

Economics of Spectrum Management

CYBR 4400/5400: Principles of Internet Policy, Lecture 4-3

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Today's Lecture

- Start recording!
- Remote learning
- Finish Spectrum Management Lecture
- Economics of Spectrum Management Lecture

Economics of Spectrum Management

Interference Policy

- Historically: poorly defined standard of "harmful interference"
 - Too stringent or lax guidelines: high opportunity costs
- Normative goal: Devise guidelines that maximize spectrum value by allowing diverse technologies to flourish and permit "right" level interference
 - Force incumbents to internalize opportunity costs

Interference Policy (cont'd)

- * Coase: "the gain from [allowing additional] interference more than offsets the harm it produces"
- Regulators must balance competing priorities
 - Lightsquared-GPS: need for greater spectrum efficiency vs. need to keep critical infrastructure operable
- * FCC yet to establish comprehensive interference policy

Goal of Spectrum Auctions: Competition in Wireless

- Multiple, facilities-based networks supporting improved redundancy and reliability
- * Rivalry on coverage, pricing, and service
- Encourages innovative services, terms, and applications
- Assign available spectrum to "highest valued" use
 - Maximize consumer value of wireless services less the cost of production

Using Auctions to Assign Spectrum

- Encouraging new entry for competition
 - Incumbent advantages of economies of scale and scope
 - Incumbent value driven in part by deterring new entry
- Should raising revenues be a goal?
 - Can reduce the amount of spectrum
 - Sell to a monopolist
- Low revenues bad if due to auction design, tacit collusion, or entry deterrence by incumbents

Market Failures to Consider

- Less natural monopoly (market concentration) in wireless — but network effects might be sufficient source of concern to merit some regulation
- Bidders private values may differ from social values (e.g., incumbent includes private value plus value of keeping it away from competitor)
- Policy instruments impact competition both in the auction and downstream market for wireless services

Current Setting

- Spectrum Auctions used to assign and price spectrum since 1994 in U.S.
 - About 90 auctions, raising over \$130B
 - Goal of economic efficiency: put the spectrum to highest-valued use
- Policy instruments for competition available to regulators using auctions
 - Set-asides
 - Bidding credits
 - Spectrum caps
 - Band plan design
 - Auction format
 - Antitrust enforcement

Designated Entities and Bidding Credits

- FCC auction authority stems from Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993: Revenue maximization is not to be the goal of auctions!
 - Section 309(j): FCC should ensure opportunity of small businesses, businesses owned by women and minorities, and rural telephone companies ("Designated Entities")
 - Supreme Court Adarand decision trimmed list to small businesses
- How do you define "small business"? Large company entering new market?
- * Bidding credits used assuming additional participation can increase revenues
 - Allows government to put a "face value" on some policy goal (e.g., new entrant)
 - * FCC auction evidence shows bidding credits typically "bid away" as qualified entities compete for licenses

Important to Enforce Rules



- In 2014, Northstar Wireless and SNR Wireless LicenseCo borrowed from Dish in exchange for Dish's de facto control
 - Also expected to qualify for FCC's bidding credits for small business (revenue below \$40M)
 - * FCC accepted their \$13.3B in bids but denied requests for \$3.3B in credits
- "2G Scam" in India in 2008 when Minister of Communications and IT forced "first come, first served" licensing scheme
 - Illegally undercharged major companies (\$28B) by tipping off favored companies to conditions required (all happened in matter of hours)
 - In 2011, Time listed scam at #2 of "Top 10 Abuses of Power" list, right behind Watergate!!!!

Sources of Spectrum: Reclaiming Government-Held Bands

- Government agencies do not internalize opportunity costs
- President's Council of Advisors in Science and Technology (PCAST) in July 2012
 - Comprehensive reallocation of federal spectrum not going to happen
 - "Norm for spectrum use...should be sharing, not exclusivity"
- Industry response: "Gold standard...remains cleared spectrum"