



**QLEE:**


**Symbolic Execution of QEMU  
Devices with KLEE**




# Fairy tale

- [Context] Fuzzing is a popular approach for finding bugs in hypervisors
- [Problem] Existing approaches require **a running instance** of QEMU to perform the fuzzing, resulting in high overhead and complexity.
- [Solution] QLEE use the KLEE symbolic execution engine to automatically test the hypervisors' emulated devices.
- [Evaluation] QLEE allowed for fine-grained testing of these emulators and found one bug/issue in QEMU (yet to be reported).

# Background: Hypervisors



## Background: QEMU Device Emulation





# Correctness is Critical

## Hypervisor Security

- Breaking Isolation Between VMs
- Denial-of-Service
- Data Corruption

## Accurate Emulation

- Discrepancies with HW
- Incorrect Device Setup in SW
- Coupling To Implementation Details

# Related Work: VDF


## Steps:

1. Record Device Accesses
2. Run AFL:
  - a. Mutate the Recordings
  - b. Replay on a QEMU Instance
3. Minimize Test Case

## Limitations:

- Instrumentation code is added **manually**
- Replay requires **running QEMU** instances

Henderson, A. et al. 2017. VDF: Targeted Evolutionary Fuzz Testing of Virtual Devices. *Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses* (Cham, 2017), 3–25.



**Step 3:** Minimize crash/hang tests to simplify analysis and generate QTest code for future reproduction of each discovered crash or hang.

# Related Work: HYPER-CUBE

Steps:

1. Boot the OS & enumerate devices
2. Interpret bytecode to interact w/ devices
3. Minimize test-cases

Limitations:

- Requires **Running** QEMU instance
- OS needs drivers and device enumeration logic
- Complex setup

Schumilo, S. et al. 2020. HYPER-CUBE: High-Dimensional Hypervisor Fuzzing. *Proceedings 2020 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium* (San Diego, CA, 2020).





Fig. 2: High-level overview of the system architecture of HYPER-CUBE

## Related Work: NYX (is Complex)



Schumilo, S. et al. Nyx: Greybox Hypervisor Fuzzing using Fast Snapshots and Affine Types.




## Related Work: NYX

### Steps:

1. Initial Snapshot
2. Generate/Mutate Payload
3. Execute & Record coverage
4. Restore snapshot if needed

### Limitations:

- Nested Hypervisor Setup
- Requires a **running** hypervisor





## Related Work: Common Pain Point

They are all dynamic, i.e., require executing the target

Observations:

- **Running a hypervisor**
  - Overhead
  - Not Needed to Fuzz a Single Device
- Inputs are not constrained to the device operations (VDF & HYPER-CUBE)
  - The recorded initial seed might have bugs (thanks device driver!)
  - The generated ops might not make any sense for the device
  - NYX, the successor of HYPER-CUBE, has a spec.



**QLEE:**

**Symbolic Execution of QEMU  
Devices with KLEE**

# KLEE: Symbolic Execution of LLVM IR

Read IR Instruction	Execute (Update State & Constraints)	Check For Errors (at “dangerous ops”)
<pre>define i32 @foo(i32 %a, i32 %b, i32 %c) { entry:   ; (1) a + b   %sum = add i32 %a, %b    ; (2) c / (a + b)   %result = sdiv i32 %c, %sum    ; (3) return result   ret i32 %result }</pre>	<p>PC</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. sum = a + b</li><li>2. result = c / sum</li><li>3. return result</li></ol> <p>Constraints</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. []</li><li>2. [sum != 0]</li><li>3. [sum != 0]</li></ol>	<p>(set-logic QF_BV)</p> <p>(declare-const a (_ BitVec 32)) (declare-const b (_ BitVec 32))</p> <p>(assert (= (bvadd a b) #x00000000))</p> <p>⇒ a = 0, b = 0 ⇒ <b>Division by Zero</b></p>



# QLEE Overview

- Specification for Target Device
  - Target device source path
  - Entry-points w/ their arguments
  - Constraints on the arguments
- Harness Generation
- Stub Generation
  - Global Variables
  - External Functions
- Run KLEE on each Entry-point



# QLEE: Specification

## Includes:

- Source path
- Variable declarations
- Constraints & Assignments
- Entry-points

## Why YAML?

- Anchor (&) and Alias (\*) to deduplicate
- Order-independent

## Why Explicit Arguments?

- Function signature has state as void\*

```
target:
  source: "hw/char/pl011.c"


variables:
  state: &state
    type: "struct PL011State"
    name: "state"
    pass-by-pointer: true
  offset: &offset
    type: "hwaddr"
    name: "offset"
  size: &size
    type: "unsigned"
    name: "size"
  value: &value
    type: "uint64_t"
    name: "value"

constraints:
- name: "state.fbrd"
  constraint:
    - "<= 0x3f"
- name: "state.ibrd"
  constraint:
    - "<= 0xffff"
- name: "state.read_pos"
  constraint:
    - ">= 0"
    - "<= 15"

assignments:
- name: "state.id"
  value: "pl011_id_arm"


entrypoint:
- name: "pl011_read"
  args: [*state, *offset, *size]
- name: "pl011_write"
  args: [*state, *offset, *value, *size]
- name: "pl011_get_baudrate"
  args: [*state]
- name: "pl011_can_receive"
  args: [*state]
- name: "pl011_loopback_mdctrl"
  args: [*state]
- name: "pl011_reset"
  args:
    - << : *state
      cast: "(DeviceState*)"
```

# QLEE: Harness Generation



```
__attribute__((used))
static int main_pl011_read(void)
{
    struct PL011State state;
    hwaddr offset;
    unsigned size;
    klee_make_symbolic(&state, sizeof(state), "state");
    klee_make_symbolic(&offset, sizeof(offset), "offset");
    klee_make_symbolic(&size, sizeof(size), "size");
    klee_assume(state.fbrd <= 0x3f);
    klee_assume(state.ibrd <= 0xffff);
    klee_assume(state.read_pos >= 0);
    klee_assume(state.read_pos <= 15);
    state.id = pl011_id_arm;
    pl011_read(&state, offset, size);
    return 0;
}
```

# QLEE: Stubs Generation



## AutoStub:


- C++ and LLVM IR Library
- Stubs
  - Global variables  $\Rightarrow$  initialized to 0
  - External Functions  $\Rightarrow$  return 0
- Types are preserved

## Why use IR as input?

- Do not have to deal with `#include<header>`



## QLEE: Run KLEE



- Run KLEE per Entry-point
- Output saved to `<outputdir>/<timestamp>/<entrypoint>`



# Evaluation

QEMU: commit 72b88908d1

## UART Devices

- Simple & Similar
- Serial Communication  
(e.g., Write character to console)

Target	Entry-points
ARM's PL011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• pl011_read</li><li>• pl011_write</li><li>• pl011_get_baudrate</li><li>• PL011_can_receive</li><li>• pl011_loopback_mdmctrl</li><li>• pl011_reset</li></ul>
"Serial.c" (Intel's 16550A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• serial_ioport_read</li><li>• serial_ioport_write</li></ul>
AVR USART (ATmega, e.g., Arduino)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• avr_usart_read</li><li>• avr_usart_write</li></ul>



# Evaluation

	Without Constraints		With <sup>†</sup> Constraints	
	True Positives	False Positives	True Positives	False Positives
PL011	1	2	1	1
“Serial.c” 16550A	0	3*	0	1*
AVR USART	0	3	0	0

<sup>†</sup> Not all device constraints were added

\* Manually terminated potentially infinite loop (undecidable)



# Discussion

## PL011 Bug (?)

- Not reported yet
  - Array out-of-bounds access
- ```
case 0x3f8 ... 0x400:  
    r = s->id[(offset - 0xfe0) >> 2];  
    break;
```
- Case range is a gcc extension
  - Case x..y is **inclusive** of both x and y

offset == 0x1000

$\Rightarrow (0x1000 - 0xfe0 \gg 2) = 8$

But s->id is 8 bytes, i.e.  $0 \leq i \leq 7$

## False Positives:

- Trivial Cases
  - Access size == 1
  - Value < 0xff (one byte access)
  - Struct field is null due to missing setup
- Suppressed with constraints

## Limitation:

- Proper struct initialization
- Stub functions are not “accurate”



## Bibliography

- Schumilo, S. et al. Nyx: Greybox Hypervisor Fuzzing using Fast Snapshots and Affine Types.
- Henderson, A. et al. 2017. VDF: Targeted Evolutionary Fuzz Testing of Virtual Devices. Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses (Cham, 2017), 3–25.
- Schumilo, S. et al. 2020. HYPER-CUBE: High-Dimensional Hypervisor Fuzzing. Proceedings 2020 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (San Diego, CA, 2020).
- LLVM Project. 2003–present. The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure. Available at: <https://llvm.org>.

