

# Replication Report: The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment Among Mexican-Born Immigrants

Replication ID: 65

January 26, 2026

## **Abstract**

This study estimates the causal impact of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born individuals in the United States. Using a difference-in-differences research design with American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2006-2016, I compare employment outcomes for DACA-eligible individuals aged 26-30 at the time of DACA implementation (treatment group) to those aged 31-35 who were ineligible due to the age cutoff (control group). The analysis finds that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 5.9 percentage points (95% CI: [0.037, 0.080],  $p < 0.001$ ). This effect is robust across multiple specifications and is larger for males and those with higher education. The findings suggest that providing legal work authorization to undocumented immigrants leads to meaningful improvements in labor market outcomes.

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Background</b>	<b>3</b>
2.1	The DACA Program . . . . .	3
2.1.1	Eligibility Requirements . . . . .	4
2.1.2	Program Implementation . . . . .	4
2.2	Theoretical Mechanisms . . . . .	4
2.3	Population of Interest . . . . .	5
<b>3</b>	<b>Data</b>	<b>5</b>
3.1	Data Source . . . . .	5
3.2	Key Variables . . . . .	5
3.2.1	Identification Variables . . . . .	5
3.2.2	Demographic Variables . . . . .	6
3.2.3	Ethnicity and Nativity . . . . .	6
3.2.4	Employment Variables . . . . .	6
3.2.5	Education . . . . .	6
3.3	Sample Construction . . . . .	6
3.4	Treatment and Control Group Definitions . . . . .	7
3.5	Outcome Variable . . . . .	7
<b>4</b>	<b>Empirical Strategy</b>	<b>7</b>
4.1	Identification Strategy . . . . .	7
4.2	Estimation Equation . . . . .	8
4.3	Extended Specifications . . . . .	8
4.4	Event Study Specification . . . . .	8
4.5	Heterogeneity Analysis . . . . .	9
<b>5</b>	<b>Results</b>	<b>9</b>
5.1	Descriptive Statistics . . . . .	9
5.2	Main Results . . . . .	10
5.3	Parallel Trends . . . . .	11
5.4	Event Study Results . . . . .	12
5.5	Difference-in-Differences Illustration . . . . .	13
5.6	Heterogeneity Analysis . . . . .	13

<b>6</b>	<b>Robustness Checks</b>	<b>15</b>
6.1	Alternative Standard Errors . . . . .	15
6.2	Specification Sensitivity . . . . .	16
6.3	Parallel Trends . . . . .	16
<b>7</b>	<b>Discussion</b>	<b>16</b>
7.1	Interpretation of Results . . . . .	16
7.2	Mechanisms . . . . .	17
7.3	Limitations . . . . .	17
7.4	Comparison to Prior Research . . . . .	18
<b>8</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>18</b>
8.1	Summary of Preferred Estimate . . . . .	18
<b>A</b>	<b>Additional Tables and Figures</b>	<b>19</b>
A.1	Variable Definitions . . . . .	19
A.2	Sample Selection Flowchart . . . . .	19
<b>B</b>	<b>Analytical Decisions Log</b>	<b>19</b>

# 1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, implemented on June 15, 2012, represented a significant policy shift in U.S. immigration enforcement. The program allowed eligible undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children to apply for deferred deportation action and work authorization for a renewable two-year period. Given that DACA provides legal work authorization, an important policy question is whether this authorization translates into improved employment outcomes for recipients.

This replication study examines the effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico. The research question is:

*Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican Mexican-born people living in the United States, what was the causal impact of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on the probability that the eligible person is employed full-time (defined as usually working 35 hours per week or more)?*

To identify the causal effect of DACA, I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design that exploits the age-based eligibility cutoff. DACA required applicants to be under age 31 as of June 15, 2012. This creates a natural comparison between individuals who were just under this cutoff (ages 26-30, the treatment group) and those who were just over it (ages 31-35, the control group). Both groups share similar characteristics as undocumented immigrants from Mexico who arrived as children, but only the younger group was eligible for DACA.

The analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS) covering the years 2006-2016. The pre-DACA period (2006-2011) establishes baseline trends, while the post-DACA period (2013-2016) captures the policy's effects. The year 2012 is excluded as it spans both periods.

The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by approximately 5.9 percentage points, a result that is statistically significant and robust to various specifications. This represents a meaningful improvement in labor market outcomes, suggesting that legal work authorization reduces barriers to formal employment.

## 2 Background

### 2.1 The DACA Program

DACA was enacted by the Obama administration on June 15, 2012, through an executive memorandum from the Department of Homeland Security. The program was designed to

provide temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to undocumented immigrants who met specific criteria.

### **2.1.1 Eligibility Requirements**

To be eligible for DACA, individuals must have:

1. Arrived in the United States before their 16th birthday
2. Not yet turned 31 years old as of June 15, 2012
3. Lived continuously in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. Been present in the United States on June 15, 2012
5. Had no lawful status (citizenship or legal residency) on June 15, 2012
6. Been currently in school, graduated from high school, obtained a GED, or been honorably discharged from the military
7. Had no felony convictions or significant misdemeanors

### **2.1.2 Program Implementation**

Applications for DACA began being accepted on August 15, 2012. In the first four years of the program, nearly 900,000 initial applications were received, with approximately 90% being approved. The program granted recipients a two-year renewable period of deferred action, during which they could legally work and were protected from deportation.

The benefits of DACA extend beyond work authorization. Recipients gained access to:

- Social Security numbers
- Driver's licenses (in most states)
- State identification cards
- In-state tuition rates at public universities (in some states)

## **2.2 Theoretical Mechanisms**

There are several channels through which DACA eligibility could affect employment outcomes:

**Direct Work Authorization Effect:** The most direct mechanism is that DACA provides legal work authorization, allowing recipients to work in the formal economy without fear of employer sanctions. This should increase employment rates and potentially shift workers from informal to formal employment.

**Reduced Fear of Deportation:** Even for those already working informally, reduced fear of deportation may encourage more active job search, job mobility, and investment in human capital.

**Identification Documents:** Access to Social Security numbers and driver’s licenses removes practical barriers to employment, such as completing I-9 forms and commuting to work.

**Signaling Effects:** DACA status may signal to employers that an individual has been vetted by the government and is committed to legal compliance.

## 2.3 Population of Interest

While DACA was not limited to any particular national origin, the structure of undocumented immigration to the United States means that Mexican-born individuals constitute the largest share of the eligible population. This study focuses specifically on Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico, both because they represent the largest eligible group and because this restriction helps ensure that the treatment and control groups are comparable.

# 3 Data

## 3.1 Data Source

The analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS) as provided by IPUMS USA. The ACS is an annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that collects detailed demographic, social, economic, and housing information from approximately 3 million households per year.

I use the one-year ACS files from 2006 through 2016, excluding 2012 (the year of DACA implementation). This provides six years of pre-treatment data (2006-2011) and four years of post-treatment data (2013-2016).

## 3.2 Key Variables

The analysis relies on the following IPUMS variables:

### 3.2.1 Identification Variables

- YEAR: Survey year (2006-2016)
- PERWT: Person weight for survey estimation

### 3.2.2 Demographic Variables

- **BIRTHYR:** Year of birth (used to determine age at DACA implementation)
- **BIRTHQTR:** Quarter of birth
- **AGE:** Age at time of survey
- **SEX:** Sex (1 = Male, 2 = Female)
- **MARST:** Marital status

### 3.2.3 Ethnicity and Nativity

- **HISPAN:** Hispanic origin (1 = Mexican)
- **BPL:** Birthplace (200 = Mexico)
- **CITIZEN:** Citizenship status (3 = Not a citizen)
- **YRIMMIG:** Year of immigration to the United States

### 3.2.4 Employment Variables

- **EMPSTAT:** Employment status (1 = Employed)
- **UHRSWORK:** Usual hours worked per week

### 3.2.5 Education

- **EDUCD:** Educational attainment (detailed)

## 3.3 Sample Construction

The analytic sample is constructed through the following steps:

1. **Ethnicity and Birthplace:** Restrict to Hispanic-Mexican individuals (**HISPAN** = 1) born in Mexico (**BPL** = 200). This yields 991,261 observations from the full ACS file.
2. **Citizenship Status:** Restrict to non-citizens (**CITIZEN** = 3). We cannot distinguish between documented and undocumented non-citizens in the data, but assume that non-citizens who have not naturalized are potentially undocumented for DACA purposes. This reduces the sample to 701,347 observations.
3. **Age at Immigration:** Restrict to those who arrived before age 16 (calculated as  $\text{YRIMMIG} - \text{BIRTHYR} < 16$ ), consistent with DACA eligibility. This yields 205,327 observations.

4. **Continuous Residence:** Restrict to those who have been in the US since at least 2007 ( $YRIMMIG \leq 2007$ ). This yields 195,023 observations.
5. **Age Group Selection:** Keep only treatment (born 1982-1986) and control (born 1977-1981) groups. This yields 49,019 observations.
6. **Exclude 2012:** Remove observations from 2012, as DACA was implemented mid-year. Final sample: 44,725 observations.

### 3.4 Treatment and Control Group Definitions

**Treatment Group:** Individuals aged 26-30 on June 15, 2012. These individuals were born between 1982 and 1986 and were eligible for DACA (assuming they met other requirements). The treatment group contains 26,591 observations.

**Control Group:** Individuals aged 31-35 on June 15, 2012. These individuals were born between 1977 and 1981 and were ineligible for DACA solely due to the age cutoff. The control group contains 18,134 observations.

### 3.5 Outcome Variable

The primary outcome is full-time employment, defined as an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is employed ( $EMPSTAT = 1$ ) and usually works 35 or more hours per week ( $UHRSWORK \geq 35$ ).

## 4 Empirical Strategy

### 4.1 Identification Strategy

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design to estimate the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The key identifying assumption is that, in the absence of DACA, the treatment and control groups would have experienced parallel trends in full-time employment.

The age-based eligibility cutoff provides a credible source of exogenous variation. Individuals born in 1981 (age 31 on June 15, 2012) were ineligible for DACA, while those born in 1982 (age 30 on June 15, 2012) were eligible. This discontinuity was determined by the policy, not by individual choices, making it plausible that the two groups are comparable in terms of unobserved characteristics affecting employment.



## 4.2 Estimation Equation

The basic DiD specification is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Treated}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \delta(\text{Treated}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where:

- $Y_{it}$  is an indicator for full-time employment for individual  $i$  in year  $t$
- $\text{Treated}_i$  is an indicator for being in the treatment group (ages 26-30 in 2012)
- $\text{Post}_t$  is an indicator for post-DACA years (2013-2016)
- $\delta$  is the difference-in-differences estimator, the coefficient of interest
- $\epsilon_{it}$  is the error term

The DiD estimator  $\delta$  captures the differential change in full-time employment for the treatment group relative to the control group after DACA implementation.

## 4.3 Extended Specifications

I estimate several specifications to assess robustness:

**Model 1:** Basic DiD (unweighted OLS)

**Model 2:** Weighted DiD using ACS person weights (PERWT)

**Model 3:** Weighted DiD with year fixed effects:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Treated}_i + \gamma_t + \delta(\text{Treated}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

**Model 4:** Weighted DiD with demographic controls:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Treated}_i + \gamma_t + \delta(\text{Treated}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + X'_{it}\theta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where  $X_{it}$  includes female, married, education dummies (high school, some college, college+), and number of children.

**Model 5:** Weighted DiD with state fixed effects added to Model 4.

**Model 6 (Preferred):** Model 4 with heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1) standard errors.

## 4.4 Event Study Specification

To examine the parallel trends assumption and the dynamics of treatment effects, I estimate an event study model:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Treated}_i + \gamma_t + \sum_{k \neq -1} \delta_k (\text{Treated}_i \times \mathbf{1}[t - 2012 = k]) + \epsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

where the year 2011 ( $k = -1$ ) is the reference year. The coefficients  $\delta_k$  for  $k < 0$  test for pre-treatment differential trends, while  $\delta_k$  for  $k > 0$  capture the post-treatment effects.

## 4.5 Heterogeneity Analysis

I examine heterogeneity in treatment effects by:

- Sex (male vs. female)
- Education (less than high school vs. high school or more)
- Marital status (married vs. not married)

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the treatment and control groups in the pre- and post-DACA periods.

Table 1: Sample Characteristics by Treatment Status and Period

	Treatment (Ages 26-30)		Control (Ages 31-35)	
	Pre-DACA	Post-DACA	Pre-DACA	Post-DACA
N	17,410	9,181	11,916	6,218
Full-time Employment Rate	0.560	0.620	0.611	0.598
Employment Rate	0.682	0.739	0.717	0.718
Female (%)	43.4	43.5	41.3	44.8
Married (%)	36.0	48.9	50.8	55.7
Less than HS (%)	43.2	44.9	51.6	53.6
College+ (%)	2.6	4.2	2.8	2.8
Mean Age	24.3	30.2	29.3	35.3

*Notes:* Treatment group consists of individuals aged 26-30 on June 15, 2012 (born 1982-1986). Control group consists of individuals aged 31-35 on June 15, 2012 (born 1977-1981). Pre-DACA period includes years 2006-2011; Post-DACA period includes years 2013-2016. Statistics are weighted using ACS person weights.

Several patterns emerge from Table 1:

- The treatment group starts with a lower full-time employment rate (56.0%) than the control group (61.1%) in the pre-period, reflecting the age difference.
- The treatment group experiences a 6.0 percentage point increase in full-time employment from pre to post (56.0% to 62.0%), while the control group experiences a 1.3 percentage point *decrease* (61.1% to 59.8%).
- The groups are similar in terms of gender composition (about 42-44% female) but differ in marital status, with the older control group having higher marriage rates.
- Educational attainment is relatively low in both groups, with over 40% having less than a high school education.

## 5.2 Main Results

Table 2 presents the main difference-in-differences estimates across specifications.

Table 2: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-time Employment

Specification	Estimate	Std. Error	95% CI	p-value	N
1. Basic DiD (unweighted)	0.0592	0.0100	[0.040, 0.079]	<0.001	44,725
2. Weighted DiD	0.0731	0.0099	[0.054, 0.093]	<0.001	44,725
3. Weighted + Year FE	0.0723	0.0099	[0.053, 0.092]	<0.001	44,725
4. Weighted + Controls	0.0590	0.0092	[0.041, 0.077]	<0.001	44,725
5. Weighted + State FE	0.0585	0.0092	[0.040, 0.077]	<0.001	44,725
6. Preferred (Robust SE)	0.0590	0.0110	[0.037, 0.080]	<0.001	44,725

*Notes:* Dependent variable is an indicator for full-time employment (usually working 35+ hours per week). All weighted specifications use ACS person weights. Year FE includes year fixed effects. Controls include gender, marital status, education level, and number of children. State FE includes state fixed effects. Preferred specification uses heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1) standard errors.

The key findings from Table 2 are:

1. **Preferred Estimate:** The preferred specification (Model 6) indicates that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by 5.90 percentage points (SE = 0.011, 95% CI: [0.037, 0.080],  $p < 0.001$ ).
2. **Consistency Across Specifications:** The estimates are remarkably stable across specifications, ranging from 5.85 to 7.31 percentage points, all statistically significant at the 0.1% level.

3. **Effect of Weighting:** The weighted estimates (Models 2-6) are generally slightly higher than the unweighted estimate (Model 1), suggesting that the effect may be somewhat larger among population-representative subgroups.
4. **Control Variables:** Adding demographic controls (Model 4) reduces the estimate slightly from 7.23 to 5.90 percentage points, suggesting that some of the unadjusted effect was due to compositional differences between groups.
5. **State Fixed Effects:** Adding state fixed effects (Model 5) has minimal impact on the estimate, suggesting that geographic sorting is not a major confounder.

### 5.3 Parallel Trends

Figure 1 displays the trends in full-time employment for the treatment and control groups over time.




Figure 1: Full-time Employment Trends by Treatment Status

*Notes:* Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line indicates DACA implementation (June 2012). Treatment group consists of individuals aged 26-30 on June 15, 2012; control group consists of individuals aged 31-35.

The figure shows that both groups exhibited roughly parallel trends in the pre-DACA period (2006-2011), with the treatment group having consistently lower full-time employment rates, which is expected given their younger age. After DACA implementation, the treatment

group's full-time employment rate increased substantially while the control group's rate remained relatively flat or declined slightly.

## 5.4 Event Study Results

Figure 2 presents the event study coefficients, which test for differential pre-trends and show the dynamics of the treatment effect.




Figure 2: Event Study: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-time Employment  
*Notes:* Coefficients represent the difference in full-time employment between treatment and control groups in each year, relative to 2011 (the omitted reference year). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line indicates DACA implementation.

The event study results (Table 3) provide several important insights:

- **Pre-trends:** The pre-period coefficients (2006-2010) are all small in magnitude and not statistically distinguishable from zero, supporting the parallel trends assumption.
- **Post-DACA Effects:** The post-DACA coefficients are positive and statistically significant in all four post-treatment years, ranging from 5.0 to 8.7 percentage points.
- **Persistence:** The effect appears to be sustained over time, with the 2016 coefficient (0.087) being among the largest, suggesting that the benefits of DACA persisted and possibly grew over time.

Table 3: Event Study Coefficients

Year	Relative Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	95% CI
2006	−6	−0.022	0.020	[−0.061, 0.018]
2007	−5	−0.012	0.020	[−0.052, 0.027]
2008	−4	0.014	0.020	[−0.026, 0.055]
2009	−3	0.013	0.021	[−0.028, 0.054]
2010	−2	0.021	0.021	[−0.020, 0.062]
2011	−1	0 (ref)	—	—
2013	+1	0.077	0.021	[0.035, 0.119]
2014	+2	0.081	0.022	[0.039, 0.124]
2015	+3	0.050	0.022	[0.007, 0.094]
2016	+4	0.087	0.022	[0.043, 0.130]

*Notes:* Coefficients estimated from event study specification with year fixed effects. Reference year is 2011. Standard errors are from WLS with person weights.

## 5.5 Difference-in-Differences Illustration

Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the DiD design.

The figure shows:

- The treatment group’s full-time employment rate increased from approximately 56.0% to 62.0% (a 6.0 pp increase).
- The control group’s rate decreased from approximately 61.1% to 59.8% (a 1.3 pp decrease).
- The counterfactual for the treatment group (what would have happened without DACA) assumes they would have experienced the same change as the control group.
- The DiD effect (approximately 7.3 percentage points in the weighted specification without controls) represents the excess improvement in the treatment group relative to this counterfactual.

## 5.6 Heterogeneity Analysis

Table 4 and Figure 4 present the treatment effects for different subgroups.

Key findings from the heterogeneity analysis:

1. **By Sex:** The effect is substantially larger for males (8.1 pp) than for females (3.2 pp). The female effect is marginally significant at the 10% level. This pattern may reflect




Figure 3: Difference-in-Differences Design Illustration

*Notes:* The dashed line shows the counterfactual trend for the treatment group based on the control group's change. The DiD effect is the difference between the observed and counterfactual treatment group outcomes in the post-period.

Table 4: Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects

Subgroup	Estimate	Std. Error	95% CI	p-value
<i>By Sex</i>				
Male	0.081	0.014	[0.054, 0.107]	<0.001
Female	0.032	0.018	[−0.003, 0.067]	0.076
<i>By Education</i>				
Less than High School	0.056	0.017	[0.022, 0.090]	0.001
High School or More	0.088	0.017	[0.056, 0.120]	<0.001
<i>By Marital Status</i>				
Married	0.066	0.017	[0.034, 0.099]	<0.001
Not Married	0.094	0.017	[0.060, 0.128]	<0.001
Overall	0.072	0.012	[0.049, 0.096]	<0.001

*Notes:* Each row reports the DiD estimate from a separate regression on the indicated subgroup. Regressions include year fixed effects and are weighted using ACS person weights. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.




Figure 4: Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects

*Notes:* Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals from subgroup-specific DiD regressions.

gender differences in labor force participation or occupational sorting.

2. **By Education:** The effect is larger for those with high school or more education (8.8 pp) compared to those with less than high school (5.6 pp). This suggests that DACA's benefits may be greater for those who can access jobs requiring documentation, which tend to require higher education.
3. **By Marital Status:** The effect is larger for unmarried individuals (9.4 pp) than for married individuals (6.6 pp). This may reflect different labor supply patterns or baseline employment rates.

## 6 Robustness Checks

### 6.1 Alternative Standard Errors

The preferred specification uses heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1) standard errors. Compared to conventional standard errors, the robust standard errors are slightly larger (0.011 vs. 0.009), resulting in a wider confidence interval. However, the results remain highly statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ).



## 6.2 Specification Sensitivity

The estimates are stable across specifications:

- Basic (unweighted) vs. weighted: 5.92 pp vs. 7.31 pp
- With vs. without year fixed effects: 7.31 pp vs. 7.23 pp
- With vs. without demographic controls: 7.23 pp vs. 5.90 pp
- With vs. without state fixed effects: 5.90 pp vs. 5.85 pp

The estimates vary by less than 1.5 percentage points across most specifications, demonstrating robustness to modeling choices.

## 6.3 Parallel Trends

The event study analysis provides evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption:

- All pre-treatment coefficients are statistically insignificant.
- The magnitudes of pre-treatment coefficients are small (ranging from  $-0.022$  to  $0.021$ ).
- There is no clear upward or downward trend in the pre-period coefficients.

However, there is some year-to-year variation in the pre-period that warrants caution in interpreting the results.

# 7 Discussion

## 7.1 Interpretation of Results

The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by approximately 5.9 percentage points (preferred estimate with robust standard errors). This effect is economically meaningful, representing roughly a 10% increase relative to the treatment group's pre-DACA full-time employment rate of approximately 56%.

The results support the hypothesis that legal work authorization removes barriers to formal employment. The effect is particularly large for males and those with higher education, groups that may have faced greater constraints in accessing formal employment without documentation.

## 7.2 Mechanisms

Several mechanisms likely contribute to the observed effect:

1. **Direct Work Authorization:** DACA recipients can legally work, allowing them to pursue formal employment that was previously inaccessible.
2. **Reduced Fear:** With protection from deportation, individuals may be more willing to search for jobs, negotiate wages, and invest in job-specific skills.
3. **Documentation:** Access to Social Security numbers and driver's licenses removes practical barriers to employment.
4. **Occupational Upgrading:** The effect being larger for more educated individuals suggests that DACA may enable movement into better jobs that require documentation.

## 7.3 Limitations

Several limitations should be noted:

1. **Identification of Undocumented Status:** The ACS does not identify documentation status. I assume non-citizens are potentially undocumented, but this includes some documented non-citizens (e.g., legal permanent residents who have not naturalized).
2. **Intent to Treat:** The estimates capture the effect of DACA *eligibility*, not DACA *receipt*. Not all eligible individuals applied, and not all applications were approved. The effect of actually receiving DACA may be larger.
3. **Age Confounds:** While the DiD design controls for fixed age-group differences, there may be age-specific trends (e.g., career progression effects) that differ between the treatment and control groups.
4. **Compositional Changes:** If DACA affected migration patterns or survey response rates, the estimated effect could be biased.
5. **Pre-Trend Variation:** While pre-treatment coefficients are not statistically significant, there is some year-to-year variation that introduces uncertainty about the parallel trends assumption.

## 7.4 Comparison to Prior Research

The estimated effect of approximately 5.9 percentage points is consistent with prior research on DACA’s labor market effects. Studies using similar identification strategies have generally found positive effects of DACA on employment outcomes, although effect sizes vary depending on the outcome measure, sample definition, and estimation approach.

## 8 Conclusion

This study provides evidence that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born individuals by approximately 5.9 percentage points. Using a difference-in-differences research design that exploits the age-based eligibility cutoff, I find consistent, statistically significant effects across multiple specifications.

The results suggest that providing legal work authorization to undocumented immigrants leads to meaningful improvements in labor market outcomes. The effect is larger for males and those with higher education, suggesting that DACA may enable access to formal employment opportunities that were previously inaccessible.

These findings have implications for immigration policy debates. Programs that provide work authorization and protection from deportation appear to benefit not only recipients but potentially the broader economy through increased formal employment and labor market participation.

### 8.1 Summary of Preferred Estimate

- **Effect Size:** 0.059 (5.9 percentage points)
- **Standard Error:** 0.011 (robust)
- **95% Confidence Interval:** [0.037, 0.080]
- **p-value:**  $< 0.001$
- **Sample Size:** 44,725

## A Additional Tables and Figures

### A.1 Variable Definitions

Table 5: Variable Definitions

Variable	Definition
Full-time Employment	Indicator = 1 if EMPSTAT = 1 (employed) and UHR-SWORK $\geq 35$
Treated	Indicator = 1 if born 1982-1986 (ages 26-30 on June 15, 2012)
Post	Indicator = 1 if YEAR $\geq 2013$
Female	Indicator = 1 if SEX = 2
Married	Indicator = 1 if MARST $\in \{1, 2\}$
Less than HS	Indicator = 1 if EDUCD $< 62$
High School	Indicator = 1 if EDUCD $\in [62, 64]$
Some College	Indicator = 1 if EDUCD $\in [65, 100]$
College+	Indicator = 1 if EDUCD $\geq 101$

### A.2 Sample Selection Flowchart

Table 6: Sample Selection Steps

Step	Observations	Dropped
Full ACS data (2006-2016)	33,851,424	—
Hispanic-Mexican, Born in Mexico	991,261	32,860,163
Non-citizens	701,347	289,914
Arrived before age 16	205,327	496,020
In US since 2007	195,023	10,304
Treatment or Control age group	49,019	145,004
Exclude 2012	44,725	4,294

## B Analytical Decisions Log

1. **Sample Definition:** Restricted to Hispanic-Mexican (HISPAN=1), Mexican-born (BPL=200), non-citizens (CITIZEN=3), arrived before age 16, and in US since 2007 or earlier.

2. **Treatment Group:** Defined based on birth year (1982-1986) corresponding to ages 26-30 on June 15, 2012.
3. **Control Group:** Defined based on birth year (1977-1981) corresponding to ages 31-35 on June 15, 2012.
4. **Outcome:** Full-time employment defined as employed (EMPSTAT=1) and usual hours  $\geq 35$  (UHRSWORK  $\geq 35$ ).
5. **Time Periods:** Pre-DACA (2006-2011), Post-DACA (2013-2016), excluding 2012.
6. **Weighting:** Used ACS person weights (PERWT) for population-representative estimates.
7. **Standard Errors:** Preferred specification uses heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1) standard errors.
8. **Controls:** Preferred specification includes gender, marital status, education, number of children, and year fixed effects.