

The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Replication Study

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Abstract

This study examines the causal effect of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born non-citizens in the United States. Using American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, I find that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment (working 35+ hours per week) by approximately 3.1 percentage points (95% CI: 2.1–4.2 pp). This represents a 7.3% increase relative to the pre-DACA baseline employment rate for eligible individuals. The effect is statistically significant at conventional levels and robust to various specification checks, though the placebo test suggests some concern about parallel pre-trends. Heterogeneity analysis reveals similar effects for both men and women. These findings suggest that DACA’s provision of work authorization meaningfully improved labor market outcomes for eligible young immigrants.

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1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, implemented on June 15, 2012, represents one of the most significant immigration policy changes affecting undocumented immigrants in the United States. The program provides eligible individuals—those who arrived as children and met certain criteria—with temporary relief from deportation and authorization to work legally in the United States.

This study investigates the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment, defined as usually working 35 or more hours per week. The research question is:

Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born people living in the United States, what was the causal impact of eligibility for DACA on the probability that the eligible person is employed full-time?

Understanding the labor market effects of DACA is important for several reasons. First, the program’s primary mechanism—legal work authorization—directly affects employment opportunities. Prior to DACA, undocumented immigrants faced significant barriers to formal employment, limiting their ability to work in regulated sectors or secure full-time positions with benefits. Second, DACA eligibility also enables recipients to obtain driver’s licenses in many states, potentially expanding geographic access to job opportunities. Third, the temporary nature of DACA status and its uncertainty may influence labor market behavior in complex ways.

This analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS) spanning 2006–2016, which covers the period before and after DACA implementation. I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design that compares changes in full-time employment between DACA-eligible and ineligible non-citizen Hispanic-Mexican immigrants before and after the program’s introduction.

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the DACA program. Section 3 describes the data and sample construction. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology. Section 5 reports the main results, and Section 6 presents robustness checks. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the findings and their limitations.

2 Background on DACA

2.1 Program Overview

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program was announced by President Obama on June 15, 2012, and applications began being accepted on August 15, 2012. The program offers two main benefits to eligible individuals: (1) temporary relief from deportation (deferred action) for two years, renewable, and (2) authorization to work legally in the United States during that period.

Additionally, DACA recipients can apply for a Social Security number, and in many states, they can obtain a driver's license. These supplementary benefits may further facilitate labor market participation by enabling formal employment verification and expanding geographic job search opportunities.

2.2 Eligibility Criteria

To qualify for DACA, applicants must meet all of the following criteria:

1. **Age at arrival:** Must have come to the United States before their 16th birthday
2. **Age as of June 15, 2012:** Must have been under the age of 31 on June 15, 2012 (i.e., born after June 15, 1981)
3. **Continuous residence:** Must have lived continuously in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. **Presence requirement:** Must have been physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012
5. **Immigration status:** Must not have had lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012
6. **Education/military:** Must be in school, have graduated from high school, obtained a GED, or be an honorably discharged veteran
7. **Criminal history:** Must not have been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors

2.3 Program Uptake

In the first four years of the program (2012–2016), approximately 900,000 initial applications were received, with about 90% approved. While the program was not restricted by national

origin, the great majority of eligible individuals and recipients were from Mexico, reflecting the composition of the undocumented immigrant population in the United States.

2.4 Expected Effects on Employment

DACA eligibility would be expected to affect employment through several channels:

- **Direct work authorization:** The most immediate effect is enabling eligible individuals to work legally, opening access to formal sector jobs that require employment verification (I-9 documentation).
- **Occupational mobility:** With legal work authorization, DACA recipients can access a broader range of occupations, potentially moving from informal work or self-employment to formal wage employment.
- **Hours adjustment:** Those already working may be able to increase their hours or move from part-time to full-time employment as they gain access to better jobs.
- **Driver's license access:** In states allowing DACA recipients to obtain licenses, geographic job search and commuting options expand.
- **Reduced labor market discrimination:** Having legal status may reduce employer reluctance to hire or provide full-time hours.

3 Data and Sample

3.1 Data Source

This analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS) as provided by IPUMS USA. The ACS is an annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that collects detailed demographic, social, economic, and housing information from approximately 1% of the U.S. population each year. I use the one-year ACS files for 2006–2016, providing 11 years of data that span the pre- and post-DACA periods.

The ACS is a repeated cross-sectional survey, not a panel, so individuals cannot be tracked over time. However, the large sample sizes allow for precise estimation of group-level outcomes across years.

3.2 Sample Construction

The sample is restricted to the target population specified in the research question: Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born non-citizens of working age. The filtering steps and resulting sample sizes are:

1. **Initial sample:** 33,851,424 observations (all ACS respondents 2006–2016)
2. **Hispanic-Mexican ethnicity** (HISPAN = 1): 2,945,521 observations
3. **Born in Mexico** (BPL = 200): 991,261 observations
4. **Non-citizens** (CITIZEN = 3): 701,347 observations
5. **Working age (16–64)**: 618,640 observations (final analytic sample)

The restriction to non-citizens is critical because naturalized citizens would not need or benefit from DACA. Following the research instructions, I assume that non-citizens who have not received immigration papers (naturalization) are undocumented for purposes of DACA eligibility determination.

3.3 DACA Eligibility Definition

I define DACA eligibility based on the criteria that can be observed in the ACS data:

1. **Arrived before age 16:** Immigration year minus birth year < 16 (using YRIMMIG and BIRTHYR)
2. **Under 31 on June 15, 2012:** Birth year > 1981 , or birth year = 1981 with birth quarter 3 or 4 (using BIRTHYR and BIRTHQTR)
3. **Continuous residence since June 2007:** Immigration year ≤ 2007 (using YRIMMIG)

Note that some eligibility criteria cannot be verified in the ACS: educational attainment requirements, criminal history, and physical presence on specific dates. The ACS also does not distinguish between documented and undocumented non-citizens. Therefore, the eligibility indicator is an approximation that may include some individuals who would not actually qualify for DACA and exclude some who would.

3.4 Key Variables

3.4.1 Outcome Variable

The primary outcome is full-time employment, defined as:

$$\text{FullTime}_{it} = \mathbf{1}[\text{UHRSWORK}_{it} \geq 35] \quad (1)$$

where UHRSWORK is the usual hours worked per week. This is consistent with the Bureau of Labor Statistics definition of full-time work.

Alternative outcomes examined include:

- Employment (any): EMPSTAT = 1
- Labor force participation: LABFORCE = 2

3.4.2 Treatment Variables

- **DACA Eligible:** Indicator for meeting eligibility criteria defined above
- **Post-DACA:** Indicator for years 2013–2016 (excluding 2012 because DACA was implemented mid-year)
- **DACA × Post:** Interaction term, the difference-in-differences estimator

3.4.3 Control Variables

- Age and age squared (AGE)
- Sex (male indicator from SEX)
- Marital status (married indicator from MARST)
- Education categories: less than high school, high school diploma, some college, bachelor's or higher (from EDUCD)
- Metropolitan area residence (from METRO)
- Years in the United States (YEAR – YRIMMIG)
- State fixed effects (STATEFIP)
- Year fixed effects (YEAR)

3.5 Sample Characteristics

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the analytic sample by DACA eligibility status.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by DACA Eligibility Status

Variable	Non-Eligible	DACA-Eligible	Difference
Full-time employment	0.591	0.455	-0.136
Employment (any)	0.654	0.547	-0.107
Labor force participation	0.712	0.627	-0.085
Age	39.6	22.6	-17.1
Male	0.538	0.550	0.011
Married	0.655	0.259	-0.395
Less than high school	0.641	0.473	-0.168
High school diploma	0.229	0.318	0.088
Some college	0.086	0.188	0.102
Bachelor's or higher	0.044	0.021	-0.022
Years in US	16.4	14.7	-1.7
N	525,818	92,822	

Notes: Data from ACS 2006–2016. Sample restricted to Hispanic-Mexican, Mexico-born non-citizens ages 16–64.

Several patterns emerge. DACA-eligible individuals are substantially younger (mean age 22.6 vs. 39.6), reflecting the age requirements for eligibility. They have lower full-time employment rates (45.5% vs. 59.1%), which is expected given their younger age and higher enrollment in school. They are less likely to be married (25.9% vs. 65.5%), consistent with their younger age. Interestingly, eligible individuals have somewhat higher education levels despite lower bachelor's degree attainment—fewer have less than high school education (47.3% vs. 64.1%) and more have some college (18.8% vs. 8.6%).

3.6 Sample Sizes by Year

Table 2 shows the sample distribution across years.

Table 2: Sample Size by Year and DACA Eligibility Status

Year	Non-Eligible	DACA-Eligible	Total
2006	50,099	6,734	56,833
2007	50,483	7,350	57,833
2008	48,555	7,160	55,715
2009	49,434	7,821	57,255
2010	50,189	8,566	58,755
2011	50,218	9,183	59,401
2012	47,959	9,211	57,170
2013	46,123	9,228	55,351
2014	45,430	9,371	54,801
2015	44,158	9,205	53,363
2016	43,170	8,993	52,163
Total	525,818	92,822	618,640

The number of DACA-eligible individuals grows over time in the early years as the eligible cohort ages into the working-age population, then stabilizes. The overall sample shows a gradual decline after 2011, potentially reflecting demographic changes in the Mexican-born non-citizen population.

4 Empirical Methodology

4.1 Identification Strategy

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design to estimate the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The key identifying assumption is that, absent DACA, the full-time employment trends for eligible and non-eligible groups would have evolved in parallel.

The DiD approach compares:

- The change in outcomes for DACA-eligible individuals before and after program implementation
- The change in outcomes for similar but ineligible individuals over the same period

The difference between these two changes identifies the program effect, under the parallel trends assumption.

4.2 Econometric Specification

The main estimating equation is:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Eligible}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \gamma(\text{Eligible}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + X'_{ist}\delta + \theta_s + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (2)$$

where:

- Y_{ist} is the full-time employment indicator for individual i in state s at time t
- Eligible_i is the DACA eligibility indicator
- Post_t is an indicator for years 2013–2016
- γ is the coefficient of interest: the DiD estimate of DACA's effect
- X_{ist} is a vector of individual controls (age, sex, marital status, education, years in US, metro area)
- θ_s are state fixed effects
- λ_t are year fixed effects
- ε_{ist} is the error term

Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for potential within-state correlation in outcomes and policy implementation.

4.3 Treatment of 2012

The year 2012 presents a complication because DACA was announced on June 15, 2012, and applications began August 15, 2012. The ACS does not identify the month of data collection, so 2012 observations include both pre- and post-DACA respondents. I handle this by:

1. Excluding 2012 from the post-treatment period ($\text{Post} = 1$ only for 2013–2016)
2. Including 2012 in the sample but treating it as part of the transition
3. Conducting event study analysis that examines each year separately

4.4 Event Study Specification

To examine the timing of effects and test for pre-trends, I estimate an event study specification:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \sum_{k \neq 2011} \beta_k (\text{Eligible}_i \times \mathbf{1}[t = k]) + X'_{ist} \delta + \theta_s + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (3)$$

where 2011 serves as the reference year (the last full pre-DACA year). This specification allows the effect to vary by year and provides a visual test of the parallel trends assumption—the pre-2012 coefficients should be close to zero if the assumption holds.

4.5 Threats to Identification

Several factors could threaten the validity of the DiD estimates:

1. **Differential trends:** If eligible and ineligible groups were on different employment trajectories before DACA, the parallel trends assumption fails. I test for this using the event study specification and placebo tests.
2. **Composition changes:** If the composition of the eligible or ineligible groups changed over time (e.g., through selective migration), this could bias results. The age restriction helps limit this concern.
3. **Measurement error in eligibility:** Because DACA eligibility cannot be perfectly observed in the ACS, there is likely classification error in the eligibility indicator. This would attenuate the estimated effect toward zero.
4. **Spillover effects:** If DACA affected outcomes for ineligible individuals (e.g., through labor market competition), the comparison group outcomes would be affected, biasing results.
5. **Concurrent policy changes:** Other policies affecting immigrant employment (e.g., state-level E-Verify mandates) could confound the DACA effect if they differentially affected eligible vs. ineligible groups.

5 Results

5.1 Graphical Evidence

Figure 1 presents trends in full-time employment rates for DACA-eligible and non-eligible groups from 2006–2016.




Figure 1: Full-Time Employment Trends by DACA Eligibility Status

Notes: Data from ACS 2006–2016. Sample restricted to Hispanic-Mexican, Mexico-born non-citizens ages 16–64. DACA was implemented on June 15, 2012.

Several patterns are evident. First, DACA-eligible individuals have consistently lower full-time employment rates throughout the period, reflecting their younger age. Second, both groups experienced declining employment during the Great Recession (2008–2010) and subsequent recovery. Third, importantly, the gap between groups narrows substantially after 2012, with eligible individuals showing faster employment growth post-DACA.

Figure 2 shows the employment gap (non-eligible minus eligible rate) over time.




Figure 2: Full-Time Employment Gap Between Groups Over Time

Notes: Gap calculated as non-eligible employment rate minus eligible employment rate. Data from ACS 2006–2016.

The gap shrinks from about 20 percentage points in 2006 to 5.4 percentage points in 2016, with the sharpest declines occurring after 2012.

5.2 Simple Difference-in-Differences

Table 3 presents the simple 2×2 DiD calculation.

Table 3: Simple Difference-in-Differences

	Pre-DACA (2006–2011)	Post-DACA (2013–2016)	Difference
DACA-Eligible	42.83%	49.62%	+6.79 pp
Non-Eligible	59.79%	57.90%	-1.89 pp
Difference	-16.96 pp	-8.28 pp	
DiD Estimate			+8.68 pp

The raw DiD estimate suggests that DACA increased full-time employment by 8.68 percentage points. However, this does not control for compositional differences between groups or macroeconomic trends.

5.3 Regression Results

Table 4 presents the main regression results.

Table 4: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment

	(1) Basic DiD	(2) + Controls	(3) + State/Year FE
DACA × Post	0.0868*** (0.0051)	0.0382*** (0.0058)	0.0312*** (0.0055)
95% CI	[0.077, 0.097]	[0.027, 0.050]	[0.021, 0.042]
DACA Eligible	-0.1696*** (0.0050)	-0.0259*** (0.0043)	-0.0208*** (0.0037)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.016	0.208	0.217
Observations	618,640	618,640	618,640

Notes: Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Outcome is full-time employment (working 35+ hours/week). Demographic controls include age, age squared, male, married, education categories, years in US, and metro area. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results show:

- **Column (1):** The basic DiD estimate without controls is 8.68 percentage points (SE = 0.51 pp), highly statistically significant.
- **Column (2):** Adding demographic controls reduces the estimate to 3.82 percentage points (SE = 0.58 pp). The substantial reduction suggests that compositional differences (especially age) between groups account for much of the raw differential.
- **Column (3):** The preferred specification with state and year fixed effects yields an estimate of 3.12 percentage points (SE = 0.55 pp). The 95% confidence interval is [2.06, 4.19] percentage points.

The preferred estimate indicates that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by 3.12 percentage points, or about 7.3% relative to the pre-DACA baseline rate of 42.8% for eligible individuals.

5.4 Event Study Results

Figure 3 presents the event study estimates.




Figure 3: Event Study: Effect of DACA Eligibility by Year

Notes: Coefficients represent the interaction between DACA eligibility and year indicators, relative to 2011. Year 2012 is omitted due to mid-year implementation. Shaded area shows 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered by state.

Table 5 reports the event study coefficients.

Table 5: Event Study Coefficients

Year	Coefficient	Standard Error
2006	-0.0167*	(0.0087)
2007	-0.0150***	(0.0048)
2008	-0.0023	(0.0088)
2009	0.0023	(0.0059)
2010	0.0050	(0.0101)
2011	—	(reference)
2012	—	(omitted)
2013	0.0095	(0.0089)
2014	0.0233*	(0.0128)
2015	0.0403***	(0.0098)
2016	0.0400***	(0.0087)

The event study reveals several patterns:

1. **Pre-trends:** The 2006 and 2007 coefficients are negative and statistically significant, suggesting some violation of parallel trends. However, the 2008–2010 coefficients are close to zero and insignificant, indicating parallel trends in the years immediately preceding DACA.
2. **Phase-in:** The post-DACA effects grow over time: small and insignificant in 2013, modest in 2014, and larger and highly significant in 2015–2016. This pattern is consistent with gradual program uptake and adjustment.
3. **Magnitude:** By 2015–2016, the effect stabilizes at about 4 percentage points.

6 Robustness Checks

6.1 Alternative Outcomes

Table 6 examines alternative labor market outcomes.

Table 6: Effects on Alternative Outcomes

Outcome	Estimate	SE	95% CI
Full-time employment	0.0312***	0.0055	[0.021, 0.042]
Employment (any)	0.0423***	0.0093	[0.024, 0.061]
Labor force participation	0.0417***	0.0096	[0.023, 0.061]

Notes: All specifications include demographic controls, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by state.

DACA eligibility significantly increases all three outcomes. The effect on employment (any) is 4.23 percentage points, and on labor force participation is 4.17 percentage points. The effect on full-time employment (3.12 pp) is somewhat smaller than the effect on any employment (4.23 pp), suggesting that most of DACA’s employment effect comes through increased labor force participation and employment, with a smaller intensive margin effect on hours.

6.2 Heterogeneity by Gender

Table 7 examines whether effects differ by gender.

Table 7: Heterogeneous Effects by Gender

Subgroup	Estimate	SE
Males	0.0272***	(0.0055)
Females	0.0289***	(0.0070)

The effects are similar for men and women (2.72 pp vs. 2.89 pp), with overlapping confidence intervals. This suggests that DACA’s labor market benefits extended to both genders.

6.3 Placebo Test

To further examine pre-trends, I conduct a placebo test using 2010 as a fake treatment year in the pre-DACA period (2006–2011).

Table 8: Placebo Test: Pre-Trend Analysis

	Estimate	p-value
Placebo DiD (2010 fake treatment)	0.0129***	0.0005

The placebo coefficient is statistically significant, which raises some concern about the parallel trends assumption. The positive coefficient suggests that relative full-time employment for eligible individuals was already improving in 2010–2011 compared to 2006–2009, before DACA was implemented. This could indicate:

1. Anticipation effects (unlikely given DACA’s surprise announcement)
2. Differential recovery from the recession by eligibility group
3. Other unobserved factors affecting eligible individuals’ employment

This finding suggests caution in interpreting the main results as purely causal effects of DACA. The true effect may be somewhat smaller than estimated if pre-DACA trends were already diverging.

6.4 Weighted Analysis

Using ACS person weights (PERWT) to make the sample representative of the target population:

Table 9: Weighted Analysis

	Estimate	95% CI
Weighted DiD	0.0385***	[0.028, 0.049]
Unweighted (main)	0.0312***	[0.021, 0.042]

The weighted estimate (3.85 pp) is slightly larger than the unweighted estimate (3.12 pp), suggesting that the population-weighted effect may be somewhat stronger.

7 Discussion and Conclusion

7.1 Summary of Findings

This study examined the effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexico-born non-citizens using a difference-in-differences research design. The main findings are:

1. **Main effect:** DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by approximately 3.1 percentage points (95% CI: 2.1–4.2 pp), representing a 7.3% increase relative to the pre-DACA baseline.
2. **Dynamic effects:** The event study shows effects growing over time, from near zero in 2013 to about 4 percentage points by 2015–2016, consistent with gradual program uptake.
3. **Robustness:** Effects are significant for employment and labor force participation as well. Effects are similar for men and women.
4. **Pre-trends concern:** The placebo test and early event study coefficients suggest some violation of parallel trends, warranting caution in interpretation.

7.2 Interpretation

The positive effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment is consistent with the program’s primary mechanism: legal work authorization. By enabling eligible individuals to work legally, DACA likely:

- Opened access to formal sector jobs that require employment verification
- Allowed movement from part-time or informal work to full-time formal employment

- Reduced employer reluctance to hire or provide full hours to workers without documentation
- Expanded job search opportunities through driver's license access in many states

The gradual phase-in of effects (minimal in 2013, larger by 2015–2016) is consistent with the time needed for application processing, recipient adjustment, and employer learning.

7.3 Limitations

Several limitations should be acknowledged:

1. **Eligibility measurement error:** DACA eligibility cannot be perfectly identified in the ACS. Some criteria (education requirements, criminal history) are not observed. This likely attenuates estimates toward zero.
2. **Non-citizen assumption:** I treat all non-citizens as potentially undocumented, but some may have legal non-citizen status (e.g., visa holders) and thus not need DACA.
3. **Parallel trends concerns:** The significant placebo test suggests the parallel trends assumption may not fully hold. Eligible individuals' employment may have been improving relative to non-eligible individuals even before DACA.
4. **External validity:** Results apply specifically to Hispanic-Mexican, Mexico-born non-citizens, the largest group affected by DACA but not the only one.
5. **ACS timing:** The ACS does not identify month of data collection, creating uncertainty for observations in 2012.

7.4 Conclusion

This replication study provides evidence that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment among the targeted population of young undocumented immigrants by approximately 3 percentage points. While concerns about parallel pre-trends warrant some caution, the overall pattern of results—including the timing of effects and consistency across outcomes and subgroups—supports a positive causal interpretation. The findings suggest that providing legal work authorization to eligible undocumented immigrants can meaningfully improve their labor market outcomes.

A Full Regression Output

A.1 Preferred Specification

The preferred specification (Model 3) includes the following controls: age, age squared, male indicator, married indicator, education category indicators (high school, some college, bachelor's or higher, with less than high school as reference), years in US, metropolitan area indicator, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Key coefficient estimates:

- DACA \times Post: 0.0312 (SE: 0.0055)
- DACA Eligible: -0.0208 (SE: 0.0037)
- Age: 0.0316 (SE: 0.0008)
- Age squared: -0.0004 (SE: 0.00001)
- Male: 0.2499 (SE: 0.0032)
- Married: 0.0470 (SE: 0.0025)
- High school: 0.0447 (SE: 0.0029)
- Some college: 0.0461 (SE: 0.0039)
- Bachelor's+: 0.0962 (SE: 0.0056)

A.2 Variable Definitions

Table 10: IPUMS Variable Definitions

Variable	IPUMS Name	Definition
Year	YEAR	Survey year
State	STATEFIP	State FIPS code
Person weight	PERWT	Person-level sample weight
Sex	SEX	1=Male, 2=Female
Age	AGE	Age in years
Birth quarter	BIRTHQTR	Quarter of birth (1–4)
Birth year	BIRTHYR	Year of birth
Hispanic origin	HISPAN	1=Mexican
Birthplace	BPL	200=Mexico
Citizenship	CITIZEN	3=Not a citizen
Immigration year	YRIMMIG	Year of immigration
Education	EDUCD	Detailed education code
Employment status	EMPSTAT	1=Employed
Labor force	LABFORCE	2=In labor force
Usual hours worked	UHRSWORK	Hours per week usually worked
Metropolitan	METRO	2,3,4=Metropolitan area