

▲ Sentrilite – Hybrid-Cloud Observability & Security Platform

Cloud-Native, AI-Powered, eBPF-based Lightweight, Real-Time System Observability, Runtime Security, Cloud Security Posture Management & Threat Prevention in One Platform

Overview

Sentrilite is a Hybrid-Cloud Programmable **Observability & Runtime Security** Platform and streams structured, real-time events to a web UI where custom rules drive risk scoring, alerting, and reporting. Hybrid & multi-cloud ready: Works the same across public clouds and on-prem—EKS, GKE, AKS, vanilla Kubernetes, bare-metal Linux Servers, and edge—so you get a consistent, low-overhead security and observability layer for entire infrastructure all managed from a single dashboard. In Kubernetes, Sentrilite runs as a **privileged DaemonSet** on every node (no app changes required). Each agent observes container processes and **enriches events with Kubernetes metadata** (namespace, pod, container, UID/PID) by correlating groups with the API server.

Problem: Runtime blind spots in Kubernetes & hybrid cloud

- Modern attacks increasingly unfold at runtime—after code is deployed—via process abuse, file access, container breakout attempts, and east-west network activity. Industry reports highlight rapid weaponization in cloud-native environments, where adversaries pivot quickly and live off the land inside containers and nodes. [Sysdig+1](#)
- Beyond container misconfigurations, defenders need visibility into what actually executes: processes (`execve`), file reads/writes of sensitive material, and socket connects/binds. This is reflected in both community guidance and adversary models (MITRE ATT&CK for Containers), which enumerate runtime techniques like credential dumping, cryptomining, and command-and-control over common ports. [MITRE ATT&CK+1](#)

- CNCF Cloud Native Survey (Linux Foundation Research) — broad adoption of containers/Kubernetes continues; orgs still report gaps around security/observability and skills—driving interest in standardized telemetry. [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
- Red Hat “State of Kubernetes Security” (2023/2024 series) — misconfigurations and human error are frequent root causes of K8s incidents; many orgs experienced security events tied to configuration and supply-chain issues. [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
- Sysdig 2024 Global Cloud Threat Report — runtime threats (cryptomining, misuse of credentials), excessive permissions, and noisy images are common; emphasizes need for real-time detection and least-privilege in Kubernetes. [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
- OWASP Kubernetes Top Ten — catalogs the most impactful K8s risks (e.g., insecure defaults, supply chain, inadequate logging/monitoring), reinforcing that visibility and policy are core to defense. [ARMO](#)
- CNCF Cloud Native Security Whitepaper — end-to-end guidance across build/deploy/run; calls for defense-in-depth with runtime detection, least privilege, and strong observability of workload behavior. [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
- AWS EKS Best Practices Guide — recommends enabling audit/metrics/trace pipelines, using IRSA/least-privilege IAM, and enforcing NetworkPolicies—i.e., observability + policy are required for secure EKS. [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
- Google (GKE) security best practices — emphasizes hardening nodes, enforcing identity/authorization, and collecting/acting on audit logs and workload telemetry at scale. [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
- Grafana OpenTelemetry report — sustained growth in OpenTelemetry interest/adoption; signals industry momentum toward standard, vendor-neutral telemetry for better visibility and cost control. [Grafana Labs](#)

Why runtime telemetry (eBPF-class) matters

Authoritative guidance emphasizes **workload-level monitoring** alongside hardening. NIST’s container security guide and the NSA/CISA Kubernetes Hardening Guide both call out the need to monitor process and network activity to detect abuse that slips past pre-deploy controls. NIST [Computer Security Resource Center](#)+1

In practice, open-source Falco popularized rules that trigger on syscall patterns (e.g., reading /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow, spawning shells in containers, or unexpected network opens). This model—observe syscalls and emit policy-driven alerts—is now a de-facto pattern for runtime defense. [Falco](#)

What to capture at runtime (signals that matter)

Processes: command + args (execve), user/UID, PID/PPID, executable/comm—and the Kubernetes context (namespace/pod/container/UID) for attribution. These align with ATT&CK (e.g., discovery, credential access, defense evasion) and Falco-style detections. [MITRE ATT&CK+1](#)

Files: reads of secrets/keys/tokens (e.g., service account tokens, SSH keys), config files, kube kubeconfigs, and credential stores. NIST and NSA/CISA note credential theft and secret exposure are common runtime objectives. [NIST Computer Security Resource Center+1](#)

Network: opens/connects/binds, destinations (IP/port/CIDR), and anomalous egress patterns that indicate exfiltration or C2. Threat research shows active campaigns (e.g., Kinsing) weaponize runtime access rapidly, often “living off the land” inside compromised containers. [Forbes+1](#)

Make it observable: consistent context and timelines

For usable forensics and SRE workflows, runtime events should be **enriched** with k8s identifiers (namespace, pod, container) and host/process metadata. This mirrors OpenTelemetry’s semantic conventions (k8s.*, process.*, host.*) so events can correlate naturally with logs/metrics/traces and existing APM/SIEM pipelines.

What “good” looks like in a runtime platform


1. **Live stream & filtering:** per node/pod views with filters (namespace/pod/container), plus node health signals (e.g., OOMKilled) to speed root cause. Guidance from NSA/CISA and NIST stresses consolidating runtime signals for timely detection. [CISA+1](#)
2. **Rules & risk scoring:** declarative rules that tag and score events; high-risk findings become human-readable alerts (who/what/where in k8s). This follows Falco’s proven approach to runtime policies. [Falco](#)
3. **Actionability:** PDF/CSV summaries and SIEM hand-off; align alerts to ATT&CK techniques to aid triage. [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
4. **Integrations:** ship to Alertmanager/PagerDuty for on-call; keep open standards for portability (Otel context, webhooks).

What Problems does Sentrilite solve ?

Category	Capability (high level)
Process Visibility	Capture every command real-time (execve) with user, PID/PPID, and container context. Example: trigger rules like "alert on cat /etc/passwd" or block high-risk binaries.
File Activity Monitoring	Detect access to sensitive files (keys, configs, tokens) and flag exfiltration or privilege-escalation attempts.
Network Activity Tracing	Observe socket connects/binds in real-time. Create CIDR-based rules such as "deny egress to 1.2.3.0/24:443".
Live Operations UI	Stream real-time events by node, namespace, or pod. Visualize node health, OOMKilled events, and container restarts.
Custom Rules & Risk Scoring	Declarative JSON rule engine tags, classifies, and scores events. High-risk detections automatically trigger alerts.
Audit & Reporting	Generate timeline reports (PDF/CSV) for compliance, audits, and incident reviews.
Rapid Response Controls	Optional iptables-based allow/deny rules for quick mitigation of suspicious network behavior.
Integrations	Supports external alerting with Prometheus Alertmanager and PagerDuty out of the box.
AI Insights	Embedded LLM engine summarizes anomalies, trends, and remediation recommendations directly from telemetry streams.

🌟 Sentrilite Hybrid Cloud Architecture


Sentrilite Hybrid Cloud Architecture



Hybrid Cloud Architecture Description

- **Public Cloud:** AWS, Azure, and GCP, On-Prem K8s, Linux Servers (bare-metal) — agents deployed per VM or node.
- **On-Prem:** On-premises infrastructure with Sentrilite agent Bare-metal or VMs with identical capabilities.
- **Linux Servers:** Individual Bare-Metal or VM Linux servers with Sentrilite agents.
- **Sentrilite Main Dashboard:** Centralized monitoring and security dashboard that aggregates data from all agents.
- **Data Flow:** All Sentrilite agents stream telemetry data to the main dashboard for unified observability.

Sentrilite Components



Workflow Description

- **trace_syscall.o** runs in kernel space and captures system calls and events directly from the kernel
- **trace_events** is a userspace application that communicates with the eBPF program to retrieve captured events
- **sentrilite** daemon processes the events from `trace_events` and makes them available via WebSocket connections
- **dashboard.html** provides a real-time view of events for individual nodes/servers
- **main.html** provides a unified view across multiple servers/nodes with AI insights and alert management

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🌟 Data Flow

- System calls and events are captured at the kernel level by the eBPF module.
- Events are processed and enriched with metadata (PID, command, arguments, etc.)
- Processed events are streamed to WebSocket clients in real-time.
- Multiple dashboard interfaces can connect to monitor different aspects of the system.
- AI insights and alerting are generated based on the streamed events.

🌟 Key Features

- Multi-Cloud/On-Prem visibility and management from a single dashboard
- eBPF syscall & network visibility
- Real-time dashboards (Nginx + WebSocket server)
- Custom rules with risk scoring and alerting
- Kubernetes enrichment (namespace/pod/container/UID) when running as a DaemonSet
- OOMKilled alerts and pod watchers (best effort if K8s APIs available)
- Seamlessly integrate with prometheus alert-manager/pagerduty

⚙️ System Requirements

Minimum Requirements

- **Linux Kernel with eBPF support** (Linux 5.8+ recommended)
- **Root privileges** (for loading eBPF programs)
- **Ports:** 80 (dashboard), 8765 (WebSocket)
- **Kubernetes** (optional): Cluster access with ability to run a privileged DaemonSet

General Requirements

- **bpftool:** Load eBPF programs and manage maps
sudo apt install bpftool # Ubuntu
- **libbpf & headers:** Required by the kernel loader (trace_events)
 - Pre-installed on most modern distros (use bundled binary)
- **nginx:** Required to view dashboard
sudo apt install nginx

Third-Party Integrations (PagerDuty & Alertmanager)

Kubernetes Configuration

Add URLs in a ConfigMap (e.g., `ALERTMANAGER_URL`, optional `PAGERDUTY_EVENTS_URL`) and the PagerDuty routing key in a Secret (`PAGERDUTY_ROUTING_KEY`).


Standalone Linux Configuration

Set the same keys in `sys.conf` (e.g., `ALERTMANAGER_URL=http://...`, `PAGERDUTY_ROUTING_KEY=...`).

Note: Sentrilite prefers env vars (K8s) and falls back to `sys.conf` (bare metal). Alertmanager must be reachable and supports v2 API (`/api/v2/alerts`). PagerDuty uses Events v2.

Sentrilite: Getting Started

On the Main Dashboard, upload a csv file (nodes, group) and click upload File:



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Upon Clicking Upload, the nodes are automatically added as follows:

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Download PDF Report

Download Combined Alerts (JSON)

Choose File

node_list.txt

Upload Node List

Download Dashboard

Select All

Clear All Alerts

Create Rule

match_key (e.g. cmd)

match_values (comma sep)

tags (comma separated)

risk_level

server_tag (default: all)

Apply to Selected

View Rules

Delete Rules

Delete All Rules

Network Rule

Select	Server IP	Status	Alerts	Groups	Dashboard	AI Insights
<input type="checkbox"/>	ec2-3-17-135-143.us-east-2.compute.amazonaws.com	Online	Critical	private	Open	View
<input type="checkbox"/>	ec2-3-86-227-160.compute-1.amazonaws.com	Online	Critical	aws	Open	View
<input type="checkbox"/>	ec2-54-157-205-225.compute-1.amazonaws.com	Online	None	aws	Open	View
<input type="checkbox"/>	myapp-eastus-001.cloudapp.azure.com	Unreachable	Unknown	azure	Open	View
<input type="checkbox"/>	myapp-eastus-002.cloudapp.azure.com	Unreachable	Unknown	azure	Open	View
<input type="checkbox"/>	gke-node-01.us-central1.example.internal	Unreachable	Unknown	gcp	Open	View
<input type="checkbox"/>	gke-node-02.us-central1.example.internal	Unreachable	Unknown	gcp	Open	View

Upon clicking the 'Open' Link under the Dashboard of any Node, it will point to the Live dashboard of that Node like the following screenshot:

[illegible]



Runtime-Security & Activity Detection Rules

Sentrilite continuously monitors system activity and commands to identify potentially dangerous or suspicious behavior using eBPF kernel hooks.

Each rule has a **risk level** (1 = High, 2 = Medium, 3 = Low / Informational).



High-Risk (Level 1): Routed to PagerDuty/AlertManager

Actions that can immediately compromise system integrity or indicate active attacks:

- **Privilege escalation:** Detects attempts to gain elevated rights using commands like `sudo`, `su`, or `pkexec`.
 - **Suspicious network tools:** Flags utilities such as `nc`, `ncat`, `netcat`, and `socat` often used for backdoors or lateral movement.
 - **Reconnaissance scans:** Monitors use of `nmap` or `masscan` for network probing and port scanning.
 - **Firewall or network-policy modification:** Watches `iptables`, `ip6tables`, and `nft` changes that can open unauthorized access.
 - **Kernel manipulation:** Alerts on `insmod` or `modprobe` commands that insert or remove kernel modules.
 - **Cryptocurrency mining:** Detects miners such as `xmrig`, `minerD`, `ethminer`, `lolMiner`, or `teamredminer`.
-



Medium-Risk (Level 2)

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Behaviors that can aid data theft, persistence, or internal reconnaissance:

- **Remote movement:** Flags `ssh`, `scp`, and `sftp` usage for potential lateral movement.
- **External data transfer:** Monitors `curl` and `wget` for possible data exfiltration or inbound malware.
- **Packet sniffing:** Detects network capture tools (`tcpdump`, `tshark`).
- **Filesystem operations:** Observes `mount` and `umount` commands that may expose sensitive storage.
- **Container or runtime admin actions:** Tracks administrative utilities like `kubectl`, `ctr`, `crictl`, `docker`, and `runc`.
- **Traffic shaping or interception:** Alerts on `tc` commands altering network performance or routing.
- **Bulk I/O or disk cloning:** Flags `dd` for potential data duplication or exfiltration.

Low-Risk / Informational (Level 3)

Benign but noteworthy behavior for audit and trend analysis:

- **Script interpreters:** Notes usage of `python`, `perl`, `ruby`, or `node` which can run arbitrary code.
- **Encoding or compression tools:** Observes commands like `base64`, `xxd`, `tar`, or `zip` that may hide or pack data.
- **Package installation:** Monitors `apt`, `yum`, `dnf`, `zypper`, and `apk` installs for potential software changes.
- **Privileged user actions:** Flags activities performed by the `root` user (UID 0) for accountability.

Purpose:


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These rules form Sentrilite's baseline behavioral detection layer. They identify high-impact commands, suspicious network activity, and system-level modifications — helping security teams catch misuse or compromise early.

In addition to this, Users can also create custom Alert Rules from the Main Dashboard which are hot-reloaded. Once a rule is submitted, sentrilite automatically picks it up without restart.

Custom Rule Creation: On the side panel, we have the rule manager:



Create Rule

match_key (e.g. cmd)

match_values (comma separated)

tags (comma separated)

risk level

server_tag (default: all)

Apply to Selected

View Rules

View All Rules

Delete Rules

Delete All Rules

The keys and their corresponding values can be one of the following:

1. **cmd** => command or process like ls/sudo/nc
2. **arg** => The first argument of any command is "abc.txt". So any command using abc.txt will raise an alert.
3. **ip** => ipv4 address
4. **pid** => process id
5. **iid** => user id (for example uid = 0 for root user)
6. **user** => user name (for example: root, ubuntu)



Pre-Defined Security Posture Management Rules

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Overview

Sentrilite evaluates **312 security rules** across Kubernetes pods and Linux hosts to surface misconfigurations, risky behaviors, and policy drift.

Coverage

- **Pod rules:** 98 (Kubernetes security posture)
 - **Host rules:** 214 (OS/network hardening, services, kernel & TCP/IP)
-

What matters most (at a glance)

- **Privilege & Auth:** default service accounts, token automount, running as root, privileged/allow-priv-esc.
 - **Isolation:** hostPID/IPC/Network, host ports, shared process namespaces.
 - **Filesystem & sockets:** hostPath mounts to `/etc`, `/root`, `/proc`, `/sys`, Docker/containerd sockets.
 - **Capabilities:** flags >30 sensitive Linux capabilities (e.g., `SYS_ADMIN`, `NET_ADMIN`, `SYS_MODULE`).
 - **Runtime hygiene:** seccomp missing, read-only rootfs disabled, probes/limits/requests missing.
 - **Network & kernel posture:** firewalls inactive, SELinux not enforcing, risky sysctl/TCP settings.
 - **Exposure:** public listeners, permissive iptables, IPv6/ICMP settings, reverse-path filtering off.
-

Pod Rules (98)

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Service Account & Auth

- Detects default/no service account or token **automount** → risk of privilege escalation.

Namespace & Isolation

- Workloads in **default** namespace; **hostNetwork/hostPID/hostIPC**; **shared process namespace**.

Networking

- **hostPorts** used; default **DNS policy** that may break isolation.

HostPath Mounts (high risk)

- Mounts of `/`, `/etc`, `/root`, `/var/lib`, `/var/run`, `/proc`, `/sys`, `/dev`, `/dev/shm`.
- Docker/containerd sockets → potential **container escape**.

Container Security Context

- **Privileged=true**; **runAsNonRoot** missing/false; **allowPrivilegeEscalation=true**.
- **Writable** root filesystem; running as **UID 0**.

Linux Capabilities (37 checks)

- Ensures **cap drop all**; flags dangerous adds (e.g., `SYS_ADMIN`, `NET_ADMIN`, `SYS_PTRACE`, `SYS_MODULE`, `SYS_TIME`, `SYS_RAWIO`, `DAC_*`, `FOWNER`, `SETUID/GID`, `NET_RAW`, etc.).

Seccomp & Profiles

- Seccomp profile missing at **container** or **pod** level.

Health Probes

- Missing **liveness/readiness/startup** probes.

Resources

- Missing **limits/requests** (CPU, memory, ephemeral storage).

Image Hygiene

- Image **without digest**; using **latest** tag.

Pod Security Context

- Security context missing; **runAsGroup=0**; **fsGroup** not set; supplemental groups; default **/proc** mount.

Config & Secrets

- Secrets in env, plaintext env, mounted ConfigMaps/Secrets (visibility & handling checks).

Volumes & Scheduling

- **Writable** mounts; **emptyDir/downwardAPI** usage; lifecycle hooks missing; long termination; priority/affinity/topology spread not set; tolerations/nodeSelector presence.

Advanced Settings

- Unsafe **sysctls**; imagePullPolicy not set to **Always**; custom DNS; host aliases; runtimeClass/overhead missing.
-

Host Rules (214)

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Filesystem Hygiene

- **World-writable** files under `/etc`, `/home`, `/var`.

Exposure

- **Public TCP/UDP listeners**; permissive **iptables**; **UFW/firewalld** inactive; **SELinux** not enforcing.

Security Services

- **auditd** inactive; **AppArmor** disabled.

Kernel/System Config

- **Module autoload** enabled; **core dumps** enabled.

IPv6 & ICMP

- IPv6 on when unused; risky **ICMP** behaviors (redirects, broadcasts, bogus errors, high ratelimits).

Routing & Forwarding

- **Source routing** accepted; **IP forwarding** enabled on non-routers; (secure) redirects issues.

TCP/IP Hardening (100+ checks)

- **SYN flood** protections off; **RPF/log_martians** disabled; risky **timestamps/SACK/window scaling/ECN**.
- Connection hygiene: **retries/FIN timeout/keepalive** mis-tuned; **SYN backlog** too low; orphan/TIME_WAIT buckets too high.
- Retry & recovery, buffers/memory thresholds, congestion control, TSO/pacing/PMTU/MTU probing misconfigurations.

- Advanced toggles (e.g., **tw_reuse**, **abort_on_overflow**, fast open, key presence, ACK/backlog tuning).

UDP & Queues

- UDP early demux; **somaxconn** low; **netdev_max_backlog** low.

Misc IP

- Shared media, BOOTP relay, **accept_source_route**, **icmp_ratemask** issues.
-

Severity Levels

- **1 Critical** – urgent risk; fix immediately. Routed to PagerDuty/AlertManager
 - **2 High** – significant risk; prioritize remediation.
 - **3 Medium** – address in next hardening cycle.
 - **4 Low** – minor; track and fix opportunistically.
 - **5 Informational** – best-practice signal.
-

Tags & Filtering

- **k8s** (pod rules), **posture**, **network**, **security-context**, **capabilities**, **volume**, **host**.
Use tags to filter dashboards, compliance reports, and CI/policy gates.
-

How to use this in practice

- **Baseline & drift:** Enforce a minimum bar (seccomp, non-root, RO rootfs, cap-drop-all) and watch for drift.
- **Prioritize by severity + blast radius:** Fix privileged/host* settings, sockets, and firewall posture first.
- **Automate remediation:** Apply PodSecurity standards/PSa, admission controls, and sysctl baselines.
- **Continuously update:** Rules evolve with kernel/K8s changes; keep the chart and rules ConfigMap up-to-date.

Sensitive Files Monitoring

Sentrilite also continuously monitors some system level sensitive files by default. The list of default files are as follows and stored on the node as `sensitive_files.json`. This file can be dynamically updated (hot-reload) and Sentrilite will automatically pick up the changes (without restart)

```
{
  "files": [
    "/etc/shadow",
    "/etc/sudoers",
    "/etc/sudoers.d/*",
    "/root/.ssh/*",
    "/home/*/.ssh/*",
    "/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*",
    "/etc/ssl/private/*",
    "/etc/pki/tls/private/*",
    "/etc/letsencrypt/live/*/.*",
    "/etc/letsencrypt/archive/*/.*",
    "/var/run/docker.sock",
    "/run/containerd/containerd.sock",
    "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token",
    "/etc/kubernetes/admin.conf",
    "/etc/kubernetes/kubelet.conf",
    "/etc/kubernetes/pki/*",
    "/var/lib/kubelet/pki/*",
    "/var/lib/kubelet/kubeconfig",
    "/home/*/.aws/credentials",
```

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
```

"/home/**/*.aws/config",
"/home/**/*.config/gcloud/*",
"/home/**/*.azure/*",
"/home/**/*.docker/config.json",
"/home/**/*.git-credentials",
"/home/**/*.netrc",
"/etc/krb5.keytab",
"/home/**/*.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/*",
"/etc/openvpn/*.key",
"/etc/wireguard/privatekey",
"/etc/ipsec.secrets",
"/etc/mysql/*.cnf",
"/root/.my.cnf",
"/home/**/*.pgpass",
"/etc/mongod.conf",
"/etc/redis/redis.conf",
"/etc/nginx/*.conf",
"/etc/nginx/sites-*/**",
"/etc/httpd/conf.d/*.conf",
"/var/log/auth.log",
"/var/log/secure",
"/var/log/messages",
"/var/log/syslog",
"/var/log/journal/**",
"/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt",

"/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace",
"/etc/passwd"
]
}


```

Click “View Rules” to see existing rules:



Click Delete Rules to remove all the rules.

Once a rule is satisfied, an alert is triggered and the status of that server/node changes to Critical . Click the critical link to see the current alerts on any node like this:



The same alert is recorded on the server side in the json format with all the metadata in the file: `alerts.json`. It can be downloaded from the main dashboard):

Example Alert Message:

```
[
  {
    "time": "2025-10-25 16:04:08",
    "type": "high_risk",
    "message": "root ran a high-risk command '/usr/bin/nc' from IP
10.0.0.1.",
    "pid": "442651",
    "cmd": "/usr/bin/nc",
    "args": "-l",
    "ip": "10.0.0.1",
    "risk_level": 1,
    "tags": [
      "scanner",
      "privilege-escalation"
    ]
  }
]
```

These alerts (with risk_level = 1 or severity = 1 or sensitive_files) will also be routed to pagerduty and alertmanager if properly configured in the sys.conf (linux) or configmap/secrets (kubernetes) covered later in the installation steps.

The risk_level or severity or sensitive_files list can be changed at runtime (hot-reload) with helm.

Click the download pdf report button to generate the reports with alerts summary on all the servers:

(Note: For LLM insights, you need to install a local LLM server)

Sentrilite One-Click Alert Summary PDF Report

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Sentrilite Alert Summary Report

Generated on: 11/17/2025, 2:35:40 PM

Server:	.amazonaws.com	Group: private
---------	----------------	----------------

Timestamp	Message
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	package-vuln: trivy not installed or not in PATH
2025-11-16 17:25:14	root ran a high-risk command '/usr/sbin/iptables' from IP 127.0.0.1.
2025-11-16 17:25:15	root ran a high-risk command '/usr/sbin/iptables' from IP 127.0.0.1.
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	ww_files_home: /home/ubuntu/netsentrix/src/trace_socket.c
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	ww_files_var: /var/www/html/bpf_trace.txt /var/www/html/get_logs.txt /var/www/html/load_module.txt
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	public_tcp_listeners: LISTEN 0 511 0.0.0.0:80 0.0.0.0:* users:(("nginx",pid=261137,fd=5),("nginx",pid=261136,fd=5)) LISTEN 0 4096 0.0.0.0:9093 0.0.0.0:* users:(("docker-proxy",pid=391827,fd=7)) LISTEN 0 4096 127.0.0.53%lo:53 0.0.0.0:* users:(("systemd-resolve",pid=261105,fd=15)) LISTEN 0 4096 127.0.0.54:53 0.0.0.0:* users:(("systemd-resolve",pid=261105,fd=17))
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	public_udp_listeners: UNCONN 0 0 172.31.25.143%enX0:68 0.0.0.0:* users:(("systemd-network",pid=261147,fd=22)) UNCONN 0 0 127.0.0.1:323 0.0.0.0:* users:(("chronyd",pid=201530,fd=5)) UNCONN 0 0 127.0.0.54:53 0.0.0.0:* users:(("systemd-resolve",pid=261105,fd=16)) UNCONN 0 0 127.0.0.53%lo:53 0.0.0.0:* users:(("systemd-resolve",pid=261105,fd=14))
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	ufw_inactive: Status: inactive
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	iptables_permissive: grep: invalid option -- ' Usage: grep [OPTION]... PATTERNS [FILE]... Try 'grep --help' for more information.
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	kernel_modules_autoload_enabled: autoload_enabled
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	core_dumps_enabled: core_dumps_enabled
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	ipv6_enabled: ipv6_enabled
2025-11-16T17:24:55Z	log_martians_disabled: log_martians_disabled

Installation Steps

For Kubernetes Cluster: EKS/AKS/GKE or Private Kubernetes Cluster

1. Deploy Sentrilite DaemonSet:

Helm Installation: In the charts directory:

```
helm upgrade --install sentrilite charts/sentrilite -n  
kube-system --create-namespace
```

OR plain kubectl installation:

```
kubectl apply -f sentrilite.yaml
```

```
kubectl -n kube-system get pods -l app=sentrilite-agent -o wide
```

```
kubectl get nodes | awk '!/NAME/{print $1,"K8s"}' > nodes.txt
```

```
# Port forward : POD=$(kubectl -n kube-system get pod -l  
app=sentrilite-agent -o name | head -n1)
```

```
kubectl -n kube-system port-forward "$POD" 8080:80 8765:8765
```

2. Verify deployment:

```
kubectl -n kube-system get pods -l app=sentrilite-agent -o  
wide
```

3. Create nodes list:

```
kubectl get nodes | awk '!/NAME/{print $1,"K8s"}' > nodes.txt
```

The file format should like this: Node_ip,group:

```
ec2-3-17-135-112.us-east-2.compute.amazonaws.com,private
```

```
ec2-3-86-227-155.compute-1.amazonaws.com,aws
```

```
ec2-54-157-205-222.compute-1.amazonaws.com,aws
```

```
myapp-eastus-001.cloudapp.azure.com,azure,azure
```

```
myapp-eastus-002.cloudapp.azure.com,azure,azure
```

```
gke-node-01.us-central1.example.internal,gcp
```

```
gke-node-02.us-central1.example.internal,gcp
```

For Non-Kubernetes Linux based Cluster

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Unzip the bundle:

unzip sentrilite_agent_bundle.zip

1. cd sentrilite

2. Load the bpf program:

```
sudo ./install.sh
```

3. Configure sys.conf:

```
LICENSE_KEY=./license.key
```

```
PAGERDUTY_EVENTS_URL=""
```

```
PAGERDUTY_ROUTING_KEY=""
```

```
ALERTMANAGER_URL=""
```

4. Launch the Server:

```
sudo ./sentrilite
```

5. Open the Dashboard:

- Copy the `dashboard.html` to `/var/www/html` or web root directory
- Open `dashboard.html` in your browser:
`http://<YOUR-SERVER-IP>/dashboard.html`
- You should see live events appear in real-time

6. Log format in the Live Dashboard Web UI:

```
[2025-04-14T00:12:32.008Z] PID=1234 COMM=ssh CMD=/bin/bash  
ARG= IP=127.0.0.1 TYPE=EXECVE
```

7. Open the Main Dashboard on your control plane:

- Copy the `main.html` & `jspdf.umd.min.js` to `/var/www/html` on your main admin server
- Open the `main.html` in your browser:
`http://<YOUR-SERVER-IP>/main.html`
- Click choose file and select a file containing your server lists

For more detailed information, refer to [dashboard.README](#)

Configuration

- **license.key** — place in the current directory (baked in image or mounted as Secret)
- **sys.conf** — network config, placed in the current directory (baked in image or mounted as ConfigMap)
- **Rule files** (**rules.json**, **sensitive_files.json**, **xdr_rules.json**, **alerts.json**) reside in the working dir; rules can be managed via the dashboard

Alerts & K8s Enrichment

- Events include (when available): **k8s_namespace**, **k8s_pod**, **k8s_container**, **k8s_pod_uid**
- OOMKilled alerts and pod watchers run best-effort when the agent can access K8s APIs

Un-installation Steps

For Kubernetes Cluster: EKS/AKS/GKE or Private Kubernetes Cluster

`kubectl -n kube-system delete ds/sentrilite-agent`

(Optional) If pods hang in Terminating:

```
kubectl -n kube-system delete pod -l app=sentrilite-agent --force
--grace-period=0
```

For Non-Kubernetes Linux based Cluster

Run the following commands as root:



```
sudo ./unload_bpf.sh
```

Licensing

The project is currently using a trial **license.key**

Support

For licensing, troubleshooting, or feature requests:

-  **Email:** info@sentrilite.com
-  **Website:** <https://sentrilite.com>

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