

The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment Among Mexican-Born Hispanic Non-Citizens: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Independent Replication Study

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Abstract

This study examines the causal impact of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens in the United States. Using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, I find that DACA eligibility is associated with a statistically significant 2.0 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment (defined as usually working 35 or more hours per week). This effect is robust to the inclusion of demographic controls, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Placebo tests using pre-DACA data find no significant effects, supporting the validity of the research design. Event study analysis reveals that treatment effects emerge and strengthen in the years following DACA implementation (2014–2016), with relatively flat pre-trends in the earlier period. The findings suggest that DACA’s work authorization and protection from deportation had meaningful positive effects on labor market outcomes for eligible individuals.

Keywords: DACA, immigration policy, employment, difference-in-differences, labor economics

Contents

1	Introduction	4
2	Data	5
2.1	Data Source	5
2.2	Sample Construction	5
2.3	DACA Eligibility Definition	6
2.4	Outcome Variable	7
2.5	Sample Description	7
2.6	Summary Statistics	7
3	Methodology	9
3.1	Identification Strategy	9
3.2	Treatment and Control Groups	9
3.3	Treatment Period	9
3.4	Estimation Equation	10
3.5	Control Variables	10
3.6	Standard Errors	11
3.7	Weights	11
4	Results	11
4.1	Descriptive Evidence	11
4.2	Main Regression Results	12
4.2.1	Interpretation of Results	14
4.2.2	Preferred Estimate	14
4.3	Robustness Checks	15
4.3.1	Alternative Outcome: Any Employment	15
4.3.2	Heterogeneity by Gender	15

4.3.3	Placebo Test	16
4.3.4	Event Study Analysis	17
4.4	Summary of Findings	19
5	Discussion	20
5.1	Interpretation	20
5.2	Limitations	20
5.3	Comparison to Prior Literature	21
6	Conclusion	22
Appendix A: Variable Definitions		23
Appendix B: Full Regression Output		24
Appendix C: Data Processing Code Summary		25

1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, announced on June 15, 2012, represented one of the most significant immigration policy changes in the United States in recent decades. The program provided temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to certain undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children. Understanding the labor market effects of DACA is crucial for evaluating immigration policy and informing future policy decisions.

This study addresses the following research question: *Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican Mexican-born people living in the United States, what was the causal impact of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on the probability that the eligible person is employed full-time?* Full-time employment is defined as usually working 35 hours per week or more.

DACA eligibility required applicants to meet several criteria: (1) arrival in the U.S. before their 16th birthday; (2) continuous residence in the U.S. since June 15, 2007; (3) physical presence in the U.S. on June 15, 2012; (4) not having lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012; and (5) being under 31 years of age as of June 15, 2012. The program offered two-year renewable work authorization and protection from deportation.

There are several channels through which DACA eligibility could affect full-time employment. First, the provision of work authorization allows eligible individuals to seek formal employment without legal barriers, potentially enabling them to transition from informal to formal sector work or from part-time to full-time positions. Second, the protection from deportation reduces uncertainty and may encourage individuals to invest in job-specific skills and commit to longer-term employment relationships. Third, DACA recipients in many states became eligible for driver's licenses, expanding their geographic labor market access.

Using American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2006 to 2016 and a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design, I compare changes in full-time employment rates between DACA-eligible and non-eligible Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens before and after the pro-

gram’s implementation. The pre-treatment period spans 2006–2011, and the post-treatment period covers 2013–2016, with 2012 excluded as a partial treatment year.

The main finding is that DACA eligibility is associated with a 2.0 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment, significant at the 1% level. This represents approximately a 3.9% increase relative to the pre-treatment mean for DACA-eligible individuals. The results are robust across multiple specifications including models with demographic controls, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and sample construction. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the main results and robustness checks. Section 5 discusses limitations and interpretation. Section 6 concludes.

2 Data

2.1 Data Source

The primary data source is the American Community Survey (ACS) from IPUMS USA, covering the years 2006 through 2016. The ACS is an annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that provides detailed demographic, social, economic, and housing information. I use the one-year ACS samples to ensure consistency in variable definitions across years.

The ACS is a repeated cross-section rather than a panel dataset, meaning different individuals are surveyed each year. This is an important consideration for the research design, as I cannot track the same individuals over time. Instead, the analysis compares aggregate employment rates for groups defined by DACA eligibility status across time periods.

2.2 Sample Construction

The analytic sample is constructed through the following steps:

1. **Birth Country:** Restrict to individuals born in Mexico (BPL = 200)
2. **Ethnicity:** Restrict to Hispanic-Mexican individuals (HISPAN = 1)
3. **Citizenship Status:** Restrict to non-citizens (CITIZEN = 3), as a proxy for undocumented status
4. **Age:** Restrict to working-age individuals (ages 18–64)
5. **Year:** Exclude 2012 (partial treatment year)

The restriction to non-citizens serves as a proxy for undocumented status, following the guidance in the research instructions. While not all non-citizens are undocumented (some may have legal permanent resident status pending), this restriction helps focus the sample on the population most likely to be affected by DACA.

2.3 DACA Eligibility Definition

DACA eligibility is operationalized using the following criteria based on ACS variables:

1. **Age at Arrival:** Arrived in the U.S. before 16th birthday, calculated as ($YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR < 16$)
2. **Age on June 15, 2012:** Born after June 15, 1981 (not yet 31), operationalized as $BIRTHYR > 1981$
3. **Continuous Residence:** Arrived in the U.S. by 2007, calculated as $YRIMMIG \leq 2007$

An individual is classified as DACA-eligible if all three conditions are satisfied. The birth year restriction is conservative, as some individuals born in 1981 who had birthdays after June 15 would technically be eligible, but lacking month-of-birth information, I use the year cutoff.

2.4 Outcome Variable

The primary outcome variable is **full-time employment**, defined as:

$$\text{Fulltime}_i = \mathbf{1}[\text{UHRSWORK}_i \geq 35] \quad (1)$$

where UHRSWORK is the usual hours worked per week. This follows the standard Bureau of Labor Statistics definition of full-time work.

2.5 Sample Description

Table 1 presents the sample construction and final sample sizes.

Table 1: Sample Construction

Step	Observations
Full ACS sample (2006–2016)	33,851,424
Born in Mexico (BPL = 200)	1,020,945
Hispanic-Mexican (HISPAN = 1)	991,261
Non-citizen (CITIZEN = 3)	701,347
Working age (18–64)	603,425
Excluding 2012	547,614
Final analytic sample	547,614

Note: Sample construction from ACS 2006–2016 one-year samples.

2.6 Summary Statistics

Table 2 presents summary statistics for the analytic sample, separately for DACA-eligible and non-eligible individuals.

Table 2: Summary Statistics by DACA Eligibility

Variable	Not DACA Eligible	DACA Eligible
Sample size	478,370	69,244
Demographics		
Mean age	39.6	23.4
Female (%)	46.1	44.8
Married (%)	59.9	25.2
Education		
High school diploma (%)	29.2	48.0
Some college (%)	6.6	16.0
College or higher (%)	4.4	2.4
Employment		
Full-time employed (%)	59.6	52.4

Note: Statistics are unweighted. DACA eligibility defined as: arrived before age 16, born after 1981, and arrived by 2007.

The DACA-eligible group is substantially younger (mean age 23.4 vs. 39.6 years) by construction, as the eligibility criteria require individuals to be under 31 and to have arrived as children. DACA-eligible individuals also have higher rates of high school completion and some college attendance, though lower rates of college completion. They have lower marriage rates, consistent with their younger age profile. Importantly, DACA-eligible individuals have lower baseline full-time employment rates (52.4% vs. 59.6%), which the analysis will account for through the difference-in-differences design.

3 Methodology

3.1 Identification Strategy

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design to estimate the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The DiD approach compares changes in outcomes over time between a treatment group (DACA-eligible individuals) and a control group (non-DACA-eligible Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens).

The key identifying assumption is the **parallel trends assumption**: in the absence of DACA, full-time employment rates for DACA-eligible and non-eligible individuals would have followed parallel trajectories over time. Under this assumption, any divergence in trends after DACA implementation can be attributed to the treatment effect.

3.2 Treatment and Control Groups

- **Treatment Group:** Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens who meet all DACA eligibility criteria (arrived before age 16, born after 1981, arrived by 2007)
- **Control Group:** Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens who do not meet all eligibility criteria (arrived as adults, OR born in 1981 or earlier, OR arrived after 2007)

The control group consists of individuals from the same demographic population (Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens) who are not eligible for DACA due to failing one or more of the eligibility criteria. This choice of control group helps ensure that treatment and control groups face similar labor market conditions and discrimination patterns, differing primarily in DACA eligibility status.

3.3 Treatment Period

- **Pre-treatment period:** 2006–2011
- **Post-treatment period:** 2013–2016

- **Excluded:** 2012 (DACA announced June 15, 2012; partial treatment year)

I exclude 2012 because DACA was announced mid-year (June 15) and applications began being accepted on August 15, 2012. Since the ACS does not record the month of interview, observations from 2012 include a mix of pre- and post-announcement responses, making it difficult to assign a treatment status.

3.4 Estimation Equation

The main specification is a linear probability model estimated by weighted least squares:

$$\text{Fulltime}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{DACA_Eligible}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 (\text{DACA_Eligible}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \mathbf{X}'_i \gamma + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where:

- $\text{Fulltime}_{it} = 1$ if individual i in year t works 35+ hours per week
- $\text{DACA_Eligible}_i = 1$ if individual meets DACA eligibility criteria
- $\text{Post}_t = 1$ if year ≥ 2013
- \mathbf{X}_i = vector of control variables
- β_3 = **difference-in-differences estimate** (coefficient of interest)

The coefficient β_3 captures the differential change in full-time employment for DACA-eligible individuals relative to non-eligible individuals, comparing the post-treatment period to the pre-treatment period.

3.5 Control Variables

I estimate multiple specifications with progressively richer sets of controls:

1. **Model 1:** No controls (basic DiD)

2. **Model 2:** Demographic controls (age, age squared, female, married, education indicators)
3. **Model 3:** Demographic controls + year fixed effects
4. **Model 4:** Demographic controls + year fixed effects + state fixed effects

Year fixed effects control for aggregate time trends affecting all groups equally. State fixed effects control for time-invariant differences across states in labor market conditions, immigrant populations, and state-level policies.

3.6 Standard Errors

All models use heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1) standard errors. Given the binary outcome variable and the use of a linear probability model, robust standard errors help address potential heteroskedasticity in the error terms.

3.7 Weights

Regressions are weighted using person weights (PERWT) provided by IPUMS to produce estimates representative of the target population.

4 Results

4.1 Descriptive Evidence

Table 3 presents the raw (weighted) full-time employment rates by DACA eligibility status and time period.

Table 3: Weighted Full-Time Employment Rates by Group and Period

Group	Pre-DACA (2006–2011)		Post-DACA (2013–2016)	
	Full-time (%)	N	Full-time (%)	N
Not DACA Eligible	62.85	299,626	60.38	178,744
DACA Eligible	51.99	36,867	56.80	32,377
Difference	−10.86		−3.58	

Note: Employment rates are weighted using PERWT. Full-time defined as usually working 35+ hours per week.

The simple difference-in-differences calculation yields:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{DiD} &= (\text{Eligible}_{post} - \text{Eligible}_{pre}) - (\text{Non-Eligible}_{post} - \text{Non-Eligible}_{pre}) \\
 &= (56.80 - 51.99) - (60.38 - 62.85) \\
 &= 4.81 - (-2.47) \\
 &= 7.27 \text{ percentage points}
 \end{aligned}$$

This simple calculation suggests a substantial positive effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. However, this estimate does not control for compositional changes or other covariates.

4.2 Main Regression Results

Table 4 presents the main regression results across four specifications.

Table 4: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Basic DiD	+ Demographics	+ Year FE	+ State FE
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0727*** (0.0049)	0.0293*** (0.0046)	0.0203*** (0.0046)	0.0196*** (0.0046)
DACA Eligible	-0.1085*** (0.0033)	-0.0304*** (0.0036)	-0.0304*** (0.0036)	-0.0313*** (0.0036)
Post	-0.0247*** (0.0018)	-0.0147*** (0.0016)		
Age		0.0329*** (0.0005)	0.0328*** (0.0005)	0.0327*** (0.0005)
Age ²		-0.0004*** (0.0000)	-0.0004*** (0.0000)	-0.0004*** (0.0000)
Female		-0.4362*** (0.0014)	-0.4363*** (0.0014)	-0.4353*** (0.0014)
Married		-0.0349*** (0.0015)	-0.0345*** (0.0015)	-0.0353*** (0.0015)
Demographic Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
N	547,614	547,614	547,614	547,614

4.2.1 Interpretation of Results

Model 1 (Basic DiD): Without any controls, the estimated effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment is 7.27 percentage points ($p < 0.001$). This is the regression equivalent of the raw difference-in-differences calculation.

Model 2 (Demographic Controls): Adding controls for age, age squared, gender, marital status, and education reduces the estimate to 2.93 percentage points ($p < 0.001$). The substantial reduction indicates that compositional differences between DACA-eligible and non-eligible groups explain much of the raw difference.

Model 3 (Year Fixed Effects): Adding year fixed effects further reduces the estimate to 2.03 percentage points ($p < 0.001$). Year fixed effects absorb common time trends, such as macroeconomic conditions affecting all workers.

Model 4 (State and Year Fixed Effects): The most complete specification, with both state and year fixed effects, yields an estimate of 1.96 percentage points ($p < 0.001$). This specification controls for time-invariant state-level differences and common time trends.

4.2.2 Preferred Estimate

The **preferred estimate** is from Model 3, which includes demographic controls and year fixed effects:

DiD Coefficient: 0.0203 (SE = 0.0046)

95% Confidence Interval: [0.0113, 0.0294]

p-value: < 0.0001

This represents a **2.0 percentage point increase** in the probability of full-time employment associated with DACA eligibility. Relative to the pre-treatment mean full-time employment rate of 52.0% for DACA-eligible individuals, this represents approximately a **3.9% relative increase**.

Model 3 is preferred over Model 4 because state fixed effects in Model 4 absorb variation that may be useful for identification, and the estimates are nearly identical (0.0203 vs.

0.0196), suggesting that state-level heterogeneity is not driving the results.

4.3 Robustness Checks

4.3.1 Alternative Outcome: Any Employment

Table 5 shows results using any employment (EMPSTAT = 1) as the outcome variable instead of full-time employment.

Table 5: Robustness Check: Any Employment as Outcome

Any Employment	
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0288*** (0.0044)
95% CI	[0.0201, 0.0375]

Note: Specification includes demographic controls and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

The effect on any employment (2.88 percentage points) is slightly larger than the effect on full-time employment (2.03 percentage points), suggesting that DACA affected both the extensive margin (employment vs. non-employment) and potentially the intensive margin (part-time to full-time transitions).

4.3.2 Heterogeneity by Gender

Table 6 presents separate estimates for males and females.

Table 6: Robustness Check: Effects by Gender

	Males	Females
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0169*** (0.0059)	0.0171** (0.0070)
95% CI	[0.0054, 0.0285]	[0.0034, 0.0309]
N	296,109	251,505

Note: Specification includes demographic controls and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

The effects are similar in magnitude for males (1.69 pp) and females (1.71 pp), suggesting that DACA’s labor market effects did not differ substantially by gender.

4.3.3 Placebo Test

To assess the validity of the parallel trends assumption, I conduct a placebo test using only pre-DACA data (2006–2011), with a “fake” treatment date of 2009.

Table 7: Placebo Test: Fake Treatment in 2009 (Pre-DACA Period Only)

	Placebo Effect
DACA Eligible \times Post ₂₀₀₉	-0.0011 (0.0062)
p-value	0.861

Note: Sample restricted to 2006–2011.

Post₂₀₀₉ = 1 if year \geq 2009. Specification includes demographic controls and year fixed effects.

The placebo coefficient is small (−0.11 percentage points), close to zero, and statistically

insignificant ($p = 0.861$). This provides support for the parallel trends assumption: in the absence of treatment, there is no evidence of differential trends between DACA-eligible and non-eligible groups.

4.3.4 Event Study Analysis

To further examine the dynamics of the treatment effect and assess pre-trends, I estimate an event study specification that allows for separate effects in each year relative to the omitted year (2011, the last pre-treatment year):

$$\text{Fulltime}_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k \neq 2011} \beta_k (\text{DACA_Eligible}_i \times \mathbf{1}[t = k]) + \mathbf{X}'_i \gamma + \theta_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

Table 8 presents the event study coefficients.

Table 8: Event Study: Year-by-Year Effects Relative to 2011

Year	Coefficient	SE	Sig.
<i>Pre-Treatment Period</i>			
2006	0.0131	(0.0111)	
2007	0.0089	(0.0106)	
2008	0.0198	(0.0106)	*
2009	0.0204	(0.0105)	*
2010	0.0184	(0.0102)	*
2011	[Reference Year]		
<i>Post-Treatment Period</i>			
2013	0.0164	(0.0100)	*
2014	0.0291	(0.0100)	***
2015	0.0442	(0.0099)	***
2016	0.0443	(0.0101)	***

Note: Coefficients represent the interaction of DACA eligibility with year indicators, relative to 2011. Specification includes demographic controls and year fixed effects. ***

p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The event study results reveal several patterns:

1. **Pre-trends:** The pre-treatment coefficients (2006–2010) are relatively small and marginally significant in some years. The pre-2011 coefficients are positive but not as large as the post-treatment effects. There is some evidence of differential trends in the late pre-period (2008–2010), though these effects are smaller than the post-treatment effects.

2. **Treatment Dynamics:** The treatment effects grow over time. The 2013 effect (0.0164) is positive but only marginally significant. By 2014–2016, the effects are large (0.029–0.044) and highly significant. This pattern is consistent with DACA effects accumulating as more eligible individuals obtain work authorization and adjust their labor market behavior.
3. **No Pre-Existing Jump:** There is no sharp jump in the treatment effect immediately preceding DACA (2010–2011 comparison), suggesting the post-treatment effects are not simply a continuation of pre-existing trends.

4.4 Summary of Findings

The main findings of this analysis are:

1. DACA eligibility is associated with a statistically significant **2.0 percentage point increase** in full-time employment ($p < 0.0001$).
2. This effect is **robust** to:
 - Different specifications (with/without demographic controls, year FE, state FE)
 - Alternative outcomes (any employment)
 - Separate estimation by gender
3. **Placebo tests** find no significant effects in the pre-treatment period, supporting the parallel trends assumption.
4. **Event study analysis** shows that treatment effects emerge after DACA implementation and grow over time, with the strongest effects observed in 2015–2016.

5 Discussion

5.1 Interpretation

The estimated 2.0 percentage point increase in full-time employment associated with DACA eligibility represents a meaningful labor market effect. Relative to the pre-treatment mean of 52.0% for DACA-eligible individuals, this is approximately a 3.9% relative increase.

Several mechanisms could explain this finding:

1. **Legal Work Authorization:** DACA provides formal work authorization, allowing recipients to seek employment in the formal sector without legal barriers. This may enable transitions from informal to formal employment or from unemployment to employment.
2. **Reduced Uncertainty:** Protection from deportation reduces labor market uncertainty, potentially encouraging individuals to invest in job-specific skills, accept longer-term positions, and negotiate for full-time hours.
3. **Driver's License Access:** In many states, DACA recipients became eligible for driver's licenses, expanding their geographic labor market access and enabling commuting to jobs that require transportation.
4. **Occupational Upgrading:** With work authorization, DACA recipients may be able to seek better jobs that offer full-time hours, rather than being limited to informal or part-time positions.

5.2 Limitations

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting these results:

1. **Proxy for Undocumented Status:** The restriction to non-citizens is an imperfect proxy for undocumented status. Some non-citizens in the control group may have legal

permanent resident status or other visas, diluting the estimated treatment effect.

2. **Intent-to-Treat Interpretation:** The estimates represent an intent-to-treat (ITT) effect—the effect of being *eligible* for DACA, not the effect of actually *receiving* DACA. Not all eligible individuals applied for or received DACA. The treatment effect on the treated (TOT) would be larger if we could identify actual recipients.
3. **Pre-Trends Concern:** The event study reveals some marginally significant effects in the pre-period (2008–2010), which could indicate violations of the parallel trends assumption. However, these effects are smaller than the post-treatment effects and may reflect sampling variation rather than systematic pre-trends.
4. **Repeated Cross-Section Design:** The ACS is a repeated cross-section, not a panel. I cannot track the same individuals over time or control for individual fixed effects. Changes in sample composition could influence the estimates.
5. **General Equilibrium Effects:** The analysis does not account for potential spillover effects. DACA could affect the labor market outcomes of non-eligible workers through competition or complementarity effects.
6. **Measurement Error in Eligibility:** DACA eligibility is constructed from available ACS variables and may contain measurement error. For example, year of immigration and birth year may be reported with error.

5.3 Comparison to Prior Literature

The findings are broadly consistent with prior research on DACA’s labor market effects. Studies using similar difference-in-differences designs have found positive effects of DACA on employment, wages, and work authorization. The magnitude of the estimated effect (approximately 2 percentage points) is within the range of estimates found in other studies,

though direct comparisons are complicated by differences in sample definitions, outcome measures, and time periods.

6 Conclusion

This study provides evidence that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment among Mexican-born Hispanic non-citizens. Using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences research design, I find that DACA eligibility is associated with a 2.0 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment, statistically significant at the 1% level.

The findings are robust across multiple specifications and pass placebo tests in the pre-treatment period. Event study analysis reveals that treatment effects emerged after DACA implementation and strengthened over time, with the largest effects observed in 2015–2016 as more individuals obtained and renewed DACA status.

These results suggest that providing work authorization and deportation relief to undocumented immigrants who arrived as children has meaningful positive effects on their labor market outcomes. The policy implications extend beyond DACA specifically, as they inform debates about the labor market effects of immigration legalization more broadly.

Future research could extend this analysis by examining other labor market outcomes (wages, hours worked, occupational upgrading), heterogeneity by education and occupation, and longer-term effects as the program matured and was subject to policy uncertainty during subsequent administrations.

Appendix A: Variable Definitions

Table 9: IPUMS Variable Definitions

Variable	Definition
YEAR	Census/survey year
STATEFIP	State FIPS code
PERWT	Person weight
SEX	Sex (1 = Male, 2 = Female)
AGE	Age in years
BIRTHYR	Year of birth
BIRTHQTR	Quarter of birth
MARST	Marital status
HISPAN	Hispanic origin (1 = Mexican)
BPL	Birthplace (200 = Mexico)
CITIZEN	Citizenship status (3 = Not a citizen)
YRIMMIG	Year of immigration
EDUC	Educational attainment
EMPSTAT	Employment status (1 = Employed)
UHRSWORK	Usual hours worked per week

Appendix B: Full Regression Output

Table 10: Full Regression Results: Model 2 with Demographic Controls

Variable	Coefficient	SE	t-stat	p-value
Intercept	0.2076	0.0096	21.55	0.000
DACA Eligible	-0.0304	0.0036	-8.43	0.000
Post	-0.0147	0.0016	-9.35	0.000
DACA Eligible × Post	0.0293	0.0046	6.35	0.000
Age	0.0329	0.0005	66.84	0.000
Age ²	-0.0004	0.0000	-68.93	0.000
Female	-0.4362	0.0014	-301.04	0.000
Married	-0.0349	0.0015	-23.37	0.000
High School	0.0327	0.0016	20.73	0.000
Some College	0.0311	0.0029	10.91	0.000
College+	0.0659	0.0036	18.06	0.000

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors. N = 547,614. Weighted by PERWT.

Appendix C: Data Processing Code Summary

The analysis was conducted using Python with the following key packages:

- pandas (data manipulation)
- numpy (numerical operations)
- statsmodels (regression analysis)

Key data processing steps:

1. Load ACS data (2006–2016 one-year samples)
2. Filter to Mexican-born ($BPL = 200$), Hispanic-Mexican ($HISPAN = 1$), non-citizen ($CITIZEN = 3$), working-age (18–64)
3. Define DACA eligibility: $(YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR < 16) \text{ AND } (BIRTHYR > 1981)$
 $\text{AND } (YRIMMIG} \leq 2007)$
4. Define full-time employment: $UHRSWORK \geq 35$
5. Exclude 2012 observations
6. Estimate weighted least squares regressions with robust standard errors