# VIETNAM

## Chams

Activity: 1975-1984

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* With the unification of Vietnam and South Vietnam the Chams became part of the unified Vietnam. The Chams’ movement for self-determination, which had been active since 1944 (see Chams under South Vietnam), continued to be active in the unified Vietnam. Since 1964, the Cham movement had been represented by the Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees (FULRO), the product of a merger between the FLC and the Front de Liberation des Hauts Plateaux (FLHP) and the Front de Liberation du Kampuchea Krom (FLKK). FULRO officially disbanded in 1984. No subsequent Cham movements were found, and thus the end of the movement is coded as 1984 (Keesing’s; Minahan 1996: 115ff, 424ff; Noseworthy 2013; Tucker 2011). [start date: 1944: end date: 1984]

**Dominant claim**

* The Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races (Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees FULRO) disbanded in 1984, which is also coded as the end of movement activity. Noseworthy (2013) describes FULRO as an irredentist movement that wants to join Cambodia, which is why we code an irredentist claim for 1975 onwards. [1975-1984: irredentist claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* See above. [start date: 1964; end date: 1984]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Cham nationalists consists of the highland districts of Dak Lak, Lam Dong, and Phu Khanh, including the coastal Mui Dinh (Ninh Thuan) district south of Camranh (Minahan 1996: 115). In 1990, Phu Khanh province split into Khanh Hoa and Phu Yen (Law 2012). We code this claim relying on the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* During the Vietnam War, FULRO fought with the United States against the communist north. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, it took not long for FULRO to launch an insurgency against the new Communist regime. We could not find precise information on casualties, but based on descriptions in qualitative sources, the LVIOLSD threshold was likely met. Based on this, we code all groups involved with FULRO – the Chams, the Khmer Krom, and the Montagnards (Magnusson 2014: 6; Minahan 2002: 428, 995; Roth 2015: 364) – with LVIOLSD in 1975-1981. We code this insurgency as over mixed motives because FULRO appears to have had partly center-seeking/ideological motives. See the Montagnards entry for more details. [1975-1981: LVIOLSD; 1982-1984: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* When the Chinese Han dynasty broke up, the Cham kingdom (Champa) emerged as a separate kingdom in what is today central and southern Vietnam. Almost permanently at war, the kingdom had to fight off the Chinese, Javanese kingdoms, the Khmer, Mongols as well as the newly independent Vietnamese in the north. After a decisive defeat in 1471 by the Vietnamese, the Cham territory was further diminished in the mid-sixteenth century when the Viet army conquered all but the highland region and the Champa empire was reduced to its southern kingdom of Panduranga. The Cham territory was completely annexed by Vietnam in 1832 when Emperor Minh Mang crushed the last bits of Cham autonomy, burned down Cham villages and destroyed farmlands and religious symbols (Islam had replaced Hinduism as the dominant Cham religion between the fifteenth and seventeenth century). The Chams were recruited by the French colonial army and administration that colonized southern Vietnam in the 1860s. Amidst rising Cham nationalism, the French administration created an autonomous Cham region in the highlands.
* However, when the French were defeated by Vietnamese nationalists, Chams mobilized as they saw their autonomy threatened by Vietnamese efforts to unify historical Vietnamese lands. At the 1954 Geneva Conference the fate of the Cham territory was sealed as it was – against their will - incorporated into the newly established Republic of Vietnam, implying the loss of their autonomy (Minahan 2002).
* During the 1950s and 1960s, the government of the Republic of Vietnam initiated several assimilation campaigns against the country’s minorities. The study of the Cham language was banned, language books were burned, Viet-Kinh Catholic migration into the Cham lands was encouraged, the official position of the mufti was eliminated and the Muslim pilgrimage to Mekka was prohibited (Noseworty 2013; Minahan 2002). We coded a cultural rights restriction under the header of South Vietnam in 1956 since we lack a clear indication when the respective policies were initiated. 1956 is the year when the “nationalization” decree was adopted, which was at the root of these assimilation campaigns (Adams et al. 2009).
* The 1957 Land Development Program first stated the principle that land of highlander minorities was belongs to the Vietnamese state and not the indigenous peoples. The 1958 Highlander Resettlement Program provided for the resettlement of highlander minorities from land they were occupying into reservations where they would be “civilized”. Corresponding legal decrees were passed in Dember 1958 and May 1959 and led to large-scale land theft (Hickey 1967: 81ff).
* As a result of pressure by the US, the South Vietnamese government began in 1965 to replace discrimination and repression with programs to protect culture and identity. The most significant acts in this direction were the establishment of a Directorate-General for Development of Ethnic Minorities and the passing of legislation according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24). Land rights are considered a concession on autonomy in line with the codebook. [1965: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* During the Vietnam War, the Chams were recruited by the US military and fought besides the US troops until the ceasefire of 1973. After the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the Chams suffered from heavy retaliation (Minahan 2002). These acts of repression do not represent restrictions in the sense of the codebook and are thus not coded. However, the discrimination against the Chams also included assimilation policies and several cultural restrictions targeting the religious beliefs and cultural identity of the Chams including the elimination of the position of the mufti, the Cham religious leader, and the prohibition of participation in the Muslim pilgrimiage to Mecca (Minahan 2002: 428). [1976: cultural rights restriction]
  + We could not find precise information regarding the exact date those restrictions were implemented (UNPO mentions the 1970s). Yet, the narrative in Minahan (2002: 428) suggests that the above-mentioned restrictions of religious rights constituted countermeasures by the Vietenamese government to the insurgency. It is therefore likely that the restriction came after the onset of violence, which we peg to 1975. We therefore code the restriction in 1976.
* Furthermore, the 1965 legislation, according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24), were reversed. This is confirmed by different sources: Minority Rights Group International, for example, observes an expropriation of traditional land and resources as agricultural lands were collectivized. Additional evidence is provided by Do and Iyer (2013). This is coded as a reversal of the autonomy concession of 1965 and thus an autonomy restriction.
  + It is not entirely clear, based on our sources, whether the land rights restriction occurred before or after the onset of the insurgency in 1975 (see above). However, the narrative in Do and Iyer (2013) suggests that land collectivization must have started soon after reunification and thus likely before the outbreak of violence. [1975: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Used to be part of South Vietnam. [1975: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Chams |
| *Scenario* | No match |
| *EPR group(s)* | - |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | - |

**Power access**

* The Chams in Vietnam are not included in EPR (in contrast to their Cambodian kin). EPR reports that there was wide-spread discrimination against ethnic groups associated with FULRO (such as the Chams) from 1975-1978 (also see Minahan 2002: 428; Noseworthy 2013: 8), and that they were powerless thereafter. [1975-1978: discriminated; 1979-1984: powerless]

**Group size**

* Population estimates vary substantially between sources, but given the small share of Cham in the country’s total population, these differences are negligible. We follow Minahan (2002), who reports a figure of 240,000 in 2002. With Vietnam’s population of around 79.54 million that same year, this yields a group size of .003. [0.003]

**Regional concentration**

* In the assimilation campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s Viet-Kinh Catholic migration into the Cham lands was encouraged (Noseworty 2013; Minahan 2002: 428). Taylor (2007: 2) states that the Cham “settlements are small and scattered within a dense circuitry of Vietnamese settlements”. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 424) there are 250,000 Chams in Cambodia. Smaller communities live in Laos, Malaysia and Thailand but they are too insignificant to be considered here. We thus code the presence of kin in a neighboring country. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Hmong

Activity: 2011-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* According to BBC News (2011a, 2011b), Hmong in Dien Bien – one of Vietnam’s poorest regions – staged a mass protest calling for autonomy, land rights, and religious freedom in 2011. According to a detailed study of the protests, the number of participants was in the thousands and involved several different claims including land rights and an independent Hmong kingdom. Some also suspected a return of God or Jesus to Muong Nhe, where the protests took place. In March 2012, eight Hmong men were given 30 months’ imprisonment for ‘public disorder’, four more men in December for ‘plotting to overthrow the government’ (one man received seven years), and one more in August 2013 (Rumsby 2019).
* Rumsby (2019) suggests that crowds were forcibly dispersed by combined army and police forces after a few weeks, with reports of lethal clashes. This is both the first and last evidence of separatist mobilization we could find. However, based on the sources we could find it is not clear whether the movement actually ended in 2011, or continued at lower intensity. Based on the 10-year rule, we code the movement as ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 2011; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Rumsby (2019: 1361) suggests that the main claim was for setting up of a new state or kingdom. [2011-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 2011; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* None of the sources we consulted includes any clear statement regarding the extent of claimed territory. We therefore use the GeoEPR settlement area polygon as an approximation.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Rumsby (2019) suggests there were lethal clashes in 2011, but we could not find good information on the number of casualties. According to diaspora networks, dozens of Hmong were killed by army troops, suggesting that the violence could have been one-sided (Rumsby 2019: 1358). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Hmong have been pushed southwards by expanding Han Chinese over the course of hundreds of years. There were regular wars between the Chinese and the Hmong, particularly during the Qing dynasty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Hundreds of thousands of the Hmong settled in the South-East Asian countries of Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Thailand (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International)
* At the end of the nineteenth century the French took control of Laos and Vietnam. The French granted the Hmong a semi-autonomous status but required taxes and labor. In 1919 the Hmong rebelled against French taxes, forced labor and the colonial authority’s attempt to control opium production. The rebellion was called the Chao Fa rebellion (meaning “Lord of the Sky”) (Roth 2015: 364). The rebellion was ended in 1921 and the Hmong were granted an autonomous area near the Vietnamese-Laotian border. The Hmong turned pro-French and during Japanese occupation, a larger fraction supported France in taking back the territory (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International).
* Soon after seizing power in the North, in 1955–6 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam established two autonomous zones in the areas where most Hmong lived, the Viet Bac and the Thai Meo autonomous zones. Both zones were abolished in 1975 and the level of autonomy was questionable (Rumsby 2019).
* In the 1980s, large chunks of land in the Vietnamese highlands were nationalilzed and privatized, implying a loss of ancestral land rights (Le & Kim 2018).
* The Hmong, many of whom are Christian, also face religious repression (Rumsby 2019). Instruction No. 1 is issued by the Prime Minister in February 2005. It bans specific forms of Protestantism. In March, further legislation is passed that requires all religious groups to be officially registered. Decree 22 of this legislation bans all religious activity “deemed to threaten national security, public order, or national unity” (Human Rights Watch 2011: 11). [2005: cultural rights restriction]
* According Rumsby (2019), early 2011 saw “several incidents of religious repression”, which contributed to the emergence of the protests in that year. [2011: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 2011 protests acted as a catalyst for economic concessions, such as poverty eradication loans to poor housholds, but we could not find a concession as defined here (see Rumsby 2019).

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Hmong |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Hmong |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 81611000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* + We follow EPR. [0.01]

**Regional concentration**

* According to EPR, the Hmong in Vietnam are regionally based, but EPR uses a lower bar. According to the Atlas of Humanity, the Hmong “are principally concentrated in the mountainous north of the country and usually live at high altitudes.” We could not find better data, so this case would profit from more research. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are numerically significant kin groups in Laos (Hmong), Thailand (Hill Tribes), and China (Miao) (see EPR; MAR; Minahan 2002: 738). In addition, Minahan (2002: 738) mentions 140,000 Hmong in the United States. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Khmer Krom

Activity: 1975-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* With the unification of Vietnam and South Vietnam the Khmer Krom became part of the unified Vietnam. The Khmer Kroms’ movement for self-determination, which had been active since 1955 (see Khmer Krom under South Vietnam), remained active in the unified Vietnam. We code activity from 1975 onwards, the year North and South Vietnam merged. Note: The movement was involved in LVIOLSD before 1975 (1964-1965), but not immediately prior to 1975. Thus we indicate that immediate prior activity was non-violent.
* Though the umbrella organization of which the Khmer Krom were part (FULRO) disbanded in 1984, the Khmer Kroms movement remains ongoing as of today. In 1985, the Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation (KKF) was founded as a peaceful organization aiming for the “right to self-determination for the Indigenous Khmer-Krom Peoples in Kampuchea-Krom (Mekong Delta region)”, and continues to be active as of 2020 (Dharma n.d.; Human Rights Watch 2009; Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation; Minahan 2002: 990ff; Thul 2005; Tyner 2008; UNPO 2008; Oishi et al. 2020). [start date: 1955; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races (Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees FULRO) continued its operations until 1984, when it was abandoned. Since we have not come across information that would suggest that FULRO’s aim (union with Cambodia) changed, we continue the irredentist claim from the pre-1975 period until 1984 (see Khmer Krom under South Vietnam). [1975-1984: irredentist claim]
* With the disbanding of FULRO in 1984, the dominant claim appears to have shifted to autonomy. As of then, the most prominent organization representing the Khmer Krom self-determination movement has been the Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation (KKF), which was founded in 1985. The KKF “seeks freedom, justice, and the right to self-determination for the Indigenous Khmer-Krom Peoples” and aims at the acceptance of Khmer as a minority language. That the claim shifted to autonomy is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 996), who sees the claim for autonomy within Vietnam as the dominant claim but only the “first step to the rebirth of Khmer Krom sovereignty”. The KKF emphasized the autonomy claim in 2005, when it demanded a separate governing system for the Khmer Krom in southern Vietnam (Cambodia Daily 2005). The autonomy claim remained current as of 2022 (KKF 2022). [1985-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* We found no evidence for politically significant secessionist claims after FULRO’s disbandement. [start date: 1955; end date: 1984]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Khmer refers to the historical territory of Cochinchina, today known as Kampuchea Krom, in southern Vietnam (Minahan 2002: 990). We code this claim using geographic data on admin units from the Global Administrative Areas databas.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* During the Vietnam War, FULRO fought with the United States against the communist north. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, it took not long for FULRO to launch an insurgency against the new Communist regime. We could not find precise information on casualties, but based on descriptions in qualitative sources, the LVIOLSD threshold was likely met. Based on this, we code all groups involved with FULRO – the Chams, the Khmer Krom, and the Montagnards (Magnusson 2014: 6; Minahan 2002: 428, 995; Roth 2015: 364) – with LVIOLSD in 1975-1981. We code this insurgency as over mixed motives because FULRO appears to have had partly center-seeking/ideological motives. See the Montagnards entry for more details. [1975-1981: LVIOLSD; 1982-1920: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Khmer Krom’s history of independence reaches back to the ninth century, when the Khmer empire reunited and initiated the golden age of Khmer culture and power around the capital of Angkor. Under constant pressure from east and north, the Khmer power declined and came to an end in the 15th century. The neighbouring Vietnamese infiltrated the region, setting off a long history of antagonism between the Vietnamese and the Khmer that continued under French colonial rule.
* French colonial rule favored the Vietnamese and relegated the Khmer. Vietnamese efforts to unify the historical Vietnamese lands caused fierce resistance by the Khmer Krom also during the Japanese occupation. In 1949, their territory (as part of Cochinchina) was placed under Vietnamese control in exchange for specific rights for the Khmer Krom. These rights were ignored and the four Khmer Krom provinces were abolished and replaced by 21 Vietnamese provinces (Minahan 2002). During the 1950s and 1960s, the government of the Republic of Vietnam initiated several assimilation campaigns. The use of the Khmer Krom language was discouraged, Khmer pagoda schools were closed, anti-Buddhist laws adopted, and the Khmer identity was targeted by the obligation to take on Vietnamese surnames. Since we lack a clear indication when the respective policies were initiated, we coded a single cultural rights restriction in 1956 under the header of South Vietnam since this is the year when the “nationalization” decree was adopted, which was at the root of these assimilation campaigns (Adams et al. 2009).
* The 1957 Land Development Program first stated the principle that land of highlander minorities was belongs to the Vietnamese state and not the indigenous peoples. The 1958 Highlander Resettlement Program provided for the resettlement of highlander minorities from land they were occupying into reservations where they would be “civilized”. Corresponding legal decrees were passed in Dember 1958 and May 1959 and led to large-scale land theft (Hickey 1967: 81ff).
* As a result of pressure by the US, the South Vietnamese government began in 1965 to replace discrimination and repression with programs to protect culture and identity. The most significant acts in this direction were the establishment of a Directorate-General for Development of Ethnic Minorities and the passing of legislation according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24). Land rights are considered a concession on autonomy in line with the codebook. [1965: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* During the Vietnam War, the Khmer Krom were recruited by the US military and fought besides the US troops until the ceasefire of 1973. After the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the Khmer Krom suffered from heavy retaliation and many anti-communist Khmer Krom were sent to re-education camps (Minahan 2002).
* The discrimination of the Khmer Krom also included assimilation policies and several cultural restrictions targeting the religious beliefs and cultural identity of the Khmer Krom. The Khmer language was prohibited, the restoration of (destroyed) existing temples and the construction of new ones was banned and donations given to religious institutions was controlled (UNPO). Since we lack a good indication as to when these policies were implemented (UNPO mentions the 1970s), we code a restriction in 1976, the year after the reunification. We do not code the restriction in 1975 because we code an onset of separatist violence in that year, and we lack evidence that the restriction preceded the violence. [1976: cultural rights restriction]
* Furthermore, the 1965 legislation, according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24), were reversed. This is confirmed by different sources: Minority Rights Group International, for example, observes an expropriation of traditional land and resources as agricultural lands were collectivized. Additional evidence is provided by Do and Iyer (2013). This is coded as a reversal of the autonomy concession of 1965 and thus an autonomy restriction. [1975: autonomy restriction]
  + It is not entirely clear, based on our sources, whether the land rights restriction occurred before or after the onset of the insurgency in 1975 (see above). However, the narrative in Do and Iyer (2013) suggests that land collectivization must have started soon after reunification, and thus likely before the outbreak of separatist violence.
* The 1992 constitution includes rights of ethnic minorities. Ethnic groups are given the right to use their own language and ethnic discrimination is forbidden (article 5). In article 36 and 39 allow preferential treatment of national minorities in education and health care (Adams et al. 2009). Furthermore, the Committee for Ethnic Minorities and Mountainous Areas was established to implement and monitor of various ethnic minorities specific projects, such as socio-economic development, land and housing, transportation, credit and sanitation. We do not code this as a concession because discrimination against the Khmer Krom has remained widespread because neither cultural rights nor the level of self-determination have significantly increased as a result of the new constitution.
* In recent years Khmer Krom elites have increasingly been represented in the government, but critics claim this represents an attempt to divert attention away from the Khmer Krom’s autonomy claim and that autonomy has been mostly token (Oishi et al. 2020: 248, 260). We could not find evidence for a concession as defined here.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Used to be part of South Vietnam. [1975: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Khmer Krom |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Khmer |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 81613000 |

**Power access**

* The Khmer Krom are only coded as of 1976 in EPR; from that year onwards, they are considered discriminated (until 1978) and then powerless. As noted above, the discrimination code can also be applied to 1975, given the assimilation policies and several cultural restrictions that targeted the religious beliefs and cultural identity of the Khmer Krom after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975. Among other things, these policies included the prohibition of the Khmer language, the banning of the restoration of (destroyed) temples and the control of donations given to religious Khmer institutions (UNPO). In recent years Khmer Krom elites have increasingly been represented in the government, but critics claim this represents an attempt to divert attention away from the Khmer Krom’s autonomy claim and that autonomy has been mostly token (Oishi et al. 2020: 248, 260). [1975-1978: discriminated; 1979-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1975-1978: 0.013; 1979-2020: 0.014]

**Regional concentration**

* The Khmer Krom are concentrated in Kampuchea Krom, where they make up 28% of the population (Minahan 2002: 990). Since they do not constitute a majority in their territory and since we could not find evidence of a smaller area where they are in the majority, we do not code them as regionally concentrated. We did not find evidence of an alternative territory where the Khmer Krom would form a majority. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 990) there are approximately 1.2 million Khmer Krom in Cambodia. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Montagnards

Activity: 1975-1984; 2000-2018

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* With the unification of Vietnam and South Vietnam the Montagnards became part of the unified Vietnam. The Montagnards’ movement for self-determination, which had been active since 1956 (see Montagnards under South Vietnam), continued to be active in Vietnam until FULRO officially disbanded in 1984. Thus we begin to code the Montagnards movement in Vietnam as of 1975, though noting that the movement was active already prior to the unification of the two Vietnams. Note: The movement was involved in LVIOLSD before 1975 (1964-1965), but not immediately prior to 1975. Thus we indicate that immediate prior activity was non-violent. We found no subsequent activity after FULRO’s disbandment in 1984, thus the end of the movement is coded as 1984. [start date 1: 1956; end date 1: 1984]
* The Montagnards movement resumed in 2000, when an activist Montagnard church movement – Tin Lanh Dega, or Dega Protestantism ­– emerged in the Central Highlands. The movement demanded greater political freedom, protection of ancestral lands, and autonomy. Protests took place in 2001 and 2004 over issues of autonomy, cultural and religious freedom, and land rights. A subsequent protest took place in 2008 allegedly under the orders of the exiled FULRO. We could not find any evidence for organized claims after 2008, however. In keeping with the 10-year rule, we code the second end date in 2018 (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 194; Human Rights Watch 2011; Hickey 2002; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 2002: 1288ff; MAR; Radio Free Asia 2013; Salemink 2003). [start date 2: 2000; end date 2: 2018]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1964, the Montagnards movement allied with the Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races (Front Unifie de Lutte des Races Opprimees FULRO). In other cases, alliance with or membership in FULRO results in the coding of an irredentist claim (see e.g. Noseworthy 2013), but not in this case. According to Minahan (2002), the Montagnard movement turned to one for independence in 1964. This seems to be the claim that gets most support in the relevant sources, e.g. Walker (2009) and Adams (1998). Following the first of January rule, we therefore change the claim to independence as of 1965. We code an independence claim up until and including 1984, when this phase of the movement ended due to the disbandment of FULRO. [1975-1984: independence claim]
* The Montagnard movement resumed in 2000. Both the Minorities at Risk Project and a Human Rights Watch (2011) report state that the rebellion now is over issues of autonomy, greater cultural and religious freedom and land rights (also see above). [2000-2018: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1964; end date: 1984]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Montagnards consists of the provinces Gia Lai, Dak Lak, Kon Tum, and Lam Dong (Minahan (2002: 1288). Up until 2003, Dak Lak included Dak Nong, which only became a separate province after (Law 2012). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* During the Vietnam War, FULRO fought with the United States against the communist north. In 1975, Saigon fell, and U.S. troops withdrew. Many FULRO forces retreated to the forests, where they soon began to resurrect their guerilla movement. Soon FULRO took up arms against the new North Vietnamese regime. According to Human Rights Watch, “The re-emergence of the group was evident as early as the first session of the National Assembly in 1976, in which a parliamentarian referred to the use of "lackeys" by "imperialist" forces to conduct counter-revolutionary activities.” MAR’s anti-government rebellion score is 4 for 1975-79, indicating “small-scale guerilla activity”. According to MAR: “It is estimated that FULRO had a force of around 10,000 guerrillas. However, by the late 1970s, FULRO was a depleted force having lost more than 8000 fighters. It was reduced to engaging in low-level sporadic armed attacks against state authorities (REBEL80X = 1).” This narrative is broadly confirmed by Human Rights Watch (2002), which adds that the last FULRO forces surrendered in 1992. Minahan (2002: 1293) also suggests that FULRO initially had around 10,000 men, adding that by 1982 “their forces were decimated and isolated.” Guérin (2007: 3), by contrast, suggests that FULRO had effectively been defeated already in 1977. The more detailed account in Evans (1992: 299), on the other hand, suggests that “between 1979 and 1981 the back of the resistance was broken through military campaigns.”
* While all accounts suggest that there was a significant insurgency, we could not find precise casualty estimates. Doyle (2007: 255) suggests that “since 1975, more than 200,000 montagnards have been killed by the Vietnamese in a genocidal campaign unequaled since World War II.” This figure seems very high; for example, Minahan (2002: 1293) suggests that between 200,000-220,000 Montagnards died, but that most of those deaths were before 1975. The likely reason for the lack of more precise casualty figures is that, after the Communist take-over in 1975, everybody was barred from entry by the regime except for Vietnamese ethnographers, who did not provide reliable reports (Evans 1992: 276). Therefore, only little remains known about the period after 1975.
* Any coding decision is ambiguous in light of the limited information. We decided to code a period of LVIOLSD because several sources report that FULRO had several thousand fighters in the beginning, which were largely decimated by the early 1980s, suggesting that there was sustained, reciprocated violence and that the 25 deaths was likely met during those years. We code this violence as over mixed motives because the FULRO insurgency appears to have had partly center-seeking/ideological motives. [1975-1981: LVIOLSD; 1982-1984: NVIOLSD]
* No fatalities were found from the protests after 2000, and thus the second period is coded as NVIOLSD. [2000-2018: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The ethnic minorities of the highland areas were to a large extent autonomous from the Vietnamese state in the pre-colonial period but nonetheless experienced economic exploitation by the ethnic Kinh (Minority Rights Group International 1997).
* The French established colonial authority over what today is Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (French Indochina) in the nineteenth century. Increased penetration of the territory and French missionary activities in the highland areas resulted in increased contacts of the Montagnards with the outside world in the mid-nineteenth century, when the French began to settle in the central highlands (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project).
* In 1899, the French divided the administration of the Central Highlands into Motagnard provinces (Minahan 2002) and utilized direct rule through traditional chiefs to collect taxes and oversee development (Minorities at Risk Project). Although the population of the Central Highlands was divided into over forty groups, French policies gradually produced a common sense of identity among them (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000).
* Upon their return after the Second World War (Indochina was under Japanese influence between 1941-1945), the French attempted to reassert control over Vietnam against the Communist Viet-Minh forces, who also tried to recruit the Montagnards in their anticolonial struggle. To accommodate the Montagnards, the French colonial authorities in 1947 created the Commiserate of the Federal Government for the Montagnard Populations of South Indochina (*Commissariat du Gouvernement Federal pour les Populations Montagnardes du Sud Indochinois*) and in 1950 established the Country of the Montagnards of Southern Indochina (*Pays Montagnard du Sud Indochinois*), five separate provinces with far-reaching autonomy rights placed under the authority of the Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai. The latter was installed by the French as an alternative to Ho Chi Minhís Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The statute that established the Country of the Montagnards also guaranteed protection of the Montagnard’s languages, traditions, and customary laws (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Human Rights Watch 2002; Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International 1997).
* At the 1954 Geneva Conference the Montagnard homeland was incorporated into the newly established Republic of Vietnam/South Vietnam. As the French withdrew, the South Vietnamese regime under Ngo Dinh Diem annexed the Central Highlands and abolished the autonomous Montagnard Region in 1955 (Minahan 2002).
  + According to Magnusson (2014: 42): “After the October 1955 South Vietnamese Presidential elections, Ngo Dinh Diem acted quickly to begin eliminating Montagnard primordial ties. He replaced French-supported Montagnard administrators in the Central Highlands with Vietnamese bureaucrats, who governed the indigenous populations with an iron fist. Vietnamese administrators eliminated the tribal legal system, requiring that all Montagnard legal issues be handled according to Vietnamese jurisprudence. Indigenous languages were removed from the education system in an attempt to eradicate tribal languages, forcing students to study in Vietnamese. Educational materials written in the traditional tribal dialects were destroyed and replaced with Vietnamese language textbooks. Members of the thirteen Montagnard military battalions, who served during the French Indochina war, were disbanded and their members transferred to different Vietnamese military units to weaken Montagnard military capabilities.
* Vietnamese settlements in Montagnard areas were encouraged through the establishment of “land development centers” (Human Rights Watch 2002). Montagnards were classified as ethnic minorities and assimilation policies were launched with the goal to eradicate their local cultures, traditional lifestyles and religious beliefs (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). We lack a clear indication when the respective policies were initiated, but 1956 seems to be a good marker since this is the year when the “nationalization” decree was adopted, which was at the rot of these assimilation campaigns (Adams et al. 2009).
* The 1957 Land Development Program first stated the principle that land of highlander minorities was belongs to the Vietnamese state and not the indigenous peoples. The 1958 Highlander Resettlement Program provided for the resettlement of highlander minorities from land they were occupying into reservations where they would be “civilized”. Corresponding legal decrees were passed in Dember 1958 and May 1959 and led to large-scale land theft (Hickey 1967: 81ff).
* As a result of pressure by the US, the South Vietnamese government began in 1965 to replace discrimination and repression with programs to protect culture and identity. The most significant acts in this direction were the establishment of a Directorate-General for Development of Ethnic Minorities and the passing of legislation according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24). Land rights are considered a concession on autonomy in line with the codebook. [1965: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Already before unification, at the founding meeting of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) in 1960, Ho Chi Minh announced plans for the establishment of autonomous regions in minority areas (Human Rights Watch 2002). These pledges of autonomy were repeated several times during the Second Indochina War. However, after the defeat of South Vietnam and the reunification, the victorious North Vietnamese government “reneged on their earlier promises to respect ethnic minority rights” and the often-promised autonomy for the Montagnards was not implemented (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 194).
* In addition to the reneging on the autonomy promise, the new government also launched several assimilation policies and “institutionalized the abolishment of the Montagnard way of life” (Minahan 2002: 1293). Religious practices and rites of passage were forbidden (Minahan 2002), catholic and protestant churches in the Central Highlands were closed (Human Rights Watch 2011) and a new campaign was undertaken to settle ethnic Vietnamese in New Economic Zones in the highlands. [1975: cultural rights restriction]
  + It is not entirely clear whether this restriction occurred before or after the onset of the separatist insurgency in 1975 (see above), but overall, the narrative in Minahan (2002: 1293) suggests that at least some of the restrictions were likely initiated prior to major violence taking place.
* Furthermore, the 1965 legislation, according to which highlanders were entitled to own land (Minahan 2002; Human Rights Watch 2002: 24), were reversed. This is confirmed by different sources: Minority Rights Group International, for example, observes an expropriation of traditional land and resources as agricultural lands were collectivized. Additional evidence is provided by Do and Iyer (2013). This is coded as a reversal of the autonomy concession of 1965 and thus an autonomy restriction. [1975: autonomy restriction]
  + It is not entirely clear, based on our sources, whether the land rights restriction occurred before or after the onset of the insurgency in 1975 (see above). However, the narrative in Do and Iyer (2013) suggests that land collectivization must have started soon after reunification. We therefore code the restriction in the same year as the onset.
* Instruction No. 1 is issued by the Prime Minister in February 2005. It specifically bans Dega (Montagnard) Protestantism and thereby reinforces a long-held official opinion that Dega Protestantism is not a legitimate religion. In March, further legislation is passed that requires all religious groups to be officially registered. Decree 22 of this legislation bans all religious activity “deemed to threaten national security, public order, or national unity” (Human Rights Watch 2011: 11). The new regulations provide a legal basis for authorities arresting Montagnard Christians and forcing them to join the government-approved Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam. [2005: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Used to be part of South Vietnam. [1975: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Montagnards |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | Gia Rai |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 81610000 |

* EPR codes the Gia Rai, the largest of the upland ethnic groups of the Central Highlands. The Montagnards do include other smaller groups as well, hence the 1:n scenario.

**Power access**

* Apart from the dominant ethnic Kinh, EPR codes all relevant ethnic groups as discriminated in the first years after reunification (1976-1978; EPR does not code 1975) and as powerless for the remaining years (1979-2012). Among these groups are also the Gia Rai, the largest of the upland ethnic groups of the Central Highlands. While they are not congruent with the whole group of Montagnards, which are a much more diverse group, the coding of their power status serves as an important guideline for the coding of the Montagnards.
* In the first years after reunification, a period of consolidation of the communist government of Vietnam in southern Vietnam, state repression of the highland ethnic minorities was systematically implemented as a consequence of the Montagnard resistance to the communist north and their support of the United States’ military operations during the war. Between 1975 and 1979, around 8,000 Montagnards were killed or captured by the Vietnamese military. Evidence of discrimination can also be found in Minahan (2002), who lists the denial of land rights, courts, restrictions on church services and equal education among the discriminatory measures by the central government. Finally, Human Rights Watch (2011) states that catholic and protestant churches in the Central Highlands were closed and a new campaign to settle ethnic Vietnamese in the highlands was initiated. We thus code the Montagnards as discriminated form 1975 onwards. [1975-1978: discriminated]
* Since we did not find any clear evidence as of when discrimination ended, we follow the EPR coding of the Gia Rai (Jarai) and code the Montagnards as powerless as of 1979. [1979-1984: powerless]
* After the reemergence of the Montagnard movement in 2000, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, the Minorities at Risk Project gives numerous reports of repression/discrimination. These include repression of the self-determination movement, repressive measures against protest activities, numerous arrests seemingly due to the Montagnards’ Christian belief, the pressuring of women to undergo sterilization as well as the maintenance of a strong police presence in the Central Highlands. The discriminatory and repressive stance is confirmed by a Human Rights Watch (2011) report according to which political organizing and independent religious activities among Montagnard Christians was suppressed and fundamental rights have been violated by authorities with ongoing arrests and imprisonment, torture and mistreatment in custody. It remains unclear if these repressive acts also resulted in explicit and targeted discrimination that also blocks the group’s access to regional and/or central state power or if they only targeted (violent) protestors. As far as the access to state power is concerned, Thuat (2009) claims that ethnic minority people in Vietnam actively exercise their rights to political participation. In the National Assembly, for example, there were 87 members of minorities in the 2007-2011 tenure, accounting for 17.65% of the Deputies, while ethnic minority people account for only 13.8% of the total population. Also in the People’s Councils (2004-2009), there was disproportionately high representation of ethnic minorities with 20.52% at provincial level, 20.18% at district level, and 24.4% at commune level. Finally, Thuat (200) also provides evidence for ethnic minority people to hold key positions in state organs from central to local levels. We struggled with the decision to classify the Montagnards as powerless or discriminated and both decisions could be justified. We follow EPR and its coding of the Gia Rai (Jarai) and code the Montagnards as powerless in the whole period from 2001 to 2012. We hereby mirror the fact that the stance of the government seems to target mostly the protestors and regime critics and is not reflected in a systematic discrimination of all Montagnards (e.g., Radio Free Asia 2016). [2000-2018: powerless]

**Group size**

* The group size the estimate draws on the figure provided in Minahan (2002: 1288): 1.31 million. In combination with the 2002 World Bank estimate of Vietnam’s population of 79.54 million, we get a 2002 group size estimate of 0.0165. [0.0165]
  + Note: group size estimates tend not to be very exact but usually coincide across sources. According to a Human Rights Watch (2011) report, the Montagnards number between 1 and 2 million. The same indication is also provided by UNPO (2008). Similar data can also be found in a Human Rights Watch (2002: 13) report of 2002, according to which “the population of the Central Highlands provinces […] is approximately four million, of whom approximately one-quarter are indigenous highlanders.”

**Regional concentration**

* The Montagnards are concentrated in their homeland, where also almost all Montagnards live (Minahan 2002: 1288; MAR). However, we also require the group to make up a majority in their respective territory. This requirement is not fulfilled: According to Minahan (2002: 1288), the Montagnards only make up only 32% of the population of the Dega Republic. We found no evidence suggesting an alternatively defined territory that would fulfil the threshold for spatial concentration. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code the Montagnards but only the Gia Rai as the largest of the upland ethnic groups of the Central Highlands. The Gia Rai are not coded as having any kin group. Minorities at Risk data, however, which code the Montagnards as a group of its own, codes “close kindred in one country“, referring to the Khmer Leou in Cambodia (over 140,000 in 1996). This is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 424) who mentions kin communities in adjacent areas of Cambodia and Laos as well as a small number (3,000) in the United States. [kin in neighboring country]

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