# Using Splunk/ELK for Auditing AWS/GCP/Azure Security Posture

By Rod Soto and José Hernandez

#### \$Whoami

#### José Hernandez

Principal Security Researcher at Splunk. He started his professional career at Prolexic Technologies (now Akamai), fighting DDOS attacks against Fortune 100 companies perpetrated by "anonymous" and "lulzsec." As a engineering co-founder of Zenedge Inc. (acquired by Oracle Inc.), José helped build technologies to fight bots and web-application attacks. He has also built security operation centers and run a public threat-intelligence service.


#### **Rod Soto**

Principal Security Research Engineer at Splunk. Worked at Prolexic Technologies (now Akamai), and Caspida. Cofounder of Hackmiami and Pacific Hackers meetups and conferences. Creator of Kommand && KonTroll / NoQrtr-CTF.

#### Security in the Cloud...

- The cloud is prevalent and pervasive in all that we do.
- Cloud providers are not invulnerable and attacks against them affect our lives.
- As cloud adoption expands, there are an increasing number of new technologies and unknowns.
- Cloud security is not an exact translation of inside-the-perimeter security.
- Every provider has its own set of technologies, features, and security items.
- While there are several cloud-security initiatives, it is still an ongoing effort.
- There are a range of emerging tools designed to assess the cloud. We chose
   CS Suite because it helps analysts assess Azure, AWS, and GCP.

#### ...Security in the Cloud



# Microsoft and Amazon will fight for the Pentagon's \$10B cloud contract

Project JEDI has attracted some of the biggest tech names in the world.














# The Imaginary Line Between Provider And Customer

Responsibility per cloud service model	laaS (Infrastructure as a Service)	<b>PaaS</b> (Platform as a Service)	<b>SaaS</b> (Software as a Service)
GRC (Security Governance, Risk & Compliance)		tV	
Data Security	or Re	esponsibility	
Application Security	Customer		
Platform Security		cnonsibility	
Infrastructure Security	Shared Re	sponsibility Provider Responsi	bility
Physical Security		Provide	

## The Imaginary Line Is Not That Imaginary... AWS



#### Azure

Securing Azure resources is a shared responsibility between Microsoft and the customer




#### **GCP**

# Understanding shared responsibility

The **boundaries change** based on the services selected by the customer

Customers can use multiple classes of services **simultaneously** 





#### Cloud Attacks Highlights

- Sony (2011): 77M users
- ICloud (2014): The Fappening
- CloudHopper: (2014 2016 )(IBM, Fujitsu, NTT Data, Tata, HP, DXC, Dimension, CSC)
- Ashley Madison: (2015) / AFF (2015/2016)
- Equifax (2017): 143M customers
- HBO (2017): 1.5 TB of data stolen, including unreleased GoT
- Marriott (2018): 327M accounts
- Kubernetes: CVE-2018-1002105 (PrivEsc)
- Yup...2019 Capital One: 100M accounts

#### Main Cloud Attack Vectors CSA: "Treacherous 12"

- 1. Data breaches
- 2. Insufficient identity, credential, and access management
- Insecure interfaces and application-programming interfaces (APIs)
- 4. System vulnerabilities
- 5. Account hijacking
- 6. Malicious insiders

#### Main Cloud Attack Vectors CSA: Treacherous 12

- 7. Advanced persistent threats (APTs)
- 8. Data loss
- 9. Insufficient due diligence
- 10. Abuse and nefarious use of cloud services
- 11. Denial of Service (DoS)
- 12. Shared technology vulnerabilities

#### Main Targets of Cloud Attacks

- Users: ATO, key exfil, phishing
- Providers: AZ, AWS, GCP
- Admins: Like Domain Admin, they have access to all
- Resources: Cryptomining, DDoS for rent
- Data: Everyone's private life and work information
- Third parties Partner or co-tenant gets hacked, actor pivots to your cloud, attacks affecting IdP

### DevOps Attack Surface (CI/CD Pipeline)

- Source code repository: Bitbucket, Beanstalk, Github,
   Gitlab, SVN, S3 buckets
- CI/CD platform: TravisCI, Jenkins, CircleCI, Gitlab
- Container repository: Docker, Vagrant
- laaS Provider: Kubernetes flavor, OpenStack (this may also be local in some private, hybrid environments)
- IaC Ansible, Terraform, Chef, Cloudformation

## Main Cloud Attack Surface Segments

Internet/intranet client

HTTP, API, web services, web sockets

Compute backend, distributed processing CLAN/CWAN

Databases SQL/NOSQL Storage (block, object, file)

#### Can We Create Common Criteria For Cloud Security?







#### Common Criteria For Cloud Security

- 1. **Network:** External access, VLAN/VWAN, VPN, routing
- 2. **Security:** CIA → heavy emphasis in IAM, encryption, and FWs
- Compute: Artifacts such as virtual machines, containers, apps, microservices
- 4. Database: SQL, NOSQL
- 5. **Storage:** Basically buckets and file type storage (block, object, file)
- 6. **Management:** Kubernetes flavor, logging setup, Management access

## Compute

**AWS:** EC2, Lightsail, Lambda, Elastic Beanstalk, ECS, EKS, Batch, ECR, Kubernetes

**Azure:** Virtual machines (VMs), load balancers, app services, batch, Mesh, disks, Kubernetes

**GCP:** VM Instances, disks, snapshots, images, TPUs, metadata, zones, Kubernetes, "big data"

# Management

AWS: Console, CloudTrail, Config, OpsWorks, Systems Manager, CloudFormation, Kubernetes

**Azure:** Console, Monitor, Advisor, activity log, metrics, manage applications, solutions, Kubernetes

**GCP:** Console, StackDriver, audit logs, cloud tasks

### **Storage**

AWS: S3, EFS, FSx, S3 Glacier, storage gateway, AWS backup

Azure: Data Box, Storage explorer, StorSimple, Data Lake Storage

GCP: Bigtable, Buckets, DataStore, FireStore, Filestore, Spanner, Memorystore

# **Security**

**AWS:** IAM, Resource Access Manager, Secrets Manager, GuardDuty, AWS SSO, Certificate Manager, Key Management Service, Dir Service, WAF & Shield, Security Hub

Azure: Azure AD, Security Center (encryption, FW, WAF, etc.), Azure Vault

**GCP:** Security Command Center, Cloud Identity-Aware Proxy, Access Context Manager, VPC, Binary Authorization, Data Loss Prevention, cryptographic keys, Access Approval, Web Security Scanner

#### **Network**

**AWS:** VPC, CloudFront, Route53, API Gateway, Direct Connect, AWS App Mesh, AWS Cloud Map, Global Accelerator

**Azure:** Virtual Networks, Load Balancers, DNS zones, CDN, Traffic Manager, ExpressRoutes, IPs, route tables/filters, Virtual WANS, Network Interfaces

**GCP:** Virtual Private Cloud network, Network Services, Hybrid Connectivity, Network Service Tiers, network security

#### **Database**

AWS: RDS, DynamoDB, ElastiCache, Neptune, Amazon Redshift, Amazon QLDB, Amazon DocumentDB

Azure: SQL DB, Azure DB for PostGres/MariaDB, Redis, SQL Elastic pools, Cosmos DB

GCP: Datastore, BigQuery, MongoDB, PostgreSQL

#### **Enter Cloud Security Suite**

One-stop tool for auditing the security posture of AWS/GCP/Azure infrastructure

Gathers and presents unified information from the following tools:

- GScout
- Scout2
- Prowler
- Lynis
- Azure Audit template

```
# python cs.py -h
usage: cs.py [-h] -env {aws,gcp,azure} [-aip AUDIT IP] [-u USER NAME]
             [-pem PEM_FILE] [-p] [-pId PROJECT_ID] [-az_u AZURE_USER]
             [-az_p AZURE_PASS] [-o OUTPUT] [-w]
this is to get IP address for lynis audit only
optional arguments:
  -h, --help
                        show this help message and exit
  -env {aws,gcp,azure}, --environment {aws,gcp,azure}
                        The cloud on which the test-suite is to be run
  -aip AUDIT IP, --audit ip AUDIT IP
                        The IP for which lynis Audit needs to be done .... by
                        default tries root/Administrator if username not
                        provided
  -u USER_NAME, --user_name USER_NAME
                        The username of the user to be logged in, for a
                        specific user
  -pem PEM_FILE, --pem_file PEM_FILE
                        The pem file to access to AWS instance
                       hidden password prompt
  -p, --password
  -pId PROJECT ID, --project id PROJECT ID
                        Project ID for which GCP Audit needs to be run. Can be
                       retrivied using 'gcloud projects list'
  -az_u AZURE_USER, --azure_user AZURE_USER
                        username of azure account, optionally used if you want
                        to run the azure audit with no user interaction.
  -az_p AZURE_PASS, --azure_pass AZURE_PASS
                        username of azure password, optionally used if you
                        want to run the azure audit with no user interaction.
  -o OUTPUT, --output OUTPUT
                        writes a log in JSON of an audit, ideal for
                        consumptions into SIEMS like ELK and Splunk. Defaults
                        to cs-audit.log
                        rm -rf reports/ folder before executing an audit
```


#### Installation

#### Github <a href="https://github.com/SecurityFTW/cs-suite">https://github.com/SecurityFTW/cs-suite</a>


- We modified the original project to produce output logs that can be ingested by major SIEM frameworks.
- You will need CLI tools, accounts with read privileges, and an API token for authentication, in some cases.
- Your vision may vary, depending on segmented resources and organizational architecture.
- The tool, however, presents a nice report category interface.

#### **Azure Security Benchmarks**


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## GCP Security Benchmark




#### AWS Security Benchmarks



#### The Challenge Of Getting All These Sources Together...

- Logging in the cloud costs \$ and requires time for setup. It is not provided by default (CloudTrail, Stackdriver, Azure Monitor, GCP Stackdriver).
- A log indexing and data streaming pipeline infrastructure (Splunk/ELK) needs to be present.
- Architecture of streaming and storage
- A framework that allows analysis and further knowledge operation (basically SIEM).
- Most of the cloud providers have JSON output. Not all monitoring logs are in JSON file, but enough to get a first comprehensive approach.

#### Architectural Diagram





#### Integration with popular SIEMS Splunk/ELK

- Based on the common criteria items we can create **knowledge objects** that can allow the analyst have a better vision on cloud security resources
- Things such as dashboards, reports can help analysts make sense of the onslaught of logs coming from such disparate sources
- We can then create **alerts**, lookups and even SOAR **playbooks** that can help us **automate** from the onslaught of logs.


# ELK

```
filebeat.yml+
                                                                               buffers
  filebeat.inputs:
2 - type: log
    enabled: true
    paths:
       /Users/jhernandez/workspace/cs-suite/cs-audit.log
    json.keys_under_root: true
    json.add_error_key: true
  filebeat.config.modules:
    path: ${path.config}/modules.d/*.yml
    reload.enabled: true
  setup.template.settings:
   index.number_of_shards: 1
13 setup.kibana:
  output.elasticsearch:
      hosts: ["http://xxxxxx:9200"]
  processors:
    - add host metadata: ~
```





# Splunk



Cloud Security Cloud security alert reports		Edit Export ▼
Azure Audit  Azure Warnings		
message \$	value \$	type \$
azure report	Please manually check for approval for these extensions ['LinuxDiagnostic', 'AADLoginForLinux']	WARNING
azure report	The VM test27MS does not have DATA DISK ENCRYPTION enabled	WARNING
azure report	The VM test27MS does not have OS DISK ENCRYPTION enabled	WARNING
azure report	Network Watcher is not enabled for your account	WARNING
azure report	There is currently no RETENTION policy applied to the LOG PROFILE	WARNING
azure report	There is currently no LOG PROFILE enabled	WARNING
azure report	Security Phone Contact is NOT SET	WARNING
azure report	Please manually check for approval for these extensions ['LinuxDiagnostic', 'AADLoginForLinux']	WARNING
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WARNING

WARNING

WARNING


Network Watcher is not enabled for your account

There is currently no LOG PROFILE enabled


There is currently no RETENTION policy applied to the LOG PROFILE

azure report

azure report



1						/
service	category \$	check ¢	/	value \$	/	failed
AWS	management	VPC_AUDIT		YPC peering is not being used		126
AWS	network	DNS_AUDIT		Zone Z369YJTWBABSRQ does not have SPF records		126
AWS	management	EC2_AUDIT		List of servers which are not associated with IamInstanceProfile i-0214f3461d8233f89 i-0d215b965a3da9349		9
AWS	management	EC2_AUDIT		List of servers which are not associated with IamInstanceProfile i-032cca8fb4ba4edec i-04a190e3ce4d25077 i-0362d95285997f26c i-06cb4ed0d3c243625		9
AWS	management	EC2_AUDIT		List of servers which are not associated with IamInstanceProfile i-076b66a3c694f1bf2 i-0768634fa406c35ad i-0801bc23165219b23 i-09c953058ea2501d7 i-0e0beab03e9ce2c2 i-0c0545b0d2b9b995f i-01a61f61060427e93 i-091112a9022161fbd i-00200b0477e69a139 i-04f99731a2635615d i-0534f6e8c378dcab1 i-068d2e41aa2b45ee9 i-0f665f1db22bbf7eb i-049c0d64f4a3d3d4bb i-06e8c38d461a684c3 i-01b639c78f143cb8d i-0505cc5242663581d i-0a198803ab7bd7f21 i-0c8c413484cb4ab22 i-04367818f89def447 i-096990e79cb4f3e25 i-07f3e91c3e0a84afb i-0f797df509aef05fe i-05ef1782c9d6f4d59 i-0ba82e44961b83292 i-0369d190c6819e3f2 i-09214304072cacaef i-0e3a9c9b0680b256e i-0a85179f5b3db3399 i-0e21214b62e2f2d42 i-03ad46b3614f69c2a i-086d3c84d5f9871f0 i-08da33d259d0f43ed i-09c2f5bb0428fbfe8	F	9
AWS	management	EC2_AUDIT		List of servers which are not associated with IamInstanceProfile i-0fd9536bc75008fc4 i-09bb0f85f79d3fdb1 i-0c45edae77d43a24f i-0d16f5a7a6d0b3baa i-05a3d61c41b19fafci-096be2a451c0d4550 i-0bdd4301683739fc9 i-0e68687f113028ac3 i-07ca362e67af6c40d i-04251639cd0fa73ec i-05173c29d334c3024 i-069ebb62ac2293b8b	i	9
AWS	management	EC2_AUDIT		List of volumes which are not encrypted vol-08c6e0830e7624644 vol-09080ad8588dbae45 vol-08be57dcb9942835a vol-06e6245e5587c143e vol-0db0f4403130d49a9 vol-0787760cbcda96b84 vol-012e0a28becf29788 vol-0cd5f8f6f7831ae10 vol-02223daad40f136a4 vol-0c9da8dd870f0448f vol-03aa7ad25c6490503 vol-09544cbefaa324a3e vol-0ed5c00b95bdd0f25 vol-0ea3acd44562bc6cb vol-0adfcdf2c7873460c vol-00c24c617577a8ada vol-0c4023fb87b7c838e vol-034b976fd831adf0e vol-0566bad152bc4a7b0 vol-02db2830d8255e49b vol-02891fff6db2dcaa7 vol-071d738e79284035c vol-00d95f64ba07048b38 vol-01e6bc3c9624ecfda vol-00b1ad660557f37c4 vol-07d6f6906a4088a0e vol-05ccd5a5538ede24a vol-0b106021be382a72b vol-049332d21ec5e78e5 vol-052793cf160314b61 vol-07b1f2657da5eb0d1 vol-07d4c08abc45c3be8 vol-096532deb3cd9241a vol-0cfc3400ed9e5e91d vol-08c9432fa9dc17119 vol-0d0bb967b80cb0efd vol-0eabc7695867e5baa vol-0308689ca1af13500 vol-07cd109db48d8f0f5 vol-041192a8b728cb6c6 vol-07b10fba6b1df9409		9
AWS	management	EC2_AUDIT		List of volumes which are not encrypted vol-0bd8911a48a007884 vol-0aa9cf2d9cc666dd0 vol-0c16e1b50c7555cfb vol-07b89099e4c500722 vol-07ea1ba7c476226bc vol-0a9d2163a5e96bf76 vol-0e460f22d90b98431 vol-03af1cdec0329b8a2 vol-0d593cc46250d66ad vol-028bdd12cef67a811 vol-0c6e5f343863f86a7 vol-0b9171a891a77fb42 vol-0e1a07b90efb0ef90 vol-08510f368b89700e3 vol-0dcd7f5ebf4affb8f vol-03117163bb5a482cb vol-0d7e50dbde4da7bdd vol-070db88e0ab4b5c43 vol-0482e07faac36e980 vol-0af9463c2b8b6791a vol-01942c970916702df vol-01d2e55a5353a5b2b vol-07b374ba17dea5ea7 vol-0615dd99efecb5de9 vol-0d0e90bd5a4619632 vol-00c48720f785d79c6 vol-062f5c66c6d5ec163 vol-06477a662e2865afa		9
AWS	management	EC2_AUDIT		List of volumes which are not encrypted vol-0c903b77ef617073b vol-010c21cf5f91c6450 vol-080d70f5aff00d312 vol-0c3903c9822fd2804 vol-0b3add6a971486e2f vol-0b30b4bbbacb4745e vol-07b302087473d3104 vol-0914aa308684780dd vol-07a9eae44ed0d1a9d vol-06fa08da0faf888d6 vol-07f07cf73317fcf83 vol-08dad905b503cbb0d vol-0e9dbbf36f4cb3968 vol-018f7fd7d77da58b5 vol-0e35c221f63ba439e vol-00dd0a938ad6a90e6 vol-0747c83283a6842e9		9
AWS	management	EC2_AUDIT		List of volumes which are not encrypted vol-0e305cfe902905726 vol-0e6959f2b0cb30304		9
AWS	management	EC2_AUDIT	ıd seci	List of volumes which are not encrypted with KMS key are vol-08c6e0830e7624644 vol-09080ad8588dbae45 vol-08be57dcb9942835a vol-06e6245e5587c143e vol-09db0f4403130d49a9 vol-0787760cbcda96b84 vol-012e0a28becf29788 vol-0cd5f8f6f7831ae10 vol-02223daad40f136a4 vol-0c9da8dd870f0448f vol-03aa7ad25c6490503 vol-00544cbefaa324a3e vol-0ed5c00b95bd00f25 vol-0ea3acd44562bc6cb vol-0adfcdf2c7873460c vol-00c24c617577a8ada vol-0c4023fb87b7c838e vol-034b976fd831adf0e vol-0566bad152bc4a7b0 vol-02db2830d8255e49b vol-02891fff6db2dcaa7 vol-071d738e79284035c vol-0d95f64ba07048b38 vol-01e6bc3c9624ecfda vol-00b1ad660557f37c4 vol-07d6f6906a4088a0e vol-05ccd5a5538ede24a vol-0b106021be382a72b vol-049332d21ec5e78e5 vol-052793cf160314b61 vol-07b1f2657da5eb0d1 vol-07d4c08abc45c3be8 vol-096532deb3cd9241a vol-0cfc3400ed9e5e91d vol-08c9432fa9dc17119 vol-0d0bb967b80cb0efd vol-0eabc7695867e5baa vol-0308689ca1af13500 vol-07cd109db48d8f0f5		9



#### Q&A

#### **Thank You!**

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