# UKRAINE

## Bulgarians and Gagauz

Activity: 1991-2001

**General notes**

* There were claims for autonomy from both ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Gagauz in Ukraine. These are combined here because both compactly settled in the Bolhrad raion in Odessa and because their claims overlap.

**Movement start and end dates**

* When Ukraine was about to gain independence, ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Gagauz (both compactly settled in the Bolhrad raion in Odessa and combined under the header of the Bulgarians) began to make claims for autonomy (Solchanyk 1994: 65; Goode 2011: 141). Local authorities organized a referendum on autonomy held simultaneously with Ukraine’s independence referendum on December 1. According to Solchanyk (1994: 65), the referendum has to be seen in the context of Ukraine’s 1990 ‘Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Ukraine’ which stated that “the language of any national group that is compactly settled in an administrative-territorial unit to function ‘on a level equal to the state [Ukrainian] language’.” 83% of voters purportedly agreed to autonomy. We code the movement from 1991. The movement is not coded under the header of the USSR since the claim appears to have surfaced with Ukraine’s independence.
* The call for autonomy has remained unsuccessful, and we did not find much further activity. Thus, we code an end to this movement in 2001 in accordance with the ten-years inactivity rule.
* There are news reports that the movement re-emerged in recent years. However, the evidence we found suggest that the alleged claim for autonomy by a far-right Bulgarian party was manufactured by Russia in the context of the war in eastern Ukraine (Coynash 2016; Novinite 2016). [start date: 1991; end date: 2001]

**Dominant claim**

* When Ukraine was about to gain independence, ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Gagauz began to make claims for autonomy (Solchanyk 1994: 65; Goode 2011: 141). Local authorities organized a referendum on autonomy held simultaneously with Ukraine’s independence referendum on December 1. No other claim was found. [1991-2001: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by this movement is the Bolhrad Raion in Odessa. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence for separatist violence. Thus the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Bulgarians and the Gagauz in Ukraine are concentrated in the Bolhrad raion in Odessa. Ukraine’s 1989 language law contained an important concession to national minorities. According to Article 11, in those territories where minorities from a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration, in addition to Ukrainian. While there is no obligation on the side of the state to communicate in the minority language, and it does not have the status of an official language (Csernicsko 2005: 103-104), the language law still exemplifies an accommodative approach. Hence, we code a prior concession. [1989: cultural rights concession]
* In November 1991 the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Ukraine established a broad range of minority rights (Minority Rights Group International). According to Solchanyk (1994: 65), the Declaration provides for “the language of any national group that is compactly settled in an administrative-territorial unit to function ‘on a level equal to the state [Ukrainian] language’. It also ‘guarantees the existence of national-administrative units’ in Ukraine.” The provision for administrative-territorial units did not lead to any form of autonomy, thus we only code a cultural rights concession. The SDM’s claims were framed in terms of this declaration, suggesting the declaration came before the SDM; therefore, we treat this as a prior concession. [1991: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In the early 1990s there was some back and forth with regard to the center-regional relations (see Wolczuk 2002; Sasse 2001; Konitzer-Smirnov 2005); we do not code this for the Bulgarians in Ukraine since they do not make up a majority in any of the first-level units and accordingly appear to lack significant influence over a first-level administrative unit.
* In 1992 Ukraine passed the Law on National Minorities. This law incorporated and restated earlier language and citizenship laws, and further provided for access to education and media in minority languages, and government financial support for ethnic minorities. Also, a Ministry of Nationalities was set up (Duplain 1996; Minority Rights Group International). [1992: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bulgarians and Gagauz |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* We found no evidence of meaningful representation in the central government. [1991-2001: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minority Rights Group International, there were 204,600 Bulgarians in Ukraine according to the 2001 census. The same census counted 31,900 Gagauz and pegged Ukraine’s total population at 48,457,100. [0.0049]

**Regional concentration**

* We consulted district level census data. Our conclusion is that the threshold for territorial concentration is not met, but it is very close. It is possible that more fine-grained data below the district level would lead to a different conclusion, but we could not find more fine-grained data. [not concentrated]
  + The Bulgarians and Gagauz make up an absolute majority in one district, Bolhrad: According to the 2001 census, Bulgarians made up 61% of Odessa’s Bolhrad raion and Gagauz 19% (total population of 74,000). We found two other, adjacent districts, in which the Bulgarians and Gagauz make up a relative majority: Tarutyne district, where the Bulgarians make up 38% and the Gagauz make up 6% of the local population (out of a total population of 45,000), and Artsyz raion, the Bulgarians make up 39% out of 46,000, and a further 1% speaks Gagauz. 41% of the Bulgarians and Gagauz reside in those three districts, and they make up 59% of the local population.
  + The Bulgarians and Gagauz make up significant minorities in two other adjacent districts: In Sarata raion, 20% are Bulgarians and approx. 1% is Gagauz out of a total population of 49,000, and in Izmail raion, 26% is Bulgarian out of 55,000 (<1% Gagauz). If those are added, 51% of the Bulgarians and Gagauz reside in the resulting area, but they no longer form an absolute majority (48%).
  + Three other raions with significant Bulgarian/Gagauz populations are Reni raion, where the Bulgarians make up 9% and the Gagauz 8% (out of 40,000), Tatarbunary raion (12% out of 42,000) as well as Chilia district: 4% Gagauz and 3% Bulgarians out of 60,000.

**Kin**

* Bulgarians in Bulgaria and the Gagauz in Moldova constitute numerically significant kin. [kin in adjacent country]

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## Crimean Russians

Activity: 1991-2014

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first calls for autonomy for Crimean Russians emerged in the summer and autumn of 1989 (Solchanyk 1994: 50), thus the start date. The calls intensified in 1990 (Sasse 2001: 87).
* Notably, it was the Communist party that began to mobilize for autonomy in Crimea. Among the first to act, Sevastopol’s city party committee proposed in August 1989 that a referendum be held on three questions, restoration of the autonomy status Crimea had enjoyed until 1945, bilingualism and whether Ukrainian should be taught in Crimea at all, and on the return of the Crimean Tatars. At the twenty-eighth Congress of Ukraine’s Communist Party in June 1990, autonomy for the Crimea was given green light, subject to a referendum. In January 1991 a referendum was held in the Crimea on restoring autonomy to the region. Over 80% of the electorate participated, of which 93% supported the “restoration of the Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and as a party to the Union Treaty.” While Ukraine’s Rukh movement was opposed to autonomy, the official position of Kyiv remained favorable to autonomy. In February 1991 the Crimean ASSR was restored.
* In August 1991 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared Ukraine's independence, and a few days later, in September 1991, the Crimean parliament declared the state sovereignty of Crimea as a constituent part of Ukraine. The Republican movement then advocated another local referendum, this time on independence. In November 1991 the Crimean Supreme Soviet passed a referendum law, and within a matter of months the Republican movement collected the required 180,000 signatures for a referendum on independence. Ukraine became independent in late 1991.
* What begun as a movement for decentralization within the Soviet Union carried over into independent Ukraine. Thus we code the movement from 1991 and note prior non-violent activity.
* In the early 1990s radicals were at the forefront of the movement, demanding outright separation from Ukraine. In Crimea, irredentism was strong among the Russians due to the large numbers of Russians living there and the relatively strong historical link between Crimea and Russia. The Republican Movement of Crimea was the main vehicle of the secessionist campaign, which advocated the nullification of the 1954 to decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine and independent statehood (Solchanyk 1994: 52).
* In early 1992 Ukraine’s parliament passed a law on the status of Crimea, which in Crimea was widely perceived as too restrictive and contravening earlier negotiations with Kyiv (Solchanyk 1994: 55). Crimea declared independence in May 1992, and scheduled a vote on independence for August. Moreover, the same month the Crimean leaders passed the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea, which proclaimed the peninsula a sovereign state that ‘enters into the state of Ukraine and defines its relations with Ukraine on the basis of contract and agreements’ (Sasse 2001: 92; Wolczuk 2002: 71).
* Kyiv’s response was harsh; it suspended the referendum and the declaration, set a deadline until May 20 to annul its resolutions, ordered a parliamentary commission to examine whether laws adopted in Crimea for their constitutionality, and gave Kravchuk the power to use all necessary means to stop Crimean separatism. Still, Kyiv offered further negotiations. In reaction to the Ukrainian ultimatum, the Crimean parliament rescinded its independence declaration, suspended (but did not rescind) the referendum, and suggested that Kyiv suspends its law on Crimean autonomy and begins negotiations on a new delineation of powers. In June 1992, a compromise was reached, and Kyiv passed a law that granted Crimea greater autonomy, though subject to Crimea bringing in line its constitution with the compromise reached. Crimea subsequently placed a ‘moratorium’ on its independence referendum (Solchanyk 1994: 56-57), and a compromise constitution was enacted in Crimea on September 25 (Sasse 2001: 92).
* The Russian nationalist movement reached its peak with the election of Yuri Meshkov, leader of Crimea’s Republican party, as president of Crimea in January 1994 (Sasse 2001: 88). Within months Meshkov proposed a new referendum to be held simultaneously with par-liamentary elections on March 27, 1994. The 1994 referendum was indeed held; it involved three questions at the brink between maximal autonomy and outright secession.
* However, at that time the separatist movement had already begun to disintegrate (Minority Rights Group International). In March 1995, when the Russian movement in Crimea had already fragmented, President Kuchma cracked down on Crimea, and Meshkov in particular, abolished the Crimean presidency and set an ultimatum for the regional parliament to draw up a new constitution. Negotiations followed, and Crimea regained some of its lost powers with the acceptance of the new regional constitution in 1998. However, they did not return to the previous status; in particular, there no longer was a Crimean presidency, and Crimea’s Prime Minister was to be chosen by Kyiv (Sasse 2007).
* Support for separatism decreased in the 2002 elections, which temporarily brought to an end “the institutional squabbles between the executive and parliament within Crimea, and paved the way for a more stable phase in regional politics” (Sasse 2007: 220).
* However, the Crimean Russians SDM remained active in Crimea until 2014. After Yanukovych won the 2010 presidential election, he appointed Vasily Dzharty as the Crimean prime minister, whose team liquidated Crimea’s consociational democracy to build a more effective government and electoral machine (Matsuzato 2016). In 2014, Crimea was annexed by Russia. While not recognized under international law, Crimea was de facto part of Russia after this, thus ending the movement. [start date: 1989; end date: 2014]

**Dominant claim**

* What began as a movement for decentralization within the Soviet Union carried over into independent Ukraine. In the early 1990s radicals were at the forefront of the movement, demanding outright separation from Ukraine. In the Crimea, irredentism is strong among the Russians due to the large numbers of Russians living there and the relatively strong historical link between Crimea and Russia. The Republican Movement of Crimea was the main vehicle of the separatist campaign, which advocated the nullification of the 1954 decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine and independent statehood (Solchanyk 1994: 52). In August 1991 the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared Ukraine's independence, and a few days, in September 1991, the Crimean parliament declared the state sovereignty of Crimea as a constituent part of the Ukraine. The Republican movement then advocated another local referendum, this time on independence. In November 1991 the Crimean Supreme Soviet passed a referendum, and within a matter of months the Republican movement collected the required 180,000 signatures for a referendum on independence. Shortly after, the referendum was suspended, but not rescinded. The Russian nationalist movement reached its peak with the election of Yuri Meshkov, leader of Crimea’s Republican party, as president of Crimea in January 1994 (Sasse 2001: 88). Within months Meshkov proposed a new referendum to be held simultaneously with parliamentary elections on March 27, 1994. The 1994 referendum was indeed held; it involved three questions at the brink between maximal autonomy and outright secession. In sum, in the first years of independent Ukraine the Crimean Russian movement was dominated by advocates of outright separation from Ukraine. There is a certain ambiguity whether the claim was for independence or union with Russia, but given i) the close ties with Russia, ii) the irredentist claims issued in the Russian Duma, and iii) the focus on the annulment of the 1954 transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, we code a claim for union with Russia. [1991-1994: irredentist claim]
* Beginning in 1993, the separatist movement began to disintegrate (Minority Rights Group International; Sasse 2001). Sasse notes that the movement by 1995 had been heavily fragmented. With Russian nationalists losing power, the dominant claim shifted towards increased autonomy. [1995-2013: autonomy claim]
* In a context of increasing uncertainty, the claim for a merger with Russia began to resurface in late 2013. However, irredentism only became the dominant claim again after the February 2014 Maidan Revolution (Matsuzato 2016). Due to the January 1 rule we code autonomy as the dominant claim also in 2014, therefore. [2014: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* Secession claims were made from 1991, which we treat as claims for a merger with Russia (see above). By 1995, the movement for secession had been highly fragmented and lost power (Sasse 2001). The detailed account in Sasse (2001) does not refer to any claims for secession after 1995, MAR suggests that Crimean Russians identified strongly with Russia in the 2000s, but does not cite evidence for irredentist mobilization. Katchanovski (2015: 83), on the other hand, suggests that pro-Russia organizations continued to operate, albeit with limited electoral success, until the annexation in 2014. [start date: 1991; end date: 2014]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Crimean Russians is the Crimean peninsula (formerly Crimean ASSR) (Roth 2015: 155f). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On May 5, 1992 the parliament of Crimea announced total independence subject to a referendum to be held in August 1992 (Sasse 2001). [1992: independence declaration]
* On March 11, 2014, the Supreme Council of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Council proclaimed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol a sovereign state (Supreme Council of Crimea 2014). As argued above, the purpose of this move was a merger with Russia. [2014: irredentist declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We have not found any reports of separatist violence above the 25-deaths threshold, hence a NVIOLSD classification. Notably, there was basically no opposition to the invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014 by the Ukrainian military (UCDP). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After the Crimean Tatars were deported in 1944, the Crimean ASSR was downgraded to a (non-autonomous) Oblast status in 1945, and in 1954 Crimea was transferred to Ukraine (Sasse 2001: 87). Note that the Crimean ASSR is variably seen as the homeland of Crimean Tatars or a multi-ethnic autonomous entity. Still, the downgrade of the Crimean ASSR can be seen as a restriction, at least in combination with the transfer to the Ukrainian SSR.
* In 1989, Ukraine passed its language law, which made Ukrainian the official state language. The law was not overly restrictive. In particular, it stipulated that in those territories where minorities form a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration in addition to Ukrainian (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 267). Still, the elevation of Ukrainian to the only official language constitutes a downgrade of the Russian language. [1989: cultural rights restriction]
* However, the Communist elite in Kyiv (and Moscow) from the outset adopted a favorable stance towards the autonomy issue. In June 1990, Crimean autonomy was given green light, subject to a referendum. After the referendum turned out positive, the Crimean ASSR was restored in February 1991 and in July Russian became the official language of the peninsula (Minority Rights Group International). We code a single autonomy concession (still under the header of the USSR) in 1990 since this is when the referendum was granted. [1990: autonomy concession]
  + Note: in 1988 contested elections were introduced throughout the Union, which can be seen as a measure of decentralization (prior to this, officials were de facto centrally appointed). However, groups without an autonomous entity (like the Crimean Russians at the time) did not profit much from increased local say over leader choice because non-autonomous entities’ decision rights were rather limited. Thus, we do not code a (prior) concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After negotiations with Crimea, in the spring of 1992 the Ukrainian parliament passed a law ‘On the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea’. The law, as passed in Kyiv, was extensively watered down, and fell clearly short of the compromise that was reached earlier on with Crimea. Intriguingly, the official name of Crimea was changed to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (in negotiations Crimea and Kyiv agreed on ‘Republic of Crimea’), which underlined that Kyiv was unwilling to accept that Crimea and Ukraine were equal partners, as it had been implicit in the original version Kyiv and Crimea agreed on (Solchanyk 1994: 55; Sasse 2001). Since the law on the status of Crimea constituted a significant downgrade vis-à-vis the compromise reached with the Crimean authorities, we code an autonomy restriction. [1992: autonomy restriction]
* In response, Crimea declared independence in May 1992, and scheduled a vote on independence for August. Moreover, the same month the Crimean leaders passed the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea, which proclaimed the peninsula a sovereign state that ‘enters into the state of Ukraine and defines its relations with Ukraine on the basis of contract and agreements’ (Sasse 2001: 92; Wolczuk 2002: 71). Kyiv’s response was harsh; it suspended the referendum and the declaration, set a deadline until May 20 to annul its resolutions, ordered a parliamentary commission to examine whether laws adopted in Crimea for their constitutionality, and gave Kravchuk the power to use all necessary means to stop Crimean separatism. Still, Kyiv offered further negotiations. In reaction to the Ukrainian ultimatum, the Crimean parliament rescinded its independence declaration, suspended (but did not rescind) the referendum, and suggested that Kyiv suspends its law on Crimean autonomy and begins negotiations on a new delineation of powers. In June 1992, a compromise was reached, and Kyiv passed a law that granted Crimea greater autonomy, though subject to Crimea bringing in line its constitution with the compromise reached. Crimea subsequently placed a ‘moratorium’ on its independence referendum (Solchanyk 1994: 56-57), and a compromise constitution was enacted in Crimea on September 25 (Sasse 2001: 92). Since the compromise solution resulted in increased autonomy for Crimea if compared to the earlier law on the status of Crimea, we code an autonomy concession. [1992: autonomy concession]
* The Russian nationalist movement reached its peak with the election of Yuri Meshkov, leader of Crimea’s Republican party, as president of Crimea in January 1994 (Sasse 2001: 88). Within months Meshkov proposed a new referendum to be held simultaneously with parliamentary elections on March 27, 1994. The 1994 referendum was indeed held; it involved three questions at the brink between maximal autonomy and outright secession. However, at that time the separatist movement had already begun to disintegrate (Minority Rights Group International). In March 1995, when the Russian movement in Crimea had already fragmented, President Kuchma cracked down on Crimea and Meshkov in particular, abolished the Crimean presidency and set an ultimatum for the regional parliament to draw up a new constitution (Ukrainian Parliament 1995; Sasse 2001). [1995: autonomy restriction]
  + Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 307) note that this was in 1994, but Sasse’s case study evidence is richer and thus more reliable.
  + Negotiations followed, and Crimea regained some of its lost powers with the acceptance of the new regional constitution and the adoption of Ukraine’s constitution in 1998. However, they did not return to the previous status; in particular, there no longer was a Crimean presidency, and Crimea’s Prime Minister was to be chosen by Kyiv (MAR; Sasse 2001). We code a single restriction in 1995; an alternative coding would be to also code a concession in 1998.
* After his victory in the presidential elections of 2005, President Viktor Yushchenko removed the right to use Russian in administrative and judicial processes (Matsuzato 2016: 229). [2005: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2012 a new language law was passed, the ‘law on the principles of the state language policy’. The law gave Russian as well as any other minority language the status of a regional official language in areas where a given national minority makes up more than 10 per cent of the total population, while Ukrainian remains the only state-wide official language. Since then, many cities and regions declared Russian a regional language, and so did a couple of Hungarian, Moldovan, and Romanian regions (see e.g. The Economist). Note that Russian had the status of an official language within the Crimean Autonomous Republic already since 1991 (Minority Rights Group International); still, this is coded since it allowed Sevastopol (a city in Crimea inhabited mostly by Russians which was left outside the Crimean Autonomous Republic due to the Russian military base there) to declare Russian as an official regional second state language. [2012: cultural rights concession]
* Immediately after the Maidan revolution in 2014, the Ukrainian parliament voted to repeal the language law in February 2014. Under the repeal bill, Ukrainian would have become the sole state language at all levels while retaining some level of protection for minority languages including Russian. This led to protests in Crimea and other regions in eastern and southern Ukraine, and met international opposition. In response, the acting President Oleksandr Turchynov said that he will not sign the repeal bill until a new language law was adopted. The Ukraininan parliament subsequently appealed to the Constitutional Court in July 2014 with a request to review the 2012 law. In October 2014, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine started reviewing the constitutionality of the law, and in February 2018 it ruled the law unconstitutional. In 2019, a new language law was passed which enhanced the status of Ukrainian at the expense of Russian. As these developments regarding language rights were all part of the same process, we code a single restriction in 2014, when the process was initiated (Arel 2018). [2014: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* We code the Crimean Russians as autonomous as of 1991 (the Crimean ASSR was restored shortly before the Soviet Union dissolved). Subsequently there was some back and forth with regard to the region’s competencies (see above), but Crimea never fully lost its autonomous status. [1991-2014: regionally autonomous]

**De facto independence**

* On March 11, 2014, the Supreme Council of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Council proclaimed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol a sovereign state (Supreme Council of Crimea 2014). On March 16, a referendum on joining Russia was held and the Republic of Crimea soon thereafter joined the Russia Federation (Sevastopol City Council 2014). Crimea was therefore nominally a de-facto independent state for 5 days; however, the real purpose of this independence declaration was clearly the paving of the way for joining the Russia Federation subsequently. Notably, all critical infrastructure within Crimea had been seized by Russian forces already. Therefore, we do not code de facto independence.

**Major territorial changes**

* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]
* In February 1991 (thus shortly before Ukraine’s independence), the Crimean ASSR was restored. Even if the exact delineation of powers between Kyiv and Simferopol had still to be negotiated, this constitutes a major break with the prior status. [1991: erection of territorial autonomy]
* Crimea was annexed by Russia in 2014. [2014: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Crimean Russians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36902000 |

**Power access**

* The Crimean Russians form a regional branch of the ‘Russians’ in EPR. Russians in Ukraine were regionally concentrated in Eastern Ukraine and in Crimea. EPR codes the Russians in Ukraine as junior partner in 1991-2014, given that the Party of Regions (often the ruling party) ideologically defends and upholds the rights of ethnic Russians and speakers of Russian language in Ukraine. The question is whether the Crimean Russians should be coded junior partners as well.
* Minorities at Risk, which codes both Russians and Crimean Russians in Ukraine, notes that there are no significant differences between Russians and Crimean Russians as regards their access to higher political offices (polic8; both are coded as not restricted). Furthermore, MAR notes that both Russians as a whole and Crimean Russians have preferential access to political power in Ukraine (poldifx<-1 in 1991-2003). Since Minorities at Risk treats Russians and Crimean Russians essentially the same with regard to power access in Ukraine, we follow EPR and peg the Crimean Russians as junior partners until 2013. [1991-2013: junior partner]
* Yanukovich fled Ukraine in March 2014 in connection to the Maidan Revolution, which gave rise to protests in Crimea. As EPR explains, Russian representation was significantly curtailed as a result of the Maidan Revolution. As it better reflects case history, we do not apply the January 1 rule in this case and apply a powerless code in 2014. [2014: powerless]

**Group size**

* Crimea is the only region in Ukraine where Russians make up the majority of the population (58% according to the 2001 census or 1,180,441). The same 2001 census gives 48.5 million as Ukraine’s population size. [0.0243]

**Regional concentration**

* While there are Russians in different parts of Ukraine, this movement refers to Russians in Crimea. Crimea is the only region in Ukraine where Russians make up the majority of the population (58% according to the 2001 census). According to MAR, the majority of the Crimean Russians resides in Crimea. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* Ukraine’s Russians have several kin groups in both adjoining and non-adjoining countries: Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Armenia, Israel, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (EPR, MAR). [kin in adjoining country]

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## Crimean Tatars

Activity: 1991-2014

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Collectively accused of treason by Stalin, the Crimean Tatars were deported to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia in 1944.The Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished in 1945, and the area was russified.
* In the second part of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the Crimean Tatars launched a campaign for the full restoration of their rights, including in particular the right to return to Crimea and the re-establishment of their autonomous status. The campaign involved repeated petitions to Moscow and demonstrations (Minahan 2002: 502-503). The earliest evidence of activity we found is in 1957, when a petition campaign began and several thousands of signatures were collected asking for the full rehabilitation and repatriation. Hence, we code 1957 as the start date. The movement was severely repressed, but non-zero MAR protest scores indicate that the movement continued to be active throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In 1967 the Crimean Tatars were absolved from mass treason, but still denied the right to return. After 1967, some Crimean Tatars attempted to return, but most were re-deported. There were plans for an autonomous entity for the Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan, but the Tatars rejected this plan. After almost 50 years of deportation, the Crimean Tatars were finally granted the right to return in 1990. Thousands of Crimean Tatars took the opportunity and returned to Crimea. The movement remained active when Ukraine became independent in 1991. We code the movement as of 1991, but indicate that it was active and nonviolent prior to independence.
* In 1992 the Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCNM) formed out of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars (NMCT), which had been formed in 1989, largely with the same goals, but with the resolution to adopt more organized forms of political struggle. Since 1993 the organization that primarily represents their demands is the Crimean Tatar Majilis, the self-styled parliament of the Crimean Tatars.
* In 1997-2000 the political activity of the Crimean Tatars, including large-scale organized protest and building tent camps to advocate their demands, significantly increased. In 1997, Crimean Tatars presented a list of demands to President Kuchma which included: change of electoral laws; recognition of the Crimean Tatars as a population native to the peninsula; recognition of the Crimean Tatar language as one of the main languages in Crimea; reimbursement of the moral and material damage caused by the deportation; recognition of the Majlis as the official body of the Crimean Tatars; introduction of 30% quota of Tatar employment in all state bodies; and the establishment of national Crimean Tatar autonomy (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 76, 305ff; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 137ff, 2002: 499ff; MAR).
* MAR coding notes suggest that the movement continued to make claims for autonomy in the 2000s.
* In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea. While Crimea remains part of Ukraine according to international law, by all intents and purposes, Crimea became part of Russia. The Crimean Tatar national movement had initially resisted the annexation and, after the annexation, Crimean Tatars became the subjects of persecution including harassment, intimidation, threats, intrusive and unlawful searches of their homes, physical attacks, and enforced disappearances. Crimean Tatar media and organizations which criticized Russia’s actions in Crimea were banned including, in 2016, the Majilis/Mejilis and, therefore, the main representative of the Crimean Tatar SDM, after a failed attempt at co-optation. Many Tatars were forced into exile, where mobilization for autonomy and a return Crimea’s to Ukraine continues (Human Rights Watch 2017; Useinow 2020; Wilson 2017, 2020). However, in Crimea itself, all open dissent ceased after 2014 (Shnykarenko 2022). Therefore, we code the movement as ended in 2014. [start date: 1957; end date: 2014]

**Dominant claim**

* From the outset, the movement’s core demands included repatriation and the restoration of all rights, including autonomy in Crimea. The 1991 sovereignty declaration (coded under the header of the USSR) confirmed the aspiration for an autonomous status within Ukraine. According to Minorities at Risk, the more radical parts of the Mejlis, the main vehicle of the Crimean Tatar movement, repeated the demand for autonomy also in recent years. No claim other than autonomy was found. Hence we code a claim for autonomy throughout. [1991-2014: autonomy claim]
  + Note: It is not fully clear whether the Crimean Tatar proposals would imply the separation of Crimean Tatar regions from the autonomous Crimea region, but it appears more likely that their claim extends to the whole of Crimea, which they consider their homeland.

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Crimean Tatars is the Crimean peninsula (formerly Crimean ASSR), which is de facto part of Russia at present but remains disputed between Russia and Ukraine (Roth 2015: 155f). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of separatist violence above the threshold, though in June 1995 at least two people were killed and nine injured in clashes between ethnic Tatars and riot police in the autonomous republic of Crimea. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Crimea, previously part of the Ottoman Empire, was incorporated into Tsarist Russia in 1783 (MAR). Subsequently Slavs immigrated into the region, and after the Crimean War of 1854-1855, there was an active policy of encouraging Tatars to leave – the Tatars were accused of collaboration with the English and the French. While significant numbers of Tatars left, they remained the majority population in the Crimea. After the October Revolution, in December 1917 the Tatars declared the Crimean region independent, but were soon defeated, only to declare independence again in 1918, before being retaken by the Red Army in 1919. In 1921, the Bolsheviks awarded the Tatars autonomous status, and created the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR); still a period of harsh repression followed. From 1942 to 1943, Crimea was under the control of Nazi Germany. When the Stalin retook the region, he accused the Crimean Tatars collectively of collaboration with the Nazis (in fact there was a Tatar legion fighting on the German side; however, many Tatars also fought in the Red Army). The Crimean Tatars were deported to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia, and their autonomous entity was abolished in 1945. Following their departure from Crimea, place names were changed, graves were desecrated, and books in the Tatar language and architecture destroyed to eradicate indications of their presence. In 1954 Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. With Stalin’s death in 1953, the situation of the Crimean Tatars began to improve. However, in contrast to other deported groups, the Crimean Tatars were not rehabilitated in 1956-1957, and were denied the right to return (Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 502-503). In 1990 (Minahan 2002: 503) the Crimean Tatars were granted the right to return to Crimea. Their demand for an autonomous entity was denied, but in line with the codebook we code an autonomy concession because the Crimean Tatars were allowed to return to Crimea. [1990: autonomy concession]
* In February 1991, the Crimean ASSR was re-established. However, this is not coded since Tatars were not included in the regional government, and in fact, are discriminated against by Russians on the peninsula. The Crimean Tatar language does not have official status in Crimea.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Note that Ukraine’s 1989 language law contained an important concession to national minorities. According to Article 11, in those territories where minorities from a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration, in addition to Ukrainian (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 267). The 1992 Law on National Minorities reaffirmed the earlier language and citizenship laws and provided for state support for the development of minorities. However, Crimean Tatars were not recognized as a national minority, and many Crimean Tatars were denied Ukrainian citizenship. Hence, we do not code a concession (Minority Rights Group International).
* According to Hewitt and Cheetham (2000: 76), the Crimean Tatars received a quota in elections to Crimea’s regional parliament in 1995 (1993 according to the Minorities at Risk Project); however, the quota was limited to a single term and was not renewed. The Crimean Tatars appear to have gained little power by this. We do not code a concession.
* The Crimean Tatar language received official status in Crimea with the 1998 constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. According to the Minorities at Risk Project: “The ARC has its own symbols, coat of arms, flag and anthem. Along with the state language [Ukrainian], the functioning, development, use and protection of the Russian and Crimean Tatar languages and the languages of other nationalities are guaranteed in Crimea. Official documents on the status of citizens are issued in Ukrainian, Russian, and at the request of the citizens, in Crimean Tatar.” [1998: cultural rights concession]
  + The 2012 language law (see under “Crimean Russians”) that allowed for regional official languages is not coded because it appears that the Crimean Tatars had enjoyed similar rights already since 1998.
* According to Minority Rights Group International, Crimean Tatar leaders in 2005 signed a power-sharing agreement with the Russian-dominated Crimean government. The agreement foresaw, among other things, the inclusion of Crimean Tatars in the regional government. However, the situation of the Crimean Tatars appears not to have changed dramatically. Minority Rights Group International notes that discrimination by the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea has continued despite the agreement. Hence, we do not code a concession.
* For the same reason – little to no change on the ground – we also do not code the 2012 language law, which allowed minority languages to attain regional official language status in areas where a given nationality makes up more than 10% of the total population, as well as the repeal of the language law in 2014 (see Crimean Russians for more discussion).

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]
* The annexation of Crimea indicates a host change [2014: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Crimean Tatars |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Crimean Tatars |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36905000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [discriminated]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.005]

**Regional concentration**

* During WWII, Stalin deported the Crimean Tatar people to places in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia; accordingly GeoEPR codes them as dispersed. In 1990, the Crimean Tatars were granted the right to return. Many took advantage of this opportunity, and GeoEPR codes the Crimean Tatars as “regionally based” from 1991 onwards. Yet the Crimean Tatars remained a clear minority on the Crimean peninsula. According to the 2001 census, the Crimean Tatars made up 10% of Crimea’s population, up from 1.6% in 1989 (in 2001, almost all (98%) of the Crimean Tatars resided in Crimea). While there was a somewhat higher concentration of Crimean Tatars in some parts of the peninsula (especially those without a seashore), in no part did they make up an absolute majority of the population. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are smaller Crimean Tatar communities outside of the USSR, but none above the threshold (Minahan 2002: 499). MAR, in its older release, coded the Turks in Turkey as ethnic kin (see gc10, gc10a, gc10b), but in the newer release it does no longer do so.
* Another potential kin group are the Volga Tatars in Russia and Tatars in Kazakhstan. However, the Crimean national movement (i.e., the Mejlis) explicitly rejects “Tatarism”, that is, the idea that there is a pan-Tatar identity and the existence of close ties with Tatars elsewhere (Wilson 2017). [no kin]

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## Donbas Russians

Activity: 1991-2004, 2014-2020

**General notes**

* Donbas refers to the Donetsk and the Luhansk Oblasts, which border Russia. We affiliate this movement with ethnic Russians in Donbas because of its leaning towards Russia and the salience of questions related to Russian identity an language. However, we note that ethncity is a complicated issue in the Donbas linked with a lot of fluidity. For example, a significant number of people who had declared themselves ethnic Russians in the last Soviet census in 1989 declared themselves Ukrainian in Ukraine’s 2001 census. Many families in the Donbas have a mixed ethnic background and, for example, the son may think of himself as Russian and the daughter of herself as Ukrainian. In sum, the boundary between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians is not very clear.

**Movement start and end dates**

* With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a regionalist movement emerged in Donbas with the formation of the Intermovement in 1990. Initially, the Intermovement campaigned primarily against Ukraine’s independence and for Ukraine signing a revised Union Treaty, though it did threaten a campaign for autonomy if Ukraine were to leave the USSR. After the August Coup and Ukraine’s declaration of independence, the Intermovement and the Democratic Movement (a similar organization in Luhansk Oblast) began to campaign for a referendum on autonomy in Eastern Ukraine and against Ukrainian independence.
* After the dissolution of the Union, the Intermovement and other movements, including the Democratic Movement, advocated incorporation into Russia. The radical demand for outright secession appears to have been a minority view. More moderate regional elites were pressing for increased autonomy, particularly in the economic realm. In 1992, the Movement for the Rebirth of Donbas was formed, with the aim of creating a free economic zone in the region and, eventually, a federal Ukraine (Solchanyk 1994: 59-61). Since demands prior to Ukraine’s independence process, which started in late August 1991, were primarily focused on remaining within the Union, and only after on autonomy within Ukraine or even secession, we code the movement as of 1991 and under the header of Ukraine only.
* In repeated strikes of miners in 1993, regional autonomy was demanded (Sasse 2001: 84). In 1994 a series of local referendums were held in the Donbas region, asking whether Russian should be made the second official language alongside Ukrainian, whether Russian should be made the official language of administration in the region, on Ukraine’s full membership in the CIS, and on the federalization of Ukraine (the latter question was included only in the Donetsk Oblast). Wide majorities approved all four measures. However, after the referendum the movement appears to have died down (see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 83).
* The Intermovement appears to not have been very active and was dissolved in 2003. No further information on the Democratic Movement, any other organization advocating union with Russia, or the Movement for the Rebirth of Donbas could be found, either. Following the ten-year rule, we code an end to the movement in 2004. [start date: 1991; end date: 2004]
* Massive unrests broke out in March 2014 following the escape of the former Ukrainian president Yanukovych and the potential retraction of the 2012 language law. Protestors were demanding Russian to be given the status of official language and the banning of several far-right political organizations in Ukraine. These demands were not met. The situation escalated in April when the first separatist claims were made. Violence broke out almost immediately as pro-Russian forces occupied regional administration-related buildings (Gazeta.ua 2014; Ukrainian Pravda 2014). These unrests envolved into a bloody war in the same month, when Ukraine launched a military counter-offensive against pro-Russian forces in April 2014. With active support from Russia, two self-proclaimed republics were established by sham referendums in May (Kyivpost 2014). The war was ongoing as of 2020 (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl 2019). [start date: 2014, end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* With the dissolution of the Union, the Intermovement and other organizations including the Democratic Movement, began to advocate incorporation into Russia. The radical demand for outright secession appears to have been a minority view, however. More moderate regional elites were pressing for increased autonomy, particularly in the economic realm. In 1992, the Movement for the Rebirth of Donbas was formed, with the aim of creating a free economic zone in the region and, eventually, a federal Ukraine (Solchanyk 1994: 59-61). [1991-2004: autonomy claim]
* The dominant claim between 2014 and 2020 was for independence. Occasionally, there is a claim for a merger of the de facto independent republics with the Russian Federation, but this was not the dominant (publicly aired) claim as of 2020 (Voronovici 2020). [2014-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date1: 1991; end date 1: 2004; start date 2: 2014; end date 2: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

* After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Intermovement and other movements, including the Democratic Movement, advocated incorporation into Russia (see above). The end of the first phase is ambiguous. The most prominent organization associated with the irredentist claim, Intermovement, was dissolved in 2003 according to Wikipedia, which we use as the end date. [start date: 1991; end date: 2003]
* While the official claim of the two self-declared Donbas republics is independence, there are occasional claims for a merger with Russia (Voronovici 2020). One of the first such claims we could find is in 2014, when pro-Russian rebel leaders announced their intention to hold a referendum on a merger with Russia (also see Roth 2015: 162). [start date: 2014, end date: ongoing]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Donbas Russians is the Donbas region, which consists of the Donetsk Oblast and the Luhansk Oblast. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* A referendum was held on 11 May, 2014 in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts respectively. A day after the referendum, the People’s Soviet of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic declared their independence (Kyivpost 2014). [2014: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD coding for 2014-2020 (ongoing) follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). We found no other reports of separatist violence. [1991-2004: NVIOLSD; 2014-2020: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

1st phase:

* In 1988 contested elections were introduced throughout the Union, which can be seen as a measure of decentralization (prior to this, officials were de-facto centrally appointed). However, regions without autonomous status (such as the Donbas) profited relatively from local leader choice because their regions’ decision rights were very limited. Hence, we do not code a concession.
* In 1989 Ukraine passed a new language law which made Ukrainian the official language of Ukraine. The law contained an important concession to national minorities. According to Article 11, in those territories where minorities from a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration, in addition to Ukrainian (Motyl & Krawchenko 1997: 267). Still, the elevation of Ukrainian to the only official language constitutes a downgrade of the Russian language, hence we code a restriction. [1989: cultural rights restriction]

2nd phase:

* In 2012 a new language law was passed, the ‘law on the principles of the state language policy’. The law gave Russian as well as any other minority language the status of a regional official language in areas where a given national minority makes up more than 10 per cent of the total population, while Ukrainian remains the only state-wide official language. Since then, many cities and regions declared Russian a regional language, and so did a couple of Hungarian, Moldovan, and Romanian regions (see e.g. The Economist). [2012: cultural rights concession]
* Immediately after the Maidan revolution in 2014, the Ukrainian parliament voted to repeal the language law in February 2014. Under the repeal bill, Ukrainian would have become the sole state language at all levels while retaining some level of protection for minority languages including Russian. This led to protests in Crimea and other regions in eastern and southern Ukraine, and met international opposition. In response, the acting President Oleksandr Turchynov said that he will not sign the repeal bill until a new language law was adopted. The Ukraininan parliament subsequently appealed to the Constitutional Court in July 2014 with a request to review the 2012 law. In October 2014, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine started reviewing the constitutionality of the law, and in February 2018 it ruled the law unconstitutional. In 2019, a new language law was passed which enhanced the status of Ukrainian at the expense of Russian. As these developments regarding language rights were all part of the same process, we code a single restriction in 2014, when the process was initiated (Arel 2018). This restriction gave impetus to the resurgence of the SDM (see above) and is therefore coded as a prior restriction. [2014: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Initially, regions were granted some more powers. According to Konitzer-Smirnov (2005: 6): “Ukraine's February 1992 'Law on local self-government' established the legal basis for post-Soviet sub-national governance and placed substantial policy-making powers in the hands of regional councils.” As part of the 1992 decentralization program, significant economic powers were transferred to several eastern Oblasts, including Donetsk and Luhansk, in 1993 (Bugajski 2000: 172: Konitzer-Smirnov (2005: 6). We code a single autonomy concession in 1992. [1992: autonomy concession]
* However, Kravchuk shortly after attempted to regain direct control of the regions. In March 1992, president Kravchuk established presidential representatives in order to gain more direct control of the regions’ activities. These were directly appointed by the president as heads of the oblasts and districts, and were to act as direct agents of the centre in the oblasts. Thereby, the executive authority of locally elected *rady* was abolished (Wolczuk 2002: 69-70; Sasse 2001: 77-78; Konitzer-Smirnov 2005: 6). [1992: autonomy restriction]
* According to Wolczuk (2002: 67-70, also see Sasse 2001: 77-78 and Konitzer-Smirnov 2005: 6-7): “By 1994, a coalition formed in parliament to press for restoring the executive authority of the rady in order to weaken President Kravchuk’s control over the regions. As a result, presidential representatives were not re-appointed after the 1994 local elections, and were subsequently abolished. The ad hoc institutional changes led to confusion and uncertainty. In June 1994, the 24 newly elected heads of *oblast*-level *rady* acquired extensive powers over their mandated territories, as, following the Soviet principle, a higher level council could decide on any issue of the lower level council. At the same time, it was unclear to whom the heads themselves were accountable. The juxtaposition of the elements of the system of soviets with presidentialism meant that regional leaders could decide on their own allegiance: either to the president, the prime minister or the chairman of the Supreme Council.” The events at the close of Kravchuk’s presidency meant significant decentralization, and hence we code an autonomy concession. [1994: autonomy concession]
* Critics were quick to argue that the decentralization threatened the integrity of Ukraine, and the newly elected Kuchma moved immediately to strengthen its control over the regions (Bugajski 2000: 169). According to Wolczuk (2002: 67-70, also see Sasse 2001: 77-78): “[…] in a decree of August 1994, the newly elected president, Leonid Kuchma, eliminated this ambiguity. He restored the executive chain of command by subordinating popularly elected heads of *rady* at *oblasť* and *raion* levels (who were simultaneously the heads of executive committees, *vykonkomy*) directly to himself, and made them personally responsible for the execution of state powers. Symptomatically, this breached Kuchma’s electoral slogan of decentralization of power to the regions (see below), as it limited democratically elected local authorities, but it evoked hardly any opposition because of fear of the centrifugal tendencies that had manifested themselves over the period 1991–94. [1994: autonomy restriction]
* The move towards centralization continued in 1995. According to Konitzer-Smirnov (2005: 7): “The June 1995 'Law on power' granted Kuchma the power to appoint all chairmen of local councils as heads of regional and local administrations.” This could be seen as a restriction, but as a general rule, we do not code changes at the local level.
  + “These were followed by later decrees in January 1996 that subordinated village, settlement and city council chairmen to the president and gave them extended executive powers within their regions. This process of centralisation was extended and crystallised in the 1996 Constitution” (Konitzer-Smirnov 2005: 7). The 1996 constitution codifies Ukraine as a strongly unitary state, and the competencies exercised by regional authorities remained very limited. Decentralization remained limited to the lowest, municipal level and did not affect the regional level. In practice, this allowed Ukraine to continue as a highly unitary state.
* The 1997 Law on local self-government in Ukraine asserted the direct election of regional councils, but did not lead to increased autonomy for the regions. The heads of the regional and district administrations are appointed by the president himself. Thus, Ukrainian Oblasts remained administrative units (Wolczuk 78-85). We do not code a concession (or restriction) since little appears to have changed with the 1997 law.
* According to Konitzer-Smirnov (2005: 7): “However, the legal changes of 1995-96 once again failed fully to institutionalise Ukraine's unitary state structures, and soon after, the diffusion of political power to the regions began anew. Prior to the 1999 presidential election Kuchma faced a similar problem as did his predecessor prior to the 1996 election. Lacking strong party structures in the regions, the president was forced to rely on his regional appointees to organise campaigns and mobilise voters. In order to expand the power of these executives and tie them to the president's campaign, Kuchma gave them unprecedented powers over key assets within their jurisdictions. Restructuring in the gas and energy sectors furthered the process of regionalisation by transferring valuable energy assets from Kyiv oligarchs to regional business elites.” Overall this seems too limited to be coded as a concession: the regional executives remained selected in an appointee system. In practice Ukraine remained highly centralized, and the regionalists’ core demand – regional gubernatorial elections – was not met (Wolczuk 2002). Hence, we do not code a concession.
* The Minsk Protocol was signed in 2014. Fighting continued and, in February 2015, Minsk II was signed. Minsk II foresaw a ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line, release of [prisoners of war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner_of_war), and Ukraine granting self-government to certain areas of Donbas in return for a return of control over these areas. Minsk II was not properly implemented due to disagreements between Russia and Ukraine on the sequence in which these actions should take place (Allan (2020). We do not code a concession.
* In 2015, Ukraine passed four controversial laws on decommunization. The laws banned Nazi and Communist symbols, the public denial of the criminal nature of the Soviet regime, opened former KGB archives, etc. (The Guardian 2015; Wilson Center 2015). Given the focus on Ukraine’s Soviet past and not Russians’ cultural rights, we do not code a restriction.
* In 2016, new rules came into force requiring Ukraine's radio stations to play a quota of Ukrainian-language songs each day, in a move designed to discourage “separatist moods” (BBC News 2016). This could be seen as a cultural rights restriction, but we consider this to be too limited to be considered here.
* Ukraine passed an education act in 2017, which demanded that lessons in minority languages can only be taught in selected classes and only at the initial phase of education (pre-school education and grades I–IV). Classes beyond this range must be taught in the official language, Ukrainian (Radio Liberty 2017). [2017: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Due to de facto independence. [2015-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* Two self-proclaimed republics were established in Donbas in May 2014. They remained de facto independence as of 2020. The territory of these two republics covered roughly one-third of the whole territory of Donbas. [2015-2020: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]
* See above. [2014: establishment of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Donbas Russians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Russians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36902000 |

**Power access**

* The Donbas Russians form a regional branch of the ‘Russians’ in EPR. Russians in Ukraine are regionally concentrated in Eastern Ukraine and in Crimea. EPR codes the Russians in Ukraine as junior partner throughout, given that the Party of Regions (often the ruling party) ideologically defends and upholds the rights of ethnic Russians and speakers of Russian language in Ukraine. The question is whether the Donbas Russians should be coded junior partners as well. Minorities at Risk, which codes both Russians and Crimean Russians in Ukraine, notes that there are no significant differences between Russians and Crimean Russians as regards their access to higher political offices (polic8; both are coded as not restricted). Furthermore, MAR notes that both Russians as a whole and Crimean Russians have preferential access to political power in Ukraine (poldifx<-1 in 1991-2003). Further evidence for inclusion in central government government: Viktor Yanukovich, Prime Minister from 2002-2005 and 2006-2007 and President from 2010-2014 originates from the Donetsk Oblast, is of Russian/Belarussian/Polish descent and was widely supported by Donbas Russians. [1991-2004: junior partner]
* Yanukovich fled Ukraine in March 2014 in connection to the Maidan Revolution, which gave rise to the movement. As EPR explains, Russian representation was significantly curtailed as a result of the Maidan Revolution. From 2015 onward we code the Donbas Russians as powerless also because of the establishment of de facto independence. [2014-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* As noted above, ethncity is a complicated issue in the Donbas linked with a lot of fluidity. We rely here on the 2001 census, according to which ethnic Russians made up roughly 38% of Donetsk Oblast’s population of about 4.8 million (i.e. 1.85 million) and roughly 39% of Luhansk Oblast’s population of about 2.45 million (approximately 960,000). The same 2001 census gives 48.5 million as Ukraine’s population size. This leads to a group size of 5.79%. We adjust the group size after the annexation of Crima through Russia. According to the 2001 census, Crimea had a population of 2,376,000, suggesting that Ukraine’s population without Crimea was ca. 46.1 million and the Donbas Russians’ relative group size 6.1%. [1991-2004: 0.0579; 2014-2020: 0.061]
  + It is worth noting that the share of ethnic Russians was higher according to the last Soviet census in 1989 and that Russian-speakers, as opposed to ethnic Russians, for a majority in the Donbas. Finally, the 1994 referendums show that the movement attracted support also outside the ethnic Russian community. A larger group size could therefore plausibly be coded.

**Regional concentration**

* This movement is treated as relating to ethnic Russians in two of Ukraine’s Oblasts, Donetsk and Luhansk. While the majority in both oblasts speaks Russian, only a minority see themselves as ethnic Russians (see above for exact figures and additional discussion). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Ukraine’s Russians have several kin groups in both adjoining and non-adjoining countries: Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Armenia, Israel, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (EPR, MAR). [kin in adjoining country]

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## Hungarians

Activity: 1991-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Ethnic Hungarians, who inhabit the Sub-Carpathian region of western Ukraine, have been pressing for greater autonomy in Ukraine since 1991, when a referendum on autonomy was organized in the Berehove district simultaneously with the Ukrainian independence referendum (Batt 2002: 168). Hence, we code 1991 as the start date. The movement is not coded under the header of the USSR since the claim appears to have surfaced with Ukraine’s independence. The autonomy demand has been repeated by the Cultural Association of Sub-Carpathian Hungarians (KMKSZ) throughout the 2000s and 2010s. The KMKSZ party is working closely with the Fidesz party in Hungary, and the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban has voiced his support for the KMKSZ and its demands for autonomy from Kyiv (Lexis Nexis; KMKSZ; Gardner 2014; Iwanski and Sadecki 2018). The movement is coded as ongoing. [start date: 1991; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Hungarians demanded autonomy, as evidenced in particular by them staging a referendum on autonomy simultaneously with Ukraine’s independence referendum in 1991 (see e.g. Duplain 1996). News sources suggest that the Cultural Association of Sub-Carpathian Hungarians (KMKSZ) has repeated the autonomy demands throughout the 2000s. Autonomy remained the dominant claim in the 2010s (Iwanski and Sadecki 2018). [1991-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* In 1991, a referendum was held in the Berehove district on the creation of a Hungarian Autonomous District. The most specific description of this desired unit was given by the parliamentary deputy of the Carpathian Hungarian Cultural Association in 2000. The parliamentary deputy proposed to create a single large district encompassing most of the 89 percent of Transcarpathia's Hungarians who are now divided between four adjoining districts along the banks of the Tisza, next to the border with Hungary: Berehove, Užhorod, Mukacheve, and Vinohradiv (Batt 2002: 168f). This corresponds to earlier, vaguer descriptions of the Tisa District (Ferenc & Toth 2013). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Hungarians in Ukraine are concentrated in the Transcarpathia region, or to be more exact, in four districts bordering Hungary in the Zakarpattya Oblast. Hungarians make up some 12.5 per cent of Zakarpattya’s population. The largest concentration of Hungarians can be found in the district of Berehove, where they make up 67 per cent of the population (Batt 2002: 164). Zakarpattya has a very peculiar history. For centuries Zakarpattya had been part of Hungary. In 1919 it was incorporated into Czechoslovakia. Between 1939 and 1944 it was again part of Hungary, before it was annexed into Soviet Ukraine in 1945 (Sasse 2001: 72). According to Sasse (2001: 83-84): “In the Soviet period the Hungarians in the region had been severely repressed. Only the collapse of communism enabled a revival of their national identity, which had a distinct international dimension to it. Even before Ukrainian independence Hungary had begun to build friendly neighbourly relations with Ukraine in return for guarantees for the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattya.” In line with this, Batt (2002: 164) argues that Hungarians were severely repressed under Soviet rule, which only began to change with the very final years of the Union’s existence. For instance, no Hungarian publications were allowed until 1967, contact with Hungary was cut off until 1960, and Hungarian-language education at secondary level restarted only after 1953 (and thus after Stalin’s reign). Ukraine’s 1989 language law contained an important concession to national minorities. According to Article 11, in those territories where minorities from a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration, in addition to Ukrainian. While there is no obligation on the side of the state to communicate in the minority language, and it does not have the status of an official language (Csernicsko 2005: 103-104), the language law still exemplifies an accommodative approach. Hence, we code a (prior) concession. [1989: cultural rights concession]
* The November 1991 Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Ukraine had established a broad range of minority rights (Minority Rights Group International). According to Solchanyk (1994: 65), the Declaration provides for “the language of any national group that is compactly settled in an administrative-territorial unit to function ‘on a level equal to the state [Ukrainian] language’. It also ‘guarantees the existence of national-administrative units’ in Ukraine.” The provision for administrative-territorial units did not lead to autonomy, thus we only code a cultural rights concession. It seems likely that the declaration preceded the emergence of the SDM (cf. Bulgarians & Gagauz), though the evidence is not clear. We treat this as a prior concession. [1991: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In the early 1990s there was some back and forth with regard to the center-regional relations (see Wolczuk 2002; Sasse 2001; Konitzer-Smirnov 2005); we do not code this for Hungarians in Ukraine since even in Zakarpattya, the Oblast where most Hungarians are located, Hungarians make up only 12.5 per cent.
  + A bilateral Treaty was signed with Hungary on December 6, 1991, wherein Hungary offered its support for Ukraine’s independence aspirations in return for favorable treatment of the Hungarian minority. According to Batt (2002), the treaty did not introduce something new, but confirmed the binding status of the ‘Declaration on the Principles of Cooperation between the Hungarian Republic and the Ukrainian SSR, stemming from May 1991. We do not code either of the treaties because they appear to have been part of a broader process. During perestroika (and thus before Ukraine’s independence) local language and education rights for Hungarians in Transcarpathia were undergoing considerable improvement (Duplain 1996); the most significant change came with Ukraine’s 1989 language law und thus before the start date for this movement (the 1989 law is coded as a concession prior to movement onset, see above).
* In 1992 Ukraine passed the Law on National Minorities. This law incorporated and restated earlier language and citizenship laws, and further provided for access to education and media in minority languages, and government financial support for ethnic minorities. Also, a Ministry of Nationalities was set up. A Bilateral Treaty signed between Ukraine and Hungary in 1993 and the 1996 constitution again restated the minority rights (Duplain 1996; Minority Rights Group International). Yet national minorities were not granted territorial autonomy. [1992: cultural rights concession]
* In 2012 a new language law was passed, the ‘law on the principles of the state language policy’. The law gave Russian as well as any other minority language the status of a regional official language in areas where a given national minority makes up more than 10 per cent of the total population, while Ukrainian remains the only state-wide official language. Since then, many cities and regions declared Russian a regional language, and so did a couple of Hungarian, Moldovan, and Romanian regions (see e.g. The Economist). [2012: cultural rights concession]
* Immediately after the Maidan revolution in 2014, the Ukrainian parliament voted to repeal the language law in February 2014. Under the repeal bill, Ukrainian would have become the sole state language at all levels while retaining some level of protection for minority languages including Russian. This led to protests in Crimea and other regions in eastern and southern Ukraine, and met international opposition. In response, the acting President Oleksandr Turchynov said that he will not sign the repeal bill until a new language law was adopted. The Ukraininan parliament subsequently appealed to the Constitutional Court in July 2014 with a request to review the 2012 law. In October 2014, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine started reviewing the constitutionality of the law, and in February 2018 it ruled the law unconstitutional. In 2019, a new language law was passed which enhanced the status of Ukrainian at the expense of minority languages including Hungarian. As these developments regarding language rights were all part of the same process, we code a single restriction in 2014, when the process was initiated (Ukrinform 2018; Ukrainian Parliament 2019; Csernicskó and Kontra 2022). [2014: cultural rights restriction]
* In 2016, new rules came into force requiring Ukraine's radio stations to play a quota of Ukrainian-language songs each day, in a move designed to discourage “separatist moods” (BBC News 2016). This could be seen as a cultural rights restriction, but we consider this to be too limited to be considered here.
* Ukraine passed an education act in 2017, articulating that lessons in minority languages can only be taught in selected classes and only at the initial phase of education (pre-school education and grades I–IV), and classes beyond this range must be taught in the official language, Ukrainian (Radio Liberty 2017). [2017: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Hungarians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Hungarians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36907000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.003]

**Regional concentration**

* Ukraine’s Hungarians are concentrated in the western part of Zakarpattya, straddling the border with Hungary. While the Hungarians have a regional base, especially in Berehove, they cannot be considered territorially concentrated based on district level data from the 2001 census. Note: while we could not find more fine-grained data, this would be useful because we cannot fully preclude the possibility that the criterion were met if we considered only parts of some districts.
  + Based on 2001 census figures, approx. 26% of Ukraine’s 157,000 Hungarians resided in Berehove district, where they made up 76% of the local population. Other significant populations can be found in Uzhorodskyi raion (33% out of 74,000) and Vynohradiv raion (26% out of 118,000). 62% of all Hungarians live in the three (adjacent) districts, but they make up only 39% there. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* Hungarians in various countries, including Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia, and Romania, constitute numerically significant kin (EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Romanians and Moldovans

Activity: 1991-2001

**General notes**

* This movement combines claims raised by ethnic Romanians and Moldovans since they are closely ethnically related, both concentrated in the Bukovina region in Chernivtsi Oblast, and their claims overlapped.

**Movement start and end dates**

* When Ukraine was about to gain independence, ethnic Romanians and Moldovans (both concentrated in the Bukovina region in Chernivtsi Oblast and combined under the header of the Romanians) began to make claims for autonomy (Goode 2012: 98; Bugajski 2000: 178). We code the movement from 1991. The movement is not coded under the header of the USSR since the claim appears to have surfaced with Ukraine’s independence.
* The call for autonomy has remained unsuccessful, and we did not find much further activity. Thus, we code an end to this movement in 2001 in accordance with the ten-years inactivity rule. [start date: 1991; end date: 2001]

**Dominant claim**

* When Ukraine was about to gain independence, ethnic Romanians and Moldovans (both concentrated in the Bukovina region in Chernivtsi Oblast and combined under the header of the Romanians) began to make claims for autonomy (Goode 2012: 98; Bugajski 2000: 178). [1991-2001: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Romanians in Ukraine is the Bukovina region in western Ukraine. This historical region is defined partly by the current borders of the Czernowitz and by the historical boundaries between Austria-Hungary and Russia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database and the CShapes 2.0 dataset (Schvitz et al. 2022).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports for separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Romanians and Moldovans in Ukraine are concentrated in the Bukovina region in Chernivtsi oblast (the movement combines Romanians and Moldovans). Ukraine’s 1989 language law contained an important concession to national minorities. According to Article 11, in those territories where minorities from a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration, in addition to Ukrainian. While there is no obligation on the side of the state to communicate in the minority language, and it does not have the status of an official language (Csernicsko 2005: 103-104), the language law still exemplifies an accommodative approach. [1989: cultural rights concession]
* In November 1991 the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities in Ukraine established a broad range of minority rights (Minority Rights Group International). According to Solchanyk (1994: 65), the Declaration provides for “the language of any national group that is compactly settled in an administrative-territorial unit to function ‘on a level equal to the state [Ukrainian] language’. It also ‘guarantees the existence of national-administrative units’ in Ukraine.” The provision for administrative-territorial units appears too broad to code an autonomy concession, thus we only code a cultural rights concession. It seems likely that the declaration preceded the emergence of the SDM (cf. Bulgarians & Gagauz), though the evidence is not clear. We treat this as a prior concession. [1991: cultural rights concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In the early 1990s there was some back and forth with regard to the center-regional relations (see Wolczuk 2002; Sasse 2001; Konitzer-Smirnov 2005); we do not code this for the Romanians in Ukraine since they do not make up a majority in any of the first-level units (i.e. oblasts).
* In 1992 Ukraine passed the Law on National Minorities. This law incorporated and restated earlier language and citizenship laws, and further provided for access to education and media in minority languages, and government financial support for ethnic minorities. Also, a Ministry of Nationalities was set up. A Bilateral Treaty signed between Ukraine and Hungary in 1993 and the 1996 constitution again restated the minority rights (Duplain 1996; Minority Rights Group International). Yet national minorities were not granted territorial autonomy. [1992: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Romanians and Moldovans |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Romanians/Moldovans |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36903000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.008]

**Regional concentration**

* This movement combines Romanians and Moldovans, which if combined make up a majority in the Bukovina region in Chernitsvi Oblast (northwestern Ukraine). Yet, there are also Romanians and Moldovans in other parts of Ukraine, in particular Odessa oblast in southwestern Ukraine and Zakarpattya oblast in northwestern Ukriane. Based on figures from the 2001 census, the Romanians/Moldovans cannot be considered concentrated according to our definition. [not concentrated]
  + The 2001 census counted 151,000 Romanians and 259,000 Moldovans (total thus 410,000)
  + Approx. 39% of all Romanians and Moldovans lives in four adjacent districts on the border with Romania, and they make up an absolute majority there (55%).
  + Another 16% live in the southern part of Odessa, but the Romanians and Moldovans do not have an absolute majority in any of the regions (share across raions: approx. 20%).
  + Another 8% live in two raions in Zakarpattya oblast, where they make up 12% of the local population.
  + Note: The threshold for territorial concentration would (marginally) not be met either if we looked only at ethnic Romanians. While approx. 64% of the Romanians lives in three adjacent districts in Chernitsvi oblast (Hertsa, Hlyboka, and Storozhynets), they make up but 49%.
  + Figures from the 2001 census:
    - Chernitsvi oblast
      * Hertsa raion: 91% Romanians out of 32,000 and 2% Moldovans
      * Hlyboka raion: 45% Romanians out of 73,000 and 6% Moldovans
      * Storozhynets raion: 37% Romanians out of 95,000 and <1% Moldovans
      * Novoselytsia raion: 57% Moldovans and 7% Romanians out of 87,000
    - Odessa:
      * Izmail raion: 28% Moldovans out of 55,000
      * Kiliya raion: 13% Romanians out of 60,000
      * Reni raion: 49% Moldovan out of 41,000
      * Sarata raion: 18% Romanian out of 47,000
      * Tarutyne raion: 17% Moldovans out of 45,000
      * Tatarbunary raion: 9% Romanians out of 42,000
      * Ananyiv raion: 18% Moldovans out of 27,000
      * Okny raion 11% Moldovans out of 23,000
    - Zakarpattya oblast
      * Teaciv raion: 12% Romanians out of 172,000
      * Rahiv raion: 12% Romanians out of 89,000

**Kin**

* Romanians in Romania and Moldovans in Moldova constitute ethnic kin (EPR). [kin in adjacent country]

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## Rusyns

Activity: 1991-2018

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The movement was active already before Ukraine’s independence, with a start date of 1990 (see Rusyns under Russia). We code movement activity as of 1991, but note prior nonviolent activity.
* The movement remained active in independent Ukraine. In 1992 the Soviet of the Trans-Carpathian Region asked the Ukrainian Parliament to consider a bill on making Ruthenia a “special self-governing administrative territory.” In May 1993 radical Rusyns set up a provisional autonomous government, appealed for Russian support, and declared their intention to join the Commonwealth of Independent States independently of Ukraine (Batt 2002: 160).
* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 257) suggest that the movement was ongoing as of 2000, but the movement appears to have lost in strength. For example, Ash (1999) describes the movement as fringe.
* The last evidence for movement activity we could find was in 2008, when two sessions of the European Congress of Rusyns were held in Mukachevo. In this context, a demand for autonomy for the Subcarpathian Rus was made (Mukachevo.net 2008). We could not find further evidence of separatist mobilization. Following the ten-year rule, we code an end to the movement in 2018. [start date: 1990; end date: 2018]

**Dominant claim**

* The most important vehicle of the Rusyn movement, the Society of Carpathian Rusyns, advocates autonomy for Transcarpathia. After the rejection of self-government in the early 1990s, some more radical emerged which demanded outright independence, but these remained marginal (Batt 2002: 159-160; Bugajski 2000: 178). The autonomy claim was reaffirmed in 2008 (Mukachevo.net 2008). Hence, we code an autonomy claim throughout. [1991-2018: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* There were independence claims, but these were marginal (see above). [no independence claims]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Rusyns is the Zakarpattya Oblast (also Transcarpathian Oblast) in today’s Ukraine. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Minahan (2016: 482) suggests there was an independence declaration in 2008. We found independent confirmation, but it appears this was not a significant element of the movement. We do not code the declaration (see: <https://reconsideringrussia.org/2014/04/19/who-are-the-rusyns/>).
* Minahan (2016: 482) suggests there was another independence declaration in 2014, but we could not find independent confirmation.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Between the two World Wars, Transcarpathia was part of Czechoslovakia. In 1938, Transcarpathia was made an autonomous entity within a federal Czechoslovakia. Transcarpathia declared independence in 1939, but it was quickly occupied by Hungarian forces. The Polish Western Ukraine, Czechoslovak Transcarpathia, and Romanian Bessarabia were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after the Second World War (Minahan 1998: 282-283).Ukraine as a whole can be considered autonomous during the Soviet period. However, the Ukrainian regions (oblasts) had very limited powers – Ukraine under Soviet rule was highly centralized (Wolczuk 2002: 68-69). Transcarpathia lost the autonomous status they had enjoyed under Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet regime attempted to Ukrainize the Ruthenians (Minahan 2002: 394). Political liberalization in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s allowed the Uniate church to function openly again after 1987; the church received official sanction in 1988 (Minahan 2002: 2075). The Uniate Catholic church, to which many Western Ukrainians belonged, was absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church during Stalin’s reign. [1987: cultural rights concession]
  + Note: in 1988 Moscow introduced contested elections throughout the Union (Brown 1996: 179; Suny 1993: 141). This is tantamount to a reduction of Moscow’s control of the regions, and can thus be seen as a measure of decentralization. Prior to Gorbachev’s reform regional elites had effectively been hand-selected by Moscow. Hence, federalism had been more a measure of indirect rule by the center (Suny 1993: 118). Democratization opened up the possibility for sub-state entities to have their own, locally chosen representatives (Suny 1993: 461; also see Linz & Stepan 1992). However, regions without autonomous status (such as Zakarpattya) profited relatively little from local leader choice because their regions’ decision rights were very limited. Hence, we do not code a concession.
  + Note that Ukraine’s 1989 language law contained an important concession to national minorities. According to Article 11, in those territories where minorities from a numerical majority, the use of the minority language is allowed in public administration, in addition to Ukrainian. However, Rusyns are not recognized as a national minority (Minahan 2002: 395). Also, note that in 1990 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was given autonomy from the Russian Orthodox Church (Minahan 1998: 283). However, the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church was dominant in Transcarpathia (Batt 2002: 160) and the Uniate church had been legalized already in the late 1980s (Minahan 2002: 2075; see above). We do not code a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Ruthenes, Carpatho-Rusyns, or simply Rusyns are concentrated in Western Ukraine along the borders of Ukraine with Poland and Slovakia. Most Rusyns are located in Ukraine’s Zakarpattya Oblast, also called Transcarpathia, where they make up two thirds of the population, at least according to Minahan (2002: 389). In contrast, several authors note that, given that after 1945, Rusyns were re-classified as Ukrainians (Batt 2002: 156; Sasse 2001: 83), the number of people self-identifying as Rusyns is not fully clear. Bugajski suggests Ukrainians who self-identify as Rusyns are actually in a minority even in Zakarpattya Oblast. Thus, the Rusyns’ influence over Zakarpattya is somewhat ambiguous, and it is not fully clear whether changes in the region’s status should be coded as concessions and restrictions for the Rusyns. However, there appears to have been significant mobilization around the Rusyn question at least in the early 1990s, when a referendum on Rusyn autonomy was called in Zakarpattya. Noting that this is not completely unambiguous, the apparent mobilization around the Rusyn question in Zakarpattya leads us to code changes in the status of Zakarpattya Oblast as concessions or restrictions.
* Also note that the center did not make concessions specific to Zakarpattya; indeed, as noted by Batt (2002: 159-160), the plea for Rusyn self-government was rejected harshly by Kyiv. However, in the early years of Ukraine’s independence, Kyiv’s lack of direct control fuelled demands for increased regional autonomy not only in Transcarpathia, and federalism was a hot topic. There was some back and forth with regards to regional powers before the idea of federalism was buried with the unitarian 1996 constitution (Wolczuk 2002: 69-70; Sasse 2001: 77-78). These movements in center-periphery relations are coded, given that Ruthenes seek autonomy for the Zakarpattya Oblast.
* Initially, regions were granted some more powers. According to Konitzer-Smirnov (2005: 6): “Ukraine's February 1992 'Law on local self-government' established the legal basis for post-Soviet sub-national governance and placed substantial policy-making powers in the hands of regional councils.” We code a single autonomy concession in 1992. [1992: autonomy concession]
* However, Kravchuk shortly after attempted to regain direct control of the regions. In March 1992, president Kravchuk established presidential representatives in order to gain more direct control of the regions’ activities. These were directly appointed by the president as heads of the oblasts and districts, and were to act as direct agents of the centre in the oblasts. Thereby, the executive authority of locally elected *rady* was abolished (Wolczuk 2002: 69-70; Sasse 2001: 77-78; Konitzer-Smirnov 2005: 6). [1992: autonomy restriction]
* According to Wolczuk (2002: 67-70, also see Sasse 2001: 77-78 and Konitzer-Smirnov 2005: 6-7): “By 1994, a coalition formed in parliament to press for restoring the executive authority of the rady in order to weaken President Kravchuk’s control over the regions. As a result, presidential representatives were not re-appointed after the 1994 local elections, and were subsequently abolished. The ad hoc institutional changes led to confusion and uncertainty. In June 1994, the 24 newly elected heads of *oblast*-level *rady* acquired extensive powers over their mandated territories, as, following the Soviet principle, a higher level council could decide on any issue of the lower level council. At the same time, it was unclear to whom the heads themselves were accountable. The juxtaposition of the elements of the system of soviets with presidentialism meant that regional leaders could decide on their own allegiance: either to the president, the prime minister or the chairman of the Supreme Council.” The events at the close of Kravchuk’s presidency meant significant decentralization, and hence we code an autonomy concession. [1994: autonomy concession]
* Critics were quick to argue that the decentralization threatened the integrity of Ukraine, and the newly elected Kuchma moved immediately to strengthen its control over the regions (Bugajski 2000: 169). According to Wolczuk (2002: 67-70, also see Sasse 2001: 77-78): “[…] in a decree of August 1994, the newly elected president, Leonid Kuchma, eliminated this ambiguity. He restored the executive chain of command by subordinating popularly elected heads of *rady* at *oblasť* and *raion* levels (who were simultaneously the heads of executive committees, *vykonkomy*) directly to himself, and made them personally responsible for the execution of state powers. Symptomatically, this breached Kuchma’s electoral slogan of decentralization of power to the regions (see below), as it limited democratically elected local authorities, but it evoked hardly any opposition because of fear of the centrifugal tendencies that had manifested themselves over the period 1991–94. [1994: autonomy restriction]
* The move towards centralization continued in 1995. According to Konitzer-Smirnov (2005: 7): “The June 1995 'Law on power' granted Kuchma the power to appoint all chairmen of local councils as heads of regional and local administrations.” This could be seen as a restriction, but as a general rule, we do not code changes at the local level.
  + “These were followed by later decrees in January 1996 that subordinated village, settlement and city council chairmen to the president and gave them extended executive powers within their regions. This process of centralisation was extended and crystallised in the 1996 Constitution” (Konitzer-Smirnov 2005: 7). The 1996 constitution codifies Ukraine as a strongly unitary state, and the competencies exercised by regional authorities remained very limited. Decentralization remained limited to the lowest, municipal level and did not affect the regional level. In practice, this allowed Ukraine to continue as a highly unitary state.
* The 1997 Law on local self-government in Ukraine asserted the direct election of regional councils, but did not lead to increased autonomy for the regions. The heads of the regional and district administrations are appointed by the president himself. Thus, Ukrainian Oblasts remained administrative units (Wolczuk 78-85). We do not code a concession (or restriction) since little appears to have changed with the 1997 law.
* According to Konitzer-Smirnov (2005: 7): “However, the legal changes of 1995-96 once again failed fully to institutionalise Ukraine's unitary state structures, and soon after, the diffusion of political power to the regions began anew. Prior to the 1999 presidential election Kuchma faced a similar problem as did his predecessor prior to the 1996 election. Lacking strong party structures in the regions, the president was forced to rely on his regional appointees to organise campaigns and mobilise voters. In order to expand the power of these executives and tie them to the president's campaign, Kuchma gave them unprecedented powers over key assets within their jurisdictions. Restructuring in the gas and energy sectors furthered the process of regionalisation by transferring valuable energy assets from Kyiv oligarchs to regional business elites.” Overall this seems too limited to be coded as a concession: the regional executives remained selected in an appointee system. In practice Ukraine remained highly centralized, and the regionalists’ core demand – regional gubernatorial elections – was not met (Wolczuk 2002). Hence, we do not code a concession, but note that this decision is not completely unambiguous.
* The 2012 Ukrainian language law recognized Rusyn as a minority language, and allowed it to be used at the regional level (Csernicskó and Fedinec 2016). However, we cannot find evidence to suggest that the status of Rusyn was subsequently actually elevated in the public or educational space, and therefore do not code a concession. For the same reason, we do not code restrictions as a result of the various restricictions of minority lanugages in 2014 and after that (see e.g. Donbas Russians).

**Regional autonomy**

* The limited measures of decentralization in the early 1990s do not justify a regional autonomy coding; devolution to the regions is too minimal.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Ukraine attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Rusyns |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Rusyns |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 36908000 |

**Power access**

* The Rusyn’s power status is not fully clear. The Ukrainian state refused to recognize the Rusyns as a separate ethnic group (Batt 2002: 159) and those advocating Rusyn identity appear to be excluded from central state power (Batt 2002: 163). EPR also suggests a powerless coding. Based on this we code the Rusyns as powerless since it appears that their main representatives were not included in the national executive. [1991-2018: powerless]

**Group size**

* EPR pegs the group size at just 0.02% and Bugajski (2000) suggests that Ukrainians who self-identify as Rusyns are in a minority even in Zakarpattya Oblast. Other sources suggest that the number of people self-identifying at least partly as Rusyns is likely to be larger (Batt 2002: 156; Sasse 2001: 83). According to Minahan (2002: 389), the Rusyns make up around two thirds of Zakarpattya Oblast. This seems too high, though. We draw on EPR. [0.0002]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 389), approx. 60% of all Rusyins in Ukraine were located in Zakarpattya Oblast, also called Transcarpathia, where they made up two thirds of the population. This would suggest regional concentration. However, most of the evidence we found suggests that the Rusyns constitute a minority in the Transcarpathian region (e.g., Pollock 2020). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 389), there are 330,000 Rusyns in Slovakia, and another 100,000 in Poland, called Lemkos or Lemkians. We follow Minahan and code ethnic kin in a neighboring country. [kin in adjacent country]

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