

SPQR: A Standardized Benchmark for Modern Safety Alignment Methods in Text-to-Image Diffusion Models

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


Figure 1. **Illustration of the SPQR benchmark.** (Left) Example of a benign fine-tuning (BFT) causing safety regression: before BFT, Stable Diffusion produces a safe image, while after BFT, the same prompt yields a harmful one. (Center) SPQR evaluates models along four axes—Safety (S), Prompt Adherence (P), Quality (Q), and Robustness (R)—and aggregates them into a single harmonic mean score. (Right) Representative comparison showing how different safety-alignment methods vary across dimensions, highlighting strong pre-adaptation safety but weak robustness after benign fine-tuning.

Abstract

Text-to-image diffusion models can emit copyrighted, unsafe, or private content. Safety alignment aims to suppress specific concepts, yet evaluations seldom test whether safety persists under benign downstream fine-tuning routinely applied after deployment (e.g., LoRA personalization, style/domain adapters). We study the stability of current safety methods under benign fine-tuning and observe frequent breakdowns. As true safety alignment must withstand even benign post-

deployment adaptations, we introduce the SPQR benchmark (Safety–Prompt adherence–Quality–Robustness). SPQR is a single-scored metric that provides a standardized and reproducible framework to evaluate how well safety-aligned diffusion models preserve safety, utility, and robustness under benign fine-tuning, by reporting a single leaderboard score to facilitate comparisons. We conduct multilingual, domain-specific, and out-of-distribution analyses, along with category-wise breakdowns, to identify when safety alignment fails after benign fine-tuning, ultimately showcasing SPQR as a con-

cise yet comprehensive benchmark for T2I safety alignment techniques for T2I models.

Warning: This paper features *illustrative examples that may involve explicit, sexual, or violent imagery and language, which could be sensitive for certain readers.*

1. Introduction

The widespread adoption of powerful open-source text-to-image models [1, 2] such as Stable Diffusion [2] has democratized content creation, but it has also created a need for reliable safety and control [2, 3]. These models can memorize and regenerate harmful [4], copyrighted [5, 6], or private material present in their training sets and when conditioning flows from text tokens through cross-attention, unsafe prompts can induce unsafe outputs. Moreover, even safe prompts can yield unsafe generations if model priors or dataset biases activate correlated directions in the CLIP embedding space [7, 8]. The practical question is not only how to prevent unsafe outputs at release time, but how to ensure that prevention *persists* throughout the model’s lifecycle. From the early Safety Checker [2] for Stable Diffusion, many methods have emerged [9]. Despite different mechanisms, their *shared objective* is to reduce the probability of unsafe generations. They do so by modifying the SD pipeline: some act directly on the conditioning C before cross-attention [7, 10–12]; others modulate the attention transfer $A_\ell V_\ell$ [13–15]; others update parameters to make edits persistent across prompts and guidance settings [16, 17].

A second challenge is *robustness to attacks*. Prior work has stressed test-time jailbreaks [18], including prompt obfuscations (paraphrases, homoglyphs, unusual Unicode, compositional triggers) [19–21] and negative-prompt strategies [3]. Recently, [22] showed that even *benign* fine-tuning can undermine safety alignment when an adversary knows the unlearned categories and collects targeted data, reviving the supposedly removed concepts.

We standardize and broaden evaluation of benign fine-tuning robustness, a failure mode recently documented [22–24], and we extend this analysis to settings where the “attacker” is *unintentional*. We define an *unintentional attacker* as a benign user or provider who fine-tunes a safety-aligned model on strictly harmless data unrelated to the mitigated concepts, inadvertently weakening or reversing its safety alignment without any malicious intent. Consider a model provider offering image generation as a service: to meet a customer’s requirements, they apply LoRA personalization [25], a style adapter, or a domain adapter on benign images. In this scenario the model may lose its safety alignment



Figure 2. **Qualitative Examples of Safety Failure After Benign Fine-Tuning.** Models that were initially safe (top row) generate harmful or explicit outputs after benign fine-tuning (bottom row), revealing a breakdown of safety across methods (ESD, AdvUnlearn, STEREO, RECE).

while maintaining high visual quality, making the regression hard to detect and raising legal, ethical, and operational risks. In everyday practice, models are routinely adapted to new domains; a system with “nudity” erased might later be fine-tuned on “classical sculpture” or “beach photography” without malicious intent. The central question is: **Does safety alignment hold under normal, benign fine-tuning?** As illustrated in Figure 2, models that were initially safe can produce harmful or explicit outputs after benign fine-tuning, visually revealing this safety collapse. Our empirical study shows that many current defenses degrade substantially under such simple benign fine-tuning: this motivates an evaluation framework that values not only pre-adaptation safety and jailbreak resistance, but also *stability under benign fine-tuning by unintentional attackers*.

To that end, we argue that modern benchmarks for safety-alignment techniques in text-to-image diffusion models must evaluate not only how safe a method makes the model, how well it preserves prompt adherence, and how much visual quality it retains, but also how robust its safety alignment remains after benign adaptation. For this reason, we introduce the SPQR benchmark (**S**afety–**P**rompt adherence–**Q**uality–**R**obustness), which provides a standardized, reproducible yardstick to assess these four dimensions jointly. Beyond aggregate scoring, we evaluate multiple *unintentional attacker profiles* and benign fine-tuning settings—including general, multilingual, and domain-specific adaptations—and further analyze robustness across out-of-distribution datasets and semantic categories to identify systematic safety failures.

We summarize our contributions as follows:

1. **Threat model and finding.** We formalize the *un-*

intentional attacker empirically showing that benign fine-tuning can destabilize safety alignment while improving utility, across multiple methods and datasets.

2. **SPQR: unified benchmark and metric.** We introduce SPQR (Safety–Prompt adherence–Quality–Robustness), a calibrated protocol with fixed compute budgets, public benign datasets, standardized evaluation tracks, and a single leaderboard score that aggregates S, P, Q, and R across seeds and languages.
3. **Comprehensive evaluation and diagnostic analysis.** We conduct comprehensive and category-wise evaluations of representative safety-alignment methods (covering **general benign fine-tuning**, **multilingual adaptation**, and **domain-specific specialization**) using multiple fine-tuning profiles that emulate realistic deployment scenarios.
4. **Summary of key findings.** Our analysis reveals BFT induces a general safety collapse vulnerable to jailbreaks. This failure is adaptation-dependent: for most robust methods, PEFT/LoRA offers superior stability over full fine-tuning, though initially weak methods fail regardless. Finally, we find top-performers succeed via **distribution-aware** alignment, not simple erasure.

2. Preliminaries and Related Work

2.1. Text-to-Image Diffusion Pipeline

We briefly review latent diffusion text-to-image (T2I) models [2] to situate where safety alignment acts. A frozen CLIP [30] encoder g_ψ maps a text prompt p to text embeddings $C = g_\psi(p) \in \mathbb{R}^{L \times d_t}$, which condition the denoising U-Net through cross-attention. At each layer ℓ , U-Net activations h_ℓ interact with text features via standard attention operations $A_\ell = \text{softmax}(Q_\ell K_\ell^\top / \sqrt{d_c})$, producing $h_{\ell+1} = h_\ell + A_\ell V_\ell$. Unsafe semantics in C or biased correlations in dataset priors can therefore propagate to unsafe generations even for benign prompts. Safety alignment methods modify this pathway—by editing the conditioning, modulating attention, or updating parameters—to suppress such behaviors while preserving image fidelity. Sampler and guidance scale remain fixed across our evaluations to isolate alignment effects.

2.2. Families of Safety-Alignment Methods

Existing defenses differ mainly in *where* they intervene: (i) **Conditioning-space edits** project or remap C before attention, as in RECE [11], MACE [12], or SPM [28]; (ii) **Attention-path edits** damp or prune attention responses, *e.g.*, ESD [16], ERASEDIFF [15], SALUN [13], SCISSORHANDS [14]; (iii) **Parameter-space unlearn-**

ing

 updates weights to make alignment persistent [31], *e.g.*, ADVUNLEARN [27], STEREO [17], FMN [26], UCE [29]. All methods balance three control knobs: the modified conditioning C' , the attention transfer $A_\ell V_\ell$, and the guidance scale s . We benchmark all major approaches under identical sampling and hyperparameter settings.

2.3. Existing Benchmarks

Prior safety benchmarks [32–34] focus on partial aspects of alignment. *Adversarial BMs* test jailbreak prompts [18]; *UnlearnCanvas* [35] measures erasure and retention quality; *NSFW Benchmark* aggregates classifier compliance; and *Illusion of Unlearning* [22] studies concept re-emergence under targeted fine-tuning. However, none evaluate robustness to *benign* fine-tuning unifying it to safety, prompt adherence, and quality.

Our benchmark SPQR instead integrates these dimensions and summarize these scores into a single-valued metric. This provides the first standardized, reproducible measure of safety persistence under realistic adaptation. An overview of the evaluation protocol and representative scores across different domains is summarized in Table 1. The table illustrates the four SPQR axes—Safety (S), Prompt adherence (P), Quality (Q), and Robustness (R)—and the overall harmonic-mean score SPQR, that will be used throughout the paper.

3. Evaluating Safety-Alignment Methods

3.1. Assessing Safety Beyond Surface Metrics

Evaluating safety alignment methods for text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models requires a multidimensional perspective that captures not only **safety compliance** but also **generation quality** and **residual utility**. On the safety axis, recent works have extensively adopted automated detectors such as *Q16* [36] and *NudeNet* [37], which assign scores for unsafe or explicit content, despite known limitations in reliability [38]. However, assessing safety alone is insufficient: an effective alignment method must also preserve semantic fidelity and perceptual realism. This motivates the inclusion of complementary quantitative measures along the prompt-adherence and image-quality axes, namely the **CLIP score** and the **Fréchet Inception Distance (FID)**.

The CLIP score evaluates the semantic consistency between a generated image I and its conditioning text T by computing the cosine similarity between their respective embeddings, obtained from pretrained encoders f_I and f_T of the CLIP model:

$$\text{CLIPScore}(I, T) = \frac{f_I(I) \cdot f_T(T)}{\|f_I(I)\|_2 \|f_T(T)\|_2}.$$

Table 1. **Cross-Domain SPQR** Benchmark: Safety (**S**), Prompt adherence (**P**), and Quality (**Q**) (shared across all domains), Robustness (**R**) and overall SPQR harmonic mean ($\frac{4}{\frac{1}{S} + \frac{1}{P} + \frac{1}{Q} + \frac{1}{R}}$) evaluated across multilingual, domain-specific, and general fine-tuning tasks. Higher values of SPQR indicate better safety–utility balance and post-FT stability.

Method	Shared Axes			Multilingual		Domain		General	
	Safety	Prompt adherence	Quality	Robustness	SPQR	Robustness	SPQR	Robustness	SPQR
ERASED [15]	0.988	0.178	0.050	0.502	0.140	<u>0.865</u>	0.144	0.726	0.143
FMN [26]	0.884	0.282	0.770	0.259	0.408	0.335	0.446	0.149	0.318
ADVU [27]	0.894	0.286	0.780	0.138	0.305	0.292	0.430	0.159	0.329
SCISS. [14]	<u>0.996</u>	0.210	0.411	0.464	0.386	0.822	0.425	0.477	0.388
STEREO [17]	0.992	0.278	0.902	0.340	0.462	0.826	0.577	0.383	0.480
SALUN [13]	0.998	0.253	0.724	0.550	0.490	0.872	0.534	0.726	0.518
MACE [12]	<u>0.996</u>	0.267	0.907	0.756	<u>0.557</u>	0.819	0.566	0.657	0.542
ESD [16]	0.936	0.289	0.950	0.291	0.443	0.652	0.562	0.684	0.568
SPM [28]	0.920	0.294	<u>0.946</u>	0.363	0.482	0.604	0.556	0.684	0.571
UCE [29]	0.926	<u>0.293</u>	0.919	0.571	0.545	0.846	<u>0.591</u>	<u>0.942</u>	<u>0.602</u>
RECE [11]	0.938	0.292	0.934	0.740	0.579	0.855	0.594	0.980	0.608

Higher values indicate stronger text-image alignment, suggesting that the model preserves the intended meaning despite alignment interventions.

Complementarily, the Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) quantifies the perceptual quality of generated images by comparing the statistics of their latent features (μ_g, Σ_g) with those of real images (μ_r, Σ_r) extracted from an Inception network:

$$\text{FID} = \|\mu_r - \mu_g\|_2^2 + \text{Tr} \left(\Sigma_r + \Sigma_g - 2(\Sigma_r \Sigma_g)^{1/2} \right).$$

Lower FID values imply that the generated distribution closely approximates the real one, indicating minimal degradation in visual quality introduced by safety mechanisms.

Beyond these axes, **residual safety metrics**—which evaluate whether unsafe concepts can re-emerge after fine-tuning or adversarial prompting—have become crucial for assessing *unlearning stability*. Recent studies [22–24] reveal that models achieving competitive CLIPScore and FID values may still retain dormant unsafe representations that resurface under benign adaptation. In particular, [22, 23] demonstrate that an intentional attacker can deliberately curate seemingly benign data that either resembles the forgotten concepts or originates from the same domain, thereby reactivating harmful behaviors through targeted benign fine-tuning (BFT).

3.2. Benign Fine-Tuning as Unintentional Attack

Given these premises, we extend recent analyses of post-training drifts from unlearning to the broader context of safety alignment, relaxing the assumption that the attacker has prior knowledge of the concepts that were unlearned.




Figure 3. Example visualization of the trade-off between prompt adherence and robustness to benign fine-tuning.

We consider a realistic deployment scenario in which a provider operates a T2I system (e.g., Stable Diffusion) and fine-tunes it on demand on new, seemingly harmless data (e.g., user uploads, aesthetic updates, or additional domain-specific samples) to meet precise utility expectations. Since such data contain no explicit harmful content, these updates are typically safe. However, our findings reveal that these benign fine-tunings can turn into *unintentional attacks*: the model continues to behave normally and produce high-quality, coherent images (Table 2), yet it silently regains unsafe or previously suppressed capabilities. This hidden failure mode motivates our evaluation framework, designed to quantify how easily safety-aligned models revert to unsafe behavior through standard, well-intentioned fine-tuning procedures.

Threat Model. We define a threat model that captures the risk posed by **benign fine-tuning (BFT)** operations on a safety-aligned T2I model. Let \mathcal{M} denote a pre-trained model, and $\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{M})$ its safety-aligned version produced by a method \mathcal{S} (e.g., concept erasure, unlearning of harmful concepts, safety-aware LoRA). Our *unintentional* adversary does not aim to reintroduce harmful concepts nor possess knowledge of the unlearned set, but instead performs a standard fine-tuning procedure $\text{BFT}_{\mathcal{D}}$ on a dataset \mathcal{D} that satisfies conditions like **(1)** it contains no harmful content ($\mathcal{D} \cap \mathcal{H} = \emptyset$), **(2)** it is composed of benign or domain-specific samples ($\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{X}_{\text{benign}}$), and **(3)** it follows a standard supervised objective ($\mathcal{L}_{\text{BFT}} = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\ell(p_{\theta}(y | x))]$). Under these assumptions, the following post-adaptation model is produced:

$$\mathcal{M}_{\text{BFT}} = \text{BFT}_{\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{M})). \quad (1)$$

This setup reflects realistic updates in production pipelines—domain refinements, aesthetic adjustments, or personalization—that are ostensibly safe yet capable of subtly eroding alignment. Formally, the safety drift is captured by:

$$\Delta_h = h(\text{BFT}_{\mathcal{D}}(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{M})), \mathcal{H}) - h(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{M}), \mathcal{H}), \quad (2)$$

where $h(\cdot, \mathcal{H})$ denotes the harmfulness score measured on a harmful prompt set \mathcal{H} . A method is considered robust if benign updates $\text{BFT}_{\mathcal{D}}$ induce negligible Δ_h , preserving safety under natural model evolution (top-right corner in Figure 3).

3.3. From a Threat to a Complete Benchmark

Since real-world T2I systems are routinely fine-tuned on *benign* data to enhance utility [39], safety alignment should remain effective under these inherently harmless updates. Robustness to post-training shifts must therefore be a core evaluation criterion, as even routine, non-adversarial updates can silently erode alignment.

We formalize this notion through our proposed *unintentional* attack, repurposed as a metric to quantify the resilience of safety-alignment methods to benign fine-tuning. The resulting *Robustness* score is defined as:

$$\text{Robustness}_h(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{M})) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\Delta_h)}. \quad (3)$$

Here, Δ_h (from Equation (2)) quantifies the drift towards harmfulness after a benign fine-tuning (BFT) operation, given a harmfulness score h and a harmful prompt set \mathcal{H} . Smaller values of Δ_h indicate greater stability of the alignment, yielding higher robustness scores.

Benchmark. Building on this, we propose a unified evaluation protocol comprising four complementary

metrics designed to capture the multidimensional behavior of safety-aligned T2I models. These axes—**Safety (S)**, **Prompt-adherence (P)**, **Quality (Q)**, and **Robustness (R)**—jointly characterize the balance between safety compliance, semantic fidelity, visual quality, and post-training stability. All scores are normalized to the interval $(0, 1]$ (where *the higher, the better*) to allow for consistent comparison and aggregation.

Safety (S). Safety is defined as the complement of the harmfulness score, ensuring that higher values consistently correspond to safer behavior:

$$\text{Safety}_h(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{M})) = 1 - \frac{h(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{M}), \mathcal{H})}{100}. \quad (4)$$

This metric directly reflects the effectiveness of an alignment method in suppressing unsafe or explicit generations. In prior works, h is often computed using the Q16 [36] and NudeNet [37] classifiers in combination. However, given recent evidence highlighting the limited reliability of Q16 [38], we replace it with the LLaVA-Guard image classifier, which has demonstrated substantially higher consistency. We therefore adopt LLaVA-Guard and NudeNet as the primary harmfulness estimators across all our experiments.

Prompt-adherence (P). Semantic coherence is captured by the model’s ability to faithfully follow benign prompts, measured through the CLIP-based similarity between text and generated images:

$$\text{Prompt-adherence}(I, T) = \text{CLIPScore}(I, T). \quad (5)$$

Higher values indicate stronger semantic consistency and thus better preservation of generative intent despite safety constraints.

Quality (Q). Visual fidelity is assessed using a normalized form of the Fréchet Inception Distance (FID), which measures the perceptual closeness of generated and real images:

$$\text{Quality}(I) = \varepsilon + \left(\frac{\max_{\mathcal{M}} \text{FID} - \text{FID}(I)}{\max_{\mathcal{M}} \text{FID} - \min_{\mathcal{M}} \text{FID}} \right) \cdot (1 - 2\varepsilon). \quad (6)$$

This formulation inverts and normalizes the FID range to maintain a consistent interpretation—higher values always correspond to higher visual quality.

Robustness (R). Finally, the robustness score, introduced above, evaluates the degree to which safety alignment withstands benign fine-tuning. A high R implies that no significant safety degradation occurs even after post-deployment adaptation.

SPQR Score. To combine these axes into a single holistic metric, we define the overall alignment score, SPQR, as the harmonic mean of the four components:

$$\text{SPQR} = \left(\frac{1}{4} \left(\frac{1}{S} + \frac{1}{P} + \frac{1}{Q} + \frac{1}{R} \right) \right)^{-1}. \quad (7)$$

Table 2. **Change in CLIP and FID metrics after fine-tuning.** Positive ΔCLIP indicates improved text-image alignment, while negative ΔFID indicates improved image quality. All values are reported as (After – Before).

Method	$\Delta\text{CLIP} (\uparrow)$	$\Delta\text{FID} (\downarrow)$
ERASEDIFF [15]	+0.111	-216.764
FMN [26]	+0.030	-63.668
ADVUNLEARN [27]	+0.026	-57.423
SCISSORHANDS [14]	+0.079	-102.358
STEREO [17]	+0.026	-14.837
SALUN [13]	+0.044	-53.837
MACE [12]	+0.007	-0.771
ESD [16]	+0.016	-4.878
SPM [28]	+0.008	-7.683
UCE [29]	+0.005	-11.323
RECE [11]	+0.000	-1.449

The harmonic mean penalizes imbalance—ensuring that excelling in one axis cannot compensate for poor performance in another. Ultimately, the SPQR score provides a concise yet comprehensive measure of a method’s ability to balance safety, utility, and robustness under real-world post-training conditions.

4. Experiments

4.1. Experimental Setup

Our experiments are designed to evaluate the robustness of safety-aligned and unlearning methods under realistic benign fine-tuning conditions. We benchmark a diverse set of representative approaches encompassing both explicit unlearning and safer generation paradigms, against a different spectrum of tests that help us understand the importance of our SPQR. All methods are implemented on the **Stable Diffusion v1.5** backbone to ensure consistent architecture, tokenizer, and latent space across experiments (more versions of Stable Diffusion are discussed in the appendix for completeness).

To assess harmfulness, we evaluate on curated *harmful test sets*—ViSU [10], I2P [3], and RAB [18]—covering policy-sensitive categories such as explicit content, violence, and illicit activities. Focusing on harmful benchmarks isolates the *revival signal*, ensuring unsafe generations result solely from benign fine-tuning.

We define three benign fine-tuning profiles—**Lite**, **Moderate**, and **Standard**—to probe safety alignment. The *Lite* profile applies **LoRA-based fine-tuning** [25], updating low-rank adapters in the UNet and text encoder to mimic lightweight post-deployment updates. The *Moderate* profile tunes only **cross-attention layers**, adjusting text–image conditioning while preserving visual priors. The *Standard* profile performs **full-parameter fine-tuning**, simulating complete re-adaptation and re-

Table 3. **Ablation on Fine-Tuning Strategy.** We analyze if parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods can mitigate the “Silent Safety Failure.” We compare the **Robustness (R \uparrow)** after fine-tuning on our Safe dataset using three different strategies. The baseline score (Before FT) is shown for reference. **Bold** = best (most robust).

Method	R (\uparrow) after FT		
	Full UNet	Cross-Attn Only	LoRA
ERASEDIFF [15]	0.726	0.692	0.942
FMN [26]	0.149	0.113	0.146
ADVUNLEARN [27]	0.159	0.120	0.087
SCISSORHANDS [14]	0.477	0.712	0.960
STEREO [17]	0.383	0.549	0.923
SALUN [13]	0.726	<u>0.869</u>	1.000
MACE [12]	0.657	0.670	0.670
ESD [16]	0.684	0.657	0.950
SPM [28]	0.684	0.619	0.571
UCE [29]	<u>0.942</u>	0.786	0.819
RECE [11]	0.980	0.942	<u>0.980</u>

vealing deeper safety breakdowns. Training spans 1–3, 3–8, and 10–20 epochs respectively, over benign datasets of 1k–50k samples.

We evaluate these attacks under four *benign fine-tuning scenarios*, each reflecting realistic post-deployment conditions: (i) **General data**, neutral image–text pairs without harmful content; (ii) **Multilingual data**, with non-English prompts to test whether cross-lingual shifts revive suppressed unsafe semantics; (iii) **Style/domain data**, involving aesthetic or stylistic transfers (e.g., photo-to-cartoon) to emulate customer-specific adaptations. These settings offer a controlled yet realistic framework to assess whether safety-aligned diffusion models remain stable or subtly degrade under benign fine-tuning.

We provide additional details on the datasets and hyperparameter settings in the supplementary materials.

4.2. Effectiveness of the Unintentional Attack

A key question in evaluating *benign fine-tuning* (BFT) is whether harmful behavior can emerge without visible drops in utility. Fine-tuning is usually assessed through metrics like prompt adherence or image quality, so stable or improved utility is often assumed to imply preserved safety. When safety degrades while utility remains high, these failures become difficult to detect and potentially misleading.

Motivated by this risk, we evaluate how robust each safety-alignment method remains under different BFT profiles (*Full UNet*, *Cross-Attn-Only*, and *LoRA*), and assess the impact that the BFT has on model utility—measured as a combination of prompt adherence and perceptual quality.

We audit the robustness of each alignment method

Table 4. **Ablation: Generalization of Safety Failure to Unseen Harmful Prompt Sets.** This table measures the *consequence* of the “Silent Safety Failure.” We take the models that were fine-tuned on our **Safe Benign Data** and evaluate their final \mathbf{R}^\uparrow (Nudenet+LLaVaGuard) score on three different unseen harmful prompt datasets. High scores across all datasets show the failure is generalized.

Method	R $^\uparrow$ Score (%) on Harmful Test Sets			
	ViSU [10]	I2P [3]	RAB [18]	Average
ERASED [15]	0.726	0.607	0.724	0.686
FMN [26]	0.149	0.497	0.016	0.221
ADVUN [27]	0.159	0.100	0.011	0.090
SCISS [14]	0.477	0.607	0.057	0.380
STEREO [17]	0.383	0.741	0.527	0.550
SALUN [13]	0.726	0.670	0.587	0.661
MACE [12]	0.657	0.819	0.726	0.734
ESD [16]	0.684	0.607	0.020	0.437
SPM [28]	0.684	0.670	0.427	0.593
UCE [29]	0.942	0.670	0.384	0.665
RECE [11]	0.980	0.905	0.727	0.871

across BFT profiles in Table 3, which summarizes how the methods respond to BFTs. For this experiment, we apply the three profiles using the same general dataset (COCO [40]). Details for each profile configuration are provided in Section 4.1 and in the supplementary materials.

Among all evaluated methods, RECE demonstrates the highest robustness across profiles, consistently ranking as either the most or second most stable. UCE—on which RECE builds—is generally the second most robust under both the *Full UNet* and *Cross-Attn-Only* profiles. Interestingly, the majority of the methods have high robustness score under the *LoRA* profile. We hypothesize that this may be related to the localized adaptation of safety gradients under low-rank fine-tuning, which interacts differently with the representational bottleneck of LoRA layers; however, further analysis is deferred to the supplementary materials.

The corresponding utility results are presented in Table 2, computed exclusively using the *Full UNet* profile on the COCO dataset [40] to ensure consistency with the robustness evaluation. Although ERASEDIF δ exhibits the most substantial utility gain, all methods experience an increase in utility after BFT. This consistent improvement highlights that the BFT process, even unintentionally, can pose a concrete and potentially serious threat to safety alignment.

4.3. Multilingual and Multi-domain Analysis

After evaluating robustness across BFT profiles, we next test how safety alignment holds under realistic specialization. Table 5 reports robustness after standard-profile

benign fine-tuning on language- and domain-specific datasets, capturing alignment stability when the fine-tuning distribution diverges from general-purpose data. Dataset and configuration details are provided in the supplementary materials.

Across all settings, RECE again emerges as the most robust method, achieving top or near-top performance in almost every case (e.g., 0.980 in the general setting). MACE and SALUN also demonstrate strong overall robustness, ranking among the top-performing methods on average—MACE particularly in the multilingual scenario, and SALUN in domain-specific adaptation. Notably, MACE stands out as the only method improving robustness in the Arabic language case, underscoring its stability under strong linguistic drift.

4.4. Cross-domain Summary via the SPQR Benchmark

We showcase the importance of our proposed benchmark in Table 1. In this experiment, we analyze all safety-alignment methods under the *standard* BFT profile and evaluate them along four complementary axes—Safety, Prompt adherence, perceptual Quality, and Robustness to BFTs. We then report our proposed single composite score (SPQR) to ease comparison across methods and settings.

While most methods perform strongly on Safety and are broadly on par for Prompt Adherence, we find that RECE achieves the best overall trade-off across all four metrics. It attains an SPQR of 0.608 in the general set-




Figure 4. **S-P-Q-R Performance Profiles for Key Methods.** Each radar plot shows the performance signature across five harmful categories. The colored polygons show Safety (blue), Prompt Adherence (orange), Quality (green), and Robustness (red).

Table 5. **Generalization of “Silent Safety Failure” to Diverse Downstream Domains.** We test if stability failure generalizes by fine-tuning unlearned models on various benign downstream tasks. All scores are the final \mathbf{R}^\uparrow (Nudenet+LlavaGuard) metric after fine-tuning. **Bold** = best, underline = second-best.

Method	\mathbf{R}^\uparrow Score After Fine-tuning on Benign Data								
	(Ref.)	Multilingual					Domain-Specific		
		General	Arabic	Spanish	French	Hindi	Avg.	Artistic	Medical
ERASEDIFF [15]	0.726	0.376	0.548	0.538	0.548	0.502	<u>0.843</u>	0.886	<u>0.865</u>
FMN [26]	0.149	0.052	0.710	0.232	0.042	0.259	<u>0.332</u>	0.338	0.335
ADVUNLEARN [27]	0.159	0.054	0.133	0.319	0.045	0.138	0.294	0.289	0.292
SCISSORHANDS [14]	0.477	0.431	0.439	0.538	0.449	0.464	0.740	0.904	0.822
STEREO [17]	0.383	0.275	0.449	0.360	0.278	<u>0.340</u>	0.691	0.960	0.826
SALUN [13]	0.726	0.517	0.527	0.726	0.432	0.550	0.801	0.941	0.872
MACE [12]	0.657	0.979	<u>0.726</u>	0.712	<u>0.606</u>	0.756	0.852	0.786	0.819
ESD [16]	0.684	0.227	0.398	0.278	0.261	0.291	0.606	0.697	0.652
SPM [28]	0.684	0.241	0.246	<u>0.756</u>	0.209	0.363	0.439	0.769	0.604
UCE [29]	0.942	0.506	0.677	0.582	0.516	0.571	0.742	<u>0.951</u>	0.846
RECE [11]	0.980	<u>0.605</u>	0.786	0.869	0.697	<u>0.740</u>	0.769	0.941	0.855

ting and degrades only marginally in the multilingual and domain-specific scenarios, with MACE and UCE following closely.

Why these methods excel. RECE relies on a strong refinement over unified counterfactual objectives, promoting safety edits that remain distribution-aware, which plausibly preserves both prompt adherence and perceptual quality while also limiting any drift. MACE has multi-attribute consistency constraints that encourage language- and domain-invariant safety signals, which likely explains its stability under multilingual shifts. UCE, on the other hand, jointly optimizes a unified contrastive erasure objective that balances the removal of unsafe behaviors with the preservation of utility-relevant features, resulting in competitive SPQR trade-offs in the general setting.

Overall, the SPQR view reveals that headline Safety, Prompt adherence, and Quality gains can mask regressions Robustness; aggregating them into the composite SPQR score provides a clearer picture of cross-domain reliability.

4.5. Multi-Category and Multi-Dataset Analyses

In this section, we analyze the evaluated safety-alignment methods across multiple datasets and semantic categories, offering a finer-grained view of robustness and safety drift under diverse harmfulness distributions. All experiments use the *standard BFT profile* within the *general setting* for benign fine-tuning.

We begin by analyzing cross-dataset robustness, examining how each method behaves when evaluated on different harmfulness benchmarks. Specifically, we report results on the VISU [10] dataset, alongside the I2P [3] and RING-A-BELL [18] datasets. These two latter benchmarks differ substantially in construc-

tion: I2P prompts are tailored for high-quality image generation and tend to be semantically rich but constrained, whereas RING-A-BELL is explicitly designed for jailbreak-style attacks, containing adversarial prompts that expose latent unsafe capabilities. As such, both serve as strong out-of-distribution (OOD) tests relative to the data used in benign fine-tuning.

Results in Table 4 confirm that RECE remains the most robust method across datasets. However, a marked drop in robustness is observed for most methods when evaluated on strongly OOD data. Nearly all models achieve higher safety scores on VISU [10] and I2P [3], but their robustness degrades when tested on RING-A-BELL [18]. The only consistent exceptions are RECE, MACE, and STEREO, whose adversarially regularized training strategies appear to confer stronger generalization under distributional shifts.

In Figure 4, we provide a complementary category-level analysis based on a subset of the VISU [10] dataset. Due to space constraints, we include five representative categories in the main text. Each radar plot illustrates how the methods score per category after a standard-profile BFT under the general setting.

As expected, RECE shows strong, balanced performance across all categories, with robustness (red) closely tracking safety (blue) and maintaining competitive utility (green and orange). This consistency underscores its stability and the effectiveness of its design in preserving safety alignment across datasets and categories.

5. Conclusion

We introduced the SPQR benchmark to evaluate the stability of safety alignment in text-to-image diffusion models. Our study shows that current defenses

often lose alignment even when adapted on harmless data, exposing a silent but practical risk in real deployments. We also find this failure is adaptation-dependent: PEFT more easily preserves safety, while full-parameter updates tend to reintroduce unsafe behavior. SPQR offers a reproducible mean to enable fairer comparison across methods. We hope this benchmark encourages future work on safety mechanisms that remain stable under everyday model adaptation.

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SPQR: A Standardized Benchmark for Modern Safety Alignment Methods in Text-to-Image Diffusion Models

Supplementary Material

A. Comparison with Existing Benchmarks

We compare our SPQR benchmark with existing alternatives along several key dimensions, highlighting why it provides a foundational protocol for evaluating safety-aligned generative models. Specifically, it captures four core properties that any safety-alignment method should ensure: **Safety**, **Prompt adherence**, **Quality**, and **Robustness** to benign fine-tunings (BFTs).

Firstly, our work introduces and formalizes an atypical yet realistic threat model that arises from the widespread practice of benign fine-tuning on non-safety-related data. Clearly defining this threat is crucial to understanding both its subtlety and practical severity. Prior studies have observed that even benign fine-tuning can weaken the safety alignment of text-to-image diffusion models [22–24], but we are the first to explicitly formalize this *unintentional*-threat model and argue that robustness to such degradations is not optional. Given the prevalence of benign adaptations, resilience to these unintentional regressions must be regarded as a fundamental requirement for modern safety-alignment methods. Because of its ubiquity and relevance, ensuring **Robustness** to benign fine-tuning is a central goal of our evaluation protocol.

While robustness is essential, it is not sufficient on its own. A safety-alignment method must also preserve the model’s fundamental generative capabilities. Accordingly, our protocol complements robustness with established metrics for **Safety**, **Prompt adherence**, and **Quality**, enabling a comprehensive, multidimensional evaluation.

In our framework, **Safety** corresponds to the inverse of harmfulness (also referred to as inappropriate probability [3]) and quantifies how effectively a model avoids producing unsafe or undesirable outputs. **Prompt adherence** and **Quality** together capture the model’s retained utility. **Prompt adherence** measures the semantic alignment between the generated image and the input prompt using CLIP embeddings, the closer the embeddings the better the model preserves user intent. **Quality** evaluates the visual coherence, absence of artifacts, and aesthetic consistency of generated images. Together, these metrics characterize the overall utility preserved by a generative model under a given safety-alignment method.

A.1. Positioning within the Landscape of Existing Benchmarks

Table A situates our SPQR benchmark relative to the most representative existing efforts in evaluating safety and concept erasure in generative models, including *Ring-A-Bell* [18], *UnlearnCanvas* [35], *NSFW Benchmark* [41], and *T2ISafety* [42]. While prior benchmarks have each contributed valuable perspectives on specific aspects of safety or unlearning, they often leave key dimensions underexplored. Rather than fully surpassing existing benchmarks, SPQR is designed to complement them, uniquely bridging the gap between safety evaluation, utility preservation, and robustness under realistic, non-adversarial conditions.

Intentional vs. Unintentional Threat Models. Most existing benchmarks focus exclusively on *intentional attackers*, where safety degradation arises from prompt-based jailbreaks or targeted adversarial inputs. Examples include *Ring-A-Bell* and *NSFW Benchmark*, both of which assess how models handle deliberately crafted unsafe prompts or concept reinstatement attacks. In contrast, SPQR explicitly targets the complementary and largely unaddressed dimension of *unintentional attackers*, where benign fine-tunings *inadvertently* compromise safety alignment. This scenario is particularly relevant in real-world adaptation pipelines, where models are routinely fine-tuned on neutral or domain-specific data without safety considerations (see Figure A for qualitative examples of the severity of this unintentional threat). SPQR thus fills a critical methodological gap by evaluating robustness under this realistic yet underexplored threat model.

Multidimensional Evaluation of Safety and Utility. While benchmarks such as *T2ISafety* or *UnlearnCanvas* measure specific aspects of safety or concept removal, none provide a unified framework covering all four axes of **Safety**, **Prompt adherence**, **Quality**, and **Robustness**. *T2ISafety* emphasizes taxonomy-based safety risks (e.g., toxicity or fairness) but omits prompt and quality consistency. *UnlearnCanvas* measures post-unlearning utility, but only in artistic and stylistic settings and without robustness analysis. In contrast, SPQR combines all four dimensions within a single, standardized protocol, enabling a holistic evaluation of both safety alignment and generative fidelity.

Robustness Beyond Adversarial Settings. *Ring-A-Bell* and similar red-teaming benchmarks assess robustness




Figure A. **The *unintentional* threat of Benign Fine-Tunings.** A simple, generally safe, fine-tuning can harm the safety of the current state-of-the-art safety-alignment techniques.

Table A. **Comparative Overview of Benchmarks for Concept Erasure, Safety, and Robustness.** We distinguish between *intentional attackers* (prompt-based jailbreaks) and *unintentional attackers* (benign fine-tuning regressions). Our SPQR benchmark provides the first unified protocol for evaluating *downstream safety-alignment stability* under the unintentional attacker threat model, jointly assessing **S**, **P**, **Q**, and **R**.

Benchmark	Ring-A-Bell [18]	UnlearnCanvas [35]	NSFW Benchmark [41]	T2ISafety [42]	SPQR (Ours)
Threat Model					
Intentional (Prompt-based)	✓	(Partial)	✓	✓	✓
Unintentional (Benign FT)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Core Properties Measured					
Safety	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Prompt adherence	(Partial)	✓	✓	(Partial)	✓
Quality	(Partial)	✓	✓	(Partial)	✓
Robustness (Benign FT)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Coverage and Generalization					
Multilingual	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Artistic / Stylistic	(Partial)	✓	(Partial)	(Partial)	✓
Comics / Text-in-image	✗	(Partial)	✗	✗	✓

only to deliberate adversarial prompts. However, such evaluations capture a narrow slice of the safety landscape, as they assume intentional exploitation. SPQR instead introduces a new form of robustness—resilience to *benign fine-tuning drift*—quantified through stability metrics that measure safety and utility degradation after neutral-domain adaptations. This perspective reframes robustness as a requirement rather than an optional safeguard, recognizing that most safety regressions in deployed systems stem from unintentional rather than adversarial changes.

Domain and Modal Diversity. Table A further highlights that SPQR is the only benchmark explicitly designed to generalize across multiple visual and linguistic domains, including multilingual prompts, artistic styles, and comic-like compositions. While *UnlearnCanvas* partially covers artistic domains, and *T2ISafety* includes limited stylistic variation, none address cross-domain resilience. By encompassing diverse visual styles and lin-

guistic inputs, SPQR ensures that evaluations reflect the broad deployment settings of real generative models.

Summary. Overall, Table A illustrates that SPQR is the first benchmark to unify safety alignment, prompt fidelity, visual quality, and robustness to benign fine-tuning within a single protocol. It captures critical yet previously overlooked failure modes—particularly safety degradation without explicit adversarial intent—establishing a foundation for evaluating next-generation, safety-aligned generative models in realistic adaptation settings.

B. Discussions on Hyperparameters

Our benign fine-tuning (BFT) experiments adopt a curriculum-based training protocol, where models are progressively exposed to increasing amounts of data. This strategy helps stabilize convergence while ensuring comparable optimization dynamics across all safety-alignment methods.

Table B. Common hyperparameters across all BFT experiments. These settings are held constant for all safety-alignment methods and BFT profiles.

Hyperparameter	Value
Optimizer	AdamW
Learning Rate	1×10^{-4}
Adam β_1	0.9
Adam β_2	0.999
Adam ϵ	1×10^{-8}
Weight Decay	1×10^{-2}
Max Gradient Norm	1.0
Batch Size (per device)	16
Gradient Accumulation Steps	1
LR Scheduler	Constant
LR Warmup Steps	500
Mixed Precision	FP16
Resolution	512×512
Random Seed	42

BFT Hyperparameters. All BFT experiments share a unified set of base hyperparameters to ensure fairness and reproducibility across both methods and profiles. The common configuration, summarized in Table B, includes standard AdamW optimization, moderate learning rates, and consistent training resolution and batch setup. These settings were kept fixed throughout all experiments to isolate the effects of model architecture and fine-tuning scope.

B.1. BFT Profiles

Each BFT profile is also characterized by its own set of hyperparameters, tailored to the scope and intensity of the fine-tuning procedure. These include specific learning rates, dropout probabilities, and, in the case of LoRA-based updates, rank and scaling coefficients. The full configuration for each profile is summarized in Table C, which outlines the target modules and optimization settings used across all experiments.

Standard Profile. It represents the most invasive form of benign fine-tuning, as it updates *all* the parameters within the diffusion model’s **Full UNet**, including attention blocks, residual layers, and convolutional stages. This configuration mirrors real-world scenarios where practitioners fine-tune a model extensively on user-specific datasets (e.g., COCO subsets, custom portrait datasets, or domain-adaptation corpora) with the goal of maximizing utility, fidelity, or personalization. Because it affects the entire generative pathway, the Standard Profile fine-tuning has the highest capacity to overwrite the safety-relevant structure learned during alignment, making it a stress test for evaluating how deeply an safety-alignment method internalizes harmful

concepts. A method that only weakly suppresses unsafe semantics will typically show pronounced behavioral drift under this profile, even if utility metrics (prompt adherence, perceptual quality) remain stable or improve. As shown in Table 3, many methods—such as FMN and AdvUnlearn—experience severe robustness collapse under Full UNet BFT, revealing the fragility of their safety guarantees when broad parameter updates are applied.

Moderate Profile. This profile targets a narrower—but highly impactful—portion of the UNet, specifically the cross-attention layers that link the text embeddings to the image generation process. It is commonly used when practitioners want to adapt the model to new prompts, styles, or linguistic distributions without altering the underlying generative prior of the model. Even though the update scope is smaller than Full UNet, altering cross-attention can strongly reshape the mapping from text semantics to latent visual features, making it an especially relevant setting for uncovering *semantic safety drift*. A model that has not robustly removed unsafe associations may re-establish harmful mappings as the text-to-image bridge is re-optimized on benign data. Interestingly, Table 3 reveals distinct behaviors across methods: some approaches degrade substantially (FMN, AdvUnlearn), while others remain more stable (Scissorhands, SalUn). This highlights that cross-attention plays a central role in reactivating suppressed harmful concepts, and methods that do not explicitly modify or regularize these layers during unlearning remain highly vulnerable to this profile.

Lite Profile. This BFT profile makes use of the **LoRA** (Low-Rank Adaptation) and represents a lightweight and parameter-efficient fine-tuning strategy—one that is widely adopted in real deployment due to its low cost, modularity, and tendency to preserve a model’s generalization ability. In this setting, only small low-rank adaptation matrices are introduced and optimized while the original UNet parameters remain frozen. Despite its seemingly minimal footprint, LoRA can still induce alignment regression, especially when the safe model’s internal representations contain residual traces of harmful concepts that can be re-amplified through these newly introduced low-rank pathways. Because LoRA does not overwrite the full network, this profile tests whether a safety method truly *eliminated* harmful concepts or merely *masked* them. Methods that learned robust, structurally deep erasure—such as SalUn, ESD, or RECE—show strong stability under LoRA, in some cases achieving their best post-FT robustness scores. Conversely, methods whose unlearning relies on brittle penalties or localized edits exhibit renewed harmfulness even when LoRA updates are small, making the LoRA profile a particularly realistic and discriminative testbed for safety stability (more in Section E).

Table C. Detailed specifications of the three BFT profiles. The **Lite (LoRA)** profile uses parameter-efficient fine-tuning with low-rank adapters, the **Moderate (Cross-Attention)** profile updates only text-conditioning layers, and the **Standard (Full)** profile performs complete model retraining.

Profile	Method	Target Modules	Default Rank	Default Alpha	Dropout
Lite (LoRA)	LoRA adapters	to_k, to_v, to_q, to_out.0	8	16	0.1
Moderate (Cross-Attn)	Parameter selection	attn2.to_k, attn2.to_v, attn2.to_out	N/A	N/A	N/A
Standard (Full)	Full fine-tuning	All UNet parameters	N/A	N/A	N/A

B.2. Datasets for the BFT Scenarios

Beyond defining our benign fine-tuning scenarios, we further characterize the datasets used to ensure their validity.

General Scenario. In this setting, we employ a standard general-purpose dataset, COCO [40]. COCO (Common Objects in Context) is a large-scale dataset containing over 330K images with dense annotations for object detection, segmentation, and captioning. It covers 80 everyday object categories captured in diverse, natural scenes, providing a representative distribution of real-world visual content for evaluating generalization and alignment stability. For our use case, the General Scenario leverages a subset of $\sim 5,000$ text–image pairs sampled from COCO, providing a diverse and unbiased distribution of everyday visual concepts. This setting serves as a representative benchmark for evaluating how safety-aligned models behave under benign, general-purpose fine-tuning.

Multilingual Scenario. For this setting, we curate a diverse multilingual text–image corpus spanning 4 languages, including Arabic, French, Spanish, and Hindi, with $\sim 5,000$ paired samples for each language (Figure B). These pairs are sourced from publicly available multilingual extensions of MS-COCO, where the original English captions are translated, preserving semantic fidelity while introducing cross-lingual variation. This dataset offers rich qualitative diversity: captions include descriptive narratives, relational statements, and culturally grounded expressions that differ significantly in structure and lexical choices across languages—providing an ideal stress-test for whether safety-aligned models inadvertently resurface harmful associations when the textual modality shifts away from English.

Domain-specific Scenario. In this scenario, we compose two complementary datasets: an artistic dataset containing $\sim 5,000$ images covering digital illustrations, anime-style renderings, comics, and stylized portraits [43]; and the mixture of two medical datasets ([44,

45]) for a total of $\sim 5,000$ non-sensitive, anonymized radiology and dermatology images paired with neutral diagnostic descriptions. The **artistic** portion captures high-variance stylistic transformations—from watercolor to cartoon to hyper-realistic line art—mirroring the types of customer-specific aesthetic fine-tuning commonly performed in real deployment. The medical portion, in contrast, emphasizes domain-rigorous visual structure (e.g., lesion boundaries, organ-level patterns), with concise clinical captions free of pathology-specific triggering content. Qualitatively, the multilingual dataset tests semantic drift introduced by linguistic diversity, while the domain-specific dataset probes stylistic and modality-shift robustness. Together, these corpora allow us to evaluate not only quantitative degradation but also nuanced failure modes where benign fine-tuning can gradually destabilize safety alignment without obvious performance losses (Figure C).

C. Analysis across Harmfulness Categories

In this section, we extend the category-wise harmfulness analysis introduced in the main paper by reporting the behavior of all evaluated safety-alignment methods and their sensitivity to different types of unsafe content. For readability, we focus on five representative categories provided by the ViSU dataset [10]. Figure D shows each method’s performance across the four axes separately, highlighting individual strengths and weaknesses.

We first observe that **Safety** (blue area) and **Prompt** adherence (orange area) exhibit generally similar trends across methods. Most approaches achieve consistently high safety scores—indicating that the alignment procedure is effective—across the selected harmfulness categories. Nevertheless, some methods (e.g., ERASED-IFF [15], STEREO [17], MACE [12], and SALUN [13]) demonstrate stronger broad-spectrum mitigation, while others (e.g., ADVUNLEARN [27], FMN [26], and SPM [28]) appear less effective in covering all categories.

A particularly insightful dimension of this analysis concerns the **Robustness** to our unintentional attacker

(red area). This view clearly illustrates that achieving safety does not guarantee resilience to benign fine-tunings (BFTs). In several cases, such as ERASED-IFF [15] and STEREO [17], the methods show pronounced fragility, losing safety almost uniformly across categories after BFT, sometimes with minimal resistance in the *nudity* dimension. Conversely, more resilient methods like RECE [11] and UCE [29] retain substantially higher robustness, consistent with observations from the main paper and Table D. Other methods, including ESD [16], SPM [28], MACE [12], and SALUN [13], show moderate robustness, exhibiting a general but less severe degradation across all categories.

D. Evolution and Comparative Analysis of Stable Diffusion Versions

Stable Diffusion [2] has evolved through multiple generations, each introducing architectural and data-driven refinements in latent diffusion modeling, text–image alignment, and safety filtering. The original 1.x series popularized the latent diffusion paradigm, enabling efficient image generation at 512×512 resolution using the CLIP ViT-L/14 text encoder [2]. Subsequent releases adopted stronger encoders, cleaner datasets, and improved filtering strategies, culminating in the SDXL family, which scales both model capacity and conditioning complexity to achieve high-fidelity 1024×1024 generation.

Stable Diffusion v1.5. Stable Diffusion 1.5 became the community-standard foundation model of the 1.x line. Trained on a large CLIP-filtered subset of LAION-5B, it balanced image fidelity, prompt controllability, and computational efficiency, establishing a strong baseline for research in personalization and safety alignment. However, weaker data curation and less stringent filtering made it more prone to unsafe or biased generations, motivating the development of more rigorously trained successors.

Stable Diffusion v2.1. Stable Diffusion 2.1 was re-trained from scratch on a higher-quality LAION-5B subset using OpenCLIP ViT-H/14 [46]. It introduced an improved latent space, enhanced noise schedules, and stricter safety filtering, leading to sharper, more consistent generations at 512×512 and 768×768 resolutions. These updates strengthened prompt fidelity across diverse styles while preserving compatibility with lightweight fine-tuning and alignment techniques.

Stable Diffusion XL. SDXL 1.0 represents a major architectural expansion over SD 2.1, featuring a wider UNet, dual text encoders (OpenCLIP ViT-G/14 plus an auxiliary encoder), and a two-stage diffusion pipeline comprising a base and a refiner model [47]. It delivers substantial gains in photorealism, compositional coherence, and fine-grained rendering at 1024×1024 resolution, supported by a more diverse and stylistically balanced training corpus.

Overall, evaluating multiple versions of Stable Diffusion allows us to track how safety alignment evolves across generations—from the early limitations of 1.x to the more advanced yet still fragile 2.1 and SDXL releases. This multi-version evaluation demonstrates that vulnerability to benign fine-tunings (BFTs) persists even in state-of-the-art architectures, emphasizing the contemporary relevance of studying safety robustness in modern T2I pipelines.

D.1. SPQR Across Stable Diffusion Versions

To further validate our findings, we also compute SPQR using SD 2.1 and SDXL. This analysis focuses on safety-alignment methods that either released checkpoints compatible with newer SD versions or provided code to reproduce alignment using SD 2.1 or SDXL. Table D reports the resulting scores under the same experimental settings discussed in the main paper.

We observe that the general trends identified in the main paper are consistently reproduced with more recent versions of Stable Diffusion. This confirms that the lack of robustness to benign fine-tunings (BFTs) remains a concrete and timely issue in modern T2I systems. Moreover, SPQR effectively highlights that robustness to BFTs is a defining property of a strong safety-alignment method. For instance, in the case of AdvUnlearning [27] and UCE [29], safety, prompt adherence, and quality are closely aligned (with a slight quality advantage for UCE). However, once BFT robustness is considered, the picture changes significantly, finally ...favoring more resilient approaches like UCE, which consequently achieves a higher SPQR score (0.606 vs. 0.338 with SD 2.1 and 0.621 vs. 0.358 with SDXL).

These additional experiments also demonstrate that the effectiveness of our unintentional attacker does not depend on outdated underlying models. The same trends observed with SD 1.5 are replicated with newer versions, indicating that the fragility of safety-aligned systems persists across generations. In particular, all safety-alignment methods tend to degrade more severely when BFTs are performed using generic or multilingual data, whereas they appear relatively more stable when fine-tuned with domain-specific datasets.

E. More Insights of Why LoRA BFTs are Less Impactful

Why LoRA Benign Fine-Tuning (BFT) Is Generally Less Harmful. LoRA introduces low-rank adaptation matrices that modify the model only through a small, localized subspace of the full parameter space. Dur-

Table D. **Cross-Domain SPQR** Benchmark: SDv2.1 vs SDXL. Comparison of Safety (**S**), Prompt adherence (**P**), and Quality (**Q**) shared across domains, and Robustness (**R**) with overall SPQR harmonic mean across multilingual, domain, and general fine-tuning tasks. Higher SPQR values indicate better safety–utility balance and post-FT stability.

Method	Backbone	Shared Axes			Multilingual		Domain		General	
		Safety (\uparrow)	Prompt adherence (\uparrow)	Quality (\uparrow)	Robustness (\uparrow)	SPQR (\uparrow)	Robustness (\uparrow)	SPQR (\uparrow)	Robustness (\uparrow)	SPQR (\uparrow)
ADVU [27]	SDv2.1	0.903	0.289	0.792	0.145	0.314	0.301	0.447	0.167	0.338
	SDXL	0.925	0.304	0.823	0.152	0.329	0.318	0.458	0.179	0.358
ESD [16]	SDv2.1	0.938	0.294	0.953	0.308	0.456	0.668	0.571	0.688	0.572
	SDXL	0.947	0.312	0.961	0.321	0.475	0.687	0.592	0.603	0.574
SPM [28]	SDv2.1	0.925	0.298	0.949	0.381	0.493	0.618	0.564	0.692	0.577
	SDXL	0.934	0.315	0.957	0.394	0.511	0.631	0.581	0.611	0.577
UCE [29]	SDv2.1	0.931	0.297	0.923	0.584	0.553	0.857	0.599	0.937	0.606
	SDXL	0.944	0.318	0.931	0.601	0.576	0.871	0.623	0.861	0.621

Table E. **Effect of LoRA Rank on Robustness.** We ablate the impact of different LoRA ranks (4, 8, 16) on **Robustness (R \uparrow)** after benign fine-tuning in the general scenario. Higher ranks increase adaptation capacity but also amplify safety degradation, illustrating how parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) influences the “Silent Safety Failure.” **Bold** indicates the most robust configuration.

Method	Backbone	R (\uparrow) after BFT		
		r = 4	r = 8	r = 16
ADVU [27]	SDv1.5	0.194	0.087	0.061
	SDv2.1	0.201	0.092	0.068
	SDXL	0.218	0.105	0.074
ESD [16]	SDv1.5	0.981	0.942	0.867
	SDv2.1	0.985	0.957	0.879
	SDXL	0.988	0.963	0.891
SPM [28]	SDv1.5	0.742	0.571	0.398
	SDv2.1	0.758	0.589	0.412
	SDXL	0.771	0.602	0.429
UCE [29]	SDv1.5	0.923	0.819	0.671
	SDv2.1	0.931	0.834	0.689
	SDXL	0.946	0.851	0.708

ing BFT with benign text–image pairs, gradients primarily optimize for utility—improving prompt–image alignment and perceptual quality—without producing strong signals along directions correlated with safety features. Because LoRA updates remain small in magnitude and spatially confined (e.g., mostly within cross-attention layers), they are unlikely to overwrite or interfere with global representations that encode alignment or safety constraints. This structural “inertia” explains why LoRA fine-tuned models often maintain comparable or even higher robustness scores than their Full-UNet or Cross-Attn-Only counterparts.

Ablation on LoRA Capacity. To further validate this hypothesis, we propose an ablation study that varies the LoRA rank r across $\{4, 8, 16\}$. The default configura-

tion ($r=8$) is compared with smaller ($r=4$) and larger ($r=16$) ranks. As it can be noticed in Table E, the “inertia” hypothesis holds even when tested on more modern versions of Stable Diffusion, where smaller ranks yield the highest robustness (since the update subspace is more constrained), and larger ranks gradually reduce robustness as the adapter gains the capacity to perturb a broader region of the parameter manifold.

Why FMN, ADVUNL, and SPM Are More Affected. These methods rely on fragile or local mechanisms for safety control: FMN enforces concept forgetting through targeted weight erasure, ADVUNLEARN modifies adversarial decision boundaries, and SPM applies prompt-based steering through conditioning vectors. Because these safety mechanisms are narrow and not deeply integrated in the backbone, LoRA residuals can easily reintroduce the forgotten concepts or reduce the effective separation between safe and unsafe regions. Even benign fine-tuning gradients can re-align text–image mappings that bypass or weaken the safety-specific components of these methods.

Why Other Methods Are Less Affected. By contrast, alignment strategies such as UCE, RECE, ERASEDIFF, or ESD embed safety more structurally, often through global representation regularization or explicit modification of attention patterns throughout the UNet. Because their safety signal is distributed across many layers, the limited and localized updates from LoRA adapters do not meaningfully interfere with those protective gradients. This distributed safety embedding acts as an implicit redundancy, allowing the model to maintain robustness even after benign fine-tuning.

Overall, LoRA fine-tuning exhibits a structural resistance to benign updates that helps preserve alignment integrity. Its constrained subspace and layer-localized nature provide an effective safeguard against silent safety degradation during BFT. However, methods whose safety relies on localized erasure or prompt

steering remain more vulnerable to such unintentional attacks, highlighting that the persistence of safety under LoRA BFT depends critically on how, or where, alignment is encoded in the model.

F. Societal Impact

F.1. Ethical Implications

Our work introduces SPQR, a standardized benchmark designed to evaluate the safety, utility, and robustness of alignment methods for text-to-image diffusion models. While our benchmark aims to advance the safe development of generative systems, it inherently involves the use of sensitive and explicit data. Several evaluation datasets (e.g., I2P, RAB, ViSU) contain sexual, violent, or otherwise harmful content, which we use solely for assessing safety alignment and model robustness under controlled conditions. All such material was processed and handled following ethical research standards, and no unsafe or copyrighted content will be redistributed.

The evaluation protocol of SPQR also raises ethical considerations regarding the operational definition of “safety”. Our safety metrics rely on automated classifiers and pretrained vision-language models (e.g., NudeNet, LLaVA-Guard) whose outputs reflect the cultural and social biases embedded in their training corpora. Consequently, our benchmark may inherit these biases when determining what constitutes “unsafe” content. We encourage practitioners to interpret SPQR scores as relative measures within a defined protocol, rather than as absolute indicators of safety or moral appropriateness. Furthermore, while SPQR assesses model robustness under benign fine-tuning, we recognize that alignment stability cannot substitute for broader institutional, societal, or contextual oversight in model deployment.

F.2. Limitations

Although SPQR provides the first unified benchmark to evaluate safety alignment and robustness under benign fine-tuning, it has several limitations. First, the benchmark’s harmfulness metrics depend on specific classifiers (LLaVA-Guard and NudeNet), which—despite their strong performance—may misclassify nuanced or context-dependent content, such as artistic nudity or medical imagery. As a result, quantitative safety scores might not perfectly align with human judgment. Second, SPQR’s current taxonomy of harmful concepts, derived from existing benchmarks, cannot fully represent the full diversity of culturally specific or evolving definitions of harm.

Another limitation lies in the scope of fine-tuning conditions: while SPQR includes multiple benign adaptation settings (general, multilingual, and domain-

specific), it does not yet account for more complex downstream modifications such as compositional adapters, adversarial retraining, or dynamic dataset shifts in production. Additionally, our evaluation assumes access to open diffusion architectures; closed-source or proprietary systems may not be directly comparable under this framework. Future work should focus on expanding SPQR to cover a broader range of modalities, refining its safety taxonomies through participatory annotation, and integrating human-in-the-loop verification to complement automated safety metrics.

Multilingual Dataset

Image	English	Arabic	French	Spanish	Hindi
	A woman stands in the dining area at the table.	امرأة تقف في منطقة تناول الطعام على الطاولة.	Une femme se tient debout dans la salle à manger, à table.	Una mujer está de pie en el comedor, sentada a la mesa.	एक महिला भोजन कक्ष में मेज के पास खड़ी है।
	A red double decker bus driving down a city street.	حافلة حمراء ذات طابقين تسير في أحد شوارع المدينة.	Un bus rouge à impériale circulant dans une rue de la ville.	Un autobús rojo de dos pisos circula por una calle de la ciudad.	एक लाल डबल डेकर बस शहर की सड़क पर चल रही है।
	Closeup of a brown bear sitting in a grassy area.	صورة مقرية لدب بنى يجلس في منطقة عشبية.	Gros plan sur un ours brun assis dans une zone herbeuse.	Primer plano de un oso pardo sentado en una zona de hierba.	धास वाले क्षेत्र में बैठे भूरे भालू का क्लोजअप।
	A large white bowl of many green apples.	وعاء أبيض كبير يحتوي على العديد من التفاح الأخضر.	Un grand bol blanc rempli de nombreuses pommes vertes.	Un gran cuenco blanco lleno de muchas manzanas verdes.	बहुत सारे हरे सेबों से भरा एक बड़ा सफेद कटोरा।
	a male tennis player in white shorts is playing tennis	لاعب تنس يرتدي شورتًا أبيض يلعب التنس	Un joueur de tennis masculin en short blanc joue au tennis	Un tenista masculino con pantalones cortos blancos está jugando al tenis.	सफेद शॉर्ट्स पहने एक पुरुष टेनिस खिलाड़ी टेनिस खेल रहा है।
	Bedroom scene with a bookcase, blue comforter and window.	مشهد غرفة النوم مع مكتبة وغطاء أزرق ونافذة.	Scène de chambre avec une bibliothèque, une couette bleue et une fenêtre.	Escena de dormitorio con estantería, edredón azul y ventana.	किताबों की अलमारी, नीले रंग की बेडरुम का दृश्य।
	A brown jetliner sitting on top of an airport runway.	طائرة نفاثة بني اللون تجلس على قمة مدرج المطار.	Un avion de ligne marron posé sur une piste d'aéroport.	Un avión de pasajeros marrón estacionado sobre una pista de aterrizaje.	एक भूरे रंग का जेटलाइनर हवाई अड्डे के रनवे के ऊपर खड़ा है।
	A small group of sheep standing together next to a building	مجموعة صغيرة من الأغنام تقف معاً بجوار مبني	Un petit groupe de moutons se tenant ensemble à côté d'un bâtiment	Un pequeño grupo de ovejas juntas junto a un edificio	एक इमारत के पास एक साथ खड़े भेड़ों का एक छोटा समूह
	A person standing on top of a ski covered slope.	شخص يقف على قمة منحدر مغطى بالثلوج.	Une personne debout au sommet d'une pente recouverte de skis.	Una persona de pie en la cima de una pista cubierta de esquís.	एक व्यक्ति से ढके ढलान के ऊपर खड़ा है।
	A man being kiss by a baby elephant with its trunk.	رجل يُقبله فيل صغير بخرطومه.	Un homme reçoit un baiser de la trompe d'un bébé éléphant.	Un hombre recibe un beso con la trompa de un elefante bebé.	एक बच्चा हाथी अपनी सूड से एक आदमी को दूम रहा है।
	A person on a motor bike on a road.	شخص على دراجة نارية على الطريق.	Une personne à moto sur une route.	Una persona en motocicleta por una carretera.	सड़क पर मोटर बाइक पर एक व्यक्ति।
	A little girl holds up a big blue umbrella.	فتاة صغيرة تحمل مظلة كبيرة.	Une petite fille brandit un grand parapluie bleu.	Una niña pequeña sostiene un gran paraguas azul.	एक छोटी लड़की एक बड़ी नीली छतरी पकड़े हुए है।

Figure B. A view of our hand-crafted multilingual COCO.

Artistic Dataset



Medical Dataset




Figure C. A view of our hand-crafted multi-domain dataset.




Figure D. Category-wise Safety, Adherence, and Robustness Analysis. Radar plots illustrate the behavior of each safety-alignment method across five representative harmfulness categories from the ViSU dataset [10]. While most methods achieve comparable safety levels, their robustness to benign fine-tunings varies widely, revealing persistent fragility to BFTs even in models that appear well-aligned.