# SUDAN

## Easterners

Activity: 1958-2020

**General notes**

* This movement includes two ethnic groups from Sudan’s east: the Beja and the (much less numerous) Rashaida. We combine the Beja and the Rashaida as one joint movement as they are both from eastern Sudan and (at times) mobilized together.

**Movement start and end dates**

The Beja Congress (BC), an organization making claims for a federal status within Sudan and a fairer distribution of resources, was established in the 1950s. According to International Crisis Group (2006), the BC was formed in 1958 while Global Security suggests 1952 – ICG is the more respected source, hence 1958 is coded as start date.

The BC was banned from 1960 until 1964, from 1969 until 1984 and again in 1989. Despite the bans, the BC continued to recruit and mobilize members (International Crisis Group 2006, 2013).

* The BC has been part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) since 1995. In 1999 another Easterner rebel group was formed, the Rashaida Free Lions. The Free Lions recruited mainly from the Rashaida, another ethnic group in Sudan’s east. The Free Lions have also made claims for increased self-determination (Assal 2013: 157-158).
* In 2005 the Free Lions and the BC established a fragile alliance and formed the Eastern Front.
* There was armed conflict between 1994 and 2006, when a peace agreement was signed. Implementation of the 2006 agreement was slow (Assal 2013: 153, 155; International Crisis Group 2013: 10-14).
* In 2011, the BC joined the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition of armed opposition groups (Global Security 2014; Thomson Reuters 2013).
* In 2015 and 2018, the Beja Congress called for the full implementation of the 2006 peace agreement (Dabanga 2015; Africa News 2018).
* The movement is ongoing. The Beja Congress continued to exist as of 2020 (Global Security 2014: Dabanga 2015; MRGI; ICG 2021), though since 2011 the Easterners’ self-rule claim had been voiced mostly through the rebel alliance SRF (Sudan Tribune 2013; Africa News 2018; BBC 2018; Anadolou Agency 2020; ICG 2021). In addition to the BC, the SRF comprised Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLAAW), and Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minnawi (SLA-MM) (Global Security 2014). Meanwhile, we could not find evidence of activities by the Rashaida Free Lions after the 2006 peace agreement. According to the International Crisis Group (2013: 24) calls for outright secession have become increasingly prevalent in recent years. [start date: 1958; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Since independence the people of eastern Sudan have struggled with the Khartoum governments for greater political autonomy and wealth sharing. The Beja Congress (BC), established in 1958 made claims for a federal status within Sudan and economic decentralization with fairer distribution of resources (International Crisis Group 2006, 2013). The BC continued its call for greater autonomy for the East also as a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which it joined in 1993 or 1995, depending on the source (Hewitt et al. 2008; International Crisis Group 2006; Young 2007). The Rashaida Free Lions, another Easterner rebel group formed in 1999, also made claims for increased self-determination (Assal 2013: 157-158).
* In 2005 the Free Lions and the BC established a formal yet fragile alliance and formed the Eastern Front (EF). The EF demanded a Sudan with a federal structure reflecting the six regions – South, North, Central, West, East and Khartoum. In the peace negotiations the EF furthermore demanded a rotating Presidency Council consisting of the governors of the six regions and redistribution of wealth based on population size (International Crisis Group 2006, 2013). Greater autonomy from Khartoum was also the claim of the protesters that were killed in Port Sudan by government forces in 2005 (Thomson Reuters 2013). Calls for outright secession have become increasingly prevalent in recent years and in 2012 activists for separation announced the establishment of the “Democratic Revolutionary Front for Eastern Sudan’s Liberation”, which calls for separation from Khartoum and creation of the “Democratic Republic of Eastern Sudan” (International Crisis Group 2013: 24). While proponents of independence seem to be on the rise, the claim to autonomy appears to be dominant throughout. [1958-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* ICG (2013: 24) suggests that calls for independence had become more prevalent at the time of writing. They refer to an organization called the Democratic Revolutionary Front for Eastern Sudan’s Liberation, which was formed in 2012. This is the earliest evidence for an organized independence movement we could find. The independence movement remained active as of 2020 (Amin 2020). [start date: 2012; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Easterners’ territorial claims are tied to the three eastern states Kassala, Red Sea, and Al Qadarif. These regions were formerly united under the Kassala region, until two administrative reforms in 1974 and 1994 (Law 2012). Despite these territorial changes, we found no evidence that the initial territorial claim would have changed. We code the territory based on the Global Administrative Areas Database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* EPR codes the Bejas as involved in armed conflict from 1983-2004 due to the SPLM/A insurgency and along with southern groups, such as the Dinka and the Nuer. We found no corroborating evidence to suggest that the Beja, who are located in eastern Sudan, were directly involved in the insurgency in southern Sudan – and, even if, the SPLM/A’s claims are focused on southern Sudan.
* That does not mean that the Easterners were not involved in separatist violence. International Crisis Group (2013: 3), for example, reports that the Beja Congress launched an armed struggle in April 1995. Other sources suggest that an insurgency had started already in 1994 (Assal 2013: 145; Hewitt et al. 2008; Thomson Reuters 2013).
* Several sources suggest that the insurgency lasted until 2006 (e.g., Assal 2013: 145).
  + According to a conflict summary by Hewitt et al. (2008): “[c]iting increasing poverty and perceived marginalization of the region, Easterners take up arms in 1994 and demand autonomy, increased power and wealth sharing, and greater control over the region’s resources. Over the course of a 13-year low-level insurgency, Eastern militants develop alliances with Southern Sudanese and Darfurian rebels, as well as Eritrea. Despite their alliance with Southern rebels, Eastern rebels demanded separate negotiations on the status of their region. Two main rebel factions united in February 2005 and continued hostilities until talks with Khartoum eventually produced a June 2006 ceasefire. Comprehensive peace agreement follows in October 2006, covering military and security issues and providing for power- and resource-sharing. Eastern rebels demobilize in December 2006. Southern rebels withdraw from the East in June 2006; renegade Southern elements may remain.”
* However, while there clearly was separatist violence, the available evidence would suggest that the 25 deaths threshold was likely not met.
  + UCDP/PRIO does not include the Easterner insurgency as such, but it does include an armed conflict between the NDA and the government of Sudan in 1996-2001. The Beja Congress had joined the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) in 1995, which sought both regime change and territorial self-determination. UCDP/PRIO does not report disaggregated casualty figures for the individual members of the alliance, however, and the NDA included many groups including but not limited to the Democratic Unionist Party, Sudan Alliance Force, the Communist Party, New Sudan Brigade, the SPLM/A, and the Umma Party.
  + UCDP/PRIO reports around 2,900 battle-related deaths in connection with NDA, and a significant share (more than half) appear to be in the Easterners’ claimed territory (Kassala, Red Sea, and Al Qadarif). Young (n.d.) similarly underlines the scale of the violence in eastern Sudan, which produced tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
  + Yet, according to suggestive evidence we found, most of the deaths should not be attributed to the Beja Congress. Specifically, according to Young (2007: 23), the Beja Congress was not a significant military force and limited itself to hit-and-run attacks along the border “which never seriously challenged the government”. The BC fighting force “did not number more than a few hundred at any time” and was furthermore tightly controlled by the Eritrean Army. Young explains that while there was significant violence conducted in eastern Sudan, this must be credited primarily to the involvement of the SPLM/A, a southern rebel group which at the time was part of the NDA.
  + This narrative is broadly backed up by ICG (2006: 6), which does cite a much higher estimate of the BC’s strength suggesting that 2,000 out of a total 8,000 to 9,000 NDA  
    forces in eastern Sudan were from the Beja Congress, but makes clear that this estimate stems from sources in the Beja Congress and is likely significantly inflated.
* Unfortunately, we were unable to find any casualty estimates specific to the Beja Congress beyond descriptions of single attacks in newspaper sources, which never exceeded 25 deaths in a year (in fact, far from that).
* Based on the available evidence, it appears that the LVIOLSD threshold was not met.
* The Beja Congress joined SRF, a rebel alliance, in 2011. SRF was involved in large-scale armed conflict between 2011 and 2018. However, according to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the armed conflict concerned the Dafur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile regions of the state. UCDP does not code any battle-related fatalities in the area claimed by the Easterners. Furthermore, MRGI suggests that the Beja/the BC have not taken up arms again by 2018, though they had threatened a return to armed conflict in 2015. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The history of Eastern Sudan is a history of occupation by outsider groups such as the Ancient Egyptians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Funj, Ottoman-Egyptians or British. Nevertheless, the Beja managed to maintainsome degree of autonomy and by the eighteenth century established themselves as the dominant people of eastern Sudan (Slight 2006).
* The Anglo-Egyptian administration was forced to withdraw from the country in 1885 after a religious leader named [Muhammad Ahmad](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ahmad) had begun to unify the tribes in 1881 and proclaimed himself the [Mahdi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahdi) ("guided one"). In the Mahdi period Eastern Sudan achieved a degree of recognition (Slight 2006). In 1889-1891 Darfur again fell to Anglo-Egyption forces. Under the British colonial regime, Sudan was treated as a single colony with eight provinces (Blue Nile, Darfur, Equatoria, Kassala, Khartoum, Kurdufan, Northern, Upper Nile). Northern and southern Sudan were however administered separately as part of a divide-and-rule policy. The eastern region of Kassala did not have a separate administrative status. Arabic and English dominated in the northern districts, while in the south several tribal languages such as Dinka, Nuer, and Bari had the official status of regional languages (Minahan 2002: 1787; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281). The Rashaida speak Arabic, but the Beja do not. There is no evidence of the Beja language (Bedawi) having had official status.
* In 1943, the north was prepared for separate self-government. In a reversal of policy, in 1946, the decision was taken to unify the northern and the southern districts into a single colonial province (Helata 2008; Seri-Hersch 2013). The constitution that was drafted in 1953 in continuance of previous policy foresaw a unitary style of government (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 9; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281-282).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to the International Crisis Group (2006), the Nimeiri regime introduced a regional system of government in 1980. However, although being well represented at the provincial and regional level (the Beja at one time controlled nine of eleven ministerial positions in the regional government), the representatives were labelled “sons of Nimeiri” as they were appointed by the central government, committed to working within the one-party system and “did not represent power being devolved to the people of the Province, or a recognition of the special needs of the Beja” (International Crisis Group 2006: 4). Hence we do not code a concession.
* In 1983 Khartoum imposed Sharia law throughout the country (Minorities at Risk Project). Even if the Beja and the Rashaida are Muslims, the introduction of Sharia law was generally resented by many as it is contrary to traditional practice (Jok 2012: 154). We code a cultural rights restriction in 1983. [1983: cultural rights restriction]
* Minahan (2002: 627) notes that new language laws and fundamentalist religious laws were adopted and enforced in the South and in Darfur after the 1989 coup of the National Islamic Front (NIF) (Minahan reports that the coup was in 1988 but it was in 1989). According to the International Crisis Group (2006: 5), the intensive Islamisation program also provoked resistance by some Muslim Beja, who saw their moderate Sufism being threatened. The regime also considered the “Beja’s pride in their ancient culture and tradition […] incompatible with the regime’s emphasis on an Arab-Islamic identity”. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
* Furthermore, the International Crisis Group (2006) also states that the NIF, in an attempt to exploit the East’s economic potential and “to centralise power and wealth in the hands of its ruling clique”, confiscated land and property and replaced the Beja governor (Mohamed Osman Karrar) of the Eastern Region with a riverain Arab army officer. [1989: autonomy restriction]
* An agreement mediated by Eritrea was signed in October 2006. The agreement had three major provisions: power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements. First, the deal gave senior members of the Eastern Front ministerial positions at both national and regional levels with one junior minister in Khartoum, an assistant to the president, an adviser to the president, eight parliamentary seats in Khartoum and 10 parliamentary seats in each of the three eastern states (Thomson Reuters 2013). The EF was granted the right to nominate deputy governors for the states of Kassala and Gedaref and was reserved ten seats in the legislatures of each of the three eastern states (Assal 2013: 148). Second, the agreement established the Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (ESRDF) with the aim to share wealth between the central government and the eastern states of Sudan. Third, the parties agreed to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of EF forces (International Crisis Group 2013). Eastern rebels demobilize in December 2006. In addition to these three general provisions, Assal (2013: 148) states that the agreement foresaw the encouragement of local languages in education and media. According to the International Crisis Group (2013: 10), the peace agreement was only “partially implemented” and the efforts by Khartoum to address the situation have been limited at best. We nevertheless code a concession, since the most relevant provision in this context, which is the legislative and executive positions for EF representatives at federal and state levels, was implemented. [2006: cultural rights & autonomy concession]
* There were significant developments after the ouster of long-term dictator Omar Bashir in 2019:
  + On August 17, 2019, four months after Bashir’s ouster, the revolutionary protest movement Forces for Freedom and Change and the Transitional Military Council signed a constitutional document to ferry Sudan through a transitional period to a civilian-led, democratic order. The agreement also enshrined a federal system (Davies 2022).
  + On October 3, 2020, Sudan’s Transitional Government and representatives of several armed group (including the Beja Congress) signed the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan. Under the terms of the agreement, Sudan is to be established as an asymmetric federation. The agreement also provides for power-sharing at the national level transitional justice mechanisms and the integration of rebels into the national security forces. Separate chapters address Darfur, the Blue Nile and Kordofan regions, and the Eastern regions. Under the agreement, Darfur , Blue Nile, Kordofan, would be granted significant autonomy, though only Blue Nile and Kordofan would acquire expansive autonomy immediately while the Darfur region must wait until April 2021 and would receive less autonomy. Under the Eastern Front Agreement, the eastern provinces would also receive a measure of autonomy, though autonomy rights are less fleshed out. Furthermore, the Beja Congress and other opposition groups are allocated 30% of seats in the executive and the legislature of Sudan’s three eastern provinces (Al-Ali 2021).
  + Yet, at the time of writing, the status of both the constitutional principles adopted in 2019 and the 2020 peace agreement remained unclear. In October 2021, the military mounted a coup and suspended the 2019 constitutional principles. By May 2022, the status of both the constitutional principles and the peace agreement remain unclear (Davies 2022). Therefore, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* The highly centralised state “gives federal authorities a near monopoly on revenue collection and control over both how much money is distributed to the states and how it is used (International Crisis Group (2006: 3). The absence of regional autonomy for the east is confirmed by EPR, where neither the Beja nor the Rashaida are coded as regionally autonomous. The 2019 constitutional principles and 2020 Juba Peace Agreement established federalism, but this has not (yet?) been implemented (see above). [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Sudan attained independence in 1956, two years before the start date. Thus we do not code a host change.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Easterners |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Beja; Rashaida |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 62503000; 62516000 |

**Power access**

* EPR distinguishes between two Eastern groups in Sudan: the Beja and the Rashaida. Jointly, they make up the Eastern self-determination movement. While the Beja are considered relevant throughout by EPR, the Rashaida are only coded relevant as of 2006, the year after the Rashaida Free Lions joined the Eastern Front. Since both groups are coded powerless in their periods of activity, the joint Easterners movement is also coded powerless throughout. [1958-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to EPR, the Beja (-2011: 0.06; post-2011: 0.09) and the Rashaida (0.002/0.003) together make up 0.062 of the total Sudanese population (0.093 after South Sudan’s secession in 2011). [1958-2011: 0.062; 2012-2020: 0.093]

**Regional concentration**

* It proved difficult to find reliable spatial population data in this case. According to GeoEPR, the Beja and Rashaida are both concentrated in the three eastern states, with no settlements outside these states where group members make up >25% of the local population. This makes it likely that the threshold for spatial concentration is met: The Beja and Rashaida numbered 2.21 million in 2010, while the three eastern states had a population of 3.908 million. We could not find more detailed population data, and on this basis code the movement as regionally concentrated. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Beja and the Rashaida are subsumed under the “Easterners’ movement. There are approx. 100,000 Rashaida in Eritrea. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Fur

Activity: 1960-1966; 1986-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to Minahan (2002: 627), Fur agitation towards self-determination emerged as a force following Sudanese independence and the creation of an Arab-dominated unitary state. Both Minahan (2002) and Salih (2005) report that the first self-determination organizations emerged in the early 1960s. Lacking clearer evidence we code 1960 as the start date. In 1966 the Fur movement was forced underground according to Minahan (2002: 627). Thus, we code an end to this first phase of separatist activity in 1966. [start date: 1960; end date: 1966]
* In 1986 the Front for the Renaissance of Darfur (FRD), an organization that had agitated for autonomy in the 1960s, resumed its activities (Salih 2005). We code a second movement onset in 1986 on this basis.
* The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) was formed in 2002. The SLM/A draws much of its support from the Fur group and has made claims for autonomy and secularism (Berlatsky 2015; Radio Dabanga 2015; Small Arms Survey 2020). In 2011 the SLM/A joined the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition aimed at replacing the government through armed insurrection. By 2016, the SLM/A’s al-Nur faction had split from the SRF in the context of SRF’s ongoing peace negotiations with the central government (UCDP 2022).
* The movement was ongoing as of 2020 (Reuters 2020: All Africa 2021: UCDP/PRIO; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). [start date 2: 1986; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The evidence on the Fur’s self-determination claims is relatively scarce. According to Minahan (2002: 627), “Fur separatism emerged as a force in 1956, following Sudanese independence and the creation of an Arab-dominated unitary state. In the early 1960s, the Sony Liberation Movement, based in Darfur, began agitation for the separation of the region from Sudan.” This suggests an independence claim. Salih (2005), however, states that the dominant claim was for autonomy. Minorities at Risk also portrays the Fur as an autonomist group, but they seem to refer to the post-2003 phase. Since we cannot establish which claim was dominant in the first phase we code the more radical claim, independence. [1960-1966: independence claim]
* Again, evidence is limited also in the initial years of the second phase. According to Salih (2005: 13), when the movement re-emerged in the 1980s it was initially centered around the aim of secession. In particular the Darfur Liberation Front made claims for independence according to Salih. [1986-2002: independence claim]
* In 2003 one of the major organizations associated with the movement, the Darfur Liberation Front, changed its name to the SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army). It also moderated its aim and henceforth has claimed autonomy. Another important rebel group, the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) also makes claims for the federalization of Sudan (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Thus, the dominant claim appears to have shifted to autonomy. We reflect this change already in 2003 because there was an escalation in that year.
* Notably, some sources including Minahan (2016: 151) suggest that the independence claim is dominant. However, most of the sources consulted suggest that the dominant claim made by the SLM/A post-2003 is for increased internal autonomy (Berlatsky 2015; Radio Dabanga 2015; US Department of State 2019; MAR). According to Roth (2015: 254) advocates of independence constitute a minority. [2003-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1960; end date: 1966] [start date 2: 1986; end date 2: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Fur consists of the Darfur province in Sudan (Minahan 2002: 624). A map can be found in (2015: 252). We code this claim using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas Database (GADM) for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* MAR codes a rebellion score of 3 (“local rebellion”) from 1985-1987, after which it remains below 3 until 2003. In partial agreement, Minahan (2002: 627) suggests that a Fur rebellion began in 1987 and that it continued at low intensity until the onset of the Darfur in 2003. Yet, this episode of conflict is not represented in UCDP/PRIO, and we could not find any evidence on casualties. If there was separatist violence, it was likely below the threshold, though the evidence is notably scarce.
* We code HVIOLSD in 2003 onwards based on Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019), who suggest the war terminated in September 2020. According to UCDP/PRIO, there continued to be low-level violence in 2021 in Darfur involving the rebel group SPLM/A (31 battle-related deaths). [1960-1966. 1986-2002: NVIOLSD; 2003-2020: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* 1st phase:
  + In the late 17th century there was large-scale conversion of Furs to Islam. For centuries there was a Fur kingdom, initially ruled by foreigners but increasingly nativized (Minahan 2002: 625-626). In 1874 (1821 according to Minorities at Risk) the Fur kingdom fell to Egypt. In 1889-1891 Darfur fell to Anglo-Egyption forces. Yet Darfur retained some automy: it was the only region of present-day Sudan that was not included in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan before it finally fell to the British in 1916 and was annexed to Anglo-Egyption Sudan as a province. The constitution that was drafted in 1953 in continuance of previous policy foresaw a unitary style of government (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 9; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281-282).
* 2nd
  + According to Minahan (2002: 627) Sudan granted Darfur limited autonomy and a regional assembly in 1980, but the Arabs continued to dominate the country. However, according to Fearon & Laitin (2005), autonomy was achieved de-facto and not granted explicitly by Khartoum. We do not code a concession. In 1983 Khartoum imposed Sharia law throughout the country (Minorities at Risk Project). Even if the Furs are Muslim, the introduction of Sharia law was resented by many Furs as it is contrary to traditional Fur practice (Minahan 2002: 627). We code a (prior) cultural rights restriction in 1983. [1983: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Minahan (2002: 627) notes that new language laws and fundamentalist religious laws were adopted and enforced in the South and in Darfur after the 1989 coup (Minahan reports that the coup was in 1988 but it was in 1989). [1989: cultural rights restriction]
* According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, “[i]n 1994 the administrative borders of Darfur [were] redrawn. Earlier Darfur had been one administrative territory but now it was divided up in three different, West, North and South Darfur. This was done by the government with the purpose to divide up the Fur tribe so that it would become a minority in all of the three territories. Before they had been in majority in the whole Darfur. Moreover, this administrative reformation created a lot of new positions and they were all given to Arabs. Put together these changes significantly reduced the power for the Fur and other African tribes.” [1994: autonomy restriction]
* In 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed. Only one of the various rebel groups – and not the most important one – signed it. The agreement included provisions on power sharing and a transitional regional government (covering all of Darfur). The leader of the rebel group that signed the agreement was appointed head of the regional government (UCDP). Yet the agreement was effectively not implemented. In particular, Minni Minawi – the rebel leader appointed as presidential adviser – was largely excluded from government decisions (International Crisis Group 2014: 3). Also, the 2006 agreement foresaw a referendum on Darfur’s future status. It has not been held. In sum, the agreement looks more like window dressing. We do not code a concession.
* Another peace agreement was signed in July 2011, the Doha agreement. The Doha agreement provided for power sharing at the national level and increased regional autonomy. However, implementation was sketchy at best, especially when it comes to the provisions on regional autonomy. According to the International Crisis Group (2014: 6): “Power sharing has been one of the most contentious issues, though the best implemented (even if only partially) DDPD section. A transitional Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) has been created, and LJM leaders and allies from civil society and the diaspora have been named to it and other institutional posts. Tijani Sese was appointed DRA chairman, a position that, per the DDPD, “comes directly after the Vice Presidents of the Republic”. However, LJM officials say, this is in protocol, and, unlike the vice presidents, Sese is not a Council of Ministers or National Security Council member. In principle, Darfur governors are deputies of the DRA executive, but as Doha did not agree on a unified region, most do not accept the DRA as a supra-state institution. NCP barons, notably North Darfur Governor Osman Mohammed Yusif Kibir, remain largely independent. A DRA official said only West Darfur Governor Haydar Galukuma accepts DRA authority. One of the few coalition leaders from the Masalit, the main West Darfur tribe, he is from the LJM and Sudan’s only non-NCP governor.“ But: “[i]mplementation has focused on individual appointments rather than steps with broader impact” and “[p]rovisions with impact on the ground have not been implemented” (International Crisis Group 2014: 6-7). We do not code a concession.
  + Notably, in circumvention of the peace negotiations, Khartoum unilaterally further fragmented Darfur by splitting the 3 existing Darfur region even further and creating two new regions in 2011 (International Crisis Group 2014: 5). This could be seen as an autonomy restriction, but we consider this too ambiguous.
* In 2016, the Sudanese government held a referendum on the status of Darfur. More than 97% of voters chose to remain as five separate states rather than form a single region (BBC 2016). The referendum was criticized for a number of reasons and is not recognized as legitimate by numerous actors including the U.S. government and rebel groups including the SLM/A, which had boycotted the referendum (BBC 2016: Chatham House 2016: ICG 2016). We do not code a concession.
* There were significant developments after the ouster of long-term dictator Omar Bashir in 2019:
  + On August 17, 2019, four months after Bashir’s ouster, the revolutionary protest movement Forces for Freedom and Change and the Transitional Military Council signed a constitutional document to ferry Sudan through a transitional period to a civilian-led, democratic order. The agreement also enshrined a federal system (Davies 2022).
  + On October 3, 2020, Sudan’s Transitional Government and representatives of several armed group (including the Beja Congress) signed the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan. Under the terms of the agreement, Sudan is to be established as an asymmetric federation. The agreement also provides for power-sharing at the national level transitional justice mechanisms and the integration of rebels into the national security forces. Separate chapters address Darfur, the Blue Nile and Kordofan regions, and the Eastern regions. Under the agreement, Darfur , Blue Nile, Kordofan, would be granted significant autonomy, though only Blue Nile and Kordofan would acquire expansive autonomy immediately while the Darfur region must wait until April 2021 and would receive less autonomy. Under the Eastern Front Agreement, the eastern provinces would also receive a measure of autonomy, though autonomy rights are less fleshed out. Furthermore, the Beja Congress and other opposition groups are allocated 30% of seats in the executive and the legislature of Sudan’s three eastern provinces (Al-Ali 2021).
  + Yet, at the time of writing, the status of both the constitutional principles adopted in 2019 and the 2020 peace agreement remained unclear. In October 2021, the military mounted a coup and suspended the 2019 constitutional principles. By May 2022, the status of both the constitutional principles and the peace agreement remain unclear (Davies 2022). Therefore, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Sudan attained independence in 1956, four years before the start date. Thus, we do not code a host change.
* The peace agreements have not been implemented to an extent that would allow us to code regional autonomy or a major territorial change (International Crisis Group 2014).

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Fur |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Fur |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 62505000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1960-1966: powerless; 1986-2002: powerless; 2003-2020: discriminated]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1960-1966: 0.02; 1986-2011: 0.02; 2012-2020: 0.03]

**Regional concentration**

* The Fur are concentrated in the Darfur region, where they make up 20% of the local population (Minahan 2002: 624). However, the Darfur region has been extended by the Sudanese government to include large non-Fur people, particularly Arabs in the north of Darfur. The Fur are concentrated in the south of Darfur in the region of Jebel Marra, where they also seem to form a majority. We could not find more detailed data. This case would profit from further research. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR there are no kin groups. However, since EPR only codes kin groups that are politically relevant, additional sources needed to be consulted. The Minorities at Risk data codes ‘Darfur Black Muslims’ as an umbrella group consisting of three different tribes (Fur, Zaghawa and Masali). For the Darfur Black Muslims’ MAR codes one kin group (Zaghawa, Massalit in Chad). Minahan (2002: 624) also mentions Fur population in northern Chad. However, the Fur population in Chad is too small to be considered here, which is why we do not code ethnic kin. [no kin]

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## Southerners

Activity: 1956-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In a dramatic reversal of policy, the British decided in 1946 to grant southern and northern Sudan joint independence. Previously the south and the north had been administered separately. At the 1947 Juba Conference, Southerner representatives agreed only under the condition that there would be explicit safeguards, including regional autonomy and inclusion in the central government (Ali et al. 2005: 197). As it became ever clearer that these preconditions would not be met, the Southerners began to contend for self-determination.
* The first evidence for organized activity we found is in 1950, when the Southern Liberation Party was formed to advocate federal status within Sudan and an equal share in development programs (Minahan 2002: 1788). 1950 is coded as start date. As Sudan did not become an independent state until 1956, we only code the movement from 1956, the year of Sudan’s independence. Violence erupted in 1955, one year before Sudan’s independence (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 9; Ali et al. 2005: 194; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281). Thus, we indicate prior violent activity.
* The post-independence period saw two major wars (1963-1972 and 1983-2005) and lower levels of conflict in several other years (see below).
* In 2005, the South signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government and the second war ended. Among other things the 2005 agreement conceded the South autonomy and foresaw the holding of a secession referendum in South Sudan. This referendum was held in January 2011, with the South Sudanese almost unanimously voting for independence. South Sudan became independent in July of the same year.
* Separate referendums were foreseen for Abyei (on joining the South) and the Blue Nile and South Kordofan area (on some undetermined form of autonomy). These three areas were awarded a special status due to their strategic location along the border and their resource wealth. The promised referendums in Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan have not been held so far. In these areas the Southerners’ agitation for self-rule is ongoing. In 2013, Abyei held a unilateral referendum on joining the South (Aljazeera 2013).
* As a consequence of South Sudan’s independence, the remnants of the SPLM/A rebranded in 2011/2012 and formed the SPLM-N. The SPLM-N participated in separatist insurgencies in Kordofan and Blue Nile areas (Radio Dabanga 2011; Maasho 2011; Small Arms Survey 2012)
* In 2017 the SPLM-N split into two factions on the subject of secularization and proposed negotiations with the state (Sudan Tribune 2020). Both factions proceeded to sign peace agreements with the Transitionary Government of Sudan in 2019-2020 (Radio Dabanga 2020; Dumo 2020). Still, continued separatist protests and limited violence have been reported (EEAS 2020). Therefore, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1950; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Fearon & Laitin (2005: 10) suggest that in the initial years of Sudan’s independence, the Southerners dominant claim was for autonomy within a federal Sudan. Minahan (2002: 1789) supports the contention that the Southerners initially lobbied for autonomy. Soon, however, significant factions demanded outright secession. One of the first appears to be Anya Nya, a rebel faction which fought in the First Sudanese War. Anya Nya was founded in 1963 (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Sudan Tribune). It is not clear whether the independence claim had already been dominant at the time. Fearon & Laitin (2005: 14), for instance, suggest that Southern rebels demanded a decentralized state during the negotiations leading to the 1972 autonomy arrangement. It was clearly a significant claim, however.
* In 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was founded, which soon became the most important organization associated with the Southerners’ movement. SPLM/A had the official aim of a united Socialist Sudan. However, despite this official policy, a significant part of SPLM/A strived for outright secession. The secessionist Anya Nya group also re-emerged in the 1980s (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* When the war came to an end, John Garang, the SPLM/A leader who had coined the official goal of a radically changed Sudan did not follow the originally espoused goal, but negotiated for an independent South Sudan.
* In sum, Anya Nya, the first significant organization with an outright secessionist claim, seems to have emerged in 1963, and even though parts of the movement continued to make (at least officially) claims for autonomy within Sudan, a very significant part demanded independence. Which of the two appears dominant is not fully clear, at least not until the 1990s (when it was clearly independence). Based on this, we code the more radical independence claim for 1963-2010 and an autonomy claim for 1956-1962. We reflect the change to an independence claim already in 1963 because Anya Nya was involved in the insurgency starting in that year. [1956-1962: autonomy claim; 1963-2010: independence claim]
* South Sudan became independent in July 2011. Separate referendums were foreseen for Abyei (on joining the South) and the Blue Nile and South Kordofan area (on some undetermined form of autonomy). However, the promised referendums in Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan have not been held so far. The main representative of the movement remained the SPLM/A and its various factions/successor organizations. The most common claim by these has been for autonomy (SPLM/A 2008; SLMA 2020), though especially in Abyei there are also claims for a merger with South Sudan (Aljazeera 2013; Sudan Tribune 2022). We reflect the autonomy claim already in 2011 because there was an escalation in precisely those areas where the autonomy claim was dominant. [2011-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1963; end date: 2011]

**Irredentist claims**

* See above. [start date: 2011; end date: ongoing]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed initially by the Southerners corresponds to the current borders of South Sudan as well as the South Kordofan region, the Blue Nile region, and Abyei. After the split of South Sudan in 2011, we code, starting from 2012, only the remaining areas: South Kordofan region, the Blue Nile region, and Abyei. We code the claimed area based on the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Violence erupted in 1955, one year before Sudan’s independence (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 9; Ali et al. 2005: 194; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281). We could not find precise information on casualties, but the account in Ali et al. (2005: 194) suggests that it must have been highly significant: “Societal anxieties and tensions, coupled with administrative overreaction and ineptness, created a highly volatile situation in southern Sudan. Violence erupted in 1955, when the [southern part of the] Torit garrison mutinied and was joined by [southern] civilians, police and prison guards. For about two weeks, Equatoria Province [in southern Sudan] became the dying fields for northerners, most of whom were civilians, including women and children. Government punishment was brutal, though many mutineers had fled into the bush or to neighboring countries.” Based on this, we code an episode of prior violence in the year preceding the first year we cover, 1956.
* Marshall & Gurr (2003) suggest violence continued after 1955, leading seamlessly into the 1963 civil war. In agreement with this notion, Ali et al. (2005) and Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 281) argue that the only years the conflict with the Southerners was inactive was 1972-1983. Yet, while there was guerilla activity between 1956 and 1962, it was limited and we found no evidence to suggest that the 25 deaths threshold was met in any year.
* HVIOLSD codings for 1963-1972 and 1983-2005 follow Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
* MAR’s rebellion score is four (“small-scale guerilla activity”) in 2006; yet, we found no evidence for continued fighting above the threshold.
* In 2010, a rebel group called SSDM/A (South Sudan Defence Movement/Army) started an insurgency (UCDP/PRIO). The SSDM/A consists of dissident SPLM/A members. Based on the UCDP/PRIO coding notes, this was not a conflict over self-determination as defined here, but was center-seeking. After 2011, the rebellion continued in independent South Sudan.
* The conflicts over Abyei and South Kordofan led to a resurfacing of violence. We code 2011-2016 as HVIOLSD based on Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
* The main rebel groups in the 2011-2016 group were SPLM/A-North and Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The SRF combines rebel groups in Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan areas. UCDP/PRIO suggests SRF continued to be involved in low-intensity conflict in 2017. Yet all 65 battle-related deaths included in UCDP/PRIO are in Darfur and not in Blue Nile or Kordofan; therefore, we do not code LVIOLSD in 2017.
  + Note: UCDP treats all violence after 1972 as over government. Regarding the 1983-2005/2006 conflict, UCDP suggests: “The leader of the [SPLM/A(/#/actor/466), from its formation until his death in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005, was John Garang. He continuously stated that he did not just seek a change in the status of the south, but rather a change in the Government of Sudan in its entirety. However, SPLM/A has seen internal divisions about how much focus should be placed on seeking independence/autonomy for what was the southern parts of Sudan up until July 2011 (present-day sovereign Republic of South Sudan), versus the amount of fighting-effort that should be made to achieve a change encompassing the whole of Sudan.” Similarly, the SRF (Sudan Revolutionary Front), which united groups from Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan areas and was the main actor in the 2011-2016/2017 war, sought changes both at the central government level as well as autonomy/secession. On this basis, we code the 1983-2005 and 2011-2016 episodes as ambiguous and over mixed motives.
* [1956-1962: NVIOLSD; 1963-1972: HVIOLSD; 1973-1982: NVIOLSD; 1983-2005: HVIOLSD; 2006-2010: NVIOLSD; 2011-2016: HVIOLSD; 2017-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Under the British colonial regime, Sudan was treated as a single colony, but the southern districts were administered separately from the northern districts as part of a divide-and-rule policy, which nonetheless allowed the Southerners a degree of autonomy. In contrast to the northern districts, where the Arab language dominated, in the southern districts English served as the official language, with several tribal languages such as Dinka, Nuer, and Bari having the status of regional languages (Minahan 2002: 1787; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 281). In 1943, the north was prepared for separate self-government. In a reversal of policy, in 1946, the decision was taken to unify the northern and the southern districts into a single colonial province, implying a loss of autonomy for the South because they were largely excluded from the government (Helata 2008; Seri-Hersch 2013). [1946: autonomy & independence restriction]
* Beginning in 1949, there was a gradual “Nordization” of southern education (Seri-Hersch 2013: 5). [1949: cultural rights restriction]
* In continuance of previous policy, the constitution that was drafted in 1953 foresaw a unitary style of government (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 9). We do not code a new restriction.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* There was a plan to send 1-1.5 million Northern settlers into the South in the early 1960s (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 13). It appears that the plan was not implemented, but relocation policies are not coded anyway.
* In 1972 the South was granted a regional government and local autonomy (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 458). The 1972 agreement recognized that English as the South’s principal language can be used in administration and would be taught in schools while reaffirming the status of Arabic as Sudan’s official language (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 14). The agreement ended the 1963-1972 civil war (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). [1972: cultural rights concession, autonomy concession]
* In 1981, Khartoum suspended the Southern Regional Assembly (Fearon & Laitin 2005: 17; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 282). [1981: autonomy restriction]
* In 1983, the autonomy arrangement was fully revoked (Minority Rights Group International 1997: 458). [1983: autonomy restriction]
  + Moreover, Khartoum imposed Sharia law throughout the country (Minorities at Risk Project. [1983: cultural rights restriction]
  + We code an onset of separatist war in 1983. Ali et al. (2005: 200) describe the imposition of sharia law as providing fertile ground for the rebellion, suggesting it preceded the outbreak of major violence. Similarly, the abolishment of autonomy is often seen as a trigger for the war (e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Addis\_Ababa\_Agreement\_(1972)).
* Minahan (2002: 627) notes that new language laws and fundamentalist religious laws were adopted and enforced in the South and in Darfur after the 1989 coup (Minahan reports that the coup was in 1988 but it was in 1989). [1989: cultural rights restriction]
* Since 1989 there were several attempts to mediate the conflict, in which Khartoum also offered autonomy, though without taking any serious steps towards implementation (e.g., in 1991 the country was territorially re-organized and Bashir promised devolution; and in 1996 Khartoum signed a peace agreement with some rebel factions (though not the SPLM/A, which made the agreement useless) that foresaw both a referendum and devolution, see Minorities at Risk Project). Hence, we do not code a concession (see Minahan 2002: 1790-1791; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
* In 2002, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government signed the Machakos Protocol, one of the first documents that would eventually make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005. The Machakos Protocol granted South Sudan the right to a referendum in six years to settle the issue of secession. The Machakos Protocol also lifted Sharia in the mostly non-Muslim South.
  + In 2003, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government agreed on an agreement on sharing oil wealth, which had previously been a major contentious issue as most of the oil fields are located in southern Sudan. The resulting agreement splits revenues evenly during the six-year interim period between the southern government and the national government (Keesing’s Record of World Events: December 2003). This is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. The two sides signed a further agreement on security arrangements on September 25, 2003. The agreement stipulated that South Sudan would maintain its own army during the six-year interim period, and that it would retain this army in the event that the referendum outcome is unity. Again, this is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.
  + In 2004, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government signed the Protocol on Power-Sharing, which stipulates the formation of a South Sudan regional government that would “exercise authority in respect of the people and States in the South.” Again, this is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.
  + In 2004, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government also signed the Resolution on the Abyei Conflict, which stipulated that “[s]imultaneously with the referendum for southern Sudan, the residents of Abyei will cast a separate ballot.” This separate ballot will determine, irrespective of the referendum results for southern Sudan, whether Abyei remains with the North, or whether it will be part of the South. The Resolution also gave Abyei special administrative status that would be represented by a locally elected Executive Council. Again, this is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. Furthermore, in 2004, the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government also signed the Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States. The protocol agrees that the boundaries of the territories remain unchanged. Both sides, however, pledge that “the diverse cultural heritage and local languages of the population of the State shall be developed and protected.” Also, while the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States were not entitled to a referendum in 2011, the two sides agreed to a system of “popular consultation” that determine the status of the states in the event of South Sudan’s secession. Again, this is one of the documents that make up the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.
  + Those concessions started to enter into force in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the 1983-2005 civil war (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). [2005: cultural rights concession, autonomy concession, independence concession]
* Another peace agreement was signed in 2007, but this did not deal with issues of self-determination (it was over demilitarization in Abyei) so this is not coded as a concession.
* In 2011, South Sudan gains independence from Sudan through referendum as agreed in earlier treaties. We do not code another concession.
* In 2011, Governor Haroun suspended the “popular consultations” on joining the South that were supposed to take place in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. Also, the referendum that was promised in Abyei was repeatedly delayed (Lexis Nexis). The narrative in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia suggests that the suspension of the referendums became evident before the outbreak of violent conflict in South Kordofan (https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/309). [2011: independence restriction]
* Based on a proposal by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan, the Minister for Cabinet Affairs announced on October 28 that there would be a referendum in October 2013 to resolve the Abyei issue (Keesing’s Record of World Events: October 2012). The referendum has not been held, thus we do not code a concession.
* In 2011 the Sudanese government dissolved the southern local governing body, the Abyei Administration, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) entered Abyei areas, leading to a continued conflict over the region alongside the dismissal and ousting of the local governor of the Blue Nile Region (Time World 2011: Sudan Tribune 2011) Craze 2011: Small Arms Survey 2015: Ottay and El-Sadany 2012). We code this as an autonomy restriction; notably, the above narrative suggests that restriction occurred before the emergence of violent conflict. [2011: autonomy restriction]
* There were significant developments after the ouster of long-term dictator Omar Bashir in 2019:
  + On August 17, 2019, four months after Bashir’s ouster, the revolutionary protest movement Forces for Freedom and Change and the Transitional Military Council signed a constitutional document to ferry Sudan through a transitional period to a civilian-led, democratic order. The agreement also enshrined a federal system (Davies 2022).
  + On October 3, 2020, Sudan’s Transitional Government and representatives of several armed group (including the Beja Congress) signed the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan. Under the terms of the agreement, Sudan is to be established as an asymmetric federation. The agreement also provides for power-sharing at the national level transitional justice mechanisms and the integration of rebels into the national security forces. Separate chapters address Darfur, the Blue Nile and Kordofan regions, and the Eastern regions. Under the agreement, Darfur , Blue Nile, Kordofan, would be granted significant autonomy, though only Blue Nile and Kordofan would acquire expansive autonomy immediately while the Darfur region must wait until April 2021 and would receive less autonomy. Under the Eastern Front Agreement, the eastern provinces would also receive a measure of autonomy, though autonomy rights are less fleshed out. Furthermore, the Beja Congress and other opposition groups are allocated 30% of seats in the executive and the legislature of Sudan’s three eastern provinces (Al-Ali 2021).
  + Yet, at the time of writing, the status of both the constitutional principles adopted in 2019 and the 2020 peace agreement remained unclear. In October 2021, the military mounted a coup and suspended the 2019 constitutional principles. By May 2022, the status of both the constitutional principles and the peace agreement have remained unclear (Davies 2022). Therefore, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Autonomy was established in 1972 and revoked in 1983. We do not code regional autonomy in 1983, in deviation from January 1 rule, because the autonomy revocation led to civil war. [1973-1982: regional autonomy]
* The 2005 CPA gave autonomy to the South (see above); the Abyei Protocol also gave autonomy to Abyei, which continues to be part of the North. However, Abyei’s autonomy was revoked in 2011 (see above). Abyei is notably just a small part of the Southerner population; since South Sudan’s secession in 2011, the Nubas in South Kordofan and the Southerners in Blue Nile State make up the majority of the remaining Southerners in Sudan (about 95%) and they do not have autonomy. Thus, we stop coding the Southerners as autonomous in 2010.
  + Note: we do not code regional autonomy in 2011 in violation of the January 1 rule because in that year, the conflicts in South Kordofan and Abyei escalated, and those areas did not/no longer had autonomy. This coding better reflects case history. [2006-2010: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Sudan attained independence in 1956, implying a host change. [1956: host change (new)]
* [1972: erection of regional autonomy]
* [1983: revocation of regional autonomy]
* [2005: erection of regional autonomy]
* [2011: independence]
* We do not code the 2011 revocation of Abyei’s autonomy as a major change as the area makes up just a small part of the group.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Southerners |
| *Scenario* | 1:n/1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Azande; Bari; Dinka; Latoka; Nuba; Nuer; Other Southern groups; Shilluk/Nuba |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 62501000; 62502000; 62504000; 62506000; 62507000; 62508000; 62511000; 62513000/62507000 |

* Up until 2011, EPR distinguishes between eight Southern groups in Sudan: the biggest group is the Dinkas, followed by the Nuer. Five smaller groups are also coded (Azande, Bari, Lakota, Nuba, and Shilluk) as well as an umbrella group covering all remaining (smaller) Southern group. Jointly, they make up the Southerners.

**Power access**

* Until 2006, all Southern groups are coded as powerless. In 2006, the Dinka attain junior partner status due to a 2005 peace agreement, according to which the vice-presidency is given to the SPLM (the major self-determination organization). Since this position was consistently held by a Dinka (Garang and Kiir, respectively) EPR codes the Dinkas as junior partners. Other Southern groups, in particular the Nuer, also gained some influence, but this is not considered significant enough to qualify for a junior partner coding. Since the Dinkas dominate the self-determination movement, and since the second biggest Southern group, the Nuer, also gained some influence, we code the Southerners as junior partner in 2006-2010. [1956-2005: powerless; 2006-2010: junior partner]
* In 2011, South Sudan became independent. However, separatist agitation continued in some of the areas that remained with Sudan, namely by i) the Nubas in South Kordofan, ii) the Ngok (a sub-group of the Dinkas) in Abyei, and iii) by various smaller Southerner tribes in the Blue Nile state. EPR, however, stops coding all Southerner groups in 2011, except for one, the Nubas. The Nubas are coded as powerless in 2012, and the International Crisis Group (2013a, b) reports that also the other Southerner groups remaining in Sudan were marginalized, hence we code the Southerners as powerless in 2012. [2012: powerless]
* We also apply a powerless code in 2011. In that year, the conflicts in Abyei and Kordofan escalated, and Southerners who remained in Sudan were marginalized. This coding does not respect the January 1 rule, but it better reflects the case history. [2011: powerless]
* Despite the shift towards a joint civilian transitionary council in 2019 which does feature one minister from Kordofan it is difficult to assess the degree of Southerner access to power in the new governments (Andolou Agency 2019). EPR does not code any significant change for the southerner groups from 2013-2020 on the grounds “that with continuing inter-communal violence until 2021 and little progress in the political transformation, it seems too early to decide whether the power relations changed significantly. Therefore, the coding remains the same, despite the regime change” (Girardin 2021: 1794). We follow EPR’s assessment for coding power access of southerner groups. [2013-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* The sum of the Azande (.02), Bari (.02), Dinka (.1), Lakota (.01), Nuba (.05), Nuer (.05), Shilluk (.01), and Other Southern groups group (.08) sizes, which does not change over time in EPR (until 2012), is 34%. [1956-2010: 0.34]
* For the post-2011 period, we need to combine i) the Nubas in South Kordofan, ii) the Ngok (a sub-group of the Dinkas) in Abyei, and iii) by various smaller Southerner tribes in the Blue Nile state. According to EPR, the Nubas have a group size of .07. To this, we need to add the Southerner groups in Abyei and Blue Nile state. Abyei, on the one hand, is estimated to have a population of about 100,000 (WHO), but this may include non-Dinkas (we were unable to get a more detailed estimate). The ethnically heterogeneous Blue Nile state, on the other hand, is home to more than a million (1 to 1.2 million according to International Crisis Group 2013b: 2), again including non-Southerners. The International Crisis Group (2013b: 3) estimates that around half of Blue Nile are “indigenous”, that is, Southerners. With Sudan’s total population of around 30 million, this yields a group size of about .07+((550,000+100,000)/30,000,000)=.0917.
  + Note: we apply the change already in 2011 because of the escalations in Abyei and South Kordofan. [2011-2020: 0.0917]

**Regional concentration**

* The Southerners were concentrated in the South Sudan, where they made up 88% of the population (Minahan 2002: 1785). This amounts to 5,962,000 Southerners (in 2002), which is more than 50% of the 7.5 million Southerners in the whole of Sudan in that same year. We thus code the Southerners regionally concentrated. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* The Southerners have kin for example in neighboring Ethiopia (approx. 200,000 Nuer, see Joshua Project). The Azande have kin in DRC and Chad (see MAR, EPR). After 2011, there is also kin in South Sudan. [kin in neighboring country]

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