# TANZANIA

## Maasai

Activity: 1992-2020

**General notes**

* Some references are made to ‘pastoralists’, which include the Maasai but also other groups.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence for separatist mobilization we were able to find is in 1992, when opposition movements were legalized and the Institute for Maasai Education, Research, and Conservation (MERC) started operating in Tanzania (see MERC Online). MERC had been formed in Kenya in 1987. The goal of MERC is to “offer community organizing and leadership to efforts of the Maasai community of East Africa for self-determination, land justice, cultural survival, and economic empowerment”.
* According to Minahan (2016: 254), “Maasai activists in both Kenya and Tanzania continue to work for the reunification and independence of Maasailand.”
* In 2022 leaders from the Maasai community in Loliondo made a statement to a UN working group calling for the protection of human and land rights following forced evicitions (All Africa 2022). This indicates a strong claim for increased autonomy for the Maasai in Tanzania.
* Note: Roth (2015: 277f) suggests that the Maasai were advocating for an independent state around Tanzania’s independence, but we could find no confirming evidence for organized separatist activity at this time. [start date: 1992; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Prior to the independence of Tanzania, the Maasai lobbied for an independent Maasailand. This claim has persisted, with the aim of reuniting the Maasai on both sides of the Tanzania-Kenya border (Minahan, 2002: 1126; 2016: 254; Danver, 2015: 59). The main group representing the Maasai is MERC, established in 1992 in Tanzania (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). On MERC’s website, the main claim is the promotion of land rights (MERC, nd: Online). This reinforces the claim by Roth that “the push for an independent Maasailand is far from a priority for Maasai people today, though they still seek greater autonomy over their territory” (2015: 278). This focus on land rights is also observed by Cultural Survival, who notes that this was the priority of the Tanzanian Maasai throughout the 1990’s (Cultural Survival, 1997: Online). Additionally, in 2022 leaders from the Maasai community in Loliondo made a statement to a UN working group calling for the protection of human and land rights following forced evicitions (AllAfrica, 2022: Online). Autonomy and land rights has been the domninant claim, with no indication of serious independence claims by the Maasai or organisations representating them in Tanzania. [1992-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There are no politically significant independence claims in Tanzania’s post-independence phase (see above). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Minahan (2002: 1122) notes that Maasailand in Tanzania are focused around the province of Arusha. We code the claim using GREG settlement areas, which corresponds with the map in Roth (2015: 270).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* In the context of forced evictions, there was one reported death of a police officer in 2022 (OHCHR 2022). This does not meet the threshold for separatist violence. No other evidence for separatist violence as found. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Maasai originated along the Nile and Lake Turkan in Northern Kenya. By the mid 17th century, they had arrived west of Mt Kilimanjaro in present day Tanzania. They expanded southwards until stopped by other tribes in 1830’s, and reaching the coast by 1859. The height of Maasai power is considered to be around the 1870’s (Minahan, 2002: 1123-4; 2016: 253; Danver, 2015: 68).
* The Maasai were contacted by German missionaries in 1848 but avoided conversion. The British were interested in Maasailand to create a land corridor between Mombasa and Lake Victoria. Through diplomacy, the Maasai accepted British rule, but Maasailand was divided by the Kenyan-Tanganyika border agreed between Britain and Germany in 1890 (Minahan, 2002: 1124; 2016: 254). The Maasai were unable to effectively resist because they were severely weakened by a smallpox outbreak that killed approximately 75% of the population throughout the 1890’s (Minahan, 2002: 1124). After WWI, the British took over Tanganyika under a League of Nations mandate in 1922 (Danver, 2015: 685), but despite demands to reunify Maasailand under a single administration, the pre-war border maintained split colonial administration over Maasailand (Minahan, 2002: 1124). Under British rule, agriculturalists were allowed to encroach on Maasai pastoralist lands, creating inter-ethnic rivalry. Land pressures were also applied by the establishment of game reserves, such as the Serengeti National Park in 1929 and the Mkomazi Game Reserve (MGR) in 1951, which evicted and limited traditional activities of Maasai people (Cultural Survival, 1998: Online). Maasai dissatisfaction was expressed during the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya through the Maasai United Front (MUF), demanding a separate independence for Maasailand (Minahan, 2002: 1125; Roth, 2015: 277).
* Tanganyika gained independence from Britain in December 1961, and united with the United Republic of Zanzibar in April 1964 to become the United Republic of Tanzania (Danver, 2015: 685). Tanzania became a one party state in July 1965, which appropriated and nationalized Maasai lands, leading to further alienation and discrimination against Maasai people (Minahan, 2002: 1125, 2088). The primary issue facing the Maasai in an independent Tanzania was land pressure (Minahan, 2002: 1125). The national parks and reserves established under British rule were a crucial source of income for Tanzania, so these reserves were incrementally enlarged whilst land use rights of the Maasai were gradually restricted, such as in 1975 when all cultivation was restricted in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) (Cultural Survival, 1997: Online). These land pressures led to unsuccesful appeals to the government to stop such encroachments (Minahan, 2002: 1125-6), but facilitated the emergence of a Maasai SDM movement in the form of the Maasai Environmental Resource Coalition (MERC) in 1992 (formed in Kenya in 1987). This was due to the ending of the single party system in Tanzania, which allowed such groups to merge (Minahan, 2002: 1126, 2089). This group demanded a independent, unified Maasailand.
* Maasai were forcibly evicted in 1988 from the MGR to allow for the cultivation of wheat and barley by Tanzania Breweries Limited (TBL) (Cultural Survival, 1997: Online; 1998: Online). This action has been the primary driver of interaction between the Maasai and Tanzanian government in the courts during the following decades. It is also a major restriction on autonomy of the Maasai on land rights, continuing from the develelopments on national parks in the 1970’s. [1988: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1992 the Tanzanian government issued a license for a ‘wildlife corridor’, or exclusive luxury hunting zone, to Ortello Business Corporation (OBC), owned by UAE royalty. This granted hunting rights on land which was home to 60,000 Maasai, who have been persistently subjected to forced evictions and violence (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). Note: it is not clear whether this restriction was made before or after the SDM’s start date. [1992: autonomy restriction]
* In response to private land rights cases brought against the Tanzanian government, it proposed a National Land Policy in 1995 (Cultural Survival, 1997: Online). This was delivered in 1997, formalizing land dispute and compensation mechanisms, but reaffirmed the power of the central government to control the use of land. Despite its promises, it was a framework that restricted the possibility of successful land claims by pastoralist groups, including the Maasai (Land Links, 2016: Online). We do not code a concession.
* The Village Land Act of 1999 provided a route for land recognition of the pastoralist Maasai. Although there was no category for grazing land recognition, grazing grounds could for the first time be claimed as legally occupied and therefore protected. This occupied grazing land came under some control of village councils, who could grant or deny use of this land to foreign companies under stipulated conditions (Land Links, 2016: Online). Although the land at large was still under formal control of the government, it was a move that provided meaningful control over land use as defined by the pastoralist Maasai. [1999: autonomy concession]
* It should be noted that the above Village Land Act was part of a policy of ‘Decentralization by Devolution’ in Tanzania during the late 1990’s. However, there is no evidence of what executve power in these 30 devolved units looks like, or whether this had any impact on Maasai self determination (beyond the Village Land Act 1999), and therefore no concession is coded.
* The Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009 established the NCA as a protected area and UNESCO World Heritage Site. This placed a severe restriction to land rights of pastoralist Maasai by prohibiting their livestock from grazing on the land without permission of the zones director and exposing them to eviction without provision of alternative housing (as pastoralists did not have sufficient security for housing under the law) (Laltaika, 2013: 57-60). [2009: autonomy restriction]
* In 2013, the Tanzanian government extended the license to the OBC (originally granted in 1992), expanding the ‘wildlife corridor by 1,500 sq km and threatening 30,000 Maasai with eviction. [2013: autonomy restriction]
* Under international pressure, the extension of the wildlife corridor was reversed in 2015 and, in November 2017, the government revoked all licenses from OBC on grounds of corrupt practices (Minority Rights Group, 2018: Online). However, on December 6th 2017, the Prime Minister announced OBC would be allowed to stay and that the area would be overseen by a special authority (Indigenous Africa, 2020a: Online). We do not code a concession.
* In reference to the above 1988 autonomy restriction from the evictions of the MGR, the Maasai brought the case to the Tanzanian Supreme Court in 1994. Despite being beyond the statute of limitations, the court did grant the right to limited compensation, but refused to order the return of the land. This is noted by Cultural Survival as a failure of the state to decide on whose claim was superior, the game reserves and national parks or the Maasai communities living on them (Cultural Survival, 1998: Online). The case of the eviction of the Maasai by the TBL (and later Tanzania Conservation Limited, TCL) was brought back to the courts in 2010, with the objective of returning the land. The case was dismissed in 2013, returned, and lost in 2015. This closed the issue of the eviction from Maasai land by the Tanzanian government.
* On the 13th and 14th of November in 2017, 185 Maasai homesteads were burned down in the Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro Conservation area, rendering around 6,800 Maasai homeless. These area were supposed to be protected under the 1999 Village Act, so this action represents a reversal of this legal protection through arbitrary land grabs by the Tanzanian government (Nexis 2017). [2017: autonomy restriction]
* In 2019 the Tanzanian government developed a Multiple Land Use Model, following recommendations by UNESCO, that failed to consult with the Maasai. This planned to divide the NCA into four zones, with only 18% set aside for human habitation. This expanded the scale on restrictions and evicitions first set out in the 2009 Wildlife Conservation act in the NCA (Indigenous Africa, 2020b: Online). [2019: autonomy restriction]
* In February 2022, the Tanzanian parliament debated policy changes “to expedite the removal of the Maasai from the NCA [Ngorongoro Conservation Area]”, with parliament strongly on the side of the evictions (Oakland Institute, 2022: Online). On the 6th June, the Arusha Regional Commissioner announced the decision to turn 1,500 sq miles of protected village act land into a game reserve, implying the eviction of up to 70,000 Maasai. On the 7th and 8th of June 700 members of the security forces deployed to the area, with live ammuniation used, 30 minor injuries, and the death of one police officer. This represents a de facto reversal of a legal garuntee for the Maasai to live in the area that has been in olace since the 1950’s and is a autonomy restriction (OHCHR, 2022: Online). (However, 2022 is beyond the temporal coverage of this dataset).

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Maasai |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Maasai |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 51004000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.013]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes regional concentration, but EPR applies a lower bar. Minahan (2002: 1122) similarly suggests regional concentration (91% of Maasais live in regional base where they make up 54% of local population), though it should be noted that the figures provided by Minahan refer to a cross-border area covering parts of Kenya and Tanzania. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1222), there are around 450,000 Maasai in neighboring Tanzania. This matches with information from MAR and EPR. [kin in adjacent country]

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## Zanzibaris

Activity: 1964-2020

**General notes**

* The Shirazi group is often associated with a broader Swahili population in Africa, leading to some sources to place the Shirazi under the Swahili umbrella.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first evidence of organized separatist activity we found is in 1955, when the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP) was formed. Note: originally, the ZNP was called the National Party of Subject of the Sultan of Zanzibar (NPSSZ). Other Zanzibari nationalist parties soon developed, including the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP). In late 1963 Zanzibar attained independence (thus ending the anti-colonial movement). After a coup against the local sultan in 1964, Shirazi Sheik Abeid Karume declared Zanzibar a people’s republic in January 1964. Severe violence followed, in which Arabs and Asians were primarily targeted (Minahan 2002: 2088).
* In October 1964, Zanzibar united with Tanzania. A Zanzibari national movement immediately developed (Minahan 2002: 2088; Hewitt et al. 2008). Based on this, we code the start date 1964, the year of the merger with Tanzania. The 1964 purges were not violence over separatism, thus we do not code separatist violence.
* The ZNP continued to operate. Donge and Liviga (2008) suggest that separatism remained organized in the late 1970s-1980s and had permeated Zanzibari politics. There is yearly activity from 1989-1999 according to Minorities at Risk, and Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 328) note that separatist activity increased in the 1980s. In particular, separatism flared in 1984-1985 and 1994-1995, both during election seasons. In 1992, the Civic United Front (CUF) was founded to fight for separatism in Zanzibar.
* Another organization, Uamsho, was found in 2001 as a religious organization aimed at Zanzibari secession. It has remained active as of 2020 (Roth 2015: 278). Meanwhile, the CUF continued to make self-rule claims as well as it kept up its “fightfor a better union for the people of Zanzibar” (Seif Sharif Hamad 2020). [start date: 1964; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The CUF is the primary organization representating Zanzibaris and its stated aim is to renegotiate the Union Treaty of 1964 to gain greater autonomy (Cameron, 2019: 193-4). CUF was formed in 1992 and the period before that is more difficult to code because of one-party rule and because information is more scarce. What is clear, though, is that different Zanzibari groups have always made claims for both increased internal autonomy and full independence (Minahan, 2002: 2089: Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000: 329). According to both Minorities at Risk and Minority Rights Group International, these diverging claims run along ethnic lines: Whereas “Arabs have been more fervent in their secessionist desire” the Shirazi tend to “favour enhanced autonomy” (Minority Rights Group International). The Shirazi are more numerous, making up around 75% of Zanzibar’s population, so we code autonomy as the dominant claim throughout. [1964-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Multiple sources indicate concurrent independence claims by different Zanzibari groups, with the Arab population being more supportive of independence (Minahan 2002: 2089: Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 329; MRGI). [start date: 1964; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Zanzibaris is the Zanzibar archipelago (Minahan 2002). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Despite yearly violent attacks, there have not been enough deaths to classify any year as LVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Persian traders established bases on the islands in the 1st century AD, with its colonies attracting larger migrations of merchants from the 10th-12th centuries. During this period, enslaved mainland Africans were bought to the island, with many eventually integrating with the Persian groups to become the Shirazi. Arab populations also established trading posts along the east African coast and Zanzibar at this time. (Minahan, 2002: 2086; Minahan, 2016: 472)
* Following a visit from Portuguese explorer Vasco de Gama in 1499, the Portuguese conquered the islands in 1509. The Omani Arabs ousted the Portuguese from the Islands in 1652 and they became a part of the Omani Empire in 1698 (Minahan, 2002: 2087; Minahan, 2016: 472; Cameron, 2019: 181; Danver, 2015: 685). Omani influence and colonization increased during the 1700’s with the Omani Sultan moving the capital to Zanzibar in 1832 (Minahan, 2002: 2087; Cameron, 2019: 181; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000: 328). Both trade and the presence of slavery on the islands drew the attention of the British Empire from 1841, so when Zanzibar underwent independence from Oman between 1858-1861, it came under increased British influence (Cameron, 2019: 181; Minahan, 2002: 2087; Danver, 2015: 685).
* An agreement between the British and German Empires saw the mainland (Tanganyika) ceded to Germany, with Zanzibar becoming a British protectorate in 1890 (Minahan, 2002: 2087; Cameron, 2019: 182; Roth, 2015: 328; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000: 328). Despite moves such as abolishing slavery, the British maintained the rigid social hierarchy of ethnic Arab dominance over Shirazi. Once Zanzibar was separated from the territory of Kenya in 1925, the British established an legislative assembly with political parties made along ethnic lines, maintaining Arab dominance up until independence (Minahan, 2002: 2088; Cameron, 2019: 183). After World War I, Germany lost Tanganyika, and it became a British Mandate (under the League of Nations) in 1922 (Danver, 2015: 685). This territory gained independence on December 9th 1961 (Cameron, 2019: 182).
* The ethnic based legislative assembly led to the Sultan declaring Zanzibar independent on 10th December 1963. However, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) saw this as an Arab dominated move, leading to the Sultanate being overthrown on 12th January 1964 and the following days seeing the massacre of approximately 10,000 Arab Zanzibaris in what is now called the Zanzibar Revolution (Minahan, 2002: 2088; Cameron, 2019: 185). In order to dilute what was perceived to be the excesses of the revolution, in April 1964 the Peoples Republic of Zanzibar signed a Union treaty with the United Republic of Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania (Minahan, 2002; 473; Cameron, 2019: 185; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000: 328; Roth, 2015: 278; Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). [1964: independence restriction]
* The Union Treaty gave Zanzibar significant autonomy from the beginning of the Tanzanian state, with the allocation of the President and Vice -President posts between the Islands and Mainland, whilst “areas such as health, primary and secondary education, agriculture, cooperatives, and any other residual powers were the constitutional prerogatives of Zanzibar” (Cameron, 2019: 187-8). [1964: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In July 1965 Tanzania was declared a single party state. This suppressed any nascent nationalist movements, including those on the Zanzibar Islands, from making autonomous decisions outside of the remit of the ASP (Minahan, 2002: 2088).
* The period between 1965 and 1977 saw persistent decline in the level of autonomy held by the Zanzibar Islands. This culminated in the 1977 constitutional changes, which saw the establishment of a pan-union party, the Revolutionary Party (CCM), made up of the ASP and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010; Cameron, 2019: 189; CSIS, 2016: Online). This shifted the center of power to the mainland, as well as claiming natural resources for the central government (Cameron, 2019: 194) and reducing the autonomy of Zanzibar’s Central Bank (CSIS, 2016: Online). [1977: autonomy restriction]
* Constitutional reform in 1979 was implemented to avert a nationalist crisis on the Zanzibar islands (Minahan, 2002: 2088). This established a house of representatives on Zanzibar to replace the autocratic assembly bought in during 1964. Although the one party system remained in place, it allowed for the election of the head of the CCM by Zanzibaris (Cameron, 2019: 189-190). [1979: autonomy concession]
* In recognition of the dissatisfaction about the status on Zanzibaris in the 1977 constitution and their economic situation, the President of Tanzania resigned in 1984 (Cameron, 2019: 187; Minahan, 2002: 2089). This began a process of reconciliation, particularly towards the Zanzibari Arabs, thoughout the 1980’s (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). A new constitution for Zanzibar came into force in January 1985 which enhanced the House of Representatives, allowing for universal suffrage and allowing representatives from Zanzibar to attend the central National Assembly of Tanzania.
* Constitutional reform in January 1992 ended the single party system. However, new parties were not allowed to be established along ethnic or cultural lines. Despite this, the Civic United Front (CUF) representing Zanzibaris was formed in 1992 from formerly clandestine nationalist groups. This allowed for institutionalized representation of the interests of the Zanzibaris in regional and national assemblies. (Minahan, 2002: 2089; Cameron, 2019: 193).
* Further constitutional reform in October 1993 gave greater autonomy to the government of Zanzibar. [1993: autonomy concession]
* Zanzibar used this autonomy to temporarily join the Organisation for Islamic Countries. However, the central government reversed this move after ruling that a non-soverign entity (ie Zanzibar) could not join such a body (Cameron, 2019: 193; Minahan, 2002: 2089; Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010). We do not code a restriction because it is not sufficiently clear whether the central government’s intervention reversed a specific right previously granted to Zanzibar.
* The death of Tanzania’s long time president, Julius Nyerere, led to a loosening of mainland control over the Zanzibar Islands. In response, the CCM negotiated with the CUF. The result of this negotiation in 1999 was for the CUF to support the CCM in the central, national assembly in return for greater autonomy of Zanzibar (Minahan, 2002: 2090). However, this did not prevent violence following the 2000 election. [1999: autonomy concession]
* A power sharing agreement between the CCM and CUF was approved in 2009, prior to the 2010 election. This included the CUF within the government as a junior partner. The CCM won a narrow victory over the CUF, but a Government of National Unity (GNU) was established in 2010 following a referendum and delivering some improved governance to Zanzibaris such as direct access to the executive (Vogt et al, 2015; Cederman et al, 2010; Cameron, 219: 198; Minority Rights Group: Online). This refers to the central state and is therefore not coded here.
* Zanzibari nationalists continued to propose reform to have a greater say in union politics. A draft constitution was sent to parliament in 2014, but this was watered down and the referendum on it indefinitely postponed (Cameron, 2019: 198). This created a hostile atmosphere in the 2015 election which gave the CCM a free hand in governing the union and the political estrangement of Zanzibar from the mainland (Minority Rights Group: Online; Cameron, 2019: 201).

**Regional autonomy**

* Zanzibar had a significant level of autonomy throughout 1964-2012, although declining from 1965-79 (cf. EPR). It should be noted though that Zanzibari politics were dominated by the Shirazi group whereas the smaller group of Zanzibari Arabs was not meaningfully represented in the regional government. Notably, universal suffrage was only extended to Zanzibari Arabs in 1985. [1964-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

N/A

**Major territorial changes**

* [1964: host state change (new), establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Zanzibaris |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Shirazi (Zanzibar Africans); Zanzibar Arabs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 51002000; 51003000 |

**Power access**

* EPR suggests that there are three groups living on Zanzibar: the largest are the Shirazi, the indigenous African inhabitants of the island. Then there are also Arabs (Africans with Arab descent) and Africans from the mainland. The EPR coding notes suggest that the Shirazi and the Arabs both form part of the movement for Zanzibari self-determination. MAR suggests the same, as does Minahan (2002: 2085-2086). Re power access, EPR codes both the Arabs and the Shirazi as powerless from 1985 onwards. From 1964-1984, EPR codes the Shirazi as powerless and the Arabs as discriminated against. Given that the Shirazi make up about 75% of the Zanzibari movement, we code the Zanzibaris as powerless during that period.
* Note that, since 1995, Tanzania’s vice presidency has gone to a person from Zanzibari origin and the 2010 Government of National Unity (GNU) guaranteed Zanzibari access to the executive (Cameron 2019: limited 198). However, the EPR coding notes explain that despite this, Zanzibari influence remained strictly and that representation was effectively token. On this basis, EPR codes both Zanzibari groups as powerless also after 2010. We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* All sources also suggest comparable group sizes: EPR suggests a combined (ie Shirazi and Arabs) 2.3%; MAR 2.8%, and Minahan (2002: 2085) in combination with WB estimate of Tanzania's population in 2002 2.7%. We draw on Minahan. [0.0272]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 2085), the Zanzibaris made up 92% of Zanzibar’s population and >95% of all Zanzibaris in Tanzania lived in Zanzibar at the time. This matches with information from EPR, which codes both the Shirazi and Zanzibari Arabs as regionally concentrated. MAR also suggests regional concentration and that >75% Zanzibaris live in their regional base. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* Neither EPR, MAR, nor Minahan (2002) provide evidence for numerically significant transborder ethnic kin. [no kin]

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