Measuring intelligence and growth rate: variations on Hibbard's intelligence measure

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Abstract

In 2011, Hibbard suggested an intelligence measure for agents who compete in an adversarial sequence prediction game. We argue that Hibbard's idea should actually be considered as two separate ideas: first, that the intelligence of such agents can be measured based on the growth rates of the runtimes of the competitors that they defeat; and second, one specific (somewhat arbitrary) method for measuring said growth rates. Whereas Hibbard's intelligence measure is based on the latter growth-rate-measuring method, we survey other methods for measuring function growth rates, and exhibit the Hibbard-like intelligence measures which result from those. Of particular interest, we obtain intelligence measures based on Big-O notation and similar notation systems, which measures are novel in that they challenge conventional notions of what an intelligence measure should look like. We also discuss how intelligence measurement of such sequence predictors can indirectly serve as intelligence measurement for agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGIs).

1 Introduction

In his insightful paper [13], Bill Hibbard introduces a novel intelligence measure (which we will here refer to as the *original Hibbard measure*) for agents who play a game of adversarial sequence prediction [12] "against a hierarchy of increasingly difficult sets of" evaders (environments that attempt to emit 1s and 0s in such a way as to evade prediction). The levels of Hibbard's hierarchy are labelled by natural numbers, and an agent's original Hibbard measure is the maximum $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that said agent learns to predict all the evaders in the nth level of the hierarchy, or implicitly[1] an agent's original Hibbard measure is ∞ if said agent learns to predict all the evaders in all levels of Hibbard's hierarchy.

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[1]Hibbard does not explicitly include the ∞ case in his definition, but in his Proposition 3 he refers to agents having "finite intelligence", and it is clear from context that by this he means agents who fail to predict some evader somewhere in the hierarchy.

The hierarchy which Hibbard uses to measure intelligence is based on the growth rates of the runtimes of evaders. We will argue that Hibbard's idea is really a combination of two orthogonal ideas. First: that in some sense the intelligence of a predicting agent can be measured based on the growth rates of the runtimes of the evaders whom that predictor learns to predict. Second: Hibbard proposed one particular method for measuring said growth rates. The growth rate measurement which Hibbard proposed yields a corresponding intelligence measure for these agents. We will argue that *any* method for measuring growth rates of functions yields a corresponding *adversarial sequence prediction intelligence* measure (or *ASPI* measure for short).

The particular method which Hibbard used to measure function growth rates is not very standard. We will survey other ways of measuring function growth rates, including some more standard ways, and these will yield corresponding ASPI measures.

The structure of the paper is as follows.

- In Section 2, we review the original Hibbard measure.
- In Section 3, we argue that any method of measuring the growth rate of functions yields an ASPI measure, and that the original Hibbard measure is just a special case resulting from one particular method of measuring function growth rate.
- In Section 4, we consider some of the most standard taxonomies of function growth rate—Big-O notation and Big-Θ notation—and define corresponding ASPI taxonomies.
- In Section 5, we consider several numeric solutions to the problem of measuring the growth rate of functions (using various number systems), and define corresponding ASPI measures and taxonomies.
- In Section 6, we give pros and cons of different ASPI measures and taxonomies.
- In Section 7, we summarize and make concluding remarks.

2 Hibbard's original measure

Hibbard proposed an intelligence measure for measuring the intelligence of agents who compete to predict evaders in a game of adversarial sequence prediction (we define this formally below). A predictor p (whose intelligence we want to measure) competes against evaders e. In each step of the game, both predictor and evader simultaneously choose a binary digit, 1 or 0. Only after both of them have made their choice do they see which choice the other one made, and then the game proceeds to the next step. The predictor's goal in each round is to choose the same digit that the evader will choose; the evader's goal is to choose a different digit than the predictor. The predictor wins the game (and is said to *learn to predict* e, or simply to *learn* e) if, after finitely many initial steps, eventually the predictor always chooses the same digit as the evader.

Definition 1. *By B, we mean the binary alphabet $\{0,1\}$. By B^*, we mean the set of all finite binary sequences. By $\langle\rangle$ we mean the empty binary sequence.*

Definition 2. *(Predictors and evaders)*

1. *By a* predictor*, we mean a Turing machine p which takes as input a finite (possibly empty) binary sequence $(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in B^*$ (thought of as a sequence of* evasions*) and outputs 0 or 1 (thought of as a* prediction*), which output we write as $p(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.*

2. *By an* evader*, we mean a Turing machine e which takes as input a finite (possibly empty) binary sequence $(y_1, \ldots, y_n) \in B^*$ (thought of as a sequence of* predictions*) and outputs 0 or 1 (thought of as an* evasion*), which output we write as $e(y_1, \ldots, y_n)$.*

3. *For any predictor p and evader e, the* result of p playing the game of adversarial sequence prediction against e *(or more simply, the* result of p playing against e*) is the infinite binary sequence $(x_1, y_1, x_2, y_2, \ldots)$ defined as follows:*

   (a) *The first evasion $x_1 = e(\langle\rangle)$ is the output of e when run on the empty prediction-sequence.*

   (b) *The first prediction $y_1 = p(\langle\rangle)$ is the output of p when run on the empty evasion-sequence.*

   (c) *For all $n > 0$, the $(n+1)$th evasion $x_{n+1} = e(y_1, \ldots, y_n)$ is the output of e on the sequence of the first n predictions.*

   (d) *For all $n > 0$, the $(n+1)$th prediction $y_{n+1} = p(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is the output of p on the sequence of the first n evasions.*

4. *Suppose $r = (x_1, y_1, x_2, y_2, \ldots)$ is the result of a predictor p playing against an evader e. For every $n \geq 1$, we say* the predictor wins round n in r *if $x_n = y_n$; otherwise,* the evader wins round n in r*. We say that p* learns to predict e *(or simply that p* learns e*) if there is some $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $n > N$, p is the winner of round n in r.*

Note that if e simply ignores its inputs $(y_1, \ldots, y_n)$ and instead computes $e(y_1, \ldots, y_n)$ based only on n, then e is essentially a sequence. Thus Definition 2 is a generalization of sequence prediction, which many authors have written about (such as Legg [16], who gives many references).

In the following definition, we differ from Hibbard's original paper because of a minor (and fortunately, easy-to-fix) error there.

Definition 3. *Suppose e is an evader. For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, let $t_e(n)$ be the maximum number of steps that e takes to run on any length-n sequence of binary* *digits. In other words, $t_e(0)$ is the number of steps e takes to run on $\langle\rangle$, and for all $n > 0$,*

$$t_e(n) = \max_{b_1,\ldots,b_n\in\{0,1\}} (\textit{number of steps } e \textit{ takes to run on } (b_1,\ldots,b_n)).$$

Example 4. *Let e be an evader. Then $t_e(2)$ is equal to the number of steps e takes to run on input $(0,0)$, or to run on input $(0,1)$, or to run on input $(1,0)$, or to run on input $(1,1)$—whichever of these four possibilities is largest.*

Definition 5. *Suppose $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ and $g : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$. We say $f \succ g$ if there is some $n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $n > n_0$, $f(n) > g(n)$.*

Definition 6. *Suppose $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$. We define E_f to be the set of all evaders e such that $f \succ t_e$.*

Definition 7. *(The original Hibbard measure) Let $g_1, g_2, \ldots$ be the enumeration of the primitive recursive functions given by Liu [17]. For each $m > 0$, define $f_m : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ by*

$$f_m(k) = \max_{0<i\leq m} \max_{j\leq k} g_i(j).$$

For any predictor p, we define the original Hibbard intelligence of *p to be the maximum $m > 0$ such that p learns to predict e for every $e \in E_{f_m}$ (or 0 if there is no such m, or ∞ if p learns to predict e for every $e \in E_{f_m}$ for every $m > 0$).*

2.1 Predictor intelligence and AGI intelligence

Definition 7, and similar measures which we will define later, as written, only quantify the intelligence of one very specific type of agent, namely, predictors in the game of adversarial sequence prediction. But any method for measuring intelligence of such predictors can also serve as an approximate proxy measure of the intelligence of (suitably idealized) agents with Artificial General Intellience (that is, the intelligence of AGIs).

Presumably, a suitably idealized AGI should be capable of understanding, and obedient in following or trying to follow, commands issued in everyday human language. For example, if an AGI were commanded, "until further notice, compute and list the digits of pi," the AGI should be capable of understanding that command, and should obediently compute said digits until commanded otherwise[2].

It is unclear how an AGI ought to respond if given an impossible command, such as "find a real number whose square is -1" or "write a computer program that solves the halting problem". But an AGI should be perfectly capable of understanding and attempting to obey an open-ended command, provided it is not impossible. For example, we could command an AGI to "until further notice, write an endless poem about trees," and the AGI should be able to do so, writing said poem line-by-line until we tell it to stop. This is despite the fact that the command is open-ended and under-determined (there are many

[2] Our thinking here is reminiscent of some remarks of Yampolskiy [25].

decisions involved in writing a poem about trees, and we have left all these decisions to the AGI's discretion). The AGI's ability to obey such open-ended and under-determined commands exemplifies its ability to "adapt with insufficient knowledge and resources" [21]. One well-known example of an open-ended command which an AGI should be perfectly capable of attempting to obey (perhaps at great peril to us all) is Bostrom's "manufacture as many paperclips as possible" [4].

In particular, an AGI X should be perfectly capable of obeying the following command: "Act as a predictor in the game of adversarial sequence prediction". By giving X this command, and then immediately filtering out all X's sensory input except only for input about the digits chosen by an evader, we would obtain a formal predictor in the sense of Definition 2. This predictor might be called "the predictor generated by X". Strictly speaking, if the command is given to X at time t, then it would be more proper to call the resulting predictor "the predictor generated by X at time t": up until time t, the observations X makes about the universe might have an effect on the strategy X chooses to take once commanded to act as a predictor; but as long as we filter X's sensory input immediately after giving X the command, no further such observations can so alter X's strategy. In short, to use Yampolskiy's terminology [24], the act of trying to predict adversarial sequence evaders is *AI-easy*.

Thus, any intelligence measure for predictors also serves as an intelligence measure for AGIs. Namely: the intelligence level of an AGI X is equal to the intelligence level of X's predictor. Of course, a priori, X might be very intelligent at various other things while being poor at sequence prediction, or vice versa, so this only approximately measures X's true intelligence.

3 Quantifying growth rates of functions

The following is a very general and open-ended problem.

Problem 8. *Quantify the growth-rate of functions from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{N}$.*

The definition of the original Hibbard measure (Definition 7) can be thought of as implicitly depending on a specific solution to Problem 8, which we make explicit in the following definition.

Definition 9. *For each $m > 0$, let f_m be as in Definition 7. For each $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$, we define the* original Hibbard growth rate *$H(f)$ to be $\min\{m > 0 : f_m \succ f\}$ if there is any such $m > 0$, and otherwise $H(f) = \infty$.*

Lemma 10. *For every natural $m > 0$ and every $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$, $H(f) \leq m$ if and only if $f_m \succ f$.*

Proof. Straightforward. □

Definition 11. *For every $m \in \mathbb{N}$, let E^H_m be the set of all evaders e such that $H(t_e) \leq m$.*

Lemma 12. *For every natural $m > 0$, $E^H_m = E_{f_m}$.*

Proof. Let e be an evader. By Definition 11, $e \in E^H_m$ if and only if $H(t_e) \leq m$. By Lemma 10, $H(t_e) \leq m$ if and only if $f_m \succ t_e$. But by Definition 6, this is the case if and only if $e \in E_{f_m}$. □

Corollary 13. *For every predictor p, the original Hibbard measure of p is equal to the maximum natural $m > 0$ such that p learns e whenever $e \in E^H_m$, or is equal to ∞ if p learns e whenever $e \in E^H_m$ for all $m > 0$.*

Proof. Immediate by Lemma 12 and Definition 7. □

Remark 14. *Corollary 13 shows that the definition of the original Hibbard measure can be rephrased in such a way as to show that it depends in a uniform way on a particular solution to Problem 8, namely on the solution proposed by Definition 9. For* any *solution H' to Problem 8, we could define evader-sets $E^{H'}_m$ in a similar way to Definition 11, and, by copying Corollary 13, we could obtain a corresponding intelligence measure given by H' (it might be necessary to replace the "maximum" in Corollary 13 by a "supremum", if H' measures growth rates using a non-discrete number system, or transform the form of it if H' solves Problem 8 using a non-complete number system or by categorizing functions into a taxonomy rather than by assigning them numerical measurements, as in the case of Big-O notation). This formalizes what we claimed in the Introduction, that Hibbard's idea can be decomposed into two sub-ideas, firstly, that a predictor's intelligence can be measured in terms of the growth rates of the runtimes of the evaders it learns, and secondly, a particular method (Definition 9) of measuring those growth rates (i.e., a particular solution to Problem 8).*

4 Big-O and Big-Θ intelligence measurement

One of the most standard solutions to Problem 8 in computer science is to categorize growth rates of arbitrary functions by comparing them to more familiar functions using Big-O notation or Big-Θ notation. Knuth defines [15] these as follows (we modify the definition slightly because we are only concerned here with functions from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{N}$).

Definition 15. *Suppose $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$. We define the following function-sets.*

- *$O(f(n))$ is the set of all $g : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ such that there is some real $C > 0$ and some $n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $n \geq n_0$, $g(n) \leq Cf(n)$.*
- *$\Theta(f(n))$ is the set of all $g : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ such that there are some real $C > 0$ and $C' > 0$ and some $n_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $n \geq n_0$, $Cf(n) \leq g(n) \leq C'f(n)$.*

By Remark 14, Definition 15 yields the following elegant taxonomy of predictor intelligence.

Definition 16. *Suppose p is a predictor, and suppose $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$.*

- *We say p* has Big-O ASPI measure $O(f(n))$ *if p learns every evader e such that t_e is $O(f(n))$.*
- *We say p* has Big-Θ ASPI measure $\Theta(f(n))$ *if p learns every evader e such that t_e is $\Theta(f(n))$.*

5 ASPI measures using various number systems

In this section we will consider various solutions to Problem 8 in various different number systems, and the ASPI measures they give rise to.

5.1 Hyperreal ASPI measures

Hyperreal numbers, studied in the field of non-standard analysis [18] [9], are equivalence classes of infinite sequences of reals, so for every sequence $(r_0, r_1, r_2, \ldots)$ of reals, there is a corresponding hyperreal represented by that sequence. Thus, there is a natural and elegant way to solve Problem 8 using hyperreal numbers. Namely: the growth rate of $f(n)$ is the hyperreal number represented by $(f(0), f(1), f(2), \ldots)$.

Unfortunately, the equivalence relations which give rise to hyperreals as equivalence classes are non-constructive. They rely on objects called *free ultrafilters*. Loosely speaking, a free ultrafilter can be thought of as a black box which makes judgments about which subsets of $\mathbb{N}$ are "large"—and does so in a particularly consistent way. Mathematicians have shown that free ultrafilters exist, but that it is impossible to concretely exhibit one.

To see the necessity of such judgments, consider the hyperreal x represented by $(1, 0, 1, 0, \ldots)$ and the hyperreal y represented by $(0, 1, 0, 1, \ldots)$. Which hyperreal is larger, x or y? On the set E of even numbers, x is larger, and on the set O of odd numbers, y is larger. A free ultrafilter $\mathcal{U}$ would either judge E to be large and O to be small, or vice versa. If $\mathcal{U}$ judges E to be large, we would have $x > y$ in the hyperreal number system corresponding to $\mathcal{U}$. Otherwise, we would have $x < y$.

Such arbitrary decisions are a necessary evil if one desires maximal solutions to Problem 8, because there are many pairs $f, g : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ with the property that $f(n) > g(n)$ for infinitely many n but also $f(n) < g(n)$ for infinitely many other n. For every such pair, one must somehow decide which of f or g (if either) should be considered faster-growing[3].

Because of the computational impracticality of free ultrafilters, the following notion is also computationally impractical. However, it could potentially be useful for proving theoretical properties about the intelligence of predictors. In the following definition, rather than assigning a particular hyperreal number

[3]This is similar to the problem of deciding which of two reinforcement learning agents is more intelligent, if one agent performs better in infinitely many environments, but the other agent performs better in infinitely many other environments. For a treatment of that problem using free ultrafilters, see [1].

intelligence to every predictor, rather, we categorize predictors into a taxonomy. This is necessary because the hyperreals are not complete, so Corollary 13 cannot directly be mimicked either with “maximum” or with “supremum”.

Definition 17. *(Hyperreal ASPI measures) For any free ultrafilter $\mathcal{U}$, the $\mathcal{U}$-*hyperreal ASPI measure *of a predictor p is defined to be $\geq$ a hyperreal number r if and only if p learns every evader e such that if r' is the hyperreal number represented by $(t_e(0), t_e(1), t_e(2), \ldots)$ then $r' < r$ (in the hyperreal number system given by $\mathcal{U}$).*

5.2 Surreal ASPI measures

The surreal numbers [6] [14] are an even larger extension of the real numbers, into which the hyperreals can be embedded [7]. Thus, for any such embedding, there is another natural and elegant way to solve Problem 8, namely: the growth rate of $f(n)$ is the surreal number corresponding to the hyperreal number represented by $(f(0), f(1), f(2), \ldots)$ under the embedding. The advantage of the surreal numbers is that they are complete, which will allow the corresponding ASPI measure to exactly measure intelligence of predictors, rather than merely classify predictors in a taxonomy as in the case of the hyperreal ASPI measures.

There are many ways to embed the hyperreals into the surreals, and there is no standard or canonical way which stands out. Thus the surreal ASPI measures are even less concrete than the hyperreal ASPI measures, because they depend not only on a free ultrafilter, but also on an embedding of the hyperreals into the surreals.

The surreal numbers are complete, which means that for any set S of surreals with a surreal upper bound, there is a *least* surreal upper bound of S, called the *supremum* of S. This allows for an ASPI measure which is more exact than Definition 17.

Definition 18. *(Surreal ASPI measures) Suppose $\mathcal{U}$ is a free ultrafilter, and suppose ι is an embedding of the hyperreals (constructed using $\mathcal{U}$) into the surreals. For every predictor p, the $(\mathcal{U}, \iota)$-*surreal ASPI measure *of p is the supremum of all surreal numbers $\iota(r)$ such that p learns e whenever the surreal number corresponding to $(t_e(0), t_e(1), t_e(2), \ldots)$ is $< r$ (according to $\mathcal{U}$).*

5.3 ASPI measures based on majorization hierarchies

Majorization hierarchies [23] provide ordinal-number-valued measures for the growth rate certain functions. A majorization hierarchy depends on many infinite-dimensional parameters. For illustrative purposes, we will describe two majorization hierarchies up to the ordinal ϵ_0, using standard choices for the parameters.

Definition 19. *(Classification of ordinal numbers) Ordinal numbers are divided into three types:*

1. *Zero: The ordinal* 0.

2. Successor ordinals: Ordinals of the form $\alpha+1$ for some ordinal α.

3. Limit ordinals: Ordinals which are not successor ordinals nor 0.

For example, the smallest infinite ordinal, ω, is a limit ordinal. It is not zero (because zero is finite), nor can it be a successor ordinal, because if it were a successor ordinal, say, $\alpha+1$, then α would be finite (since ω is the *smallest* infinite ordinal), but then $\alpha+1$ would be finite as well.

The ordinal ϵ_0 is the smallest ordinal bigger than the ordinals $\omega, \omega^\omega, \omega^{\omega^\omega}, \ldots$. It satisfies the equation $\epsilon_0 = \omega^{\epsilon_0}$ and can be intuitively thought of as

$$\epsilon_0 = \omega^{\omega^{\omega^{\cdot^{\cdot^{\cdot}}}}}.$$

Ordinals below ϵ_0 include such ordinals as ω, $\omega^{\omega+1}+\omega^\omega+\omega^5+3$,

$$\omega^{\omega^{\omega^{\omega^\omega}}} + \omega^{\omega^{\omega^\omega}+\omega^{\omega\cdot 2+1}+\omega^4+3} + \omega^{\omega^5+\omega^3} + \omega^8 + 1,$$

and so on. Any ordinal below ϵ_0 can be uniquely written in the form

$$\omega^{\alpha_1} + \omega^{\alpha_2} + \cdots + \omega^{\alpha_k}$$

where $\alpha_1 \geq \cdots \geq \alpha_k$ are smaller ordinals below ϵ_0—this form for an ordinal below ϵ_0 is called its *Cantor normal form.* For example, the Cantor normal form for $\omega^{\omega\cdot 2}\cdot 2+\omega\cdot 3+2$ is

$$\omega^{\omega\cdot 2}\cdot 2+\omega\cdot 3+2 = \omega^{\omega\cdot 2}+\omega^{\omega\cdot 2}+\omega^1+\omega^1+\omega^1+\omega^0+\omega^0.$$

Definition 20. *(Standard fundamental sequences for limit ordinals $\leq \epsilon_0$) Suppose λ is a limit ordinal $\leq \epsilon_0$. We define a* fundamental sequence for λ, *written $(\lambda[0], \lambda[1], \lambda[2], \ldots)$, inductively as follows.*

- *If $\lambda = \epsilon_0$, then $\lambda[0] = 0$, $\lambda[1] = \omega^0$, $\lambda[2] = \omega^{\omega^0}$, and so on.*
- *If λ has Cantor normal form $\omega^{\alpha_1} + \cdots + \omega^{\alpha_k}$ where $k > 1$, then each*

$$\lambda[i] = \omega^{\alpha_1} + \cdots + \omega^{\alpha_{k-1}} + (\omega^{\alpha_k}[i]).$$

- *If λ has Cantor normal form $\omega^{\alpha+1}$, then each $\lambda[i] = \omega^\alpha \cdot i$.*
- *If λ has Cantor normal form ω^{λ_0} where λ_0 is a limit ordinal, then each $\lambda[i] = \omega^{\lambda_0[i]}$.*

Example 21. *(Fundamental sequence examples)*

- *The fundamental sequence for $\lambda = \omega = \omega^1 = \omega^{0+1}$ is $\omega^0\cdot 0, \omega^0\cdot 1, \omega^0\cdot 2, \ldots$, i.e., $0, 1, 2, \ldots$.*
- *The fundamental sequence for $\lambda = \omega^5$ is $0, \omega^4, \omega^4\cdot 2, \omega^4\cdot 3, \ldots$.*
- *The fundamental sequence for $\lambda = \omega^\omega$ is $\omega^0, \omega^1, \omega^2, \ldots$.*

- *The fundamental sequence for $\lambda = \omega^\omega + \omega$ is $\omega^\omega + 0, \omega^\omega + 1, \omega^\omega + 2, \ldots$.*

Definition 22. *(The standard slow-growing hierarchy up to ϵ_0) We define functions $g_\beta : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ (for all ordinals $\beta \le \epsilon_0$) by transfinite induction as follows.*

- $g_0(n) = 0$.
- $g_{\alpha+1}(n) = g_\alpha(n) + 1$.
- $g_\lambda(n) = g_{\lambda[n]}(n)$ *if λ is a limit ordinal.*

Here are some early levels in the slow-growing hierarchy, spelled out in detail.

Example 23. *(Early examples of functions in the slow-growing hierarchy)*

1. $g_1(n) = g_{0+1}(n) = g_0(n) + 1 = 0 + 1 = 1$.
2. $g_2(n) = g_{1+1}(n) = g_1(n) + 1 = 1 + 1 = 2$.
3. *More generally, for all $m \in \mathbb{N}$, $g_m(n) = m$.*
4. $g_\omega(n) = g_{\omega[n]}(n) = g_n(n) = n$.
5. $g_{\omega+1}(n) = g_\omega(n) + 1 = n + 1$.
6. $g_{\omega+2}(n) = g_{\omega+1}(n) + 1 = (n+1) + 1 = n + 2$.
7. *More generally, for all $m \in \mathbb{N}$, $g_{\omega+m}(n) = n + m$.*
8. $g_{\omega\cdot 2}(n) = g_{(\omega\cdot 2)[n]}(n) = g_{\omega+n}(n) = n + n = n \cdot 2$.

Following Example 23, the reader should be able to fill in the details in the following example.

Example 24. *(More examples from the slow-growing hierarchy)*

1. $g_{\omega^2}(n) = n^2$.
2. $g_{\omega^3}(n) = n^3$.
3. $g_{\omega^\omega}(n) = n^n$.
4. $g_{\omega^{\omega\cdot 3+1}+\omega+5}(n) = n^{3n+1} + n + 5$.
5. $g_{\omega^{\omega^\omega}}(n) = n^{n^n}$.

What about g_{ϵ_0}? Thinking of ϵ_0 as

$$\omega^{\omega^{\omega^{\cdot^{\cdot^{\cdot}}}}},$$

one might expect $g_{\epsilon_0}(n)$ to be

$$n^{n^{n^{\cdot^{\cdot^{\cdot}}}}},$$

but such an infinite tower of exponents makes no sense if $n > 1$. Instead, the answer defies familiar mathematical notation.

Example 25. *(Level ϵ_0 in the slow-growing hierarchy) The values of g_{ϵ_0} are as follows:*

- $g_{\epsilon_0}(0) = 0$.
- $g_{\epsilon_0}(1) = 1^1$.
- $g_{\epsilon_0}(2) = 2^{2^2}$.
- $g_{\epsilon_0}(3) = 3^{3^{3^3}}$.
- *And so on.*

Examples 23–25 illustrate how the slow-growing hierarchy systematically provides a family of reference functions against which any particular function can be compared. This yields a solution to Problem 8: we can declare the growth rate of an arbitrary function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ to be the smallest ordinal $\beta < \epsilon_0$ such that $g_\beta \succ f$ (or ∞ if there is no such β). This yields the following ASPI measure.

Definition 26. *If p is a predictor, the* ASPI measure of X given by the standard slow-growing hierarchy up to ϵ_0 *is defined to be the supremum of all ordinals $\alpha < \epsilon_0$ such that p learns every evader e such that $g_\alpha \succ t_e$ (or ∞ if said property holds for all ordinals $\alpha < \epsilon_0$).*

In Definition 22, in the successor ordinal case, we chose to define $g_{\alpha+1}(n) = g_\alpha(n) + 1$. The resulting majorization hierarchy is referred to as *slow-growing* because in some sense this makes $g_{\alpha+1}$ just barely faster-growing than g_α. Different definitions of $g_{\alpha+1}$ would yield different majorization hierarchies, such as the following.

Definition 27. *(The standard fast-growing hierarchy up to ϵ_0, also known as the Wainer hierarchy) We define functions $h_\beta : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ (for all ordinals $\beta \leq \epsilon_0$) by transfinite induction as follows.*

- $h_0(n) = 0$.
- $h_{\alpha+1}(n) = h^n_\alpha(n)$, *where h^n_α is the nth iterate of h_α (so $h^1_\alpha(x) = h_\alpha(x)$, $h^2_\alpha(x) = h_\alpha(h_\alpha(x))$, $h^3_\alpha(x) = h_\alpha(h_\alpha(h_\alpha(x)))$, and so on).*
- $h_\lambda(n) = h_{\lambda[n]}(n)$ *if λ is a limit ordinal.*

True to the name, the functions in the fast-growing hierarchy grow quickly as α grows. It can be shown [20] that for every computable function f whose totality can be proven from the axioms of Peano arithmetic, there is some $\alpha < \epsilon_0$ such that $h_\alpha \succ f$.

Definition 28. *If p is a predictor, the* ASPI measure of X given by the standard fast-growing hierarchy up to ϵ_0 *is defined to be the supremum of all ordinals $\alpha < \epsilon_0$ such that p learns every evader e such that $h_\alpha \succ t_e$ (or to ∞ if said property holds for all ordinals $\alpha < \epsilon_0$).*

Between Definitions 26 and 28, the former offers a higher granularity intelligence measure for the predictors whose intelligence it assigns non-∞ intelligence to, but the latter assigns non-∞ intelligence to a much larger set of predictors.

It should be noted that Definitions 22 and 27 are only two representative samples of majorization hierarchies. Both the slow- and fast-growing hierarchies can be extended by extending the fundamental sequences of Definition 20 to larger ordinals[4], however, the larger the ordinals become, the more difficult it is to do this, and especially the less clear it is how to do it in any sort of *canonical* way. There are also other choices for how to proceed at successor ordinal stages besides $g_{\alpha+1}(n) = g_\alpha(n) + 1$ or $h_{\alpha+1}(n) = h^n_\alpha(n)$—for example, one of the oldest majorization hierarchies is the Hardy hierarchy [11], where $H_{\alpha+1}(n) = H_\alpha(n + 1)$. And even for ordinals up to ϵ_0, there are other ways to choose fundamental sequences besides how we defined them in Definition 20—choosing non-canonical fundamental sequences can drastically alter the resulting majorization hierarchy [22]. All these different majorization hierarchies yield different ASPI measures.

5.4 A remark about ASPI measures and AGI intelligence

All the ASPI measures we have defined so far double as indirect intelligence measure for an AGI, by the argument we made in Subsection 2.1.

For a given AGI X, a priori, we cannot say much for certain about the predictor X would act as if X were commanded to act as a predictor. But there is one particularly elegant and parsimonious strategy which X might use, a *brute force strategy*, namely:

- Enumerate all the computable functions f which X knows to be total, and for each one, attempt to predict the evader e by assuming that the evader's runtime t_e satisfies $f \succ t_e$. If the evader proves not to be so majorized (by differing from every computable function whose runtime is so majorized), then move on to the next known total function f, and continue the process.

We do not know for certain which predictor X would imitate when commanded to act as a predictor, but it seems plausible that X would use this brute force strategy or something equivalent.

For an AGI X who uses the above brute force strategy, ASPI measures of X's intelligence would be determined by X's knowledge, namely, by the runtime complexity of the computable functions X knows to be total. Furthermore, the most natural way for X to know totality of functions with large runtime complexity, is for X to know fundamental sequences for large ordinal numbers, and produce said functions by means of majorization hierarchies[5]. This suggests

[4]Remarkably, the slow-growing hierarchy eventually catches up with the fast-growing hierarchy if both hierarchies are extended to sufficiently large ordinals [19] [8], a beautiful illustration of how counter-intuitive large ordinal numbers can be.

[5]It may be possible for an AGI to be contrived to know totality of functions that are larger than the functions produced by majorization hierarchies up to ordinals the AGI knows about, but we conjecture that that is not the case for AGIs not so deliberately contrived.

a connection between

1. ASPI measures like that of Definition 28, and
2. intelligence measures based on which ordinals the AGI knows [2].

Indeed, Alexander has argued [3] that the task of notating large ordinals is one which spans the entire range of intelligence. This is reminiscent of Chaitin's proposal to use ordinal notation as a goal intended to facilitate evolution—"and the larger the ordinal, the fitter the organism" [5]—and Good's observation [10] that iterated Lucas-Penrose contests boil down to contests to name the larger ordinal.

6 Pros and cons of different ASPI measures

Here are pros and cons of the ASPI measures which arise from different solutions to the problem (Problem 8) of measuring the growth rate of functions.

- The original Hibbard measure (Definition 7), which arises by measuring growth rate by comparing a function with Liu's enumeration [17] of the primitive recursive functions:
  - Pro: Relatively concrete.
  - Pro: Measures intelligence using a familiar number system (the natural numbers).
  - Con: The numbers which the measure outputs are not very meaningful, in that predictor p having a measure of $+1$ higher than predictor q tells us little about how *much* more computationally complex the evaders which p learns are, versus the evaders which q learns.
  - Con: Only distinguishes sufficiently non-intelligent predictors; all predictors sufficiently intelligent receive measure ∞.
- Big-O/Big-Θ (Definition 16), in which, rather than directly measuring the intelligence of a predictor, instead, we would talk of a predictor's intelligence being $O(f(n))$ or $\Theta(f(n))$ for various functions $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$:
  - Pro: Gets directly at the underlying concept, without obfuscation.
  - Pro: Computer scientists already use Big-O/Big-Θ routinely and are comfortable with them.
  - Con: This option is not really a measure, but more of a taxonomy—and a non-numerical taxonomy at that.
- Hyperreal intelligence (Definition 17):
  - Pro: A taxonomy like Big-O/Big-Θ, but with the added benefit that the taxons are numerical (hyperreal numerical, to be more precise).

- Con: Depends on a free ultrafilter (rendering it computationally impractical).

- Surreal intelligence (Definition 18):
  - Pro: An actual numerical measure (not just a taxonomy), with about the same perfect granularity as the Big-O/Big-Θ taxonomies.
  - Con: Abstract and impractical: depends not only on a free ultrafilter, but also on an embedding of the hyperreals into the surreals.
  - Con: The numbers which the measure outputs are surreal numbers, which may be unfamiliar to some users.

- Intelligence based on a majorization hierarchy such as the standard slow- or fast-growing hierarchy up to ϵ_0 (Definitions 26 and 26):
  - Pro: A numerical measure, albeit less granular than the Big-O/Big-Θ taxonomies.
  - Pro: Relatively concrete.
  - Pro: The numbers which the measure outputs are meaningful, in the sense that the degree to which a predictor p is more intelligent than a predictor q is reflected in the degree to which p's intelligence-measure is larger than q's.
  - Con: The numbers which the measure outputs are ordinal numbers, which may be unfamiliar to some users.
  - Con: Only distinguishes sufficiently non-intelligent predictors; for any particular majorization hierarchy, all predictors sufficiently intelligent receive measure ∞.

7 Conclusion

To summarize:

- Hibbard proposed [13] an intelligence measure for predictors in games of adversarial sequence prediction.
- We argued that Hibbard's idea actually splits into two orthogonal sub-ideas. First: that intelligence can be measured via the growth-rates of the run-times of evaders that a predictor can learn to predict. Second: that such growth-rates can be measured in one specific way (involving an enumeration of the primitive recursive functions). We argued that there many other ways to measure growth-rates, and that each method of measuring growth-rates yields a corresponding adversarial sequence prediction intelligence (ASPI) measure.

- We considered several specific ways of measuring growth-rate of functions, and exhibited corresponding ASPI measures. The growth-rate-measuring methods which we considered were: Big-O/Big-Θ notation; hyperreal numbers; surreal numbers; and majorization hierarchies.
- We also discussed how measuring the intelligence of adversarial sequence predictors provides an indirect measure of the intelligence of idealized AGIs.

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