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ND-22-0905  
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

Docket No.: 52-025

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Southern Nuclear Operating Company  
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) – Unit 3  
Licensee Event Report 2022-001-00  
Automatic Reactor Trip Signal due to Inadequate Procedure Guidance Causing Incorrect  
Opening of Division B DC Supply Breaker

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Southern Nuclear Operating Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report for VEGP Unit 3.

This letter contains no regulatory commitments. If you have questions regarding the enclosed information, please contact Will Garrett at (706) 848-7154.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Patrick A. Martino".

Patrick A. Martino  
Site Vice President, Unit 3

PAM/KJD/sfr

Enclosure: Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 2022-001-00

CC:  
Regional Administrator, Region II  
VPO Project Manager  
Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle 3 & 4  
Director, Environmental Protection Division - State of Georgia

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 3

Licensee Event Report 2022-001-00

Automatic Reactor Trip Signal due to Inadequate Procedure Guidance Causing  
Incorrect Opening of Division B DC Supply Breaker

Enclosure

Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 2022-001-00



<b>NRC FORM 366</b> (08-2020)		<b>U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION</b>			<b>APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104</b>		<b>EXPIRES: 08/31/2023</b>			
 <b>LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)</b> (See Page 3 for required number of digits/characters for each block) (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/">http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/</a> )										
<b>1. Facility Name</b> Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3					<b>2. Docket Number</b> 05000      "05200025"		<b>3. Page</b> 1 OF 2			
<b>4. Title</b> Automatic Reactor Trip Signal due to Inadequate Procedure Guidance Causing Incorrect Opening of Division B DC Supply Breaker										
<b>5. Event Date</b>			<b>6. LER Number</b>			<b>7. Report Date</b>			<b>8. Other Facilities Involved</b>	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision No.	Month	Day	Year	Facility Name	Docket Number
10	06	2022	2022	- 001 -	00	12	02	2022		05000
						Facility Name: _____ Docket Number: 05000				
<b>9. Operating Mode</b> N						<b>10. Power Level</b> 000				
<b>11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)</b>										
<b>10 CFR Part 20</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		<b>10 CFR Part 73</b>		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.69(g)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)		<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)		<b>10 CFR Part 21</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)		<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(1)(i)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 21.2(c)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(i)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		<b>10 CFR Part 50</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(ii)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)				
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)				
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify here, in abstract, or NRC 366A).										
<b>12. Licensee Contact for this LER</b>										
<b>Licensee Contact</b> Will Garrett, VEGP 3&4 Site Licensing Manager								<b>Phone Number (Include area code)</b> (706) 848 7154		
<b>13. Complete One Line for each Component Failure Described in this Report</b>										
Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to IRIS	Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to IRIS	
<b>14. Supplemental Report Expected</b>					<b>15. Expected Submission Date</b>			Month	Day	Year
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date)										
<b>16. Abstract</b> (Limit to 1560 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On October 6, 2022, at 0244 EDT with the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 defueled at 0 percent power, the Reactor Protection System automatically actuated during restoration of Division B Class 1E DC and Uninterruptible Power Supply system. The cause of the actuation was due to inadequate procedural guidance. During restoration of VEGP Unit 3 Division B 72 hour DC bus, the breaker for the Unit 3 Division B 24 hour DC distribution panel was opened while performing a lineup to establish initial conditions in accordance with the associated System Operating Procedure (SOP). This resulted in a loss of power to Division B powered safety related air-operated valves, causing the valves to reposition to their fail-safe, loss-of-power safety position. Due to 3-PXS-V108B (Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Control Valve) failing open a Reactor Trip signal was generated. The operators responded with approved procedures and restored power to the Division B 24 hour DC distribution panel. As corrective action to address the cause of the event, procedure 3-IDSOP-001 was revised to improve separation of the 24 hour and 72 hour battery system alignments. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to the automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection System, which is one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). VEGP Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 4 were unaffected during this event.										



**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET**

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form  
<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

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1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3	05000-	2022	001	00

**NARRATIVE****EVENT DESCRIPTION**

On October 6, 2022, at 0244 EDT with the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 defueled at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) [EIS: JD] occurred during restoration of the Division B 72 hour DC bus [EIS: EJ / BU] in the Class 1E DC and Uninterruptible Power Supply System [EIS: EJ]. During restoration, the breaker [EIS: EJ / 72] for the Unit 3 Division B 24 hour DC distribution panel (3-IDSB-DD-1) was opened by the system operator (non licensed). This resulted in a loss of power to Division B powered safety related air-operated valves, causing the valves to reposition to their fail-safe, loss-of-power safety position. The reason for the RPS actuation was due to the opening of the Division B Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Control Valve (3-PXS-V108B) [EIS: BP / FCV]. The reactor trip breakers were in an open state at the time of the event when the RPS signal was received, therefore, the reactor trip breakers did not change state. The operators responded with approved procedures and restored power to the Division B 24 hour DC distribution panel.

**EVENT ANALYSIS**

All systems operated as expected even though the Unit was not in operation. The cause of this event was inadequate procedural guidance. Specifically, procedure 3-IDSB-SOP-001, "Class 1E DC System-Division B," included instructions within the same attachment for both the 24 hour and 72 hour battery subsystems and resulted in operation of an unintended component.

**REPORTABILITY AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT**

There were no safety consequences due to this event because the RPS signal was generated while the reactor was in a defueled condition and did not impact plant safety. Additionally, no radiological release occurred due to this event. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to the automatic actuation of the RPS, which is one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

**CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED OR COMPLETED**

Procedure 3-IDSB-SOP-001 was revised to improve the separation of steps associated with the 24 hour battery system and the 72 hour battery system alignments by separating them into different attachments in the procedure.

**PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS**

There were no events from the last three years with either the same or similar cause to this event.