

sally1337 - StaticAuth — Reverse Engineering Write-up


Challenge link: <https://crackmes.one/crackme/6947f3c00c16072f40f5a2b0>

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Tools used: Binary Ninja

Platform	Difficulty	Quality	Arch	Language
Windows	2.0	4.0	x86-64	C/C++



Status: Complete

Goal: Document a clean path from initial recon → locating key-check logic → validation/reversal strategy

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1. Executive Summary

This crackme is a small *Windows x64* console binary that implements a “system authentication” prompt. The user is asked to enter an authentication code, with a limited number of attempts. The correct password is embedded in the binary in a lightly obfuscated form and is reconstructed at runtime using a few helper functions.

The imposed constraint for this challenge was to solve it purely using **static analysis**. No dynamic debugging, no stepping, and no tracing. I used **Binary Ninja (HLIL)** to follow the control flow, identify `main`, and reverse the flag-generation logic.

The end result of the analysis is the recovered authentication code:

► Click to reveal password

Static analysis alone was enough to:

- Find the input-handling and validation logic in `main`.
- Identify the helper routines that assemble the flag string.
- Confirm the expected program behaviour (attempt counter, lockout, success message).

- Verify that `goodjob123` is the correct authentication code.

1.1 Crackme Description

This is a classic, beginner-friendly reverse engineering challenge designed to teach static analysis techniques. A password is hidden within the binary using simple obfuscation methods. Your task is to analyze the executable *without running it*, locate the obfuscated data, reconstruct the correct key, and enter it into the program.

2. Target Overview

2.1 UI / Behaviour

As per the rules of the *crackme*, I am to analyse it *without running it*.

3. Tooling & Environment

- OS: *Windows 11*
- Decompiler: *Binary Ninja Free*

4. Static Recon

I didn't bother importing the binary into *CFF Explorer* this time as it was just purely static analysis.

5. Static Analysis

Loading up the *Portable Executable (PE)* within *Binary Ninja* I begin by targeting the *Symbols*.

Name	Address	Section
_start	0x140002a08	.text
std::Paralle...	0x140001000	.text
__scrt_acquir...	0x140002a68	.text
__scrt_releas...	0x140002c04	.text
sub_140001040	0x140001040	.text
std::exception...	0x140001060	.text
std::exception...	0x1400010b0	.text
sub_1400010d0	0x1400010d0	.text
stdext::threa...	0x140001100	.text
sub_140001120	0x140001120	.text
sub_140001160	0x140001160	.text
sub_1400011a0	0x1400011a0	.text
sub_1400011c0	0x1400011c0	.text
sub_1400012a0	0x1400012a0	.text
sub_140001490	0x140001490	.text
sub_1400015b0	0x1400015b0	.text
sub_140001ae0	0x140001ae0	.text
main	0x140001d40	.text
sub_140002050	0x140002050	.text
sub_140002220	0x140002220	.text
sub_1400023f0	0x1400023f0	.text
sub_140002430	0x140002430	.text
sub_140002450	0x140002450	.text
sub_1400024b0	0x1400024b0	.text
sub_140002520	0x140002520	.text
sub_140002560	0x140002560	.text
sub_1400026d0	0x1400026d0	.text
Sleep	0x1400026f4	.text
__security_ch...	0x140002710	.text
operator new(...	0x140002730	.text
sub_140002760	0x140002760	.text

I am trying to find where the entry point is. I try the following common symbols;

`entry`, `_start`, and `WinMainCRTStartup`. I get a hit on `_start`.

Name	Address	Section
_start	0x140002a08	.text
__scrt_acquir...	0x140002a68	.text
__scrt_releas...	0x140002c04	.text

Double clicking it opens up the `_start` function in the *High Level IL* view.

```
140002a08    int64_t _start()
140002a0c    sub_140002ca8()
140002a15    return __scrt_common_main_seh() __tailcall
```

Binary Ninja auto labels functions starting with the prefix `sub_`. The first function is just C Run Time (CRT) and initialization code. Double clicking on `__scrt_common_main_seh` lands me in that function where there should be a call to the `main` function somewhere.

```
1400028a7    if (__scrt_initialize_crt(1) == 0)
1400029e8        sub_140002dcc(7)
1400029e8        noreturn
1400029e8
1400028ad    int64_t rsi
1400028ad    rsi.b = 0
1400028b0    char var_18 = 0
1400028ba    int64_t rbx
1400028ba    rbx.b = __scrt_acquire_startup_lock()
1400028bc    int32_t rcx = data_140006120
1400028bc
1400028c5    if (rcx == 1)
1400029f3        sub_140002dcc(7)
1400029f3        noreturn
1400029f3
1400028cd    if (rcx != 0)
140002919        rsi.b = 1
14000291c        char var_18_1 = 1
1400028cd    else
1400028cf        data_140006120 = 1
1400028cf
1400028ee    if (_initterm_e(_First: &data_140004298, _Last:
&data_1400042b0) != 0)
1400028f0        return 0xff
1400028f0
140002908    _initterm(_First: &data_140004280, _Last: &data_140004290)
14000290d    data_140006120 = 2
14000290d
140002921    rcx.b = rbx.b
140002923    __scrt_release_startup_lock(rcx.b)
140002923
140002934    if (data_1400061a8 != 0
```

```
140002934          &&
__scrt_is_nonwritable_in_current_image(&data_1400061a8) != 0)
14000294e          data_1400061a8(0, 2, 0)
14000294e
140002960          if (data_1400061a0 != 0
140002960          &&
__scrt_is_nonwritable_in_current_image(&data_1400061a0) != 0)
140002971          _register_thread_local_exe_atexit_callback(_Callback:
data_1400061a0)
140002971
140002976          _get_initial_narrow_environment()
140002983          *__p___argv()
140002991          *__p___argc()
140002993          main()
140002993
1400029a1          if (sub_140002ddc() == 0)
1400029fa          exit(_Except: 0)
1400029fa          noreturn
1400029fa
1400029a6          if (rsi.b == 0)
1400029a8          _cexit()
1400029a8
1400029b1          __scrt_uninitialize_crt(1, 0)
1400029b6          return 0
```

Bingo!

```
140002993          main()
```

Double clicking it lands us in `main`.

Boy that's a long function.

```
140001d57          void var_a8
140001d57          int64_t rax_1 = __security_cookie ^ &var_a8
140001d60          int32_t var_88 = 0
140001d71          sub_140002050(std::cout, "System authentication required.\n")
140001d76          int32_t r15 = 3
140001d7c          int64_t r14
140001d7c          r14.b = 0
140001d7c
140001d83          while (r14.b == 0)
140001d97          sub_140002050(std::cout, "\nEnter authentication code: ")
```

```
140001da0        int128_t var_80 = zx.o(0)
140001da4        char* rbx_1 = nullptr
140001da6        char* var_70_1 = nullptr
140001daa        int64_t rdi_1 = 0xf
140001daf        int64_t var_68_1 = 0xf
140001db3        var_80.b = 0
140001db9        int32_t var_88_1 = 1
140001dbc        char i_2
140001dbc        int64_t rdx_1
140001dbc        int64_t r8_1
140001dbc        i_2, rdx_1, r8_1 = _getch()
140001dc2        char i_1 = i_2
140001dc2
140001dc6        if (i_2 != 0xd)
140001e5e        char i
140001e5e
140001e5e        do
140001dd3        if (i_1 != 8)
140001e0c        if (i_1 - 0x20 u<= 0x5e)
140001e11        if (rbx_1 u>= rdi_1)
140001e3a        sub_140002560(&var_80, rdx_1, r8_1, i_1)
140001e11        else
140001e17        var_70_1 = &rbx_1[1]
140001e1b        char* rax_5 = &var_80
140001e1b
140001e23        if (rdi_1 u> 0xf)
140001e23        rax_5 = var_80.q
140001e23
140001e28        *(rax_5 + rbx_1) = i_1
140001e2b        *(rax_5 + rbx_1 + 1) = 0
140001e2b
140001e46        sub_140002220(std::cout)
140001e4b        rbx_1 = var_70_1
140001e4f        rdi_1 = var_68_1
140001dd3        else if (rbx_1 != 0)
140001ddd        var_70_1 = rbx_1 - 1
140001de1        int128_t* rax_2 = &var_80
140001de1
140001de9        if (rdi_1 u> 0xf)
140001de9        rax_2 = var_80.q
140001de9
140001dee        *(rbx_1 - 1 + rax_2) = 0
140001e00        sub_140002050(std::cout, &data_1400043a0)
140001e4b        rbx_1 = var_70_1
```

```
140001e4f          rdi_1 = var_68_1
140001e4f
140001e53          i, rdx_1, r8_1 = _getch()
140001e59          i_1 = i
140001e5e          while (i != 0xd)
140001e5e
140001e72          std::ostream::operator<<(this: std::cout, sub_1400023f0)
140001e7c          int128_t var_60
140001e7c          sub_1400015b0(&var_60)
140001e88          int64_t var_50
140001e88          char* rbx_3
140001e88          int64_t var_48
140001e88
140001e88          if (rbx_1 == var_50)
140001ece          int64_t rdx_5 = 0
140001ed0          rbx_3 = var_80.q
140001ed8          int128_t* r8_2 = var_60.q
140001ed8
140001edf          if (var_50 == 0)
140001f1d          label_140001f1d:
140001f1d
140001f21          if (var_48 <= 0xf)
140001f54          r14.b = 1
140001f57          sub_140001ae0()
140001f21          else
140001f2e          if (var_48 + 1 >= 0x1000)
140001f30          int128_t* rax_9 = *(r8_2 - 8)
140001f30
140001f3f          if (r8_2 - rax_9 - 8 > 0x1f)
140002038          trap(0xd)
140002038
140001f49          r8_2 = rax_9
140001f49
140001f4f          sub_140002774(_Block: r8_2)
140001f54          r14.b = 1
140001f57          sub_140001ae0()
140001edf          else
140001ef0          while (true)
140001ef0          char* rcx_10 = &var_80
140001ef0
140001ef8          if (rdi_1 > 0xf)
140001ef8          rcx_10 = rbx_3
140001ef8
140001efc          int128_t* rax_7 = &var_60
```

```
140001efc
140001f04          if (var_48 > 0xf)
140001f04          rax_7 = r8_2
140001f04
140001f0f          if (rcx_10[rdx_5] != *(rax_7 + rdx_5))
140001f0f          break
140001f0f
140001f15          rdx_5 += 1
140001f15
140001f1b          if (rdx_5 >= var_50)
140001f1b          goto label_140001f1d
140001f1b
140001fe9          if (var_48 <= 0xf)
140002018          r15 -= 1
140002029          sub_140002050(std::cout, "Authentication
failed.\n")
140001fe9          else
140001ff6          if (var_48 + 1 >= 0x1000)
140001ff8          int128_t* rax_12 = *(r8_2 - 8)
140001ff8
140002007          if (r8_2 - rax_12 - 8 > 0x1f)
140002038          trap(0xd)
140002038
14000200d          r8_2 = rax_12
14000200d
140002013          sub_140002774(_Block: r8_2)
140002018          r15 -= 1
140002029          sub_140002050(std::cout, "Authentication
failed.\n")
140001e88          else
140001e92          if (var_48 > 0xf)
140001e97          void* rcx_7 = var_60.q
140001e97
140001ea2          if (var_48 + 1 >= 0x1000)
140001ea4          void* rax_6 = *(rcx_7 - 8)
140001ea4
140001eb3          if (rcx_7 - rax_6 - 8 > 0x1f)
140002038          trap(0xd)
140002038
140001ebd          rcx_7 = rax_6
140001ebd
140001ec0          sub_140002774(_Block: rcx_7)
140001ec0
140001ec5          rbx_3 = var_80.q
```

```

140002018          r15 -= 1
140002029          sub_140002050(std::cout, "Authentication failed.\n")
140002029
140001f63          if (rdi_1 > 0xf)
140001f70          if (rdi_1 + 1 >= 0x1000)
140001f72          char* rax_10 = *(rbx_3 - 8)
140001f72
140001f81          if (rbx_3 - rax_10 - 8 > 0x1f)
14000203f          trap(0xd)
14000203f
140001f8b          rbx_3 = rax_10
140001f8b
140001f91          sub_140002774(_Block: rbx_3)
140001f91
140001f99          if (r15 <= 0)
140001fa2          if (r14.b == 0)
140001fb2          sub_140002050(std::cout, "\nMaximum attempts
reached.\n")
140001fc5          sub_140002050(std::cout, "System locked.\n")
140001fc5
140001fa2          break
140001fa2
140001fd3          __security_check_cookie(rax_1 ^ &var_a8)
140001fe4          return 0

```

Analysing the code I can see that upon running it we should be greeted with the following messages where it prompts us for an authentication code.

System authentication required

Enter authentication code:

It seems to create a while loop that loops until `r14` is toggled to 1 (true). I go ahead and rename `r14` to `break_loop`.

I notice that the user input is being captured one character at a time and stored into `i_2`, which I rename to `char_input`. `char_input` is being copied into `rcx_2`, which I rename to `char_input_copy`.

```
140001dbc          i_2 = _getch();
140001dc2          char rcx_2 = i_2;
```

Followed by the first conditional within the *while* loop which checks for the *carriage return symbol* `0xD` (13).

```
140001dc6          if (i_2 != 0xd)
```

We have another character definition, `i`. Looking further into where this character is used it seems to be doing the same task as `char_input`. So I rename it to `char_input2`.

```
140001e5e          char i;
```

This definition is followed by another *do while* loop.

```
140001e5e          do
140001e5e          {
140001dd3          if (char_input_copy != 8)
140001dd3          {
140001e0c          if (char_input_copy - 0x20 <= 0x5e)
140001e0c          {
140001e11          if (rbx_1 >= rdi_1)
140001e3a          sub_140002560(&var_80, rdx_1, r8_1,
char_input_copy);
140001e11          else
140001e11          {
140001e17          var_70_1 = &rbx_1[1];
140001e1b          char* rax_5 = &var_80;
140001e1b
140001e23          if (rdi_1 > 0xf)
140001e23          rax_5 = (uint64_t)var_80;
140001e23
140001e28          *(uint8_t*)(rax_5 + rbx_1) =
char_input_copy;
140001e2b          *(uint8_t*)(rax_5 + rbx_1 + 1) = 0;
140001e11          }
140001e11
140001e46          sub_140002220(std::cout);
140001e4b          rbx_1 = var_70_1;
```

```
140001e4f          rdi_1 = var_68_1;
140001e0c          }
140001dd3          }
140001dd3          else if (rbx_1)
140001dd8          {
140001ddd          var_70_1 = rbx_1 - 1;
140001de1          int128_t* rax_2 = &var_80;
140001de1
140001de9          if (rdi_1 > 0xf)
140001de9          rax_2 = (uint64_t)var_80;
140001de9
140001dee          *(uint8_t*)(rbx_1 - 1 + rax_2) = 0;
140001e00          sub_140002050(std::cout, &data_1400043a0);
140001e4b          rbx_1 = var_70_1;
140001e4f          rdi_1 = var_68_1;
140001dd8          }
140001dd8
140001e53          char_input2 = _getch();
140001e59          char_input_copy = char_input2;
140001e5e          } while (char_input2 != 0xd);
```

At the end of the loop we can see `char_input2` being used in the same way `char_input` was.

```
140001e53          char_input2 = _getch();
140001e59          char_input_copy = char_input2;
```

The *do while* loop also breaks when `char_input2 == 0xD`.

```
140001e5e          } while (char_input2 != 0xd);
```

The first conditional in the loop seems to check if the input character is a *backspace* (`0x8`). If it is and `rbx_1` is assigned, we do *something*. This *something* is actually just checking if we already have an input and if backspace is pressed, then delete a character off the stored input.

If it is not a *backspace character*, grab the character input, subtract `0x20` and check if it is equal or less than `0x5E`.

```
140001e0c          if (char_input_copy - 0x20 <= 0x5E)
```

This is an interesting check.

`char_input_copy - 0x20 <= 0x5e` is mathematically the same as `0x20 <= char_input_copy <= 0x7e`.

So, with that, we can deduce that this conditional is verifying that the input character is within `0x20` (32) and `0x7E` (126). Which is the printable character set, see [ASCII table](#) for a visual reference.

If the user has entered in a valid character another check is performed to see if the length of the input buffer has reached its capacity.

```
140001e11           if (len >= capacity)
```

If the capacity has not been reached append the current character input onto the input buffer.

Otherwise, add a null-terminator to the end of the input buffer. This is mostly boilerplate code.

```
140001e11           if (len >= capacity)
140001e3a           sub_140002560(&var_80, rdx_1, r8_1,
char_input_copy);
140001e11           else
140001e11           {
140001e17           len_1 = &len[1];
140001e1b           int128_t* rax_5 = &var_80;
140001e1b
140001e23           if (capacity > 0xf)
140001e23           rax_5 = (uint64_t)var_80;
140001e23
140001e28           *(uint8_t*)((char*)rax_5 + len) =
char_input_copy;
140001e2b           *(uint8_t*)((char*)rax_5 + len + 1) = 0;
140001e11           }
```

So, with that I deduce that the first *do while* loop is just responsible for gathering the input from the user.

We can think of that whole loop as the following *Pseudo-C* code:

```
std::string input;
while (true) {
```

```

char ch = _getch();

if (ch == '\r') break; // Enter

if (ch == '\b') {
    if (!input.empty()) {
        input.pop_back();
        // print some backspace effect
    }
} else if (isprint((unsigned char)ch)) {
    input.push_back(ch); // grow if needed
    // print masking char / echo
}
}

```

I do a quick scan through the rest of the while loop and a conditional at the end catches my eye.

140001f99	if (r15 <= 0)
140001f99	{
140001fa2	if (!(uint8_t)break_loop)
140001fa2	{
140001fb2	sub_140002050(std::cout, "\nMaximum attempts reached.\n");
140001fc5	sub_140002050(std::cout, "System Locked.\n");
140001fa2	}
140001fa2	
140001fa2	break;
140001f99	}

From this it is clear that `r15` is an attempt counter of some sort, so I rename it to `attempt_counter`. It is 3 upon initialization.

If all attempts are used up the user should see the following displayed on the console.

Maximum attempts reached.
System locked.\n

The next conditional after the *do while* loop compares the length of the user input against `var_50`.

```
140001e88      if (len == var_50)
```

If the length does not match then the authentication fails and the user will have `Authentication failed.` output to the console.

```
140001e88      else
140001e88      {
140001e92          if (var_48 > 0xf)
140001e92          {
140001e97              void* rcx_7 = (uint64_t)var_60;
140001e97
140001ea2          if (var_48 + 1 >= 0x1000)
140001ea2          {
140001ea4              void* rax_6 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)rcx_7 - 8);
140001ea4
140001eb3          if ((char*)rcx_7 - rax_6 - 8 > 0x1f)
140002038              trap(0xd);
140002038
140001ebd          rcx_7 = rax_6;
140001ea2      }
140001ea2
140001ec0          sub_140002774(rcx_7);
140001e92      }
140001e92
140001ec5          rbx_2 = (uint64_t)var_80;
140002018          attempt_counter -= 1;
140002029          sub_140002050(std::cout, "Authentication failed.\n");
140001e88      }
```

Upon further analysis, it seems that `var_50` is actually the length of the flag that is being compared against, while `var_60` is the actual flag. I go ahead and rename them `flag_len` and `flag` respectively.

If the length does match, then the following code gets executed.

```
140001ece      int64_t rdx_5 = 0;
```

```
140001ed0          rbx_2 = (uint64_t)var_80;
140001ed8          int128_t* r8_2 = (uint64_t)var_60;
140001ed8
140001edf          if (!var_50)
140001edf          {
140001f1d          label_140001f1d:
140001f1d
140001f21          if (var_48 <= 0xf)
140001f21          {
140001f54          (uint8_t)break_loop = 1;
140001f57          sub_140001ae0();
140001f21          }
140001f21          else
140001f21          {
140001f2e          if (var_48 + 1 >= 0x1000)
140001f2e          {
140001f30          int128_t* rax_9 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)r8_2 -
8);
140001f30
140001f3f          if ((char*)r8_2 - rax_9 - 8 > 0x1f)
140002038          trap(0xd);
140002038
140001f49          r8_2 = rax_9;
140001f2e          }
140001f2e
140001f4f          sub_140002774(r8_2);
140001f54          (uint8_t)break_loop = 1;
140001f57          sub_140001ae0();
140001f21          }
140001edf          }
140001edf          else
140001edf          {
140001ef0          while (true)
140001ef0          {
140001ef0          char* rcx_10 = &var_80;
140001ef0
140001ef8          if (capacity > 0xf)
140001ef8          rcx_10 = rbx_2;
140001ef8
140001efc          int128_t* rax_7 = &var_60;
140001efc
140001f04          if (var_48 > 0xf)
140001f04          rax_7 = r8_2;
140001f04
```

```

140001f0f           if (rcx_10[rdx_5] != *(uint8_t*)((char*)rax_7 +
rdx_5))
140001f0f           break;
140001f0f
140001f15           rdx_5 += 1;
140001f15
140001f1b           if (rdx_5 >= var_50)
140001f1b           goto label_140001f1d;
140001ef0           }
140001ef0
140001fe9           if (var_48 <= 0xf)
140001fe9           {
140002018           attempt_counter -= 1;
140002029           sub_140002050(std::cout, "Authentication
failed.\n");
140001fe9           }
140001fe9           else
140001fe9           {
140001ff6           if (var_48 + 1 >= 0x1000)
140001ff6           {
140001ff8           int128_t* rax_12 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)r8_2
- 8);
140001ff8
140002007           if ((char*)r8_2 - rax_12 - 8 > 0x1f)
140002038           trap(0xd);
140002038
14000200d           r8_2 = rax_12;
140001ff6           }
140001ff6
140002013           sub_140002774(r8_2);
140002018           attempt_counter -= 1;
140002029           sub_140002050(std::cout, "Authentication
failed.\n");
140001fe9           }
140001edf           }

```

Function `sub_14001ae0` prints out the validation successful message, so I rename it to `validation_successful`. It seems that the important check is the following *if* statement.

```

140001f21           if (var_48 <= 0xf)
140001f21           {

```

```

140001f54          (uint8_t)break_loop = 1;
140001f57          validation_successful();
140001f21          }
140001f21          else
140001f21          {
140001f2e          if (var_48 + 1 >= 0x1000)
140001f2e          {
140001f30          int128_t* rax_9 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)r8_2 -
8);
140001f30
140001f3f          if ((char*)r8_2 - rax_9 - 8 > 0x1f)
140002038          trap(0xd);
140002038
140001f49          r8_2 = rax_9;
140001f2e          }
140001f2e
140001f4f          sub_140002774(r8_2);
140001f54          (uint8_t)break_loop = 1;
140001f57          validation_successful();
140001f21          }

```

So in order to get to the validation successful branch, we need to pass the following conditionals.

```

140001e88          if (len == var_50)
140001edf          if (!var_50)

```

As it seems that the final *if else* doesn't matter as both branches go towards a successful validation.

Which means we now have another function to decode. For readability I rename the function `sub_1400015b0` to `get_flag`.

```
140001e7c          sub_1400015b0(&var_60);
```

5.1 sub_1400015b0 - get_flag

It seems there is a common trend that these functions are quite long in the decompiler.

```
1400015b0    {
1400015b0        void** result = arg1;
1400015c0        int128_t* var_10 = arg1;
1400015c6        int32_t var_38 = 0;
1400015cc        *(uint128_t*)arg1 = {0};
1400015cf        arg1[1] = 0;
1400015d3        *(uint64_t*)((char*)arg1 + 0x18) = 0xf;
1400015db        *(uint8_t*)arg1 = 0;
1400015dd        int32_t var_38_1 = 1;
1400015e8        void* var_30;
1400015e8        int128_t* rax;
1400015e8        int64_t r8;
1400015e8        rax = sub_1400012a0(&var_30);
1400015e8
1400015f3        if (*(uint64_t*)((char*)rax + 0x18) > 0xf)
1400015f5            rax = *(uint64_t*)rax;
1400015f5
1400015f8        char r9 = *(uint8_t*)rax;
1400015fc        char* rcx_1 = result[2];
140001600        int64_t rdx = result[3];
140001600
140001607        if (rcx_1 >= rdx)
14000162b            sub_140002560(result, rdx, r8, r9);
140001607        else
140001607        {
14000160d            result[2] = &rcx_1[1];
140001611            void** result_1 = result;
140001611
140001618            if (rdx > 0xf)
14000161a                result_1 = *(uint64_t*)result;
14000161a
14000161d                *(uint8_t*)(rcx_1 + result_1) = r9;
140001621                *(uint8_t*)(rcx_1 + result_1 + 1) = 0;
140001607        }
140001607
140001639        int64_t var_18;
140001639
140001639        if (var_18 <= 0xf)
```

```
140001639         goto label_140001672;
140001639
14000163b         void* rax_2 = var_30;
140001649         void* rcx_3;
140001649
140001649         if (var_18 + 1 < 0x1000)
140001649         {
140001666             rcx_3 = rax_2;
140001669             label_140001669:
140001669             sub_140002774(rcx_3);
140001672             label_140001672:
140001672             int128_t* rax_5;
140001672             int64_t r8_1;
140001672             rax_5 = sub_1400012a0(&var_30);
140001672
14000167d         if (*(uint64_t*)((char*)rax_5 + 0x18) > 0xf)
14000167f             rax_5 = *(uint64_t*)rax_5;
14000167f
140001682         char r9_1 = *(uint8_t*)((char*)rax_5 + 1);
140001687         char* rcx_5 = result[2];
14000168b         int64_t rdx_4 = result[3];
14000168b
140001692         if (rcx_5 >= rdx_4)
1400016b6             sub_140002560(result, rdx_4, r8_1, r9_1);
140001692         else
140001692         {
140001698             result[2] = &rcx_5[1];
14000169c             void** result_2 = result;
14000169c
1400016a3         if (rdx_4 > 0xf)
1400016a5             result_2 = *(uint64_t*)result;
1400016a5
1400016a8             *(uint8_t*)(rcx_5 + result_2) = r9_1;
1400016ac             *(uint8_t*)(rcx_5 + result_2 + 1) = 0;
140001692         }
140001692
1400016c4         if (var_18 <= 0xf)
1400016c4             goto label_1400016fd;
1400016c4
1400016c6         void* rax_7 = var_30;
1400016d4         void* rcx_7;
1400016d4
1400016d4         if (var_18 + 1 < 0x1000)
1400016d4         {
```

```
1400016f1          rcx_7 = rax_7;
1400016f4          label_1400016f4:
1400016f4          sub_140002774(rcx_7);
1400016fd          label_1400016fd:
1400016fd          int128_t* rax_10;
1400016fd          int64_t r8_2;
1400016fd          rax_10 = sub_1400012a0(&var_30);
1400016fd
140001708          if (*(uint64_t*)((char*)rax_10 + 0x18) > 0xf)
14000170a          rax_10 = *(uint64_t*)rax_10;
14000170a
14000170d          char r9_2 = *(uint8_t*)((char*)rax_10 + 2);
140001712          int64_t rcx_9 = result[2];
140001716          int64_t rdx_8 = result[3];
140001716
14000171d          if (rcx_9 >= rdx_8)
140001741          r8_2 = sub_140002560(result, rdx_8, r8_2, r9_2);
14000171d          else
14000171d          {
140001723          result[2] = rcx_9 + 1;
140001727          void** result_3 = result;
140001727
14000172e          if (rdx_8 > 0xf)
140001730          result_3 = *(uint64_t*)result;
140001730
140001733          *(uint8_t*)((char*)result_3 + rcx_9) = r9_2;
140001737          *(uint8_t*)((char*)result_3 + rcx_9 + 1) = 0;
14000171d          }
14000171d
14000174f          if (var_18 <= 0xf)
14000174f          goto label_140001788;
14000174f
140001751          void* rax_12 = var_30;
14000175f          void* rcx_11;
14000175f
14000175f          if (var_18 + 1 < 0x1000)
14000175f          {
14000177c          rcx_11 = rax_12;
14000177f          label_14000177f:
14000177f          r8_2 = sub_140002774(rcx_11);
140001788          label_140001788:
140001788          var_30 = {0};
14000178c          int64_t var_18_1 = 0xf;
140001794          int32_t var_38_2 = 3;
```

```
14000179b          __builtin_strncpy(&var_30, "djob", 5);
1400017a2          int64_t var_20_1 = 4;
1400017ae          int64_t rcx_12 = result[2];
1400017b2          int64_t rdx_12 = result[3];
1400017b2
1400017b9          if (rcx_12 >= rdx_12)
1400017dd          r8_2 = sub_140002560(result, rdx_12, r8_2,
0x64);
1400017b9          else
1400017b9          {
1400017bf          result[2] = rcx_12 + 1;
1400017c3          void** result_4 = result;
1400017c3
1400017ca          if (rdx_12 > 0xf)
1400017cc          result_4 = *(uint64_t*)result;
1400017cc
1400017cf          *(uint16_t*)((char*)result_4 + rcx_12) = 0x64;
1400017b9          }
1400017b9
1400017e6          var_30 = {0};
1400017ea          int64_t var_18_2 = 0xf;
1400017f2          int32_t var_38_3 = 5;
1400017f9          __builtin_strncpy(&var_30, "djob", 5);
140001800         int64_t var_20_2 = 4;
14000180c         int64_t rcx_14 = result[2];
140001810         int64_t rdx_13 = result[3];
140001810
140001817         if (rcx_14 >= rdx_13)
14000183b         r8_2 = sub_140002560(result, rdx_13, r8_2,
0xa);
140001817         else
140001817         {
14000181d         result[2] = rcx_14 + 1;
140001821         void** result_5 = result;
140001821
140001828         if (rdx_13 > 0xf)
14000182a         result_5 = *(uint64_t*)result;
14000182a
14000182d         *(uint16_t*)((char*)result_5 + rcx_14) = 0xa;
140001817         }
140001817
140001844         var_30 = {0};
140001848         int64_t var_18_3 = 0xf;
140001850         int32_t var_38_4 = 9;
```

```
140001857          __builtin_strncpy(&var_30, "djob", 5);
14000185e          int64_t var_20_3 = 4;
14000186a          int64_t rcx_16 = result[2];
14000186e          int64_t rdx_14 = result[3];
14000186e
140001875          if (rcx_16 >= rdx_14)
140001899              r8_2 = sub_140002560(result, rdx_14, r8_2,
0x6f);
140001875          else
140001875          {
14000187b              result[2] = rcx_16 + 1;
14000187f              void** result_6 = result;
14000187f
140001886          if (rdx_14 > 0xf)
140001888              result_6 = *(uint64_t*)result;
140001888
14000188b          *(uint16_t*)((char*)result_6 + rcx_16) = 0x6f;
140001875      }
140001875
1400018a2          var_30 = {0};
1400018a6          int64_t var_18_4 = 0xf;
1400018ae          int32_t var_38_5 = 0x11;
1400018b5          __builtin_strncpy(&var_30, "djob", 5);
1400018bc          int64_t var_20_4 = 4;
1400018c8          int64_t rcx_18 = result[2];
1400018cc          int64_t rdx_15 = result[3];
1400018cc
1400018d3          if (rcx_18 >= rdx_15)
1400018f7              sub_140002560(result, rdx_15, r8_2, 0x62);
1400018d3          else
1400018d3          {
1400018d9              result[2] = rcx_18 + 1;
1400018dd              void** result_7 = result;
1400018dd
1400018e4          if (rdx_15 > 0xf)
1400018e6              result_7 = *(uint64_t*)result;
1400018e6
1400018e9          *(uint16_t*)((char*)result_7 + rcx_18) = 0x62;
1400018d3      }
1400018d3
1400018fc          int32_t var_38_6 = 1;
140001907          int64_t* rax_19;
140001907          int64_t r8_3;
140001907          rax_19 = sub_140001490(&var_30);
```

```
140001907
140001912             if (rax_19[3] > 0xf)
140001914                 rax_19 = *(uint64_t*)rax_19;
140001914
140001917                 char r9_3 = *(uint8_t*)rax_19;
14000191b                 int64_t rcx_21 = result[2];
14000191f                 int64_t rdx_16 = result[3];
14000191f
140001926                 if (rcx_21 >= rdx_16)
14000194a                     sub_140002560(result, rdx_16, r8_3, r9_3);
140001926                 else
140001926                 {
14000192c                     result[2] = rcx_21 + 1;
140001930                     void** result_8 = result;
140001930
140001937                     if (rdx_16 > 0xf)
140001939                         result_8 = *(uint64_t*)result;
140001939
14000193c                         *(uint8_t*)((char*)result_8 + rcx_21) = r9_3;
140001940                         *(uint8_t*)((char*)result_8 + rcx_21 + 1) = 0;
140001926                     }
140001926
140001958                 if (var_18_4 <= 0xf)
140001958                     goto label_140001991;
140001958
14000195a                     void* rax_21 = var_30;
140001968                     void* rcx_23;
140001968
140001968                 if (var_18_4 + 1 < 0x1000)
140001968                 {
140001985                     rcx_23 = rax_21;
140001988                     label_140001988:
140001988                         sub_140002774(rcx_23);
140001991                     label_140001991:
140001991                         int64_t* rax_24;
140001991                         int64_t r8_4;
140001991                         rax_24 = sub_140001490(&var_30);
140001991
14000199c                         if (rax_24[3] > 0xf)
14000199e                             rax_24 = *(uint64_t*)rax_24;
14000199e
1400019a1                         char r9_4 = *(uint8_t*)((char*)rax_24 + 1);
1400019a6                         int64_t rcx_25 = result[2];
1400019aa                         int64_t rdx_20 = result[3];
```

```
1400019aa
1400019b1           if (rcx_25 >= rdx_20)
1400019d5           sub_140002560(result, rdx_20, r8_4, r9_4);
1400019b1           else
1400019b1           {
1400019b7           result[2] = rcx_25 + 1;
1400019bb           char* result_9 = result;
1400019bb
1400019c2           if (rdx_20 > 0xf)
1400019c4           result_9 = *(uint64_t*)result;
1400019c4
1400019c7           result_9[rcx_25] = r9_4;
1400019cb           result_9[rcx_25 + 1] = 0;
1400019b1           }
1400019b1
1400019e3           if (var_18_4 <= 0xf)
1400019e3           goto label_140001a1c;
1400019e3
1400019e5           void* rax_26 = var_30;
1400019f3           void* rcx_27;
1400019f3
1400019f3           if (var_18_4 + 1 < 0x1000)
1400019f3           {
140001a10          rcx_27 = rax_26;
140001a13          label_140001a13:
140001a13          sub_140002774(rcx_27);
140001a1c          label_140001a1c:
140001a1c          int64_t* rax_29;
140001a1c          int64_t r8_5;
140001a1c          rax_29 = sub_140001490(&var_30);
140001a1c
140001a27          if (rax_29[3] > 0xf)
140001a29          rax_29 = *(uint64_t*)rax_29;
140001a29
140001a2c          char r9_5 = *(uint8_t*)((char*)rax_29 + 2);
140001a31          char* rcx_29 = result[2];
140001a35          int64_t rdx_24 = result[3];
140001a35
140001a3c          if (rcx_29 >= rdx_24)
140001a6b          sub_140002560(result, rdx_24, r8_5,
r9_5);
140001a3c          else
140001a3c          {
140001a42          result[2] = &rcx_29[1];
```

```
140001a42
140001a4a          if (rdx_24 <= 0xf)
140001a4a          {
140001a5d          *(uint8_t*)(rcx_29 + result) = r9_5;
140001a61          *(uint8_t*)(rcx_29 + result + 1) =
0;
140001a4a          }
140001a4a          else
140001a4a          {
140001a4c          void* rax_31 = *(uint64_t*)result;
140001a4f          *(uint8_t*)(rcx_29 + rax_31) = r9_5;
140001a53          *(uint8_t*)(rcx_29 + rax_31 + 1) =
0;
140001a4a          }
140001a3c          }
140001a3c
140001a79          if (var_18_4 <= 0xf)
140001acf          return result;
140001acf
140001a7b          void* rax_33 = var_30;
140001a7b
140001a89          if (var_18_4 + 1 < 0x1000)
140001a89          {
140001abd          sub_140002774(rax_33);
140001acf          return result;
140001a89          }
140001a89
140001a8b          int64_t rcx_31 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)rax_33
- 8);
140001a8b
140001a9a          if ((char*)rax_33 - rcx_31 - 8 <= 0x1f)
140001a9a          {
140001aa0          sub_140002774(rcx_31);
140001ab2          return result;
140001a9a          }
1400019f3          }
1400019f3          else
1400019f3          {
1400019f5          rcx_27 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)rax_26 - 8);
1400019f5
140001a04          if ((char*)rax_26 - rcx_27 - 8 <= 0x1f)
140001a04          goto label_140001a13;
1400019f3          }
140001968          }
```

```

140001968         else
140001968         {
14000196a             rcx_23 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)rax_21 - 8);
14000196a
140001979             if ((char*)rax_21 - rcx_23 - 8 <= 0x1f)
140001979             goto label_140001988;
140001968         }
14000175f     }
14000175f     else
14000175f     {
140001761         rcx_11 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)rax_12 - 8);
140001761
140001770         if ((char*)rax_12 - rcx_11 - 8 <= 0x1f)
140001770         goto label_14000177f;
14000175f     }
1400016d4     }
1400016d4     else
1400016d4     {
1400016d6         rcx_7 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)rax_7 - 8);
1400016d6
1400016e5         if ((char*)rax_7 - rcx_7 - 8 <= 0x1f)
1400016e5         goto label_1400016f4;
1400016d4     }
140001649     }
140001649     else
140001649     {
14000164b         rcx_3 = *(uint64_t*)((char*)rax_2 - 8);
14000164b
14000165a         if ((char*)rax_2 - rcx_3 - 8 <= 0x1f)
14000165a         goto label_140001669;
140001649     }
140001ab8     trap(0xd);
1400015b0     }

```

Instead of breaking this function down bit by bit, I will just go through the interesting parts.

It seems to initialize a pointer `rax` which gets passed to another function `sub_1400012a0`.

```
1400015e8          rax, r8 = sub_1400012a0(&var_30)
```

Time to break down `sub_1400012a0`. It seems that it just returns the string `goo`.

Therefore, `rax == goo`, so I rename it to `flag_piece_goo`.

Skipping a bunch of boilerplate code, I land on `label_140001788`.

```
140001788          label_140001788:  
140001788          var_30.o = zx.o(0)  
14000178c          int64_t var_18_1 = 0xf  
140001794          int32_t var_38_2 = 3  
14000179b          __builtin_strncpy(dest: &var_30, src: "djob", count:  
5)  
1400017a2          int64_t var_20_1 = 4  
1400017ae          int64_t rcx_12 = arg1[1].q  
1400017b2          int64_t rdx_12 = *(arg1 + 0x18)
```

Which seems to be appending `djob` onto `var_30`, which I rename to `flag`. So now, `flag / var_30` should be `goodjob` as it appended `djob` onto `goo` (the result of the `get_goo` function).

Tracing the logic past more boilerplate, I land on `label_140001991`.

```
140001991          int64_t* rax_27  
140001991          int64_t r8_4  
140001991          rax_27, r8_4 = sub_140001490(&flag)
```

After analysing `sub_140001490` it seems that it just returns the string `123`. So, our `flag` variable should now be `goodjob123`.

Tracing the logic further, it seems that this is the last transformation that is done on the flag before it is returned.

With that, let's `test the flag out`.

5.2 sub_1400012a0

```
1400012b9    void var_68
1400012b9    int64_t rax_1 = __security_cookie ^ &var_68
1400012c4    int128_t* var_40 = arg1
1400012ce    int16_t var_48 = 0x6f67
1400012d5    char var_46 = 0x6f
1400012da    int64_t var_38 = (zx.o(0)).q
1400012e0    int64_t var_28 = 0
1400012ea    int64_t rax_2 = operator new(3)
1400012ef    var_38 = rax_2
1400012f4    var_38:8.q = rax_2
140001310    memmove(dest: rax_2, src: &var_48, count: 3)
140001315    var_38:8.q = rax_2 + 3
14000131a    int64_t rdi = var_38
140001322    *arg1 = zx.o(0)
140001326    arg1[1].q = 0
14000132a    *(arg1 + 0x18) = 0xf
14000132a
140001335    if (rdi != rax_2 + 3)
14000133f    int64_t rbp_1 = rax_2 + 3 - rdi
140001342    int64_t rsi_1 = 0x7fffffffffffffff
140001342
14000134f    if (rbp_1 > 0x7fffffffffffffff)
14000147c    sub_1400011a0()
14000147c    noreturn
14000147c
140001359    int128_t* rax_7
140001359
140001359    if (rbp_1 <= 0xf)
1400013eb    rsi_1 = 0xf
1400013f0    rax_7 = nullptr
140001359    else
140001362    int64_t rax_4 = rbp_1 | 0xf
140001369    uint64_t rax_5
140001369
140001369    if (rax_4 <= 0x7fffffffffffffff)
14000138c    rsi_1 = rax_4
14000138c
140001397    if (rax_4 < 0x16)
140001397    rsi_1 = 0x16
140001397
1400013a2    if (rsi_1 != -1)
```

```
1400013b7             if (rsi_1 + 1 u>= 0x1000)
1400013b9                 rax_5 = rsi_1 + 0x28
1400013b9
1400013c0             if (rax_5 u> rsi_1 + 1)
1400013c0                 goto label_140001378
1400013c0
140001482             stdext::threads::_Throw_lock_error()
140001482                 noreturn
140001482
1400013dd             rax_7 = operator new(rsi_1 + 1)
1400013e2                 *arg1 = rax_7
1400013e5                 *(arg1 + 0x18) = rsi_1
1400013a2             else
1400013a4                 rax_7 = nullptr
1400013a7                 *arg1 = 0
1400013aa                 *(arg1 + 0x18) = rsi_1
140001369             else
14000136b                 rax_5 = -0x7fffffffffffffd9
140001378             label_140001378:
140001378                 int64_t rax_6 = operator new(rax_5)
140001378
140001383             if (rax_6 == 0)
14000138a                 trap(0xd)
14000138a
1400013cc             rax_7 = (rax_6 + 0x27) & 0xfffffffffffffff0
1400013d0                 *(rax_7 - 8) = rax_6
1400013d4                 *arg1 = rax_7
1400013d7                 *(arg1 + 0x18) = rsi_1
1400013d7
1400013f3             int128_t* rbx_1 = arg1
1400013f3
1400013fa             if (rsi_1 u> 0xf)
1400013fa                 rbx_1 = rax_7
1400013fa
140001407             memmove(dest: rbx_1, src: rdi, count: rbp_1.d)
14000140c             arg1[1].q = rbp_1
140001410                 *(rbx_1 + rbp_1) = 0
140001414                 rdi = var_38
140001335             else
140001337                 *arg1 = 0
140001337
14000141c             if (rdi != 0)
14000142d                 if (rax_2 + 3 - rdi u>= 0x1000)
14000142f                 int64_t rax_9 = *(rdi - 8)
```

```
14000142f
14000143e          if (rdi - rax_9 - 8 u> 0x1f)
14000147a          trap(0xd)
14000147a
140001444         rdi = rax_9
140001444
14000144a         sub_140002774(_Block: rdi)
14000144a
14000145a         __security_check_cookie(rax_1 ^ &var_68)
140001474         return arg1
```

At the top we see `var_48` being assigned `0x6F67`. `0x67 == q` and `0x68 == o`.

```
1400012ce         int16_t var_48 = 0x6f67
1400012d5         char var_46 = 0x6f
```

These three bytes are then copied into `rax_2`, so `rax_2 == goo`.

```
140001310         memmove(dest: rax_2, src: &var_48, count: 3)
```

Note: The majority of `sub_1400012a0` is not part of the actual challenge logic. After extracting the meaningful constant bytes, `0x6f676f == goo`, the remainder of the function consists entirely of **C++ standard library implementation details**, not custom obfuscation.

In particular:

- Large conditionals checking values like `0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF`, `0x16`, `0x1000`
- Branches involving heap metadata and page-aligned allocations
- Calls to `operator new`, `operator delete`, and internal allocator helpers
- Stack-protector setup/teardown (`__security_cookie`, `__security_check_cookie`)
- Alignment arithmetic (`& 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0`)
- Fallback allocator paths (`trap(0xd)`, `stdext::threads::_Throw_lock_error`)

None of these operations reference:

- user input
- expected authentication data
- constants that contribute to the password
- any transformation logic that affects correctness

They are simply the compiler-generated machinery for constructing a `std::string`, handling *Small-String Optimization (SSO)*, and freeing temporary buffers.

Therefore, after extracting the 3-byte literal `goo` from the stack variables and confirming that this is the only meaningful data produced by the function, the remainder of the code was safely ignored as **allocator and runtime boilerplate**.

In simplified form, the entire function reduces to:

```
std::string out = "goo";
return out;
```

This matches exactly what the surrounding code expects, and no other values produced in the function influence the authentication logic.

With that, I rename the function to `get_goo` (d son).

6.3 sub_140001490

Finally, a short one!

140001499	int64_t* _Str = arg1
1400014a1	__builtin_memset(dest: arg1, ch: 0, count: 0x20)
1400014a4	void* rdi = nullptr
1400014a6	_Str.d = 0x333231
1400014be	uint64_t rax = strlen(&_Str)
1400014c3	int64_t rbp = 0x7fffffffffffffff
1400014c3	
1400014d3	if (rax > 0x7fffffffffffffff)
14000159f	sub_1400011a0()
14000159f	noreturn
14000159f	

```
1400014dd      if (rax <= 0xf)
1400014e2          arg1[2] = rax
1400014eb          arg1[3] = 0xf
1400014f6          memcpy(dest: arg1, src: &_Str, count: rax.d)
1400014fe          *(rax + arg1) = 0
14000150a      return arg1
14000150a
14000150b      int64_t rax_2 = rax | 0xf
140001512      uint64_t rax_3
140001512
140001512      if (rax_2 <= 0x7fffffffffffff)
140001537          rbp = rax_2
140001537
14000153d      if (rax_2 < 0x16)
14000153d          rbp = 0x16
14000153d
140001548      if (rbp != -1)
140001551          if (rbp + 1 >= 0x1000)
140001553              rax_3 = rbp + 0x28
140001553
14000155a      if (rax_3 > rbp + 1)
14000155a          goto label_140001521
14000155a
1400015a5          stdext::threads::_Throw_lock_error()
1400015a5          noreturn
1400015a5
140001571          rdi = operator new(rbp + 1)
140001512      else
140001514          rax_3 = -0x7fffffffffffffd9
140001521      label_140001521:
140001521          int64_t rax_4 = operator new(rax_3)
140001521
140001529      if (rax_4 == 0)
140001530          trap(0xd)
140001530
140001562      rdi = (rax_4 + 0x27) & 0xfffffffffffffe0
140001566          *(rdi - 8) = rax_4
140001577          *arg1 = rdi
14000157f          arg1[2] = rax
140001586          arg1[3] = rbp
14000158a          memcpy(dest: rdi, src: &_Str, count: rax.d)
140001592          *(rax + rdi) = 0
14000159e      return arg1
```

It seems that all this function is doing is returning a string, which upon first assumption we think is 321.

We see the bytes 0x333231, which are the bytes that are getting written.

```
_Str.d = 0x333231
```

But since it's on *little-endian*, the value laid out in memory would be

0x31	0x32	0x33	0x00
'1'	'2'	'3'	'\0'

So the actual string getting returned here is 123.

5.4 validation_successful

```
140001ae0    int64_t validation_successful()

140001ae0    {
140001ae0        sub_140002050(std::cout, "\nVerification successful.\n\n");
140001b12        sub_140002050(std::cout, "Secure data accessed:\n");
140001b25        sub_140002050(std::cout, "-----\n");
140001b38        sub_140002050(std::cout, "Location: Grid 47-C\n");
140001b4b        sub_140002050(std::cout, "Access code: 8891-3324\n");
140001b5e        sub_140002050(std::cout, "Status: Active\n");
140001b71        sub_140002050(std::cout, "Timestamp: Verified\n\n");
140001b84        sub_140002050(std::cout, "Clearing in 15 seconds...\n");
140001b84
140001d08        for (int32_t i = 0xf; i > 0; i -= 1)
140001d08        {
140001bf7            std::ostream::operator<<(
140001bf7                sub_140002050(std::ostream::operator<<(sub_140002050(std::cout, u"\r")),
140001bf7                                u" "),
140001bf7                                sub_140002430);
140001c02        int64_t arg_8;
140001c02        sub_1400011c0(&arg_8);
140001c07        int64_t rbx_1 = arg_8;
140001c0f        int64_t rbx_2;
140001c0f
```


```
140001c0f          rbx_2 = rbx_1 > 0x7fffffffffc46535fe ? 0x7fffffffffffff :  
rbx_1 + 0x3b9aca00;  
140001c0f  
140001c20      while (true)  
140001c20      {  
140001c20          int64_t rax_4 = _Query_perf_frequency();  
140001c29          int64_t rax_5 = _Query_perf_counter();  
140001c39          int64_t rax_6;  
140001c39  
140001c39          if (rax_4 != 0x989680)  
140001c39          {  
140001c48          int64_t rax_14;  
140001c48          int64_t rcx_18;  
140001c48  
140001c48          if (rax_4 != 0x16e3600)  
140001c48          {  
140001c94          int64_t rax_15;  
140001c94          int64_t rdx_4;  
140001c94          rdx_4 = HIGHQ((int128_t)rax_5);  
140001c94          rax_15 = LOWQ((int128_t)rax_5);  
140001ca5          rax_14 = (int128_t)(COMBINE(rdx_4, rax_15) %  
rax_4 * 0x3b9aca00)  
140001ca5          / rax_4;  
140001ca8          rcx_18 = COMBINE(rdx_4, rax_15) / rax_4 *  
0x3b9aca00;  
140001c48          }  
140001c48          else  
140001c48          {  
140001c4d          rax_14 = rax_5 % 0x16e3600 * 0x3b9aca00 /  
0x16e3600;  
140001c8b          rcx_18 = rax_5 / 0x16e3600 * 0x3b9aca00;  
140001c48          }  
140001c48  
140001caf          rax_6 = rax_14 + rcx_18;  
140001c39          }  
140001c39          else  
140001c3b          rax_6 = rax_5 * 0x64;  
140001c3b  
140001cb5          if (rbx_2 == rax_6)  
140001cb5          break;  
140001cb5  
140001cb7          if (rbx_2 < rax_6)  
140001cb7          break;  
140001cb7
```

```
140001cbc             int64_t rcx_21 = rbx_2 - rax_6;
140001cbc
140001cc2             if (rcx_21 < 0x4e94914f0001)
140001cc2             {
140001cd8                 int64_t rdx_10 = rcx_21 / 0xf4240;
140001cd8
140001cf3                 if (rdx_10 * 0xf4240 < rcx_21)
140001cf5                     rdx_10 += 1;
140001cf5
140001cfa                 Sleep((uint32_t)rdx_10);
140001cc2             }
140001cc2             else
140001ccb                 Sleep(0x5265c00);
140001c20             }
140001d08             }
140001d08
140001d15             system("cls");
140001d39             /* tailcall */
140001d39             return sub_140002050(std::cout, "Session terminated.\n");
140001ae0         }
```

6. Testing The Flag

With the static analysis complete, we try out the flag we found `goodjob123` as well as track the output to see if it matches the findings from the static analysis.

Starting the crackme reveals that we traced the initialization output logic correctly.



Entering the flag we found, `goodjob123` reveals that our static analysis was on point!

The screenshot shows a terminal window with the following text output:

```
C:\Users\david\Desktop\crack X + -  
System authentication required.  
Enter authentication code: *****  
Verification successful.  
Secure data accessed:  
-----  
Location: Grid 47-C  
Access code: 8891-3324  
Status: Active  
Timestamp: Verified  
Clearing in 15 seconds...  
14 |
```

7. Conclusion

This challenge implements a small MSVC-built console program that prompts the user for an authentication code and compares it against a statically constructed flag string. The flag is assembled in a deliberately noisy way using helper routines (`get_goo`, `get_flag`, and a small builder for `"123"`), but semantically it's straightforward: build `"goodjob123"` and compare it to the user's input.

Why this was a good static-analysis exercise:

The crackme forces you to:

- Navigate *CRT* start-up to find `main`.
- Read and interpret *High Level IL / disassembly*.
- Recognise boilerplate SSO string initialisation and growth logic.
- Isolate the small "interesting" parts of a long decompiled function and ignore allocator / housekeeping noise.

What I'd improve next time:

- Be more deliberate about identifying and mentally collapsing "standard library" patterns early, so I can focus attention on the real logic sooner.

- Take more structured notes on helper functions (`get_goo`, `get_flag`) up front, since recognising those patterns made the solution fall into place.
- Cross-check string layouts with a minimal C++ `std::string` model to make the SSO fields and offsets even more obvious.

Lessons learned:

- Even when a function looks huge in the decompiler, often 80–90% of it is generic runtime or container management. The actual obfuscation / logic is small and localised.
- Simple "manual obfuscation" (splitting a string across helpers, copying bytes around, using SSO internals) is more about intimidating beginners than providing real security.
- Static-only reversing is very achievable for this kind of challenge and it forces you to build a stronger mental model of the code compared to relying on a debugger from the start.

The final solution is the recovered password:

goodjob123

Appendix A — ASCII Table

ASCII table for reference. Source: <https://www.asciitable.com/>

Dec	Hx	Oct	Char		Dec	Hx	Oct	Html	Chr		Dec	Hx	Oct	Html	Chr		Dec	Hx	Oct	Html	Chr
0	0	000	NUL	(null)	32	20	040	 	Space		64	40	100	@	Ø		96	60	140	`	'
1	1	001	SOH	(start of heading)	33	21	041	!	!		65	41	101	A	A		97	61	141	a	a
2	2	002	STX	(start of text)	34	22	042	"	"		66	42	102	B	B		98	62	142	b	b
3	3	003	ETX	(end of text)	35	23	043	#	#		67	43	103	C	C		99	63	143	c	c
4	4	004	EOT	(end of transmission)	36	24	044	$	\$		68	44	104	D	D		100	64	144	d	d
5	5	005	ENQ	(enquiry)	37	25	045	%	%		69	45	105	E	E		101	65	145	e	e
6	6	006	ACK	(acknowledge)	38	26	046	&	&		70	46	106	F	F		102	66	146	f	f
7	7	007	BEL	(bell)	39	27	047	'	'		71	47	107	G	G		103	67	147	g	g
8	8	010	BS	(backspace)	40	28	050	((72	48	110	H	H		104	68	150	h	h
9	9	011	TAB	(horizontal tab)	41	29	051))		73	49	111	I	I		105	69	151	i	i
10	A	012	LF	(NL line feed, new line)	42	2A	052	*	*		74	4A	112	J	J		106	6A	152	j	j
11	B	013	VT	(vertical tab)	43	2B	053	+	+		75	4B	113	K	K		107	6B	153	k	k
12	C	014	FF	(NP form feed, new page)	44	2C	054	,	,		76	4C	114	L	L		108	6C	154	l	l
13	D	015	CR	(carriage return)	45	2D	055	-	-		77	4D	115	M	M		109	6D	155	m	m
14	E	016	SO	(shift out)	46	2E	056	.	.		78	4E	116	N	N		110	6E	156	n	n
15	F	017	SI	(shift in)	47	2F	057	/	/		79	4F	117	O	O		111	6F	157	o	o
16	10	020	DLE	(data link escape)	48	30	060	0	0		80	50	120	P	P		112	70	160	p	p
17	11	021	DC1	(device control 1)	49	31	061	1	1		81	51	121	Q	Q		113	71	161	q	q
18	12	022	DC2	(device control 2)	50	32	062	2	2		82	52	122	R	R		114	72	162	r	r
19	13	023	DC3	(device control 3)	51	33	063	3	3		83	53	123	S	S		115	73	163	s	s
20	14	024	DC4	(device control 4)	52	34	064	4	4		84	54	124	T	T		116	74	164	t	t
21	15	025	NAK	(negative acknowledge)	53	35	065	5	5		85	55	125	U	U		117	75	165	u	u
22	16	026	SYN	(synchronous idle)	54	36	066	6	6		86	56	126	V	V		118	76	166	v	v
23	17	027	ETB	(end of trans. block)	55	37	067	7	7		87	57	127	W	W		119	77	167	w	w
24	18	030	CAN	(cancel)	56	38	070	8	8		88	58	130	X	X		120	78	170	x	x
25	19	031	EM	(end of medium)	57	39	071	9	9		89	59	131	Y	Y		121	79	171	y	y
26	1A	032	SUB	(substitute)	58	3A	072	:	:		90	5A	132	Z	Z		122	7A	172	z	z
27	1B	033	ESC	(escape)	59	3B	073	;	:		91	5B	133	[[123	7B	173	{	{
28	1C	034	FS	(file separator)	60	3C	074	<	<		92	5C	134	\	\		124	7C	174	|	
29	1D	035	GS	(group separator)	61	3D	075	=	=		93	5D	135]]		125	7D	175	}	}
30	1E	036	RS	(record separator)	62	3E	076	>	>		94	5E	136	^	^		126	7E	176	~	~
31	1F	037	US	(unit separator)	63	3F	077	?	?		95	5F	137	_	_		127	7F	177		DEL

Source: www.LookupTables.com