

Autocrats of the World: International Politics of Authoritarianisms

Course Objective and Learning Outcomes

This course aims to provide an overview of critical conversations about the international politics of authoritarianisms. The course will investigate the following key questions: Is there a new emerging post-liberal global order as a backlash against economic globalization? Are we experiencing a new wave of autocratization across the world at the hands of tech-savvy dictators who repress dissidents beyond their borders and disrupt democratic processes abroad? Has autocracy promotion and diffusion replaced the international efforts of democratization? Can the international community feasibly constrain autocratic regimes? How can we make sense of autocratic foreign policy? This course's primary expected learning outcome is to offer an insight into the international roots of autocratic resilience. Students will also be equipped with analytical tools to assess current policy interventions designed to contain or curtail autocratic regime practices.

Requirements and Grading Policy

Grading Scheme

- 1. Attendance (15%):** You are expected to attend lectures in person. There will be no recordings. You get one freebie – no questions asked.
- 2. Short Exams (40%):** Two short exams will be conducted, each worth 20%. The exams will not be cumulative. They will consist of fill-in-the-blank, multiple-choice, matching, and short-answer questions regarding lectures and required readings. The exams will be administered online. They must be completed within 24 hours after the questions are posted online, with a limited time window of 1.5 hours.
- 3. Review Articles (30%):** You will write two short review articles (around 1500 words), each worth 15%, to engage with the recommended readings of a week of your choosing. You are not allowed to use any other scholarly sources. You will pick up one week from Section B: International causes of autocratization and autocratic resilience and one week from Section C: Strategies for constraining autocrats. You may find more details at the end of the syllabus.
- 4. Collective Assignment - Podcast (15%):** You will form a working group of 3-4 to prepare a podcast together. You may find more details on the exact format of the podcast at the end of the syllabus. You should pitch your idea to me in advance. You should submit the podcast online.
- 5. Extra Credit/Optional – Data Geek Workshop (5%):** Depending on demand, I will conduct an extra workshop (1.5 hours long) outside lecture time and present available datasets on autocratic politics. We will run together quick statistical analyses using R and do some data visualizations. No prior knowledge of R is required. More details will be communicated in our first class.
- 6. Extra Credit/Optional – Participation (5%):** Your active class participation is highly encouraged. Further details will be shared in the first lecture.

Grade Appeal

If you wish to appeal your grade for any assignments, you must send me a one-paragraph explanation of why you think the grade you received does not accurately evaluate and reflect your work a week after posting your grades. Be advised that your mark may go up or down during the appeal process.

Missed Term Work

Late assignments will be subject to a late penalty of **5% per day** (including weekends) of the total marks for the assignment. Assignments submitted five calendar days beyond the due date will be assigned a grade of zero. Assignments handed in AFTER the work has been returned to the class cannot be marked for credit. Accommodations due to late registration into the course will NOT be approved.

Other Policies

Communication

I typically respond to emails swiftly, but please allow 48 hours for a response. I will host drop-in in-person office hours (Wednesday, 4-5 pm). I will also hold asynchronous office hours using the discussion board.

Accessibility and Accommodation

Students with diverse learning styles and needs are welcome in this course. In particular, if you have a disability/health consideration that may require accommodations, please feel free to approach me and/or the AccessAbility Resource Centre as soon as possible.

I am fully aware that some of you may come from autocratic countries, and having these conversations may be potentially dangerous for you. It is important to keep in mind that repression is often random, and it is a risk you should not underestimate. I will do my best to create a safe space for everyone per university policies. Please let me know in advance if you need specific accommodations.

A. The state of the world

Week 1 (Jan. 11) | Is there a new wave of autocratization and rise of illiberal values?

Required

Applebaum, Anne. 2021. "[The Bad Guys Are Winning](#)." The Atlantic. November 15, 2021.

Recommended

Kaplan, Robert. 2022. "[To Save Democracy, We Need a Few Good Dictators](#)." *Bloomberg*, April 1.

Lührmann, Anna, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here: What Is New about It?" *Democratization* 26(7): 1095–1113.

Diamond, Larry. 2021. "Democratic Regression in Comparative Perspective: Scope, Methods, and Causes." *Democratization* 28(1): 22–42.

Skaaning, Svend Erik. 2020. "Waves of Autocratization and Democratization: A Critical Note on Conceptualization and Measurement." *Democratization* 27(8): 1533–42.

Boese, Vanessa A., Staffan I. Lindberg, and Anna Lührmann. 2021. "Waves of Autocratization and Democratization: A Rejoinder." *Democratization*: 1–9.

Jee, Haemin, Hans Lueders, and Rachel Myrick. 2022. "Towards a Unified Approach to Research on Democratic Backsliding." *Democratization* 29 (4): 754–67.

Brownlee, Jason, and Kenny Miao. 2022. "Why Democracies Survive." *Journal of Democracy* 33 (4): 133–49.

Hyde, Susan D., and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2022. "Follow the Leader." *Journal of Democracy* 33 (4): 164–68.

Walker, Christopher. 2022. "Rising to the Sharp Power Challenge." *Journal of Democracy* 33 (4): 119–32.

Bermeo, Nancy. 2022. "Questioning Backsliding." *Journal of Democracy* 33 (4): 155–59.

Gerring, John, Carl Henrik Knutsen, and Jonas Berge. 2022. "Does Democracy Matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 25 (1): 357–75.

B. International causes of autocratization and autocratic resilience

Week 2 (Jan. 18) | Global political economy shocks lead to democratic regression

Required

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and Nita Rudra. 2021. "The Globalization Backlash: Exploring New Perspectives." *Comparative Political Studies*: 1-19.

Recommended

Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth. 2021. "Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash." *International Organization* 75(2): 464–94.

Weyland, Kurt. 2019. "Populism's Threat to Democracy: Comparative Lessons for the United States." *Perspectives on Politics* 18(2): 1–18.

Milner, Helen V. 2021. "Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right." *Comparative Political Studies*: 1-35.

Wu, Nicole. 2022. "Misattributed Blame? Attitudes toward Globalization in the Age of Automation." *Political Science Research and Methods* 10 (3): 470–87.

Voorheis, John, Nolan McCarty, Boris Shor, and Steve Rogers. 2016. [Unequal Incomes, Ideology and Gridlock: How Rising Inequality Increases Political Polarization](#). Working paper.

Spierings, Niels. 2020. "Democratic Disillusionment? Desire for Democracy after the Arab Uprisings." *International Political Science Review* 41 (4): 522–37.

Rodrik, Dani, John F Kennedy, and D Rodrik. 2018. "Populism and the Economics of Globalization." *Journal of International Business Policy*: 1-22.

Autor, David, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2020. "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure." *American Economic Review* 110(10): 3139–83.

Ahmed, Amel. 2022. "Is the American Public Really Turning Away from Democracy? Backsliding and the Conceptual Challenges of Understanding Public Attitudes." *Perspectives on Politics*, July, 1–12.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2022. ["America's Coming Age of Instability."](#) *Foreign Affairs*, November 3.

Fossati, Diego, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton. 2021. "Why Democrats Abandon Democracy: Evidence from Four Survey Experiments." *Party Politics* 28 (3): 554–66.

Kavanagh, Nolan, and Anil Menon. 2021. ["No, the pandemic didn't sink populism. It might have helped it."](#) *The Washington Post*, April 28.

De Vries, Catherine, and Sarah Hobolt. 2020. ["Does the pandemic spell the end of populism? Most likely not — here's why."](#) *The Washington Post*, July 23.

De Waal, Joel Rogers. 2019. ["There is no mass public revolt against globalization"](#). *The Guardian*, May 2.

Snegovaya, Maria. 2022. "Fellow Travelers or Trojan Horses? Similarities across pro-Russian Parties' Electorates in Europe." *Party Politics* 28 (3): 409–18.

Mader, Matthias, Nikolay Marinov, and Harald Schoen. 2022. "Foreign Anti-Mainstream Propaganda and Democratic Publics." *Comparative Political Studies* 55 (10): 1732–64.

Week 3 (Jan. 25) | There is a new authoritarian international political order on the rise

Required

- Layne, Christopher. 2018. "The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana." *International Affairs* 94(1): 89–111.
- Arase, David M. 2022. "Making Sense of the Belt and Road Initiative." In *The Belt and Road Initiative in Asia, Africa, and Europe*, edited by David Arase and Pedro Miguel Amakasu Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho, 3–24. London: Routledge.

Recommended

- Ikenberry, G. John. 2018. "The End of Liberal International Order?" *International Affairs* 94(1): 7–23.
- Yom, Sean. 2020. "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Logic of Hegemonic Retreat." *Global Policy* 11 (1): 75–83.
- Way, Lucan Ahmad. 2022. "The Rebirth of the Liberal World Order?" *Journal of Democracy* 33 (2): 5–17.
- Ambrosio, Thomas. 2012. "The Rise of the 'China Model' and 'Beijing Consensus': Evidence of Authoritarian Diffusion?" *Contemporary Politics* 18(4): 381–99.
- Chen, Ling S. 2022. "Getting China's Political Economy Right: State, Business, and Authoritarian Capitalism." *Perspectives on Politics* 20 (4): 1397–1402.
- Öniş, Ziya, and Mustafa Kutlay. 2020. "The New Age of Hybridity and Clash of Norms: China, BRICS, and Challenges of Global Governance in a Postliberal International Order." *Alternatives* 45(3): 123–42.
- Doshi, Rush. 2021. "[The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order](#)." 2021. *Brookings*, August 2.
- McNally, Christopher A. 2012. "Sino-Capitalism: China's Reemergence and the International Political Economy." *World Politics* 64(4): 741–76.
- Miller, Chris. 2022. *Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology*. New York: Scribner, ii–xxvii.
- Inboden, Rana Siu. 2022. "China and Authoritarian Collaboration." *Journal of Contemporary China* 31 (136): 505–17.
- The Economist*. 2022. "[China Is Helping Zimbabwe to Build a Surveillance State](#)." *The Economist*, December 15.
- Fulton, Jonathan. 2017. "[China is trying to pull Middle East countries into its version of NATO](#)." *The Washington Post*, June 21.
- Green, Mark. 2019. "[China's Debt Diplomacy](#)." *Foreign Policy*, April 25.
- Singh, Ajit. 2020. "The Myth of 'Debt-Trap Diplomacy' and Realities of Chinese Development Finance." *Third World Quarterly* 42(2): 239–53.
- Camba, Alvin. 2021. "[Two of China's Belt and Road projects reveal a flaw in the G-7's new global financing plan](#)." *The Washington Post*, June 29.
- Glaser, Mareike Ohlberg, Bonnie S. Glaser. 2021. "[Why China Is Freaking Out Over Biden's Democracy Summit?](#)" *Foreign Policy*, December 10.
- Diamond, Larry. 2022. "[All Democracy Is Global: Why America Can't Shrink from the Fight of Freedom](#)." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (5): 182–97.
- Weiss, Jessica Chen. 2022. "[The China Trap: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Perilous Logic of Zero-Sum Competition](#)." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (5): 40–58.

Week 4 (Feb. 1) | Autocrats collaborate with and learn from each other

Required

- Yakouchyk, Katsiaryna. 2019. "Beyond Autocracy Promotion: A Review." *Political Studies Review* 17(2): 147–60.
- Tansey, Oisín. 2016. "Underwriting Repression: The International Politics of Coercive Crackdowns." In *International Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, Chapter 5. New York: Oxford University Press: 122–50.

Recommended

- Ambrosio, Thomas. 2010. "Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research." *International Studies Perspectives* 11: 375–92.
- Weyland, Kurt. 2017. "Autocratic Diffusion and Cooperation: The Impact of Interests vs. Ideology." *Democratization* 24(7): 1235–52.
- Tolstrup, Jakob, Michael Aagaard Seeberg, and Johanne Grøndahl Glavind. 2018. "Signals of Support from Great Power Patrons and the Use of Repression During Nonviolent Protests." *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (4): 514–43.
- Faucon, Benoit, Summer Said, and Joe Parkinson. 2021. "[Military Coups in Africa at Highest Level Since End of Colonialism](#)." *Wall Street Journal*, November 4.
- Boutton, Andrew. 2019. "Coup-Proofing in the Shadow of Intervention: Alliances, Moral Hazard, and Violence in Authoritarian Regimes." *International Studies Quarterly* 63(1): 43–57.
- Tansey, Oisín, Kevin Koehler, and Alexander Schmotz. 2017. "Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(9): 1221–54.
- Sinan Ciddi, Behnam Ben Taleblu. 2022. "[Will Turkey Pay a Price for Helping Iran Break Sanctions?](#)" *The National Interest*, December 19.
- Bader, Julia, Jörn Grävingholt, and Antje Kästner. 2010. "Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy? A Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in Regional Neighbourhoods." *Contemporary Politics* 16(1): 81–100.
- Vanderhill, Rachel. 2013. *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*. Chapter 2. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 41–96.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2017. "The Limited Reach of Authoritarian Powers." *Democratization* 24(7): 1326–44.
- Way, Lucan A. 2015. "The Limits of Autocracy Promotion: The Case of Russia in the 'near Abroad.'" *European Journal of Political Research* 54(4): 691–706.
- Buzogány, Aron. 2017. "Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: Authoritarian Diffusion or Domestic Causation?" *Democratization* 24(7): 1307–25.
- Ostovar, Afshon. 2016. "Exporting the Revolution." In *Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards*, New York: Oxford University Press, 102–20.
- Kneuer, Marianne, Thomas Demmelhuber, Raphael Peresson, and Tobias Zumbrägel. 2019. "Playing the Regional Card: Why and How Authoritarian Gravity Centres Exploit Regional Organisations." *Third World Quarterly* 40(3): 451–70.
- Libman, Alexander, and Anastassia V. Obydenkova. 2018. "Regional International Organizations as a Strategy of Autocracy: The Eurasian Economic Union and Russian Foreign Policy." *International Affairs* 94(5): 1037–58.
- Debre, Maria J. 2021. "Clubs of Autocrats: Regional Organizations and Authoritarian Survival." *Review of International Organizations*, June, 1–27.
- Bank, André, and Mirjam Edel. 2015. [Authoritarian Regime Learning: Comparative Insights from the Arab Uprisings](#). Report. Hamburg: GIGA.

Week 5 (Feb. 8) | Autocrats got better at employing new technologies for repression, propaganda, and coordinated disinformation campaigns

Required

- Roberts, Margaret E. 2017. *Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China's Great Firewall*. Introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1-20.
- Maurer, Tim. 2018. "Cyber Proxies on a Loose Leash: Iran and Syria." In *Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 81–93.

Recommended

- Zannettou, Savvas, Michael Sirivianos, Jeremy Blackburn, and Nicolas Kourtellis. 2019. "The Web of False Information: Rumors, Fake News, Hoaxes, Clickbait, and Various Other Shenanigans." *Journal of Data and Information Quality* 11(3): 1-26.
- Sloss, David L. 2022. "Russian Information Warfare and U.S. Elections." In *Tyrants on Twitter: Protecting Democracies from Information Warfare*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 24–46.
- Unver, Akin. 2020. ["Fake news' methods change faster than Western governments can react. Here's how to keep up."](#) *The Washington Post*, August 13.
- Leber, Andrew, and Alexei Abrahams. 2021. ["Saudi Twitter blew up with support for the crown prince. How much of it is genuine?"](#) *The Washington Post*, March 9.
- Zhong, Raymond, Aaron Krolik, Paul Mozur, Ronen Bergman, and Edward Wong. 2020. ["Behind China's Twitter Campaign, a Murky Supporting Chorus."](#) *The New York Times*, June 8.
- Stukal, Denis, Sergey Sanovich, Richard Bonneau, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2022. "Why Botter: How Pro-Government Bots Fight Opposition in Russia." *American Political Science Review*, 1–15.
- Miller, Andrew Cesare. 2022. "#DictatorErdogan: How Social Media Bans Trigger Backlash." *Political Communication* 39(6): 801-25.
- Gunitsky, Seva. 2015. "Corrupting the Cyber-Commons: Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability." *Perspectives on Politics* 13(1): 42–54.
- Frantz, Erica, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Joseph Wright. 2020. [Digital Repression in Autocracies](#). V-Dem Institute: 1-54.
- Gohdes, Anita R. 2020. "Repression Technology: Internet Accessibility and State Violence." *American Journal of Political Science* 64(3): 488–503.
- Hoffman, Samantha. 2022. "China's Tech-Enhanced Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 33 (2): 76–89.
- Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. 2022. "After a Wave of Protests, China's Silent Crackdown." *Journal of Democracy* (December).
- Gertz, Geoffrey. 2019. ["Is TikTok a threat to national security?"](#) *The Washington Post*, November 11.
- Dou, Eva. 2021. ["Documents Link Huawei to China's Surveillance Programs."](#) *The Washington Post*, December 14.
- Unver, Akin. 2021. [Motivations for the Adoption and Use of Authoritarian A.I. Technology](#). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 19.
- Lime, Nathaniel Allen and Matthew La. 2021. ["How Digital Espionage Tools Exacerbate Authoritarianism across Africa."](#) *Brookings*, November 19.
- Marckzak, Bill, et al. 2021. ["From Pearl to Pegasus: Bahraini Government Hacks Activists with NSO Group Zero-Click iPhone Exploits."](#) CitizenLab, August 24.
- Crosston, Matthew. 2020. "Cyber Colonization: The Dangerous Fusion of Artificial Intelligence and Authoritarian Regimes." *Cyber, Intelligence, and Security* 4(1): 149–71.

Week 6 (Feb. 15) | Autocrats can silence opposition abroad, rebrand their image, and legitimize their repressive acts (SHORT EXAM I)

Required

- Dukalskis, Alexander. 2021. "Selling Dictatorship and Silencing Dissent." In *Making the World Safe for Dictatorship*, Chapter 4. New York: Oxford University Press, 55-81.
- . "Promoting and Controlling the China Dream: China's External Propaganda and Repression." In *Making the World Safe for Dictatorship*, Chapter 6. New York: Oxford University Press: 111-38.

Recommended

- Glasius, Marlies. 2017. "Extraterritorial Authoritarian Practices: A Framework." *Globalizations* 15(2): 179-97.
- Tsourapas, Gerasimos. 2020. "Global Autocracies: Strategies of Transnational Repression, Legitimation, and Co-Optation in World Politics." *International Studies Review*: 1-29.
- Moss, Dana M. 2022. "Silenced and Split." *The Arab Uprisings Abroad: Diaspora Activism against Authoritarian Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 71-92.
- Al-Jizawi, Noura, Siena Anstis, Sophie Barnett, Sharly Chan, Niamh Leonard, Adam Senft, and Ron Deibert. 2022. "[Psychological and Emotional War: Digital Transnational Repression in Canada](#)." Citizen Lab Research Report No. 151. University of Toronto.
- Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi, and Bahar Baser. 2022. "The Transnational Politics of Religion: Turkey's Diyanet, Islamic Communities and Beyond." *Turkish Studies* 23 (5): 1-21.
- Lipton, Eric, Broke Williams, and Nicholas Confessore. 2014. "[Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks](#)." *The New York Times*, September 7.
- Pu, Xiaoyu. 2019. "China on the World Stage." In *Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 34-50.
- Kokas, Aynne. 2022. "How Beijing Runs the Show in Hollywood." *Journal of Democracy* 33 (2): 90-102.
- Brady, Anne-Marie. 2015. "Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): China's Foreign Propaganda Machine." *Journal of Democracy* 26(4): 51-58.
- Schatz, Edward. 2008. "Transnational Image Making and Soft Authoritarian Kazakhstan." *Slavic Review* 67(1): 50-62.
- Mattingly, Daniel C., and James Sundquist. 2022. "When Does Public Diplomacy Work? Evidence from China's 'Wolf Warrior' Diplomats." *Political Science Research and Methods*, November, 1-9.
- Xiao, Muiyi, Paul Mozur, and Gray Beltran. 2021. "[Buying Influence: How China Manipulates Facebook and Twitter](#)." *The New York Times*, December 20.
- Edel, Mirjam, and Maria Josua. 2018. "How Authoritarian Rulers Seek to Legitimize Repression: Framing Mass Killings in Egypt and Uzbekistan." *Democratization* 25(5): 882-900.
- Ulrichsen, Coates. 2018. "[Has Mohammed bin Salman finally gone too far?](#)" *The Washington Post*, October 16.
- Scharpf, Adam, Christian Glaessel, and Pearce Edwards. 2022. "International Sports Events and Repression in Autocracies: Evidence from the 1978 FIFA World Cup." *American Political Science Review*, October, 1-18.
- Rotaru, Vasile. 2019. "'Mimicking' the West? Russia's Legitimization Discourse from Georgia War to the Annexation of Crimea." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 52 (4): 311-21.
- Lin-Greenberg, Erik. 2022. "[The Dawn of Drone Diplomacy](#)." *Foreign Affairs*, December 20.

Week 7 | READING WEEK

C. Strategies for constraining autocrats

Week 8 (Mar. 1) | The international community may enforce compliance with human rights through treaties, I.O.s, and condemnation

Required

- Simmons, Beth. 2010. "Treaty Compliance and Violation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (May): 273–96.
- Tansey, Oisín. 2016. "The International Politics of Electoral Manipulation." In *International Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, Chapter 4. New York: Oxford University Press, 89–121.

Recommended

- Conrad, Courtenay R, and Emily Hencken Ritter. 2013. "Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law." *The Journal of Politics* 75(2): 397–409.
- Conrad, Courtenay R. 2014. "Divergent Incentives for Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(1): 34–67.
- Fariss, Christopher J. 2014. "Respect for Human Rights Has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 108(2): 297–318.
- Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62(Winter): 65–101.
- Escriba-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. 2015. "Human Rights Prosecutions and Autocratic Survival." *International Organization* 69(2): 343–73.
- Hashimoto, Barry. 2020. "Autocratic Consent to International Law: The Case of the International Criminal Court's Jurisdiction, 1998–2017." *International Organization* 74 (2): 331–62.
- Kersten, Mark. 2019. "[Here's how perpetrators of crimes in Syria are being prosecuted.](#)" *The Washington Post*, March 4.
- Gruffydd-Jones, Jamie J. 2019. "Citizens and Condemnation: Strategic Uses of International Human Rights Pressure in Authoritarian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 52(4): 579–612.
- Ausderan, Jacob. 2014. "How Naming and Shaming Affects Human Rights Perceptions in the Shamed Country." *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (1): 81–95.
- Levitz, Philip, and Grigore Pop-Eleches. 2010. "Why No Backsliding? The European Union's Impact on Democracy and Governance before and after Accession." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(4): 457–85.
- Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2017. "Political Safeguards against Democratic Backsliding in the E.U.: The Limits of Material Sanctions and the Scope of Social Pressure." *Journal of European Public Policy* 24(3): 337–51.
- Gherghina, Sergiu, and Sorina Soare. 2016. "A Test of European Union Post-Accession Influence: Comparing Reactions to Political Instability in Romania." *Democratization* 23(5): 797–818.
- Corstange, Daniel, and Nikolay Marinov. 2012. "Taking Sides in Other People's Elections: The Polarizing Effect of Foreign Intervention." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 655–70.
- Donno, Daniela. 2010. "Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms." *International Organization* 64(4): 593–625.
- Terman, Rochelle, and Joshua Byun. 2022. "Punishment and Politicization in the International Human Rights Regime." *American Political Science Review* 116 (2): 385–402.
- Zarpli, Omer, and Huseyin Zengin. 2022. "Shame, Endorse, or Remain Silent?: State Response to Human Rights Violations in Other Countries." *Research & Politics* 9 (1).

Week 9 (Mar. 8) | The international community may promote democratization by funding human rights organizations and enforce compliance through material incentives with strings attached such as foreign aid, FDI, and PTAs

Required

- Bush, Sarah Sunn. 2015. *The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators*. Chapter 7. New York: Cambridge University Press, 159-86.
- Donno, Daniela, Sara Fox, and Joshua Kaasik. 2022. "International Incentives for Women's Rights in Dictatorships." *Comparative Political Studies* 55 (3): 451-92.

Recommended

- Snider, Erin A. 2022. "The Politics of Democracy Aid after the Arab Uprisings." In *Marketing Democracy: The Political Economy of Democracy Aid in the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 181-201.
- Yabanci, Bilge. 2017. "[Turkey is getting more authoritarian. Here's why funding nongovernmental organizations won't help democracy.](#)" *The Washington Post*, December 21.
- Slater, Dan, and Rob Mickey, ed. 2020. [Democracy and Autocracy: Is Democracy Promotion Dead?](#) Report: 1-26.
- Hyde, Susan D., Emily Lamb, and Oren Samet. 2022. "Promoting Democracy Under Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence from Cambodia." *Comparative Political Studies*, November.
- Gafuri, Adea. 2022. "Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy? The European Union's Democracy Assistance 2002-2018." *Democratization* 29 (5): 777-97.
- Pitel, Laura, and Sam Fleming. 2022. "[Does the EBRD Still Finance Freedom?](#)" *Financial Times*, January 31.
- Ahmed, Faisal Z. 2012. "The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival." *The American Political Science Review* 106(1): 146-65.
- Wright, Joseph. 2009. "How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3): 552-71.
- Kono, Daniel Yuichi, and Gabriella R Montinola. 2009. "Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?" *The Journal of Politics* 71(2): 704-18.
- Arias, Eric, James R Hollyer, and B Peter Rosendorff. 2018. "Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral Investment." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(4): 905-21.
- Spilker, Gabriele, and Tobias Böhmelt. 2013. "The Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements on Governmental Repression Revisited." *The Review of International Organizations* 8: 343-61.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *International Organization* 59 (Summer): 593-629.
- Bak, Daehee, and Chungshik Moon. 2016. "Foreign Direct Investment and Authoritarian Stability." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(14): 1998-2037.
- Bastiaens, Ida. 2016. "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Authoritarian Regimes." *International Interactions* 42(1): 140-71.
- Osekaire, J. 2019. "Compensating Autocratic Elites: How International Demands for Economic Liberalization Can Lead to More Repressive Dictatorships." *International Studies Quarterly* 63: 394-405.

Week 10 (Mar. 15) | The international community may employ economic coercion through sanctions and boycotts to increase public pressure, and induce regime change or compliance

Required

- Drezner, Daniel W. 2021. "[The United States of Sanctions: The Use and Abuse of Economic Coercion](#)." *Foreign Affairs* 100 (5): 142–54.
- Özdamar, Özgür, and Evgeniia Shahin. 2021. "Consequences of Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art and Paths Forward." *International Studies Review* 23 (4): 1646–71.

Recommended

- Zarpli, Omer. 2022. "When Do Imposed Sanctions Work? The Role of Target Regime Type." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, November.
- Early, Bryan R, and Marcus Schulzke. 2019. "Still Unjust, Just in Different Ways: How Targeted Sanctions Fall Short of Just War Theory's Principles." *International Studies Review* 21 (1): 57–80.
- Grauvogel, Julia, and Christian von Soest. 2014. "Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes." *European Journal of Political Research* 53(4): 635–53.
- Blaydes, Lisa. 2020. "The Domestic Political Implications of Economic Sanctions: Evidence from Iraq under Saddam Hussein." In *Economic Shocks and Authoritarian Stability: Duration, Financial Control, and Institutions*, ed. Victor C. Shih, 21–40. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Escriba-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. 2010. "Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(2): 335–59.
- Wood, Reed. 2008. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression." *International Studies Quarterly* 52(3): 489–513.
- Hultman, Lisa, and Dursun Peksen. 2017. "Successful or Counterproductive Coercion? The Effect of International Sanctions on Conflict Intensity." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (6): 1315–39.
- Aarup, Sarah. 2021. "[5 key questions on tighter Belarus sanctions](#)." *Politico*, August 11.
- Gallagher, Nancy. 2021. "[Iran's New President, Public Opinion, and the Prospects for Negotiations](#)." *War on the Rocks*, August 24.
- Shih, Victor C., ed. 2020. *Economic Shocks and Authoritarian Stability: Duration, Financial Control, and Institutions*. Introduction. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1-21.
- Tang, Min, Narisong Huhe, and Qiang Zhou. 2017. "Contingent Democratization: When Do Economic Crises Matter?" *British Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 71–90.
- Frye, Timothy. 2019. "Economic Sanctions and Public Opinion: Survey Experiments from Russia." *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (7): 967–94.
- Rozenas, Arturas, and Denis Stukal. 2019. "How Autocrats Manipulate Economic News: Evidence from Russia's State-Controlled Television." *Journal of Politics* 81(3): 982–96.
- Rosenfeld, Bryn. 2018. "The Popularity Costs of Economic Crisis under Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence from Russia." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(2): 382–97.
- Aytaç, Selim Erdem. 2021. "Effectiveness of Incumbent's Strategic Communication during Economic Crisis under Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence from Turkey." *American Political Science Review* 115 (4): 1517–23.
- Liou, Ryan Yu-Lin, Amanda Murdie, and Dursun Peksen. 2022. "Pressures from Home and Abroad: Economic Sanctions and Target Government Response to Domestic Campaigns." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (August).

Week 11 (Mar. 22) | The international community may use limited force through targeted strikes, no-fly zones, and intelligence operations.

Required

- Brunstetter, Daniel R. 2021. *Just and Unjust Uses of Limited Force: A Moral Argument with Contemporary Illustrations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1-28.
- Bellamy, Alex J. 2022. "Epilogue: System Failure." In *Syria Betrayed: Atrocities, War, and the Failure of International Diplomacy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 383-92.

Recommended

- Hulme, M Patrick, and Erik Gartzke. 2021. "The Tyranny of Distance: Assessing and Explaining the Apparent Decline in U.S. Military Performance." *International Studies Quarterly* 65(2): 542–50.
- Daalder, Ivo H., and James G. Stavridis. 2012. "NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 91 (2): 2–7.
- Kuperman, Alan J. 2013. "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign." *International Security* 38 (1): 105–36.
- Wester, Karin. 2020. *Intervention in Libya: The Responsibility to Protect in North Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-10 & 290-315.
- Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. "Towards a 'Post-American' Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya." *International Affairs* 88 (2): 313–27.
- Clausen, Maria-Louise. 2019. "Justifying Military Intervention: Yemen as a Failed State." *Third World Quarterly* 40 (3): 488–502.
- Lee, Joyce Sohyun, Meg Kelly, and Atthar Mirza. 2022. "[Saudi-Led Airstrikes in Yemen Have Been Called War Crimes. Many Relied on U.S. Support.](#)" *Washington Post*, June 4.
- Mulford, Felicity. 2022. "Circumventing the Responsibility to Protect in Yemen: Rhetorical Adaptation and the United Nations Security Council." *Global Responsibility to Protect* 14 (1): 75–104.
- Mandelbaum, Michael. 2016. *Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 185-244.
- Lushenko, Paul, Shyam Raman, and Sarah Kreps. 2022. "Multilateralism and Public Support for Drone Strikes." *Research & Politics* 9(2): 1-9.
- Schulzke, Marcus. 2017. "Introduction." In *The Morality of Drone Warfare and the Politics of Regulation*, by Marcus Schulzke, 1–26. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Karlsrud, John, and Frederik Rosén. 2016. "Lifting the fog of war? Opportunities and challenges of drones in U.N. peace operations." In *The Good Drone*, edited by Kristin Sandvik and Maria Jumbert, 45-59. New York: Routledge.
- Smith, Megan, and James Igoe Walsh. 2013. "Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence From Propaganda Output." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25 (2): 311–27.
- Cagaptay, Soner, and Rich Outzen. 2022. "[Turkey's Lethal Weapon.](#)" *Foreign Affairs*, September 2.
- Wrage, Stephen, and Scott Cooper. 2019. *No Fly Zones and International Security*. London: Routledge.
- Beauchamp, Zack. 2022. "[Why Even a 'Limited' No-Fly Zone Is a Bad Idea.](#)" *Vox*. March 10, 2022.
- Nevitt, Mark. 2022. "[The Operational and Legal Risks of a No-Fly Zone Over Ukrainian Skies.](#)" *Just Security*. March 10.
- Benard, Alexander. 2004. "Lessons from Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and Practice of No-Fly Zones." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 27 (3): 454–78.
- Alaaldin, Ranj. 2021. "[Imperfect Allies and Non-State Actors: Lessons from the 1991 No-Fly Zone in Iraq.](#)" *Brookings*. May 28.

D. Epilogue

Week 12 (Mar. 29) | Russian foreign policy and the war against Ukraine

Required

- Treisman, Daniel. 2022. "[Putin Unbound: How Repression at Home Presaged Belligerence Abroad.](#)" *Foreign Affairs* 101 (3): 40–53.
- Person, Robert, and Michael McFaul. 2022. "[What Putin Fears Most.](#)" *Journal of Democracy*. February 22.

Recommended

- Casey, Adam E., and Seva Gunitsky. 2022. "[The Bully in the Bubble: Putin and the Perils of Information Isolation.](#)" *Foreign Affairs*, February 4.
- Lynch, Allen C. 2016. "The Influence of Regime Type on Russian Foreign Policy toward 'the West,' 1992–2015." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 49 (1): 101–11.
- Jung, Sung Chul. 2022. "Economic Slowdowns and International Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research*, November.
- Radnitz, Scott. 2021. "Connecting the Dots: Patterns of Conspiracism in Post-Soviet Politics." In *Revealing Schemes: The Politics of Conspiracy in Russia and the Post-Soviet Region*. New York: Oxford University Press, 67–83.
- Kozachenko, Ivan. 2019. "Fighting for the Soviet Union 2.0: Digital Nostalgia and National Belonging in the Context of the Ukrainian Crisis." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 52 (1): 1–10.
- Düben, Björn Alexander. 2022. "[The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin's Rhetoric Towards Ukraine.](#)" LSE Ideas, February.
- Larson, Deborah Welch, and Alexei Shevchenko. 2014. "Russia Says No: Power, Status, and Emotions in Foreign Policy." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47 (3–4): 269–79.
- Rutland, Peter. 2012. "Still out in the Cold? Russia's Place in a Globalizing World." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45(3–4): 343–54.
- Sarotte, M. E. 2021. *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1–18.
- Tsygankov, Andrei P. 2018. "The Sources of Russia's Fear of NATO." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 51 (2): 101–11.
- Wolff, Andrew T. 2015. "The Future of NATO Enlargement after the Ukraine Crisis." *International Affairs* 91 (5): 1103–21.
- Chapkovski, Philipp, and Max Schaub. 2022. "Solid Support or Secret Dissent? A List Experiment on Preference Falsification during the Russian War against Ukraine." *Research & Politics* 9 (2).
- Rosenfeld, Bryn. 2022. "Survey Research in Russia: In the Shadow of War." *Post-Soviet Affairs*: 1–11.
- Smetana, Michal, and Michal Onderco. 2022. "From Moscow with a Mushroom Cloud? Russian Public Attitudes to the Use of nuclear weapons in a Conflict With NATO." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (August).
- Hale, Henry E. 2018. "How Crimea Pays: Media, Rallying' Round the Flag, and Authoritarian Support." *Comparative Politics* 50 (3): 369–91.
- Chyzh, Olga V. 2022. "The Impact of Western Sanctions on Putin's War." *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique* 55 (2): 496–501.

Week 13 (Apr. 5) | NO CLASS (SHORT EXAM II)

Guidelines On the Review Articles

You may find some details/guidelines on the review article below:

Quality of critical engagement, argument, and evidence (50%)

1. You are expected to use only the recommended readings listed in your chosen week. Depending on your argument, you are expected to cite a minimum of 6-7 readings meaningfully. You will notice that the recommended readings are thematically clustered. You may use non-academic sources such as news articles. However, you are NOT allowed to cite other scholarly sources. This assignment aims to incentivize you to do these recommended readings and formulate an argument around them.
2. In your paper, you are expected to advance an argument. This essay is not just a summary of readings. Your paper must be argumentative. In other words, your paper should be an overall critique of the readings. Summarizing will lower your grade since it takes away valuable space from your arguments. The authors you read are often engaged in a conversation, whether implicitly or explicitly. Your goal is to participate in that conversation by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments. Feel free to drop by my office hours to discuss the argument you have in mind for the paper.
3. In political science, we primarily focus on three major independent variables and their impact on political phenomena: *institutions, interests, and ideas*. In the readings, which one is the predominant explanation? Does that account convince you? Is there anything missing? Are these findings generalizable? Under which conditions do you think the argument will hold? What is the empirical evidence that supports or challenges the arguments of these readings?
4. A well-crafted argumentative paper will show an excellent understanding of the arguments, draw specific parallels or highlight contrasts among them; focus on making solid and specific arguments about the readings; avoid summarizing, and offer precise, well-constructed, and substantiated arguments.
5. Your introduction must have a concise and clear thesis statement encapsulating the overall argument. Throughout, you must closely follow your thesis statement.
6. A coherent set of arguments and evidence should be deployed to support the thesis statement. Arguments and evidence must be sophisticated and persuasive. The connection between each supporting argument and the thesis statement should be clear. Connections to lecture conversations or recent news are highly encouraged.

Structure/Style (35%)

1. Your paper should be around 1500 words. There is a wiggle room of 10%.
2. An ideal introduction should be structured as follows: a) You should immediately start with a research question or puzzle. No long stories, overtures. b) Outline the debate. Briefly introduce different sides of the debate. c) What is your take on it? What is your thesis statement? Make sure your thesis has a causal mechanism, and it's clear and precise. d) Offer an argumentative road map for the rest of the paper.
3. The flow of your argumentation must be well-structured. There should be no jumps or gaps.
4. Each paragraph should have only one main idea and a clear topic sentence.
5. Double space, Times New Roman, 12 pt. Submit in .doc or .pdf format. You are responsible for ensuring that the files are not corrupt and submitting the documents by the deadline. Technical glitch is no excuse.

Citations/Grammar (15%)

1. You must cite properly and with **page numbers**. All materials that require citation should be cited. If an idea comes from a specific page, you must cite the page number. If there is no page number, then cite the paragraph number. Use [Chicago author-date citation style](#). I highly encourage you to use software such as [Zotero](#). Do not use outdated citation management websites.
2. Your writing must be clear and concise. Avoid long, convoluted sentences. Proofread before you submit. Make your writing as accessible as possible.

Guidelines On the Podcast Assignment

You may find some *technical guidelines* on the podcast below:

1. The podcast should be around half an hour long.
2. Make sure you collectively decide on the format of your podcast: you may interview multiple scholars/activists who specialize in your chosen topic, or you may come up with a conversational format in which you discuss the topic among yourselves. If you need help with reaching out to experts, let me know.
3. You should have a structure and a script to follow. Start with a music and host intro and attract your audience's attention. Inform us why this topic matters and why we should continue to listen to your podcast. Introduce us to the topic.
4. There should be at least two different segments in your podcast, covering different aspects of the topic, divided by a sound effect or music clip.
5. In the end, recap the conversation, and offer an overview.
6. Do not worry too much about the technicalities – what matters most is that you structure the podcast in advance and there is some resemblance to the podcast format. Otherwise, I don't expect you to produce high-tech, professional podcasts.

Regarding the *style* of your podcast:

1. Please just make sure that you canvass the relevant landscape well. Your conversation must rely on evidence and be theoretically informed. You must conduct some research beforehand on the topic. The podcast assignment is not just casual-daily conversation.
2. Your podcast should be engaging and informative. Let me hear your views on the topic. In other words, do not just pass on others' opinions – engage with the issue from your point of view.
3. Also, I want you to enjoy your collective work! Have fun! Get to know each other!

Here are some potential topics you may cover in your podcast, but feel free to come up with suggestions.

1. [Kenneth Waltz](#) published a controversial article a decade ago about the Iranian nuclear enrichment program and suggested that Iran should be allowed to develop nuclear capabilities for regional stability. A decade after, [the Iran Nuclear Deal has](#) collapsed, and there was a diplomatic stalemate in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Did sanctions pay off? Were they effective? Would international agreements with "strings attached" serve better to the international community?
2. Do autocrats comply with international rules and institutions? The trends suggest they do not. Very recently, Turkey has circumvented a [European Court of Human Rights](#) ruling on a prominent civil society activist by going around the court's decision with new criminal proceedings against him. What kind of tactics do autocrats employ to defy international institutions? Do they get away with it? Why?
3. Autocrats use electoral meddling to cause instability and trigger a public backlash in democratic countries. One such instance is [Russia's meddling in the U.S. elections](#). What have we learned so far? What are the effective strategies to fight misinformation campaigns? Can international institutions play a role there? Would [sanctions](#) work?

I will use the following *rubric* to grade your podcast: podcast structure (20%), style (20%), the quality of the content (60%).