, which gave Andalusia a degree of autonomy similar to the historic nations – the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia (Minahan 2002: 113; Keating & Wilson 2009). We code a concession in 1980 to coincide with the decision to allow Andalusia to proceed with the fast track even if it did not meet the formal constitutional requirements. [1980: autonomy concession]
* In 2002 there was a revision of the autonomy statute (Magone 2009: 195), but we found no evidence that competencies were increased and it seems that this revision belongs to the “tidying up exercises” hinted at by Keating & Wilson (2009: 549). Hence, we do not code a concession.
* In 2006, Madrid approved a new, second-generation autonomy statute, which transferred additional competencies to the region. A referendum held in the beginning of 2007 endorsed the new statute (Martinico 2010; Magone 2009: 195; Keating & Wilson 2009: 547-554; Ninet 2012). [2006: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* 1982 to 2020, following the first of January rule. [1982-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Andalusia achieved pre-autonomous status in 1978, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In 1981 Andalusia’s autonomy statute was adopted which initiated the devolution process. [1981: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Andalusians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Spanish |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 23001000 |

**Power access**

* EPR subsumes the Andalusians under the ‘Spanish’. After Franco’s death, Spain became much more ethnically inclusive. According to Linz et al. (2003: 33), the Andalusians have been represented in the cabinet throughout ever since 1976, though underrepresented, especially in the transition phase. Still, there was also some representation in the initial phase. Based on this, we code the Andalusians as junior partner throughout. In Rajoy’s first and second Council of Ministers (2011-16, 2016-18), there were ministers from Andalusia (including Cristobal Montoro, Minister of Finance and Civil Service between 2016 and 2018 who was born in Cambil, Jaen, Andalusia; Fatima Banez, Minister of Employment and Social Security between 2011 and 2018 who was born in San Juan del Puerto, Huelva, Andalusia; Alfonso Dastis, Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2016 and 2018 who was born in Jerez de la Frontera, Cadiz, Andalusia; and Juan Ignacio Zoido, Minister of the Interior between 2016 and 2018 who was born in Montellano, Seville, Andalusia). [1976-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 109) there are approximately 9.4 million Andalusians in southwestern Europe, concentrated in Andalusia but with sizable communities in other parts of Spain and smaller communities in other countries. Minahan does not give an exact estimate of the number of Andalusians in Spain. Leaning on Minahan, we use a rough cut estimate of 9 millions. The World Bank put Spain’s 2002 population at 41.84 million. [0.2151]

**Regional concentration**

* Approx. 62% of the Andalusians lives in Andalusia, where they make up 86% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 109). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found, apart from “smaller” communities in France, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Latin America (Minahan 2002: 109). [no kin]
  + Note: The Andalusians speak Spanish. We do not code Spanish speakers in other countries (e.g. Latin America) as kin, mainly because this is a movement by Spanish speakers directed against a Spanish-dominated state.

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## Aragonese

Activity: 1978-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Aragonese Regionalist Party (renamed the Aragonese Party in 1990) was founded in January 1978 (start date). It advocates Aragonese autonomy.
* The Spanish government granted a statute of autonomy on 10 August 1982. The movement is ongoing, as the ARP is campaigning for a greater degree of autonomy.
* In 1986, a second Aragonese nationalist party was formed, the Chunta Aragonesista (Chunta Aragonesista; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 2002: 163ff).
* Furthermore, Estau Aragones was founded in 2006 and, the following year, merged with other independentist parties to form a coalition: the Independentist Bloc of the Left (BIC) (Roth, 2015:78). [start date: 1978; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Minahan (2002: 167) mentions only claims for internal autonomy whereas Minahan (2016: 35) also reports demands for outright independence. The evidence we found suggests that the autonomy claim is dominant. For example, a statement released by the Aragonese Party in 2017 spoke of the need for an increased level of self-government as opposed to independence (Partido Aragones, n.d.). [1978-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There is an independence movement, but according to Roth (2015: 78), it is “quite small and marginal”. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Aragonese Party is the current autonomous community of Aragón in Spain, which is composed of the three provinces Huesca, Zaragoza, and Teruel (Minahan 2002: 163). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found, and thus the movement is coded NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Aragon historically had been a separate kingdom, but was incorporated into Spain. Under Franco (1936-1975), Spain underwent a heavily centralized period, and Aragon had no autonomy (Minahan 2002: 163).
* In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). [1975: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1978 constitution foresaw the devolution of significant competencies to autonomous communities, including Aragon. In 1978 Aragon achieved a pre-autonomous status. In 1982, Aragon’s Autonomy Statute went into force, initiating the devolution of some competencies from Madrid, including legislative powers (Minahan 2002: 166; Keating & Wilson 2009). We code a single autonomy concession in 1978 to coincide with the adoption of the Spanish constitution. [1978: autonomy concession]
  + Note that the Spanish constitution foresaw both a fast and a slow track to autonomy. The fast track implied immediate devolution of a comprehensive set of competencies. In principle, the fast track was reserved to the historic nations (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia); other regions could also go with the fast track, but under very restrictive provisions that are basically impossible to meet. Andalusia still managed to jump on the fast track, though formally it did not meet the requirements (a referendum was required in which in all provinces an absolute majority votes in favor – in one province, the absolute majority was missed by a mere 20,000 votes and after inter-party negotiations was allowed to proceed with the fast track anyway). Aragon, along with the other non-historic nations (except for Andalusia) had to go with the slow track. Slow track regions were devolved a more limited set of competencies, but after five years they could gain more (Keating & Wilson 2009: 539; Aparico n.d.). Hence, devolution in Spain was asymmetrical.
* In the second half of the 1980s, many of the slow-route autonomous communities (such as Aragon), which had considerably fewer competencies than the fast-route communities (such as Catalonia or the Basque Country), began to demand that additional powers be transferred to them, as they had been promised earlier on. Initially Madrid was unwilling to devolve further competencies. However, in 1992, the second “autonomy pact” was struck, which foresaw the devolution of additional competencies to slow-route communities, in particular health care and education. The intention was to make Spain’s federal set-up symmetric (Aparico n.d.; Keating & Wilson 2009: 540). Following this compromise, in 1994, Madrid approved a new autonomy statute, which gave Aragon increased competencies (Magone 2009: 195). We code a single concession in 1992 because the 1994 revision was an outflow of the 1992 deal. [1992: autonomy concession]
* In 1996, Aragon’s autonomy statute was revised again (Magone 2009: 195). It is not fully clear whether the region’s competencies were actually increased, and the fact that the new statute was passed only two years after the last makes us suspect that this revision was one of the “tidying up exercises” hinged at by Keating & Wilson (2009: 549). Hence, we do not code a concession.
* In 2007, Madrid approved Aragon’s new, second-generation autonomy statute, which transferred additional competencies to the region and provided for the protection of the Aragonese languge (Martinico 2010; Magone 2009: 195; Keating & Wilson 2009: 547-554). [2007: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* 1983 to 2020, following the first of January rule. [1983-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Aragon achieved pre-autonomous status in 1978, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In 1982 Aragon’s autonomy statute went into force, which initiated the devolution process. [1982: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Aragonese |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Spanish |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 23001000 |

**Power access**

* In EPR, the Aragonese are subsumed under the Spanish. According to Linz et al. (2003: 33) the Aragonese were not represented in the transition cabinet while 3.1% of ministers between 1979 and 2001 were from Aragon, which signals a slight underrepresentation relative to Aragon’s population share of ca. 4.5%.
* We found only one minister from Aragon in the 2001-2020 period – Roman Escolano Olivares who held the post of Minister of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness for a period of three months between March 2018 and June 2018. As Olivares was in office for a mere three months, we code the Aragonese as powerless in the 21st century.
  + Note: we also found no evidence for Aragonese representation in the cabinet in 2000-2004, and therefore change the code to “powerless” from 2001.
* [1978: powerless; 1979-2000: junior partner; 2001-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 163), there are about 2.05 million Aragonese in Europe, with most in Aragon itself. He does not give a more exact number of the number of Aragonese in Spain itself. We use a rough cut figure of 1.9 million. The World Bank pegs Spain’s at 41.84 million in 2002. [0.0454]

**Regional concentration**

* Approx. 60% of the Aragonese lives in Aragon, where they make up 93% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 163). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]
  + Note: The Aragonese tend to speak Spanish. We do not code Spanish speakers in other countries (e.g. Latin America) as kin, mainly because this is a movement by Spanish speakers directed against a Spanish-dominated state.

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## Aranese

Activity: 1978-2020

**General notes**

* The Aranese are a small linguistic minority in northern Catalonia that speaks Aranese, a dialect of Occitan (4,700 native speakers in 2001). The Aran Valley is the only region left where Occitan-speakers dominate. The Aranese have their own nationalist movement that makes claims for increased self-government and self-determination – most often, it seems (though this would profit from more research), within Catalonia, but there have also been claims for the establishment of an Aran autonomous community separate from Catalonia.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first nationalist organization we found is Es Terçons, which was formed in 1978 to lobby for a special status for Aran in Catalonia’s Autonomy Statute. Thus, 1978 is coded as start date.
* The movement is ongoing. In 1980, Unity of Aran was formed, an autonomist party that is in a coalition with the Socialist Party of Catalonia. Another relevant organization is the Aranese Democratic Convergence (formerly the Aranese Nationalist Party), an offshoot of Catalonia’s Democratic Convergence. Esquerra Republicana, the Catalan independentist party, also has an offshoot in Aran since 2008 that is dedicated to Occitan nationalism (CAN 2015; Convergencia Aranesa; Nationalia 2015; Suils & Huguet 2001; Unitat d’Aran).
* In 2017, the Deputy Mayor of Aran’s capital, Vielha, threatened to break away from Catalonia if the region secured independence and, during this time, the valley’s politicians claimed that “holding their own referendum could be the only way to defend the local economy” (Berwick 2017; see also: Hansen 2018). [start date: 1978; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Aranese nationalist movement makes claims for increased self-government and self-determination – most often, it seems (though this would profit from more research), within Catalonia, but there have also been claims for the establishment of an Aran autonomous community separate from Catalonia. [1978-2020: autonomy claim]
  + The first nationalist organization we have found is Es Terçons, which was formed in 1978 to lobby for a special status for Aran in Catalonia’s Autonomy Statute (Unitat d’Aran).
  + In 1980, Unity of Aran was formed, an autonomist party that is in a coalition with the Socialist Party of Catalonia (Unitat d’Aran). The website of the Unity of Aran calls for autonomy (autonomia) and self-government (autogovèrn) (Unitat d’Aran 2022).
  + Another important organization is the Aranese Democratic Convergence (formerly the Aranese Nationalist Party), an offshoot of Catalonia’s Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Aranesa). Esquerra Republicana, the Catalan independentist party, also has an offshoot in Aran since 2008 that is dedicated to Occitan nationalism.

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Aranese claims concern the Aran Valley, an area within northern Catalonia in the Lleida province. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of separatist violence, thus a NVIOLSD code for the entire movement. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Under Franco, Spain underwent a highly centralized period. The official use of languages other than Spanish (Castilian) was banned (e.g. Minahan 2002: 163, 407; Encyclopedia Britannica; Minority Rights Group International).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Catalonia’s 1979 autonomy statute gave Aran a special status within Catalonia. In particular, it foresaw special protection of the Aran language, including in education. [1979: cultural rights concession]
* In 1983 the Catalan Parliament recognized Aranese as Aran’s official language (Jordi & Huguet 2001: 144). [1983: cultural rights concession]
* In 1990 the Arran Valley attained a very limited extent of self-rule (CAN 2015). Critically, the 1990 law made Aranese a school subject and the “language of common usage in the public documents of the town councils and the *Conselh Generau*” (Jordi & Huguet 2001: 145). No legislative powers were devolved (Nationalia 2015). We code a cultural rights concession but no autonomy concession, given that the nature of the self-rule conferred to Aran was very limited. [1990: cultural rights concession]
* The Arran Valley was granted further concessions with Catalonia’s new 2006 Autonomy Statute, as a result of which Aranese became Catalonia’s third official language in 2010 (CAN 2015). [2006: cultural rights concession]
* In January 2015, the Catalan Parliament recognized the Aran Valley’s special status including a special status over areas such as education, health, culture, and local government. Furthermore, the law recognized the Valley’s right to decide its future relations with Spain separately from the rest of Catalonia (CAN 2015). However, the local government still lacks legislative powers (Nationalia 2015). [2015: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Despite some concessions, the Aranese local government still lacks legislative powers (Nationalia 2015). Thus, we do not code a major territorial change.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Aranese |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence of representation in the national cabinet. [powerless]

**Group size**

* In 2001, there were 4,700 Aranese-speakers in Aran (Conselh Generau d’Aran 2001, but Spanish speakers in the region commonly also self-identify as Aranese (Suils & Huguet 2001: 152-154). Ethnologue puts the total ethnic population at 5,550 (1991). Spain’s population in 1991 was approx. 39 million. [0.0001]

**Regional concentration**

* The Aran Valley is the only region left where a majority is able to speak Occitan; figures from the 1980s suggest approx. 80% of the population are able to speak Aranese, and that approx. 60% use it in their daily lifes (Suils & Huguet 2001: 145). The share may have decreased in recent years because knowledge of Aranese was lower among younger cohorts. However, it is common even among Spanish speakers in the region to self-identify as Aranese (Suils & Huguet 2001: 152-154). Ethnologue estimate the ethnic population at 5,550 (1991), and suggests that the vast majority of self-identified Aranese lives in the Aran Valley. In 1996, the Valley’s total population was approx. 7,100, suggesting that the threshold for territorial concentration is met. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Aran is a dialect of Occitan, thus we code France’s Occitans as ethnic kin (>10 million according to Minahan 2002: 1438). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Asturians

Activity: 1976-2020

**General notes**

* Asturia is a region in northwestern Spain.

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (2002: 213-214) the Asturians had strong separatist tendencies in the 1930s which, however, were quickly suppressed.
* After Franco’s death in 1975, the Asturian nationalist movement re-emerged. According to Zimmerman (2012: 25) the first nationalist organization was Conceyu Bable, a cultural organization formed in 1974 and legalized in 1976. However, it appears that Conceyu Bable’s claims were primarily focused on language rights, at least initially. The Conceyu Nacionalista Astur (CNA), an Asturian party that openly advocated separatism, grew out of Conceyu Bable in 1976. The CNA made “self-determination for Asturias the party’s central goal”, advocating autonomy for Asturias within or even outside of Spain (Zimmerman 2012: 26). Since this is the first clear-cut evidence of organized separatist activity, 1976 is coded as the start date.
* In 1981 the Asturians were granted an autonomy statute, though Asturia received less autonomy compared to Andalusia and the three ‘historic’ nations, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia (Minahan 2002; Zimmerman 2012: 34). The CNA disbanded in 1981 and no separatist party fought the 1982 elections (Zimmerman 2012: 32). However, soon thereafter the CNA’s successor party, the Ensame Nacionaliste Astur was formed (Zimmerman 2012: 32). We do not code an interruption in activity based on the ten-years rule.
* In 1985, the Asturian Party (PAS) was formed, a nationalist party aiming to reform Asturia’s autonomy statute so that Asturia gains increased self-government, recognition as a historic nation and official status for the Asturian language.
* Andecha Astur, another nationalist party, was formed in 1990.
* Minahan (2002: 215) reports that “[t]he Asturian Party (PAS), the largest of the regional political organizations, has gained widespread support for its campaign to win greater self-government for Austrians. The party has elected members to the national legislature, local mayors in Asturian municipalities, and many members of regional and local councils. The Asturians seek the same rights as the neighboring region of Galicia, which has been granted greater autonomy within Spain, along with the regions of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Andalusia.” According to Minahan (2002: 215) the Asturian language was given an official status in 1998 but it did not become an official language.
* The PAS, the Andecha Astur, and other nationalist organizations continued to be active in Asturia as of 2020 (cf. Roth 2015: 80). Furthermore, Minahan (2016:47) contends that ‘continuing economic problems, threats to the culture, and the need to emigrate keeps nationalism alive, particularly among the influential diaspora’. [start date: 1976; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The first openly separatist organization was Conceyu Nacionalista Astur (CNA). The CNA made “self-determination for Asturias the party’s central goal”, advocating autonomy for Asturias within or even outside of Spain (Zimmerman 2012: 26). It appears that autonomy was the central or dominant goal.
* Autonomy appears to have remained the movement’s dominant goal throughout. The CNA disbanded in 1981 and no separatist party fought the 1982 elections (Zimmerman 2012: 32). However, soon thereafter the CNA’s successor party, the Ensame Nacionaliste Astur was formed (Zimmerman 2012: 32).
* In 1985, the Asturian Party (PAS) was formed, a nationalist party aiming at a reform of Asturia’s autonomy statute that would give Asturias increased self-government, recognition as a historic nation and official status for the Asturian language. Andecha Astur, another nationalist party, was formed in 1990.
* Minahan (2002: 215) reports that “[t]he Asturian Party (PAS), the largest of the regional political organizations, has gained widespread support for its campaign to win greater self-government for Austrians. The party has elected members to the national legislature, local mayors in Asturian municipalities, and many members of regional and local councils. The Asturians seek the same rights as the neighboring region of Galicia, which has been granted greater autonomy within Spain, along with the regions of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Andalusia.”
* Claims for outright independence have also been made, but they claims for independence are relatively marginal (Roth 2015: 80). [1976-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There is an independence movement, but according to Roth (2015: 80), it is “quite small and marginal”. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Asturians claims concern the autonomous community Asturia in northwestern Spain, the Principado de Asturias. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There has been some separatist violence (Zimmerman 2012) but not above the low-level violence threshold. Thus, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Under Franco (1936-1975), Spain underwent a heavily centralized period (e.g. Minahan 2002: 163). In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). [1975: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1978 constitution foresaw the devolution of significant competencies to autonomous communities, including Asturias. In 1978 Asturias achieved a pre-autonomous status. In late December 1981 the Asturians were granted an autonomy statute, though Asturia received less autonomy compared to Andalusia and the three ‘historic’ nations, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia (Minahan 2002; Zimmerman 2012: 34; Rodriguez n.d.). January 11, 1982, Asturia’s Autonomy Statute went into force, initiating the devolution of some competencies from Madrid, including legislative powers (Keating & Wilson 2009). We code a single autonomy concession in 1978 to coincide with the adoption of the Spanish constitution. [1978: autonomy concession]
  + Note that the Spanish constitution foresaw both a fast and a slow track to autonomy. The fast track implied immediate devolution of a comprehensive set of competencies. In principle, the fast track was reserved to the historic nations (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia); other regions could also go with the fast track, but under very restrictive provisions that are basically impossible to meet. Andalusia still managed to jump on the fast track, though formally it did not meet the requirements (a referendum was required in which in all provinces an absolute majority votes in favor – in one province, the absolute majority was missed by a mere 20,000 votes and after inter-party negotiations was allowed to proceed with the fast track anyway). Asturias, along with the other non-historic nations (except for Andalusia) had to go with the slow track. Slow track regions were devolved a more limited set of competencies, but after five years they could gain more (Keating & Wilson 2009: 539; Aparico n.d.). Hence, devolution in Spain was asymmetrical.
* In the second half of the 1980s, many of the slow-route autonomous communities (such as Asturias), which had considerably fewer competencies than the fast-route communities (such as Catalonia or the Basque Country), began to demand that additional powers be transferred to them, as they had been promised earlier on. Initially Madrid was unwilling to devolve further competencies. However, in 1992, the second “autonomy pact” was struck, which foresaw the devolution of additional competencies to slow-route communities, in particular health care and education. The intention was to make Spain’s federal set-up symmetric (Aparico n.d.; Keating & Wilson 2009: 540). Following this compromise, in 1994, Madrid approved a new autonomy statute, which gave Asturias increased competencies (Magone 2009: 195). We code a single concession in 1992 because the 1994 revision was an outflow of the 1992 deal. [1992: autonomy concession]
* In 1991 and 1999, there were two further revisions of Asturias’ autonomy statute (Magone 2009: 195), but we found no evidence suggesting that Asturias’ autonomy was significantly improved by either of these revisions. It appears that these revisions belong to the “tidying up exercises” hinged at by Keating & Wilson (2009: 549). Hence, we do not code a concession.
* According to Minahan (2002: 215) the Asturian language was given an official status in 1998 but it did not become an official language. This appears to be an action by Asturias’ regional government. Language protection tends to be part of the autonomous statute legislation, which is already coded (see above). Thus, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* 1983 to 2012, following the first of January rule. [1983-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Asturias achieved pre-autonomous status in 1978, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In late December 1981 the Asturians were granted an autonomy statute (Minahan 2002; Zimmerman 2012: 34; Rodriguez n.d.). January 11, 1982, Asturia’s Autonomy Statute went into force, initiating the devolution of some competencies from Madrid, including legislative powers (Keating & Wilson 2009). [1982: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Asturians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Spanish |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 23001000 |

**Power access**

* In EPR, the Asturians are subsumed under the Spanish. According to Linz et al. (2003: 33), Asturias has been well represented in Spain’s cabinet, especially under Franco and during the transition to democracy. While the number of ministers from Asturias has decreased since the transition, Asturias has remained overrepresented with about 4% of all ministers between 1979 and 2001 (Linz et al. 2003: 33).
* We could not find evidence for Asturian representation in the national cabinet between 2000 and 2018, when Maria Luisa Carcedo became Minister of Health, Consumer Affairs and Social. Carcedo remained in post until 2020 and was born in Santa Barbara, Asturias. [1976-2000: junior partner; 2001-2018: powerless; 2019-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 211), there are approximately 925,000 Asturians in Spain. This matches with Rodriguez (n.d.), who reports an estimate of Asturias’ population of a bit less than 1.1 million. We draw on Minahan’s figure. The World Bank pegs Spain’s at 41.84 million in 2002. [0.0221]

**Regional concentration**

* Approx. 80% of the Asturians lives in Asturia, where they make up 68% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 211). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]
  + Note: Most Asturians speak Spanish. We do not code Spanish speakers in other countries (e.g. Latin America) as kin, mainly because this is a movement by Spanish speakers directed against a Spanish-dominated state.

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## Basques

Activity: 1959-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (2002: 286), Basque nationalism grew in the 1850s and 1860s in the context of increased centralization, though he does not give clear evidence of organized activity.
* The first evidence of organized activity we found comes with the foundation of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV – Basque National Party) in 1895 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 39, 234).
* The Basques won their first major concession – the Basque statute of autonomy – in 1936, which ran parallel to the Catalan statute of autonomy. During the Spanish Civil War, the Euzko Gudarostea, an army of Basque nationalists, fought against Franco’s army.
* Following defeat in 1939, Basque nationalism was suppressed and many Basque leaders were forced into exile. During Franco’s dictatorship all Basque parties were prohibited. The PNV established an exile government in France. We found no evidence for any significant mobilization within Spain after 1939.
* Basque nationalism began to reemerge in the 1950s among the younger generations. In 1959 separatists formed the main Basque rebel organization, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Freedom for the Basque Country, ETA), hence the start date. ETA began a violent campaign of bombings in the early 1960s (MAR; UCDP/PRIO).
* PNV returned to Spain after Franco’s death and became the Basque Country’s most influential party. PNV was opposed to ETA.
* In October 2011, ETA announced a unilateral ceasefire. ETA dissolved in 2018. The PNV remained active as of 2020, however, and in 2012, a new separatist militant organization, Euskal Herria Bildu (EHB), had emerged to continue the fight for Basque separatism. In 2018, tens of thousands in the Basque Country “formed a human chain to push for greater autonomy” (BBC 2011, 2018; Fazi 2012; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 38f, 87, 94f, 234, 279f; Hewitt et al. 2008; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 168ff, 2002: 283ff, 2016: 70; MAR; START).
* Note: the Basque nationalist movement has been active not only in the Basque Country, but also in Navarre. Navarre is a region in northern Spain that borders the Basque Country; 10-20% of the local population are Basque speakers. Basque nationalists have laid claim on Navarre, wanting to incorporate it into the Basque Country. Basque nationalist parties, variably claiming increased autonomy or joint independence with the Basque Country, have run in Navarre’s regional elections (Sorens 2012: 181). [start date: 1959; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* There are various claims associated with the Basque country, from independence over increased autonomy to (at least since the establishment of autonomy in 1979) the incorporation of Navarra into the Basque Country (Minorities at Risk Project; Degenhardt 1988: 342-343). The dominant claim is not fully clear (see, for instance, Keating & Bray 2006).
* We code a claim for independence throughout because there is evidence for significant contention towards independence throughout.
  + In particular: i) Minorities at Risk notes that many Basques have a strong commitment to independence;
  + ii) the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which has tended to dominate the Basque Country’s politics since democratization in the 1970s (e.g. Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 234), has a somewhat ambiguous stance towards independence, but at least part of the PNV favors independence. There was, for instance, the Ibarretxe Plan, a proposal by the Basque government under Juan Ibarretxe in the early 2000s to create a semi-independent Basque state in confederation with the rest of Spain (Keating & Wilson 2009: 540; BBC 2003). In response, Ibarretxe initiated a self-determination referendum, which was stopped by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2008. Moreover, Keating & Bray (2006) note that PNV, though not fully committed to independence, has at least maintained “a level of pro-independence rhetoric” (in contast, Degenhardt 1988: 342 describes PNV as “autonomist”). On its website, the EAJ/PNV speaks of the ‘recovery’ of the Basque Country’s ‘sovereignty’ (EAJ/PNV n.d.), supporting the decision to code an independence claim throughout;
  + and iii) ETA, the terrorist organization that was formed in 1959, advocates independence, and so does its political arm which has fetched a significant share of the vote share ever since democratization, even if it has been clearly outpaced by the PNV. [1959-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* [start date: 1959; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Although some Basque separatists have limited their claims to the Basque country, the movement’s dominant claim includes both Basque Country and Navarre (Roth 2015: 75). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* UCDP/PRIO codes a “minor war” over the Basque Country in the following years: 1978-1982, 1985-1987 and 1991. Marshall & Gurr (2003, 2005) and Hewitt et al. (2008) suggest a much longer period (1959-2006, the last year they cover). At the other extreme is MAR, whose rebellion score does not suggest substantial violence in any year.
* We investigated this further using qualitative sources. We found that 1959 is clearly too early a start date; according to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia: “Violence first broke out in 1961, when ETA attempted to derail a train transporting politicians.” The first deadly attack occurred several years later, in 1968, when “a policeman was killed during a gun battle at a police roadblock” (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* We turned to case-specific sources for more detailed investigation. The table below shows the number of killings per annum committed by ETA based on de la Calle et al. (2006) and the number of deaths on the ETA/rebel side based on Zabalza (2000) and as collated by Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. This suggests that the number of killings per annum ranged from 0-7 in 1968-1973. The conflict then escalated in 1974 the 25-deaths threshold was met throughout 1974-1992. Unfortunately, the data on deaths on the rebel side does not cover the post-1992 period, but it is clear from the data that there was a de-escalation after 1992. Still, until 2001 most years saw more than a dozen ETA killings, and an unknown number of deaths on the ETA side. After 2001, the number of deaths was consistently below 5. Note: according to Wikipedia, ETA committed 10 more killings after 2006 – 2 in 2007; 4 in 2008; 3 in 2009; and 1 in 2010.[[1]](#footnote-1)
* Overall, based on case-specific sources the 25-deaths threshold was met in 1974-1992 while prior to this violence was significantly more limited. Between 1993 and 2001, the 25-deaths threshold was probably not met in most or all years, but significant violence did continue. [1959-1973: NVIOLSD; 1974-1992: LVIOLSD; 1993-2020: NVIOLSD]

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | ETA killings | ETA dead | Total |
| 1968 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 1969 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 1972 | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| 1973 | 3 | 4 | 7 |
| 1974 | 19 | 6 | 25 |
| 1975 | 15 | 23 | 38 |
| 1976 | 16 | 22 | 38 |
| 1977 | 10 | 15 | 25 |
| 1978 | 66 | 16 | 82 |
| 1979 | 80 | 21 | 101 |
| 1980 | 95 | 32 | 127 |
| 1981 | 32 | 12 | 44 |
| 1982 | 39 | 7 | 46 |
| 1983 | 40 | 11 | 51 |
| 1984 | 33 | 22 | 55 |
| 1985 | 37 | 13 | 50 |
| 1986 | 41 | 8 | 49 |
| 1987 | 52 | 10 | 62 |
| 1988 | 19 | 4 | 23 |
| 1989 | 18 | 5 | 23 |
| 1990 | 25 | 5 | 30 |
| 1991 | 45 | 10 | 55 |
| 1992 | 26 | 2 | 28 |
| 1993 | 14 | n/a |  |
| 1994 | 13 | n/a |  |
| 1995 | 18 | n/a |  |
| 1996 | 5 | n/a |  |
| 1997 | 13 | n/a |  |
| 1998 | 6 | n/a |  |
| 2000 | 23 | n/a |  |
| 2001 | 15 | n/a |  |
| 2002 | 5 | n/a |  |
| 2003 | 3 | n/a |  |

**Historical context**

* In 1936 the Basques were granted a statute of autonomy. Yet in June 1937 Franco’s forces captured the Basque Country. The Basques’ autonomy was abolished (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 39).
* Furthermore, Franco banned every language and dialect other than Castilian (Encyclopedia Britannica; Minority Rights Group International; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 279-280).
* Note that Franco allowed Navarre, which had supported the insurgents in the civil war, to continue its fuero system, which implied some limited autonomy (Keating & Bray 2006: 351).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Note: the Basque nationalist movement has been active not only in the Basque Country, but also in Navarre. Navarre is a region in northern Spain that borders the Basque Country. However, only 10-20% of the local population are Basque speakers, thus only changes in the Basque Country’s status are coded.
* In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). [1975: autonomy concession]
* In 1976, Juan Carlos lifted the ban on the Basque language (Weaver 2002: 57). [1976: cultural rights concession]
* December 31, 1977, the Basque Country was granted pre-autonomous status (Weaver 2002: 59), a status that implied some increased executive powers, that is, increased administrative autonomy (Pi-Suñyer 2010: 6). [1977: autonomy concession]
* The 1978 constitution foresaw an autonomous status for the Basque Country, and allowed autonomous communities to provide a co-official language status. In 1979, the Basque Autonomy Statute was accepted by Madrid. The 1979 autonomy statute gave the Basque Country its own parliament and Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Basque Country was allowed to raise and spend tax money. The Basque Country would also have its own police force. Furthermore, Basque attained official status along with Castilian in the Basque Country (Minahan 2002: 287; Minorities at Risk Project). Note that Basque also gained co-official language status in Basque-dominated areas of Navarra. We code a single autonomy concession in 1978 to coincide with adoption of the Spanish constitution. [1978: autonomy concession]
* In 2004, the Spanish Cortes vehemently rejected the Ibarretxe Plan, a proposal by the Basque government under Juan Ibarretxe to create a semi-independent Basque state in confederation with the rest of Spain (Keating & Wilson 2009: 540; BBC 2003; Keating & Bray 2006). In response, Ibarretxe initiated a self-determination referendum; the Spanish Constitutional Court stopped this move in 2008 (Reuters 2008). We do not code a restriction since Madrid has never conceded either a confederation or an independence referendum (thus their status was not lowered).

**Regional autonomy**

* The Basque Country achieved a “pre-autonomous” status in 1977, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In 1979, the Autonomy Statute was approved. Given this we code regional autonomy from 1980 onwards in accordance with the first of January rule. [1980-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1979: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Basques |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Basques |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 23004000 |

**Power access**

* We deviate from EPR in this case. EPR codes the Basques as discriminated against until 1976, and as powerless from the democratic transition onward. Yet, as demonstrated by Linz et al. (2003: 33f), there were many ministers from the minority nations, including the Basques, during the democratic transition, the subsequent democratic (parliamentary monarchy) period, and even during Franco’s reign. EPR does acknowledge this, but considers all representation by minority nations “token”. This argument seems plausible when it comes to Franco’s regime, which was highly repressive especially towards minority nations. EPR argues that minority representation during the transition and afterwards should similarly be seen as token because the respective ministers were not from nationalist parties (see EPR coding notes). However, the EPR coding rules (and, by implication, the SDM coding rules) for the coding of power access do not require that nationalists or separatists are represented; it is sufficient if there is meaningful representation by members of the ethnic group, which Linz et al. (2003) suggest was the case. Therefore, we code the Basques as junior partner from the transition onwards (i.e., after Franco’s death in November 1975).
* Linz et al. (2003) cover the period until 2001. We found evidence for Basque representatives in the cabinet also after 2001 (i.e., born in the Basque Country) and therefore maintain the junior partner code.
  + Jaime Mayor Oreja – Minister of the Interior (1996-2001) – born in San Sebastian, Basque Country
  + Cristina Garmendia – Minister of Science and Innovation (2008-2011) – born in San Sebastian, Basque Country
  + Angel Gabilondo Pujol – Minister of Education (2009-2011) – born in San Sebastian, Basque Country
  + Ramon Jauregui Atondo – Minister of the Presidency (2010-2011) – born in San Sebastian, Basque Country
  + Leire Pajin Iraola – Minister of Health, Social Policy and Equality (2010-2011) – born in San Sebastian, Basque Country
  + Pedro Morenes – Minister of Defence (2011-2016) – born in Las Arenas, Basque Country
  + Alfonso Alonso – Minister of Health, Social Services and Equality (2014-2016) – born in Vitoria, Basque Country
  + Inigo de la Serna – Minister of Public Works (2016-2018) – born in Bilbao, Basque Country
  + Fernando Grande-Marlaska – Minister of the Interior (2018-) – born in Bilbao, Basque Country
  + Isabel Celaa – Minister of Education and Vocational Training (2018-2021) – born in Bilbao, Basque Country
* [1959-1975: discriminated; 1976-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.054]

**Regional concentration**

* Spain’s Basques are concentrated in the Basque Country and adjacent areas of Navarra (Minahan 2002: 283). MAR gives conflicting information on the degree of spatial concentration. In phase I-IV, the Basques made up less than 50% of their homeland, while in phase V the Basques made up the majority. A possible explanation may be that MAR draws on the number of Basque speakers. The Basque language was severely repressed under Franco, and the number of Basque speakers has increased significantly since the transition (though it remains in the 30% area in terms of native speakers). Yet, language is not the same as ethnic self-identification. Though he also includes Basque regions in France, the figures in Minahan (2002: 283) suggest that the majority of self-identified Basques are located in the larger Basque area, and that they form an absolute majority there. Academic research also suggests that an absolute majority self-identifies as Basque in the Spanish Basque Country, and importantly, many more than in the French Basque Country (see e.g. Lancaster 1987). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR, MAR, and Minahan (2002: 283) all suggest numerically significant ethnic kin due to a the approx. 600-700,000 Basques in neighboring France. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Canarians

Activity: 1976-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for an organization making SD claims we found is in 1963 or 1964, depending on the source, when Antonia Cubillo founded the Canary Islands Independence Movement (CIIM) to achieve independence from Spain. However, the CIIM was founded not in Spain but from exile in Algiers, and we found no clear evidence for separatist mobilization in Spain itself. Hence, we do not code the start date in the early 1960s (Davison 2013; Russell 2018).
* In 1976, the CIIM set up an armed wing, which proceeded to carry out 28 dozen small bomb attacks on Spanish territories. In total, one policeman died. The group was disbanded again in 1978 (Davison 2013). This is the first evidence for organized claim-making in Spain itself we could find, hence the start date.
* In 1985, the National Congress of the Canaries (Congreso Nacional de Canarias, CNC) was formed, which supports independence and sovereignty for the Canary Islands (‘independencia’ and ‘soberana’), is opposed to the EU, and depicts the Spanish government as a colonizer (CNC-MPAIAC, n.d.).
* According to Roth, the Canaries have been governed by the Canarian Coalition since 1993, “which advocates enhanced autonomy but not independence”; the independentist banner is instead carried by “marginal left-wing groups” (including the Popular Front of the Canary Islands and Azarug) (Roth 2015: 81).
* The Canarian movement is ongoing (Congreso Nacional de Canarias; Degenhardt 1988: 346; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 60; Keesing’s; Minahan 1996: 102ff, 2002: 374ff). [start date: 1976; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* During Franco’s regime, Canarian nationalism was severely repressed. Nonetheless, in 1961, the Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Archipelago was founded, an organization demanding secession from Spain (Degenhardt 1988:346-347). When Spain liberalized after Franco’s death in 1975, a number of self-determination organizations were formed, including in 1985 the National Congress of the Canaries (Congreso Nacional de Canarias, CNC), a pro-independence group which favors leaving the EU and joining the OAU (Minahan 2002: 378). Today, the organizations receiving most support, however, advocate autonomy within Spain, including the Canarian Coalition, an umbrella group of several nationalist organizations that has repeatedly ruled Canary Islands since its inception in 1993 (Pallarés et al. 1997). The question is when autonomy became the dominant demand, and this is not fully clear. Aldrich & Connell (1998: 118-119) report that the independence movement faded away soon after Franco’s death, the transition to democracy, and the autonomy grant, but also that it was involved in concerted bombing campaigns in the late 1970s. Based on this, we code an autonomy claim from 1980 onwards and an independence claim in the years preceding 1980. [1976-1979: independence claim; 1980-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Independence was the dominant initially. Independence claims continued to be made in subsequent years, including by the CNC (formed in 1985), Azarug (formed in 1992), Unidad del Pueblo (formed in 1998), and the Canarian Nationalist Alternative (APC, formed in 2006). According to Roth (2015: 81f), the movement for outright independence is “marginal”. Still, independentist parties have had some success; for example, APC made between c. 1,000 and 7,000 votes in elections while Unidad del Pueblo made between 1-2,000. While a borderline case, we code the movement as ongoing on this basis. [start date: 1976; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Canarian self-determination movements consists of the Canary Islands (Roth 2015: 80f). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* While there have been assassination attempts and bombings, we found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Canary Islands were colonized by Spain in the 15th century. Under Franco (1936-1975), Spain underwent a heavily centralized period, and the Canary Islands had no autonomy (Minahan 2002: 377; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000:60; Degenhardt 1988: 346-347).
* In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). [1975: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1978 constitution foresaw the devolution of significant competencies to autonomous communities, including the Canary Islands. In 1978 the Canary Islands achieved a pre-autonomous status. In 1982, the Canary Island Autonomy Statute went into force, initiating the devolution of some competencies from Madrid, including legislative powers (Minahan 2002: 378; Keating & Wilson 2009). We code a single autonomy concession in 1978 to coincide with the adoption of the Spanish constitution. [1978: autonomy concession]
  + Note that the Spanish constitution foresaw both a fast and a slow track to autonomy. The fast track implied immediate devolution of a comprehensive set of competencies. In principle, the fast track was reserved to the historic nations (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia); other regions could also go with the fast track, but under very restrictive provisions that are basically impossible to meet. Andalusia still managed to jump on the fast track, though formally it did not meet the requirements (a referendum was required in which in all provinces an absolute majority votes in favor – in one province, the absolute majority was missed by a mere 20,000 votes and after inter-party negotiations was allowed to proceed with the fast track anyway). The Canary Islands, along with the other non-historic nations (except for Andalusia) had to go with the slow track. Slow track regions were devolved a more limited set of competencies, but after five years they could gain more (Keating & Wilson 2009: 539; Aparico n.d.). Hence, devolution in Spain was asymmetrical.
* In the second half of the 1980s, many of the slow-route autonomous communities (such as the Canary Islands), which had considerably fewer competencies than the fast-route communities (such as Catalonia or the Basque Country), began to demand that additional powers be transferred to them, as they had been promised earlier on. Initially Madrid was unwilling to devolve further competencies. However, in 1992, the second “autonomy pact” was struck, which foresaw the devolution of additional competencies to slow-route communities, in particular health care and education. The intention was to make Spain’s federal set-up symmetric (Aparico n.d.; Keating & Wilson 2009: 540). Following this compromise, in 1996, Madrid approved a new autonomy statute, which gave Cantabria increased competencies (Magone 2009: 195). We code a single concession in 1992 because the 1996 revision appears to have been an outflow of the 1992 deal. [1992: autonomy concession]
* In 1997 and 2002, there were two further revisions of the Canary Islands’ autonomy statute (Magone 2009: 195), but it seems that these revisions belong to the “tidying up exercises” hinted at by Keating & Wilson (2009: 549). Hence, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* 1983 to 2012, following the first of January rule. [1983-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The Canary Islands achieved pre-autonomous status in 1978, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In 1982 the Canary Islands’ autonomy statute went into force, which initiated the devolution process. [1982: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Canarians |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code overseas entities, such as the Canary Islands, but the Canarians still can be seen as forming part of the EPR umbrella group of the Spanish. According to EPR, the Spanish dominated Spain until Franco’s death. However, Spanish domination actually means Castilian domination. Hence, the Canarians are powerless similarly to the Catalans and Basques.
* After Franco’s death, the Spanish polity became much more inclusive. The Canarians were not included in the transition cabinet but had some representation in the following democratic phase (Linz et al. 2003: 33). Minahan (2002: 378) suggests that Canarian nationalist parties at times were important partners in national coalition governments in Madrid. In Rajoy’s first Council of Ministers (2011-2016), we found one minister from the Canary Islands; but none in subsequent governments. [1976-1978: powerless, 1979-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 163), there are about 1.75 million Canarians in Europe, most in Spain but some also in other countries. Thus, we subtract (somewhat arbitrarily) a small bit and use an estimate of 1.6 million. The World Bank pegs Spain’s at 41.84 million in 2002. [0.0382]

**Regional concentration**

* Almost all Canarians live in the Canary Islands, where they make up 90% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 374). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]
  + Note: We do not code Spanish speakers in other countries (e.g. Latin America) as kin, mainly because this is a movement by Spanish speakers directed against a Spanish-dominated state.

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## Cantabrians

Activity: 1976-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for organized Cantabrian self-determination activity is the formation of the Association for the Defense of the Interests of Cantabria in May 1976. Therefore, we peg the start date of the movement at 1976.
* In 1977, Cantabrian nationalists formed the United Cantabria Association (ATROPU), campaigning for Cantabrian autonomy.
* The Cantabrian autonomous community was established by statute on December 30, 1981. The movement was ongoing as of 2020 (Minahan 2002: 378ff; PRC; Roth 2015: 79). [start date: 1976; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* While there are some smaller groups which make claims for independence, the main drive is for increased political autonomy within Spain throughout (Minahan 2002: 383, 2016: 89; Roth 2015: 79). [1976-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Roth (2015: 79) suggests that Cantabria has a small left-wing independence movement”. Minahan (2002: 384) suggests the same while implying that the number of secessionists does not exceed a small number of “militants”. We could not find much further evidence for mobilization for independence, suggesting that the political significance criterion is not met. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Cantabrian claims for autonomy concern the autonomous community Cantabria in northern Spain (Minahan 2002: 379). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The Cantabrians have sought autonomy through conventional party politics, and thus we found no instance of violence. Based on this, we code NVIOLSD for the entire movement. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Cantabria aimed for autonomy during the Second Republic (1931-1936). The Cantabrian drive to autonomy was severely suppressed under Franco. Franco’s regime (1936-1975) heavily centralized power (Minahan 2002: 383).
* In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). [1975: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1978 constitution foresaw the devolution of significant competencies to autonomous communities, including Cantabria. In 1978 Cantabria achieved a pre-autonomous status. In 1981, the Cantabrian Autonomy Statute was adopted, initiating the devolution of some competencies from Madrid, including legislative powers (Minahan 2002: 383; Keating & Wilson 2009). We code a single autonomy concession in 1978 to coincide with the adoption of the Spanish constitution. [1978: autonomy concession]
  + Note that the Spanish constitution foresaw both a fast and a slow track to autonomy. The fast track implied immediate devolution of a comprehensive set of competencies. In principle, the fast track was reserved to the historic nations (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia); other regions could also go with the fast track, but under very restrictive provisions that are basically impossible to meet. Andalusia still managed to jump on the fast track, though formally it did not meet the requirements (a referendum was required in which in all provinces an absolute majority votes in favor – in one province, the absolute majority was missed by a mere 20,000 votes and after inter-party negotiations was allowed to proceed with the fast track anyway). Cantabria, along with the other non-historic nations (except for Andalusia) had to go with the slow track. Slow track regions were devolved a more limited set of competencies, but after five years they could gain more (Keating & Wilson 2009: 539; Aparico n.d.). Hence, devolution in Spain was asymmetrical.
* In the second half of the 1980s, many of the slow-route autonomous communities (such as Cantabria), which had considerably fewer competencies than the fast-route communities (such as Catalonia or the Basque Country), began to demand that additional powers be transferred to them, as they had been promised earlier on. Initially Madrid was unwilling to devolve further competencies. However, in 1992, the second “autonomy pact” was struck, which foresaw the devolution of additional competencies to slow-route communities, in particular health care and education. The intention was to make Spain’s federal set-up symmetric (Aparico n.d.; Keating & Wilson 2009: 540). Following this compromise, in 1994, Madrid approved a new autonomy statute, which gave Cantabria increased competencies (Magone 2009: 195). We code a single concession in 1992 because the 1994 revision was an outflow of the 1992 deal. [1992: autonomy concession]
* In 1991 and 1997, there were two further revisions of Cantabria’s autonomy statute (Magone 2009: 195), but we found no evidence suggesting that Cantabria’s autonomy was significantly improved by either of these revisions. It seems that these revisions belong to the “tidying up exercises” hinted at by Keating & Wilson (2009: 549). Hence, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* 1983 to 2020, following the first of January rule. [1983-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Cantabria achieved pre-autonomous status in 1978, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In 1981, the Cantabrian autonomy statute was adopted. It went into force in January 1982. [1982: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Cantabrians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Spanish |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 23001000 |

**Power access**

* In EPR, the Cantabrians are subsumed under the Spanish. According to Linz et al. (2003: 33), Old Castile (which includes Cantabria) is well represented in the national cabinet. We could not find more detailed historic data, but were able to investigate the post-2000 period in more detail and found evidence for at least one minister from Cantabria: Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, Deputy Prime Minister of Spain between 2010 and 2011 and Minister of the Interior between 2006 and 2011. Rubalcaba was born in Solares, Medio Cudeyo, Cantabria. On this basis, we code the Cantabrians as junior partner throughout. This case would profit from more research. [1976-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 379), there are about 600,000 Cantabrians in Spain. The World Bank pegs Spain’s at 41.84 million in 2002. [0.0143]

**Regional concentration**

* Approx. 75% of the Cantabrians live in Cantabria, where they make up 88% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 379). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* None found. [no kin]
  + Note: We do not code Spanish speakers in other countries (e.g. Latin America) as kin, mainly because this is a movement by Spanish speakers directed against a Spanish-dominated state.

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## Catalans

Activity: 1975-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first Catalan nationalist party and, in fact, the first modern cohesive political party in Spain – the Lliga Regionalista – was founded sometime between 1900 and 1905. Under Franco’s regime (1937-75) Catalan nationalism was suppressed in various ways. Following 1975, pro-Catalan political parties flourished (hence the start date of the movement), gained representation in the national Parliament, and in 1980 won an overwhelming majority in the legislative assembly of the newly established Catalonian Autonomous Community (Black et al. n.d.; Buffery & Marcer 2011; France 24 2012; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 61, 279f; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 111ff, 2002: 402ff; Reagrupament; Ross et al. 2008; Solidaritat Catalana per La Independència; Toyer 2013).
* Buffery & Marcer (2011: xxxix) report that there were demonstrations in favor of autonomy throughout the Catalan lands in 1977 (that is, in Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands).
* The key organizations associated with the movement are Convergence and Union (CiU), a political party formed in 1978 that seeks greater autonomy, as well as the more radical Esquerra Republicana.
* The more militant organization Terra Lliure (Free Land) ceased its activities in the 1990s: In 1995, Terra Lliure broke up and members subsequently joined the Republican Left of Catalonia, a party championing an independent Catalan nation.
* The Reagrupament Independentista was formed in 2009 as an umbrella group for Catalan organizations aiming at independence.
* In 2010, the Solidaritat Catalana founded to fight for Catalan independence.
* In September 2012, there was a mass independence rally in Barcelona, which prompted “frustrating talks on secession between the Catalan and Spanish governments” (Roth 2015: 72; Al Jazeera 2019). A regional election was held two months later in which CiU won with 30% of the vote. CiU formed a coalition with Esquerra Republicana and promised a referendum on Catalan independence (Roth 2015: 72). In early 2013, the Catalan parliament declared sovereignty, ‘challenging the very legitimacy of rule from Madrid’ (Roth 2015:72).
* In 2014, Catalan President Artur Mas organized a referendum on independence which was declared unconstitutional by the Spanish government. 80% of those who voted favored independence although only 40% of the electorate turned out (Minority Rights Group 2018; see also: Jones 2019; Rodriguez 2022; Payero-Lopez 2020: 77; Al Jazeera, 2019).
* Mas called for snap regional parliamentary elections to be held in September 2015 which he framed as a “de facto plebiscite on independence” (Rodriguez 2022; Payero-Lopez 2020: 77). Mas led the ‘Together for Yes’ alliance which won 62 of the 135 seats in the Catalan parliament, and entered into a coalition with the anti-austerity Popular Unity Candidacy in order to secure a narrow majority (Rodriguez 2022). On the 9th of November 2015, the new Catalan parliament narrowly approved a measure to implement a “peaceful disconnection from the Spanish state”, which the then Prime Minister of Spain, Mariano Rajoy, declared would be illegal (Rodriguez 2022). On the 9th of January 2016, Carles Puigdemont took over from Mas, vowing “to continue the efforts to establish an independent Catalan state” (Rodriguez 2022).
* In March 2017, a Spanish court found Mas guilty of “contempt” due to his calling of the 2014 referendum. Mas was barred from holding public office for two years (Rodriguez 2022; see also: Jones 2019).
* The Catalan authorities organized a second referendum on independence in October 2017 (Minority Rights Group 2018; Jones 2019; Rodriguez 2022; BBC 2019). Pro-independence parties “managed to get a law for the referendum passed in the regional parliament…despite furious objections from opposition MPs” (Jones 2019). As the date of the referendum came closer, “tensions mounted between Barcelona and Madrid, and Spanish authorities took increasingly dramatic steps to avert the vote” including the seizing of nearly 10 million ballot forms and arresting pro-independence Catalan officials (Rodriguez 2022). Over 90% of those who voted in the referendum favored secession. Turnout was 43% (Minority Rights Group 2018; Jones 2019; Rodriguez 2022; Payero-Lopez 2020: 78; BBC 2019). Spain’s Constitutional Court deemed the referendum illegal and peaceful protesters and voters “faced a violent crackdown by Spanish police” (Minority Rights Group, 2018; see also: Jones 2019; Rodriguez 2022, BBC 2019; Al Jazeera 2019). Almost 900 protesters and 33 police officers were injured (Minority Rights Group 2018).
* After the 2017 referendum, the Catalan parliament declared independence (Minority Rights Group 2018) but Puigdemont proposed that the effects of the declaration “be suspended for two months to allow for dialogue” (Jones 2019; see also: Payero-Lopez 2020: 78). In October 2017, a general strike was called to protest against Madrid’s violent response to the referendum. Approximately 700,000 people took to the streets of Barcelona (Rodriguez 2022). Pro-independence Catalan MPs voted, on October 27, 2017, to unilaterally declare independence from Spain in a session which was boycotted by many opposition MPs (Jones 2019; Rodriguez 2022; BBC 2019).
* The Spanish government responded to these events by dissolving the regional parliament in Catalonia, establishing direct rule, and calling new elections (Minority Rights Group 2018; Rodriguez 2022; Payero-Lopez 2020: 74, 78, 80; BBC 2019; Al Jazeera 2019). The Spanish government also pursued criminal charges against the sacked Catalonian leaders. Puigdemont and his closest advisers fled to Brussels (Rodriguez 2022; Al Jazeera 2019). In December 2017, new regional elections were called, which returned pro-independence parties to power (Minority Rights Group 2018; Jones, 2019). Direct rule by the government in Catalonia ended in June 2018 when the new Catalan government was sworn in (Minority Rights Group 2018; Jones 2019).
* In October 2019, Spain’s Supreme Court announced its verdict in the trial of twelve Catalan leaders accused of rebellion, sedition and misuse of public funds over their role in the push for regional independence in 2017; nine were cleared of violent rebellion but were convicted of sedition and the misuse of public funds (Jones 2019; Rodriguez 2022; Al Jazeera 2019). Puigdemont and several of his ministers remained in exile and an international arrest warrant was issued for Puigdemont. This provoked peaceful protests and rioting in Barcelona and other Catalonian towns (Al Jazeera 2019). [start date: 1975; end date: ongoing]
* Note: Catalan nationalists have been active not only in Catalonia but also in other Catalan-speaking regions, primarily Valencia and the Balearic Islands. We do not code a separate Valencian SDM because while there has been mobilization for a separate Valencian identity, specifically by the Valencian Union (VU), this was contested and the Blavers’ claim for a separate identity has not had much support beyond the 1980s (see below). We do not code a separate Balearic SDM, either, because the Balearic Islanders’ sense of separate nationhood is even weaker than that in Valencia (Roth 2015: 73).
  + Valencia, on the one hand, is a region in eastern Spain that borders Catalonia. Catalan nationalists see Valencia as part of a greater Catalonia and contend for increased autonomy or even independence in a greater Catalonia including Valencia (Fusterianism). In 1978, the first Fusterian party was formed, the Valencian Nationalist Party. In 1982 the Valencian Nationalist Party joined another nationalist party to form the Unitat del Poble Valencia (UPV). Today, the main organization associated with the Fusterian part of the movement is the Bloc Nacionalista Valencia (BNV) (Black et al. n.d.: 15) that was formed in the late 1990s as a result of a merger of several smaller nationalist parties (Buffery & Marcer 2011: 84). According to Sorens (2012: 181) the main representatives of this wing, the Bloc and the Unitat del Poble, made mainly autonomist claims. There has also been contention for independence: Catalonia’s independentist Esquerra Republicana has a Valencian branch that became a separate party in 2000 and so did Estat Catala (Sorens 2012: 181). Adherents of Fusterianism in Valencia believe that the Valencian language is a dialect of Catalan. They are opposed by the right-wing blavers who do not see Valencia as part of a greater Catalonia and consider Valencian a separate language. Blavers contend for a separate Valencian identity. Organizationally, Blaverism is mainly represented by the Valencian Union (VU) that was formed in 1982. The VU enjoyed considerable support in the 1980s but not thereafter (Ross et al. 2008).
  + The Balearic Islands, on the other hand, are a set of islands in Spain’s west, including Mallorca, Mellorca, and Ibiza. Both Spanish and Catalan are spoken in the Balearics. The first evidence for organized separatist activity we found is in 1975, when the Socialist Party of the Islands was formed and began to campaign for autonomy. The two main nationalist organizations associated with the movement are the autonomist Partit Socialista de Mallorca-Entesa nacionalista (PSM-EN), which was formed in 1976 (the result of a split in the above-mentioned Socialist Party of the Islands) and continues to exist (along with similar autonomist Socialist parties in the smaller Balearic islands), and the Unio Mallorquina (formed in 1982) (Fazi 2012; Sorens 2012: 181). The Unio was dissolved in 2011 and the Convergence for the Isles emerged out of its remnants, aiming for increased autonomy. In 2012 Convergence merged with other smaller nationalist parties to form the Proposa per les Illes, an autonomist party. In addition, since 1993 Catalonia’s Esquerra Republicana entertains an offshoot in the Balearic Islands which contends for joint independence with the other Catalan lands (mainly Catalonia and Valencia) (Fazi 2012: 476). However, the autonomist parties clearly have had more support in the Balearics (Fazi 2012: 485).

**Dominant claim**

* Several organizations are associated with the Catalan movement, which spans three regions: Catalonia (the most important one), Valencia, and the Balearic Islands. Before 2011, contention in Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearics was focused more on autonomy, though important factions also contended for independence. The independence claim in 2011-2020 follows from the escalation of nationalist claim-making mainly in Catalonia. In particular, there are three main reasons to code a claim escalation in 2011: i) the 2010 ruling which limited Catalonia’s autonomy is generally seen as a tipping point (Carrera 2014; Rico & Liñeira 2014: 258), ii) by 2010, a significant part of CiU has begun to advocate independence and iii) opinion polls since 2010 show that a relative majority favors independence in Catalonia (Serrano 2013). Since 2012, Catalonia declared independence twice and held referendums on independence. [1975-2010: autonomy claim; 2011-2020: independence claim]
* Notes by region:
  + In Catalonia itself, Convergence and Union (CiU), the strongest organization associated with the movement, was traditionally seen as an autonomist party (Keating 1996; Guibernau 1999). The most important organization calling for outright independence traditionally was the Catalan Republican Left (ERC). Up until recently, independence was seen as a minority position (Minorities at Risk Project). However, following the controversial Statute reform process, the independence option gained ground. Between 2009 and 2011, more than 500 Catalan municipalities organized unofficial independence referendums (Muñoz & Guinjoan 2013). CiU officially abandoned its autonomist position in 2012 (Rico & Liñeira 2014: 262), but parts of CiU had begun to support independence already before 2012. In particular, regional branches of CiU supported the independence referendums held between 2009 and 2011.
  + Catalan nationalists in Valencia see Valencia as part of a greater Catalonia and contend for increased autonomy or even independence in a greater Catalonia including Valencia (Fusterianism). In 1978, the first Fusterian party was formed, the Valencian Nationalist Party. In 1982 the Valencian Nationalist Party joined another nationalist party to form the Unitat del Poble Valencia (UPV). Today, the main organization associated with the Fusterian part of the movement is the Bloc Nacionalista Valencia (BNV) (Black et al. n.d.: 15) that was formed in the late 1990s as a result of a merger of several smaller nationalist parties (Buffery & Marcer 2011: 84). According to Sorens (2012: 181) the main representatives of this wing, the Bloc and the Unitat del Poble, made mainly autonomist claims. There has also been contention for independence: Catalonia’s independentist Esquerra Republicana has a Valencian branch that became a separate party in 2000. Another secessionist party, Estat Catala, also has a regional branch in Valencia (Sorens 2012: 181).
  + With regard to the Balearic Islands, the first evidence for organized separatist activity we have found is in 1975, when the Socialist Party of the Islands was formed and began to campaign for autonomy. The two main nationalist organizations associated with the movement are the autonomist Partit Socialista de Mallorca-Entesa nacionalista (PSM-EN), which was formed in 1976 (the result of a split in the above-mentioned Socialist Party of the Islands) and continues to exist (along with similar autonomist Socialist parties in the smaller Balearic islands), and the Unio Mallorquina (formed in 1982) (Fazi 2012; Sorens 2012: 181). The Unio was dissolved in 2011 and the Convergence for the Isles emerged out of its remnants, aiming for increased autonomy. In 2012 Convergence merged with other smaller nationalist parties to form the Proposa per les Illes, an autonomist party. In addition, since 1993 Catalonia’s Esquerra Republicana entertains an offshoot in the Balearic Islands which contends for joint independence with the other Catalan lands (mainly Catalonia and Valencia) (Fazi 2012: 476). However, the autonomist parties clearly have had more support in the Balearics (Fazi 2012: 485).

**Independence claims**

* The main independentist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, was formed in 1931, then banned by Franco in 1939. The party became active again soon after Franco’s death in 1975 and held its 8th National Congress in July 1976. [start date: 1975; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Catalan pro-autonomy or pro-independence parties consists primarily of the Catalan speaking region Catalonia. Some Catalan nationalists also envision Valencia and the Balearic islands as part of “Greater Catalonia” (see above). However, this claim seems to be made only by a minority, whereas for example, the president of Catalonia (by 2020) reassures that no territorial claims besides Catalonia are made (Tremlett 2012). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In early 2013, the Catalan parliament declared sovereignty, thus “challenging the very legitimacy of rule from Madrid”. Furthermore, from 2012 onwards, nearly 200 towns and villages in the Catalan region “declared themselves Free Catalan Territory” together with five of Catalonia’s 41 districts (Roth 2015: 72). [2013: autonomy declaration]
* On October 27, 2017, the Catalan parliament voted to unilaterally declare independence from Spain in a session which was boycotted by many opposition MPs (Jones 2019; Rodriguez 2022; BBC 2019). [2017: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No separatist violence above the LVIOLSD threshold was found, hence the movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Catalonia was an independent state in the 9th century, but was joined with Aragon through marriage in 1137. Using their newfound wealth, the Catalans expanded their growing Mediterranean Empire, while the Aragonians defended the homeland. By the late middle ages, the Empire was flourishing, and Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia were joined together in a federation. In the early fifteenth century, the male line of the counts of Barcelona became extinct, weakening Catalonia’s position in the kingdom. Aragonese attempts to curtail Catalonia’s autonomous rights incited a Catalan rebellion and a civil war from 1460 to 1472. The victorious Aragon and Castile united in 1479 (Minahan 2002: 405). The Catalans retained their autonomy and the Generalitat (Catalan parliament), but by the 17th century separatism had found widespread support. With French help, the Catalans rebelled against Philip IV during the Thirty Years War, and by the terms of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, France took control of northern Catalonia, Roussillon, and Cerdagne. During the War of Spanish Succession, the Catalans sided with the Archduke Charles of Austria. In reprisal for their rebellion, Philip deprived the Catalans of their constitution and all their traditional privileges, including a ban of their language. (Minahan 2002: 405). The suppressed Catalan culture and language began to revive with the spread of education and publishing in the 1830s; a rebellion broke out in Barcelona in 1842, but the cultural revival movement remained active. In 1902, the first nationalist organizations demanded a separate administration and budget for Catalonia, and by 1913, the Catalans had won a slight degree of home rule. After WWI (wherein Spain had remained neutral), separatist agitation swept Catalonia. The Catalan Union sent a delegation to peace negotiations in 1919, hoping to appeal to the American President under his proposal for self-determination for European minorities; this was blocked by the Spanish government. The Spanish dictator Primo de Rivera repealed what little home rule Catalonia had. On April 14, 1931, while the Madrid government was in disarray, the republican leader of Catalonia, Louis Companys, declared the independence of the Catalan Republic. A compromise was negotiated, and the Catalan government received the recognition of the new republican government of Madrid and far-reaching autonomy. The statute of autonomy for Catalonia became law in 1932 (Minahan 2002: 406). Following continued interference, the Catalan government again declared independence in 1934. Madrid sent troops. The leftist government that came to power in Madrid in 1936 once more established a degree of Catalan autonomy. However, when the Spanish Fascists captured Barcelona in 1939, the entire Catalan leadership was executed. Under Franco, power was centralized and the Catalans’ autonomy abolished. Also, the Catalan language was banned (Minahan 2002: 407; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 279-280).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). Note: it is not clear whether this concession was made before or after the movement’s start date. [1975: autonomy concession]
* In 1977, Catalonia was granted pre-autonomous status (Buffery & Marcer 2011: xxxix), a status that implied some increased executive powers, that is, increased administrative autonomy (Pi-Suñyer 2010: 6). [1977: autonomy concession]
* In 1978 Valencia and the Balearic Islands were granted pre-autonomous status (Buffery & Marcer 2011: xxxix). Furthermore, the 1978 constitution foresaw the devolution of significant competencies to autonomous communities, including Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, and Valencia, and allowed for a co-official status of the Catalan language (in Valencia called Valencian). In 1979 the Catalan Autonomy Statute was ratified. The 1979 Autonomy Statute devolved significant powers, including full control over education, and Catalan became an official language together with Castilian (Minority Rights Group International; Magone 2009: 195; Minahan 202: 407; Keating & Wilson 2009). In 1982 Valencia received an autonomy statute and in 1983 the Balearic islands (Buffery & Marcer 2011: xl; Magone 2009: 195). We code a single autonomy concession in 1978 to coincide with the adoption of the Spanish constitution and the granting of the pre-autonomous status to Valencia and the Balearic Islands. [1978: autonomy concession]
  + Note that the Spanish constitution foresaw both a fast and a slow track to autonomy. The fast track implied immediate devolution of a comprehensive set of competencies. In principle, the fast track was reserved to the historic nations (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia); other regions could also go with the fast track, but under very restrictive provisions that are basically impossible to meet. Andalusia still managed to jump on the fast track, though formally it did not meet the requirements (a referendum was required in which in all provinces an absolute majority votes in favor – in one province, the absolute majority was missed by a mere 20,000 votes and after inter-party negotiations was allowed to proceed with the fast track anyway). Valencia and the Balearic Islands, along with the other non-historic nations (except for Andalusia) had to go with the slow track. Slow track regions were devolved a more limited set of competencies, but after five years they could gain more (Keating & Wilson 2009: 539; Aparico n.d.). Hence, devolution in Spain was asymmetrical.
* In the second half of the 1980s, many of the slow-route autonomous communities (such as the Balearic Islands and Valencia), which had considerably fewer competencies than the fast-route communities (such as Catalonia or the Basque Country), began to demand that additional powers be transferred to them, as they had been promised earlier on. Initially Madrid was unwilling to devolve further competencies. However, in 1992, the second “autonomy pact” was struck, which foresaw the devolution of additional competencies to slow-route communities, in particular health care and education. The intention was to make Spain’s federal set-up symmetric (Aparico n.d.; Keating & Wilson 2009: 540). Following this compromise, in 1994, Madrid approved a new autonomy statute for the Balearic Islands and Valencia (Magone 2009: 195). We code a single concession in 1992 because the 1994 revision was an outflow of the 1992 deal. [1992: autonomy concession]
* Note: Valencia’s autonomy statute was furthermore revised in 1991 and the Balearic Islands’ statute in 1999 (Magone 2009: 195), but we found no evidence suggesting that this involved significant changes in terms of SD. It seems that these revisions belong to the “tidying up exercises” hinged at by Keating & Wilson (2009: 549). Hence, we do not code a concession.
* In 2006 a new Autonomy Statute was passed which expanded the competencies of Catalonia’s regional government, including a strengthening of tax authority, language rights, and recognition of Catalonia as having a national character (though not as a nation; Colino 2009: 12-13). Valencia received a new second-generation statute too (Magone 2009: 195). [2006: autonomy concession]
  + It has to be noted that the version of the 2006 Autonomy Statute that was eventually passed by the Spanish Parliament (and the people of Catalonia in a referendum) went short of the version that was passed in 2005 by the Catalan Parliament. The original version faced significant conservative opposition, and was thus revised after negotiations between CiU’s Artur Mas and Zapatero. In particular, the contentious definition of Catalonia as a nation was amended to say ‘national character’. Thus, it can be said (an interpretation widely shared in Catalonia) that the end product went short of what Zapatero, then-candidate for Prime Minister, had promised in November 2013 (“I will support any reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy approved by the Catalan Parliament”) (Carrera 2014). While there is hence a case to code a restriction, we do not code one because Catalonia’s self-government was still expanded and because CiU, the most important organization, endorsed the watered down version.
* In 2007, the Balearic Islands received a new second-generation statute too (Magone 2009: 195). [2007: autonomy concession]
* The Partido Popular (PP) opposed even the watered down version of the Catalan statute and in 2006 it filed a complaint against the new Statute with Spain’s Constitutional Court. In 2010 the Constitutional Court issued its final ruling. It annulled 14 articles of the Catalan Autonomy Statute and thereby decreased Catalan autonomy. In particular, positive discrimination language clauses were declared unconstitutional as well as certain taxation rights and certain financial obligations of the center vis-à-vis Barcelona (Almendral 2010). [2010: autonomy restriction]
* After the 2017 referendum, the Catalan parliament declared independence (Minority Rights Group 2018) but Puigdemont proposed that the effects of the declaration “be suspended for two months to allow for dialogue” (Jones 2019; see also: Payero-Lopez 2020: 78). In October 2017, a general strike was called to protest against Madrid’s violent response to the referendum. Approximately 700,000 people took to the streets of Barcelona (Rodriguez 2022). On October 27, 2017 the Catalan parliament voted to unilaterally declare independence from Spain in a session which was boycotted by many opposition MPs (Jones 2019; Rodriguez 2022; BBC 2019).
* After Catalonia’s independence declaration in late 2017, the Spanish government dissolved the regional parliament in Catalonia, established direct rule, and called new elections (Minority Rights Group 2018; Rodriguez 2022; Payero-Lopez 2020: 74, 78, 80; BBC 2019; Al Jazeera 2019). [2017: autonomy restriction]
* Direct rule by the government in Catalonia ended in June 2018 when the new Catalan government was sworn in (Minority Rights Group 2018; Jones 2019). As noted in the codebook, we do not code the end of short-term impositions of direct rule as concessions.

**Regional autonomy**

* 1980-2020, following the first of January rule. Note: autonomy was suspended in 2017-18, but in line with our general approach we continue to code autonomy during temporary suspensions. [1980-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Catalonia achieved pre-autonomous status in 1977, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. However, the 1979 Autonomy Statute led to a significant devolution of powers, including legislative powers (see above). [1979: establishment of regional autonomy]
* In 1982 Valencia received an autonomy statute and in 1983 the Balearic Islands (Buffery & Marcer 2011: xl; Magone 2009: 195). [1982, 1983: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Catalans |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Catalans |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 23002000 |

**Power access**

* We deviate from EPR in this case. EPR codes the Catalans as discriminated against until 1976, and as powerless from the democratic transition onward. Yet, as demonstrated by Linz et al. (2003: 33f), there were many ministers from the minority nations, including the Catalans, during the democratic transition, the subsequent democratic (parliamentary monarchy) period, and even during Franco’s reign. EPR does acknowledge this, but considers all representation by minority nations “token”. This argument seems plausible when it comes to Franco’s regime, which was highly repressive especially towards minority nations. EPR argues that minority representation during the transition and afterwards should similarly be seen as token because the respective ministers were not from nationalist parties (see EPR coding notes). However, the EPR coding rules (and, by implication, the SDM coding rules) for the coding of power access do not require that nationalists or separatists are represented; it is sufficient if there is meaningful representation by members of the ethnic group, which Linz et al. (2003) suggest was the case. Therefore, we code the Catalans as junior partner from the transition onwards (i.e., after Franco’s death in November 1975).
* Linz et al. (2003) cover the period until 2001. We found evidence for Catalan representatives in the cabinet also after 2001 (i.e., born in Catalonia) and therefore maintain the junior partner code.
  + Josep Piqué – Minister of Foreign Affairs (2000-2002), Minister of Science and Technology (2002-2003) – born in Vilanova i la Geltru, Catalonia
  + Anna Birules – Minister of Science and Technology (2000-2002) – born in Girona, Catalonia
  + Julia Garcia-Valdecasas – Minister of Public Administration (2003-2004) – born in Barcelona, Catalonia
  + Joan Clos – Minister of Industry (2006-2008) – born in Parets del Valles, Catalonia
  + Carme Chacon – Minister of Housing (2007-2008), Minister of Defence (2008-2011) – born in Esplugues de Llobregat, Catalonia
  + Dolors Montserrat – Minister of Health, Social Services and Equality (2016-2018) – born in Sant Sadurni d’Anoia, Catalonia
  + Josep Borrell – Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation (2018-2019) – born in La Pobla de Segur, Catalonia
  + Meritxell Batet – Minister for Territorial Policy and the Civil Service (2018-2019) – born in Barcelona, Catalonia
* [1975: discriminated; 1976-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.169]

**Regional concentration**

* The Catalan homeland includes three of Spain’s regions: Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, and Valencia. According to Minahan (2002: 402-403), almost all Catalans live in the Catalan lands, which also includes a small adjacent area in France, and the Catalans make up approx. 75% of the local population. This matches with information from MAR. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* MAR reports kin in Italy and France due to smaller Catalan communities there. According to the Joshua project, the Catalans in France make up about 110,000, while the Catalans in Italy make up approx. 23,000. Ethnologue estimates their number at 100,000 and 20,000, respectively, as of 1996. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Galicians

Activity: 1963-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first two Galician political organizations in the post-World War II era were Partido Socialista Galega (PSG), founded in 1963, and the Marxist-Leninist oriented Galician People's Union, Unión do Pobo Galega (UPG), founded in 1964. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1963. It has been reported that the UPG was actually the only organization that managed to maintain some structured and disciplined coordination before Franco’s death. It postulated the right to self-determination for Galicia, but it did not advocate independence.
* The Galician Armed League disbanded in 1980. However, the movement remains ongoing, with different organizations forming to champion separatism. Most importantly, the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG) was formed in 1982 and “has since then been the main thrust behind the nationalist movement in Galicia” (Wray & Miranda 2019; see also: Warf & Ferras 2015: 263). The BNG are signatories of the 25 October Declaration of Llotja del Mar, a collective commitment by nationalist forces within Spain “to defend self-determination and free political prisoners”.
* The BNG remains active as of 2020, though it is no longer the dominant force it once was. In the 2012 regional elections, the BNG was surpassed in votes by ANOVA, Marxist nationalist party (Warf and Ferras 2015: 264-5). Independence is supported by 10% of Galicia’s population (Wray and Miranda 2019).
* In 2005, the Resistencia Galega (REGA) was formed as a militant separatist organization. REGA mainly launches attacks through bombings and is branded as a terrorist organization by the Spanish government (CMI Brasil; Degenhadt 1988: 347f; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 109f, 279f; Iberia Nature; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996: 190ff, 2002: 637ff; Núñez 1997). [start date: 1963; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* There have been calls for independence, but all sources we consulted suggest that the main drive has been for increased autonomy and recognition as a nation (within Spain). [1963-2020: autonomy claim]
  + The Galician Socialist Party, the organization that was founded in 1963 and led us to code the onset of the modern Galician nationalist movement, made claims for the federalization of Spain (Núñez 1997: 34).
  + The Galician People’s Union, another early Galician self-determination organization, postulated the right to self-determination but independence was not on its agenda (Núñez 1997: 33).
  + After Franco’s death in 1975, calls for independence emerged, but the main drive continued to be for increased autonomy (Núñez 1997: 36-53).
  + This is true also for the most recent years, where there has been discussion about a new, second-generation autonomy statute. The debate stalled due to disagreement about whether Galicia should be considered a nation or continued to be considered a historic nation (Keating & Wilson 2009: 543).
  + An extreme wing of the BNG – the main vehicle of Galician separatism – advocates complete independence, a view that enjoys some degree of favor especially among the young (Núñez 1997: 49; Warf & Ferras 2015: 264). The BNG has tended, however, to call for “increased regional autonomy and the teaching of Gallego in the public schools” (Warf & Ferras 2015: 263; see also Maiz (2003: 20).

**Independence claims**

* Both the Galician Socialist Party (formed in 1963) and the Galician People’s Union (formed in 1964) made claims for autonomy, not independence. Yet, after Franco’s death in 1975, calls for independence started to emerge, though autonomy remained the movement’s dominant claim.
* We could not find good information regarding the exact year when the first public calls for independence were made. Yet, according to Núñez (1997: 37), the Galician movement was internally fragmented as early as 1977, with some groups advocating internal autonomy/federalism and others outright secession. On this basis, we use 1977 as the start date of the independence movement.
* BNG, the main vehicle of the Galician SDM today, was formed in 1982; the party advocates autonomy but has an extreme wing which calls for independence (Núñez 1997: 49; Warf & Ferras 2015: 264). Roth (2015: 76) suggests that there are other, small independence groups including the Galician People’s Front (formed in 1986) and Galician Resistance (formed in 2005). [start date: 1977; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Galician claims concern the autonomous community of Galicia in northern Spain, which is composed of the provinces La Coruña, Lugo, Orense, and Pontevedra (Minahan 2002: 637). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Other than the killing of a guard by the Armed Galician League in 1978, we found no reports of deaths resulting from separatist violence. Despite numerous bombings from 2005 onward, there were no fatalities. Since the 1978 event does not qualify as LVIOLSD, we classify the entire movement as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1931, the Second Spanish Republic was declared, and Galicians began to press for increased autonomy. After a referendum in 1936, Galicia was indeed granted autonomy. Soon after, however, Franco came to power and revoked Galicia’s autonomy (Minahan 2002: 641). Furthermore, Franco banned every language and dialect other than Castilian (Encyclopedia Britannica; Minority Rights Group International).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). [1975: autonomy concession]
* The 1978 constitution foresaw an autonomous status for Galicia, and allowed for a co-official status of the Galician language. In 1979, Galicia achieved pre-autonomous status. In 1980, Galicians adopted an Autonomy Statute by plebiscite, which came into force in 1981 after it was signed into law by King Juan Carlos. The 1981 Autonomy Statute recognizes Galicia as one of Spain’s historic nations, establishes self-government institutions, including a parliament and an executive, and devolves diverse competencies to the regional level, including legislative powers in the areas of culture and education (Keating and Wilson : 541; Hombrado 2008: 5). We code a single autonomy concession in 1978 to coincide with the adoption of the Spanish constitution. [1978: autonomy concession]
* According to Magone (2005: 195), Galicia’s statute was revised in 1997 and 2002, but we found no evidence suggesting that Galicia’s were significantly improved by either of these revisions. It seems that these revisions belong to the “tidying up exercises” hinted at by Keating & Wilson (2009: 549). Hence, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* From 1982 onwards, following the first of January rule. [1982-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Galicia achieved pre-autonomous status in 1979, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In 1981, Galicia’s Autonomy Statute entered into force, which led to a significant devolution of powers, including legislative powers (see above). [1981: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Galicians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Galician |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 23003000 |

**Power access**

* We deviate from EPR in this case. EPR codes the Galicians as discriminated against until 1976, and as powerless from the democratic transition onward. Yet, as demonstrated by Linz et al. (2003: 33f), there were many ministers from the minority nations, including the Galicians, during the democratic transition, the subsequent democratic (parliamentary monarchy) period, and even during Franco’s reign. EPR does acknowledge this, but considers all representation by minority nations “token”. This argument seems plausible when it comes to Franco’s regime, which was highly repressive especially towards minority nations (though it’s noteworthy that Franco was born in Galicia). EPR argues that minority representation during the transition and afterwards should similarly be seen as token because the respective ministers were not from nationalist parties (see EPR coding notes). However, the EPR coding rules (and, by implication, the SDM coding rules) for the coding of power access do not require that nationalists or separatists are represented; it is sufficient if there is meaningful representation by members of the ethnic group, which Linz et al. (2003) suggest was the case. Therefore, we code the Galicians as junior partner from the transition onwards (i.e., after Franco’s death in November 1975).
* Linz et al. (2003) cover the period until 2001. We found evidence for Galician representatives in the cabinet also after 2001 (i.e., born in Galicia) and therefore maintain the junior partner code.
  + Mariano Rajoy – Minister of the Interior (2001-2002), Minister of the Presidency (2002-2003), First Deputy Prime Minister of Spain (2000-2003), Prime Minister (2011-2018) – born in Santiago de Compostela, Galicia
  + Elena Espinosa – Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (2004-2010) – born in Ourense, Galicia
  + Elena Salgado – Minister of Health (2004-2007), Minister for Public Administration (2007-2009), Minister of Economy and Finance (2009-2011), Second Deputy Prime Minister of Spain (2009-2011), First Deputy Prime Minister of Spain (2011-2011) – born in Ourense, Galicia
  + Cesar Antonio Molina Sanchez – Minister of Culture (2007-2009) – born in A Coruna, Galicia
  + Francisco Caamano Dominguez – Minister of Justice (2009-2011) – born in A Coruna, Galicia
  + Jose Blanco Lopez – Minister of Public Works and Transport (2009-2011) – born in Lugo, Galicia
  + Nadia Calvino – Minister of Economy (2020-), Minister of Economy and Business (2018-2020) – born in A Coruna, Galicia
* [1963-1975: discriminated; 1976-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.06]

**Regional concentration**

* Approx. 75% of the Galicians lives in Galicia, where they make up 94% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 637). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* No politically relevant kin according to EPR. Minahan (2002: 637) argues that there are “sizable” Galician populations in Portugal, France, and Germany, as well as “large” populations in Latin America, particularly Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. According to the Joshua project, there are 700,000 Galician speakers in Argentina, 40,000 in Germany and Uruguay, and 15,000 in Mexico and Portugal. Ethnologue only lists Galician speakers in Portugal, and gives the same estimate (15,000). More generally, Galician is similar to Portuguese (see Ethnologue; Minahan 2002: 638); arguably there are ethnic bonds with the Portuguese in Portugal. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Leonese

Activity: 1980-2020

**General notes**

* The Leonese are located in the autonomous Castile and Leon region, where they make up around a fifth of the population of the region.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for organized self-determination activity we found is the formation of the Partido Regionalista del Pais Leones in 1980, hence the start date. An umbrella nationalist party, the Leonese People’s Union, was founded in 1986 out of several smaller regionalist and autonomist organizations. The movement’s main drive has been for the separation from Castile and Léon, an autonomous community established in 1978 (Conversi 2000: 140).
* In 1983, Leon’s provincial legislature proposed the creation of a separate Leonese autonomous community, backtracking on its 1980 endorsement of the creation of a joint Castile and Léon autonomus community. The Spanish constitutional court rejected the proposal.
* Some smaller Leonese organizations (e.g., AGORA País Llionés) have also advocated full independence, but with little following (Conversi 2000; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 2002: 1079ff).
* Both Minahan (2016: 241) and Roth (2015: 79-80) report that the movement is ongoing. [start date: 1980; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The movement’s main drive has been for the separation from Castile and Léon, an autonomous community foreseen in 1978 and fully implemented by 1983 (Conversi 2000: 140).
* In particular, the Leonese People’s Union, an umbrella organization consisting of several regionalist and autonomist organizations that was founded in 1986, advocates separation from Castile and Leon. Further evidence for this coding is that in 1983, Leon’s provincial legislature proposed the creation of a separate Leonese autonomous community, backtracking on its 1980 endorsement of the creation of a joint Castile and Léon autonomus community. Some smaller Leonese organizations (e.g., AGORA País Llionés) have also advocated full independence, but with little following.
* Minahan (2016: 241) reports that “continuing demands for separation and self-government have been ignored, pushing some Leonese groups to propose the independence of “Greater Leon”, including territory in Portugal, within the European Union” (see also: Roth 2015: 80). However, Roth (2015: 80) describes the groups advocating for a Greater Leon as “marginal” and suggests that the drive for a separate autonomous province as dominant. [1980-2020: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

* While there are some organizations that have advocated outright independence, including AGORA País Llionés, these are marginal Roth (2015: 80). We could not find much further information, suggesting that the political significance criterion is likely not met. [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The main claim is for the separation of three provinces (Leon, Zamora and Salamanca) from Castile and Leon. Some groups have also advocated for a Greater Leon including Zamora, Salamanca, Leon, Palencia, Valladolid, and parts of Galicia, but this claim is marginal (Roth 2015: 80). We code the three provinces as the SDM’s claimed territory using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No violence was found for the Leonese movement, and we thus code NVIOLSD for the entire period. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After Franco’s death in 1975, Spain democratized and embarked on a process of decentralization in reversal of Franco’s extreme centralism.
* In 1975, Spain passed a law that allowed all provinces (except Navarra) to directly elect presidents and half of the mayors of each province (except Barcelona and Madrid) (Cunningham 2014: 224; Malloy 1997: 10). Castile and Leon achieved a “pre-autonomous” status in 1978, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers (see Minahan 2002: 1080, but note that he erroneously pegs this to 1979). Moreover, the 1978 constitution foresaw the devolution of significant competencies to autonomous communities, such as Castile and Leon, and allowed autonomous communities to provide a co-official language status. However, Leon makes up only around a fifth of Castile and Leon (population-wise), so these actions are not coded as concessions to the Leonese.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1983, Leon’s provincial legislature proposed the creation of a separate Leonese autonomous community, backtracking on its 1980 endorsement of the creation of a joint Castile and Léon autonomous community. The Spanish constitutional court rejected the proposal. Minahan (2002: 1082) seems to suggest that Leon was promised a separate status in 1978; however, this information could not be confirmed. Since Madrid appears never to have promised a separate status, we do not code a restriction.
  + Note that the Spanish constitution foresaw both a fast and a slow track to autonomy. The fast track implied immediate devolution of a comprehensive set of competencies. In principle, the fast track was reserved to the historic nations (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia); other regions could also go with the fast track, but under very restrictive provisions that are basically impossible to meet. Andalusia still managed to jump on the fast track, though formally it did not meet the requirements (a referendum was required in which in all provinces an absolute majority votes in favor – in one province, the absolute majority was missed by a mere 20,000 votes and after inter-party negotiations was allowed to proceed with the fast track anyway). Castile and Leon, along with the other non-historic nations (except for Andalusia) had to go with the slow track. Slow track regions were devolved a more limited set of competencies, but after five years they could gain more (Keating & Wilson 2009: 539; Aparico n.d.). Hence, devolution in Spain was asymmetrical.
* There were changes in Castile and Leon’s autonomy status, but Leon only makes up a fifth of the combined region, so these developments are not coded:
  + In 1983, Castile and Leon’s autonomy status was approved, initiating the devolution of some competencies from Madrid, including legislative competencies. The 1978 constitution had already foreseen the establishment of autonomous communities.
  + In the second half of the 1980s, many of the slow-route autonomous communities (such as Castile-Leon), which had considerably fewer competencies than the fast-route communities (such as Catalonia or the Basque Country), began to demand that additional powers be transferred to them, as they had been promised earlier on. Initially Madrid was unwilling to devolve further competencies. However, in 1992, the second “autonomy pact” was struck, which foresaw the devolution of additional competencies to slow-route communities, in particular health care and education. The intention was to make Spain’s federal set-up symmetric (Aparico n.d.; Keating & Wilson 2009: 540). Following this compromise, in 1994, Madrid approved a new autonomy statute, which gave Castile and Leon increased competencies (Magone 2009: 195).
  + In 1999, Castile and Leon’s autonomy statute was revised again (Magone 2009: 195). It is not fully clear whether the region’s competencies were actually increased, and the fact that the new statute was passed only five years after the last makes us suspect that this revision was one of the “tidying up exercises” hinged at by Keating & Wilson (2009: 549).
  + In 2007, Madrid approved Castile and Leon’s new, second-generation autonomy statute, which transferred additional competencies to the region and provided for the protection of the Leonese language (Martinico 2010; Magone 2009: 195; Keating & Wilson 2009: 547-554).

**Regional autonomy**

* Castile and Leon achieved a “pre-autonomous” status in 1978, which implied some executive, but no legislative powers. Pi-Suñyer (2010: 6) notes that the pre-autonomies had “purely administrative” competencies, hence regional autonomy is not given. In 1983, Castile and Leon’s autonomy status was approved, initiating the devolution of some competencies from Madrid, including legislative powers (Keating & Wilson 2009). Yet, Leon makes up only a fifth of the local population, so we do not code regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Leonese |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Spanish |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 23001000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code the Leonese as such, but the ‘Spanish’. The Leonese form a regional branch of the Spanish. According to Linz et al. (2003: 33) the autonomous community of Castile and Leon has a disproportionately high share of cabinet ministers after democratization, and thus during the movement’s period of activity. Unfortunately, Linz et al. (2003) do not give the figure for the Leonese homeland as such.
* Additional research into the regional origins of Spanish prime ministers and important cabinet members (defense, foreign affairs, and interior) suggests that the Castilian part of Castil and Leon has stronger representation than the Leonese. Still, during the movement’s existence, several of the serving cabinet members have their origins in Leonese territory, including José Zapatero, the former prime minister, and José Antonio Alonso, the former defence and interior minister (serving from 2004 to 2008 under Zapatero). Furthermore, Ana Pastor, who was born in Cubillos, Zamora, was Minister of Development between 2011 and 2016; and Margarita Robles, born in Leon, has been the Minister of Defence since June 2018. Hence, a junior partner coding appears most adequate (though one could conceivably also apply a senior partner code during the Zapatero reign). [1980-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 1079) reports 1.3 million Leonese living in Spain and Portugal in 2002. However, we should not include Leonese in Portugal in the group size estimate. Minahan (2002: 1079) furthermore notes that the Leon region’s population size amounts to 1.726 million, 68% of which are Leonese. Hence, in 2002 there are 1.17 million Leonese in the region of Leon. We use this figure (rounded up to 1.2 to account for Leonese living outside of Leon) in combination with the 2002 World Bank estimate of Spain’s population (41.84 million) to calculate the group size estimate (0.0287). [0.0287]

**Regional concentration**

* The Leonese are located in the autonomous Castile and Leon region. They make up around a fifth of the province as a whole, but are concentrated in the region of Leon. According to Minahan (2002: 1079), the overwhelming majority of the Leonese resides in Leon, where they make up 68% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1079) there are Leonese communities in northeastern Portugal (Mirandese region). Minahan does not provide an estimate of the number of Leonese in Portugal. We estimated the number of Leonese in Spain at 1.2 million out of a total of 1.3 worldwide (see above). But this was a very rough guess, and we do not feel confident to conclude on this basis that the number of Leonese in Portugal crosses the 100,000 threshold. [no kin]
  + Note: The Leonese speak Spanish. We do not code Spanish speakers in other countries (e.g. Latin America) as kin, mainly because this is a movement by Spanish speakers directed against a Spanish-dominated state.

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1. https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Asesinatos\_cometidos\_por\_ETA\_desde\_la\_muerte\_de\_Francisco\_Franco [↑](#footnote-ref-1)