

Short-circuiting the definition of mathematical knowledge for an Artificial General Intelligence

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Abstract. We propose that, for the purpose of studying theoretical properties of the knowledge of an agent with Artificial General Intelligence (that is, the knowledge of an AGI), a pragmatic way to define such an agent’s knowledge (in the language of Epistemic Arithmetic (EA)) is as follows. We declare an AGI to know a certain EA-statement ϕ if and only if that AGI would include ϕ in the resulting enumeration if that AGI were commanded: “Enumerate all the EA-sentences which you know.” This definition is non-circular because an AGI, being capable of practical English communication, is capable of understanding the everyday English word “know” independently of how any philosopher formally defines knowledge (we elaborate further on the non-circularity of this circular-looking definition). This elegantly solves the problem that different AGIs may have very different internal knowledge definitions and yet we want to be able to study knowledge of AGIs in general, without having to study different AGIs separately just because they have separate internal knowledge definitions. Finally, we suggest how this definition of AGI knowledge can be used as a bridge which could allow the AGI research community to import certain abstract results about mechanical knowing agents from mathematical logic.

Keywords: AGI · machine knowledge

1 Introduction

It is difficult to define knowledge, or what it means to know something. In Plato’s dialogs, again and again Socrates asks people to define knowledge¹, and no-one ever succeeds. Neither have philosophers reached consensus even in our own era [17].

At the same time, the problem is often brushed aside as something only philosophers care about: pragmatists rarely spend time on this sort of debate. One exception is the area of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), where even the staunchest pragmatists admit the importance of the question.

In this paper, we narrow down the question “what is knowledge” and offer a simple answer within that narrow context: we propose a definition of what

¹ Perhaps the best example being in the *Theaetetus* [19].

it means for a suitably idealized AGI to know a mathematical sentence² in the language of Epistemic Arithmetic [22] (hereafter EA; EA consists of the language of Peano Arithmetic along with an additional modal operator K for knowledge—for example, the EA-sentence $K(1 + 1 = 2)$ might be read “I know $1 + 1 = 2$ ” or “the knower knows $1 + 1 = 2$ ”). Our proposed definition is short and sweet (at the price of appearing deceptively circular): we say that an AGI knows an EA-sentence ϕ if and only if ϕ would be among the sentences which that AGI would enumerate if that AGI were commanded:

“Enumerate all the EA-sentences which you know.”

This is non-circular because an AGI, being capable of practical English communication, is therefore capable of understanding the everyday English word “know” in the above command, independently of how any philosopher formally defines knowledge. We discuss this further in Subsection 3.1.

Our proposed definition is not directly intended for methodological purposes—it would not directly be helpful in the quest to construct an AGI. Instead, it is intended for the purpose of understanding the properties of AGI (some of which we discuss in Section 5). We hope that a better understanding of theoretical properties of AGIs will indirectly help in their creation someday.

The structure of this paper is as follows.

- In Section 2 we discuss the AGIs for whose knowledge we are attempting to propose a definition.
- In Section 3 we propose a knowledge definition for AGIs for EA-sentences.
- In Section 4 we extend our knowledge definition to formulas with free variables.
- In Section 5 we use this knowledge definition as a bridge to translate some ideas from mathematical logic into the field of AGI.
- In Section 6 we summarize and make concluding remarks.

2 Idealized AGIs

In this paper, we approach AGI using what Goertzel [15] calls the Universalist Approach: we adopt “...an idealized case of AGI, similar to assumptions like the frictionless plane in physics”, hoping that by understanding this “simplified special case, we can use the understanding we’ve gained to address more realistic cases.”

We do not have a formal definition for what an AGI is, but whatever it is, we assume an AGI is a deterministic machine which repeatedly reads sensory input from its environment and outputs English words based on what sensory inputs

² By a *sentence*, we mean a formula with no free variables. Thus, $x^2 > 0$ is not a sentence, but $\forall x(x^2 > 0)$ is.

it has received so far³. When we say that this AGI is a “deterministic machine”, we mean that said outputs (considered as a function of said inputs) could be computed by a Turing machine. We further assume the AGI can understand English commands and is capable of practical English communication. Thus, if we were to command the AGI in English, “Tell us the value of $1 + 1$ ”, the AGI would respond in English and reply “2”, or “ $1 + 1 = 2$ ”, or something along those lines.

We assume an AGI is capable of everyday English discussions which would cause no difficulty to a casual English speaker, even if these discussions involve topics, such as “knowledge”, which might be philosophically tricky. A casual English speaker does not get bogged down in philosophical questions about the nature of knowledge just in order to answer a question like “Do you know that $1 + 1 = 2$?”, and therefore neither should our AGI.

We also assume an AGI is better than a casual human English speaker in certain ways. We assume an AGI would have no objections to performing exceedingly tedious tasks indefinitely, if so commanded. If we asked a casual human English speaker to begin computing and reciting all the prime numbers until further notice, and then we waited silently forever listening to the results, said human would eventually get tired of the endless tedium and would disobey our command (not to mention the fact that they might make arithmetic errors along the way). We assume an AGI has no such limitations and would happily compute and recite prime numbers for all eternity, if so commanded—and would make no arithmetic mistakes. Of course, in reality the AGI would eventually run out of memory, or perish in the heat death of the universe, etc., but we are speaking of idealized AGI here and we intentionally ignore such possibilities, in the same way a Turing machine is assumed to have infinite tape and infinite time to run.

3 An elegant definition of mathematical knowledge

The following definition might initially look circular, but we will argue that it is not.

Definition 1. *Let X be an AGI. For any EA-sentence ϕ , we say that X knows ϕ if and only if X would eventually include ϕ in the resulting enumeration if X were commanded:*

“Enumerate all the EA-sentences which you know.”

Definition 1 is non-circular because the AGI is capable (see Section 2) of practical English communication, including that involving everyday English words

³ We should note that, with the AGI research field being so young, there is little consensus even on basic things. Some researchers would consider some things to be AGI which have no communication ability (applying the term to entities who have certain adaptation abilities or pattern-matching abilities, for example, even if those entities have no means of communicating), however, we believe that to be a minority opinion.

such as the word “know”, independently of how any philosophers formally define things. More on this in Subsection 3.1.

One of the strengths of Definition 1 is that it is uniform across different AGIs: many different AGIs might internally operate based on different definitions of knowledge, but Definition 1 works equally well for all these different AGIs regardless of those different internal knowledge definitions⁴.

Although Definition 1 may differ significantly from a particular AGI X ’s own internal definition of knowledge, the following theorem states that materially the two definitions have the same result.

Theorem 1. *Suppose X is an AGI. For any EA-sentence ϕ , the following are equivalent:*

1. X is considered to know ϕ (based on Definition 1).
2. X knows ϕ (based on X ’s own internal understanding of knowledge).

Proof. By Definition 1, (1) is equivalent to the statement that X would include ϕ in the list which X would output if X were commanded:

“Enumerate all the EA-sentences which you know.”

Since we have assumed (in Section 2) that X is obedient, X would output ϕ in the resulting list if and only if (2). \square

Theorem 2. *Let X be an AGI. The set of EA-sentences ϕ such that X knows ϕ (based on Definition 1) is computably enumerable.*

Proof. This follows from our assumption (in Section 2) that X is a deterministic machine. \square

3.1 Non-Circularity of Definition 1

‘What is said by a speaker (what she meant to say, her “meaning-intention”) is understood or misunderstood by a hearer (“an interpreter”).’
—Albrecht Wellmer [23]

Definition 1 is non-circular because an AGI’s response to an English command only depends on how the AGI understands the words in that command, not on how *we* (the speakers) understand those words. Recall from Section 2 that we are assuming an AGI is a deterministic machine which outputs English words based on sensory inputs from its environment. Those outputs depend *only* on those environmental inputs, and not on any decisions made by philosophers.

If the reader wants to further convince themselves of the non-circularity of Definition 1, we need only point out that the apparent circularity would disappear if we changed Definition 1 to define what it means for X to “grok” sentence

⁴ This is reminiscent of Elton’s proposal that instead of trying to interpret an AI’s outputs by focusing on specific low-level details of a neural network, we should instead let the AI explain itself [11].

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ϕ , rather than to “know” sentence ϕ (without changing the command itself). In other words, we could define that X “groks” ϕ if and only if X would include ϕ in the list of sentences that would result if X were commanded,

“Enumerate all the EA-sentences which you know.”

This would make the non-circularity clearer, because the word “grok” does not appear anywhere in the definition.

For the sake of completion, we will further illustrate the non-circularity of Definition 1 with two examples.

- (The color blurple) Bob could (without Alice’s awareness) define “blurple” to be the color of the card which Alice would choose if Bob were to run up to Alice, present her a red card and a blue card, and demand: “Quick, choose the blurple card! Do it now, no time for questions!” There is nothing circular about this, because Alice’s choice cannot depend on a definition which Alice is unaware of.
- (Zero to the zero) If asked to compute 0^0 , some calculators output 1, and some output an error message or say the result is undefined⁵. For any calculator X , it would be perfectly non-circular to define “the 0^0 of X ” to be the output which X outputs when asked to compute 0^0 . Said output is pre-programmed into the calculator; the calculator does not read the user’s mind in order to base its answer on any definitions that exist there.

3.2 Sentences using the Knowledge Operator

Definition 1 is particularly interesting when ϕ itself contains makes use of EA’s K operator for knowledge.

Example 1. Applying Definition 1, we consider an AGI X to know $K(1 + 1 = 2)$ if and only if X would output $K(1 + 1 = 2)$ when commanded to enumerate all the EA-sentences he knows. X would (when so commanded) output $K(1 + 1 = 2)$ if and only if X knows (in his own internal sense of the word “know”) that he knows (in his own internal sense of the word “know”) $1 + 1 = 2$.

3.3 A Simpler Definition, and Why It Does Not Work

“It is difficult to be aware of whether one knows or not. For it is difficult to be aware of whether we know from the principles of a thing or not—and that is what knowing is. (...) Let that demonstration be better which, other things being equal, depends on fewer postulates or suppositions. For if they are equally familiar, knowing will come about more quickly in this way; and that is preferable.” —Aristotle [7]

⁵ Which is incorrect—see [18].

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The reader might wonder why we would not further simplify Definition 1 and declare that X knows ϕ if and only if X would respond “yes” if X were asked: “Do you know ϕ ? (Yes or no)”. We will argue that this would be a poor candidate for an idealized knowledge definition.

Definition 2. *If X is an AGI and ϕ is an EA-sentence, say that X quick-knows ϕ if and only if X would respond “yes” if X were asked, “Do you know ϕ ? (Yes or no)”.*

The following should be contrasted with Theorem 2.

Theorem 3. *Let X be an AGI. The set of EA-sentences ϕ such that X quick-knows ϕ is computable.*

Proof. This follows from our assumption (in Section 2) that X is a deterministic machine. \square

By Theorem 3, it seems that if we used Definition 2 as a knowledge definition, it would contradict Aristotle’s claim that “it is difficult to be aware of whether one knows or not”. It is much more plausible that knowledge be *computably enumerable* (as in Theorem 2) than that knowledge be *computable*. A prototypical example of a process which is computably enumerable but not computable would be: enumerating the consequences of Peano arithmetic⁶ (hereafter PA). Said consequences cannot be computable, lest they could be used to solve the Halting Problem (because a Turing machine halts if and only if PA proves that it halts).

Theorem 4. *Let X be an AGI and assume X does not quick-know any falsehoods. At least one of the following is true:*

1. *There is an axiom of PA which X does not quick-know.*
2. *There exist PA-sentences ϕ and ψ such that X quick-knows ψ and X quick-knows $\psi \rightarrow \phi$, but X does not quick-know ϕ .*

Proof. It is well-known that a sentence ϕ is provable from PA if and only if there is a sequence ϕ_1, \dots, ϕ_n such that:

1. ϕ_n is ϕ .
2. For every i , either ϕ_i is an axiom of PA, or else there are $j, k < i$ such that ϕ_k is $\phi_j \rightarrow \phi_i$.

(Loosely speaking: proofs from PA can be carried out using no rules of inference besides Modus Ponens.) For any formula ϕ which PA proves, let $|\phi|$ be the smallest n such that there is a sequence ϕ_1, \dots, ϕ_n as above.

Call a PA-sentence ϕ *elusive* if PA proves ϕ but X does not quick-know ϕ . By Theorem 3, the fact that X does not quick-know any falsehoods, and the unsolvability of the Halting Problem, it follows that some elusive ϕ exists—otherwise, to computably determine whether or not a given Turing machine M

⁶ We assume Peano arithmetic is true.

halts, we could simply ask X , “Do you know Turing machine M halts? (Yes or no)”.

Since some elusive ϕ exists, there exists an elusive ϕ such that $|\phi|$ is as small as possible—that is, such that $|\phi| \leq |\psi|$ for every elusive ψ . Fix such a ϕ .

Case 1: ϕ is an axiom of PA. Then condition (1) of the theorem is satisfied, as desired.

Case 2: ϕ is not an axiom of PA. Let $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_{|\phi|}$ be as in the first paragraph of this proof (so $\phi_{|\phi|}$ is ϕ). Then since ϕ is not an axiom of PA, there must be $j, k < |\phi|$ such that ϕ_k is $\phi_j \rightarrow \phi_{|\phi|}$. Now, the sequence ϕ_1, \dots, ϕ_k witnesses that PA proves ϕ_k and $|\phi_k| \leq k < |\phi|$; and the sequence ϕ_1, \dots, ϕ_j witnesses that PA proves ϕ_j and $|\phi_j| \leq j < |\phi|$. Thus, since ϕ was chosen to be elusive with $|\phi|$ as small as possible, it follows that ϕ_k and ϕ_j are not elusive. Thus, X quick-knows ϕ_j , and X quick-knows ϕ_k , but ϕ_k is $\phi_j \rightarrow \phi$. Thus condition (2) of the theorem is satisfied, as desired. \square

Theorem 4 clearly shows that Definition 2 makes a terrible notion of idealized knowledge. An AGI should most certainly know the axioms of PA, and should most certainly be capable of the minimal logical reasoning needed to conclude ϕ from ψ and $\psi \rightarrow \phi$. And the way we have established the unsuitability of Definition 2 is nicely anticipated by the words of Aristotle quoted at the beginning of this subsection.

4 Quantified Modal Logic

Definition 1 only addresses sentences with no free variables. In this section, we will extend Definition 1 to formulas which possibly include free variables. We are essentially adapting a trick from Carlson [9].

Definition 3. We define so-called numerals, which are EA-terms, one numeral \bar{n} for each natural number $n \in \mathbb{N}$, by induction: $\bar{0}$ is defined to be 0 (the constant symbol for zero from PA) and for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\overline{n+1}$ is defined to be $S(\bar{n})$ (where S is the successor symbol from PA).

For example, the numeral $\bar{3}$ is the term $S(S(S(0)))$.

Definition 4. If ϕ is an EA-formula (with free variables x_1, \dots, x_k), and if s is an assignment mapping variables to natural numbers, then we define ϕ^s to be the sentence

$$\phi(x_1|\overline{s(x_1)})(x_2|\overline{s(x_2)}) \cdots (x_k|\overline{s(x_k)})$$

obtained by substituting for each free variable x_i the numeral $\overline{s(x_i)}$ for x_i ’s value according to s .

Example 2. Suppose $s(x) = 0$, $s(y) = 1$, and $s(z) = 3$. Then

$$((z > y + x) \wedge \forall x(K(z > y + x - x)))^s$$

is defined to be

$$((\bar{3} > \bar{1} + \bar{0}) \wedge \forall x(K(\bar{3} > \bar{1} + x - x)))$$

(note that the numeral is not substituted for the later occurrences of x because these are bound by the $\forall x$ quantifier).

Definition 5. *If ϕ is any \mathcal{L} -formula, and s is any assignment mapping variables to \mathbb{N} , we say that X knows ϕ (with variables interpreted by s) if and only if X knows ϕ^s according to Definition 1.*

Armed with Definition 5, the Tarskian notion [16] of truth can be extended to a complete semantics for knowledge in EA.

Example 3. Assume an AGI X is clear from context. Suppose ϕ is an EA-formula, of one free variable x , which expresses “the x th Turing machine eventually halts”. Suppose we want to assign a truth value to the formula

$$\exists x(\neg K(\phi) \wedge \neg K(\neg\phi)).$$

We proceed as follows.

- Following Tarski, we should declare $\exists x(\neg K(\phi) \wedge \neg K(\neg\phi))$ is true if and only if for every assignment s mapping variables to \mathbb{N} , $\exists x(\neg K(\phi) \wedge \neg K(\neg\phi))$ is true (with variables interpreted by s).
- By the semantics of \exists , the above is true if and only if for every assignment s , there is some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\neg K(\phi) \wedge \neg K(\neg\phi)$ is true (with variables interpreted by $s(x|n)$), where $s(x|n)$ is the assignment that agrees with s except for mapping x to n .
- By Definition 5, this is the case if and only if for every assignment s there is some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that X does not know $\phi^{s(x|n)}$ (according to Definition 1) and X does not know $\neg\phi^{s(x|n)}$ (according to Definition 1).
- By Definition 4 and the fact that x is the only free variable in ϕ , the above is the case if and only if there is some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that X does not know $\phi(x|\bar{n})$ (according to Definition 1) and X does not know $\neg\phi(x|\bar{n})$ (according to Definition 1).

So ultimately, we consider $\exists x(\neg K(\phi) \wedge \neg K(\neg\phi))$ to be true if and only if there is some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that, in response to the command “Enumerate all the EA-sentences which you know”, X would not include $\phi(x|\bar{n})$ nor $\neg\phi(x|\bar{n})$ in the resulting enumeration.

5 Knowledge formulas

In this section, we will look at some formulas about knowledge and interpret them in the context of AGI in terms of Definitions 1 and 5.

Example 4. (Basic axioms of knowledge) The following axiom schemas, in the language of EA, are taken from Carlson [9] (we restrict them to sentences for purposes of simplicity).

- (E1) $K(\phi)$ whenever ϕ is valid (i.e., a tautology). Interpreted for an AGI X using Definition 1, this becomes: “If commanded to enumerate his knowledge in EA, X will include all EA-tautologies in the resulting list.” This is plausible because the set of tautologies in any computable language is computable, and an AGI should have no problem enumerating them.
- (E2) $K(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow K(\phi) \rightarrow K(\psi)$. This becomes: “If commanded to enumerate his knowledge in EA, if X would include $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ and if X would also include ϕ , then X would also include ψ .” This is plausible because an AGI should certainly be capable of basic logical reasoning.
- (E3) $K(\phi) \rightarrow \phi$. This becomes: “If commanded to enumerate his knowledge in EA, the resulting statements X enumerates will be true.” This is plausible since knowledge is widely regarded as having truthfulness as one of its requirements. Truthfulness is not a requirement in the definition proposed in this paper, but for any particular AGI, truthfulness is probably a requirement of that AGI’s internal definition of knowledge. There is no need to worry about the AGI being misinformed about contingent facts about the physical world, because EA is a purely mathematical language in which no such contingent facts are expressible.
- (E4) $K(\phi) \rightarrow K(K(\phi))$. This becomes: “If commanded to enumerate his knowledge in EA, if X would list ϕ , then X would also list $K(\phi)$.” This is plausible because presumably when X enumerates ϕ in response to the command, X should understand why he is enumerating ϕ , namely because he knows ϕ —so X should therefore know that he knows ϕ .

Example 5. (Reinhardt’s strong mechanistic thesis [20] [21] [9]) Reinhardt suggested the EA-schema

$$\exists e \forall x (K(\phi) \leftrightarrow x \in W_e)$$

as a formalization of the mechanicalness of the knower. Here, W_e is the e th computably enumerable set of natural numbers (W_e can also be thought of as the set of naturals enumerated by the e th Turing machine). For simplicity, consider the case where x is the lone free variable of ϕ . Then in terms of Definition 5, the schema becomes: “If X were commanded to enumerate his knowledge in the language of EA, then the set of $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that X would include $\phi(x|\bar{n})$ in the resulting list, would be computably enumerable.” This is not just plausible but obvious, since X himself is an AGI and thus presumably a computer. If Φ is the above EA-schema, then the schema $K(\Phi)$ is *Reinhardt’s strong mechanistic thesis*. Reinhardt conjectured that his strong mechanistic thesis is consistent with basic axioms about knowledge (i.e., that it is possible for a knowing machine to know that it is a machine). This conjecture was proved by Carlson [9] using sophisticated structural results about the ordinals [8]. See [4] for an elementary proof of a weaker version of the conjecture.

Example 6. (Reinhardt’s absolute version of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem) If we vary the formula from Example 5 by requiring that the knowing know the value of e , we obtain:

$$\exists e K(\forall x (K(\phi) \leftrightarrow x \in W_e)).$$

Carlson [9] glosses this schema in English as: “I am a Turing machine, and I know which one.” Reinhardt showed that this schema is *not* consistent with basic axioms about knowledge. Following Carlson’s gloss, this shows that it is impossible for an AGI to know its own code⁷.

Example 7. (The Epistemic Church’s Thesis [14] [10]) The following EA-schema has been suggested as a kind of epistemic formalization of Church’s Thesis:

$$(\forall x \exists y (K(\phi))) \rightarrow (\exists e K(\forall x \exists y (E(e, x, y) \wedge \phi))),$$

where $E(e, x, y)$ is an EA-formula which expresses that the e th Turing machine outputs y on input x . For simplicity, we will just consider when x and y are the lone free variables of ϕ . Then the schema becomes:

- “Suppose X were commanded to enumerate his EA-knowledge. Assume there is a (not necessarily computable) function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\phi(x|\bar{n})(y|f(n))$ is *individually* included in the resulting enumeration. Then in fact there is a computable function $f' : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ (with Turing index e) such that the enumeration includes a *single* statement which transcends all the aforementioned statements by stating all at once that $\phi(x|\bar{n})(y|f'(n))$ is true for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.”

This beautiful formalism seems to capture the AGI’s self-reflection ability. We can imagine the AGI dutifully enumerating statement after statement and as she goes, she discovers and predicts patterns in her own enumeration. If the above EA-schema is called Φ , then the schema $K(\Phi)$ is what is called the Epistemic Church’s Thesis. Flagg proved that the Epistemic Church’s Thesis is consistent with basic axioms of knowledge [14], and Carlson proved that it is also consistent with Reinhardt’s strong mechanistic thesis [10].

Remark 1. As far as I know, AGI has not yet received much attention in the mathematical logical literature. Instead, mathematical logicians tend to concern themselves with *knowing agents* or *knowing machines*. Presumably, every AGI is a knowing agent and a knowing machine, but certainly not every knowing agent (or knowing machine) is an AGI. Thus, in general, inconsistency results about knowing agents or knowing machines carry directly over to AGIs (if no knowing agent, or no knowing machine, can satisfy some property, then in particular no AGI can either). Consistency results do not generally carry over to AGIs (it may be possible for a knowing agent or a knowing machine to satisfy some property, but it might be that none of the knowing agents or knowing machines which satisfy that property are AGIs). Nevertheless, a consistency result about knowing agents or knowing machines should at least count as evidence in favor of the corresponding consistency result for AGIs, at least if there is no clear reason otherwise. In the examples above:

⁷ We have pointed out elsewhere [3] that Reinhardt implicitly assumes that the knower knows its own truthfulness, and that it is possible for a knowing machine to know its own code if it is allowed to be ignorant of its own truthfulness, despite still being truthful. See [1] and [2] for some additional discussion.

- Reinhardt’s strong mechanistic thesis (Example 5) was proven to be consistent with basic knowledge axioms, so it is possible for a knowing machine to know that it is a machine (without necessarily knowing which machine). Since not every knowing machine is an AGI, it might still be impossible for an AGI to know it is a machine. But the consistency of Reinhardt’s strong mechanistic thesis at least suggests evidence that an AGI can know it is a machine.
- Reinhardt’s absolute version of the incompleteness theorem (Example 6) is an inconsistency result. As such, it transfers over directly to AGI, proving (at least under suitable idealization) that no AGI can know its own code⁸.
- The epistemic Church’s thesis (Example 7) was proven to be consistent with basic knowledge axioms. Since not every knowing machine is an AGI, this consistency result might not hold for AGIs. But at least the result suggests evidence that an AGI can satisfy the Epistemic Church’s Thesis.

Example 8. (Higher-order ignorance) Let $I(\phi)$ be shorthand for $\neg K(\phi) \wedge \neg K(\neg\phi)$, so $I(\phi)$ expresses the knower’s ignorance about ϕ . Kit Fine argued [13] that very basic assumptions about knowledge imply that second-order ignorance implies third-order (and hence all higher-order) ignorance:

$$I(I(\phi)) \rightarrow I(I(I(\phi))).$$

This becomes: “If, when X is commanded to enumerate his EA-knowledge, X would include neither $I(\phi)$ nor $\neg I(\phi)$ in the resulting enumeration, then X would also include neither $I(I(\phi))$ nor $\neg I(I(\phi))$.”

Example 9. (Belief and higher-order ignorance) Fano and Graziani have suggested [12] the following schema which would relate belief (B) with higher-order ignorance (where, as in Example 8, $I(\phi)$ is shorthand for $\neg K(\phi) \wedge \neg K(\neg\phi)$):

$$((B(\phi) \wedge \neg\phi) \vee (B(\neg\phi) \wedge \phi)) \rightarrow I(I(\phi)),$$

in other words, that incorrect belief about ϕ implies higher-order ignorance about ϕ . It would be straightforward to give a definition similar to Definition 1 for belief, along the following lines: an AGI X believes a formula ϕ (in a mathematical language \mathcal{L} similar to EA but also including an operator B for belief) if and only if X would include ϕ in the resulting list if X were commanded: “Enumerate all the \mathcal{L} -sentences which you believe.” This proposed schema of Fano and Graziani would then become: “If, when commanded to enumerate his beliefs in \mathcal{L} , X would include $\neg\phi$ (if ϕ is true) or ϕ (if ϕ is false), then, when commanded to enumerate his knowledge in \mathcal{L} , X would not include $I(\phi)$ nor $\neg I(\phi)$.”

Example 10. (Intuitive Ordinal Intelligence) In [5] we defined an intelligence measure for idealized mechanical knowing agents (who are aware of the computable ordinals) as follows. If A is such a knowing agent, we define the intelligence of A to be the supremum of the set of ordinals α such that α has some

⁸ Or rather, its own code and its own truthfulness—we have pointed out [3] that Reinhardt implicitly assumes the knower knows its own truthfulness.

code c such that A knows that c is a code of a computable ordinal. In [6] we specialized this to AGIs, and called it *Intuitive Ordinal Intelligence*. Let \mathcal{L} be a language like EA but including an additional predicate symbol O for the set of codes of computable ordinals. Modifying Definition 1 accordingly, we can systematically perform said specialization to AGIs, and it becomes: “The Intuitive Ordinal Intelligence of an AGI X is the supremum of the set of ordinals α such that there is some c such that X would include $O(\bar{c})$ in the resulting enumeration if we asked X to enumerate all the statements that he knows in \mathcal{L} .”

6 Conclusion

What does it mean to know something? This is a difficult question and there probably is no one true answer. In the field of AGI, how can we systematically investigate the theoretical properties of knowledge, when different AGIs might not even agree about what knowledge really means? So motivated, we have proposed an elegant way to brush these philosophical questions aside. In Definition 1, we declare that an AGI knows an EA-sentence if and only if that AGI would enumerate that sentence if commanded:

“Enumerate all the EA-sentences which you know.”

(This definition might look circular at first glance but we have argued that it is not; see Subsection 3.1). In Definition 5 we extended this to formulas with free variables, not just sentences.

This one-size-fits-all knowledge definition sets the study of AGI knowledge on a firmer theoretical footing. In Section 5 we give examples of how our definition can serve as a bridge to translate knowledge-related results from mathematical logic into the realm of AGI.

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