The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment Among Mexican-Born Hispanic Immigrants: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Independent Replication Study

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Abstract

This study examines the causal effect of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican immigrants born in Mexico. Using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, I compare employment outcomes for DACA-eligible individuals against similar non-eligible immigrants before and after the program's implementation in 2012. The preferred specification, which includes year and state fixed effects along with demographic controls, yields a point estimate of 0.63 percentage points (SE = 0.37 pp, p = 0.089), suggesting a modest positive but statistically insignificant effect on full-time employment. Robustness checks across demographic subgroups and alternative outcomes provide mixed evidence, with stronger effects found for any employment (2.0 percentage points, p ¡ 0.001). An event study analysis raises some concerns about parallel pre-trends, though the differential narrows approaching the policy implementation year.

Contents

1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, announced on June 15, 2012, represents one of the most significant immigration policy changes in recent U.S. history. The program provided temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to qualifying undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children. Understanding the economic effects of this policy is crucial for evaluating its success and informing future immigration policy debates.

This study addresses the following research question: *Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican Mexican-born people living in the United States, what was the causal impact of eligibility for the DACA program on the probability of full-time employment, defined as usually working 35 hours per week or more?*

The theoretical mechanism connecting DACA to employment outcomes is straightforward. Prior to DACA, eligible individuals faced significant barriers to formal employment due to their undocumented status. DACA provided two critical benefits: (1) protection from deportation, reducing the risk associated with formal employment, and (2) work authorization, allowing recipients to legally work in the United States. Both mechanisms should increase employment rates and potentially shift workers from informal to formal (and often full-time) employment.

This replication study uses a difference-in-differences (DID) identification strategy, comparing changes in full-time employment rates for DACA-eligible individuals against changes for similar non-eligible Mexican-born Hispanic immigrants. The analysis uses American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2006–2016, with 2012 excluded due to the mid-year policy implementation.

2 Background and Literature

2.1 The DACA Program

DACA was announced by the Obama administration on June 15, 2012, and began accepting applications on August 15, 2012. To qualify for DACA, individuals had to meet the following criteria:

1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012
2. Came to the United States before reaching their 16th birthday
3. Had continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007

4. Were present in the United States on June 15, 2012

5. Had no lawful status on June 15, 2012

6. Met certain educational or military service requirements

7. Had not been convicted of certain crimes

The program provided successful applicants with a two-year period of deferred action (renewable) and eligibility for work authorization. In the first four years, nearly 900,000 initial applications were received, with approximately 90% approved. While the program was not limited to any particular nationality, the structure of undocumented immigration to the United States meant that the vast majority of eligible individuals were from Mexico.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The expected effect of DACA on employment operates through several channels:

Work Authorization Channel: The most direct mechanism is that DACA provides legal work authorization, enabling recipients to work in formal sector jobs that were previously inaccessible. This should increase employment rates and potentially shift workers toward full-time positions that require legal documentation.

Reduced Deportation Risk Channel: By providing protection from deportation, DACA reduces the risk associated with formal employment. Undocumented workers may have previously avoided formal jobs due to fear of detection and deportation, instead working in informal settings with more limited hours.

Human Capital Investment Channel: The security provided by DACA may encourage investments in education and job training, potentially leading to better employment outcomes over time. However, this channel would operate more slowly than the direct work authorization effect.

Occupational Mobility Channel: With legal work authorization, DACA recipients can seek employment based on their skills and preferences rather than based on which employers are willing to hire undocumented workers. This increased mobility could lead to better job matches and potentially more full-time positions.

2.3 Context: Mexican Immigration to the United States

Understanding the context of Mexican immigration to the United States is essential for interpreting the results of this study. Mexico has historically been the largest source country for immigration to the United States, driven by geographic proximity, economic disparities,

and established migration networks. The undocumented population from Mexico grew substantially from the 1980s through the mid-2000s, with estimates suggesting that Mexican nationals comprised the majority of undocumented immigrants in the United States.

The population of potential DACA beneficiaries—young adults who arrived as children—represents a distinct demographic group. These individuals often arrived with their families seeking economic opportunity or family reunification. Many spent their formative years in the United States, attending American schools and developing social networks, yet faced significant barriers to formal employment and higher education due to their undocumented status.

Prior to DACA, these individuals faced a challenging labor market environment. Without work authorization, they were limited to informal employment arrangements, often in sectors such as agriculture, construction, domestic work, and food services. These jobs typically offered lower wages, fewer hours, and less stability compared to formal sector employment. The inability to obtain driver's licenses in many states further constrained employment options.

2.4 Policy Rationale and Expected Effects

The DACA program was designed to address the situation of individuals who were brought to the United States as children and had limited culpability for their undocumented status. By providing temporary protection from deportation and work authorization, the policy aimed to allow these individuals to more fully participate in American society and the formal economy.

From an economic perspective, DACA was expected to generate several benefits. At the individual level, recipients could access formal employment with higher wages and better working conditions. At the societal level, bringing workers out of the informal economy could increase tax revenues and reduce labor market distortions. The policy was also expected to have indirect effects through increased educational attainment and reduced stress associated with deportation fears.

However, there were also concerns about potential negative effects. Some argued that DACA could reduce employment opportunities for native-born workers or legal immigrants by increasing competition in the formal labor market. Others noted that the temporary and uncertain nature of DACA—subject to renewal every two years and potential policy reversal—might limit its effectiveness in inducing long-term behavioral changes.

3 Data

3.1 Data Source

The analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS) as provided by IPUMS USA. The ACS is a large annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, providing detailed demographic, social, economic, and housing information. For this study, I use the one-year ACS files from 2006 through 2016, excluding 2012.

3.2 Sample Construction

The analytic sample is constructed through the following steps:

1. **Ethnicity restriction**: Include only individuals identified as Hispanic-Mexican (HISPAN = 1)
2. **Birthplace restriction**: Include only individuals born in Mexico (BPL = 200)
3. **Year exclusion**: Exclude 2012 observations, as DACA was implemented mid-year and we cannot distinguish pre-treatment from post-treatment observations
4. **Age restriction**: Include only working-age adults (18–64 years old)

The initial dataset contained approximately 34 million observations across all demographics. After applying the Hispanic-Mexican and Mexican-born filters during data loading, approximately 991,000 observations remained. After excluding 2012 and restricting to ages 18–64, the final analytic sample contains 755,660 observations.

3.3 Variable Definitions

3.3.1 Outcome Variable

The primary outcome is **full-time employment**, defined as usually working 35 or more hours per week. This is constructed from the UHRSWORK variable:

$$\text{fulltime}_i = \mathbf{1}[\text{UHRSWORK}_i \geq 35]$$

As a secondary outcome for robustness, I also examine **any employment**, defined as having employment status of employed (EMPSTAT = 1).

3.3.2 Treatment Variable

The treatment variable indicates DACA eligibility based on the program's criteria. An individual is classified as DACA-eligible if they meet all of the following conditions:

1. **Arrived before age 16**: Year of immigration minus birth year is less than 16
2. **Under 31 on June 15, 2012**: Birth year $\geq$ 1982, or birth year = 1981 with birth quarter $\geq$ 3
3. **In US since 2007**: Year of immigration $\leq$ 2007
4. **Not a citizen**: Citizenship status = 3 (Not a citizen)

Note that the ACS does not distinguish between documented and undocumented non-citizens. Following the research instructions, I assume that non-citizens who have not received naturalization papers are undocumented for DACA purposes. This is a necessary approximation given data limitations.

3.3.3 Control Variables

The analysis includes the following control variables:

- Age and age squared (to capture nonlinear age effects on employment)
- Female indicator (SEX = 2)
- Married indicator (MARST $\leq$ 2)
- Education categories: less than high school, some high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate or higher
- Metropolitan area indicator (METRO $\geq$ 2)

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Identification Strategy

I employ a difference-in-differences (DID) research design to estimate the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The key identifying assumption is that, in the

absence of DACA, full-time employment trends would have been parallel between the treatment group (DACA-eligible individuals) and the control group (non-eligible Mexican-born Hispanic immigrants).

The control group consists of Mexican-born Hispanic individuals who fail to meet at least one of the DACA eligibility criteria. This includes:

- Individuals who arrived in the US at age 16 or older
- Individuals born before 1981 (too old for DACA)
- Individuals who arrived after 2007
- Naturalized citizens

The pre-treatment period includes survey years 2006–2011, before DACA was announced. The post-treatment period includes survey years 2013–2016, after DACA implementation. Year 2012 is excluded because DACA was implemented in June 2012, and the ACS does not record the month of interview.

4.2 Estimation Equations

The basic DID specification is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Treat}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 (\text{Treat}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{it} is full-time employment status for individual i in year t, Treat_i indicates DACA eligibility, Post_t indicates the post-DACA period (2013–2016), and β_3 is the DID estimate of the treatment effect.

The preferred specification adds demographic controls, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects:

$$Y_{ist} = \gamma_s + \delta_t + \beta (\text{Treat}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + X_i' \theta + \varepsilon_{ist} \tag{2}$$

where γ_s are state fixed effects, δ_t are year fixed effects, and X_i is a vector of individual covariates. Note that with year fixed effects, the main effect of Post_t is absorbed, and with the inclusion of a treatment main effect interacted with the fixed effects structure, the Treat_i main effect captures baseline differences.

All specifications use heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1) standard errors.

4.3 Threats to Identification

Several potential threats to the validity of the DID design merit discussion:

Parallel Trends Assumption: The key assumption is that treatment and control groups would have had parallel trends in full-time employment absent the policy. I test this using an event study specification that estimates separate treatment effects for each year relative to 2011 (the year immediately before DACA announcement).

Compositional Changes: If the composition of the treatment or control groups changed differentially over time, this could bias the estimates. For example, if DACA induced additional migration or reduced return migration among eligible individuals, the observed population might change. I partially address this by focusing on individuals already in the US as of 2007 (per DACA eligibility requirements).

Spillover Effects: DACA eligibility might affect employment outcomes of non-eligible individuals through labor market competition. This would violate the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) and could attenuate or bias the estimated treatment effect.

Measurement Error in Treatment Status: Because we cannot perfectly identify undocumented status in the ACS, some individuals classified as DACA-eligible may have actually had legal status (and thus not benefit from DACA), while some classified as non-eligible may have been eligible. This measurement error likely attenuates the estimated treatment effect toward zero.

5 Results

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the treatment and control groups. The full-time employment rate in the sample is 60.6%, with the control group having a higher rate (61.4%) than the treatment group (53.0%). This baseline difference reflects the younger age and different characteristics of the DACA-eligible population.

Table 1: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status

	Control (Non-Eligible)	Treatment (DACA-Eligible)
Full-Time Employment Rate	0.614	0.527
Any Employment Rate	0.679	0.623
Mean Age	41.1	23.4
Female Share	0.47	0.45
Married Share	0.67	0.37
Less than High School	0.53	0.38
High School Graduate	0.03	0.02
Some College	0.04	0.05
College Graduate+	0.01	0.02
N	684,313	71,347

Notes: Sample includes Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico, ages 18–64, from ACS years 2006–2011 and 2013–2016. Treatment group includes individuals meeting all DACA eligibility criteria.

Table 2 presents the simple difference-in-differences calculation based on group means.

Table 2: Full-Time Employment Rates by Group and Period

	Pre-DACA (2006–2011)	Post-DACA (2013–2016)	Difference
Control Group	0.622	0.603	−0.019
	(415,802)	(268,511)	
Treatment Group	0.510	0.547	+0.037
	(38,248)	(33,099)	
Difference (Treatment − Control)	−0.112	−0.056	
DID Estimate			**+0.056**

Notes: Cell entries are full-time employment rates (proportion working 35+ hours per week). Sample sizes in parentheses. DID estimate $= (0.547 - 0.510) - (0.603 - 0.622) = 0.037 - (-0.019) = 0.056$.

The simple DID calculation suggests a positive effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment of 5.6 percentage points. While the control group experienced a decline in full-time employment of 1.9 percentage points between the pre and post periods, the treatment group experienced an increase of 3.7 percentage points, yielding a relative gain of 5.6 percentage points.

5.2 Main Regression Results

Table 3 presents the main regression results across specifications.

Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Regression Results

	(1) Basic DID	(2) + Demographics	(3) + Year FE	(4) + State FE
DACA Eligible × Post	0.0561***	0.0122***	0.0070*	0.0063*
	(0.0039)	(0.0037)	(0.0037)	(0.0037)
DACA Eligible	−0.1118***	−0.0216***	−0.0116***	—
	(0.0027)	(0.0028)	(0.0028)	
Post	−0.0188***	−0.0173***	—	—
	(0.0012)	(0.0011)		
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	755,660	755,660	755,660	755,660
R-squared	0.003	0.181	0.185	0.189

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for full-time employment (35+ hours per week). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Demographic controls include age, age squared, female, married, education categories, and metro area. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

The results show a strong pattern of attenuation as controls are added. The basic DID estimate of 5.6 percentage points drops to 1.2 percentage points with demographic controls, 0.7 percentage points with year fixed effects, and 0.6 percentage points with state fixed effects. This attenuation suggests that much of the raw difference-in-differences is driven by compositional differences between groups and differential exposure to macroeconomic conditions.

The preferred specification (Column 4) includes all controls plus year and state fixed effects. The estimated effect is 0.63 percentage points (SE = 0.37 pp), which is marginally significant at the 10% level (p = 0.089) but not significant at conventional 5% levels. The 95% confidence interval is [−0.09 pp, 1.35 pp], which includes zero.

5.3 Robustness Checks

Table 4 presents results from several robustness checks.

Table 4: Robustness Checks

Specification	Coefficient	SE	N
Panel A: Subgroup Analysis			
Younger sample (ages 18–40)	0.0048	(0.0039)	414,834
Males only	0.0012	(0.0048)	399,807
Females only	0.0026	(0.0055)	355,853
Panel B: Alternative Outcome			
Any employment	0.0201***	(0.0036)	755,660

Notes: All specifications include demographic controls, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

The subgroup analyses in Panel A show effects that are smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant across all subgroups. The effect for the younger sample (ages 18–40) is 0.48 percentage points, for males only is 0.12 percentage points, and for females only is 0.26 percentage points. The lack of heterogeneity and the consistently small effects suggest that DACA had limited impact on full-time employment specifically.

However, Panel B shows a stronger effect when examining any employment as the outcome. The coefficient of 2.0 percentage points is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that DACA may have had a larger effect on extensive margin employment (whether employed at all) rather than intensive margin employment (whether working full-time conditional on employment).

5.4 Event Study Analysis

To assess the validity of the parallel trends assumption, I estimate an event study specification that allows for separate treatment effects in each year relative to 2011 (the year immediately before DACA implementation). The results are presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Event Study Results

Year	Coefficient	SE	p-value
Pre-Treatment Period			
2006	0.0293***	(0.0087)	0.001
2007	0.0252***	(0.0084)	0.003
2008	0.0250***	(0.0084)	0.003
2009	0.0177**	(0.0083)	0.033
2010	0.0098	(0.0080)	0.225
2011	(reference)	—	—
Post-Treatment Period			
2013	0.0024	(0.0078)	0.753
2014	0.0202***	(0.0077)	0.009
2015	0.0334***	(0.0077)	0.000
2016	0.0346***	(0.0078)	0.000

Notes: Coefficients represent the interaction between treatment status and year indicators, relative to 2011. All specifications include demographic controls, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

The event study results raise some concerns about the parallel trends assumption. The pre-treatment coefficients for 2006–2009 are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the treatment group was on a different trend than the control group even before DACA. However, two observations mitigate this concern:

1. The magnitude of the pre-treatment coefficients decreases monotonically as we approach 2011, from 2.9 pp in 2006 to 1.0 pp in 2010 (not significant)

2. The coefficient for 2010 is not statistically distinguishable from zero, suggesting approximate parallel trends in the years immediately before treatment

The post-treatment coefficients show an interesting pattern. The 2013 coefficient is essentially zero (0.24 pp), suggesting no immediate effect of DACA on full-time employment. However, effects emerge and grow in 2014–2016, reaching 3.3–3.5 percentage points by 2015–2016. This delayed effect pattern could reflect:

- Time needed for DACA recipients to find full-time employment after receiving work authorization

- Gradual adjustment in the labor market
- Measurement lag in the ACS

6 Discussion

6.1 Interpretation of Results

The main finding of this analysis is that DACA eligibility had a modest positive effect on full-time employment, with the preferred estimate suggesting an increase of 0.63 percentage points. However, this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.089$), and the 95% confidence interval includes zero.

Several factors may explain the modest effect size:

Extensive vs. Intensive Margin: The stronger effect found for any employment (2.0 pp, $p < 0.001$) compared to full-time employment (0.63 pp, $p = 0.089$) suggests that DACA may have primarily affected whether people work at all rather than whether they work full-time. This is consistent with DACA enabling entry into formal employment but not necessarily into full-time positions.

Measurement Error: The inability to precisely identify undocumented status in the ACS means that some individuals classified as DACA-eligible may not have actually been eligible (and vice versa). This measurement error attenuates estimates toward zero.

Control Group Contamination: The control group includes documented immigrants who would not benefit from DACA but may have been affected by labor market changes induced by DACA recipients entering the formal workforce. Such spillover effects would bias the DID estimate toward zero.

Timing Effects: The event study suggests that effects may take time to materialize. The preferred DID specification averages effects across all post-treatment years, potentially diluting the stronger effects observed in 2015–2016.

6.2 Limitations

This analysis has several important limitations:

1. **Parallel Trends Concerns**: The event study reveals statistically significant pre-trends in 2006–2009, raising questions about the validity of the DID design. While trends converge by 2010–2011, this remains a concern for causal interpretation.

2. **Treatment Definition**: The ACS does not allow precise identification of DACA eligibility, particularly regarding documentation status and continuous residence requirements. The treatment variable is an approximation based on observable characteristics.

3. **No Take-Up Information**: We observe eligibility but not actual DACA receipt. The estimated effects are intent-to-treat effects averaged over both recipients and eligible non-recipients.

4. **Unweighted Analysis**: This analysis does not apply survey weights. Results may differ with weighted estimation.

5. **Linear Probability Model**: The use of OLS for a binary outcome is standard in the DID literature for ease of interpretation but may yield predicted probabilities outside [0,1] for some observations.

6.3 Comparison to Literature

The modest effects found in this analysis are generally consistent with the existing literature on DACA's labor market effects, though some studies have found larger impacts on specific outcomes. The finding that extensive margin effects (any employment) exceed intensive margin effects (full-time employment) aligns with the theoretical prediction that DACA primarily affects access to formal employment rather than job quality conditional on employment.

7 Conclusion

This study examined the effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican immigrants born in Mexico using a difference-in-differences research design. The main finding is a modest positive effect of 0.63 percentage points, which is not statistically significant at the 5% level. However, the effect on any employment (2.0 pp) is statistically significant, suggesting that DACA may have had stronger effects on the extensive margin of employment.

The event study analysis reveals some concerns about parallel pre-trends, though these differences diminish approaching the policy implementation year. The growing effects observed in 2014–2016 suggest that DACA's benefits may have accumulated over time as recipients gained experience in the formal labor market.

Several avenues for future research emerge from this analysis. First, examining the mechanisms behind the extensive vs. intensive margin distinction could provide insights into how

work authorization affects employment outcomes. Second, longer-term data (post-2016) would allow examination of whether effects continued to grow. Third, complementary data sources that allow better identification of DACA receipt (rather than just eligibility) could provide more precise treatment effect estimates.

In conclusion, while the evidence suggests DACA had modest positive effects on employment, the magnitude is smaller than the simple difference-in-differences would suggest, and the effect on full-time employment specifically is not robust to the inclusion of standard controls and fixed effects.

8 Policy Implications

The findings of this study have several implications for immigration policy and labor market analysis.

8.1 Implications for DACA Policy

The modest estimated effect on full-time employment (0.63 pp) should be interpreted in the context of broader policy debates about DACA. While the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels for full-time employment, the larger and significant effect on any employment (2.0 pp) suggests that DACA did facilitate entry into formal employment. This aligns with the policy's primary mechanism—providing work authorization to previously unauthorized individuals.

The finding that extensive margin effects exceed intensive margin effects has implications for how we evaluate DACA's success. If the goal is to enable access to formal employment, the evidence suggests moderate success. If the goal is to facilitate full-time, stable employment, the evidence is less conclusive.

8.2 Implications for Future Policy Design

Several features of DACA may have limited its effectiveness, and future policies might address these limitations:

1. **Temporary nature**: DACA provided only two-year renewable protections. This uncertainty may have discouraged employers from hiring recipients for permanent positions or may have discouraged recipients from investing in job-specific skills. A path to permanent status might generate stronger employment effects.

2. **Eligibility restrictions**: DACA's age and arrival date requirements excluded many undocumented individuals who might have benefited from work authorization. Broader eligibility criteria could extend benefits to a larger population.

3. **Educational requirements**: DACA required recipients to be enrolled in school, have graduated from high school, or have a GED. These requirements may have excluded some potential beneficiaries who faced barriers to educational attainment.

8.3 Implications for Research Methodology

This study highlights several methodological challenges in evaluating immigration policies:

Measurement of treatment status: The inability to precisely identify undocumented status in survey data creates measurement error that likely attenuates estimated treatment effects. Future research could benefit from administrative data or survey oversamples of immigrant populations.

Control group selection: Choosing an appropriate comparison group for DACA-eligible individuals is challenging. The control group in this study includes both documented immigrants (who would not benefit from DACA) and undocumented immigrants who fail eligibility criteria (who might be affected by spillover effects). Alternative control group definitions might yield different results.

Timing of effects: The event study suggests that DACA effects may have grown over time as recipients gained experience in the formal labor market. Short-term evaluations may understate long-term policy impacts.

A Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures

A.1 Variable Definitions

Table 6: Variable Definitions from ACS/IPUMS

Variable	Definition
YEAR	Census/survey year
STATEFIP	State FIPS code
HISPAN	Hispanic origin (1 = Mexican)
BPL	Birthplace (200 = Mexico)
CITIZEN	Citizenship status (3 = Not a citizen)
YRIMMIG	Year of immigration
BIRTHYR	Year of birth
BIRTHQTR	Quarter of birth
AGE	Age in years
SEX	Sex (1 = Male, 2 = Female)
MARST	Marital status
EDUC	Educational attainment
EMPSTAT	Employment status (1 = Employed)
UHRSWORK	Usual hours worked per week
METRO	Metropolitan area status

A.2 Sample Construction Details

Table 7: Sample Construction

Step	N
Total ACS observations (2006–2016)	33,851,424
After Hispanic-Mexican restriction (HISPAN = 1)	—
After Mexico birthplace restriction (BPL = 200)	991,261
After excluding 2012	898,879
After age restriction (18–64)	755,660
Final analytic sample	**755,660**

A.3 Full Model 2 Coefficients

Table 8: Full Regression Output: Model with Demographic Controls

Variable	Coefficient (SE)
DACA Eligible × Post	0.0122*** (0.0037)
DACA Eligible	−0.0216*** (0.0028)
Post	−0.0173*** (0.0011)
Age	0.0373*** (0.0003)
Age Squared	−0.0005*** (0.0000)
Female	−0.3922*** (0.0010)
Married	−0.0242*** (0.0012)
Some High School	0.0509*** (0.0011)
High School Graduate	0.1101*** (0.0032)
Some College	0.1204*** (0.0026)
College Graduate+	0.1522*** (0.0040)
Metro Area	0.0085*** (0.0016)
Constant	0.0689*** (0.0069)
Observations	755,660
R-squared	0.181

Technical Notes

- All analyses conducted in Python 3.14 using pandas, numpy, and statsmodels
- Robust (HC1) standard errors used throughout
- Data loaded in chunks due to file size (∼34 million total observations)
- Analysis code available in `analysis.py`
- Full output log available in `analysis_output.txt`
- Run log with all decisions documented in `run_log_78.md`