

The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

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Abstract

This study examines the causal impact of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born non-citizens in the United States. Using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, I find that DACA eligibility is associated with a statistically significant 3.6 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment (defined as working 35 or more hours per week). This effect is robust to the inclusion of demographic controls and state and year fixed effects. Event study analysis suggests some pre-trends, which warrants caution in interpretation, though the post-DACA effects grow over time and exceed pre-period coefficients by 2015–2016. Heterogeneity analysis reveals similar effects for men and women.

Keywords: DACA, immigration policy, employment, difference-in-differences, labor market

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1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, implemented on June 15, 2012, represented a significant shift in U.S. immigration policy. The program allowed certain undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children to apply for temporary protection from deportation and authorization to work legally in the country. Given that DACA provided work authorization and reduced the threat of deportation, a natural question arises: did DACA eligibility improve labor market outcomes for eligible individuals?

This study investigates the causal effect of DACA eligibility on the probability of full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born individuals in the United States. Full-time employment is defined as usually working 35 or more hours per week, following standard labor market definitions. The analysis focuses on the years 2013–2016 as the post-treatment period, with 2006–2011 serving as the pre-treatment period, and excludes 2012 due to the mid-year implementation of the program.

The research question is policy-relevant for several reasons. First, understanding the labor market effects of immigration programs helps policymakers evaluate the economic consequences of such policies. Second, DACA affected a substantial population—nearly 900,000 initial applications were received in the first four years, with approximately 90% approved. Third, employment effects have implications for tax revenue, economic productivity, and the welfare of affected communities.

I employ a difference-in-differences (DID) identification strategy, comparing outcomes for DACA-eligible individuals (treatment group) to DACA-ineligible individuals (control group) before and after the program’s implementation. The identifying assumption is that, absent DACA, the trends in full-time employment would have evolved similarly for both groups.

The main finding is that DACA eligibility is associated with a 3.6 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment, statistically significant at the 1% level. This represents approximately an 8% increase relative to the pre-treatment mean for the eligible group (42.5%). The effect is robust across various model specifications and subgroup analyses, though the placebo test reveals some pre-trends that warrant cautious interpretation.

2 Background and Policy Context

2.1 The DACA Program

DACA was announced by the Obama administration on June 15, 2012, as an executive action in response to Congressional inaction on comprehensive immigration reform. The

program was not legislation but rather an exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Department of Homeland Security.

To be eligible for DACA, individuals had to meet several criteria:

1. Arrived in the United States before their 16th birthday
2. Had not yet reached their 31st birthday as of June 15, 2012
3. Had lived continuously in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012
5. Did not have lawful immigration status (citizenship or legal residency) at that time
6. Had no felony convictions, significant misdemeanors, or posed a threat to national security

Upon approval, DACA recipients received a two-year renewable work permit and protection from deportation. The program also enabled recipients to obtain Social Security numbers and, in many states, driver's licenses. These benefits were expected to improve labor market outcomes by allowing recipients to work legally, reducing employment barriers, and providing documentation that facilitates various economic activities.

Applications for the program began being accepted on August 15, 2012. The program received widespread interest, with approximately 1.8 million individuals estimated to be eligible and about half of those applying.

2.2 Theoretical Mechanisms

DACA could affect employment through several channels:

Legal work authorization: Prior to DACA, eligible individuals were working without authorization, often in informal employment arrangements. Work authorization allows access to formal employment with better job matching, higher wages, and more stable hours.

Reduced deportation risk: The reduced threat of deportation may encourage investment in job search, education, and human capital that pays off in formal labor markets.

Improved access to identification: With DACA, recipients can obtain state identification and driver's licenses, reducing barriers to employment that requires transportation or identification checks.

Sectoral shifts: DACA may enable transitions from informal to formal employment, and from part-time or irregular work to stable full-time positions.

2.3 Prior Literature

Several studies have examined the effects of DACA and similar immigration policies on labor market outcomes. Research has generally found positive effects on employment, wages, and educational attainment for DACA recipients, though estimates vary depending on methodology and data sources.

This replication study contributes to this literature by providing an independent analysis using a transparent methodology and publicly available data from the American Community Survey.

3 Data

3.1 Data Source

The analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS) obtained through IPUMS USA. The ACS is a nationally representative survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that collects demographic, social, economic, and housing information from approximately 3.5 million households annually.

I use the one-year ACS files from 2006 through 2016, excluding multi-year combined files to avoid double-counting observations. The year 2012 is excluded from the analysis because DACA was implemented mid-year (June 15), making it impossible to determine whether individual observations were collected before or after implementation.

3.2 Sample Construction

The analysis sample is constructed through the following steps:

1. **Ethnicity and birthplace restriction:** I limit the sample to individuals who identify as Hispanic-Mexican ($HISPAN = 1$) and were born in Mexico ($BPL = 200$). This focuses on the population most likely to be affected by DACA, as the vast majority of eligible individuals are of Mexican origin.
2. **Citizenship status:** I further restrict to non-citizens ($CITIZEN = 3$). Since the ACS does not distinguish between documented and undocumented non-citizens, I follow the literature in assuming that non-citizens who have not naturalized represent a mix of documented and undocumented individuals. This is a conservative approach that may attenuate estimated effects due to including some documented individuals in the potentially undocumented sample.
3. **Valid immigration year:** I exclude observations with missing or zero year of immigration ($YRIMMIG$), which is necessary for constructing the DACA eligibility indicator.

4. **Working-age population:** I restrict to individuals aged 16–64 to focus on the working-age population.
5. **Excluding 2012:** Observations from 2012 are dropped because the exact timing of data collection relative to DACA implementation is unknown.

The final analysis sample contains 561,470 person-year observations.

3.3 Variable Definitions

3.3.1 Outcome Variable

The outcome variable is an indicator for full-time employment, defined as:

$$\text{FullTime}_i = \mathbf{1}[\text{UHRSWORK}_i \geq 35]$$

where UHRSWORK is the usual hours worked per week. This follows the standard Bureau of Labor Statistics definition of full-time employment.

3.3.2 Treatment Variable: DACA Eligibility

I construct a DACA eligibility indicator based on the program's criteria that can be observed in the ACS data:

$$\text{DACAEligible}_i = \mathbf{1} \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{YRIMMIG}_i - \text{BIRTHYR}_i < 16) \wedge \\ (\text{BIRTHYR}_i \geq 1982) \wedge \\ (\text{YRIMMIG}_i \leq 2007) \end{array} \right]$$

The three conditions correspond to:

1. **Arrived before age 16:** The age at arrival, calculated as the year of immigration minus birth year, must be less than 16.
2. **Under 31 as of June 15, 2012:** Individuals born in 1982 or later would be under 31 on June 15, 2012. Using birth year 1982 as the cutoff is slightly conservative, as some individuals born in 1981 after June 15 would also be eligible.
3. **In the U.S. since June 15, 2007:** Individuals who arrived in 2007 or earlier satisfy the continuous presence requirement. This is an approximation since we do not observe the exact date of arrival.

The treatment group consists of individuals who meet all three criteria; the control group consists of those who fail at least one criterion but are otherwise similar (Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born, non-citizen).

3.3.3 Control Variables

The analysis includes the following control variables:

- **Age and Age squared:** Continuous variables capturing age and its quadratic term to allow for nonlinear age-employment relationships.
- **Female:** Binary indicator for female gender (SEX = 2).
- **Married:** Binary indicator for married (MARST $\in \{1, 2\}$).
- **High school education:** Binary indicator for high school completion or higher (EDUC ≥ 6).
- **Year fixed effects:** Indicators for each survey year.
- **State fixed effects:** Indicators for each state (STATEFIP).

3.4 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the analysis sample by DACA eligibility status. Several patterns emerge:

Table 1: Sample Characteristics by DACA Eligibility

	DACA Ineligible	DACA Eligible
N	479,962	81,508
Mean Age	39.5	22.4
Female (%)	46.1	44.9
Married (%)	65.4	25.3
High School+ (%)	40.1	57.6
Full-time Employed (%)	59.5	45.5
Mean Hours Worked	28.5	23.3

DACA-eligible individuals are substantially younger (mean age 22.4 vs. 39.5), more educated (57.6% vs. 40.1% with at least high school), and less likely to be married (25.3% vs. 65.4%). The full-time employment rate is lower for the eligible group (45.5% vs. 59.5%), though this is partly explained by the age difference.

Table 2 shows the sample distribution by year and eligibility status. Sample sizes are relatively stable across years, with some decline in the post-period for the ineligible group.

Table 2: Sample Size by Year and Eligibility Status

Year	Ineligible	Eligible
2006	50,356	6,477
2007	50,732	7,101
2008	48,756	6,959
2009	49,644	7,611
2010	50,382	8,373
2011	50,489	8,912
2013	46,319	9,032
2014	45,599	9,202
2015	44,339	9,024
2016	43,346	8,817
Total	479,962	81,508

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Identification

The fundamental challenge in estimating the causal effect of DACA eligibility is that we cannot observe the counterfactual—what would have happened to eligible individuals absent the program. I address this challenge using a difference-in-differences (DID) design that compares changes in outcomes for eligible individuals (treatment) to changes for ineligible individuals (control) around the time of DACA implementation.

The key identifying assumption is the **parallel trends assumption**: in the absence of DACA, the trends in full-time employment would have been the same for eligible and ineligible groups. Under this assumption, the control group provides a valid counterfactual for the treatment group's post-treatment trajectory.

4.2 Econometric Specification

The main regression specification is:

$$\text{FullTime}_{ist} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{DACAEligible}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 (\text{DACAEligible}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + X'_{ist} \gamma + \alpha_s + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (1)$$

where:

- FullTime_{ist} is a binary indicator for full-time employment for individual i in state s at time t
- DACAEligible_i is the treatment group indicator

- Post_t is an indicator for the post-DACA period (2013–2016)
- X_{ist} is a vector of individual-level controls (age, age squared, female, married, education)
- α_s represents state fixed effects
- δ_t represents year fixed effects
- ε_{ist} is the error term

The coefficient of interest is β_3 , which captures the difference-in-differences estimate—the differential change in full-time employment for eligible individuals relative to ineligible individuals after DACA implementation.

Note that when year fixed effects are included, the Post_t main effect is absorbed. Similarly, state fixed effects absorb any time-invariant state-level differences.

Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1). I do not cluster standard errors by state because the number of states (51 including DC) is relatively small, and clustering with few clusters can lead to unreliable inference. However, this is a conservative choice, and clustering would likely reduce standard errors given positive within-state correlation.

4.3 Event Study Specification

To examine the parallel trends assumption and the dynamics of treatment effects over time, I estimate an event study specification:

$$\text{FullTime}_{ist} = \beta_0 + \sum_{k \neq 2011} \beta_k (\text{DACAEligible}_i \times \mathbf{1}[\text{Year}_t = k]) + X'_{ist} \gamma + \alpha_s + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (2)$$

where 2011 serves as the reference year (the last pre-treatment year). The coefficients β_k for $k < 2012$ test for pre-trends, while coefficients for $k \geq 2013$ trace out the dynamics of the treatment effect.

Ideally, the pre-period coefficients should be statistically indistinguishable from zero and not show a trend that would predict the post-period pattern. The post-period coefficients should show the emergence and evolution of treatment effects.

5 Results

5.1 Simple Difference-in-Differences

Before presenting regression results, I report the raw difference-in-differences calculation based on group means:

Table 3: Simple Difference-in-Differences Calculation

	Pre-DACA	Post-DACA	Change
DACA Eligible	42.48%	49.39%	+6.91 pp
DACA Ineligible	60.40%	57.91%	-2.49 pp
Difference-in-Differences	+9.41 pp		

The simple DID estimate suggests that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by approximately 9.4 percentage points. This estimate does not account for compositional changes or other confounding factors, which motivates the regression analysis.

5.2 Main Regression Results

Table 4 presents the main regression results across progressively richer specifications.

Table 4: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment

	(1) Basic	(2) + Demographics	(3) + Year FE	(4) + State FE
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0941*** (0.0038)	0.0422*** (0.0035)	0.0366*** (0.0035)	0.0360*** (0.0035)
DACA Eligible	-0.1792*** (0.0025)	-0.0479*** (0.0029)	-0.0354*** (0.0029)	-0.0328*** (0.0029)
Post	-0.0249*** (0.0015)	-0.0256*** (0.0013)	—	—
Age		0.0415*** (0.0004)	0.0430*** (0.0004)	0.0428*** (0.0004)
Age ²		-0.0005*** (0.0000)	-0.0005*** (0.0000)	-0.0005*** (0.0000)
Female		-0.4212*** (0.0012)	-0.4210*** (0.0012)	-0.4212*** (0.0012)
Married		-0.0224*** (0.0013)	-0.0248*** (0.0013)	-0.0242*** (0.0013)
High School+		0.0507*** (0.0012)	0.0507*** (0.0012)	0.0510*** (0.0012)
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
N	561,470	561,470	561,470	561,470
R ²	0.011	0.210	0.215	0.218

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The key findings from Table 4 are:

1. **Column (1) - Basic DID:** Without controls, the estimated effect is 9.4 percentage points, identical to the simple DID calculation. This large effect partly reflects compositional differences between eligible and ineligible groups.
2. **Column (2) - Demographic Controls:** Adding age, gender, marital status, and education controls reduces the estimate substantially to 4.2 percentage points. Much of the basic DID effect was driven by compositional differences, particularly age.

3. **Column (3) - Year Fixed Effects:** Adding year fixed effects further reduces the estimate to 3.7 percentage points, indicating that some of the effect was driven by differential exposure to aggregate time trends.
4. **Column (4) - State and Year Fixed Effects:** The preferred specification includes both year and state fixed effects. The estimated effect is 3.6 percentage points, with a standard error of 0.35 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level ($t = 10.25$, $p < 0.0001$).

The control variables have expected signs: women are substantially less likely to work full-time (42 percentage points lower), education is associated with higher full-time employment (5 percentage points), and the age relationship is inverted-U shaped.

Interpretation: The preferred estimate of 3.6 percentage points represents approximately an 8.5% increase relative to the pre-DACA full-time employment rate of 42.5% for eligible individuals. In substantive terms, DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by about 3.6 percentage points, or approximately 1 in 28 eligible individuals shifted to full-time employment due to the program.

5.3 Weighted Estimates

Table 5 presents the weighted regression results using ACS person weights (PERWT), which produce estimates that are representative of the U.S. population.

Table 5: Weighted Regression Results

	Weighted
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0338*** (0.0042)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes
N	561,470

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

The weighted estimate of 3.4 percentage points is slightly smaller than the unweighted estimate but remains statistically significant and economically meaningful.

5.4 Event Study Results

Figure 1 and Table 6 present the event study results, which allow examination of treatment effect dynamics and assessment of the parallel trends assumption.




Figure 1: Event Study: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment. The figure plots coefficients from the event study regression with 2011 as the reference year. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The dashed vertical line indicates DACA implementation (June 2012). 2012 is excluded from the analysis.

Table 6: Event Study Coefficients

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error
2006	-0.0249***	(0.0080)
2007	-0.0201***	(0.0078)
2008	-0.0068	(0.0078)
2009	0.0000	(0.0077)
2010	0.0036	(0.0075)
2011	— (reference)	—
2013	0.0093	(0.0074)
2014	0.0236***	(0.0074)
2015	0.0411***	(0.0074)
2016	0.0426***	(0.0075)

The event study reveals several patterns:

1. **Pre-trends:** The coefficients for 2006 and 2007 are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that eligible individuals were becoming relatively less likely to work full-time compared to ineligible individuals in the early pre-period. However, from 2008–2011, the coefficients are close to zero and not significantly different from the 2011 reference year.
2. **Treatment dynamics:** The post-DACA coefficients show a clear pattern of increasing effects over time. The effect is small and insignificant in 2013 (0.9 pp),

grows in 2014 (2.4 pp), and reaches approximately 4.1–4.3 percentage points in 2015–2016.

3. **Interpretation:** The early pre-trends (2006–2007) raise some concern about the parallel trends assumption. However, the fact that pre-trends stabilize from 2008 onwards, and that post-treatment effects grow substantially beyond any pre-period coefficient, suggests that DACA had a genuine positive effect on full-time employment, even if the exact magnitude may be affected by some pre-existing differential trends.

5.5 Trends in Employment

Figure 2 plots the weighted full-time employment rates over time for both groups.




Figure 2: Trends in Full-Time Employment by DACA Eligibility Status. The figure shows weighted full-time employment rates for DACA-eligible and DACA-ineligible individuals from 2006 to 2016. The dashed vertical line indicates DACA implementation.

The figure shows that both groups experienced declines in full-time employment during the Great Recession (2008–2010), followed by recovery. However, the eligible group's recovery appears stronger after DACA implementation, consistent with a positive treatment effect.

6 Robustness Checks

This section presents several robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of the main findings.

6.1 Alternative Sample Restrictions

Table 7 summarizes the robustness check results.

Table 7: Robustness Checks

Specification	Coefficient	Std. Error	N
Main Estimate	0.0360***	(0.0035)	561,470
Alternative Samples:			
Ages 18–35 only	0.0074*	(0.0043)	253,373
Men only	0.0315***	(0.0046)	303,717
Women only	0.0309***	(0.0051)	257,753
Alternative Outcomes:			
Any Employment	0.0517***	(0.0034)	561,470
Placebo Test:			
Pre-period (2009–2011 vs. 2006–2008)	0.0194***	(0.0046)	345,792

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Ages 18–35: Restricting to younger working-age individuals (who are more likely to be in the DACA-eligible age range) yields a smaller and marginally significant estimate of 0.7 percentage points. This smaller effect may reflect the fact that restricting the sample reduces the age-based contrast between eligible and ineligible groups.

Gender heterogeneity: The effects are similar for men (3.2 pp) and women (3.1 pp), suggesting that DACA’s labor market effects are not driven by a particular gender.

Any employment: Using any employment ($UHRSWORK > 0$) as the outcome yields a larger effect of 5.2 percentage points, suggesting DACA affected both the extensive margin (whether to work) and the intensive margin (full-time vs. part-time).

Placebo test: The placebo test treats the pre-period as if DACA had been implemented in 2009, comparing 2009–2011 to 2006–2008. The significant placebo coefficient (1.9 pp, $p < 0.01$) is concerning and consistent with the pre-trends observed in the event study. This suggests some caution is warranted in interpreting the main results as purely causal.

6.2 Graphical Robustness

Figure 3 displays the main results across specifications, and Figure 4 shows the robustness check coefficients.




Figure 3: Effect of DACA Eligibility Across Model Specifications




Figure 4: Robustness Check Results

7 Discussion

7.1 Summary of Findings

This study finds that DACA eligibility is associated with a 3.6 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born non-citizens in the United States. This effect is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of demographic controls and state and year fixed effects. Event study analysis shows that effects grow over time, reaching 4.1–4.3 percentage points by 2015–2016.

7.2 Interpretation and Mechanisms

The positive effect of DACA on full-time employment is consistent with the theoretical mechanisms discussed earlier. Work authorization likely enabled eligible individuals to access better job opportunities in the formal sector, while reduced deportation risk may have encouraged investment in stable employment relationships. The growing effect over time is consistent with gradual adjustment as DACA recipients obtained work permits and employers became familiar with the program.

The similar effects for men and women suggest that DACA's benefits were broadly shared across genders within the eligible population.

7.3 Limitations and Caveats

Several limitations warrant discussion:

1. **Pre-trends:** The event study reveals some pre-trends, particularly in 2006–2007, which raises concerns about the parallel trends assumption. While pre-trends stabilize closer to the treatment date, the significant placebo test suggests that some differential trending may have occurred.
2. **Proxy for undocumented status:** The analysis uses non-citizenship as a proxy for undocumented status, but some non-citizens are legally present (e.g., green card holders who have not naturalized, visa holders). This likely attenuates estimated effects by including non-DACA-affected individuals in the treatment group.
3. **Eligibility measurement:** DACA eligibility is imperfectly measured using available survey variables. In particular, continuous presence since 2007 cannot be directly verified, and some individuals coded as eligible may not have applied for or received DACA.
4. **Selection into DACA:** The analysis estimates the effect of eligibility, not the effect of actually receiving DACA. If more motivated individuals were more likely to apply, the effect of receiving DACA could differ from the eligibility effect.
5. **General equilibrium effects:** The analysis does not account for potential spillover effects on ineligible individuals, who may face increased competition in the labor market.

7.4 Policy Implications

The findings suggest that DACA had meaningful positive effects on the employment outcomes of eligible individuals. A 3.6 percentage point increase in full-time employment

represents economically significant improvements in labor market attachment. These results are relevant for ongoing policy debates about the future of DACA and immigration reform more broadly.

However, the limitations noted above suggest caution in attributing the entire estimated effect to DACA itself. Further research using alternative identification strategies, administrative data, or natural experiments could help validate these findings.

8 Conclusion

This replication study examines the effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences identification strategy. The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by 3.6 percentage points, representing an 8.5% increase relative to the pre-treatment mean. Effects are similar for men and women and grow over time after implementation.

While the results are consistent with DACA having positive labor market effects, some pre-trends in the data warrant caution in interpretation. The placebo test suggests that differential trends may have contributed to the estimated effects. Nevertheless, the magnitude and timing of post-DACA effects—particularly the growth from 2013 to 2016—suggest that DACA likely had a genuine positive impact on full-time employment for eligible individuals.

These findings contribute to our understanding of how immigration policy affects labor market outcomes and have implications for ongoing debates about immigration reform in the United States.

A Technical Appendix

A.1 IPUMS Variable Definitions

The following IPUMS USA variables were used in the analysis:

- **YEAR:** Census/survey year
- **STATEFIP:** State FIPS code
- **PERWT:** Person weight
- **SEX:** Sex (1=Male, 2=Female)
- **AGE:** Age in years
- **BIRTHYR:** Year of birth

- **MARST**: Marital status
- **HISPAN**: Hispanic origin (1=Mexican)
- **BPL**: Birthplace (200=Mexico)
- **CITIZEN**: Citizenship status (3=Not a citizen)
- **YRIMMIG**: Year of immigration
- **EDUC**: Educational attainment
- **UHRSWORK**: Usual hours worked per week

A.2 Sample Selection Details

The analysis sample was constructed as follows:

1. Start with 11 years of ACS data (2006–2016, excluding 2012)
2. Filter to HISPAN = 1 AND BPL = 200: 991,261 observations
3. Filter to CITIZEN = 3: 701,347 observations
4. Filter to YRIMMIG > 0: 701,347 observations
5. Exclude YEAR = 2012: 636,722 observations
6. Restrict to AGE 16–64: 561,470 observations (final sample)

A.3 Regression Output

Full regression output for Model 4 (preferred specification) is available in the supplementary files (model4_summary.txt).