# **Unit 4**



- 1. Authentication requirement Authentication function MAC Hash function Security of hash function: HMAC, **CMAC** SHA
- 2. Digital signature and authentication protocols DSS Schnorr Digital Signature Scheme ElGamal cryptosystem
- 3. Entity Authentication: Biometrics, Passwords, Challenge Response protocols Authentication applications Kerberos MUTUAL
- 4. TRUST: Key management and distribution Symmetric key distribution using symmetric and asymmetric encryption Distribution of public keys X.509 Certificates.

#### **CMAC**

CBC-MAC -fixed





10110111 00011100 11111111 00000011

10110111 00011100 11111111

8 6its





⇒长

b bits

b bits

Constant K1

Constant K2

to 0)

(Used when msg%b not equal

86125

# 0000011 861ts









0	100000



00010000


10	100000

10110111

10110111 00011100 11111111 000


00011100

#### CMAC (Cipher Based MAC) - Secure for variable length messages



(a) Message length is integer multiple of block size

Block Length  Number of blocks	b n	
Key length	k	$T$ = message authentication code, also referred to as the tag $Tlen$ = bit length of T $MSB_s(X)$ = the $s$ leftmost bits of the bit string $X$
Constant K1	b bits	
Constant K2 (Used when msg%b not equal to 0)	b bits	



(b) Message length is not integer multiple of block size

## Calculation of Keys K<sub>1</sub> and K<sub>2</sub>

To generate an  $\ell$ -bit CMAC tag (t) of a message (m) using a b-bit block cipher (E) and a secret key (k), one first generates two b-bit sub-keys ( $k_1$  and  $k_2$ ) using the following algorithm (this is equivalent to multiplication by x and  $x^2$  in a finite field  $GF(2^b)$ ). Let  $\ll$  denote the standard left-shift operator and  $\oplus$  denote bit-wise exclusive or:

- 1. Calculate a temporary value  $k_0 = E_k(0)$ .
- 2. If  $msb(k_0) = 0$ , then  $k_1 = k_0 \ll 1$ , else  $k_1 = (k_0 \ll 1) \oplus C$ ; where C is a certain constant that depends only on b. (Specifically, C is the non-leading coefficients of the lexicographically first irreducible degree-b binary polynomial with the minimal number of ones: 0x1B for 64-bit, 0x87 for 128-bit, and 0x425 for 256-bit blocks.)
- 3. If  $msb(k_1) = 0$ , then  $k_2 = k_1 \ll 1$ , else  $k_2 = (k_1 \ll 1) \oplus C$ .
- 4. Return keys  $(k_1, k_2)$  for the MAC generation process.





### **Key Points**

First, let us define the operation of CMAC when the message is an integer multiple n of the cipher block length b. For AES, b = 128, and for triple DES, b = 64. The message is divided into n blocks  $(M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_n)$ . The algorithm makes use of a k-bit encryption key K and a b-bit constant,  $K_1$ . For AES, the key size k is 128, 192, or 256 bits; for triple DES, the key size is 112 or 168 bits. CMAC is calculated as follows (Figure 12.8).

$$C_{1} = E(K, M_{1})$$

$$C_{2} = E(K, [M_{2} \oplus C_{1}])$$

$$C_{3} = E(K, [M_{3} \oplus C_{2}])$$

$$\cdot$$

$$\cdot$$

$$\cdot$$

$$C_{n} = E(K, [M_{n} \oplus C_{n-1} \oplus K_{1}])$$

$$T = MSB_{Tlen}(C_{n})$$

where

$$T$$
 = message authentication code, also referred to as the tag
 $Tlen$  = bit length of T
 $MSB_s(X)$  = the  $s$  leftmost bits of the bit string  $X$ 

If the message is not an integer multiple of the cipher block length, then the final block is padded to the right (least significant bits) with a 1 and as many 0s as necessary so that the final block is also of length b. The CMAC operation then proceeds as before, except that a different b-bit key  $K_2$  is used instead of  $K_1$ .









