# UGANDA

## Ankole

Activity: 1962-1972; 1993-2020

**General notes**

* The Ankole are also referred to as Banyankole.

**Movement start and end dates**

* British colonial policy gradually reduced the Ankole kingdom’s powers, sparking a separatist movement (Minahan 2002: 132). According to Minahan, agitation for autonomy or separate independence swept the Ankole kingdom in the late 1950s, but after extensive negotiations the Banyankole accepted semi-federal status within an independent Uganda. Since Uganda did not become independent until 1962 and since separatist activity appears to have continued straight through independence, we code movement activity from 1962. We note prior activity though we lack a clear indication as of when the movement started. The first evidence of organized activity we found is the above-mentioned agitation in the late 1950s. Based on this, we peg the start date to 1958. We found no separatist violence before independence, and thus indicate prior non-violent activity.
* In 1966 amid growing tensions and moves toward secession the Obote government ended all Ankole autonomy and, in 1967, abolished the four Southern kingdoms (Minahan 2002: 132). After an abortive secessionist revolt in 1972, Amin unleashed his army on the Ankole and thousands were massacred (Minahan 2002: 132). Its leadership decimated, murdered or disappeared, the Ankole separatist movement collapsed in 1972, hence the end date of the first phase of the movement. [start date 1: 1958; end date: 1972]
* In 1993 a new law restored all former kingdoms except the Ankole kingdom. In defiance, Ankole activists crowned their own king and unilaterally declared the restoration of their kingdom (Tumushabe 2012). This is coded as the beginning of a new phase of the separatist movement. The movement remains ongoing as of 2020 (Roth 2015: 276). [start date 2: 1993; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002), the Banyankole (Ankole) demanded “autonomy or separate independence” prior to Ugandan independence (Minahan 2002: 132), but finally accepted semi-federal status within an independent Uganda. Minahan (2002: 132) reports “growing tensions and moves toward secession” in 1966, which caused the Obote government to put an end to Ankole autonomy. There was another “secessionist revolt” by the Ankole in 1972 after the overthrow of Obote (Minahan 2002: 132). The revolt was crushed by Idi Amin’s army, the Ankole leadership was ‘decimated, murdered or disappeared’ and the separatist movement collapsed. Mwakikagile (2009: 95) also describes the Ankole as secessionist from 1966 onwards. [1962-1966: autonomy claim][1967-1972: independence claim]
* In 1993, the the Nkore Cultural Trust (NCT) was formed to demand the restoration of the Ankole kingship (Tumushabe 2012). The Ankole demand became stronger when a 1993 law restored the former kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro-Kitara, Busoga and Toro but not the Ankole kingdom. The movement was ongoing as of 2020 (Ninsiima and Basiime 2016; Magara 2014). Autonomy is coded as the dominant claim, since the restoration of the kingdom did not result in independence, as the examples of the other kingdoms have shown. [1993-2020: autonomy claim]
  + It is worth noting that Minahan (2002:133) argues that the Ankole are ‘bitterly divided over the future of their homeland’: ‘some want a restoration of the kingdom and autonomy or independence’ whereas others ‘in the outer areas of the old kingdom, reject the monarchy but support greater autonomy’. For instance, the Banyankore Cultural Foundation (BCF), while nationalist, ‘rejects the monarchy as an antiquated caste system’ (Minahan, 2002:133; see also: Roth 2015:276; Mwakikagile, 2009:119).

**Independence claims**

* Independence claims stopped upon Uganda’s independence, but re-started in 1966 (see above). While Minahan (2002: 133) and Roth (2015: 276) suggest that some Ankole want complete independence from the 1990s onwards, most sources speak of an autonomy movement (e.g., Mwakikagile 2009), suggesting that the claim for outright independence is not politically significant. [start date: 1966; end date: 1972]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Ankole is the Ankole subregion in southwestern Uganda which was split first into the districts of Bushenyi, Mbarara, Kabale, Rakai, Ntungamo, and Rukungiri (Minahan 2002: 129). A map can be found in the Economist (2008). We code the claim using GIS data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas Database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The 1972 incident (see above) is not noted in any of our standard sources for separatist violence. We do not code the 1972 incident as LVIOLSD as it appears to have been one-sided violence. However, we flag this case for further research. We found no other reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Ankole is one of the ‘traditional kingdoms of Uganda’ (Roth, 2015:274).
* British officials signed a treaty with Ankole in 1894 before proclaiming the kingdom to be a British protectorate (Minahan, 1996:23; Minahan, 2002:131; Mwakikagile, 2009:123). The Ankole, however, ‘bitterly opposed British attempts to extend their authority’ into Ankole, and rose up against the British in 1897 (Minahan, 1996:23; Minahan, 2002:131). The British ‘crushed’ the uprising, and Ankole’s leaders signed a formal protectorate agreement; this agreement ‘left most government functions to the Omugabe [the King] and a partially elected assembly, the Eishengyero’ (Minahan, 1996:23; Minahan, 2002:131-2; Mwakikagile, 2009:123).
* During the 1920s and 30s, British colonial policy ‘greatly reduced the power of the king and the political independence of the kingdom’ (Minahan, 1996:23; Minahan, 2002:131-2; Mwakikagile, 2009:124). Ankole was diminished to a labour pool and became less developed than other regions of British Uganda, fomenting resentment and the rise of nationalism (Minahan, 1996:23; Minahan, 2002:132; Minahan, 2016:30; Mwakikagile, 2009:124).
* In the early 1950s, Iru/Bairu (one of two peoples who comprise the Ankole, with the other being the Ima/Bahima) activists created the Kumayana movement and ‘demanded that the British authorities end Hima domination and the disparities in the allocation of local government jobs and in education’ (Minahan, 1996:22, 23; Minahan, 2002:132). This movement later merged ‘with the growing Ankole national movement’ (Minahan, 1996:23; Minahan, 2002:132).
* In the 1950s, as independence approached, the kingdom of Ankole ‘increasingly opposed inclusion in Uganda’. The Hima and the Iru settled their differences, and came together in support of Ankole nationalism (Minahan, 1996:23; Minahan, 2002:132). In the late 1950s, ‘agitation for autonomy or separate independence swept the kingdom (Minahan, 1996:23; Minahan, 2002:132).
* In 1962, Uganda achieved independence and Milton Obote became the first Prime Minister (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:207; Minahan, 1996:89; Roth, 2015:275).
* In 1962, upon independence, Ankole accepted semi-federal status (Minahan 1996:23; Minahan 2002: 132; Roth 2015: 274). [1962: autonomy concession]

2nd phase:

* When Obote returned to power in 1979, the Ankole supported a southern Bantu rebel movement led by an ethnic Ankole, Yoweri Musaveni (Minahan, 1996:24; Minahan, 2002:132; however, Jones (2009) claims that Museveni is an ethnic Bihama). Musaveni managed to seize power in 1986 (Minahan, 1996:24; Minahan, 2002:132). Musaveni opposed Ankole autonomy and Ankole nationalism resurfaced during his rule (Minahan, 1996:24; Minahan, 2002:133).
* Since 1986, there have been significant changes in the competencies of local councils in Uganda. A detailed summary with references is provided in the Baganda entry. We do not code changes in the level of municipal/local autonomy as concessions or restrictions. This decentralisation programme has prompted further calls for the restoration of the Ankole kingdom (Minahan, 1996:24; Minahan, 2002:133).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the second start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1966, ‘amid growing tensions and moves toward secession’, the Obote government withdrew the autonomy of Ankole and, in 1967, abolished the kingdom (Minahan, 1996:24; Minahan, 2002:132; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:53). [1966: autonomy restriction]
* In July 1993, a new law restored all former kingdoms except Ankole (Minahan, 1996:24; Minahan, 2002:133; Roth, 2015:276). In November 1993, the Ankole defiantly crowned John Barigye and declared the restoration of the kingdom (Minahan, 1996:24; Minahan, 2002:129, 133; Roth, 2015:276; Monitor, 2021). The declaration was condemned as illegal by the government, sparking ‘a serious crisis’ between the Ankole and the Ugandan central government (Minahan, 1996:24; Minahan, 2002:133). At this time, the Nkore Cultural trust (NCT) was spearheading the campaign to restore the monarchy (Monitor, 2021). Following the coronation, the President convened a meeting of more than 150 civic leaders from Ankole during which the coronation was harshly criticized (Monitor, 2021).
* In February 2000, President Museveni declared that ‘he would consider the restoration of the monarchy if the majority of the people in the concerned districts demanded it’ (Minahan, 2002:133). The NCT, an organization in Favour of the Ankole monarchy, began consultations (Minahan, 2002:133). Minahan (2002) does not indicate whether a formal survey or referendum was then held (however, a report produced by Monitor (2021) claims that, following a meeting between the President and the NCT in 1993, the former tasked the latter with ‘sensitiz[ing]’ the people of Ankole to the idea of the monarchy in order to foster ‘general acceptability’). Due to the lack of meaningful action, we do not code a concession.
* In November 2009, at the Uganda Cultural Leaders Forum, Barigye and other Ankole leaders asked the President once more to restore the monarchy; Museveni declined (Monitor, 2021).
* In December 2009, Barigye met councilors to request they pass resolutions to restore the Ankole Kingdom. It was reported that these councilors received bribes to do so, and the President wrote to the same councilors, ‘warning against the move’ (Monitor, 2021).
* In 2010, Barigye and the Prime Minister, Katatymba, petitioned the Constitutional Court to compel the government to restore the Kingdom and to return the property of the Kingdom (Monitor, 2021). Following the petition, in 2011, the Attorney General sent a team to Ankole to gather views on the restoration of the monarchy (Monitor, 2021). Due to the lack of meaningful action, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Upon independence in 1962, Ankole received a measure of autonomy. However, in February 1966, Obote suspended the constitution (and, thus, the Ankole’s autonomy), assumed absolute power, and then abolished the Kingdom of Ankole entirely in 1967. [1962-1966: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1962: host change (new), establishment of regional autonomy] [1966: revocation of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ankole |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)/South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 50011000/50011090 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code this group separately but includes it in an umbrella group called the "South-Westerners". This group includes four sub-groups until 1989 (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda); from 1990 onwards the Banyarwanda are coded separately and the South-Westerners include only the Ankole, Banyoro, and the Toro.
* Between 1962 and 1966, EPR codes the umbrella South-Westerners group as junior partner. A list of the members of Prime Minister Milton Obote’s cabinet can be found in Monitor (2021). According to this, the Ankole had representation in the national executive including Grace Ibingira, Minister of Information, who was born in Ankole. [1962-1966: junior partner]
* Obote declared a one-party state in 1966, after which the government ‘came to be dominated by Obote’s fellow Luo-speakers (Acholi and Langi) as well as Teso’ (MRGI). Under Idi Amin (1971-1979), the Ugandan government was dominated by the Kakwa Nubian group (EPR). We therefore code the Ankole as powerless in 1967-1972. This follows EPR’s coding of the broader South-Westerners group. [1967-1972: powerless]
* Museveni came to power in 1986 as the leader of the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Reportedly, he described his first cabinet as a ‘coalition government intended to accommodate all parties and unite the country’ (Monitor, 2021). However, Lindemann (2011b) argues that ‘in the early days, the NRM’s leadership exhibited a strong ethnic bias in favour of western and central Uganda’. Lindemann further suggests that ‘most key positions in the inner core of political power have gone to Banyankole, Museveni’s group, while members of the Bakiga, Banyoro and Batoro [were] also…prominently represented’ (Lindemann, 2011b). EPR supports this interpretation, claiming that, in 1996, most of the top leadership came ‘from the west, particularly the former political unity of Ankole’.
* According to Tripp (2012:159), by the mid-1990s, there had been a ‘shrinking’ of the political space in Uganda: Museveni eliminated from his cabinet those not affiliated with the NRM, closing his circle ever further in the 2000s by purging ‘some of his staunchest NRM supporters from the cabinet’. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022:15, 38) wrote that the NRM has clung to power, with ‘tolerance of divergent political views’ lacking, while ‘the most important holder of veto power is the president, who uses money and the army to bolster his position’. Museveni, in turn, is dependent upon the armed forces to remain in power (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022:38). Decision-making ‘is conducted in the inner circles of power, which include the army and the NRM leadership’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022:39). Still, the Ankole continued to be represented.
  + According to Minahan (1996:24; 2002:132) and Lindemann (2011b) Museveni himself is an ethnic Ankole – though it is worth noting that according to Jones (2009), Museveni is a member of the Bahima ethnic group.
  + In 1997, Miria Matembe, who was born in Mbarara, in Ankole, was appointed a minister (New Vision 2019).
  + Note: A list of those in Museveni’s first cabinet can be found in Monitor (2021) and of members of subsequent cabinets in New Vision (2019). [1993-2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 129), there were 3.608 million Ankoles in Uganda in 2002. Uganda's population was 25.94 mio in that year according to the WB. [0.1391]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 129), 55% of the Ankole in Uganda live in the Kingdom of Ankole where they make up 58% of the local population. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for transborder kin. [no kin]

**Sources**

Baker, Wairama G. (2001) ‘Uganda: The Marginalization of Minorities’ *Minority Rights Group International* [online], available from: <https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-143-Uganda-The-Marginalization-of-Minorities.pdf> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022). ‘Uganda Country Report 2022’ [online], available from: <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/UGA> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Economist (2008). “A Grumpy Kingdom: Ancient Animosities Threaten an East African Country Yearning to be Modern.” <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2008/07/24/a-grumpy-kingdom> [November 25, 2021].

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2022). ‘Milton Obote’ [online], available from: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Milton-Obote> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Jones, Ben (2009) ‘Museveni’s Rule Has Divided Uganda’ *Guardian* [online], available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/katineblog/2009/apr/02/museveni-divided-uganda> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [April 25, 2002].

Kiwanuka, Semakula et al. (2022) ‘Uganda’ *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [online], available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Uganda> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [July 1, 2003].

Lindemann, Stefan (2011b). ‘Increased Territorial Power-sharing in Museveni’s Uganda Has led to the Decline of Civil Wars’ *LSE* [online], available from: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2011/09/19/new-lse-research-increased-territorial-power-sharing-in-museveni%e2%80%99s-uganda-has-led-to-the-decline-of-civil-wars/> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Magara, Darious (2014). “Ankole youth demand restoration of Ankole monarchy.” http://www.newvision.co.ug/new\_vision/news/1303541/ankole-youth-demand-restoration-ankole-monarchy [August 25, 2017].

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp.22-24.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 129-134.

Minahan, James (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Minority Rights Group (n.d.) ‘Uganda: Background’ [online], available from: <https://minorityrights.org/country/uganda/> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Monitor (2021). ‘Ankole Monarchists’ Two Decade Battle for Restoration of Kingdom’ [online], available from: <https://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/Ankole-monarchists--two-decade-battle-for-restoration-kingdom/-/688342/1513552/-/x7a7y6/-/index.html> [last accessed: 7.10.2022]

Monitor (2021). ‘Contrasting Amin, Obote and Museveni Cabinets’ [online], available from: <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/contrasting-amin-obote-and-museveni-cabinets-3460704> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Mwakikagile, Godfrey (2009). *Uganda: The land and its people.* Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press.

New Vision (2019). ‘Who Has Been in Museveni’s Cabinet Over the Years?’ [online], available from: <https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1512160/-served-disappeared-read-about-musevenis-ministers> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Ninsiima, Enid and Felix Basiime (2016). “Ankole prince unveiled as demand for king resumes.” http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Ankole-prince-unveiled-demand-king-resumes-/688334-3015538-ks8w18z/index.html [August 25, 2017].

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Tripp, Aili Mari (2012). ‘The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda’ *USIP* [online], available from: <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Framing%20the%20State/Chapter6_Framing.pdf> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Tumushabe, Alfred (2012). “Ankole Monarchists’ Two Decade Battle for Restoration of Kingdom.” Daily Monitor. September 22. http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/Ankole-monarchists--two-decade-battle-for-restoration-kingdom/-/688342/1513552/-/x7a7y6/-/index.html [August 25, 2017].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Baganda

Activity: 1962-1966; 1990-2020

**General notes**

* The Baganda are also referred to as Gandas or Bugandans.

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1953, the possibility of a federation of East African states spurred the Baganda into action. Fearful of a white-dominated government that would impose apartheid-like policies, the Baganda demanded their own independent state (Minahan 2002: 644).
* As constitutional negotiations took place with Britain in advance of independence, the Lukiiko demanded Baganda’s own army, courts and legislature, declaring Baganda to be independent in December 1960. However, the declaration had no practical effect (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 53; Minahan 1996: 88; Roth 2015: 275).
* In 1962, the Lukiiko abandoned its secessionist stance. Furthermore, a new political party to represent Baganda was founded: Kabaka Yekka (The Monarch Alone). Kabaka Yekka entered into an alliance with the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), led by Milton Obote. Together, the UPC and Kabaka Yekka won a majority and formed a coalition government, with Obote becoming the first Prime Minister of an independent Uganda and the then-Kabaka, Edward Mutesa II, becoming the ceremonial president (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 53; Roth 2015: 275; Englebert 2002: 348; Oloka-Onyango 1997: 175).
* Upon independence in 1962, the Buganda kingdom was given considerable autonomy and a special federal status within the new nation (Encyclopedia Britannica 2008). It is not entirely clear whether the Baganda continued to make claims for increased self-determination in the immediate post-independence years; all we could find is the following quote from MAR “[s]ince independence, the Baganda have consistently demanded a higher degree of autonomy and protection of their traditional customs.” This quote leaves it open whether or not there was also separatist mobilization.
* Over the subsequent years, Obote consolidated his power and, in February 1966, he suspended the constitution and assumed absolute power. The Bagandan Kabaka was dismissed from his role as ceremonial president and the autonomy of the historical kingdoms (Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro, and Toro) was abolished (MAR; Minahan 2002: 646). According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 53), this reignited Bagandan secessionism and the Lukiiko (Baganda’s parliament) “passed a secession resolution”. This was followed by unrest in Buganda, whereby insurgents blocked roads and attacked police posts (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 53; Minahan 2002: 646). According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 53), “[t]his precipitated the Battle of Mengo in May 1966, when the kabaka’s palace was assaulted by the Ugandan army and hundreds lost their lives in the attack.” Minahan (2002: 646) suggests an even higher number of casualties. The Baganda lost, but the Kabaka was able to flee to England, where he died in 1969. We could not find clear evidence of organized separatist activity after the Kabaka went into exile. In 1967, the Obote government completely abolished all historical kingdoms including Buganda, Ankole, Bunyoro, and Toro (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 53; Minahan 2002: 646).
* On this basis, we code a first phase of activity with a start date in 1953 and an end date in 1966. It should be noted that it is not entirely clear whether the movement was active between 1962 and 1965; during these years the movement is coded as ongoing based on the ten-years rule. In the dataset, the first year the movement is included is 1962, the year of Uganda’s independence; we note prior nonviolent activity. [start date 1: 1953; end date 1: 1966]
* In 1990, the son of King Mutesa II, Crown Prince Ronald Mutebi, returned to Buganda from exile and established a secretariat. Through this secretariat, he lobbied for ebyaffe (the ‘return of our things’). This can be read as a claim for the restoration of the Baganda kingdom and therefore an autonomy claim (Englebert 2002: 348). In 1993, the Baganda kingdom was partially restored, though the king’s role remained limited to the cultural sphere.
* Since the restoration of their king, the Baganda have consistently brought up the issue of autonomy for their region and more power for their king. In 1995 the National Democratic Alliance was formed and it demands semi-autonomy for the Buganda kingdom, the most populous and wealthy of Uganda's tribal kingdoms. Also, in 1995 a new group, the Buganda Youth Movement, began fighting for autonomy for the Buganda region.
* Non-zero MAR protest scores between 1996 and 2009 indicate an ongoing movement during these years. According to MAR, “[i]n 2003, the Baganda submitted a list of demands, which included: a federal system of government for Buganda; the recognition of Kampala City as part of Buganda; the granting of privileges of immunity to the traditional leaders; and the return of the 9,000 square miles of land to the Kingdom. Of these, the demand for federal government is the most significant (PROT04-05 = 3).” Furthermore, MAR notes that “the push for autonomy grew during the 2004 presidential elections, Baganda threatened to remove their political support of Museveni if he refused to grant Buganda administrative autonomy” and that “[i]n 2005, the central government negotiated and agreed to a proposal with the Baganda Mengo government that would allow for the Buganda Kingdom to control education and health care in the region. The Lukiiko, the regional council, quickly approved the proposal, which was later rejected by the Baganda in 2006. Critics complained that it failed to give them adequate autonomy over the region in areas such as taxation for revenue generation and also included provisions for the election of the katikkoro, Prime Minister of the kingdom, who is traditionally appointed.”
* Minahan (2016: 52) suggests that the movement remained ongoing.
* Based on this, we peg the second start date of the movement at 1990 and code the movement as ongoing. [start date 2: 1990; end date 2: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The dominant type of SD claim in 1962-1966 is ambiguous. Prior to Uganda’s independence, the Buganda had mobilized for secession. Yet, Bugandan parliament abandoned its secessionist stance in 1962 (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 53; Roth 2015: 275; Englebert 2002: 348; Oloka-Onyango 1997: 175). We code the movement as ongoing because of the ten-year rule and the following quote from MAR: “[s]ince independence, the Baganda have consistently demanded a higher degree of autonomy and protection of their traditional customs.” Based on this, autonomy is coded as the dominant claim. [1962-1965: autonomy claim]
  + Bugandan secessionism re-emerged in 1966 after the Bugandan kingdom’s autonomy was abolished (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 53; Minahan 2002: 646). Note: we already reflect this change in 1966 (in violation of January 1 rule) to be consistent with the case dynamics (violence emerged as a result).
* Autonomy remained the dominant claim during the second phase. Various individuals and organizations made claims for a federal system during the second phase including the Bugandan king (Kabaka), the National Democratic Alliance, the Bugandan Youth Movement, and a range of other groups (MAR; Minahan 2002: 647). Minahan (2002: 648) describes regional autonomy as the Baganda’s “most pressing political issue”, though claims for independence have also been made (Minahan 2016: 52). [1990-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* Bugandan secessionism re-emerged in 1966 after the Bugandan kingdom’s autonomy was abolished (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 53; Minahan 2002: 646). [start date: 1966; end date: 1966]
* Minahan (2016: 52) notes that Bagandan claims for independence persist in the post 1993 period, with Roth also noting the movement pursues sovereignty. However, these claims are not politically significant, with no concrete claims identified as the focus is on greater autonomy within Uganda (MAR).

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Baganda is the traditional Buganda kingdom (Roth 2015: 275). A map from Buganda Kingdom (2020) shows a territory composed of the following administrative units: Kampala, Kayunga, Kiboga, Lake Victoria, Luwero, Masaka, Mpigi, Mubende, Mukono, Nakasongola, Rakai, Sembabule and Wakiso. We code these areas based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 53), the Lukiiko (Baganda’s parliament) “passed a secession resolution” in 1966. [1966: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We code LVIOLSD in 1966 based on the following account in Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 53): “[t]his precipitated the Battle of Mengo in May 1966, when the kabaka’s palace was assaulted by the Ugandan army and hundreds lost their lives in the attack.” Minahan (2002: 646) suggests an even higher number of casualties. [1962-1965: NVIOLSD; 1966: LVIOLSD]
* According to MAR, the Baganda’s renewed agitation in the 1990s channeled into institutional mechanisms. Yet, in 2009 there were riots in Buganda after the government blocked the Bugandan king, Ronald Muwenda Mutebi, from visiting Kayunga district, home of the Banyala group. This led to deadly clashes between Bugandan supporters of the king and security forces (PML Daily 2019). According to PML Daily, the clashes led to a minimum of 15 casualties. More precise figures are provided by the Monitor (2012) - 27 people dead - while The Sunrise (2017) reports 29 people being killed. We apply an LVIOLSD code but note that casualty estimates are ambiguous. [1990-2008: NVIOLSD; 2009: LVIOLSD; 2010-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* 1st phase:
  + During the 1500s, the Baganda people developed a highly advanced state (Buganda), led by a *Kabaka* (a monarch) (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207).
  + In 1893, British colonisers negotiated a treaty with the then-*Kabaka*, Mutesa I, under which Buganda became a British Protectorate (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207; Minahan 1996: 88; Encyclopedia Britannica 2008; Englebert 2002: 348). The Baganda allied with the British to subdue the neighbouring kingdom, Bunyoro; in return, the *Kabaka* was awarded, by the British, a tract of land taken from Bunyoro (Minahan 1996: 88).
  + Buganda was the ‘nucleus’ of the British colony and Kampala, the capital of Buganda, became a commercial centre (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207). The British adopted a policy of indirect rule, administering Buganda through indigenous government structures (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207). The British recognized the *Kabaka* as the legal head of state while the kingdom was divided into twenty counties, each of which was governed by a chief selected by the *Kabaka*. The kingdom also had a legislature, the *Lukiiko*, which had ‘extensive powers’ (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207). Overall, under the British, Buganda ‘retained significant autonomy and superior status’ (Englebert 2002: 348; also see: MAR).
  + Britain tentatively suggested the federation of Uganda and Kenya in 1953 which prompted the *Kabaka* ‘to demand a timetable for separate Bugandan independence’ (Minahan 1996: 88). The British deported the *Kabaka* in 1953, which caused widespread indignation in Buganda (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207; Minahan 1996: 88). [1953: autonomy restriction]
  + The *Kabaka* was restored to his position in 1955 on condition he would not issue further demands for the secession of Buganda (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207; Minahan 1996: 88). In line with the codebook, restoration of indirect rule after a short-term interruption is not coded as a concession.
  + In the late 1950s, it became clear that Britain was preparing to grant Uganda independence. Legislative elections were held in 1958 but Bagandan traditionalists advocated a boycott of the elections and, in Buganda, only 4% of the population voted (by comparison with 80% nationally). In December of the same year, the *Lukiiko* sent a memorandum to London calling for the termination of Buganda’s agreement with Britain. This memorandum implied that the kingdoms of Ankole, Toro and Bunyoro were dependencies of Buganda, antagonizing these states and isolating Buganda (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207). As constitutional negotiations took place with Britain in advance of independence, the *Lukiiko* demanded Buganda’s own army, courts and legislature, declaring Buganda to be independent in December 1960 (although this declaration ‘had no practical effect’) (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207; Minahan 1996: 88; Roth 2015: 275).
  + Elections were held again in April 1962. The *Lukiiko* abandoned its secessionist stance and founded a new political party to represent Buganda, *Kabaka Yekka* (The Monarch Alone). *Kabaka Yekka* entered into an alliance with the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), led by Milton Obote. Together, the UPC and *Kabaka Yekka* won a majority and formed a coalition government, with Obote becoming the first Prime Minister of an independent Uganda and the then-*Kabaka*, Edward Mutesa II, becoming the ceremonial president (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000:207; Roth 2015: 275; Englebert 2002:348; Oloka-Onyango 1997: 175).
  + Uganda achieved independence in 1962 (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 207; Minahan 1996: 89).
  + Upon Uganda’s independence in 1962, the Buganda kingdom was given considerable autonomy and a special federal status within the new nation (Encyclopedia Britannica 2008). [1962: autonomy concession]
* 2nd phase:
  + After curtailing their autonomy in 1966, in 1967 the Obote government completely abolished all historical kingdoms. This includes Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro, and Toro (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 53; Minahan 2002: 646).
  + The Obote government was overthrown in 1971 by Idi Amin whose rule proved brutal (Minahan 1996: 89). Amin was deposed in 1979. Obote returned to power before being defeated by a coup led by Basilio Olara Okello in 1985 (MAR; Minahan 1996: 89). In 1986, Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) rose to power after a multi-year insurgency. The NRM had strong support from the Baganda (Oloka-Onyango 1997: 176) and the insurgency was largely waged from Bugandan territory (Englebert 2002: 348).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1964, the “Lost Counties”, which had been assigned to Buganda under colonial rule, were returned to the Bunyoro kingdom after a referendum (Minahan 2002: 1429). We code a restriction due to the loss in territory. [1964: autonomy restriction]
* In February 1966, Obote suspended the constitution and assumed absolute power. The Bagandan Kabaka was dismissed from his role as ceremonial president and the autonomy of the historical kingdoms (Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro, and Toro) was abolished (MAR; Minahan 2002: 646). [1966: autonomy restriction]
  + We code an onset of violence in 1966. The account in Minahan (2002: 646) suggests the restriction occurred before the violence.
* In August 1993, the government restored a degree of autonomy to Buganda, allowing Ronald Mutebi to take the throne (Minahan 2002: 647; Encyclopedia Britannica 2008; Englebert 2002: 347f). At first, the autonomy was ‘merely cultural, leaving the kingdom on the margins of the country’s structures of governance’ (Englebert 2002: 347; MAR 2006). However, the new *Kabaka* ‘wasted no time’ creating executive, legislative and administrative structures. He appointed a *Lukiiko* again, with representatives of districts, clan elders and other appointees; and he also appointed a government which included ministers with the portfolios one would expect in the cabinet of a national government (Englebert 2002: 349). [1993: autonomy concession]
* The 1995 constitution prohibited traditional chiefs including the Bugandan *Kabaka* from taxing or otherwise forcing contributions from their subjects (Englebert 2002: 352).We do not code this as a restriction the *Kabaka* had not had this right prior to the constitution.
* In 1995, the *Kabaka* reestablished the 18 traditional counties of Buganda (the *amasaza*) as local administrative units. Sub-counties and parishes followed (Englebert 2002: 350). We do not code a concession as this did not increase the level of self-rule in Buganda.
* In June 1998, the national parliament passed a Land Bill which awarded 9,000 square miles of ‘crown land’ to the peasants who farmed it. The Baganda saw this ‘move as an assault on their traditions and their king’ (Minahan 2002: 647), but it is difficult to square with our idea of a restriction.
* In 2005, ‘the central government negotiated and agreed to a proposal with the Baganda Mengo government that would allow for the Buganda Kingdom to control education and health care in the region’. The *Lukiiko* (Baganda’s parliament) ‘quickly approved the proposal’. Critics of the proposal ‘complained that it failed to give them adequate autonomy over the region in areas such as taxation for revenue generation and also included provisions for the election’ of the *Katikkoro* (the Prime Minister of the kingdom), who is traditionally appointed (MAR). [2005: autonomy concession]
* In 2009, the central government prevented the Bugandan Kabaka (king), Ronald Muwenda Mutebi, from travelling to Kayunga district, citing fears of violence. Kayunga is part of the Buganda kingdom (PML Daily 2019). This restriction gave way to an outbreak of separatist violence (see above). [2009: autonomy restriction]
* Note: over the past 40 years there have been significant changes in the competencies of local councils in Uganda. A summary is provided below. We do not code changes in the level of municipal/local autonomy as concessions or restrictions (see the Codebook).
  + After coming to power in 1986, Museveni’s NRM initiated ‘a new phase of increasingly decentralized governance’ (Lewis 2014: 577). The first step came in 1987, when the Resistance Council and Committee Statute extended the Resistance Council (RC) (later to become Local Councils (LCs)) system of local governance throughout Uganda (Lewis 2014: 577-8).
  + In 1992, several responsibilities were devolved to the district-level in education, health, and water services (Lewis 2014: 578).
  + The LC system was formalized and strengthened by the 1993 Resistance Council Statute (Lewis 2014: 578). After 1993, a ‘phased fiscal decentralization process’ was implemented nationwide, ‘during which responsibilities and resources were divided between the central and local governments and annual transfers of funds from the centre to the LCs were formalised’ (Lewis 2014: 578). Districts became responsible for handling all funds from the central government and were granted new powers to raise taxes and legislate for bylaws (Lewis 2014: 578).
  + The 1995 constitution further formalized and strengthened the LC system (Lewis 2014: 578).
  + In 1997, the Local Government Act increased the powers of the districts to generate local revenue and formalized the distribution of district revenue to be allocated to the various LC levels (Lewis 2014: 578). The act also established that most LC executive positions were to be locally elected or appointed by elected officials (Lewis 2014: 578).
  + The tide turned around the year 2000 and a process of re-centralization was initiated. In 2001, national regulations limited the per capita amount of a graduated personal tax which districts could collect (Lewis 2014: 580).
  + In 2005, the central government eliminated the graduated tax (Lewis 2014: 580).
  + In 2008, an amendment to the Local Government Act stripped districts of the power to appoint their head administrator, accountant, and other senior-level administrators (Lewis 2014: 581).
  + While districts had received almost 20% of the national budget in the 2003-4 fiscal year, they received only received 15% in the 2010-1 fiscal year (Lewis 2014: 580).

**Regional autonomy**

* Upon Uganda’s independence in 1962, the Buganda kingdom was given considerable autonomy and a special federal status within the new nation (Encyclopedia Britannica 2008). In February 1966, Obote suspended the constitution, abolished the Baganda’s autonomy, and removed their king from his role as ceremonial president in February 1966, which led to the Mengo crisis in May that is coded as LVIOLSD (see above). At the time of the violence, the Baganda no longer had autonomy, therefore. While not adhering to January 1 rule, coding no regional autonomy in 1966 therefore better reflects case dynamics. 1962-1965: regional autonomy]
* The Buganda kingdom was restored in 1993; however, all sources consulted suggest that its powers remained relatively limited (Minahan 2002: 647; Encyclopedia Britannica 2008; Englebert 2002: 347f; MAR). We do not code autonomy. [1990-2020: no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The Buganda kingdom had significant autonomy prior to independence; therefore, we do not code a major change when Buganda received special federal status in 1962. [1962: host change]
* In 1966, Buganda’s autonomy was abolished (see above). [1966: revocation of autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Baganda |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Baganda |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 50002000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR; however, we code the Baganda as discriminated against already in 1966 and not only in 1967, as EPR does. Obote suspended the constitution, abolished the Baganda’s autonomy, and removed their king from his role as ceremonial president in February 1966, which led to the Mengo crisis in May that is coded as LVIOLSD (see above). At the time of the violence, the Baganda no longer were a senior partner, therefore. Moving the discriminated better reflects case dynamics. [1962-1965: senior partner; 1966: discriminated; 1990-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.16]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes the Baganda as regionally concentrated, but EPR applies a lower bar. According to MAR, the Baganda are concentrated, and more than 75% of group members live in the regional base. According to Minahan (2002: 643), the Baganda make up 82% of the population of their regional base, where almost all Baganda live. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code transborder kin. MAR suggests there are Ganda in Tanzania, but their population is below the numeric threshold (Joshua Project; Minahan 2002: 643). [no kin]

**Sources**

Buganda Kingdom (2020). “Map of Buganda.” <https://www.buganda.or.ug/map-of-buganda> [October 10, 2020].

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Encyclopedia Britannica (2008). “Buganda.” https://www.britannica.com/place/Buganda [August 16, 2022].

Englebert, Pierre (2002). “Born-again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence in Africa.” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40(3): 345-368.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, pp. 52-53, 147, 175.

Joshua Project. “Baganda in Tanzania.” <https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/16784/TZ> [June 17, 2022].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [April 23, 2002].

Lewis, Janet (2014). “When Decentralization Leads to Recentralization: Subnational State Transformation in Uganda.” *Regional and Federal Studies* 24(5): 571-588.

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [July 1, 2003].

Marshall, Monty G., and Ted R. Gurr (2003). *Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy.* College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, p. 64.

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 87-89.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 643-648.

Minahan, James (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Minority Rights Group International. *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Groups*. <http://minorityrights.org/directory/> [November 9, 2021].

Monitor (2012). “We Got What We Wanted, Say Banyala.” <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-got-what-we-wanted-say-banyala-1525232> [October 11, 2022].

Oloka-Onyango, J. (1997). “The Question of Buganda in Contemporary Ugandan Politics.” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 15(2): 173-189.

PML Daily (2019). “Ten years later! Recounting the 2009 Buganda riots that threatened NRM rule.” <https://www.pmldaily.com/investigations/special-reports/2019/09/ten-years-later-recounting-the-2009-buganda-riots-that-threatened-nrm-rule.html> [October 11, 2022].

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

The Sunrise (2017). “Museveni Meets Kabaka Mutebi in Over Eat Years.” April 7. <https://sunrise.ug/news/201704/kabaka-mutebi-meets-museveni-after-eight-years.html> [October 11, 2022].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Banyala

Activity: 2009-2020

**General notes**

* The Banyala are a minority group which was were originally ceded to the Buganda Kingdom by the British following the 1890-1899 war. To escape Bugandan rule, many Banyala people left the area and settled in Teso, Lango, Busoga, and Bunyoro. Today, the Banyala mainly live in Kayunga district within the Buganda Kingdom in Central Uganda near the Nile River-Lake Kyoga basin. The Banyala tribe is one of the 56 tribes living in the area.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Beginning in 2009, the Banyala have been active in lobbying for autonomy from Buganda kingdom as the Banyalas have remained bitter about the history of Buganda rule. In a conference in 2009, the Banyala “declared that in the event Buganda got federal, Buruuli and Banyala would not be part of it” (New Uganda). In addition, the Banyala demanded cultural recognition.
* In 2010, the Banyala demanded autonomy during a public rally and sang their own anthem. The Banyala cultural leader, Captain Baker Kimeze, submitted a petition for breaking away from Buganda Kingdom and establishing the Banyala region as an “autonomous cultural institution” (The Observer 2/11/2010).
* A 2017 newspaper article reports that the Banyala continued to make claims for autonomy (The Sunrise 2017). On this basis, we code the movement as ongoing. [start date: 2009; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Banyala, who are settled within the Buganda kingdom, started to demand more autonomy from the Buganda kingdom in 2009. During a conference in 2009, the Banyala announced their rejection of a federal Buganda and their intentions to not participate in this undertaking. Furthermore, in 2010, the ‘disputed cultural leader of the Banyala, Captain Baker Kimeze…told President Museveni that his people want autonomy from [the] Buganda Kindom’ (Mwesigye, 2010; see also: Monitor, 2021). A 2017 newspaper article reports that the Banyala continued to make claims for autonomy (The Sunrise 2017). [2009-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Banyala demands concern the Kayunga district, which is located within the Buganda Kingdom near the Nile River in Central Uganda. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* In 2009 there were riots in Buganda after the government blocked the Bugandan king, Ronald Muwenda Mutebi, from visiting Kayunga district, home of the Banyala group. According to the Monitor (2012), this ban was originally requested by Banyalas. However, the violence involved mainly Bugandan protestors and security forces, and is thus not coded here (PML Daily 2019).
* No other indications of separatist violence were found. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Banyala are a minority ethnic group which lives in the Kayunga District of Buganda (Mwesigye, 2010). The Kayunga district is in Bugerere, an area which Buganda captured from the Bunyoro Kingdom over a century ago (Kiwawulo, 2009). The Banyala claim that the area is their ancestral home (Kiwawulo, 2009).
* Reportedly, in 1896, the Baganda ‘invaded’ the Bugerere county; many Banyala died and others fled. The war ended in 1899 and the Baganda assumed control of all land and property in Bugerere. The county was officially annexed to Buganda in the 1900 agreement between Buganda and the British colonisers (Monitor, 2021). This is the narrative offered by an ‘elder’ interviewed by Monitor (2021), who also claims that, following the annexation, those who remained in Bugerere were treated as though they were ‘sub-human’, were prohibited from speaking their own language, and were forced to abandon their ‘traditional’ names. Offering support for this view, Singiza and De Visser (2011:10) argue that, historically, both the Banyala and the Baruli ‘had their own culture and language identity but were “assimilated” into the Buganda culture during the time of the British colonial administration’.
* Since 1986, there have been significant changes in the competencies of local councils in Uganda. A detailed summary with references is provided in the Baganda entry.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 2010, Museveni ‘declared that Kayunga [the district in which the Banyala live] will not break away from Buganda’; however, he simultaneously declared that ‘the Banyala have the right to practise their culture’ (Mwesigye, 2010). We could not identify a concession as defined here, though.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Banyala |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence for inclusion in the center. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We could not find information on the number of self-identified Banyala. Instead, we therefore rely on population of Kayunga district, the Banyalas’ ethnic homeland (The Sunrise 2017). According to the 2014 census, a total of 368,062 Ugandans live in the Kayunga district whereas Uganda’s total population was enumerated as 34,634,650. [0.0106]

**Regional concentration**

* We could not find good information, but according to The Sunrise (2017), “Kayunga is predominantly composed of Banyala, a Bantu ethnic group in the Buganda region.” [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for transborder ethnic kin. [no kin]

**Sources**

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022). ‘Uganda Country Report 2022’ [online], available from: <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/UGA> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Jones, Ben (2009).’Museveni’s Rule Has Divided Uganda’ *Guardian* [online], available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/katineblog/2009/apr/02/museveni-divided-uganda> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Kibanja, Grace M., Mayanja M. Kajumba, and Laura R. Johnson (2012). “Ethnocultural Conflict in Uganda: Politics Based on Ethnic Divisions Inflame Tensions Across the Country.” In: Dan Landis, and Rosita D. Albert (eds.), *Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, 403–435. Boston, MA: Springer.

Kiwawulo, Chris (2009). ‘Uganda: Who Are the Banyala People’ *All Africa* [online], available from: <https://allafrica.com/stories/200909170235.html> [last accessed: 7.10.2022]

Lindemann, Stefan (2011b). ‘Increased Territorial Power-sharing in Museveni’s Uganda Has led to the Decline of Civil Wars’ *LSE* [online], available from: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2011/09/19/new-lse-research-increased-territorial-power-sharing-in-museveni%e2%80%99s-uganda-has-led-to-the-decline-of-civil-wars/> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Minority Rights Group International (2009). “Minorities in the News: Kampala Returns to Normalcy after Days of Ethnic Tension.” September 15. <http://www.minorityrights.org/8128/minorities-in-the-news/kampala-returns-to-normalcy-after-days-of-ethnic-tension.html> [June 24, 2014].

Monitor (2012). “We Got What We Wanted, Say Banyala.” <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-got-what-we-wanted-say-banyala-1525232> [October 11, 2022].

Monitor (2021). ‘Formation of Kingdoms Did Not End With Buganda, Say Banyala’ [online], available from: <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/formation-of-kingdoms-did-not-end-with-buganda-say-banyala-1477788> [last accessed: 7.10.2022]

Mulira, Peter (2009). “Banyala-Baganda Conflict Can Be Settled Peacefully.” *New Vision*. September 16. <http://www.newvision.co.ug/E/8/20/694815> [June 24, 2014].

Mwesigye, Shifa (2010). “Banyala Ask Museveni for Autonomy from Buganda.” *The Observer*, February 11. <http://observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7190:banyala-ask-museveni-for-autonomy-from-buganda&catid=34:news&Itemid=59> [June 24, 2014].

New Uganda (2013). “The Baruuli-Banyara People and Their Culture.” <http://www.newuganda.com/the-baruuli-banyara-people-and-their-culture/> [June 24, 2014].

PML Daily (2019). “Ten years later! Recounting the 2009 Buganda riots that threatened NRM rule.” <https://www.pmldaily.com/investigations/special-reports/2019/09/ten-years-later-recounting-the-2009-buganda-riots-that-threatened-nrm-rule.html> [October 11, 2022].

Singiza, Douglas Karekona and De Visser, Jaap (2011). ‘Chewing More Than One Can Swallow: The Creation of New Districts in Uganda’ *Law, Democracy & Development* 15, pp. 19-36

Sjögren, Anders (2015). ‘Battles Over Boundaries: The Politics of Territory, Identity and Authority in Three Ugandan Regions’ *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 2, pp. 268-84

The Sunrise (2017). “Museveni Meets Kabaka Mutebi in Over Eat Years.” April 7. <https://sunrise.ug/news/201704/kabaka-mutebi-meets-museveni-after-eight-years.html> [October 11, 2022].

Tripp, Aili Mari (2012). ‘The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda’ *USIP* [online], available from: <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Framing%20the%20State/Chapter6_Framing.pdf> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2014). ‘National Population and Housing Census 2014’ [online], available from: <https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/03_20182014_National_Census_Main_Report.pdf> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Banyoro

Activity: 1962-1972

**General notes**

* The Banyoro are also referred to as the Nyoros or the Bunyoros.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Banyoro kingdom was incorporated into British Uganda in 1896. An attempt to re-establish the kingdom in 1899 was quickly quelled (Minahan 2002: 1428). The Banyoro king was exiled. He was allowed to return in 1900, but forced to sign an agreement that gave parts of Nyoro land to the Buganda, a local British ally (Minahan 2002: 1428). The “Lost Counties” issue contributed significantly to the growth of the Banyoro national movement.
* In 1921 Banyoro nationalists formed a political group called Mubende-Banyoro, which advocated the return of the Lost Counties as well as secession from Britain. Mubende-Banyoro quickly became the region’s major political party (Minahan 2002: 1428). In 1933, the Banyoro kingdom became a British protectorate. Mubende-Banyoro continued to make self-determination claims, in particular regarding the return of the Lost Counties. The issue became ever more salient as Uganda was approaching independence. Based on this, we code movement activity from 1962 onwards to coincide with Ugandan independence. The start date is pegged at 1921 to coincide with the formation of Mubende-Banyoro. We found no separatist violence before 1962 and thus indicate prior non-violent activity.
* Upon independence, the Banyoro kingdom was granted a semi-federal status. In 1964, the “Lost Counties”, which had been assigned to Buganda under colonial rule, were returned to Banyoro after a referendum. However, in 1966, the Ugandan government revoked the Banyoro kingdom’s autonomy and in 1967, all Bantu kingdoms were abolished (Minahan 2002: 1429). The Banyoro self-determination movement continued to be active through independence up to 1972 when, following an abortive secession attempt, it was suppressed (Minahan 2002: 1429). [start date 1: 1921; end date 1: 1972]
* Minahan (2002: 1429-30) argues that the Banyoro movement re-emerged in the late 1980/early 1990s. However, the evidence we found suggests that the claims made are too minimal for inclusion in this dataset. Specifically, according to news reports, the Banyoros have made calls for the enlargement of the Banyoro kingdom (which had been re-instituted as a cultural institution in 1993) and for reparations for the suffering of their people under colonialism (News Uganda 2013; Uganda Radio Network 2005). Notably, the Banyoro kingdom has highly limited powers and enlargement of its territory is therefore difficult to see as a claim for more self-rule. Importantly, we could not find claims for more devolution of powers to the kingdom or outright independence.

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002), the Banyoro initially accepted an autonomous status within an independent Uganda, but analogously to the Banyankole switched their claim to independence in 1966 (Minahan 2002: 1429). [1962-1966: autonomy claim; 1967-1972: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1966; end date: 1972]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Banyoro is the Banyoro kingdom in western Uganda with the kingdom’s traditional boundaries, including the Mubende area of Buganda (Minahan 2002: 1430). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of casualties that would allow us to code 1972 (i.e., the secessionist revolt mentioned above) as LVIOLSD. We found no other evidence for separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* From 1869, the kingdom of Bunyoro, led by Kabarega, ‘engaged rival Buganda in a long series of wars in the second half of the century’ (Minahan, 2002:1428).
* Bunyoro was unable to resist the incorporation of the kingdom into British Uganda in 1896 (Minahan, 2002:1428; Minahan, 2016:66).
* In 1899, the Kyanyangire Abagdana Rebellion erupted, an ‘attempt to reestablish the sovereign kingdom’ (Minahan, 2002:1428). The uprising ended with the exile of the *Omukama* (King) Kabarega to the Seychelles (Minahan, 2002:1428). He was allowed to return to Bunyoro in 1900 but was forced to sign the Buganda Agreement which gave all Nyoro lands south of the Kafo River, the provinces of Buyaga and Bugangaizi to Buganda (Minahan, 2002:1428; Minahan, 2016:66; see also: Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000:622). Ganda chiefs were employed in Bunyoro as agents of the British government and the Ganda language was used as the language of administration (Minahan, 2002:1428). These Ganda chiefs were withdrawn in 1907 (Minahan, 2002:1428).
* In 1933, the King of Bunyoro signed a protectorate agreement with the British (Minahan, 2002:1429).
* In 1961, the King of Bunyoro refused to attend a constitutional conference, convened in anticipation of independence, until the conflict over the “lost counties” was resolved. The Ganda refused to negotiate and ‘Bunyoro moved toward secession and prepared for war’ (Minahan, 2002:1429). The British mediated between the two kingdoms, securing ‘an agreement to hold a plebiscite in the disputed area, finally allowing Uganda to achieve independence in 1962’.
* Upon Uganda’s independence in 1962, the Bunyoro Kingdom ‘reluctantly agreed to accept autonomy and a semifederal status within Uganda’ (Minahan, 2002:1429). [1962: autonomy concession]
* Since 1986, there have been significant changes in the competencies of local councils in Uganda. A detailed summary with references is provided in the Baganda entry. We do not code changes in the level of municipal/local autonomy as concessions or restrictions.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1964, the “Lost Counties”, which had been assigned to Buganda under colonial rule, were returned to the Bunyoro kingdom after a referendum (Minahan 2002: 1429). [1964: autonomy concession]
* In 1966, the government withdrew the autonomy of Uganda’s kingdoms and then, in 1967, abolished the kingdoms (Minahan, 2002: 1429; Minahan, 2016: 66; see also: Golooba-Mutebi, 2008: 6-7). [1966: autonomy restriction]
* In July 1993, the government permitted the partial restoration of the Kingdom of Bunyoro and a new king, Solomon Iguru, was crowned (Minahan 2002: 1430; Minahan 2016: 66). The King has been described as a ‘cultural leader, with no political or administrative power’ (Minahan 2002: 1430).

**Regional autonomy**

* As noted above, upon the independence of Uganda in 1962, the Bunyoro Kingdom was awarded autonomy. However, this was then revoked in 1966. [1962-1966: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* See above. [1962: host change (new), establishment of regional autonomy]
* [1966: revocation of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Banyoro |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 50011000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code the Banyoro as a separate group but includes them in an umbrella group called the "South-Westerners". This group includes four sub-groups until 1989 (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda); from 1990 onwards the Banyarwanda are coded separately and the South-Westerners include only the Ankole, Banyoro, and the Toro.
* Between 1962 and 1966, EPR codes the umbrella South-Westerners group as junior partner. A list of the members of Prime Minister Milton Obote’s cabinet can be found in Monitor (2021). We could not find evidence for a cabinet minister with a Banyoro background; however, this case would profit from more research as we could not find out about the ethnic background of all ministers. [1962-1966: powerless]
* Obote declared a one-party state in 1966, after which the government ‘came to be dominated by Obote’s fellow Luo-speakers (Acholi and Langi) as well as Teso’ (MRGI). Under Idi Amin (1971-1979), the Ugandan government was dominated by the Kakwa Nubian group (EPR). We therefore code the Banyoro as powerless in 1967-1972. This follows EPR’s coding of the broader South-Westerners group. [1967-1972: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1429), there were 1.412 mio Nyoros (Banyoros) in Uganda in 2002. Uganda's population was 25.94 mio in that year according to the WB. [0.0544]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1426), >85% of the Banyoro in Uganda live in the Kingdom of Bunyoro where they make up 88% of the local population. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for transborder kin. [no kin]

**Sources**

Baganchwera-Barungi (2011). *Parliamentary Democracy in Uganda: The Experiment That Failed*. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse.

Baker, Wairama G. (2001) ‘Uganda: The Marginalization of Minorities’ *Minority Rights Group International* [online], available from: <https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-143-Uganda-The-Marginalization-of-Minorities.pdf> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022). ‘Uganda Country Report 2022’ [online], available from: <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/UGA> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2022). ‘Milton Obote’ [online], available from: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Milton-Obote> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick (2008). ‘Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Uganda: An Analytical Narrative on State-making’ *Makerere Institute of Social Research* Working Paper No. 27 [online], available from: <https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/wp27.2-collapse-war-and-reconstruction-in-uganda.pdf> [last accessed: 7.10.2022]

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 175.

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

Jones, Ben (2009).’Museveni’s Rule Has Divided Uganda’ *Guardian* [online], available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/katineblog/2009/apr/02/museveni-divided-uganda> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [April 23, 2002].

Kiwanuka, Semakula et al. (2022) ‘Uganda’ *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [online], available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Uganda> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [July 1, 2003].

Lindemann, Stefan (2011b). ‘Increased Territorial Power-sharing in Museveni’s Uganda Has led to the Decline of Civil Wars’ *LSE* [online], available from: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2011/09/19/new-lse-research-increased-territorial-power-sharing-in-museveni%e2%80%99s-uganda-has-led-to-the-decline-of-civil-wars/> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 90-92.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1426-1432.

Minahan, James (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Minority Rights Group (n.d.) ‘Uganda: Background’ [online], available from: <https://minorityrights.org/country/uganda/> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Monitor (2021). ‘Contrasting Amin, Obote and Museveni Cabinets’ [online], available from: <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/contrasting-amin-obote-and-museveni-cabinets-3460704> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Mubende-Bunyoro Committee (1962). “Memorandum Submitted by the Mubende Banyoro Committee to the Commission of Privy Councillors Appointed to Investigate the Issue of Bunyoro’s Lost Counties of Buyaga, Bugangaiza, Buwekula, Bugerere, Buruli and Portions of the Counties of Singo and Bulemeezi (Rugonjo).” <http://semuwemba.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/mubende-banyoro-memorandum-on-lost-counties.pdf> [June 24, 2014].

New Vision (2019). ‘Who Has Been in Museveni’s Cabinet Over the Years?’ [online], available from: <https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1512160/-served-disappeared-read-about-musevenis-ministers> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

News Uganda (2013). “Bunyoro: Subjects and Omukama Fight Over Reparation Billions.” March 20. <http://newsuganda.ug/news/latest/red-pepper/bunyoro-subjects-and-omukama-fight-over-reparation-billions/2b5b.32133> [October 26, 2013].

Tripp, Aili Mari (2012). ‘The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda’ *USIP* [online], available from: <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Framing%20the%20State/Chapter6_Framing.pdf> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Uganda Radio Network (2005). “Mubende -Banyoro Petition Museveni over Unresolved Buyaga Bugangaizi Referendum.” December 7. <http://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=1614> [June 24, 2014].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Batoro

Activity: 1962-1972

**General notes**

* Toro and Batoro are synonyms (Minahan 2002: 1909).

**Movement start and end dates**

* A gradual decrease of the Toro kingdom’s autonomy gave way to a Toro national movement. The first evidence for organized activity we found is in 1953, when the Toro royal government demanded federal status (Minahan 2002: 1912). Toro nationalism intensified as Ugandan independence neared, with nationalists claiming that the Toro king is granted increased powers (Minahan 2002: 1912). Toro nationalism paralleled the growing nationalism of the Ruwenzoris, who sought to separate from the Toro kingdom (see Ruwenzoris).
* At Ugandan independence in 1962, the Toros accepted a semi-federal status within newly independent Uganda. This appears to have mollified the Toro nationalists at least somewhat, who in subsequent years were busy fighting the Ruwenzoris’ attempt at separation (Minahan 2002: 1912-1913). Nevertheless, Minahan (2002: 1913) suggests that a Toro SDM continued to operate. In 1967, the Ugandan government abolished all kingdoms. Minahan (1996: 578) notes that the Toro secessionist movement ended in 1972 with the murder or disappearance of the majority of the Toro’s leadership. The end date is therefore pegged at 1972. The start date is coded as 1953 (see above), though we do not code the movement before Uganda’s independence in 1962. We found no separatist violence before 1962 and thus note prior non-violent activity.
* In 1993 the Toro kingdom was reestablished. Though Minahan (2002: 1913-1914) suggests that there was secessionist or at least autonomist sentiment, we found no clear evidence of organized self-determination activity. [start date: 1953; end date: 1972]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Minahan (2002), the Toros initially accepted an autonomous status within an independent Uganda, but much like the Banyankole switched their claim to independence in 1966 (Minahan 2002: 1912). [1962-1966: autonomy claim; 1967-1972: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1966; end date: 1972]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Batoro is the Toro kingdom in southeastern Uganda (Minahan 2002: 1909). A map of the territory can be found on Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tooro\_Kingdom#/media/File:Kingdom\_of\_Toro\_(map\_of\_the\_original\_kingdom).png). We code this claim using data on sub-national borders in Uganda (https://data.humdata.org/dataset/cod-ab-uga?), which offers a better approximation in this case compared to GADM.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We code this period as NVIOLSD as we found no casualties besides the assassinations of the Toro’s leadership during this time (in other words, the 1972 events appear best described as one-sided violence). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Kingdom of Toro signed a diplomatic treaty with the British in 1890. Five years later, Toro was declared by the British to be a protected state and the King signed a protectorate agreement in 1900, consolidating his authority (Minahan, 1996:577; Minahan, 2002:1911; Minahan, 2016:73). The Toro parliament, the *Rukurato*, became a partially elected legislature (Minahan, 1996:577; Minahan, 2002:1911).
* The colonial authorities gradually reduced the power and independence of the Kingdom (Minahan, 1996:577; Minahan, 2002:1912). However, in 1949, legislation was passed which recognized the King’s right to regulate local government (Minahan, 1996:577-8; Minahan, 2002:1912).
* In 1962, the Kingdom was awarded semi-federal status within the new, independent Uganda (Minahan, 1996:578; Minahan, 2002:1912; Minahan, 2016:73). [1962: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In February 1966, Obote suspended the constitution and assumed absolute power. The autonomy of the historical kingdoms (Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro, and Toro) was abolished (MAR; Minahan 2002: 646). In 1967, the Kingdoms were entirely abolished by the government (Minahan 1996: 578; Minahan 2002: 1913). [1966: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* As noted above, in 1962, upon independence, the Kingdom was awarded semi-federal status. This was revoked in 1966, and in 1967 the kingdoms were abolished entirely (MAR; Minahan, 1996; Minahan, 2002; Minahan, 2016 [1962-1966: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* See above. [1962: host change (new), establishment of regional autonomy]
* [1966: revocation of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Batoro |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 50011000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not code the Batoro as a separate group but includes them in an umbrella group called the "South-Westerners". This group includes four sub-groups (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda) and is coded as junior partner between 1962 and 1966. The evidence we found suggests that the Batoro did have representation at the time; specifically, Obote’s first cabinet included John Babiiha, Minister of Animal Industry, Game and Fisheries, who was born in Toro. [1962-1966: junior partner]
* Obote declared a one-party state in 1966, after which the government ‘came to be dominated by Obote’s fellow Luo-speakers (Acholi and Langi) as well as Teso’ (MRGI). Under Idi Amin (1971-1979), the Ugandan government was dominated by the Kakwa Nubian group (EPR). We therefore code the Toro as powerless in 1967-1972. This follows EPR’s coding of the broader South-Westerners group. [1967-1972: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1909), there were 0.945 mio Toros in Uganda in 2002. Uganda's population was 25.94 mio in that year according to the WB. [0.0364]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1909), >95% of the Batoro in Uganda live in the Kingdom of Toro where they make up 56% of the local population. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* We found no evidence for transborder kin. [no kin]

**Sources**

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Keesing’s Record of World Events. [http://www.keesings.com](http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0/) [April 23, 2002].

Kokole, Omari et al. (2022). ‘Uganda’. *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [online], available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Uganda> [last accessed: 7.10.2022]

Lexis Nexis. <http://www.lexis-nexis.com> [July 1, 2003].

Minahan, James (1996). *Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements.* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 576-578.

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1909-1914.

Minahan, James (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Minority Rights Group (n.d.) ‘Uganda: Background’ [online], available from: <https://minorityrights.org/country/uganda/> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.

## Ruwenzoris

Activity: 1962-2020

**General notes**

* Ruwenzururu is a mountainous region in western Uganda inhabited by the Bakonzo (or Bakonjo) and Baamba peoples, which we here combine.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Ruwenzuru movement emerged in the 1950s, initially as an attempt at cultural revitalization (Rubongoya 1995: 86). To this purpose, in 1954, the Bakonzo Life History Research Society was formed to promote the cultural identity of the Bakonzo (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 259; Peterson 2012).
* With independence approaching, nationalist conflicts intensified in Uganda. According to Rubongoya (1995: 80), “[o]f all these struggles […] it was the Bakonjo-Baamba mobilization, which came to be known as the Ruwenzurururu Movement, that most explicitly and actively called for secession and resisted integration and assimilation (ethnocide) through actual armed struggle with the postcolonial regime.”
* Shortly before Uganda’s independence in November 1962, the Ruwenzuru movement began to demand separation from the Toro kingdom and the creation of a separate (federal) district within Uganda (Rubongoya 1995: 86). The Ruwenzoris’ demand for a separate district was not met. Furthermore, the new Toro constitution did not recognize the Ruwenzori but continued to espouse the ethnocentric view that the Batoro were the only legitimate inhabitants of Toro. In response, the Ruwenzoris escalated their demand shortly before independence, now aspiring at a merger with neighboring Congo (shortly before independence) and an independent Ruwenzururu kingdom (since independence).
* According to Rubongoya (1995: 86-87), when the demand for a separate district was not met, Ruwenzori leaders “informed the central government that, short of a separate district, “we are prepared to join the province of Kivu in the Congo where we have the backing of twelve members of our tribes in the Congo National Assembly.”” However, “[n]either the Congo government nor the Banande ethnic group in the Congo […] responded to Bakonjo-Baamba appeals with statements of support.”
* Rubongoya does not give an exact date when SD demands were first made; nor does Minahan (2002: 1620). However, both suggest that calls for Ruwenzuru autonomy were first made in the early 1960s. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 259) suggest that the first separatist calls were made in 1962, thus very shortly before Uganda’s independence in November 1962. Based on this, 1962 is coded as start date. We found no evidence for separatist violence prior to Uganda’s independence.
* Shortly after independence, Ruwenzori leaders began to set up their own structures and established a de facto state (Rubongoya 1995). According to Minahan (2002: 1620-1621) and Horowitz (1985: 236), independence was declared on February 13, 1963. Fighting ensued, which lasted almost two decades (see below).
* According to Forrest (2004: 222), “[t]he second Obote administration pursued negotiations with Ruwenzururu leaders and reached a settlement in 1982 according to which Konjo and Amba elites agreed to abandon outright secession in return for “a degree of local autonomy”; the appointment of Konjo and Amba to administrative posts; and the provision of economic benefits, such as motorized vehicles, shops, and student scholarships, that would be assigned for distribution by traditional leaders of these two groups.” However, according to Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca (2016: 10), “not all secessionist Rwenzururians…accepted the idea of reconciliation’, with some taking up arms once more. For instance, ‘a regiment of disgruntled former Rwenzururu fighters…formed a new movement which they named ‘Rwenzururu Freedom Movement’ (RFM).”
  + Note: Minahan (2002: 1621) reports that the last Ruwenzori king, Charles Iremangoma, surrendered in 1983. Whether or not Iremangoma actually surrendered is not fully clear, as Rubongoya (1995: 90-91) suggests that Charles Iremangoma died in 1983, but it is possible that he died after surrendering.
* Forrest (2004: 222) argues that the movement was revived in the 1990s in reaction to the restoration of a number of kingdoms. Minahan (2002: 1621-1622) suggests that the Ruwenzoris made demands for autonomy throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
* In 2000, the Obusinga Bwa Rwenzururu (OBR) Recognition Committee formally petitioned the Ugandan government to recognize the Rwenzururu Kingdom, sending a letter in this year requesting “a process of negotiations and deliberations with the leadership of Obusinga Bwa Rwenzururu, aiming at recognizing the cultural institution so cherished by the people of Rwenzururu” (Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca 2016: 14).
* In 2008 a Ruwenzori kingdom was established as a cultural institution (All Africa 2008; see also: Minahan 2016: 357). The kingdom was not given political or regional autonomy and its activities were limited to “cultural” matters.
* In 2016, the Museveni government believed that Royal Guards of the Rwenzururu Palace in Kasese were ‘planning to fight for an independent state’ and thus attacked the palace, killed a ‘huge number of civilians’ and arrested the king together with over 100 ceremonial guards (Beevor and Titeca, 2018). A BBC article published in 2016 supports this interpretation, arguing that tensions regarding independence have continued to simmer (BBC, 2016). An LSE blog post published in 2018 asserts that ‘the desire for true independence…among many Bakonzo people has never really gone away’ (Beevor and Titeca, 2018). [start date: 1962; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* With independence approaching, the Ruwenzuru movement began to demand separation from the Toro kingdom and the creation of a separate (federal) district within Uganda. In response, the Ruwenzoris escalated their demand shortly before independence, now aspiring at a merger with neighboring Congo (shortly before independence) and an independent Ruwenzururu kingdom (since independence) (Rubongoya 1995: 86f). According to Minahan (2002: 1620-1621) and Horowitz (1985: 236), independence was declared on February 13, 1963.
* The evidence we collected suggests that autonomy became the dominant claim in the 1980s or 1990s (Forrest 2004: 222; Minahan 2002: 1621f). The exact year this happened is not clear; we use 1982/1983 as the cut-off because, according to Forrest (2004: 222), Ruwenzoris agreed to a settlement which promised them a degree of autonomy if they abandon their secession claim.
* The central government increasingly interpreted the Ruwenzoris’ goals as secessionist after 2009. However, the Ruwenzori kingdom of pursuing independence “has denied any secessionist ambitions” (Gaffey 2016). [1962-1982: independence claim; 1983-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* While the dominant claim shifted to autonomy around 1982, groups such as the RFM continued to make independence claims (see above). These seem to have faded out subsequently. We code the end date in accordance with the ten-years rule. [start date: 1962; end date: 1992]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Ruwenzoris is the area around the Ruwenzori mountains between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Minahan 2002: 1617). The kingdom includes the districts of Bundibugyo, Kasese and Ntoroko. A map can be found in Roth (2015: 270). We code the claim based on that map, using data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1620-1621) and Horowitz (1985: 236), independence was declared on February 13, 1963. [1963: independence declaration]
  + According to Minahan (2016: 484), the Ruwenzoris had already declared independence in June 1962, shortly before Uganda’s independence in November 1962. Since the declaration was strictly speaking before Uganda’s independence and since we already cover the 1963 declaration, we do not code this one.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There is evidence of a rebellion which started in 1963 and lasted until the 1980s, with peaks of violence in 1963-1964 and 1979-1982. However, UCDP/PRIO does not include this episode, and despite consulting many sources we were unable to find any casualty estimates. While it is well possible that the LVIOLSD threshold was met, particularly in 1963-1964, the evidence is too thin for us to code LVIOLSD.
  + Rubongoya (1995: 87) reports that the central government imposed a state of emergency over the Ruwenzori mountains in February 1963 and dispatched the Ugandan army “in full force”. The Ruwenzoris attempted to resist, but “wielded only spears and bows and arrows”. Thus, the lower slopes of the mountain region were quickly lost. The self-declared Ruwenzori king retreated higher up to the mountains. The Ugandan central government then installed direct rule over the lower slopes, effectively taking away the administration from the discriminatory Toro kingdom (Rubongoya 1995: 87-88). Those higher up in the mountains continued to defy the state, but in the lower slopes the movement lost support (Rubongoya 1995: 88).
  + Minahan, too, reports a Ruwenzori rebellion in 1963, arguing that “violence spread across the kingdom”, and adds that there were also fights in 1964, when “the Ugandan army attacked the Ruwenzori rebels, but they held out in their mountain strongholds.”
  + Forrest (2004: 222) also makes reference to battles in 1963-1964 “between the Konjo and the Amba on the one hand, and Toro and Ugandan army units on the other; the latter effectively suppressed the rebels.”
  + Rothchild (1997: 90) suggests that “casualties proved high at times, especially in 1963 and 1964, when Batoro forces massacred many Bakonjo in their struggle for control of the fertile valleys.”
  + According to Rubongoya (1995: 88), the Ugandan government had effectively crushed the rebellion by 1965: “[r]ealizing that it had broken the back of the Baamba, the government embarked on the process of co-optation: agents formerly engaged in Rwenzururu resistance replaced Batoro administrators; the government promised a 100 bed hospital in Bwaamba; and in late 1965 granted amnesty for Rwenzururu fighters, further weakening the secessionist movement.” Still, some fighting continued (Rubongoya 1995: 88), as “a number of Bakonjo fighters held out against continued military attacks”, “helped by the difficult mountain terrain and their well-developed knowledge of how to evade government forces.” According to Rubongoya (1995: 89) the rebellion “has flared up and faded out in irregular cycles.”
  + Forrest (2004: 222) argues that the Ruwenzoris reconsolidated their movement after the defeat in 1964, but were only able to mount a significant threat again “in the wake of the power vacuum left by the collapse of Idi Amin’s regime in 1979.”
  + Rothchild (1997: 90) broadly corroborates this account when arguing that “In 1979, the Ruwenzuru movement seized the opportunity accorded it by the collapse of Idi Amin’s regime to strengthen its military arm by securing significant amounts of military equipment and supplies from that administration’s retreating soldiers. As a result of this strengthening of Rwenzururu fighting capabilities after the county’s liberation, the security threat became serious in the period from 1979 to 1982.”
  + Finally, the Minorities at Risk rebellion score of the Konjo and Amba (the two groups making up the Ruwenzoris, see above) is six from 1965-1979, suggesting “large-scale guerilla activity”. Yet, as noted, we were unable to find any concrete evidence that the 25 deaths threshold was met, and in what years.
* Note: Minahan (2002: 1622) suggests that the Ruwenzoris played a major role in the multi-ethnic Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group that was formed in 1996 and that the Ruwenzoris under the ADF umbrella engaged in separatist violence. In partial agreement, UCDP reports that the ADF was a conglomerate of three groups, including the remnants of the Ruwenzori separatist movement. However, the ADF’s main goal does not appear to be Ruwenzori separatism (Titeca and Vlassenroot 2012). UCDP argues that “most analysts agree that ADF’s was really a rebellion without a political cause. Like LRA, ADF attacked indiscriminately, killing and abducting large numbers of civilians” (see also: Syahuka-Muhindo & Titeca 2016: 11). Thus, we do not code the ADF rebellion.
* There was an escalation of violence in 2014-2016, with particularly severe incidents in 2014 and 2016. This round of violence is different from the earlier rebellion and, according to Khisa & Rwengabo (2022: 954ff), is broadly related to the secession of the Bwamba kingdom from Ruwenzuru in 2014. According to Khisa & Rwengabo (2022: 955f), the first clashes erupted in Bundibugyo in June 2014 and spilled over to Ntoroko and Kasese districts, as armed men attacked residents with guns, machetes, and bows and arrows, killing up to 98 people. Much of this violence appears to be inter-ethnic violence between the Ruwenzuru, Bamba, and Babwisi in Bughendera, but Khisa & Rwengabo suggest that there were a minimum of six UPDF soldiers and five police officers killed as well. There were brutal counter-security operations against the Bakonzo in the aftermath (Titeca & Reuss 2017).
  + Additional information: Local media reports suggest more than 100 people were killed during the violence in 2014. Bakonzo cultural leaders “told Human Rights Watch that the [initial] attacks were…a protest against perceived historical marginalization by the central government” (Human Rights Watch 2014). Indeed, in July, “a Bakonzo group claiming responsibility for the attacks wrote to President Museveni explaining their motivation, highlighting land conflicts, the refusal of the president to meet Bakonzo cultural elders, and high unemployment rates among Bakonzo people” (Human Rights Watch 2014; for a further discussion of this period of violence, see also: Titeca and Reuss 2017).
* In 2016, government forces stormed the Ruwenzori royal palace. According to Khisa & Rwengabo (2022: 957), at least 52 people died, though the death toll may be closer to 100 (also see Beevor and Titeca 2018). We could not find disaggregated casualty figures, but the cited reports suggest that violence was reciprocated. The motive is not fully clear, though does appear to involve separatism in some sort. Specifically, the Museveni government appears to have believed that Royal Guards of the Rwenzururu Palace in Kasese were “planning to fight for an independent state” and thus attacked the palace (Beevor and Titeca 2018; see also: Titeca and Reuss 2017). According to Khisa & Rwengabo (2022: 957), the Minister of Internal Affairs explained after the attack that it was a response to a string of attacks by a secessionist militia between 2014 and 2016, which had killed a total of 16 police officers. Accusations of secessionism were denied by Ruwenzuru kingdom officials. Therefore, this is an ambiguous case.
  + Additional information: in February 2016, in the aftermath of an election more than 50 people were killed in the region and thousands displaced (Titeca and Reuss 2017). Based on the evidence we found, it was not clear whether the violence had separatist motives, however.
* Overall, there was an escalation of violence in 2014 which lasted until 2016. The motives for the violence are not fully clear, but appear to include increased self-determination, and in the case of 2014 much of the violence appears due to inter-ethnic strife and, therefore, the 25 deaths threshold is ambiguous. We code LVIOLSD in 2014-2016, given that there appears to have been sustained fighting in 2015. We denote the episode as ambiguous due to “mixed motives”.
* [1962-2013: NVIOLSD; 2014-2016: LVIOLSD; 2017-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Before the arrival of the British, the Bakonzo and Baamba peoples were self-governing (Rubongoya 1995: 77). Between 1891 and 1900 Ruwenzururu was incorporated into the Toro kingdom following a number of treaties signed by the Toro king and the British, implying a loss of autonomy (Rubongoya 1995: 81-82). Centralization, discrimination in particular with regard to the assignment of government posts and assimilation pressure gave way to a Ruwenzori rebellion in 1919, which was brutally suppressed (Rubongoya 1995: 83). The 1919 incident proved vital for the subsequent emergence of the Ruwenzuru national movement.
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the movement start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1966 (1967 according to Minahan 2002: 1621), Uganda abandoned its federal structure; Ugandan nationalists installed a system of direct rule, taking away the autonomy of kingdoms such as the Toro one (Rubongoya 1995: 79, 88). In 1970 authority over parts of the Ruwenzururu mountains was given back to the Toros. “The government also established another district specifically for the Bakonjo-Baamba, separate from the Toro, and some evidence suggests that after that point they were better able to manage local government” (Rubongoya 1995: 88). We consider this too ambiguous to code a concession.
* According to Forrest (2004: 222), “[t]he second Obote administration pursued negotiations with Ruwenzururu leaders and reached a settlement in 1982 according to which Konjo and Amba elites agreed to abandon outright secession in return for “a degree of local autonomy”; the appointment of Konjo and Amba to administrative posts; and the provision of economic benefits, such as motorized vehicles, shops, and student scholarships, that would be assigned for distribution by traditional leaders of these two groups.” [1982: autonomy concession]
* Since 1986, there have been significant changes in the competencies of local councils in Uganda. A detailed summary with references is provided in the Baganda entry. We do not code changes in the level of municipal/local autonomy as concessions or restrictions.
* In 2001, Museveni convened a meeting of OBR elders in Kampala “to discuss Rwenzururu concerns”. At this meeting, ‘the pro-Obusinga achieved a formal (written) commitment of the President towards solving the issue of the recognition and restoration of OBR’; in the letter, the president ‘promised to attend to the OBR issue as soon as possible as long as the people of Kasese voted to return him to power’. Museveni gained 69% of the vote in Kasese in the 2001 presidential elections (Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca, 2016:17-8). In December 2004, the OBR Recognition Committee wrote to Museveni, proposing the next steps to begin formal OBR-government negotiations. The Rwenzururu king arrived in the country in December 2004 and met the president in January 2005. Following the meeting, the president appointed a four-member Ministerial Committee ‘to make deeper investigations into the disagreement around the Obusinga, and to make recommendations to the Government’ (Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca 2016:18). This committee was called the Kajura Committee. Following its investigation, the committee “recommended that a cultural institution for the Bakonzo be allowed to exist within the region”; “it also recommended that the Bakonzo should determine their cultural leader in accordance with the[ir] customs, wishes, culture, traditions and aspirations’ (Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca, 2016:18-9). On a visit to Kasese in August 2009, Museveni announced his decision to recognize the Obusinga Bwa Rwenzururu and a coronation ceremony took place in October 2009 (Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca 2016:19). Charles Mumbere was installed as Omusinga (Syahuka-Muhindo and Titeca 2016:19). The government’s recognition did ‘not grant any executive power’ but allowed the reinstated monarch ‘to determine cultural and social issues’ (CBS 2009). [2009: autonomy concession]
  + It should be noted that Minahan (2016: 357) claims the kingdom was restored in 2008 (also see All Africa 2008); however, several other sources peg the concession to including CBS (2009), BBC (2016), Gaffey (2016), New Vision (2019), and Human Rights Watch (2017).
* In May 2014, Museveni allowed the Bwamba kingdom to secede from the Ruwenzuru kingdom against the latter’s will. With this, the Ruwenzuru lost a part of its territory (Khisa & Rwengabo 2022: 954). [2014: autonomy restriction]
  + We code a violence onset in 2014. The first clashes did not take place until June (see above), suggesting that the restriction preceded the violence onset in the same year.

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1963-1965 because of de facto independence. While the Ruwenzoris received a degree of autonomy in 1982 and their own kingdom in 2009, autonomy remained limited (CBS 2009), so we do not code autonomy after 1982. [1963-1965: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* Shortly after independence, Ruwenzori leaders began to set up their own structures. According to Rubongoya (1995: 87), “[o]ne month after Uganda’s independence in November 1962, the Bakonjo-Baamba secessionist leaders appointed chiefs, printed their own tax receipts, collected taxes, proceeded to establish their own tax receipts, collected taxes, proceeded to establish their own administrative structure in the Ruwenzori Mountains, and the movement adopted Rwenzururu national songs and a flag. Mukirane, who had declared himself king and leader of the Rwenzururu Secessionist Movement, wrote to Prime Minister Milton Obote declaring the Ruwenzori Mountains independent from Uganda; copies of this document were sent to UN Secretary General U Thant and to the Organization of African Unita (OAU) Chairman […] By December 1962, law and order had completely broken down.”
* Florea (2014) suggest that the Ruwenzoris retained de facto independence until 1982. However, according to Rubongoya (1995: 88), the Ugandan government had effectively crushed the rebellion by 1965 and fighters retreated to the mountains. Based on the latter, we code an end to de facto independence in 1965. [1963-1965: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* [1962: establishment of de facto independence]
* [1965: revocation of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ruwenzoris |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Ruwenzoris' movement is associated with both the Bakonzo (or Bakonjo) and Baamba peoples (Minahan 2002: 1617-1618). Neither a Bakonzo, a Baamba, nor an umbrella Ruwenzori group are coded in EPR.
* We found no evidence for representation in the central government. The Ruwenzoris were de facto independent from late 1962-1965 and, from the mid-1960s onwards, the government became dominated by Luo-speakers (Acholi and Langi) as well as Teso (MRGI). Under Idi Amin (1971-1979), the Ugandan government was dominated by the Kakwa Nubian group and subsequently northern groups including the Langi, Acholi, and Teso dominated the Ugandan executive (EPR). Museveni’s governments from 1986 onwards were more ethnically inclusive (EPR; Lindemann 2011b), but we found no evidence for Ruwenzori representation. [powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1617), there are 640,000 Ruwenzoris in Uganda and the DRC, including 420,000 Konjos (who live primarily in Uganda) and 220,000 Ambas (who live primarily in DRC). Uganda's population was 25.94 mio in that year according to the WB. [0.0162]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1617), >90% of all Ruwenzoris live in the Ruwenzori region where they make up 82% of the local population (these figures include parts of Ruwenzori in DRC). [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are ca. 220,000 Ruwenzoris in the DRC (Minahan 2002: 1617). [kin in adjoining country]

**Sources**

All Africa (2008). “Uganda: Welcome Rwenzururu.” March 31. http://allafrica.com/stories/200804010029.html [March 5, 2015].

Baker, Wairama G. (2001) ‘Uganda: The Marginalization of Minorities’ *Minority Rights Group International* [online], available from: <https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-143-Uganda-The-Marginalization-of-Minorities.pdf> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

BBC (2016) ‘Uganda Rwenzururu: King Charles Mubere Charged With Murder’ [online], available from: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38146226> [last accessed: 2.11.2022]

BBC (2016). ‘Uganda Police Arrest Rwenzururu King Over Deadly Clashes’ [online], available from: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38121581> [last accessed: 7.10.2022]

Beevor, Eleanor and Titeca, Kristof (2018). ‘Troubling Times for the Rwenzururu Kingdom in Western Uganda’ *LSE* [online], available from: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/08/29/troubling-times-for-the-rwenzururu-kingdom-in-western-uganda/> [last accessed: 7.10.2022]

Bertelsmann Stiftung (2022). ‘Uganda Country Report 2022’ [online], available from: <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/UGA> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

CBS (2009) ‘Ex-Nurse Aide in US Crowned Uganda King’ [online], available from: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-nurse-aide-in-us-crowned-uganda-king/> [last accessed: 2.11.2022]

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel: New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62(1): 87-119.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2022). ‘Milton Obote’ [online], available from: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Milton-Obote> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Florea, Adrian (2014). “De Facto States in International Politics (1945‒2011): A New Dataset.” *International Interactions*(just-accepted).

Forrest, Joshua (2004). *Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances, and Politics.* Lynne Rienner Publishers.

GADM (2019). Database of Global Administrative Boundaries, Version 3.6. <https://gadm.org/> [November 19, 2021].

Gaffey, Conor (2016) ‘How a Traditional Ugandan Kingdom Became the Center of Deadly Violence’ *Newsweek* [online], available from: <https://www.newsweek.com/how-traditional-ugandan-kingdom-became-center-deadly-violence-526036> [last accessed: 2.11.2022]

Hewitt, Christopher, and Tom Cheetham (2000). *Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, p. 259.

Horowitz, Donald L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Human Rights Watch (2014) ‘Uganda: Violence, Reprisals in Western Region’ [online], available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/05/uganda-violence-reprisals-western-region> [last accessed: 2.11.2022]

Human Rights Watch (2017) ‘Uganda: Ensure Independent Investigation into Kasese Killings’ [online], available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/15/uganda-ensure-independent-investigation-kasese-killings> [last accessed: 2.11.2022]

Jones, Ben (2009).’Museveni’s Rule Has Divided Uganda’ *Guardian* [online], available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/katineblog/2009/apr/02/museveni-divided-uganda> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Khisa, Moses, and Sabastian Rwengabo (2022). “The Deepening Politics of Fragmentation in Uganda: Understanding Violence in the Rwenzori Region.” *African Studies Review* 65(4): 939-964.

Kiwanuka, Semakula et al. (2022) ‘Uganda’ *Encyclopaedia Britannica* [online], available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Uganda> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Lindemann, Stefan (2011b). ‘Increased Territorial Power-sharing in Museveni’s Uganda Has led to the Decline of Civil Wars’ *LSE* [online], available from: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2011/09/19/new-lse-research-increased-territorial-power-sharing-in-museveni%e2%80%99s-uganda-has-led-to-the-decline-of-civil-wars/> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Minahan, James (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 1617-1622.

Minahan, James (2016). *Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations. Second Edition.* Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Minorities at Risk Project (2009). College Park, MD: University of Maryland.

Minority Rights Group (n.d.) ‘Uganda: Background’ [online], available from: <https://minorityrights.org/country/uganda/> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Monitor (2021). ‘Contrasting Amin, Obote and Museveni Cabinets’ [online], available from: <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/contrasting-amin-obote-and-museveni-cabinets-3460704> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

New Vision (2019) ‘Uganda Through 57 Years’ [online], available from: <https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1508206/uganda-57> [last accessed: 2.11.2022]

New Vision (2019). ‘Who Has Been in Museveni’s Cabinet Over the Years?’ [online], available from: <https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1512160/-served-disappeared-read-about-musevenis-ministers> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Nyeko, Oryem (2019) ‘The Legacy of Uganda’s Kasese Massacre’ *Human Rights Watch* [online], available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/27/legacy-ugandas-kasese-massacre> [last accessed: 2.11.2022]

Peterson, Derek R. (2012). *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, C. 1935-1972*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roth, Christopher F. (2015). *Let's Split! A Complete Guide to Separatist Movements and Aspirant Nations, from Abkhazia to Zanzibar.* Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books.

Rothchild, Donald S. (1997). *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation.* Brookings Institution Press.

Rubongoya, Joshua B. (1995). “The Bakonjo-Baamba and Uganda: Colonial and Postcolonial Integration and Ethnocide.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18(2): 75-92.

Syahuka-Muhindo, Arthur and Titeca, Kristof (2016). ‘The Rwenzururu Movement and the Struggle for the Rwenzururu Kingdom in Uganda’ *Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp* Discussion paper 2016.01, pp. 1-25

Thawite, John (2020). ‘New Rwenzururu Cabinet Unveils Roadmap to Revitalise Kingdom’ *New Vision* [online], available from: <https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1526662/rwenzururu-cabinet-unveils-roadmap-revitalise-kingdom> [last accessed: 7.10.2022]

The Independent (2022) ‘State Seeks to protect 42 Witnesses in the Mumbere Trial’ [online], available from: <https://www.independent.co.ug/state-seeks-to-protect-42-witnesses-in-the-mumbere-trial/> [last accessed: 2.11.2022]

Titeca, Kristof and Reuss, Anna (2017) ‘Uganda: Why the Unrest in Rwenzori is Far From Over’ *African Arguments* [online], available from: <https://africanarguments.org/2017/07/uganda-why-the-unrest-in-rwenzori-is-far-from-over/> [last accessed: 2.11.2022]

Titeca, Kristof, and Koen Vlassenroot (2012). “Rebels without Borders in the Rwenzori Borderland? A Biography of the Allied Democratic Forces.” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6(1): 154-176.

Tripp, Aili Mari (2012). ‘The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda’ *USIP* [online], available from: <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Framing%20the%20State/Chapter6_Framing.pdf> [last accessed: 8.10.2022]

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). *Conflict Encyclopedia.* [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/  
gpcountry.php?id=160&regionSelect=2-Southern\_Africa#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=160&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa) [February 22, 2015].

Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin (2015). “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1327-1342.