# YEMEN

## Hadhramis

Activity: 2017-2020

**General notes**

* Hadhramawt is Yemen’s largest governorate, and part of a larger, pre-modern Hadhramawt region which stretched into present-day Oman (Baron and Basalma, 2021). Currently, the governorate has 28 districts and covers 74,000 square miles in the south-east of Yemen, reaching from the border with Saudi Arabia in the north to the Gulf of Aden in the south. The city of Mukalla is the capital of Hadhramawt, and the governorate produces 100,000 barrels of oil per day (about half of Yemen’s oil wealth) (Baron and Basalma, 2021). 1.4 million live in Hadhramawt and there are a further 14 million ethnic Hadhramis in the diaspora (Baron and Basalma, 2021). Many of those in the diaspora do not have Yemeni passports, and refer to themselves as Hadhramis as opposed to Yemenis, and this community often takes an interest, and participates in, ‘the humanitarian and economic affairs of the governorate’ (Baron and Basalma, 2021).
* Hadhramis have emigrated since the 13th century as the region’s agriculture has been unable to support the region’s populace (Horton, 2010). Horton (2010) argues that ‘the emigrant experience and idea of return to the homeland have been responsible for developing much of the Hadrami identity’.

**Movement start and end dates**

* Minahan (2016:168) reports that, since the early 2000s, Hadhramis have rejected Southern separatism ‘while a movement for the separation and independence of Hadhramaut has gained support’. Other sources suggest that Southern separatism does enjoy support in Hadrahmawat, but at the same time confirm that there is also a movement for greater autonomy for the Hadrahamawt governate.
* The first clear evidence for separatist mobilization we have found is in 2017, when local authorities and local communities came together to organize the ‘Hadhramawt Inclusive Conference’ in a bid to ‘unify the political vision’ of Hadhramawt (Baron and Basalma 2021; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). The conference generated a ‘consensus on revenue sharing and autonomy that has nudged the governorate toward greater local control over economic resources and security’ (Baron and Basalma 2021). The conference resulted in several outcomes including calls for greater autonomy, representation, and greater devolution of power over the security sector and, since the first meeting, the conference ‘has evolved into a permanent organization’ (Baron and Basalma 2021).
* We found indications for separatist sentiment before 2017, but no clear-cut evidence for significant political mobilization. Specifically, Horton (2010) suggests that, in 2010, members of the governorate’s merchant class ‘often referenced the idea of a return to an independent Mahdhramawt’. In 2011, political, religious and academic figures from Hadhramawt drafted a document called ‘Hadhramaut: The Vision and the Way’, which included proposals for federalism and revenue-devolution (Baron and Basalma, 2021). Finally, Minahan (2016:168) claims that, in 2011, the Hadhramawt Tribes Confederacy declared autonomy; however, we could not find confirming evidence. Instead, we found that an organization called the Tribal Alliance, which later was renamed the Hadhramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA), was formed in 2013 and attempted to place pressure on the central government by organizing demonstrations. The movement appeared focused on protesting the death of a tribal leader and we found no evidence for claims for increased self-determination as defined here (Baron and Basalma, 2021). [start date: 2017; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Hadhramis have made claims for internal autonomy.
  + We code the start date of this movement in 2017 due to the organization of a conference called the Hadhramaut Inclusive Conference (HIC). This conference developed ‘a consensus on revenue sharing and autonomy that has nudged the governorate toward greater local control over conomic resources and security’ (Baron and Basalma, 2021). In a similar vein, Mermier reports that the Hadhramaut Conference issued a declaration saying that the Hadhramaut was a politically autonomous region distinct from the rest of South Yemen within a federal framework.
  + Mermier (2018) also reports that ‘some elite groups in Hadhramaut have argued for the region’s enhanced political and economic autonomy’
* Minahan (2016: 168) suggests that Hadhramis have also made claims for independence. However, we found no other evidence for a politically significant evidence movement for independence, though Horton (2010) would suggest that there is secessionist sentiment. Overall, internal autonomy seems to be the only politically significant organized claim and, therefore, also the dominant claim. [2017-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The area claimed is the Hadhramawt governorate of Yemen. A map is available in Baron and Basalma (2021). We code this claim using GIS data on administrative units from the GADM dataset.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Minahan (2016:168) claims that, in 2011, the Hadhramawt Tribes Confederacy declared autonomy; however, this information was not corroborated by other sources and we therefore do not code a sovereignty declaration.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no indications of separatist violence between 2017 and 2020 so the movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Britain seized Aden, in the south of Yemen, in 1839. The city received considerable investment due to its role connecting Britain’s maritime empire with the Suez Canal, India, Singapore and London (Dresch, 2000:86, 10; Minahan, 1996:543). Britain’s influence in Aden’s tribal hinterland, which included Hadhramawt, fluctuated; the imperial power expended a great deal of resources attempting to secure southern Yemen’s tribal areas, entering into a plethora of treaties offering protection, sponsoring leading sultans and sheikhs in a bid to secure their support, overlooking the need to collect taxes, and targeting rebellious areas with air raids (Dresch, 2000:35, 37; Clark, 2010:66-7, 72-3, 77-8). During this period, ‘Hadhramawt was divided into a patchwork of fiefdoms and tribal territories’. Harold Ingrams, the British Resident Adviser to the al-Quaiti sultanate which ruled a large swathe of Hadhramawt, ‘estimated that in 1936 there were 2,000 separate governments’ in the region (Horton, 2010).
* As the British prepared to leave the region, they created the Federation of South Arabia (Clark, 2010:79-81). The sultanate of Hadhramawt refused to join the Federation (Salisbury, 2018). Moreover, less than a year later, an uprising in Radfan, led by the National Liberation Front (NLF), ignited an insurgency which reached Aden (Clark, 2010:79-81). A state of emergency was declared in 1965; casualties soared, Britain employed harsh security measures, and the two dominant revolutionary factions in the south of Yemen, the NLF and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), struggled violently against one another (Dresch, 2000:84-6; Hill, 2017:36; Minahan, 1996:544; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). Britain evacuated and handed power to the NLF (Dresch, 2000:84; Hill, 2017:37; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). The movement founded the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1967, declaring it ‘the first and only Marxist state in the Arab world’ (Hill, 2017:37; Minahan, 1996:544). In August 1967, NLF revolutionaries deposed Hadhramawt’s ruling al-Quaiti sultanate, incorporating Hadhramawt into the PDRY (Bafana, 2014).
* The NLF, now the Yemeni Socialist party (YSP), was rife with internal conflict; in 1986, two conflicting factions took up arms against one another, leading to the deaths of thousands (Dresch, 2000:169; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). When the clashes subsided, politicians from Hadhramawt dominated the new government, but their attempts to rebuild the state’s economy were unsuccessful and, with Moscow no longer able to support the nascent republic following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PDRY found itself on the verge of bankruptcy (Hill, 2017:46). Unification with the North was perceived as the only viable path and, in May 1990, Ali Abdullah Saleh assumed the title of President of the United Republic of Yemen (Hill, 2017:46; Minahan, 2016:396; Roth, 2015:214).
* In the years following unification, Saleh and other northerners retained firm control of the most important levels of power, with deep distrust pervading the relationship between the bureaucracies and militaries of the south and the north (Clark, 2010:135, 138; Hill, 2017:48; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000). During the official three-year transition period, there was a rapid decline in living standards in the south (Al-Hamdani and lackner, 2020). Following the discovery of oil in Hadhramawt, the sense that the north was draining the resources of the south, and the exclusion of southerners from Saleh’s newly enriched networks of patronage, fostered resentment, prompting a descent into civil war (Hill, 2017:48; Lackner, 2017:119; Dresch, 2000:193-4; Minahan, 1996:544). A southern separatist bid, which enjoyed Saudi support, proved unsuccessful; northern tanks rolled into Aden in 1994 (Dresch, 2000:197; Roth, 2015:215; Minahan, 1996:544). Appalling misconduct by the northern military was reported (Dresch, 2000:197) and, following the conflict, the constitution was altered, granting Saleh greater power (Clark, 2010:144). In the years following the conflict, the Southerners ‘saw their economic situation deteriorate and their social lives increasingly fall under influence of conservative religious norms which particularly affected women’ (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020).
* In 2011, a revolution broke out in Yemen which forced President Saleh from power and saw President Hadi assume the role of caretaker President following a referendum.
* Between 2013 and 2014, a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was convened in an attempt to resolve the political crisis in Yemen. At the conference, it was agreed that Yemen would be federalized and a committee was established to decide the precise shape of federalism in Yemen. The committee resolved that Hadhramawt would become one of six states in the new federal republic. This new state would have encompassed the governorates of Hadhramawt, al-Mahrah, Shabwah and Socotra. It would have covered over 50% of Yemen’s land mass and more than 89% of Yemen’s producing oil fields, with water widely available (Bafani, 2014). However, federalization was never implemented; just one year following the conclusion of the NDC, the northern Huthi movement marched into the capital, Sana’a, triggering a fierce civil war. Baron and Basalma (2021) argue that ‘the war has fragmented Yemen’s political system and created a power vacuum to an extent that has arguably never been seen in the country’s modern history’.
* In 2015, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) swept into Mukalla and consolidated power. A year later, the UAE and their allies ‘stood up a 12,000-strong force of tribal fighters’ from Hadhramawt, which managed to expel AQAP in April 2016 (Baron, 2018).
* No concessions or restrictions were found in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1998, Yemen was divided into ten provinces – called governates – each of which was further divided into districts. The central government appoints a governor as well as district heads (Baron et al., 2016:4f). Baron et al. (2016:4) suggest that as a result, ‘there was, for all intents and purposes, no local representation in local governance, with all power and decision-making authority centralized in the capital’. Since the outbreak of war, ‘the ability of local councils to provide services and govern weakened substantially, as their sources of financial funding, as well as the wider economy, began to collapse’ (Baron et al., 2016:8). Overall, the evidence we found suggests that governates, such as Hadhramawat, have relatively little autonomy. [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Hadhramis |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Southern Shafi’i |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 67807000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not include the Hadrahmis as a separate group, but codes them together with the Southerners, who are coded as junior partner throughout 2017-2020. In 2021, the Hadramawt Conference was granted representation in the central government, suggesting that the Hadhramis have had representation since at least this point. Unfortunately, we were not able to establish to what extent Hadhramis were represented in the cabinet before that. However, Jalal (2021) suggests that 70% of the central government consisted of Southerners during the movement’s years of activity. We apply a junior partner 2017-2020, noting that this case would profit from more research. [2017-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to Baron and Basalma (2021), a total of 1.4 million people live in Hadhramawt. This is supported by Minahan (2016:167) who estimates that between 1.3 and 1.5 million people live in the governorate. We use the 2017 World Bank Yemen population estimate (27,834,811) as the reference figure. [0.05]

**Regional concentration**

* As this is a regional movement, we assume regional concentration. It it is important to note that this is not based on empirical data on the number of self-identified Hadhramis in and outside of their homeland, as we could not find such data. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* There are 14 million ethnic Hadhramis in the diaspora (Baron and Basalma, 2021). Hadhramis live in neighbouring countries, such as Saudi Arabia, but also further afield including Indonesia and the Horn of Africa (Baron and Basalma, 2021). Based on this, we code kin in a neighbouring country. [kin in a neighboring country]

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## Mahras

Activity: 2012-2020

**General notes**

* Mahra’s location is ‘geo-strategically important, with borders to Oman and Saudi Arabia and a maritime border to Somalia’ (Kendall, 2018:71). According to Kendall (2018:73), Mahra has ‘its own culture and identity that is distinct from South Yemen’ while ‘its entanglement with Yemen represents fewer than 50 years in a history stretching back over half a millennium during which Mahra operated as its own sultanate’. Mahra has retained its own distinctive, unwritten language, Mehri, which contributes to the ‘strong sense of Mahri identity’ (Kendall, 2018:73; see also: Al-Sewari, 2019). Mahra is Yemen’s second-largest governorate and the easternmost region in the country (Al-Sewari, 2019). The governorate covers 67,000 square kilometres and is divided into nine districts. Its capital is the city of al-Ghaydah (Al-Sewari, 2019). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated in 2017 that the governorate has 150,000 residents but academic estimates have claimed that the figure is closer to 350,000 while the governor of Mahra has claimed that the population, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), is 650,000 (Al-Sewari, 2019; see also: Nagi, 2020).

**Movement start and end dates**

* Most of the Mahra Sultanate was integrated into South Yemen in 1967 (some parts are also in today’s Oman, specifically the Dhofar region). Minahan (2016: 256) reports that this integration was against the will of the Mahra sultan, who wanted separate independence. This suggests separatist mobilization, but Yemen was not an independent state at the time. Therefore, this period is not included.
* Minahan (2016: 256) reports increased separatist sentiment in recent years. He points to an informal 2013 poll, which suggested a lot of support for Mahran independence (see also: Kendall 2014; Nagi 2020). Minahan also suggests that a plan for a federal Yemen, which would merge Mahra into Hadramaut, was met with opposition in Mahra due to the desire for a separate status.
* The earliest evidence for separatist mobilization we could find is in 2012, when a political group called the General Council was formed “with designs to revive the Sultanate [of Mahra] in the wake of Yemen’s revolution” (Kendall 2018: 78). The General Council also made claims related to Socotra Island. In 2012, local sheikhs from the General Council of the People of Mahra and Socotra appointed Sultan Abdullah bin Essa al-Afar, son of the former Sultan of Mahra, as head of the council. At this point, the al-Afar was living in exile (Mills 2020). 2012 is coded as the start date.
* According to Mills (2020): “In May 2018 Sultan al-Afar returned to Mahra from exile in Muscat, Oman. Al-Afar’s speech calling for the Saudis to withdraw from Mahra galvanized anti-Saudi sentiment and led to a list of demands which included amongst other things; the empowerment of local authorities in matters of governance, security, trade, and the transfer of the al-Ghaydah airport to civilian control. As a traditional tribal leader, al-Afar is typically subdued in his rhetoric in order to preserve unity amongst the sheikhs in the General Council. On November 27th 2019 when al-Afar switched from calling for a federal system to calling for independence, he represented the opinion of the General Council […] Calls for independence in Mahra are not universally supported, but may become more popular over time. There is an ongoing debate, with some groups, such as those led by al-Hurayzi calling for a united Yemeni state, while other sheikhs in the General Council call for a federal system in Yemen.”
* This account is confirmed by a 2019 Al-Monitor article, which suggests that the former sultan of Mahra told the newspaper about “the intention to revive the sultanate”. The article continues to report that the sultan reappeared in 2012 for the first time to advocate for an independent Al Mahra. At the time the sultan was based in exile Saudia Arabia; he later moved to Oman and, in 2018, to Yemen.
* Another report from 2019 suggests that a protest movement against Saudi military presence emerged in 2018. Among the demands was the reinstatement of local authority management and “full empowerment” of the local authority. The same source also suggests that Mahri representatives at a conference on the future of Yemen in ca 2014 declared their intention to become a separate autonomous region in a federal Yemen (al-Sewahri 2019).
* Overall, we found evidence in several sources for separatist mobilization. We code 2012 as the start date, coinciding with the formation of the General Council. The movement is ongoing. [start date: 2012; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Mills (2020) suggests that, in November 2019, the sultan leading the General Council, the main organization associated with this movement, “switched from calling for a federal system to calling for independence”, and that he in doing so “represented the opinion of the General Council”. Castelier (2019) reports that al-Afar has remained open to an autonomy solution under certain conditions while Al-Sewari (2019) writes that ‘Mahris have a unique history of running their own affairs as well as a common vision of sovereignty within a federal system that has kept them remarkably unified’. Overall, it is therefore not fully clear whether the dominant claim switched to independence in 2019. Still, in line with the codebook, we code the more radical claim for outright independence from 2020 onward. [2012-2019: autonomy claim; 2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 2019; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The movement’s territorial claim relates to the former Sultanate of Mahra (Kendall 2018: 78). The Mahra Sultanate was divided in 1967 upon the formation of South Yemen, whereby mainland Al Mahra became its own governorate while Socotra Island was administered by the Aden governorate. From 2004, Socotra was placed under Hadhramaut governorate and, in 2013, Socotra became its own governate (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahra\_Sultanate). A map of Mahra is also available in al-Sewari (2019), Roy (2019) and Nagi (2020). We code this claim using data on admin units from GADM for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no indications of separatist violence so the movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Mahra Sultanate, which included the present-day governorate of Mahra and the Socotra archipelago, was formed in the early 16th century. The Sultan was chosen by consensus among the Mahri tribes (Al-Sewari, 2019). At times, the Mahra Sultanate was under the hegemony of Oman ‘but it remained an autonomous polity’ (Lewis, 2015).
* Britain seized Aden, in the south of Yemen, in 1839. The city received considerable investment due to its role connecting Britain’s maritime empire with the Suez Canal, India, Singapore and London (Dresch, 2000:86, 10; Minahan, 1996:543). Britain’s influence in Aden’s tribal hinterland, which included Mahra, fluctuated; the imperial power expended a great deal of resources attempting to secure southern Yemen’s tribal areas, entering into a plethora of treaties offering protection, sponsoring leading sultans and sheikhs in a bid to secure their support, overlooking the need to collect taxes, and targeting rebellious areas with air raids (Dresch, 2000:35, 37; Clark, 2010:66-7, 72-3, 77-8). In 1886, the Sultanate became a British Protectorate but this did not lead to direct British rule (Al-Sewari, 2019; Lewis, 2015).
* As the British prepared to leave the region, they created the Federation of South Arabia (Clark, 2010:79-81). Mahra refused to join the Federation (Salisbury, 2018). Moreover, less than a year later, an uprising in Radfan, led by the National Liberation Front (NLF), ignited an insurgency which reached Aden (Clark, 2010:79-81). A state of emergency was declared in 1965; casualties soared, Britain employed harsh security measures, and the two dominant revolutionary factions in the south of Yemen, the NLF and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), also struggled violently against one another (Dresch, 2000:84-6; Hill, 2017:36; Minahan, 1996:544; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). Britain evacuated and handed power to the NLF (Dresch, 2000:84; Hill, 2017:37; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). The movement founded the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1967, declaring it ‘the first and only Marxist state in the Arab world’ (Hill, 2017:37; Minahan, 1996:544). Mahra was incorporated into the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1967 (Kendall, 2018:72). This amalgamation was ‘not consensual’, with the region preferring ‘to retain its independence as the Mahra Sultanate under British protection’ (Kendall, 2018:73; see also: Mills, 2020; Minahan, 2016:256). Once the British evacuated, Mahra was left without protection and was overrun by the National Liberation Front (NLF) (Kendall, 2018:73; Al-Sewari, 2019). There was a sense of betrayal, by the British, in Mahra (Lewis, 2015).
* The NLF, now the Yemeni Socialist party (YSP), became rife with internal conflict; in 1986, two conflicting factions took up arms against one another, leading to the deaths of thousands (Dresch, 2000:169; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). When the clashes subsided, politicians from Hadhramawt dominated the new government but their attempts to rebuild the state’s economy were unsuccessful and, with Moscow no longer able to support the nascent republic following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PDRY found itself on the verge of bankruptcy (Hill, 2017:46). Unification with the North was perceived as the only viable path and, in May 1990, Ali Abdullah Saleh assumed the title of President of the United Republic of Yemen (Hill, 2017:46; Minahan, 2016:396; Roth, 2015:214). Prior to unification in 1990, Mahra was administered from Hadhramawt (Kendall, 2018:77).
* In the years following unification, Saleh and other northerners retained firm control of the most important levels of power, with deep distrust pervading the relationship between the bureaucracies and militaries of the south and the north (Clark, 2010:135, 138; Hill, 2017:48; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000). During the official three-year transition period, there was a rapid decline in living standards in the south (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). Following the discovery of oil in Hadhramawt, the sense that the north was draining the resources of the south, and the exclusion of southerners from Saleh’s newly enriched networks of patronage, fostered resentment, prompting a descent into civil war (Hill, 2017:48; Lackner, 2017:119; Dresch, 2000:193-4; Minahan, 1996:544). A southern separatist bid, which enjoyed Saudi support, proved unsuccessful; northern tanks rolled into Aden in 1994 (Dresch, 2000:197; Roth, 2015:215; Minahan, 1996:544). Appalling misconduct by the northern military was reported (Dresch, 2000:197) and, following the conflict, the constitution was altered, granting Saleh greater power (Clark, 2010:144). In the years following the conflict, the Southerners ‘saw their economic situation deteriorate and their social lives increasingly fall under influence of conservative religious norms which particularly affected women’ (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020).
* In 2011, a revolution broke out in Yemen which forced President Saleh from power and saw President Hadi assume the role of caretaker President following a referendum.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* As the state collapsed during the war, ‘the local authority in Mahra began to develop independent solutions to ensure the governorate’s economic stability’; for instance, by creating the Committee of Petroleum Products which allowed traders to import and sell oil in return for paying taxes to the local authority (Al-Sewari, 2019).
* Between 2013 and 2014, a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was convened in an attempt to resolve the political crisis in Yemen. At the conference, it was agreed that Yemen would be federalized and a committee was established to decide the precise shape of federalism in Yemen. It was decided that Mahra would be joined with Hadhramawt to create one of six regions, and this was strongly rejected in Mahra (Lewis, 2015; see also: Minahan, 2016:256). However, federalization was never implemented; just one year following the conclusion of the NDC, the northern Huthi movement marched into the capital, Sana’a, triggering a fierce civil war. Baron and Basalma (2021) argue that ‘the war has fragmented Yemen’s political system and created a power vacuum to an extent that has arguably never been seen in the country’s modern history’.
* From August 2015 to late 2017, the UAE operated limited military forces in the region, and attempted to create a local security force under its direction (Mills, 2020).
* In 2017, Saudi-backed forces moved into Mahra and came to dominate nine districts, building several military compounds. In response, Oman began supporting ‘local tribes standing against the Saudis’ (Nagi, 2020; Mills, 2020).
* In 2017, the then-governor of Mahra, Mohammed Kudda, began to organize a conference, to promote investment opportunities in Mahra. However, at the Saudis’ request, President Hadi dismissed the governor, who had been criticial of Saudi intervention in Mahra. Hadi then installed a replacement, Rajih Bakrit, deemed loyal to the Saudis, whose first decision was to cancel the conference (Nagi, 2020). It is ambiguous whether this constitutes a restriction as defined here.
* As noted above, Saudi Arabia ‘controls the governorate’s airport, border crossings and main seaport, and has established more than a dozen military bases around the governorate where it has stationed thousands of its own troops and Yemeni proxy forces imported from other southern governorates’ (Al-Sewari, 2019). There is ‘a growing opposition movement to the Saudi presence’, supported by Oman and, ‘in more recent months there have been clashes with Saudi forces, with the Saudi air force carrying out airstrikes against Mahri tribesmen’ (Al-Sewari, 2019). However, this constitutes neither a concession nor a restriction.
* In September 2019, Mahris created the Southern National Salvation Council to counter the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and to expel the Saudi-led coalition’s military forces from Mahra and from South Yemen more broadly. The Southern National Salvation Council was backed by Oman (Nagi, 2020). This also constitutes neither a concession nor a restriction.

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1998, Yemen was divided into ten provinces – called governates – each of which was further divided into districts. The central government appoints a governor as well as district heads (Baron et al., 2016:4f). Baron et al. (2016:4) suggest that as a result, ‘there was, for all intents and purposes, no local representation in local governance, with all power and decision-making authority centralized in the capital’. Since the outbreak of war, ‘the ability of local councils to provide services and govern weakened substantially, as their sources of financial funding, as well as the wider economy, began to collapse’ (Baron et al., 2016:8). Overall, the evidence we found suggests that governates, such as Mahra, have relatively little autonomy. Notably, foreign states including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman, have wielded varying levels of control over Mahra (Nagi, 2020, Al-Sewari, 2019; Mills, 2020). [no autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Mahrans |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Southern Shafi’i |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 67807000 |

**Power access**

* EPR does not include the Mahrans as a separate group, but codes them together with the Southerners, who are coded as junior partner throughout 2012-2020. Unfortunately, we were not able to establish to what extent Madhrans were represented in the cabinet before that. However, Jalal (2021) suggests that 70% of the central government consisted of Southerners during the movement’s years of activity. We apply a junior partner 2012-2020, noting that this case would profit from more research. [2012-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated in 2017 that the governorate has 150,000 residents but academic estimates have claimed that the figure is closer to 350,000 while the governor of Mahra has claimed that the population, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), is 650,000 (Al-Sewari, 2019; also see: Nagi, 2020). We rely on the academic estimates and use use the 2017 World Bank Yemen population estimate (27,834,811) as the reference figure. [0.01]

**Regional concentration**

* As this is a regional movement, we assume regional concentration. It it is important to note that this is not based on empirical data on the number of self-identified Mahrans in and outside of their homeland, as we could not find such data. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* Minahan (2016: 255) suggests that there are Mahras in Oman. According to the Joshua Project, they number only 97,000, however, which is below the threshold. [no kin]

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## South Yemeni

Activity: 1990-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* North and South Yemen were united in May 1990 and immediately there were disputes between the Northern and Southern Yemeni political parties with the more subordinante Southerners demanding more political autonomy. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1990.
* The inter-party dispute from 1990 to early 1994 was nonviolent and involved several issues. The main Southern party, the Yemeni Soclialist Party (YSP), wanted a decentralized state that would grant considerable powers to its regional components. But even though the YSP did not advocate secession until May 1994, the Northern parties were adamant about maintaining Yemen’s unity and objected to any form of autonomy for the South.
* Although defeated by the Northern military in the 1994 civil war, Southern separatists remained a potent force in the region and the YSP remained active as of 2012. The YSP has since been eclipsed by other secessionist organizations including Hiraak and the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The movement is ongoing (Curran et al. 2011; Hammond 2012; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s; Kostiner 1996; Lexis Nexis; Minahan 1996, 2002; Salama 2013; Al-Saafin 2019; Heibach 2021). [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Right after unification, the main Southern party, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), wanted a decentralized state that would grant considerable powers to its regional components. The demand for a more decentralized government in the early years of the unified Republic of Yemen is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 706), as is the fact that the Southerners changed their goal to independence in 1994. Secessionist fighting broke out on in May and southern leaders declared the independence of South Yemen. Since 1994, there have been claims for both independence and also more moderate demands for decentralization or federation (Brehony 2011: 202). The foremost southern movement (as of April 2022), the STC, has declared self-governance (see above) and was founded ‘with the aim of leading the territories of the former People’s Democratic Repbulic of Yemen to independence’ (Heibach, 2021). Nevertheless, the STC by no means represents the ‘wide range’ of separatist movements in the south of Yemen and has limited control over parts of the western governorates (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). It is unclear which of the two claims is dominant. In line with the SDM coding instruction, the more extreme claim is coded. Demands for secession and an independence referendum were reiterated in 2011 and 2012 (Reuters 2011, 2012) and also more recently (Middle East Eye 2017).
* Note: we reflect the change to an independence claim already in 1994, in contravention of the January 1 rule, because the secessionist claim led to violence. [1990-1993: autonomy claim][1994-2020: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1994; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The Aden protectorate corresponds to the present-day governates of Aden, Lahij, Abyan, Shabwah, Hadhramawt, and Al Mahrah. Combined, these governates reflect the claim as shown in Roth (Roth 2015: 206, 214). They also coincide with the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Southern leaders declared the independence of South Yemen in 1994 (Minahan, 1996:544) [1994: independence declaration].
* The STC declared self-rule in 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2020; Aden Historic Declaration, 2017). Al Jazeera described the STC, upon this announcement, as being a 'self-proclaimed parallel authority', but whether the declaration aimed at internal autonomy or outright independence is not entirely clear. We code the more maximalist claim. [2017: independence declaration]
* The STC declared self-rule in 2020 (Al Jazeera, 2020). The phrase “'autonomous administration of the South” was explicitly used in the declaration. [2020: autonomy declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD coding for 1994 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
* In May 2007, former southern military officers began holding weekly sit-ins, and the protests grew quickly. The protests led to significant violence which, however, appears to have been largely one-sided until 2009. For example, in October 2007, security forces shot and killed four young men. The next month, two more protesters were killed and, less than four months later, ‘government forces killed and injured dozens of southern youths’ (Day 2010:8-9). According to a 2009 Human Rights Watch report, between 2007 and 2009, government security forces carried out ‘unlawful killings, arbitrary detentions, beatings, crackdowns on freedom of assembly and speech, arrests of journalists’ in response to protests organized by al-Hiraak (Alsaafin, 2019; also see: Human Rights Watch, 2009). As we found no evidence that there was reciprocated violence above the threshold, we code 2007-2008 as NVIOLSD.
* UCDP/PRIO reports that separatist violence broke out in 2009: “During 2009, violence erupted once again in connection to several demonstrations held by the secessionist group called the Southern Movement. Several people died during, and in connection to, the demonstrations”. Despite this, UCDP/PRIO does not code a separatist armed conflict because “it was not possible to code them as battle-related deaths due to lack of information about the events.”
  + We investigated this further. The best evidence we could find is from Critical Threats, which provides a detailed timeline for 2010-2011 suggesting >25 deaths in both years. According to our count, 21 rebels died in clashes between separatists and security forces in 2010, 48 security personnel, 7 civilians, and another 8 who were not clearly identified; the corresponding figures for 2011 are: 23 rebels killed 28 security forces, 4 civilians, and 12 unclear. It should be noted that attribuition of casualties is difficult in some cases because of a simultaneous Islamist insurgency led by Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
  + A timeline can also be found on Wikipedia. Contrary to Critical Threats, it covers more years (2009-2011 and 2014). According to our count:
    - 2009: 20 security forces and 12 civilians, including rebels.
    - 2010: 9 rebels killed, 28 security forces, 1 civilian, and 3 unclear
    - 2011: 6 rebels killed, 23 security forces, 3 civilians
    - 2012: no data
    - 2013: no data
    - 2014: 21 rebels killed and 25 security forces
* Based on this, we code LVIOLSD throughout 2009-2014. While we found no concrete evidence for casualties in 2012-2013, it is likely that violence continued throughout these years (according to Wikipedia, the South Yemen insurgency lasted from 2009-2014 and the total number of casualties reported (around 2,000) far exceeds those noted in the timeline).
* Tensions rose again in April 2017 when president Hadi accused Aden’s governor, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, of disloyalty and dismissed him. In January 2018, fighting between the Security Belt forces (dominated by the STC and backed by the UAE) and the internationally recognized government broke out. Separatist forces seized almost all of Aden while the presidential palace was surrounded. At least 38 people were killed in three days of fighting before mediation saw the city placed under government control (Alsaafin 2019). A year and a half later, the STC regained control of Aden after four days of fighting between separatists and Hadi’s troops, which killed ‘dozens’ and wounded more than 200 (Alsaafin 2019). Based on this account, we code LVIOLSD in 2018-2019.
* [1990-1993: NVIOLSD; 1994: HVIOLSD; 1995-2008: NVIOLSD; 2009-2014: LVIOLSD; 2015-2017: NVIOLSD; 2018-2019: LVIOLSD; 2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Britain seized Aden, in the south of Yemen, in 1839. The city received considerable investment due to its role connecting Britain’s maritime empire with the Suez Canal, India, Singapore and London (Dresch, 2000:86, 10; Minahan, 1996:543). Britain’s influence in Aden’s tribal hinterland fluctuated; the imperial power expended a great deal of resources attempting to secure southern Yemen’s tribal areas, entering into a plethora of treaties offering protection, sponsoring leading sultans and sheikhs in a bid to secure their support, overlooking the need to collect taxes, and targeting rebellious areas with air raids (Dresch, 2000:35, 37; Clark, 2010:66-7, 72-3, 77-8). Authorisation to establish trade unions was given in 1942 while a parliament was established in the south in 1947 (Clark, 2010:75; Minahan, 1996:543).
* Britain announced the inception of the Federation of South Arabia in 1963 which allegedly encompassed the whole of the south of Yemen. However, less than a year later, an uprising in Radfan, led by the National Liberation Front (NLF), ignited an insurgency which reached Aden (Clark, 2010:79-81). A state of emergency was declared in 1965; casualties soared, Britain employed harsh security measures, and the two dominant revolutionary factions in the south of Yemen, the NLF and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), also struggled violently against one another (Dresch, 2000:84-6; Hill, 2017:36; Minahan, 1996:544; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020).
* Britain evacuated and handed power to the NLF (Dresch, 2000:84; Hill, 2017:37; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). The movement founded the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1967, declaring it ‘the first and only Marxist state in the Arab world’. It was at this point that South Yemen became a single, formal political entity (Hill, 2017:37; Minahan, 1996:544). The economy was nationalised, state-led development policies were introduced, and land was confiscated from those who had been power-brokers under the British (Hill, 2017:40; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020).
* The NLF, now the Yemeni Socialist party (YSP), became rent with internal conflict; in 1986, two conflicting factions took up arms against one another, leading to the deaths of thousands (Dresch, 2000:169; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). When the clashes subsided, politicians from Hadhramawt dominated the new government but their attempts to rebuild the state’s economy were unsuccessful and, with Moscow no longer able to support the nascent republic following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PDRY found itself on the verge of bankruptcy (Hill, 2017:46). Unification with the North was perceived as the only viable path and, in May 1990, Ali Abdullah Saleh assumed the title of President of the United Republic of Yemen (Hill, 2017:46; Minahan, 2016:396; Roth, 2015:214). Saleh had risen to power in the north, in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), in 1978 (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). Ali Salim al-Bayd, the leader of South Yemen, became the Deputy President of the new Republic (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000). It has been suggested that, throughout the existence of the PDRY, the idea of Yemeni unity was popular; it has been argued that the socialist regime did not attempt to create a southern Yemeni national identity but, instead, supported the concept of the Yemeni nation (as did the leadership in the north), while unification in 1990 was welcomed throughout the country (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). Nevertheless, the unification amounted to a loss of independence. [1990: independence restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In the years following unification, Saleh and other northerners retained firm control of the most important levels of power, with deep distrust pervading the relationship between the bureaucracies and militaries of the south and the north (Clark, 2010:135, 138; Hill, 2017:48; Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000). During the official three-year transition period, there was a rapid decline in living standards in the south; subsidies on basic food commodities came to an end and prices rose as the riyal immediately replaced the dinar. The city of Aden was neglected by officials as they moved to the capital, Sanaa, to be closer to the centre of power. Remote rural areas suffered as the new government reversed agrarian reforms (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). During this time, over 150 YSP officials were assassinated, and the YSP claimed that northern leaders had instigated the killings (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000; Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). However, this discrimination, and alleged government-sponsored violence, do not constitute a restriction as defined in the codebook.
* Elections were held in 1993, and the ‘more populous north prevailed’ (Minahan, 1996:544). Saleh’s party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), won 123 seats while the YSP won 56; Islah (a northern, Islamist platform) won 62 (Hewitt and Cheetham, 2000). Islah thus replaced the YSP in the new government (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). However, this does not constitute a restriction as defined in the codebook.
* Following the discovery of oil in Hadhramawt, in the south, the sense that the north was draining the resources of the south, and the exclusion of southerners from Saleh’s newly enriched networks of patronage, fostered resentment, prompting a descent into civil war (Hill, 2017:48; Lackner, 2017:119; Dresch, 2000:193-4; Minahan, 1996:544). A southern separatist bid, which enjoyed Saudi support, proved unsuccessful; northern tanks rolled into Aden in 1994 (Dresch, 2000:197; Roth, 2015:215; Minahan, 1996:544). Appalling misconduct by the northern military was reported (Dresch, 2000:197) and, following the conflict, the constitution was altered, granting Saleh greater power (Clark, 2010:144). However, we found no evidence for a restriction as defined in the codebook.
* In the years following the conflict, the Southerners ‘saw their economic situation deteriorate and their social lives increasingly fall under influence of conservative religious norms which particularly affected women’ (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). Once more, this constitutes discrimination but not a restriction as defined in the codebook.
* In 1998, Yemen was divided into ten provinces – called governates – each of which was further divided into districts. The central government appoints a governor as well as district heads (Baron et al., 2016:4f). Baron et al. (2016:4) suggest that as a result, ‘there was, for all intents and purposes, no local representation in local governance, with all power and decision-making authority centralized in the capital’. Overall, the evidence we found suggests that have relatively little autonomy (Nagi 2020; Al-Sewari 2019; Mills 2020). We therefore do not code an autonomy concession.
* In 2006, Yemeni military and security personnel who had been forced into retirement after 1994 started a movement which initially demanded the payment of their pensions. Saleh brutally suppressed the movement, spurring it to expand beyond Dhali and Lahij until it took hold in Aden and in Hadhramawt (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020; Stracke and Haidar, 2010:2). However, this attempted suppression, once more, does not constitute a restriction as defined in the codebook.
* Following the outbreak of the 2011 revolution, many southerners joined forces with other Yemenis to overthrow Saleh; however, following the signing of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, separatist sentiment rose to the fore once more (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020). Southerners participated in the National Dialogue Conference (held between 2013-4); the conference was unable, though, to bring many separatist factions to the table; these movements refused to be part of any discussion which treated the south as part of Yemen. The NDC ultimately failed to resolve the ‘southern question’ (Al-Hamdani and Lackner, 2020) and its recommendations were never implemented. Just one year following the conclusion of the NDC, the northern Huthi movement marched into the capital, Sanaa, triggering a fierce civil war. Southern separatist aspirations have persisted during the war (please refer to the Claims section) while the internationally recognised government of Yemen has largely been based in the south, in Aden (nevertheless, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has seized Aden, and the Presidential Palace, on a number of occasions since 2017, and further declared self-rule; the actions of the STC is elaborated on in the De Facto Independence and Claims sections). Unilateral actions by regional governments controlled by SDM groups are not coded as concessions; moreover, the extent of self-rule can be challenged (please refer to the De Facto Independence section). Furthermore, according to the coding instructions, if a group loses its de facto independent status, no restriction is coded.
* In December 2020, the President of Yemen announced a new cabinet, including STC members (Jalal, 2021). However, this did not increase the level of autonomy exerted by the STC over the south and is not coded as a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

* As noted above, the south declared its seccession from the north in 1994; however, within months, the north re-took the south, quashing this bid. The south did not enjoy meaningful, long-term independence during this period due to the rapid descent into civil war. Therefore, we do not code de facto independence.
* The STC declared self-rule in 2017 and again in 2020 (Al Jazeera, 2020; Aden Historic Declaration, 2017). Moreover, the STC seized the Presidential Palace in Aden, and the city of Aden, on a number of occasions since 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2020; Younes 2019; Peace Agreements Database, n.d.). Nevertheless, their power seems to have largely been confined to Aden while mediation efforts, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, together with battles against the internationally recognized government, have limited the extent of self-rule (Al Jazeera, 2020; Peace Agreements Database, n.d.). Based on this, we do not code de facto independence.

**Major territorial changes**

* [1990: host change (new)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | South Yemeni |
| *Scenario* | No match/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | 1991-1994: Southerners  1995-2020: Southern Shafi’i |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 1991-1994: 67801000  1995-2020: 67807000 |

**Power access**

* The Southerners/Southern Shafi’i are coded only from 1991 onwards in EPR. We found no evidence to suggest that power access or group size were significantly different in 1991 compared to 1990. [1990-1994: senior partner; 1995-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* The Southerners/Southern Shafi’i are coded only from 1991 onwards in EPR. We found no evidence to suggest that power access or group size were significantly different in 1991 compared to 1990. [0.18]

**Regional concentration**

* EPR codes regional concentration. Minahan (2002: 702) suggests that the South Yemeni/Hadhramis made up 69% of the population of their regional base in southern and eastern Yemen; and that around 75% of all South Yemenis in Yemen live in that regional base. [regional concentration]

**Kin**

* EPR codes ethnic kinship ties to Sunni Arabs in a range of other countries including Lebanon, Saudia Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, etc. [kin in neighboring country]

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