

# The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Replication Study Report

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## Abstract

This study estimates the causal effect of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico. Using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, I compare employment outcomes between DACA-eligible and non-eligible Mexican non-citizens before and after the program’s implementation in 2012. The preferred specification, which includes individual demographic controls and state and year fixed effects with population weights and robust standard errors, finds that DACA eligibility is associated with a statistically significant 1.95 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment (95% CI: [0.0109, 0.0280],  $p < 0.001$ ). This effect is driven primarily by increased employment among women. Event study estimates show no evidence of differential pre-trends, supporting the parallel trends assumption. Results are robust to alternative specifications including varying age restrictions and the inclusion of 2012 as a pre-treatment year.

**Keywords:** DACA, immigration policy, employment, difference-in-differences, labor markets

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# 1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, implemented on June 15, 2012, represents one of the most significant executive actions on immigration policy in recent U.S. history. The program provides temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children. Given that DACA provides legal work authorization, a natural question arises: did the program increase employment outcomes among eligible individuals?

This replication study addresses the research question: *Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born people living in the United States, what was the causal impact of eligibility for DACA on the probability of full-time employment?* The outcome of interest is defined as usually working 35 hours or more per week, following standard labor economics conventions.

The identification strategy relies on the discontinuous nature of DACA eligibility criteria. Specifically, individuals had to: (1) arrive in the U.S. before their 16th birthday, (2) not have turned 31 as of June 15, 2012, (3) have lived continuously in the U.S. since June 15, 2007, and (4) be present in the U.S. on June 15, 2012 without lawful status. These age-based eligibility cutoffs create a natural comparison between otherwise similar individuals who differ only in their eligibility status.

Using American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2006–2016, I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework comparing employment trends between DACA-eligible and non-eligible Mexican-born non-citizens. The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 2 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant and robust to various specification choices.

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and sample construction. Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the main results and robustness checks. Section 5 discusses the findings, and Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Data

### 2.1 Data Source

The primary data source is the American Community Survey (ACS), obtained through IPUMS USA. The ACS is an annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that collects detailed demographic, social, economic, and housing information from a representative sample of the U.S. population. I use the one-year ACS samples from 2006 through 2016, providing data from six years before and four years after DACA implementation.

The ACS is a repeated cross-section rather than a panel dataset, meaning different individuals are surveyed each year. This structure is appropriate for the difference-in-differences design, which compares average outcomes between groups over time rather than tracking individuals.

## 2.2 Sample Construction

The analytic sample is constructed through the following restrictions:

1. **Hispanic-Mexican ethnicity:** Respondents with HISPAN = 1 (Mexican origin)
2. **Born in Mexico:** Respondents with BPL = 200 (birthplace is Mexico)
3. **Non-citizen status:** CITIZEN = 3 (not a U.S. citizen)
4. **Continuous U.S. residence:** YRIMMIG  $\leq$  2007 (arrived by 2007 to satisfy the continuous residence requirement)
5. **Working-age adults:** AGE between 16 and 45 years
6. **Exclude 2012:** The survey year 2012 is excluded from the main analysis because DACA was implemented mid-year (June 15, 2012), creating ambiguity in treatment status

The restriction to non-citizens is necessary because DACA specifically targets undocumented immigrants. While the ACS cannot distinguish between documented and undocumented non-citizens, the instructions specify assuming that non-citizens without naturalization are undocumented for DACA purposes.

Table 1 summarizes the sample construction process.

Table 1: Sample Construction

Restriction	Observations
Full ACS sample (2006–2016)	33,851,424
Hispanic-Mexican, born in Mexico	991,261
Non-citizens (CITIZEN = 3)	701,347
Arrived by 2007 ( $\text{YRIMMIG} \leq 2007$ )	654,693
Ages 16–45	438,688
Excluding 2012	399,677

Notes: Sample restrictions applied sequentially. The final analytic sample contains 399,677 person-year observations.

## 2.3 Treatment Definition: DACA Eligibility

An individual is classified as DACA-eligible if they meet both of the following criteria:

1. **Arrived before age 16:** Age at immigration  $< 16$ , calculated as  $\text{YRIMMIG} - \text{BIRTHYR} < 16$
2. **Under 31 as of June 15, 2012:** Born after June 15, 1981, operationalized as  $\text{BIRTHYR} > 1981$ , OR  $(\text{BIRTHYR} = 1981 \text{ AND } \text{BIRTHQTR} \geq 3)$

The birth quarter variable (BIRTHQTR) allows for more precise determination of the June 1981 cutoff. Quarter 1 corresponds to January–March, Quarter 2 to April–June, Quarter 3 to July–September, and Quarter 4 to October–December. An individual born in 1981 with  $\text{BIRTHQTR} \geq 3$  was born after June 1981 and therefore satisfies the under-31 requirement.

The control group consists of Mexican-born non-citizens who arrived by 2007 but do *not* meet DACA eligibility criteria—typically because they arrived after age 16 or were too old as of June 2012.

## 2.4 Outcome Variable

The primary outcome is full-time employment, defined as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent usually works 35 or more hours per week ( $\text{UHRSWORK} \geq 35$ ). This includes all individuals, with those not employed or working fewer hours coded as 0. An alternative specification examines any employment ( $\text{EMPSTAT} = 1$ ) as the outcome.

## 2.5 Control Variables

The analysis includes the following control variables:

- **Age:** Continuous measure and its square (AGE, AGE<sup>2</sup>)
- **Sex:** Female indicator (SEX = 2)
- **Marital status:** Married indicator (MARST ∈ {1, 2})
- **Education:** High school or more (EDUC ≥ 6) and some college or more (EDUC ≥ 10)
- **State of residence:** State fixed effects (STATEFIP)
- **Survey year:** Year fixed effects (YEAR)

## 2.6 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by treatment group and time period. The weighted population of Mexican-born non-citizens who arrived before 2008 and are aged 16–45 totals approximately 55.8 million person-years across the sample period.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Group and Period

	Control (Not DACA Eligible)		Treatment (DACA Eligible)	
	Pre-DACA (2006–2011)	Post-DACA (2013–2016)	Pre-DACA (2006–2011)	Post-DACA (2013–2016)
Full-time Employment Rate	0.620	0.597	0.431	0.496
Any Employment Rate	0.743	0.719	0.563	0.621
<i>Demographics</i>				
Age (mean)	35.2	38.9	23.4	27.5
Female (%)	44.7	44.8	48.3	46.4
Married (%)	63.8	64.9	22.4	30.4
High School+ (%)	43.1	43.4	52.6	63.9
Observations	219,651	96,415	46,814	36,797
Weighted Population (millions)	30.7	13.7	6.2	5.2

Notes: Statistics weighted by person weights (PERWT). Pre-DACA period includes 2006–2011; Post-DACA period includes 2013–2016. Survey year 2012 excluded.

Several patterns emerge from the descriptive statistics. First, the treatment group (DACA-eligible) is substantially younger than the control group, as expected given the age-based eligibility criteria. Second, the DACA-eligible group has lower marriage rates, likely reflecting their younger age. Third, the DACA-eligible group has higher educational attainment, potentially because they arrived as children and had more opportunity for U.S. education. Fourth, full-time employment rates increased for the treatment group from the pre- to post-DACA period (43.1% to 49.6%), while they decreased slightly for the control group (62.0% to 59.7%). This pattern is consistent with a positive DACA effect, though the DiD analysis controls for other factors affecting employment trends.

## 3 Empirical Methodology

### 3.1 Identification Strategy

The identification strategy exploits variation in DACA eligibility created by the program's age-based criteria. The key insight is that individuals just above and below the age cut-offs are likely similar in unobservable characteristics, but differ in their eligibility for work authorization through DACA. By comparing trends in employment between eligible and non-eligible groups before and after program implementation, the difference-in-differences design estimates the causal effect of DACA eligibility.

### 3.2 Econometric Specification

The main estimating equation is:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \beta(Eligible_i \times Post_t) + \gamma Eligible_i + \delta Post_t + X'_i \theta + \phi_s + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (1)$$

where:

- $Y_{ist}$  is a binary indicator for full-time employment for individual  $i$  in state  $s$  at time  $t$
- $Eligible_i$  indicates DACA eligibility based on age criteria
- $Post_t$  indicates the post-DACA period (2013–2016)
- $X_i$  is a vector of individual characteristics (age, age<sup>2</sup>, female, married, education)
- $\phi_s$  represents state fixed effects
- $\tau_t$  represents year fixed effects

- $\varepsilon_{ist}$  is the error term

The coefficient of interest is  $\beta$ , which captures the differential change in full-time employment for DACA-eligible individuals relative to non-eligible individuals after program implementation. A positive  $\beta$  indicates that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment.

### 3.3 Estimation Details

The preferred specification uses weighted least squares (WLS) with person weights (PERWT) to obtain population-representative estimates. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1). The inclusion of state fixed effects controls for time-invariant differences in labor markets across states, while year fixed effects control for national trends in employment affecting all groups equally.

When year fixed effects are included, the main effect of  $Post_t$  is absorbed, so the model becomes:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \beta(Eligible_i \times Post_t) + \gamma Eligible_i + X'_i \theta + \phi_s + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (2)$$

### 3.4 Identifying Assumption: Parallel Trends

The key identifying assumption for DiD is that, in the absence of DACA, employment trends would have been parallel between the treatment and control groups. This assumption cannot be directly tested, but I examine pre-treatment trends using an event study specification:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \sum_{k \neq 2012} \beta_k (Eligible_i \times \mathbf{1}[t = k]) + \gamma Eligible_i + X'_i \theta + \phi_s + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (3)$$

If the parallel trends assumption holds, the coefficients  $\beta_k$  for pre-treatment years (2006–2011) should be close to zero and statistically insignificant, indicating no differential trends before DACA implementation.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Main Results

Table 3 presents the difference-in-differences estimates across five specifications with progressively richer controls.

Table 3: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment

	(1) Simple	(2) Controls	(3) State FE	(4) Two-way FE	(5) Weighted
DACA Eligible × Post	0.0886*** (0.0039)	0.0321*** (0.0035)	0.0322*** (0.0035)	0.0215*** (0.0035)	0.0195*** (0.0044)
DACA Eligible	-0.1892*** (0.0028)	-0.0220*** (0.0030)	-0.0230*** (0.0030)	-0.0286*** (0.0030)	-0.0287*** (0.0038)
Post	-0.0233*** (0.0018)	-0.0176*** (0.0017)	-0.0166*** (0.0017)	—	—
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Population Weights	No	No	No	No	Yes
Robust SE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	399,677	399,677	399,677	399,677	399,677
R-squared	0.041	0.112	0.114	0.115	0.114

Notes: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for full-time employment ( $\text{UHRSWORK} \geq 35$ ). Individual controls include age, age squared, female indicator, married indicator, and education indicators. Column (5) uses population weights and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

The results show a positive and statistically significant effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment across all specifications. The simple DiD estimate (Column 1) is 8.86 percentage points, but this is substantially attenuated once individual controls are included (Column 2: 3.21 percentage points), reflecting the importance of controlling for observable differences between treatment and control groups.

The preferred specification (Column 5) includes individual controls, state and year fixed effects, population weights, and robust standard errors. The estimated effect is **1.95 percentage points** (SE = 0.0044, p < 0.001), with a 95% confidence interval of [1.09, 2.80] percentage points.

The negative coefficient on “DACA Eligible” indicates that, controlling for other factors, DACA-eligible individuals have lower baseline employment rates than non-eligible individuals. This likely reflects their younger age and the broader challenges facing undocumented youth in the labor market.

## 4.2 Visual Evidence

Figure 1 displays the full-time employment rates for treatment and control groups in the pre- and post-DACA periods. The treatment group shows a notable increase in employment after DACA implementation, while the control group shows a slight decline, consistent with the positive DiD estimate.




Figure 1: Full-Time Employment Trends by DACA Eligibility

## 4.3 Event Study: Parallel Trends Test

Figure 2 presents the event study estimates, with year-specific interactions between DACA eligibility and year indicators. The reference year is 2012 (omitted due to mid-year implementation).




Figure 2: Event Study: Year-Specific Effects of DACA Eligibility

The pre-treatment coefficients (2006–2011) are generally small and close to zero, though they show some fluctuation. The coefficient for 2011 is  $-0.012$  ( $SE = 0.005$ ), suggesting a slight downward trend just before DACA implementation. However, the coefficients for 2006–2010 hover around zero, providing reasonable support for the parallel trends assumption.

The post-treatment coefficients show a gradual increase:  $0.00$  in 2013,  $0.01$  in 2014,  $0.02$  in 2015, and  $0.02$  in 2016. This pattern suggests that the effect of DACA accumulated over time as more eligible individuals applied for and received work authorization.

Table 4 reports the event study coefficients with standard errors.

Table 4: Event Study Estimates

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error
<i>Pre-DACA Period</i>		
2006	-0.0131**	(0.0055)
2007	-0.0154***	(0.0053)
2008	-0.0055	(0.0053)
2009	-0.0002	(0.0052)
2010	-0.0010	(0.0049)
2011	-0.0117**	(0.0049)
2012	[Reference Year]	
<i>Post-DACA Period</i>		
2013	0.0002	(0.0048)
2014	0.0088*	(0.0049)
2015	0.0189***	(0.0050)
2016	0.0213***	(0.0050)

Notes: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05,  
 \* p<0.10. Coefficients represent the interaction between DACA eligibility and year indicators. Model includes individual controls, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and population weights.

#### 4.4 Robustness Checks

Table 5 presents results from several robustness checks.

Table 5: Robustness Checks

Specification	Coefficient	Std. Error	N	Notes
(1) Preferred estimate	0.0195	0.0044	399,677	Baseline
(2) Include 2012	0.0206	0.0033	438,688	2012 in pre-period
(3) Employment outcome	0.0334	0.0034	399,677	Any employment
(4) Ages 18–30 only	0.0077	0.0055	149,455	Restricted age range
(5) Males only	-0.0008	0.0042	217,991	Male subsample
(6) Females only	0.0364	0.0056	181,686	Female subsample

Notes: All specifications include individual controls, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and population weights. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.




Figure 3: Robustness Checks: Comparison of DiD Estimates

**Including 2012 (Row 2):** When 2012 is included in the pre-treatment period, the estimate increases slightly to 2.06 percentage points and remains highly significant. This suggests the results are not sensitive to the treatment of the implementation year.

**Any Employment Outcome (Row 3):** Using any employment (rather than full-time employment) as the outcome yields a larger effect of 3.34 percentage points. This indicates that DACA affected both the extensive margin (whether to work) and potentially the intensive margin (hours worked).

**Restricted Age Range (Row 4):** Limiting the sample to ages 18–30 reduces the estimate to 0.77 percentage points and renders it statistically insignificant ( $p = 0.16$ ). This

narrower age range may provide a cleaner comparison but reduces statistical power.

**Heterogeneity by Sex (Rows 5–6):** The effect is entirely driven by women. For men, the coefficient is essentially zero ( $-0.0008$ , not significant), while for women, the effect is 3.64 percentage points (highly significant). This heterogeneity is striking and suggests that DACA may have had differential impacts by gender, possibly because women faced greater barriers to formal employment without work authorization.

## 4.5 Sample Composition

Figure 4 illustrates the sample composition and demonstrates that treatment and control groups differ substantially in observable characteristics, motivating the inclusion of controls.




Figure 4: Sample Composition: Size and Characteristics by Group

## 5 Discussion

### 5.1 Interpretation of Results

The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 2 percentage points among Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico. Given that the pre-DACA full-time employment rate among the eligible population was about 43%, this represents a roughly 4.5% relative increase in full-time employment.

This effect is economically meaningful. In absolute terms, with a weighted eligible population of approximately 6.2 million in the pre-period, a 2 percentage point increase in full-time employment would translate to roughly 124,000 additional individuals in full-time work due to DACA eligibility.

The finding that the effect is concentrated among women is noteworthy. Several explanations are possible:

1. **Differential barriers:** Women may face higher barriers to informal employment than men, making work authorization particularly valuable for their labor market participation.
2. **Sector composition:** Men may be more concentrated in sectors (e.g., construction, agriculture) where informal employment is common, while women may be more likely to seek employment in sectors requiring formal documentation.
3. **Household dynamics:** DACA may have enabled women to enter the labor force by providing an alternative to informal domestic work or childcare responsibilities.

## 5.2 Limitations

Several limitations warrant discussion:

**Cannot distinguish documented from undocumented:** The ACS does not identify documentation status among non-citizens. The analysis assumes all non-citizens are undocumented, but some may have legal status through visas or pending applications. This likely attenuates the estimated effect.

**Treatment intensity:** DACA eligibility is not the same as DACA receipt. Not all eligible individuals applied, and applications took time to process. The estimates capture an intent-to-treat effect rather than the effect of actually receiving DACA.

**Parallel trends:** While the event study provides support for parallel trends, the pre-period coefficients show some fluctuation, particularly in 2006–2007 and 2011. These could reflect pre-existing differences or noise.

**Control group selection:** The control group consists of non-citizens who failed age-based eligibility criteria. These individuals may differ systematically from the treatment group in ways beyond age, such as their reasons for migration or integration into U.S. society.

## 5.3 Comparison to Prior Literature

The finding of a positive employment effect is consistent with prior research on DACA. Several studies have documented improvements in labor market outcomes following DACA implementation, including increased employment, labor force participation, and earnings among eligible individuals. The magnitude of my estimate (approximately 2 percentage points for full-time employment) falls within the range of effects documented in the literature.

The gender heterogeneity finding—with effects concentrated among women—aligns with some prior work suggesting that DACA had particularly strong effects on women’s labor force participation, potentially by enabling transitions from informal to formal employment.

## 5.4 Policy Implications

The findings have several implications for immigration policy:

**Work authorization matters.** The positive employment effects suggest that providing legal work authorization can substantively improve labor market outcomes for undocumented immigrants. The inability to work legally represents a significant barrier to formal employment, and programs like DACA that remove this barrier appear to have real economic effects.

**Gender-differentiated impacts.** The concentration of effects among women suggests that immigration policies may have differential impacts by gender. Policymakers should consider how work authorization requirements interact with existing gender disparities in labor markets, particularly in sectors where formal documentation requirements vary.

**Gradual uptake.** The event study results showing larger effects in 2015–2016 compared to 2013 highlight that the benefits of such programs may take time to fully materialize as eligible individuals learn about the program, apply, receive approval, and transition to formal employment.

**Incomplete coverage.** Because not all eligible individuals apply for or receive DACA, the intent-to-treat estimates presented here likely underestimate the effect of actually receiving work authorization. This suggests that outreach efforts to increase program uptake could amplify the positive labor market impacts.

## 5.5 Mechanisms and Channels

Several mechanisms could explain the positive effect of DACA on full-time employment:

1. **Direct work authorization:** DACA provides recipients with Employment Authorization Documents (EADs), enabling them to work legally in the formal sector. This removes legal barriers to employment that may have prevented full-time work.
2. **Driver's licenses:** In many states, DACA recipients can obtain driver's licenses, facilitating commuting to work and expanding the geographic range of accessible jobs.
3. **Reduced fear of deportation:** The temporary relief from deportation may increase willingness to seek employment in visible, formal sector jobs rather than informal work with lower detection risk.
4. **Human capital investment:** Knowing they can work legally may encourage DACA recipients to invest in education and training, improving their employment prospects. The descriptive statistics show higher education levels among the DACA-eligible group in the post-period.

5. **Employer preferences:** Some employers may prefer or require documentation for hiring, meaning DACA recipients gain access to jobs that were previously unavailable to them.

The data do not allow me to distinguish between these mechanisms, but the combination likely contributes to the overall positive effect observed.

## 6 Conclusion

This replication study provides evidence that eligibility for the DACA program increased full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico. Using a difference-in-differences framework with ACS data from 2006–2016, the preferred estimate indicates a 1.95 percentage point increase in the probability of full-time employment (95% CI: [1.09, 2.80],  $p < 0.001$ ).

Key findings include:

1. DACA eligibility had a statistically significant positive effect on full-time employment.
2. The effect accumulated over time, with larger impacts in later post-treatment years (2015–2016) compared to 2013.
3. The effect is driven entirely by women, with no significant effect for men.
4. Results are robust to alternative specifications, including the inclusion of 2012 and the use of any employment as the outcome.
5. Event study analysis provides reasonable (though not perfect) support for the parallel trends assumption.

These findings suggest that providing work authorization to undocumented immigrants who arrived as children can improve their labor market outcomes. The concentration of effects among women suggests particular attention should be paid to gender-specific impacts of immigration policies.

## Appendix: Technical Details

### A.1 Variable Definitions

Table 6: Variable Definitions from IPUMS ACS

Variable	IPUMS Name	Definition
Survey Year	YEAR	Year of ACS survey
Person Weight	PERWT	Person-level sampling weight
State	STATEFIP	State FIPS code
Age	AGE	Age in years
Sex	SEX	1 = Male, 2 = Female
Birth Year	BIRTHYR	Year of birth
Birth Quarter	BIRTHQTR	Quarter of birth (1-4)
Marital Status	MARST	1-2 = Married
Hispanic Origin	HISPAN	1 = Mexican
Birthplace	BPL	200 = Mexico
Citizenship	CITIZEN	3 = Not a citizen
Year of Immigration	YRIMMIG	Year arrived in U.S.
Education	EDUC	General education attainment
Employment Status	EMPSTAT	1 = Employed
Hours Worked	UHRSWORK	Usual hours worked per week

### A.2 DACA Eligibility Coding

```
# DACA Eligibility Criteria
# 1. Arrived before age 16
age_at_immigration = YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR
arrived_before_16 = (age_at_immigration < 16)

# 2. Under 31 as of June 15, 2012
under_31_june_2012 = (BIRTHYR > 1981) |
    ((BIRTHYR == 1981) & (BIRTHQTR >= 3))

# 3. Combined eligibility (assuming other criteria met)
daca_eligible = arrived_before_16 & under_31_june_2012
```

### A.3 Full Regression Output

Table 7 provides the complete regression output for the preferred specification.

Table 7: Full Regression Output: Preferred Specification

Variable	Coefficient	Robust SE
Constant	0.0512***	(0.0156)
DACA Eligible	-0.0287***	(0.0038)
DACA Eligible × Post	0.0195***	(0.0044)
Age	0.0316***	(0.0007)
Age Squared	-0.0005***	(0.0000)
Female	-0.2189***	(0.0016)
Married	0.0541***	(0.0017)
High School+	0.0433***	(0.0020)
Some College+	0.0298***	(0.0024)
State Fixed Effects	Yes (50 states)	
Year Fixed Effects	Yes (10 years)	
Observations	399,677	
Weighted Population	55,769,588	
R-squared	0.114	

Notes: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10.

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Population-weighted regression.

# Results Summary

## Preferred Estimate

### Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment:

$$\hat{\beta} = 0.0195 \text{ (SE} = 0.0044\text{)}$$

- 95% Confidence Interval: [0.0109, 0.0280]
- p-value: < 0.001
- Sample Size: 399,677 observations
- Weighted Population: 55.8 million person-years

**Interpretation:** DACA eligibility is associated with a 1.95 percentage point increase in the probability of working full-time (35+ hours per week).

## Model Specification:

- Difference-in-differences with individual controls
- State and year fixed effects
- Population-weighted (PERWT)
- Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors

## Sample:

- Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico
- Non-citizens who arrived by 2007
- Ages 16–45
- Survey years: 2006–2011 and 2013–2016 (excluding 2012)