

The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment Among Mexican-Born Hispanic Immigrants: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Replication Study 43

January 25, 2026

Abstract

This study examines the causal impact of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born individuals in the United States. Using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences research design, I compare employment outcomes for DACA-eligible individuals to a control group of similar non-citizens who do not meet the program’s age requirements. The preferred specification indicates that DACA eligibility is associated with a statistically significant 2.06 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment (defined as working 35 or more hours per week). This effect is robust across alternative specifications and represents approximately a 4 percent increase relative to the pre-treatment mean. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that employment gains are concentrated among individuals with at least a high school education. The parallel trends assumption is supported by placebo tests examining pre-treatment trends. These findings suggest that DACA’s pro-

vision of work authorization had meaningful positive effects on labor market outcomes for eligible immigrants.

Keywords: DACA, immigration, employment, difference-in-differences, labor economics

JEL Codes: J15, J22, J61

Contents

1	Introduction	4
2	Background	5
2.1	The DACA Program	5
2.2	Theoretical Mechanisms	5
2.3	Expected Effects on Full-Time Employment	6
3	Data	6
3.1	Data Source	6
3.2	Sample Definition	7
3.3	Variable Definitions	7
3.3.1	Outcome Variable	7
3.3.2	Treatment: DACA Eligibility	8
3.3.3	Control Group	8
3.3.4	Control Variables	9
3.4	Summary Statistics	9
4	Empirical Methodology	10
4.1	Difference-in-Differences Design	10
4.2	Regression Specification	11
4.3	Specification Details	11
4.4	Identification Assumptions	12
5	Results	12
5.1	Simple Difference-in-Differences	12
5.2	Main Regression Results	13
5.3	Alternative Outcome: Any Employment	14
5.4	Event Study Analysis	15

5.5	Placebo Test: Pre-Treatment Trends	16
5.6	Heterogeneity Analysis	17
6	Discussion	18
6.1	Summary of Findings	18
6.2	Limitations	19
6.3	Comparison to Expectations	19
7	Conclusion	20
A	Additional Tables and Robustness Checks	22
B	Variable Definitions Using IPUMS Names	22
C	Sample Construction	23
D	DACA Eligibility Criteria Implementation	24

1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, implemented on June 15, 2012, represented one of the most significant immigration policy changes in recent U.S. history. The program provided temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to undocumented immigrants who had arrived in the United States as children. This study examines whether DACA eligibility causally affected full-time employment among the program’s primary target population: Mexican-born Hispanic immigrants.

Understanding the labor market effects of DACA is important for several reasons. First, one of DACA’s primary benefits—legal work authorization—should theoretically enable recipients to transition from informal to formal employment and potentially increase their hours of work. Second, the program provides a natural experiment for studying how legal status affects immigrant labor market outcomes. Third, given ongoing policy debates about DACA’s future, empirical evidence on its effects can inform these discussions.

This analysis focuses specifically on full-time employment, defined as usually working 35 or more hours per week. I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design comparing DACA-eligible individuals to similar non-citizens who do not meet the program’s eligibility criteria due to age restrictions. Using American Community Survey (ACS) data from IPUMS spanning 2006–2016, I find that DACA eligibility is associated with a statistically significant 2.06 percentage point increase in full-time employment probability.

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on DACA and discusses the theoretical mechanisms through which the program might affect employment. Section 3 describes the data and defines the key variables. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology. Section 5 reports the main results, robustness checks, and heterogeneity analysis. Section 6 discusses the findings and their limitations. Section 7 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 The DACA Program

DACA was announced by the Obama administration on June 15, 2012, and began accepting applications on August 15, 2012. The program was designed to provide temporary relief from deportation to undocumented immigrants who had arrived in the United States as children. To be eligible, individuals had to meet the following criteria:

1. Arrived in the United States before their 16th birthday
2. Were under 31 years of age as of June 15, 2012 (born on or after June 16, 1981)
3. Had continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the time of application
5. Had no lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012
6. Were currently in school, had graduated from high school, had obtained a GED, or were honorably discharged veterans
7. Had not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors

Upon approval, DACA recipients received a two-year period of deferred action (protection from deportation) and were eligible to apply for work authorization. Recipients could renew their status every two years. By 2016, approximately 800,000 individuals had received DACA status.

2.2 Theoretical Mechanisms

There are several channels through which DACA could affect full-time employment:

Work Authorization Effect: The most direct mechanism is that DACA provides legal work authorization. Prior to DACA, eligible individuals could only work in the informal economy or using fraudulent documents. Legal work authorization allows individuals to seek employment in the formal sector, potentially with better hours and conditions.

Occupational Mobility: With legal status, DACA recipients may be able to pursue jobs that require background checks, professional licenses, or other documentation. This could facilitate movement into higher-quality jobs with more regular hours.

Reduced Fear of Deportation: The deportation relief provided by DACA may reduce the fear and uncertainty that could previously have constrained labor market behavior. This psychological effect might encourage greater labor force participation.

Human Capital Investment: Access to driver's licenses and in-state tuition in some states might encourage DACA recipients to invest in education and training, though such effects might take longer to materialize in employment outcomes.

2.3 Expected Effects on Full-Time Employment

Given these mechanisms, I hypothesize that DACA eligibility would increase full-time employment among eligible individuals. The work authorization effect should directly enable transitions from informal part-time work to formal full-time employment. However, the magnitude of this effect is an empirical question, as some individuals may have already been working full-time in the informal sector prior to DACA.

3 Data

3.1 Data Source

The data for this analysis come from the American Community Survey (ACS) as provided by IPUMS USA. I use the one-year ACS samples from 2006 through 2016. The ACS is an

annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that provides detailed demographic, social, economic, and housing information for a representative sample of the U.S. population.

The full dataset contains 33,851,424 person-level observations across the eleven-year period. For this analysis, I restrict the sample to individuals who meet the target population criteria described below.

3.2 Sample Definition

Following the research question, I restrict the sample to ethnically Hispanic-Mexican individuals who were born in Mexico. Specifically, I require:

- $HISPAN = 1$ (Mexican Hispanic ethnicity)
- $BPL = 200$ (Birthplace: Mexico)

This restriction yields 991,261 observations. I further restrict to working-age individuals (18–64 years old) and exclude the year 2012 because DACA was implemented mid-year (June 15, 2012) and the ACS does not indicate the month of interview, making it impossible to distinguish pre- and post-treatment observations within that year.

3.3 Variable Definitions

3.3.1 Outcome Variable

The primary outcome is an indicator for full-time employment, defined as:

$$FullTime_i = \mathbf{1}[UHRSWORK_i \geq 35]$$

where UHRSWORK is the usual hours worked per week. This follows the standard definition of full-time employment as working 35 or more hours per week.

3.3.2 Treatment: DACA Eligibility

I construct a DACA eligibility indicator based on the observable eligibility criteria:

1. **Age at arrival:** Arrived before 16th birthday
 - Calculated as: $\text{YRIMMIG} - \text{BIRTHYR} < 16$
2. **Age as of June 2012:** Under 31 years old
 - Implemented as: $\text{BIRTHYR} \geq 1982$
3. **Continuous residence since 2007:** In the U.S. for at least 5 years
 - Implemented as: $\text{YRIMMIG} \leq 2007$
4. **Non-citizen status:** Not a U.S. citizen
 - Implemented as: $\text{CITIZEN} = 3$

Important Limitation: The ACS does not distinguish between documented and undocumented non-citizens. Following the instructions, I assume that non-citizens ($\text{CITIZEN} = 3$) who have not naturalized are potentially undocumented for purposes of DACA eligibility. This introduces measurement error, as some individuals coded as DACA-eligible may actually have legal status (e.g., visa holders) and would not benefit from DACA.

3.3.3 Control Group

The control group consists of Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born non-citizens who do not meet DACA's age-based eligibility criteria but are otherwise similar. Specifically, control group members:

- Are non-citizens ($\text{CITIZEN} = 3$)
- Have been in the U.S. since at least 2007 ($\text{YRIMMIG} \leq 2007$)

- Either arrived at age 16 or older ($\text{YRIMMIG} - \text{BIRTHYR} \geq 16$) OR were 31 or older as of June 2012 ($\text{BIRTHYR} < 1982$)

This control group shares the characteristic of being long-term undocumented Mexican immigrants but differs in DACA eligibility due to the age restrictions.

3.3.4 Control Variables

I include the following control variables in regression specifications:

- **AGE:** Age in years (continuous)
- **AGE²:** Age squared (to capture nonlinear age effects)
- **Female:** Indicator for female ($\text{SEX} = 2$)
- **Married:** Indicator for married with spouse present ($\text{MARST} = 1$)
- **Education:** Categorical variable based on EDUC (less than high school, high school, some college, college or more)

3.4 Summary Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the analysis sample, separately by treatment status and time period.

Table 1: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status and Period

	DACA-Eligible		Control Group	
	Pre (2006–2011)	Post (2013–2016)	Pre (2006–2011)	Post (2013–2016)
Observations	36,365	31,935	291,097	155,942
Demographics				
Mean Age	22.0	25.0	38.4	43.1
% Female	44.2%	—	45.6%	—
% Married	22.1%	—	60.5%	—
Outcomes				
Full-time Employment Rate	50.6%	54.7%	60.7%	58.4%
Any Employment Rate	58.6%	66.4%	65.8%	66.6%

Several patterns emerge from the summary statistics. First, the DACA-eligible group is substantially younger than the control group (mean age 22–25 vs. 38–43), reflecting the program’s age restrictions. Second, the DACA-eligible group has lower marriage rates and baseline full-time employment rates, consistent with their younger age profile. Third, the raw data show that full-time employment increased for the treatment group (50.6% to 54.7%) while decreasing for the control group (60.7% to 58.4%), suggesting a positive treatment effect.

4 Empirical Methodology

4.1 Difference-in-Differences Design

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design to estimate the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The basic DiD estimator compares the change in outcomes for the treatment group before and after DACA implementation to the change in outcomes for the control group over the same period:

$$\hat{\tau}_{DiD} = (\bar{Y}_{T,Post} - \bar{Y}_{T,Pre}) - (\bar{Y}_{C,Post} - \bar{Y}_{C,Pre})$$

where $\bar{Y}_{g,t}$ is the mean outcome for group $g \in \{T, C\}$ in period $t \in \{Pre, Post\}$.

4.2 Regression Specification

The regression-based DiD estimator is implemented as:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Treat}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 (\text{Treat}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + X'_{it} \gamma + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where:

- Y_{it} is the full-time employment indicator for individual i in year t
- Treat_i is an indicator for DACA eligibility
- Post_t is an indicator for the post-DACA period (2013–2016)
- X_{it} is a vector of control variables
- β_3 is the DiD coefficient of interest

The coefficient β_3 captures the differential change in full-time employment for DACA-eligible individuals relative to the control group after DACA implementation.

4.3 Specification Details

I estimate several specifications with increasing controls:

1. **Basic DiD:** No controls (Equation 1 with $X = \emptyset$)
2. **Demographic controls:** Add age, age squared, female indicator, and married indicator
3. **Education controls:** Add education category dummies
4. **Year fixed effects:** Replace the single Post indicator with year fixed effects

5. **Weighted:** Apply ACS person weights (PERWT)
6. **Robust standard errors:** Use heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1) standard errors

The preferred specification (Model 7) includes all controls, year fixed effects, ACS weights, and robust standard errors.

4.4 Identification Assumptions

The key identifying assumption for the DiD design is the **parallel trends assumption**: absent DACA, the treatment and control groups would have experienced the same trends in full-time employment. This assumption cannot be directly tested, but I provide supporting evidence through:

1. **Event study analysis:** Examining year-by-year treatment effects to verify that there are no significant pre-treatment differences in trends
2. **Placebo tests:** Testing for differential trends in the pre-treatment period

Additional assumptions include:

- No spillover effects from DACA-eligible individuals to the control group
- No other policies differentially affecting the treatment and control groups coincident with DACA
- The ACS accurately captures employment outcomes for undocumented immigrants

5 Results

5.1 Simple Difference-in-Differences

Before presenting regression results, I calculate the simple (unweighted, unadjusted) DiD estimate:

Table 2: Simple Difference-in-Differences Calculation

	Pre-DACA (2006–2011)	Post-DACA (2013–2016)	Difference
DACA-Eligible (Treatment)	0.5062	0.5465	+0.0404
Control Group	0.6073	0.5843	−0.0230
Difference-in-Differences			0.0634

The simple DiD estimate is 6.34 percentage points. This suggests a substantial positive effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment, though this estimate does not account for differences in observable characteristics between the groups.

5.2 Main Regression Results

Table 3 presents the DiD estimates across specifications.

Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment

	(1) Basic	(2) Demographics	(3) + Education	(4) + Year FE
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0634*** (0.0041)	0.0314*** (0.0037)	0.0298*** (0.0037)	0.0210*** (0.0037)
95% Confidence Interval	[0.055, 0.071]	[0.024, 0.039]	[0.023, 0.037]	[0.014, 0.028]
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Weighted	No	No	No	No
Observations	515,339	515,339	515,339	515,339

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Weighted Specifications

	(5) Weighted Basic	(6) Weighted + Controls	(7) Preferred
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0720*** (0.0040)	0.0308*** (0.0036)	0.0206*** (0.0046)
95% Confidence Interval	[0.064, 0.080]	[0.024, 0.038]	[0.011, 0.030]
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes
Weighted	Yes	Yes	Yes
Robust SE	No	No	Yes
Observations	515,339	515,339	515,339

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Key Findings:

The DiD coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications. The basic specification (column 1) yields an estimate of 6.34 percentage points, but this falls substantially when controlling for demographic characteristics (column 2: 3.14 pp), reflecting the age differences between treatment and control groups.

The preferred specification (Model 7) includes demographic and education controls, year fixed effects, ACS person weights, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. This specification yields a DiD estimate of **2.06 percentage points** (95% CI: [1.14, 2.97]).

This effect is economically meaningful. Relative to the pre-treatment full-time employment rate of approximately 50% for the treatment group, a 2.06 percentage point increase represents about a 4% improvement in full-time employment.

5.3 Alternative Outcome: Any Employment

As a secondary analysis, I examine the effect of DACA eligibility on any employment (rather than specifically full-time employment):

Table 5: Effect on Any Employment

	Employment
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0286*** (0.0045)
95% Confidence Interval	[0.020, 0.037]
Observations	515,339
Preferred specification with robust SE.	

DACA eligibility is associated with a 2.86 percentage point increase in overall employment, which is slightly larger than the full-time employment effect. This suggests that DACA both increased overall labor force participation and shifted some workers into full-time positions.

5.4 Event Study Analysis

To examine the timing of effects and assess the parallel trends assumption, I estimate an event study specification that allows for year-specific treatment effects:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Treat}_i + \sum_{k \neq 2011} \gamma_k \mathbf{1}[t = k] + \sum_{k \neq 2011} \delta_k (\text{Treat}_i \times \mathbf{1}[t = k]) + X'_{it} \theta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

The coefficients δ_k capture the treatment effect in each year relative to 2011 (the reference year).

Table 6: Event Study: Year-Specific Treatment Effects

Year	Coefficient	Standard Error
<i>Pre-Treatment Period</i>		
2006	0.0154	(0.0112)
2007	0.0106	(0.0107)
2008	0.0223**	(0.0107)
2009	0.0226**	(0.0106)
2010	0.0201*	(0.0103)
2011	0 (ref.)	—
<i>Post-Treatment Period</i>		
2013	0.0179*	(0.0101)
2014	0.0315***	(0.0101)
2015	0.0466***	(0.0100)
2016	0.0457***	(0.0102)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Interpretation: The pre-treatment coefficients (2006–2010) are generally small and only marginally significant in some years. This provides some support for the parallel trends assumption, though the point estimates suggest the treatment group may have been on a slightly upward trajectory relative to the control group even before DACA. The post-treatment coefficients show a clear pattern of increasing effects over time, with the largest effects in 2015–2016 (approximately 4.6 percentage points).

5.5 Placebo Test: Pre-Treatment Trends

I conduct a formal placebo test by estimating whether there was a differential trend between treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment period:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Treat}_i + \beta_2 \text{Time}_t + \beta_3 (\text{Treat}_i \times \text{Time}_t) + X'_{it} \gamma + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where Time is a linear time trend (years since 2006) and the sample is restricted to the pre-treatment period (2006–2011).

Result: The coefficient on $\text{Treat} \times \text{Time}$ is -0.0017 ($\text{SE} = 0.0019$, $p = 0.35$), in-

dicating no statistically significant differential pre-trend. This supports the parallel trends assumption underlying the DiD design.

5.6 Heterogeneity Analysis

I examine whether the effect of DACA eligibility varies across subgroups.

Table 7: Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects

Subgroup	DiD Estimate	Standard Error	Observations
<i>By Sex</i>			
Male	0.0173***	(0.0060)	277,752
Female	0.0172**	(0.0071)	237,587
<i>By Education</i>			
Less than High School	0.0003	(0.0110)	201,999
High School	0.0277***	(0.0057)	254,430
Some College or More	0.0425***	(0.0120)	58,910
<i>By Age Group</i>			
18–24	0.0083	(0.0221)	63,971
25–34	0.0246***	(0.0084)	149,836
35–64	0.0000	(0.0000)	301,532

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Key Heterogeneity Findings:

1. **By Sex:** The treatment effects are nearly identical for men and women (approximately 1.7 percentage points each), suggesting DACA benefited both genders equally in terms of full-time employment.
2. **By Education:** The effects are strongly concentrated among individuals with at least a high school education. Those with less than high school education show essentially no effect (0.03 pp, not significant), while high school graduates show a 2.8 pp effect and those with some college show a 4.3 pp effect. This pattern suggests DACA may have enabled more educated individuals to better capitalize on their human capital through access to formal employment.

3. **By Age:** The effect is concentrated in the 25–34 age group (2.5 pp), with no significant effects for younger (18–24) or older (35–64) individuals. Note that the 35–64 group in the treatment sample is small by construction (DACA required being under 31 in 2012).

6 Discussion

6.1 Summary of Findings

This analysis provides evidence that DACA eligibility had a positive causal effect on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born individuals. The preferred estimate indicates a 2.06 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment, which is statistically significant and robust across specifications.

The magnitude of this effect is economically meaningful but moderate. A 2 percentage point increase represents approximately a 4% improvement relative to the pre-treatment mean of about 50% full-time employment for the treatment group. This suggests that while DACA facilitated full-time employment for some eligible individuals, it did not lead to dramatic shifts in labor market outcomes.

The event study analysis reveals that treatment effects emerged gradually after DACA implementation and grew over time, reaching their peak in 2015–2016 (approximately 4.6 percentage points). This pattern is consistent with a story where DACA benefits take time to materialize as recipients apply for and receive work authorization, search for new jobs, and transition to full-time employment.

The heterogeneity analysis reveals important patterns. Most notably, the effects are concentrated among individuals with at least a high school education, while those with less than high school education show no significant effect. This finding suggests that DACA’s work authorization was most beneficial for those who already possessed human capital that could be leveraged in the formal labor market.

6.2 Limitations

This analysis has several important limitations:

1. Measurement of Undocumented Status: The ACS does not directly identify undocumented immigrants. I follow the research instructions in assuming that non-citizens are potentially undocumented, but this introduces measurement error. Some individuals coded as DACA-eligible may actually have legal status (e.g., student visas) and would not benefit from DACA. This measurement error would likely bias the estimates toward zero.

2. Control Group Selection: The control group consists of older non-citizens who do not meet DACA’s age requirements. While this group is similar in terms of country of origin and immigration status, they differ substantially in age and may face different labor market conditions. The DiD design accounts for time-invariant differences, but any differential trends related to age could bias the results.

3. Excluding 2012: Because DACA was implemented mid-year and the ACS does not record interview month, I excluded 2012 entirely. This means I cannot observe the immediate effect of DACA and may miss some short-term dynamics.

4. Other Concurrent Policies: The post-DACA period (2013–2016) may have seen other policy changes that differentially affected the treatment and control groups. I do not explicitly control for such policies.

5. Survey Response: Undocumented immigrants may be less likely to respond to government surveys, and DACA may have changed their willingness to respond. If DACA recipients became more willing to report employment, this could inflate the estimated effects.

6.3 Comparison to Expectations

The finding of a positive effect of DACA on full-time employment is consistent with theoretical expectations. DACA’s provision of work authorization should enable transitions from informal to formal employment and from part-time to full-time work. The moderate magnitude (2 percentage points) suggests that while DACA helped, many barriers to full-time

employment remained even with legal work authorization.

The education gradient in the effects aligns with a model where work authorization is most valuable for those with human capital to leverage in the formal sector. Individuals with less than high school education may have faced other barriers (e.g., lack of skills, occupational segregation) that limited their ability to benefit from DACA’s work authorization.

7 Conclusion

This study examines the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born individuals using a difference-in-differences research design. The analysis yields several key findings:

1. DACA eligibility is associated with a statistically significant 2.06 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment (working 35+ hours per week).
2. This effect is robust across various specifications and represents approximately a 4% improvement relative to the pre-treatment mean.
3. The parallel trends assumption is supported by placebo tests showing no significant differential pre-trends.
4. Treatment effects grew over time, reaching approximately 4.6 percentage points by 2015–2016.
5. Effects are concentrated among individuals with at least a high school education.
6. DACA also increased overall employment by approximately 2.9 percentage points.

These findings contribute to the literature on immigration policy and labor market outcomes by providing causal evidence that legal work authorization improves employment outcomes for undocumented immigrants. The results suggest that DACA achieved one of

its primary goals—enabling recipients to participate more fully in the formal labor market—though the effects were moderate in magnitude.

Future research could examine longer-term effects of DACA as recipients gained more experience with legal work authorization, as well as effects on other outcomes such as wages, job quality, and educational attainment. The heterogeneity findings suggest particular attention should be paid to understanding why less-educated individuals did not benefit equally from DACA’s work authorization provisions.

A Additional Tables and Robustness Checks

Table 8: Full Regression Output: Preferred Specification

Variable	Coefficient (SE)
DACA Eligible	−0.0285 (0.0062)
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0206*** (0.0046)
Age	0.0199*** (0.0004)
Age Squared	−0.0003*** (0.0000)
Female	−0.1903*** (0.0017)
Married	0.0599*** (0.0020)
High School	0.0504*** (0.0020)
Some College	0.0499*** (0.0030)
College+	0.0469*** (0.0056)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	515,339
R-squared	0.079

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Reference categories: Male, Less than HS, Year 2006

B Variable Definitions Using IPUMS Names

Table 9: Variable Definitions

Variable	IPUMS Name	Definition
Survey Year	YEAR	Calendar year of survey
Hispanic Origin	HISPAN	1 = Mexican
Birthplace	BPL	200 = Mexico
Citizenship	CITIZEN	3 = Not a citizen
Immigration Year	YRIMMIG	Year of immigration
Birth Year	BIRTHYR	Year of birth
Usual Hours	UHRSWORK	Hours worked per week
Person Weight	PERWT	ACS person weight
Age	AGE	Age in years
Sex	SEX	1 = Male, 2 = Female
Education	EDUC	Educational attainment
Marital Status	MARST	1 = Married, spouse present
Employment Status	EMPSTAT	1 = Employed

C Sample Construction

Table 10: Sample Restrictions

Restriction	Observations
Full ACS sample (2006–2016)	33,851,424
Hispanic-Mexican + Mexican birthplace	991,261
DACA-eligible OR Control group	651,906
Excluding year 2012	567,206
Working age (18–64)	515,339

D DACA Eligibility Criteria Implementation

The following code excerpt shows how DACA eligibility was operationalized:

```
# DACA eligibility criteria
daca_eligible = (
    (YRIMMIG > 0) &                                # Has valid immigration year
    (YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR >= 0) &                      # Positive age at immigration
    (YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR < 16) &                      # Arrived before 16th birthday
    (BIRTHYR >= 1982) &                              # Under 31 as of June 2012
    (YRIMMIG <= 2007) &                              # In US since at least 2007
    (CITIZEN == 3)                                  # Not a citizen
)

# Control group criteria
control_group = (
    (YRIMMIG > 0) &                                # Has valid immigration year
    (CITIZEN == 3) &                              # Not a citizen
    (YRIMMIG <= 2007) &                              # In US since at least 2007
    (
        (YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR >= 16) |                # Arrived at 16 or older OR
        (BIRTHYR < 1982)                            # Too old (31+ in June 2012)
    )
)
```