

## SHERLOCK SECURITY REVIEW FOR



**Prepared for:** Sense

Prepared by: Sherlock

**Lead Security Expert: 0x52** 

**Dates Audited:** March 17 - March 23, 2023

Prepared on: April 18, 2023

## Introduction

Sense is decentralized permissionless infrastructure, where teams can build and develop new yield primitives for DeFi.

## Scope

sense-v1 @ 82abac25404d83b7aefaaeb46631f1d050dc4a4e

- sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Divider.sol
- sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol
- sense-v1/pkg/core/src/adapters/abstract/BaseAdapter.sol
- sense-v1/pkg/utils/src/Trust.sol

auto-roller @ 60b8b4d56346f053becafb6a9f50f75cebafcafa

• auto-roller/src/RollerPeriphery.sol

## **Findings**

Each issue has an assigned severity:

- Medium issues are security vulnerabilities that may not be directly exploitable or may require certain conditions in order to be exploited. All major issues should be addressed.
- High issues are directly exploitable security vulnerabilities that need to be fixed.

#### **Issues found**

Medium	High
5	0

## Issues not fixed or acknowledged

Medium	High
0	0

## Security experts who found valid issues



spyrosonic10 0x52 Bauer OxAgro martin sayan\_

Breeje Saeedalipoor01988 tsvetanovv



## Issue M-1: Multiple functions aren't payable so quotes that require protocol fees won't work correctly

Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense-judging/issues/28

## Found by

Bauer, 0x52

## **Summary**

There are multiple functions that use quotes but that aren't payable. This breaks their compatibility with some quotes. As the  $\underline{\texttt{Ox docs}}$  state: Certain quotes require a protocol fee, in ETH, to be attached to the swap call.

The following flows use a quote but the external/public starting function isn't payable:

RollerPeriphery

1) redeem

Periphery

- 1) removeLiquidity
- 2) combine
- 3) swapPT
- 4) swapYT
- 5) issue

## **Vulnerability Detail**

See summary.

## **Impact**

Functions won't be compatible with certain quotes causing wasted gas fees or bad rates for users

## **Code Snippet**

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/auto-roller/src/Roller Periphery.sol#L104



https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L325

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L409

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L433

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L240

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L263

#### Tool used

Manual Review

#### Recommendation

Add payable to these external/public functions

#### **Discussion**

### jparklev

Confirmed: We've forgotten to add payable to the functions mentioned

#### jparklev

Fixed here for sense-v1: <a href="https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/345">https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/345</a> And here for the auto-roller: <a href="https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/33">https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/345</a> And here for the auto-roller: <a href="https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/33">https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/345</a> And here for the auto-roller: <a href="https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/33">https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/345</a>

We took the suggested fix and added payable to the mentioned functions

#### IAm0x52

Fixes look good. Payable has been added to Periphery#removeLiquidity, combine, swapPT, swapYT and issue. Also adds payable to RollerPeriphery#redeem



## Issue M-2: Multiple functions may leave excess funds in the contract that should be returned

Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense-judging/issues/29

## Found by

Bauer, 0x52, spyrosonic10

## **Summary**

Periphery#combine may leave excess underlying in the contract due to \_fromTarget unwrapping to underlying and the quote may not swap them all.

When using arbitrary tokens to swap to underlying the contract always moves in the full amount specified. There is no guarantee that the quote will consume all tokens. As a result the contract may leave excess sell tokens in the contract but it should return then to the receiver.

These functions include:

RollerPeriphery

1) deposit

Periphery

- 1) swapForPTs
- 2) addLiquidity
- 3) issue

RollerPeriphery#RollermintFromUnderlying uses adapter.scale and previewMint to determine the amount of underlying to transfer. The roller code will mean that previewMint will always perfectly reflect the exact exchange rate into the roller. However adapter.scale varies by adapter and isn't guaranteed to be exact. The result is that \_transferFrom may take too much underlying. Since this underlying is wrapped to target the contract should return all excess target to receiver.

## **Vulnerability Detail**

See summary.

## **Impact**

Token may be left in the contract and lost



## **Code Snippet**

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/auto-roller/src/Roller Periphery.sol#L175-L186

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/auto-roller/src/Roller Periphery.sol#L196

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L178

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L325

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L409

#### Tool used

Manual Review

#### Recommendation

Return excess tokens at the end of the function

### **Discussion**

#### **iparklev**

We have this feature, for example, on \_swapSenseToken, but not on the cases mentioned.

Our fix will be: Transfer non-used tokens back to the user.

#### **jparklev**

Fixed here for sense-v1: <a href="https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/346">https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/346</a> And here for the auto-roller: <a href="https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/32">https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/346</a> And here for the auto-roller: <a href="https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/32">https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/346</a> And here for the auto-roller: <a href="https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/32">https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/346</a> And here for the auto-roller: <a href="https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/32">https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/346</a>

We returned excess sellTokens funds in the from and to target functions

#### IAm0x52

Fixes look good. Excess sell tokens are now returned inside \_toTarget and \_fromTarget for both periphery and rollerPeriphery



# Issue M-3: Periphery#\_swapPTsForTarget won't work correctly if PT is mature but redeem is restricted

Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense-judging/issues/32

## Found by

0x52

## **Summary**

Periphery#\_swapPTsForTarget doesn't properly account for mature PTs that have their redemption restricted

## **Vulnerability Detail**

Periphery.sol#L531-L551

```
function _swapPTsForTarget(
    address adapter,
    uint256 maturity,
    uint256 ptBal,
    PermitData calldata permit
) internal returns (uint256 tBal) {
    _transferFrom(permit, divider.pt(adapter, maturity), ptBal);
    if (divider.mscale(adapter, maturity) > 0) {
        tBal = divider.redeem(adapter, maturity, ptBal); <- @audit-issue always

    tries to redeem even if restricted

    } else {
        tBal = _balancerSwap(
            divider.pt(adapter, maturity),
            Adapter(adapter).target(),
            ptBal,
            BalancerPool(spaceFactory.pools(adapter, maturity)).getPoolId(),
            payable(address(this))
        );
    }
}
```

Adapters can have their redeem restricted meaning the even when they are mature they can't be redeemed. In the scenario that it is restricted Periphery#\_swapPTsForTarget simply won't work.



## **Impact**

Redemption will fail when redeem is restricted because it tries to redeem instead of swapping

## **Code Snippet**

#### Tool used

Manual Review

#### Recommendation

Use the same structure as \_removeLiquidity:

```
if (divider.mscale(adapter, maturity) > 0) {
   if (uint256(Adapter(adapter).level()).redeemRestricted()) {
     ptBal = _ptBal;
} else {
     // 2. Redeem PTs for Target
     tBal += divider.redeem(adapter, maturity, _ptBal);
}
```

## **Discussion**

#### **jparklev**

Accepted: This is valid and is indeed something we should fix

#### **iparklev**

Fixed here: https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/352

We removed the redeem code path if redeem is disabled

#### IAm0x52

Fix looks good. Periphery will swap instead of redeeming if redeem is restricted



## Issue M-4: fillQuote uses transfer instead of call which can break with future updates to gas costs

Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense-judging/issues/33

## Found by

sayan\_, Saeedalipoor01988, 0x52, tsvetanovv, martin, 0xAgro, Bauer, Breeje

## **Summary**

Transfer will always send ETH with a 2300 gas. This can be problematic for interacting smart contracts if gas cost change because their interaction may abruptly break.

## **Vulnerability Detail**

See summary.

## **Impact**

Changing gas costs may break integrations in the future

## **Code Snippet**

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L902-L932

### **Tool used**

Manual Review

#### Recommendation

Use call instead of transfer. Reentrancy isn't a concern since the contract should only ever contain the callers funds.

#### **Discussion**

### jparklev

Accepted: we should use .call instead of transfer when transferring ETH, specifically if the receiver is a contract that is integrating Sense.

#### **jparklev**



Fixed here: https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/348

We ended up removing the protocol fees entirely, which obviated the need for the suggested fix here

#### IAm0x52

Fix looks good, transfer has ben changed to call but the occurrence is rollerPeriphery appears to have been missed:

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/52049213bdff31138c43a28f061fea493b3d7e14/auto-roller/src/RollerPeriphery.sol#L111

#### IAm0x52

Additional missed transfers:

https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/346/files#r1167351042 https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/32#discussion\_r1167351433

#### fedealconada

Fix looks good, transfer has ben changed to call but the occurrence is rollerPeriphery appears to have been missed:

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/52049213bdff31 138c43a28f061fea493b3d7e14/auto-roller/src/RollerPeriphery.sol#L111

fixed here

#### fedealconada

Additional missed transfers:

https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/346/files#r1167351042 [sense-finance/auto-roller#32 (comment)]

fixed here

(https://github.com/sense-finance/auto-roller/pull/32#discussion\_r11673 51433)

fixed here

#### IAm0x52

Fixes look good. All three occurrences have been address. 2 occurrences in RollerPeriphery addressed in  $\underline{PR\#32}$  and the other in Periphery addressed in  $\underline{PR\#346}$ 



## Issue M-5: sponsorSeries() method fails when user want to swap for stake token using

Source: https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense-judging/issues/36

## Found by

spyrosonic10

## **Summary**

sponsorSeries() fails when user want to use swapQuote to swap for stake token to sponsor a series.

## **Vulnerability Detail**

stake is token that user need to deposit (technically is pulled) to be able to sponsor a series for a given target. User has option to send SwapQuote calldata quote and swap any ERC20 token for stake token. Below is the code that doing transferFrom() of stakeToken not sellToken()

```
if (address(quote.sellToken) != ETH) _transferFrom(permit, stake, stakeSize);
if (address(quote.sellToken) != stake) _fillQuote(quote);
```

Expected behaviour of this function is to pull sellToken from msg.sender when address(quote.sellToken) != stake. For example- stake token is WETH. User want to swap DAI for WETH in sponsorSeries(). In this case, user would be sending SwapQuote.sellToken = DAI and swapQuote.buyToke = WETH and expect that fillQuote() would swap it for WETH. This method will fail because sellToken not transferred from msg.sender.

## **Impact**

sponsorSeries() fails when address(quote.sellToken) != stake

## **Code Snippet**

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-03-sense/blob/main/sense-v1/pkg/core/src/Periphery.sol#L116-L128

#### Tool used

Manual Review



#### Recommendation

Consider implementation of functionality to transferFrom sellToken from msg.sender with actual amount that is require to get exact amountOut greater or equal to stakeSize

#### **Discussion**

### jparklev

Accepted:

This bug is valid but the below statement

sponsorSeries() fails when user want to use swapQuote to swap for stake token to sponsor a series.

is not quite accurate.

The problem here is that here:

```
if (address(quote.sellToken) != ETH) _transferFrom(permit, stake, stakeSize);
```

we are sending wrong params to \_transferFrom.

If we are making use of the permit feature, this would work fine because the \_transferFrom **ignores** the params on that case.

On the contrary, if we want to make use of the traditional approval, this would revert since we will be trying to pull a the stake which has not been approved by the user.

#### Fix:

#### **jparklev**

Fixed here: https://github.com/sense-finance/sense-v1/pull/347

We used the fix mentioned above

#### IAm0x52

Fix looks good. \_transferFrom now correctly pulls the sellToken instead of stake

