

# The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment Among Mexican-Born Hispanic Immigrants: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

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## Abstract

This study estimates the causal effect of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens in the United States. Using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences research design, I compare employment outcomes between DACA-eligible and non-eligible Mexican immigrants before and after the program’s implementation in June 2012. The preferred specification, which includes state and year fixed effects along with demographic controls, yields a DiD estimate of 3.29 percentage points ( $SE = 0.0043$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), indicating that DACA eligibility significantly increased the probability of full-time employment. This effect represents approximately a 7.4% increase relative to the pre-treatment mean for eligible individuals. Event study analyses support the parallel trends assumption and demonstrate that effects emerged gradually in the post-treatment period. Results are robust across alternative specifications, subgroup analyses, and outcome measures.

**Keywords:** DACA, immigration policy, employment, difference-in-differences, labor economics

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# 1 Introduction

On June 15, 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, a significant immigration policy that would provide temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to certain undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children. The program represented one of the most substantial changes to immigration enforcement policy in decades and directly affected hundreds of thousands of young immigrants, the majority of whom were of Mexican origin.

This study addresses the following research question: Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican Mexican-born people living in the United States, what was the causal impact of eligibility for DACA on the probability that the eligible person is employed full-time, defined as usually working 35 hours per week or more?

Understanding the labor market effects of DACA is important for several reasons. First, one of the primary policy goals of DACA was to improve economic outcomes for eligible immigrants by providing legal work authorization. Second, the program's effects on employment have implications for broader debates about immigration policy and the economic integration of undocumented immigrants. Third, evaluating the program's effectiveness can inform future policy decisions regarding pathways to legal status.

The identification strategy exploits the timing of DACA's implementation and the specific eligibility criteria established by the program. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework, I compare changes in full-time employment between DACA-eligible and non-eligible Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens before and after the program's announcement. The eligibility criteria—which included requirements related to age at arrival, birth year, and continuous presence in the United States—create plausibly exogenous variation in treatment status that can be leveraged for causal identification.

The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 3.3 percentage points, a statistically significant and economically meaningful effect. This estimate is robust to a variety of specification choices, including the inclusion of demographic controls, education variables, and state fixed effects. Event study analyses provide support for the parallel trends assumption and demonstrate that the treatment effect emerged in the years following DACA's implementation.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the DACA program and its eligibility requirements. Section 3 describes the data and sample construction. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology. Section 5 reports the main results. Section 6 discusses robustness checks and supplementary analyses. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Background: The DACA Program

### 2.1 Program Overview

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program was announced by the Obama administration on June 15, 2012, and began accepting applications on August 15, 2012. The program offered two primary benefits to eligible applicants: (1) deferred action status, providing temporary relief from deportation for a renewable two-year period, and (2) employment authorization documents (EADs), allowing recipients to work legally in the United States.

The creation of DACA represented a significant shift in immigration enforcement priorities. While the program did not confer legal immigration status or provide a pathway to citizenship, it provided substantial practical benefits to recipients, who became known colloquially as “Dreamers” in reference to earlier legislative proposals (the DREAM Act) that would have provided similar protections through congressional action.

### 2.2 Eligibility Criteria

To be eligible for DACA, applicants had to meet several specific criteria as of June 15, 2012:

1. **Age at Arrival:** Must have arrived in the United States before their 16th birthday
2. **Age on Announcement Date:** Must have been under 31 years of age (i.e., born after June 15, 1981)
3. **Continuous Presence:** Must have lived continuously in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. **Physical Presence:** Must have been present in the United States on June 15, 2012
5. **Immigration Status:** Must have been without lawful immigration status (i.e., undocumented) on June 15, 2012
6. **Education/Military:** Must have been enrolled in school, graduated from high school, obtained a GED, or been honorably discharged from the military
7. **Criminal History:** Must not have been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors

## 2.3 Program Uptake

DACA proved highly popular among eligible immigrants. In the first four years of the program (2012–2016), approximately 900,000 initial applications were submitted, with an approval rate of roughly 90%. Given the demographic composition of unauthorized immigration to the United States, the majority of DACA recipients were from Mexico, making Mexican-born immigrants the most relevant population for studying the program’s effects.

## 2.4 Theoretical Mechanisms

DACA could affect full-time employment through several channels:

- **Legal Work Authorization:** The most direct mechanism is that DACA provided employment authorization documents, allowing recipients to work legally and thereby access formal sector employment that typically offers more hours and better conditions.
- **Reduced Fear of Deportation:** Deferred action status reduced the risk of detection and deportation, potentially increasing labor supply as recipients could seek employment more openly.
- **Access to Identification:** DACA recipients became eligible for Social Security numbers and, in many states, driver’s licenses, reducing barriers to employment.
- **Human Capital Investment:** The program may have encouraged investments in education and training by providing a more secure foundation for future employment.

## 3 Data and Sample Construction

### 3.1 Data Source

The analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS), obtained through IPUMS USA. The ACS is an annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that provides detailed demographic, social, and economic information on the U.S. population. The survey’s large sample size makes it well-suited for studying relatively small subpopulations, such as Mexican-born non-citizen immigrants.

I use the one-year ACS samples from 2006 through 2016. The year 2012 is excluded from the analysis because DACA was announced in mid-June and applications began in August, making it impossible to distinguish pre-treatment and post-treatment observations within that calendar year using ACS data, which does not record the month of interview.

## 3.2 Sample Restrictions

The analysis sample is constructed by applying the following sequential filters to the raw ACS data:

1. **Hispanic-Mexican Ethnicity:** Restrict to individuals who report Hispanic-Mexican ethnic origin (HISPAN = 1 in IPUMS coding)
2. **Mexican Birthplace:** Restrict to individuals born in Mexico (BPL = 200)
3. **Non-Citizen Status:** Restrict to non-citizens (CITIZEN = 3), as citizens would not have been affected by DACA. Following the research instructions, I assume that non-citizens who have not naturalized are potentially undocumented for purposes of DACA eligibility.
4. **Working Age:** Restrict to individuals aged 16–64 to focus on the working-age population
5. **Exclude 2012:** Remove observations from 2012 due to the mid-year timing of DACA implementation

Table 1 summarizes the sample construction process.

Table 1: Sample Construction

Sample Restriction	Observations	% of Previous
Full ACS sample (2006–2016)	33,851,424	—
Hispanic-Mexican ethnicity	2,945,521	8.7%
Born in Mexico	991,261	33.7%
Non-citizen	701,347	70.8%
Working age (16–64)	618,640	88.2%
Excluding 2012	561,470	90.8%

Notes: Table shows the progressive application of sample restrictions to construct the analysis sample. The final analysis sample contains 561,470 person-year observations.

## 3.3 DACA Eligibility Definition

Within the analysis sample, I define DACA eligibility based on the following observable criteria:

1. **Arrived Before Age 16:** Age at arrival (YRIMMIG – BIRTHYR) < 16

2. **Born After 1981:** Birth year  $\geq 1982$  (ensuring age  $< 31$  on June 15, 2012)
3. **Arrived by 2007:** Year of immigration  $\leq 2007$  (ensuring continuous presence since June 2007)

An individual is classified as DACA-eligible if all three criteria are satisfied. This definition captures the key age-based eligibility requirements that can be observed in the ACS data. Note that some eligibility criteria (education requirements, criminal history) cannot be directly observed, so the eligibility indicator represents potential eligibility based on demographic characteristics.

### 3.4 Variable Definitions

**Outcome Variable:** The primary outcome is an indicator for full-time employment, defined as usually working 35 or more hours per week ( $UHRSWORK \geq 35$ ). This follows the standard definition of full-time employment used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

**Treatment Variables:**

- *DACA Eligible:* Binary indicator equal to 1 if the individual meets all three eligibility criteria defined above
- *Post-DACA:* Binary indicator equal to 1 for years 2013–2016 (after DACA implementation)
- *Eligible  $\times$  Post:* Interaction term representing the DiD estimator

**Control Variables:**

- Age and age squared (to capture life-cycle patterns)
- Female indicator ( $SEX = 2$ )
- Married indicator ( $MARST \in \{1, 2\}$ )
- Education indicators: less than high school (reference), high school, some college, college or more
- State fixed effects (STATEFIP)
- Year fixed effects (YEAR)

### 3.5 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents summary statistics for key variables by treatment group and time period.

Table 2: Summary Statistics by Group and Period

Variable	Pre-Period (2006–2011)		Post-Period (2013–2016)	
	Eligible	Control	Eligible	Control
Full-time employment	0.447	0.627	0.520	0.601
Any employment	0.529	0.684	0.636	0.685
Age (years)	21.1	37.3	24.2	41.1
Female	0.444	0.428	0.451	0.461
Married	0.215	0.620	0.288	0.624
Less than high school	0.474	0.601	0.364	0.586
High school	0.395	0.296	0.445	0.300
Some college	0.117	0.064	0.164	0.071
College or more	0.013	0.039	0.027	0.043
N (observations)	43,851	265,422	36,449	215,748

Notes: All means are weighted using ACS person weights (PERWT). Pre-period includes years 2006–2011; post-period includes years 2013–2016.

Several patterns emerge from the descriptive statistics. First, the eligible group is substantially younger than the control group, reflecting the age-based eligibility criteria. The eligible group has a mean age of about 21 years in the pre-period compared to 37 years for the control group. Second, the eligible group has higher educational attainment, with lower rates of less-than-high-school education and higher rates of high school and college attendance. Third, marriage rates are much lower among the eligible group, consistent with their younger age profile.

Most importantly for the analysis, both groups experienced changes in full-time employment between the pre- and post-periods. Among the eligible group, full-time employment increased from 44.7% to 52.0%, a gain of 7.3 percentage points. Among the control group, full-time employment decreased slightly from 62.7% to 60.1%, a decline of 2.6 percentage points. The raw difference-in-differences is thus approximately 9.9 percentage points, though this does not account for compositional changes or secular trends.

## 4 Empirical Methodology

### 4.1 Difference-in-Differences Design

The primary empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences (DiD) design that compares changes in full-time employment between DACA-eligible and non-eligible Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens before and after DACA's implementation. The basic DiD model is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Eligible}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 (\text{Eligible}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{it}$  is full-time employment status for individual  $i$  in year  $t$ ,  $\text{Eligible}_i$  indicates DACA eligibility,  $\text{Post}_t$  indicates the post-treatment period (2013–2016), and  $\beta_3$  is the coefficient of interest capturing the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment.

### 4.2 Extended Specification

The preferred specification extends the basic model to include individual-level controls and fixed effects:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Eligible}_i + \beta_3 (\text{Eligible}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + X'_{it} \gamma + \lambda_t + \mu_s + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where  $X_{it}$  is a vector of control variables (age, age squared, gender, marital status, education),  $\lambda_t$  represents year fixed effects, and  $\mu_s$  represents state fixed effects. Note that the main effect of Post is absorbed by the year fixed effects.

### 4.3 Identifying Assumptions

The key identifying assumption for DiD is the parallel trends assumption: absent DACA, the treatment and control groups would have experienced the same trends in full-time employment. While this assumption cannot be directly tested, I examine its plausibility through:

1. **Pre-treatment Trend Analysis:** Examining whether employment trends were parallel in the years before DACA
2. **Event Study Specification:** Estimating year-specific treatment effects to assess whether effects emerge only after DACA implementation

## 4.4 Event Study Specification

To examine the dynamics of the treatment effect and assess the parallel trends assumption, I estimate an event study specification:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k \neq 2011} \delta_k (\text{Eligible}_i \times \mathbf{1}[t = k]) + X'_{it} \gamma + \lambda_t + \mu_s + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where the  $\delta_k$  coefficients capture the difference in outcomes between eligible and non-eligible groups in each year, relative to the reference year 2011 (the last pre-treatment year). Pre-treatment coefficients ( $\delta_{2006}$  through  $\delta_{2010}$ ) that are close to zero and statistically insignificant would support the parallel trends assumption. Post-treatment coefficients ( $\delta_{2013}$  through  $\delta_{2016}$ ) capture the evolution of the treatment effect over time.

## 4.5 Estimation Details

All regressions are estimated using weighted least squares (WLS) with ACS person weights (PERWT) to ensure that estimates are representative of the target population. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1). Given the binary nature of the outcome variable, OLS/WLS provides a linear probability model; the coefficients can be interpreted as changes in the probability of full-time employment.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Graphical Evidence

Before presenting regression results, Figure 1 shows the time trends in full-time employment for both groups.




Figure 1: Full-Time Employment Trends by DACA Eligibility Status

*Notes:* Figure shows weighted mean full-time employment rates ( $\text{UHRSWORK} \geq 35$ ) by year for DACA-eligible and non-eligible Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens. Vertical dashed line indicates DACA implementation (2012 excluded from analysis). Year 2012 is omitted from the sample.

The figure reveals several important patterns. First, both groups experienced declining full-time employment rates during the Great Recession (2008–2010), followed by recovery. Second, the gap between the two groups narrowed substantially in the post-DACA period, driven primarily by increases among the eligible group. Third, while there are some differences in pre-treatment levels and trends, the general pattern is consistent with a positive treatment effect.

Figure 2 shows the difference in full-time employment rates between the two groups over time.




Figure 2: Difference in Full-Time Employment: DACA-Eligible vs. Non-Eligible  
*Notes:* Figure shows the difference in weighted mean full-time employment rates between DACA-eligible and non-eligible groups by year. Negative values indicate lower employment among the eligible group. Red dashed line indicates DACA implementation.

## 5.2 Main Regression Results

Table 3 presents the main difference-in-differences results across five specifications of increasing complexity.

Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment

	(1) Basic	(2) Demo.	(3) Demo.+Educ.	(4) Year FE	(5) Full
Eligible $\times$ Post	0.0994*** (0.0047)	0.0442*** (0.0043)	0.0410*** (0.0043)	0.0335*** (0.0043)	0.0329*** (0.0043)
DACA Eligible	-0.1797*** (0.0037)	-0.0280*** (0.0048)	-0.0125** (0.0048)	-0.0111** (0.0048)	-0.0116** (0.0048)
Post-DACA	-0.0262*** (0.0019)	0.0211*** (0.0017)	0.0210*** (0.0017)	—	—
Age, Age <sup>2</sup>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Female, Married	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	561,470	561,470	561,470	561,470	561,470
R-squared	0.011	0.220	0.223	0.227	0.230

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for full-time employment ( $UHRSWORK \geq 35$ ). All regressions are estimated using weighted least squares with ACS person weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

The results show a consistent positive effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The basic DiD estimate in Column (1) is 0.099, but this is likely biased upward by compositional differences between groups. Adding demographic controls in Column (2) reduces the estimate to 0.044, as the age and marital status controls account for substantial variation in employment. Column (3) adds education controls, yielding an estimate of 0.041. Column (4) replaces the post-period indicator with year fixed effects, reducing the estimate to 0.034. The preferred specification in Column (5) adds state fixed effects, yielding a DiD estimate of 0.0329 (SE = 0.0043).

**Interpretation of Preferred Estimate:** The coefficient of 0.0329 indicates that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by 3.29 percentage points. Given a pre-treatment full-time employment rate of 44.7% among the eligible group, this represents a relative increase of approximately 7.4%. The effect is highly statistically significant ( $t = 7.73$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), with a 95% confidence interval of [0.0246, 0.0413].

### 5.3 Event Study Results

Figure 3 presents the event study estimates, showing year-specific treatment effects relative to 2011.




Figure 3: Event Study: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment

*Notes:* Figure shows coefficients from the event study specification, representing the difference in full-time employment between DACA-eligible and non-eligible groups in each year relative to 2011. Bars show 95% confidence intervals. Red dashed line indicates DACA implementation.

The event study results provide support for the parallel trends assumption and reveal the dynamics of the treatment effect:

- **Pre-treatment Period (2006–2010):** All coefficients are small and not statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Point estimates range from  $-0.018$  (2006) to  $0.015$  (2010), with confidence intervals that include zero. This pattern is consistent with parallel trends in the pre-treatment period.
- **Post-treatment Period (2013–2016):** Effects emerge gradually after DACA implementation. The 2013 coefficient ( $0.017$ ) is not statistically significant, reflecting that many recipients may not have received work authorization until later that year. By 2014, the effect ( $0.028$ ) is statistically significant, and it continues to grow through 2015 ( $0.045$ ) and 2016 ( $0.045$ ).

Table 4 presents the detailed event study coefficients.

Table 4: Event Study Coefficients

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	95% CI
2006	-0.0176	0.0099	[-0.037, 0.002]
2007	-0.0134	0.0095	[-0.032, 0.005]
2008	0.0025	0.0097	[-0.016, 0.021]
2009	0.0110	0.0095	[-0.008, 0.030]
2010	0.0150	0.0093	[-0.003, 0.033]
2011	0.0000	—	[Reference Year]
2013	0.0173	0.0092	[-0.001, 0.035]
2014	0.0279**	0.0093	[0.010, 0.046]
2015	0.0445***	0.0092	[0.027, 0.063]
2016	0.0452***	0.0094	[0.027, 0.064]

Notes: Coefficients from event study regression including demographic controls, education, and state and year fixed effects. Reference year is 2011. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

## 6 Robustness and Supplementary Analyses

### 6.1 Subgroup Analysis by Gender

Table 5 presents results separately for males and females.

Table 5: Subgroup Analysis by Gender

	Males	Females
Eligible × Post	0.0301*** (0.0056)	0.0268*** (0.0063)
Observations	303,717	257,753

Notes: Full specification with demographic controls, education, and state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01.

The effect is positive and statistically significant for both genders. The point estimate is slightly larger for males (3.0 pp) than for females (2.7 pp), though the difference is not statistically significant. This pattern is consistent with males having higher baseline employment rates and potentially greater labor supply responses to work authorization.

## 6.2 Alternative Age Restrictions

As a robustness check, I re-estimate the model restricting the sample to ages 18–55 rather than 16–64. This narrower age range excludes teenagers (who may be in school) and older workers (who may be approaching retirement).

Table 6: Robustness: Alternative Age Restrictions

	Ages 16–64	Ages 18–55
Eligible × Post	0.0329*** (0.0043)	0.0255*** (0.0047)
Observations	561,470	507,423

Notes: Full specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01.

The estimate with the restricted age range (0.026) is somewhat smaller but remains statistically significant and economically meaningful.

## 6.3 Alternative Outcome: Any Employment

I also examine whether DACA affected the extensive margin of employment (any employment vs. none), rather than just full-time employment.

Table 7: Robustness: Any Employment Outcome

	Full-Time Employment	Any Employment
Eligible × Post	0.0329*** (0.0043)	0.0423*** (0.0042)
Observations	561,470	561,470

Notes: Full specification. Any employment defined as EMPSTAT = 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01.

The effect on any employment (4.2 pp) is larger than the effect on full-time employment (3.3 pp), suggesting that DACA increased both labor force participation and the intensity of employment among those who were already working.

## 6.4 Summary of Robustness Checks

Table 8 summarizes all robustness checks.

Table 8: Summary of Robustness Checks

Specification	DiD Estimate	Robust SE	N
<b>Main Specification</b>	<b>0.0329</b>	<b>0.0043</b>	<b>561,470</b>
Males Only	0.0301	0.0056	303,717
Females Only	0.0268	0.0063	257,753
Ages 18–55	0.0255	0.0047	507,423
Any Employment Outcome	0.0423	0.0042	561,470

Notes: All specifications include demographic controls, education, and state and year fixed effects. All estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.

## 7 Discussion

### 7.1 Interpretation of Results

The main finding of this study is that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 3.3 percentage points among Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens. This effect is economically meaningful: it represents a 7.4% increase relative to the pre-treatment mean of 44.7% for the eligible group.

The effect likely operates through multiple channels. Most directly, DACA provided employment authorization documents that allowed recipients to work legally in the formal sector. This would have enabled access to jobs that require documentation, which often offer more hours and better working conditions than informal employment. Additionally, DACA recipients gained access to Social Security numbers and driver's licenses (in many states), reducing practical barriers to employment.

The event study results reveal that the treatment effect emerged gradually, becoming statistically significant by 2014 and continuing to grow through 2015 and 2016. This pattern is consistent with the timeline of DACA implementation: applications began in August 2012, processing took several months, and the benefits of work authorization may have accumulated over time as recipients found formal employment and built work histories.

### 7.2 Comparison to Literature

While this analysis was conducted independently, the findings are broadly consistent with other research on DACA's labor market effects. Studies using various identification strategies have generally found positive effects of DACA on employment outcomes, though the magnitudes vary depending on the sample and methodology.

### 7.3 Limitations

Several limitations should be noted:

1. **Observable Eligibility:** The DACA eligibility measure is based on observable demographic characteristics and may not perfectly capture true eligibility, which also depends on education requirements and criminal history that are not observed in the ACS.
2. **Undocumented Status:** The data do not distinguish between documented and undocumented non-citizens. I follow the research instructions in assuming that non-naturalized citizens are potentially undocumented, but this introduces measurement error.
3. **Selection into the Sample:** The analysis conditions on being a non-citizen, but DACA may have affected naturalization decisions. However, this is unlikely to be a major concern given the short time period and the fact that DACA did not provide a pathway to citizenship.
4. **Generalizability:** The findings apply specifically to Mexican-born Hispanic immigrants and may not generalize to other DACA-eligible populations.

## 8 Conclusion

This study provides evidence that DACA eligibility had a positive and statistically significant effect on full-time employment among Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens in the United States. Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits the timing of DACA's implementation and the program's specific eligibility criteria, I find that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by 3.29 percentage points, a 7.4% increase relative to the pre-treatment mean.

The results are robust to alternative specifications, subgroup analyses, and outcome measures. Event study estimates support the parallel trends assumption and show that the treatment effect emerged gradually in the years following DACA's implementation, consistent with the program's rollout timeline.

These findings have implications for ongoing debates about immigration policy. The positive employment effects suggest that providing work authorization to undocumented immigrants who arrived as children can improve their economic outcomes and labor market integration. As policymakers consider the future of DACA and broader immigration reform, evidence on the program's effects provides valuable input for policy design.

## A Additional Tables and Figures

### A.1 Full Regression Output

Table 9 presents the complete regression output for the preferred specification (Model 5).

Table 9: Full Regression Output: Preferred Specification

Variable	Coefficient (SE)
Eligible × Post	0.0329*** (0.0043)
DACA Eligible	-0.0116** (0.0048)
Age	[Included]
Age <sup>2</sup>	[Included]
Female	[Included]
Married	[Included]
High School	[Included]
Some College	[Included]
College+	[Included]
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	561,470
R-squared	0.230

Notes: Dependent variable is full-time employment indicator. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05. Control variable coefficients suppressed for space.

## A.2 Yearly Sample Sizes

Table 10: Sample Size by Year and Eligibility Status

Year	Eligible	Non-Eligible	Total
2006	6,702	44,618	51,320
2007	7,281	44,779	52,060
2008	7,393	43,410	50,803
2009	7,709	42,739	50,448
2010	7,829	42,893	50,722
2011	6,937	46,983	53,920
2013	9,159	55,095	64,254
2014	9,295	55,105	64,400
2015	9,076	53,103	62,179
2016	8,919	52,445	61,364
<b>Total</b>	<b>80,300</b>	<b>481,170</b>	<b>561,470</b>

## B Data and Code Availability

All analyses were conducted using Python with the following packages: pandas, numpy, statsmodels, and matplotlib. The analysis code is available in `analysis_79.py`. Data are from the American Community Survey via IPUMS USA.