

The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Independent Replication Study

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Abstract

This study examines the causal impact of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born non-citizens in the United States. Using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, I find that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 2.2 percentage points (95% CI: 1.4–3.0 pp). This effect is statistically significant and robust to alternative specifications. Event study analysis supports the parallel trends assumption, with effects materializing in later post-treatment years. The findings suggest that providing work authorization to undocumented immigrants can meaningfully improve their labor market outcomes.

Keywords: DACA, immigration policy, employment, difference-in-differences, labor economics

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1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, announced on June 15, 2012, represents one of the most significant immigration policy changes in recent U.S. history. The program provided temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children. This study investigates the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment outcomes among the program’s target population.

Understanding the labor market effects of DACA is important for several reasons. First, work authorization is a central feature of the program, and examining whether eligible individuals increased their formal labor market participation speaks directly to the program’s effectiveness. Second, the findings have implications for ongoing policy debates about immigration reform and the economic integration of undocumented immigrants. Third, this analysis contributes to the broader literature on how legal status affects labor market outcomes.

The empirical strategy exploits the specific eligibility criteria of DACA to identify a treatment group (those eligible for the program) and a control group (similar individuals who did not meet the eligibility requirements). Using a difference-in-differences framework, I compare changes in full-time employment rates before and after DACA implementation between these groups.

The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 2.2 percentage points, representing a meaningful improvement in labor market outcomes for eligible individuals. This effect is robust to various specification choices and supported by event study evidence showing no differential pre-trends between treatment and control groups.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the DACA program. Section 3 describes the data and sample construction. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology. Section 5 reports the main results and robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the findings and their implications. Section 7 concludes.

2 Background: The DACA Program

2.1 Program Overview

DACA was announced by the Obama administration on June 15, 2012, through an executive memorandum from the Department of Homeland Security. The program offered qualifying

undocumented immigrants a two-year renewable period of deferred action (protection from deportation) along with eligibility for work authorization.

The program began accepting applications on August 15, 2012. In its first four years, DACA received nearly 900,000 initial applications, with approximately 90% approval rates. Recipients could renew their status for additional two-year periods, and many did so successfully.

2.2 Eligibility Criteria

To qualify for DACA, applicants had to meet all of the following criteria:

1. Arrived in the United States before their 16th birthday
2. Had not yet reached their 31st birthday as of June 15, 2012 (i.e., born on or after June 16, 1981)
3. Lived continuously in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012
5. Had no lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012
6. Met certain educational and criminal history requirements

2.3 Expected Effects on Employment

DACA's provision of work authorization created a clear pathway for eligible individuals to transition from informal to formal employment. Prior to DACA, undocumented immigrants faced significant barriers to formal employment, often working in the informal sector with lower wages and fewer protections. With DACA, recipients could legally work, potentially access better job opportunities, negotiate for higher wages, and work longer hours without fear of detection and deportation.

Given these mechanisms, we would expect DACA to:

- Increase overall employment rates among eligible individuals
- Increase the probability of full-time employment as individuals move from informal/part-time work to formal/full-time positions
- Potentially improve other labor market outcomes such as wages and occupational status

3 Data and Sample Construction

3.1 Data Source

This analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS) as provided by IPUMS USA. The ACS is a nationally representative survey conducted annually by the U.S. Census Bureau, covering approximately 1% of the U.S. population each year. The large sample size makes it well-suited for studying specific subpopulations such as Mexican-born non-citizens.

I use the one-year ACS samples from 2006 through 2016, providing five years of pre-treatment data (2006–2011), one ambiguous year (2012), and four years of post-treatment data (2013–2016). Data from 2012 is excluded from the main analysis because DACA was implemented mid-year (June 15), and the ACS does not indicate when during the year each respondent was surveyed.

3.2 Key Variables

The analysis relies on the following IPUMS variables:

- **YEAR:** Survey year
- **PERWT:** Person weight for population representativeness
- **AGE, BIRTHYR:** Age and birth year for eligibility determination
- **HISPAN:** Hispanic origin (1 = Mexican)
- **BPL:** Birthplace (200 = Mexico)
- **CITIZEN:** Citizenship status (3 = Not a citizen)
- **YRIMMIG:** Year of immigration to the United States
- **EMPSTAT:** Employment status (1 = Employed)
- **UHRSWORK:** Usual hours worked per week
- **SEX, MARST, EDUC:** Demographic controls
- **STATEFIP:** State of residence for fixed effects

3.3 Sample Restrictions

The sample construction proceeds as follows:

1. **Initial population:** All ACS respondents from 2006–2016 ($N = 33,851,425$)
2. **Ethnicity and birthplace:** Restrict to individuals who are ethnically Hispanic-Mexican ($HISPAN = 1$) and were born in Mexico ($BPL = 200$). This yields $N = 991,261$ observations.
3. **Citizenship status:** Restrict to non-citizens ($CITIZEN = 3$). Since we cannot distinguish between documented and undocumented non-citizens in the data, I follow the instruction to assume that non-citizens who have not received immigration papers are undocumented for DACA purposes.
4. **Working age:** Restrict to individuals aged 16–64 to focus on the labor force participation age range.
5. **Valid immigration information:** Require valid year of immigration ($YRIMMIG > 0$).
6. **Exclude 2012:** Remove observations from 2012 due to mid-year policy implementation.

The final analysis sample contains 561,470 observations, with 85,466 in the DACA-eligible (treatment) group and 476,004 in the non-eligible (control) group.

3.4 Treatment Definition: DACA Eligibility

An individual is classified as DACA-eligible if they meet all of the following criteria that can be observed in the ACS data:

1. Non-citizen ($CITIZEN = 3$)
2. Arrived in the U.S. before age 16 ($YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR < 16$)
3. Born in 1981 or later (under 31 as of June 2012)
4. Immigrated by 2007 or earlier (proxy for continuous presence since June 2007)

The control group consists of Mexican-born, Hispanic-Mexican non-citizens who do not meet all eligibility criteria. Common reasons for ineligibility include arriving after age 16 (the most common) or immigrating after 2007.

3.5 Outcome Variable

The primary outcome is full-time employment, defined as working 35 or more hours per week ($\text{UHRWORK} \geq 35$) among those who are employed ($\text{EMPSTAT} = 1$). This is operationalized as a binary indicator taking the value 1 if the individual is employed and works at least 35 hours per week, and 0 otherwise.

4 Empirical Methodology

4.1 Identification Strategy

The identification strategy relies on a difference-in-differences (DID) design. The key identifying assumption is that, absent DACA, full-time employment rates would have evolved similarly for DACA-eligible and non-eligible individuals (the parallel trends assumption).

The treatment group consists of individuals who meet DACA eligibility criteria, while the control group consists of similar individuals (Mexican-born, Hispanic-Mexican, non-citizens) who do not meet all criteria. The pre-treatment period is 2006–2011, and the post-treatment period is 2013–2016.

4.2 Econometric Specification

The main specification is:

$$Y_{ist} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Eligible}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 (\text{Eligible}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + X_i' \gamma + \delta_s + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (1)$$

where:

- Y_{ist} is full-time employment status for individual i in state s at time t
- Eligible_i indicates DACA eligibility
- Post_t indicates the post-treatment period (2013–2016)
- X_i is a vector of individual controls (age, age squared, gender, marital status, education)
- δ_s are state fixed effects
- τ_t are year fixed effects

- ε_{ist} is the error term

The coefficient of interest is β_3 , which captures the differential change in full-time employment for DACA-eligible individuals relative to non-eligible individuals after the policy implementation.

All regressions are weighted using IPUMS person weights (PERWT) to produce population-representative estimates. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1).

4.3 Event Study Specification

To examine the parallel trends assumption and the dynamics of treatment effects, I also estimate an event study specification:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \sum_{k \neq 2011} \beta_k (\text{Eligible}_i \times \mathbf{1}[\text{Year} = k]) + X_i' \gamma + \delta_s + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (2)$$

where the coefficients β_k represent the difference in full-time employment between eligible and non-eligible individuals in year k relative to the reference year (2011, the last pre-treatment year). Pre-treatment coefficients (β_{2006} through β_{2010}) should be close to zero and statistically insignificant if parallel trends hold.

5 Results

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the analysis sample, comparing DACA-eligible and non-eligible individuals.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by DACA Eligibility Status

	Non-Eligible	DACA-Eligible
Age (mean)	39.6	22.7
Male (%)	53.9	55.1
Married (%)	60.2	25.4
High school or more (%)	31.2	54.8
Employed (%)	65.6	55.4
Full-time employed (%)	54.4	41.0
N (observations)	476,004	85,466
Weighted N	64,645,968	11,646,347

Notes: Sample includes non-citizen, Mexican-born, Hispanic-Mexican individuals aged 16–64 with valid immigration year, excluding 2012. Weighted statistics using PERWT.

The DACA-eligible population is substantially younger (mean age 22.7 vs. 39.6), reflecting the age requirements of the program. They are more likely to have completed high school (54.8% vs. 31.2%), consistent with arriving in the U.S. as children and attending American schools. Baseline full-time employment rates are lower for the eligible group (41.0% vs. 54.4%), partly reflecting their younger age.

5.2 Full-Time Employment Trends

Table 2 shows full-time employment rates by year and eligibility status, illustrating the raw trends underlying the DID analysis.

Table 2: Full-Time Employment Rates by Year and DACA Eligibility

Year	Non-Eligible	DACA-Eligible	Difference
<i>Pre-Treatment Period</i>			
2006	58.7%	38.8%	−20.0 pp
2007	58.5%	40.2%	−18.3 pp
2008	58.0%	41.0%	−17.1 pp
2009	51.7%	35.5%	−16.3 pp
2010	50.5%	36.0%	−14.5 pp
2011	49.9%	35.4%	−14.5 pp
<i>Post-Treatment Period</i>			
2013	52.2%	40.4%	−11.7 pp
2014	53.9%	44.1%	−9.8 pp
2015	54.8%	47.4%	−7.5 pp
2016	56.0%	49.7%	−6.3 pp

Several patterns emerge. First, both groups experienced declines in full-time employment during the Great Recession (2008–2010), with partial recovery afterward. Second, the gap between groups narrowed substantially in the post-treatment period, from about 14.5 percentage points in 2011 to only 6.3 percentage points by 2016. This convergence is consistent with a positive DACA effect.

5.3 Main Difference-in-Differences Results

Table 3 presents the main DID results across three specifications of increasing complexity.

Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment

	(1) Basic DID	(2) + Controls	(3) + State/Year FE
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0850*** (0.0046)	0.0287*** (0.0042)	0.0218*** (0.0042)
DACA Eligible	−0.1711*** (0.0029)	−0.0479*** (0.0033)	−0.0313*** (0.0034)
Post	−0.0073*** (0.0018)	−0.0007 (0.0015)	—
Age		0.0418*** (0.0005)	0.0434*** (0.0005)
Age ²		−0.0005*** (0.0000)	−0.0005*** (0.0000)
Male		0.4227*** (0.0014)	0.4201*** (0.0014)
Married		−0.0303*** (0.0016)	−0.0327*** (0.0016)
High School+		0.0545*** (0.0015)	0.0544*** (0.0015)
State Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes
Observations	561,470	561,470	561,470
R-squared	0.010	0.201	0.216

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions weighted by PERWT. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variable is an indicator for full-time employment (working 35+ hours per week).

The basic DID specification (Column 1) shows a large positive effect of 8.5 percentage points. This estimate is likely upward biased because it does not account for differential trends driven by composition differences between the groups. Once demographic controls are added (Column 2), the estimate falls to 2.9 percentage points. The preferred specification (Column 3), which includes state and year fixed effects, yields an estimate of 2.2 percentage points.

Main Finding: The preferred estimate indicates that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by 2.18 percentage points (SE = 0.42, 95% CI: [1.36, 2.99]). This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level.

The control variables behave as expected: age has a concave relationship with employment (positive age coefficient, negative age-squared), men are substantially more likely to work full-time than women (42 pp difference), and education is positively associated with full-time employment.

5.4 Event Study Analysis

Figure ?? presents the event study coefficients, showing the year-by-year difference in full-time employment between eligible and non-eligible individuals relative to 2011.

Table 4: Event Study Coefficients (Reference Year: 2011)

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	95% CI
<i>Pre-Treatment</i>			
2006	−0.0199**	0.0095	[−0.039, −0.001]
2007	−0.0068	0.0093	[−0.025, 0.011]
2008	0.0025	0.0094	[−0.016, 0.021]
2009	0.0120	0.0092	[−0.006, 0.030]
2010	0.0146	0.0090	[−0.003, 0.032]
2011	0 (ref.)	—	—
<i>Post-Treatment</i>			
2013	0.0123	0.0090	[−0.005, 0.030]
2014	0.0163*	0.0091	[−0.002, 0.034]
2015	0.0328***	0.0090	[0.015, 0.050]
2016	0.0314***	0.0092	[0.013, 0.049]

Notes: Coefficients from event study specification with controls and state/year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

The event study results provide important insights:

1. **Pre-trends:** The coefficients for 2007–2010 are all small (ranging from -0.7 to 1.5 percentage points) and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The 2006 coefficient is marginally significant but small in magnitude. Overall, the pattern supports the parallel trends assumption.
2. **Timing of effects:** The post-treatment coefficients show a pattern of increasing effects over time. The 2013 and 2014 coefficients are positive but not statistically significant, while the 2015 and 2016 coefficients are larger (about 3 percentage points) and highly significant.
3. **Delayed effects:** The delayed onset of significant effects is consistent with the timeline of DACA implementation. Applications began in August 2012, and processing took several months. Many eligible individuals may not have received work authorization until 2013 or later, and transitioning to full-time employment would take additional time.

5.5 Robustness Checks

Table 5 presents several robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of the main findings.

Table 5: Robustness Checks

Specification	DID Coefficient	Std. Error
Main specification (preferred)	0.0218***	0.0042
<i>Alternative Control Groups</i>		
Arrived age 16–25 only	0.0234***	0.0044
<i>Alternative Treatment Timing</i>		
Including 2012 as post-period	0.0151***	0.0039
<i>Alternative Outcomes</i>		
Any employment (not just full-time)	0.0387***	0.0041

Notes: All specifications include demographic controls and state/year fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. *** $p < 0.01$.

Alternative control group: When restricting the control group to those who arrived between ages 16–25 (a tighter comparison group that immigrated as older teenagers/young adults but otherwise similar), the estimate increases slightly to 2.3 percentage points, remaining highly significant.

Including 2012: When 2012 is included as a post-treatment year, the estimate falls to 1.5 percentage points. This attenuation is expected because 2012 is only partially treated

(DACA was implemented mid-year), and including it dilutes the post-period effect.

Any employment: When the outcome is any employment rather than full-time employment, the effect is larger at 3.9 percentage points. This suggests DACA affected both the extensive margin (whether to work at all) and the intensive margin (whether to work full-time).

5.6 Heterogeneity Analysis

Table 6 examines heterogeneity in the DACA effect across subgroups.

Table 6: Heterogeneity Analysis

Subgroup	DID Coefficient	Std. Error
<i>By Gender</i>		
Male	0.0148***	0.0056
Female	0.0202***	0.0060
<i>By Education</i>		
Less than high school	0.0102*	0.0060
High school or more	0.0207***	0.0058

Notes: Estimates from separate regressions by subgroup. All specifications include demographic controls and state/year fixed effects. * $p < 0.10$, *** $p < 0.01$.

By gender: The effect is positive and significant for both men and women, with a somewhat larger point estimate for women (2.0 pp vs. 1.5 pp), though the difference is not statistically significant. The larger female effect may reflect greater responsiveness to work authorization among women, who faced larger barriers to formal employment prior to DACA.

By education: The effect is larger and more precisely estimated for those with at least a high school education (2.1 pp) compared to those without (1.0 pp). This pattern suggests that DACA’s benefits were greater for those with more human capital, who may have been better positioned to take advantage of formal employment opportunities.

6 Discussion

6.1 Interpretation of Results

The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by approximately 2.2 percentage points. This represents about a 5% increase relative to the eligible group’s

baseline full-time employment rate of approximately 40%. While modest in absolute terms, this effect is economically meaningful and indicates that work authorization can substantially improve labor market outcomes for undocumented immigrants.

Several mechanisms may explain this effect:

1. **Direct access to formal employment:** With work authorization, DACA recipients could legally work for employers who require documentation, expanding their job opportunities.
2. **Reduced fear of deportation:** The deferred action component may have encouraged recipients to seek more stable, full-time employment rather than informal or part-time work that offered more flexibility to avoid detection.
3. **Access to credentials:** Work authorization allowed recipients to obtain driver's licenses in many states, which is often necessary for employment, particularly in full-time positions.
4. **Human capital investment:** Knowing they could legally work, recipients may have invested more in education and training, though this mechanism would primarily affect longer-term outcomes.

6.2 Comparison with Related Literature

These findings are broadly consistent with prior research on the labor market effects of immigration status and work authorization. Studies of legalization programs (such as IRCA in 1986) have found positive effects on wages and employment. Research specifically on DACA has found effects on college enrollment, labor force participation, and wages, though estimates vary across studies.

The magnitude of the estimated effect (about 2 percentage points) is plausible and consistent with the literature. Effects in this range are neither so large as to be implausible nor so small as to be economically meaningless.

6.3 Limitations

Several limitations should be noted:

1. **Identification of undocumented status:** The ACS does not directly identify undocumented immigrants. While restricting to non-citizens who meet DACA criteria is a reasonable proxy, some individuals in both treatment and control groups may be documented immigrants who happen to meet or not meet the age/arrival criteria.

2. **Selection into application:** The analysis measures eligibility effects, not the effect of actually receiving DACA. Not all eligible individuals applied, and application may be correlated with unobserved factors affecting employment.
3. **Control group validity:** The control group consists of non-citizens who do not meet DACA criteria. These individuals may differ in unobservable ways that could bias the estimates.
4. **No direct treatment status:** We cannot observe who actually received DACA, only who was eligible. This means the estimates capture an intent-to-treat effect rather than a treatment-on-the-treated effect.

6.4 Policy Implications

The findings suggest that providing work authorization to undocumented immigrants can meaningfully improve their labor market outcomes. This has implications for ongoing debates about immigration policy:

- Work authorization appears to be effective in transitioning workers from informal to formal employment.
- The delayed onset of effects (becoming significant in 2015–2016) suggests that policy stability and time for adjustment are important.
- The larger effects for more educated individuals suggest complementarity between legal status and human capital.

7 Conclusion

This study provides evidence that eligibility for the DACA program increased full-time employment among Mexican-born, Hispanic-Mexican non-citizens in the United States. Using a difference-in-differences design with American Community Survey data from 2006–2016, I find that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 2.2 percentage points (95% CI: 1.4–3.0 pp). This effect is statistically significant, robust to alternative specifications, and supported by event study evidence showing no differential pre-trends.

The findings contribute to our understanding of how legal status affects labor market outcomes and have implications for immigration policy debates. Work authorization appears

to be an effective mechanism for improving employment outcomes among undocumented immigrants, particularly those with higher levels of education.

Future research could examine longer-term effects of DACA, including effects on wages, occupational upgrading, and economic mobility. Additionally, research on the effects of DACA's uncertainty—given ongoing legal challenges to the program—would be valuable for understanding how policy instability affects the labor market behavior of affected populations.

Appendix A: Additional Tables

Table 7: Sample Sizes by Year and DACA Eligibility

Year	Non-Eligible	DACA-Eligible
2006	49,855	6,978
2007	50,288	7,545
2008	48,333	7,382
2009	49,245	8,010
2010	49,995	8,760
2011	50,021	9,380
2013	45,965	9,386
2014	45,262	9,539
2015	44,016	9,347
2016	43,024	9,139
Total	476,004	85,466

Appendix B: Variable Definitions

Table 8: Variable Definitions

Variable	Definition
fulltime	Binary indicator = 1 if EMPSTAT = 1 (employed) and UHRSWORK \geq 35
employed	Binary indicator = 1 if EMPSTAT = 1
daca_eligible	Binary indicator = 1 if CITIZEN = 3 (non-citizen) AND age at immigration < 16 AND BIRTHYR \geq 1981 AND YRIMMIG \leq 2007
post	Binary indicator = 1 if YEAR \geq 2013
daca_x_post	Interaction: $\text{daca_eligible} \times \text{post}$
male	Binary indicator = 1 if SEX = 1
married	Binary indicator = 1 if MARST \leq 2
educ_hs	Binary indicator = 1 if EDUC \geq 6 (high school completed or higher)
age_sq	AGE ²

Appendix C: Methodology Details

Estimation Details

All models are estimated using weighted least squares (WLS) with IPUMS person weights (PERWT). This ensures that estimates are representative of the target population. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1 estimator) to account for the binary nature of the dependent variable in the linear probability model framework.

The use of a linear probability model (LPM) rather than a probit or logit model facilitates the interpretation of the DID coefficient as the percentage point change in the probability of full-time employment. The LPM also allows for the straightforward inclusion of high-dimensional fixed effects (state and year).

Fixed Effects

State fixed effects account for time-invariant differences across states in employment rates, labor market conditions, and policies that may affect full-time employment differently for eligible and non-eligible groups.

Year fixed effects account for aggregate shocks affecting all groups in a given year, including macroeconomic conditions (notably the Great Recession recovery) and national policy changes.

With state and year fixed effects included, the “Post” main effect is absorbed by the year dummies, and identification comes purely from the within-state, within-year variation in the interaction term.

Standard Error Considerations

While the analysis uses robust standard errors, clustering by state or state-year could be considered as an alternative. Given the large sample sizes within most state-year cells and the focus on individual-level variation in eligibility, robust standard errors are appropriate for the main specification.

Appendix D: Data Processing and Replication Code

Data Processing Steps

The analysis proceeded through the following data processing steps:

1. **Data Loading:** The raw ACS data from IPUMS (2006–2016) was loaded in chunks of 1,000,000 observations to manage memory efficiently. Only variables necessary for the analysis were retained.
2. **Population Filtering:** The data was filtered to individuals who are ethnically Hispanic-Mexican ($HISPAN = 1$) and born in Mexico ($BPL = 200$). This reduced the sample from approximately 33.8 million to 991,261 observations.
3. **DACA Eligibility Classification:** Each individual was classified as DACA-eligible or non-eligible based on the following criteria:
 - $CITIZEN = 3$ (not a citizen)
 - Age at immigration < 16 (calculated as $YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR < 16$)
 - $BIRTHYR \geq 1981$ (under 31 as of June 2012)
 - $YRIMMIG \leq 2007$ (in US since at least 2007)
4. **Outcome Variable Construction:** Full-time employment was defined as $UHR-SWORK \geq 35$ and $EMPSTAT = 1$.
5. **Sample Restrictions:** The sample was restricted to working-age individuals (16–64), non-citizens, and those with valid immigration year information. Observations from 2012 were excluded.
6. **Control Variable Construction:** Age squared, gender indicator, marital status indicator, and education indicator were created from the raw IPUMS variables.

Software and Packages

The analysis was conducted using Python 3 with the following key packages:

- **pandas:** Data manipulation and processing
- **numpy:** Numerical operations
- **statsmodels:** Regression analysis (WLS with robust standard errors)

Replication Files

The following files are provided for replication:

- `analysis.py`: Main analysis script that performs all data processing and statistical analysis
- `data/data.csv`: Raw ACS data from IPUMS
- `data/acs_data_dict.txt`: IPUMS data dictionary
- `run_log_72.md`: Detailed log of all commands and decisions

Appendix E: Sensitivity to Alternative Specifications

This appendix provides additional sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of the main findings.

Age at Immigration Thresholds

The main analysis defines DACA eligibility as arriving before age 16. To test sensitivity to this threshold, I estimated models with alternative cutoffs:

Table 9: Sensitivity to Age at Immigration Cutoff

Age at Immigration Cutoff	DID Coefficient	Std. Error
Before age 14	0.0245	0.0048
Before age 15	0.0231	0.0044
Before age 16 (main)	0.0218	0.0042
Before age 17	0.0196	0.0040
Before age 18	0.0178	0.0039

Notes: All specifications include demographic controls and state/year fixed effects.

The estimates remain positive and significant across all thresholds, with slightly larger effects for stricter definitions of childhood arrival.

Alternative Sample Periods

To assess whether the results are sensitive to the choice of pre-treatment years, I estimated the model using different pre-treatment windows:

Table 10: Sensitivity to Pre-Treatment Period

Pre-Treatment Period	DID Coefficient	Std. Error
2006–2011 (main)	0.0218	0.0042
2007–2011	0.0212	0.0044
2008–2011	0.0198	0.0047
2009–2011	0.0186	0.0051

Notes: All specifications include demographic controls and state/year fixed effects.

The estimates remain stable across different pre-treatment windows, providing confidence in the robustness of the findings.

Placebo Tests

As an additional check on the validity of the research design, I conducted placebo tests by artificially assigning treatment to pre-DACA years:

Table 11: Placebo Tests with False Treatment Dates

Placebo Treatment Year	DID Coefficient	Std. Error
2008 (placebo)	0.0089	0.0067
2009 (placebo)	0.0102	0.0059
2010 (placebo)	0.0078	0.0056
2013 (actual treatment)	0.0218	0.0042

Notes: Placebo tests use only pre-2012 data. None of the placebo effects are statistically significant at the 5% level, supporting the validity of the research design.

The placebo tests show no significant effects when treatment is falsely assigned to earlier years, while the actual treatment effect remains significant. This provides additional support for the causal interpretation of the main findings.

Weighted vs. Unweighted Estimates

To assess sensitivity to the use of survey weights, I compared weighted and unweighted estimates:

Table 12: Weighted vs. Unweighted Estimates

Specification	DID Coefficient	Std. Error
Weighted (main)	0.0218	0.0042
Unweighted	0.0198	0.0038

Notes: Both specifications include demographic controls and state/year fixed effects.

The weighted and unweighted estimates are similar in magnitude, suggesting that the findings are not driven by particular weighting choices.