The Causal Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Replication Study

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Abstract

This study estimates the causal effect of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican immigrants born in Mexico. Using American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, I find that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 2.2 percentage points (95% CI: [1.48, 2.99], $p < 0.001$). This effect is robust to the inclusion of individual-level controls, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Event study analysis confirms parallel pre-treatment trends and shows effects emerging in 2014–2016, consistent with the timing of DACA implementation. Placebo tests using pre-treatment data find no spurious effects, supporting the validity of the research design. These findings suggest that DACA's provision of work authorization and protection from deportation had meaningful positive effects on labor market outcomes for eligible individuals.

Keywords: DACA, immigration policy, employment, difference-in-differences, causal inference

Contents

1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, implemented on June 15, 2012, represented a significant shift in U.S. immigration policy. The program allowed qualifying undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children to apply for temporary protection from deportation and obtain work authorization for a renewable two-year period. Given that DACA provides legal work authorization—a critical barrier to formal employment for undocumented immigrants—understanding its effect on employment outcomes is important for evaluating immigration policy.

This study addresses the following research question: *Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born individuals living in the United States, what was the causal impact of DACA eligibility on the probability of full-time employment (defined as usually working 35 or more hours per week)?*

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design that exploits the sharp age-based eligibility criteria established by DACA. By comparing changes in employment outcomes before and after DACA implementation between eligible and ineligible Mexican-born non-citizens, I can identify the causal effect of the program while controlling for common time trends and group-specific characteristics.

The main findings indicate that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by approximately 2.2 percentage points, representing a roughly 5% increase relative to the pre-treatment mean for the eligible group. This effect is statistically significant and robust across multiple specifications.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on DACA and its eligibility requirements. Section 3 describes the data and sample construction. Section 4 presents the empirical methodology. Section 5 reports the main results and robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the findings and their implications. Section 7 concludes.

2 Background: DACA Policy and Eligibility

2.1 Program Overview

DACA was announced by the Obama administration on June 15, 2012, and began accepting applications on August 15, 2012. The program was not established through legislation but rather through executive action, exercising prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement. DACA provides eligible individuals with:

- Protection from deportation (deferred action) for two years, renewable
- Authorization to work legally in the United States
- Eligibility to obtain a Social Security number
- In most states, eligibility to obtain a driver's license

In the first four years of the program, nearly 900,000 initial applications were received, with approximately 90% approved. Many recipients renewed their status after the initial two-year period.

2.2 Eligibility Criteria

To qualify for DACA, applicants must meet all of the following criteria:

1. **Age at arrival**: Arrived in the United States before their 16th birthday
2. **Age on June 15, 2012**: Had not yet reached their 31st birthday as of June 15, 2012 (i.e., born after June 15, 1981)
3. **Continuous residence**: Lived continuously in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. **Physical presence**: Present in the United States on June 15, 2012
5. **Immigration status**: Did not have lawful status (citizenship or legal permanent residency) on June 15, 2012
6. **Education/military**: Currently in school, have graduated high school, obtained a GED, or are an honorably discharged veteran
7. **Criminal history**: Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors

The age-based criteria (items 1–2) create natural variation in eligibility that I exploit for identification. While the program was not country-specific, the overwhelming majority of DACA recipients were from Mexico due to the structure of undocumented immigration to the United States.

2.3 Theoretical Mechanism

DACA could affect employment through several channels:

- **Work authorization**: Legal work authorization allows individuals to seek formal employment in sectors previously inaccessible, potentially improving job quality and hours
- **Reduced fear of deportation**: Protection from deportation may encourage more active job searching and reduce constraints on mobility
- **Documentation**: Access to Social Security numbers and driver's licenses reduces barriers to employment
- **Human capital investment**: The stability provided by DACA may encourage investments in education and training

3 Data

3.1 Data Source

The analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS) provided by IPUMS USA. I utilize the annual 1-year ACS samples from 2006 through 2016, excluding 2012 because DACA was implemented mid-year (June 15), making it impossible to distinguish pre- and post-treatment observations within that year.

3.2 Sample Construction

The target population consists of Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico who are not U.S. citizens. I apply the following sample restrictions:

1. **Hispanic-Mexican ethnicity**: HISPAN = 1 (Mexican origin)
2. **Birthplace**: BPL = 200 (born in Mexico)
3. **Citizenship status**: CITIZEN = 3 (not a citizen)
4. **Valid immigration year**: YRIMMIG $>$ 0 (reported year of immigration)
5. **Working age**: AGE between 18 and 55
6. **Survey year**: YEAR $\neq$ 2012 (exclude transition year)

The restriction to non-citizens serves as a proxy for undocumented status. While the ACS cannot directly identify documentation status, the instructions indicate that individuals who are not citizens and have not received immigration papers should be assumed undocumented for DACA purposes.

Table 1 reports the sample sizes at each stage of restriction.

Table 1: Sample Construction

Restriction	**Observations**	**Remaining**
Total ACS observations (2006–2016)	33,851,424	100.0%
Hispanic-Mexican ethnicity (HISPAN=1)	2,945,521	8.7%
Born in Mexico (BPL=200)	991,261	2.9%
Not a citizen (CITIZEN=3)	701,347	2.1%
Excluding 2012	636,722	1.9%
Valid immigration year (YRIMMIG>0)	636,722	1.9%
Working age (18–55)	507,423	1.5%

Note: Sample restrictions applied sequentially. The final analytic sample contains 507,423 person-year observations.

3.3 Variable Definitions

3.3.1 Outcome Variable

The outcome variable is **full-time employment**, defined as:

$$\text{fulltime}_i = \mathbf{1}\{\text{EMPSTAT}_i = 1 \text{ and } \text{UHRSWORK}_i \geq 35\} \tag{1}$$

This equals 1 if the individual is employed (EMPSTAT = 1) and usually works 35 or more hours per week (UHRSWORK $\geq$ 35), and 0 otherwise.

3.3.2 Treatment Variable: DACA Eligibility

DACA eligibility is constructed based on the observable criteria:

1. **Arrived before age 16**: (YRIMMIG − BIRTHYR) $<$ 16
2. **Under 31 on June 15, 2012**: BIRTHYR $\geq$ 1982, or (BIRTHYR = 1981 and BIRTHQTR $\geq$ 3)
3. **In U.S. since June 15, 2007**: YRIMMIG $\leq$ 2007

The treatment indicator is:

$$\text{daca\_eligible}_i = \mathbf{1}\{\text{criterion 1} \cap \text{criterion 2} \cap \text{criterion 3}\} \tag{2}$$

Note that some criteria (physical presence on specific dates, education/military status, criminal history) are not directly observable in the ACS and are thus not included. This means the constructed eligibility measure may include some individuals who would not actually qualify, introducing measurement error that likely attenuates the estimated effect.

3.3.3 Control Variables

I include the following control variables:

- **AGE** and **AGE**^{2}: Age and age squared to capture nonlinear lifecycle patterns
- **female**: Indicator for female (SEX = 2)
- **married**: Indicator for married with spouse present (MARST = 1)
- **educ_hs**: Indicator for high school completion or higher (EDUC $\geq$ 6)
- **Year fixed effects**: Indicators for each survey year
- **State fixed effects**: Indicators for state of residence (STATEFIP)

3.4 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents summary statistics for the analytic sample by DACA eligibility status.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by DACA Eligibility Status

Variable	**Not Eligible**	**DACA Eligible**
N (observations)	436,076	71,347
Mean Age	37.8	23.6
Female (%)	45.8	44.8
Married (%)	59.5	25.8
High School+ (%)	41.7	66.2
Employed (%)	67.6	64.2
Full-Time Employment (%)	55.7	46.8

Note: Statistics computed over the full analytic sample (2006–2011, 2013–2016). DACA eligibility determined by arrival before age 16, birth after June 15, 1981, and arrival by 2007.

The DACA-eligible group is substantially younger (mean age 23.6 vs. 37.8), reflecting the age-based eligibility criteria. They have higher educational attainment (66.2% with high school or more vs. 41.7%), which is consistent with the "1.5 generation" having more U.S. schooling. The eligible group has lower marriage rates (25.8% vs. 59.5%), reflecting their younger age distribution.

Full-time employment rates are lower among the eligible group (46.8% vs. 55.7%), but this reflects compositional differences, particularly age. The key question is whether DACA eligibility changed these rates relative to what would have occurred absent the program.

4 Empirical Methodology

4.1 Difference-in-Differences Design

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design that compares changes in full-time employment before and after DACA implementation between eligible and ineligible individuals. The basic DiD estimator is:

$$\hat{\tau}^{DiD} = (\bar{Y}_{E,post} - \bar{Y}_{E,pre}) - (\bar{Y}_{NE,post} - \bar{Y}_{NE,pre}) \tag{3}$$

where E denotes eligible, NE denotes not eligible, *pre* denotes 2006–2011, and *post* denotes 2013–2016.

4.2 Regression Specification

The main regression specification is:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot \text{eligible}_i + \beta_2 \cdot \text{post}_t + \tau \cdot (\text{eligible}_i \times \text{post}_t) + X_i'\gamma + \mu_t + \delta_s + \varepsilon_{ist} \tag{4}$$

where:

- Y_{ist} is full-time employment for individual i in state s at time t
- eligible_i is the DACA eligibility indicator
- post_t is an indicator for years 2013–2016
- X_i is a vector of individual controls (age, age^2, female, married, education)
- μ_t are year fixed effects

- δ_s are state fixed effects
- ε_{ist} is the error term

The coefficient of interest is τ, which identifies the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment under the parallel trends assumption.

4.3 Identification Assumptions

The validity of the DiD design relies on several key assumptions:

1. **Parallel trends**: Absent DACA, full-time employment trends would have been parallel between eligible and ineligible groups. I assess this through event study analysis.
2. **No anticipation**: Individuals did not change behavior in anticipation of DACA before June 2012. Given the surprise nature of the announcement, this is plausible.
3. **Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)**: One individual's treatment does not affect another's outcome. This could be violated through labor market competition, though such spillovers are likely small.
4. **No compositional changes**: The composition of the eligible and ineligible groups does not change differentially over time in ways correlated with outcomes.

4.4 Event Study Specification

To assess parallel pre-trends and examine dynamic treatment effects, I estimate an event study model:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \sum_{k \neq 2011} \tau_k \cdot (\text{eligible}_i \times \mathbf{1}\{t = k\}) + X_i'\gamma + \mu_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \tag{5}$$

where 2011 serves as the reference year (the last year before DACA implementation). The coefficients τ_k for $k < 2012$ test for pre-treatment differential trends, while τ_k for $k > 2012$ trace out the dynamic treatment effects.

4.5 Standard Errors

All standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1). Given that treatment is at the individual level and the large sample size, clustering is less critical than in designs with group-level treatment.

5 Results

5.1 Main Results

Table 3 presents the main difference-in-differences results across four specifications with progressively richer controls.

Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment

	(1) Basic	(2) + Controls	(3) + Year FE	(4) + State FE
DACA Eligible × Post	0.0564***	0.0301***	0.0227***	0.0223***
	(0.0041)	(0.0039)	(0.0039)	(0.0038)
DACA Eligible	−0.1158***	−0.0252***	−0.0252***	−0.0231***
	(0.0031)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)
Post	0.0014	0.0025	—	—
	(0.0016)	(0.0015)	—	—
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	507,423	507,423	507,423	507,423
R-squared	0.007	0.178	0.179	0.194

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Individual controls include age, age squared, female, married, and high school education indicators. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The basic DiD estimate (column 1) shows that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by 5.64 percentage points. However, this estimate is likely biased upward because it does not account for differential age compositions between groups.

Adding individual controls (column 2) reduces the estimate to 3.01 percentage points, with age being the most important control. Including year fixed effects (column 3) further reduces the estimate to 2.27 percentage points. The preferred specification (column 4) includes state fixed effects, yielding an estimate of **2.23 percentage points** (SE = 0.0038, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [1.48, 2.99]).

This effect size represents approximately a 5.0% increase relative to the pre-treatment full-time employment rate of 44.1% among the eligible group.

5.2 Visual Evidence

Figure 1 displays full-time employment rates over time for eligible and ineligible groups.



Figure 1: Full-Time Employment Rates by DACA Eligibility Status, 2006–2016
Note: The vertical dashed line indicates DACA implementation (June 2012). The shaded area indicates the Great Recession period (December 2007 – June 2009). Data for 2012 are excluded.

Both groups experienced declining employment during the Great Recession (2008–2009), followed by recovery. Importantly, the trajectories appear roughly parallel in the pre-DACA period (2006–2011). After 2012, the eligible group shows a steeper increase in full-time employment relative to the ineligible group, consistent with a positive DACA effect.

5.3 Event Study Results

Figure 2 presents the event study estimates, with 2011 as the reference year.



Figure 2: Event Study: Dynamic Treatment Effects of DACA Eligibility
Note: Coefficients represent the difference in full-time employment between eligible and ineligible groups relative to 2011. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. The vertical dashed line indicates DACA implementation.

The pre-treatment coefficients (2006–2010) are all small and statistically indistinguishable from zero, supporting the parallel trends assumption. There is no evidence of differential pre-trends between the groups.

The post-treatment coefficients show a pattern consistent with gradual DACA uptake:

- 2013: 0.0107 ($p = 0.185$) – small, insignificant effect
- 2014: 0.0235 ($p = 0.004$) – significant effect emerges
- 2015: 0.0380 ($p < 0.001$) – larger significant effect
- 2016: 0.0391 ($p < 0.001$) – sustained significant effect

This dynamic pattern is consistent with the timing of DACA: applications began in August 2012, and effects would build as more individuals received approval and obtained work authorization.

5.4 Robustness Checks

5.4.1 Alternative Sample Restrictions

Table 4 presents results from various robustness checks.

Table 4: Robustness Checks

Specification	**Coefficient**	**SE**	**N**
Main specification	0.0223***	0.0038	507,423
Alternative age range (20–45)	0.0305***	0.0043	397,006
Alternative outcome: Any employment	0.0416***	0.0038	507,423
Weighted (PERWT)	0.0271***	0.0046	507,423
By gender:			
Males	0.0224***	0.0052	275,552
Females	0.0304***	0.0056	231,871

Note: All specifications include individual controls, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *** $p < 0.01$.

The effect is robust to alternative age restrictions (20–45 years), with a slightly larger estimate of 3.05 percentage points. Using any employment as the outcome yields a larger effect (4.16 percentage points), suggesting DACA increased both extensive margin employment and full-time work conditional on employment.

The weighted estimates using ACS person weights (PERWT) yield a similar coefficient of 2.71 percentage points, confirming that the unweighted results are representative of the population.

Gender-specific analyses show positive effects for both men (2.24 pp) and women (3.04 pp), with the effect being somewhat larger for women, though the difference is not statistically significant.

5.4.2 Placebo Test

To further validate the research design, I conduct a placebo test using only pre-DACA data (2006–2011), pretending that 2009 was the treatment year.

Table 5: Placebo Test: Fake Treatment in 2009

	Placebo DiD
DACA Eligible × Post (Placebo)	0.0017
	(0.0052)
	[$p = 0.739$]
Sample	Pre-DACA only (2006–2011)
Observations	315,509

Note: Specification includes individual controls, year fixed effects. The placebo post period is defined as 2009–2011; pre-placebo is 2006–2008.

The placebo coefficient is near zero (0.0017) and statistically insignificant ($p = 0.739$), providing strong evidence that the main findings are not driven by spurious differential trends.

6 Discussion

6.1 Interpretation of Results

The main finding indicates that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 2.2 percentage points among Hispanic-Mexican immigrants born in Mexico. Several aspects of this finding merit discussion.

Effect magnitude: A 2.2 percentage point increase represents a meaningful improvement in labor market outcomes. Relative to the pre-treatment mean of 44.1% for the eligible group, this is a 5.0% increase. Given that approximately 800,000 individuals received DACA approval in the study period, this translates to roughly 17,600 additional individuals working full-time who otherwise would not have been.

Timing of effects: The event study reveals that effects emerged gradually, becoming statistically significant in 2014 and strengthening through 2016. This pattern is consistent with the mechanics of DACA implementation: processing of applications, receipt of work authorization, and job searching take time. The absence of effects in 2013 may reflect that many individuals were still in the application process or had only recently received authorization.

Mechanisms: The positive effect likely operates through multiple channels. Work authorization allows access to formal sector jobs that require documentation, which tend to offer more hours and better working conditions. Protection from deportation may also reduce constraints on job searching and geographic mobility. Additionally, drivers' licenses

(obtainable in most states with DACA status) facilitate commuting to work.

6.2 Comparison to Existing Literature

The estimated effect size is broadly consistent with previous studies of DACA's labor market effects, though methodological differences make direct comparisons difficult. Pope (2016) finds DACA increased labor force participation by 5–6 percentage points using a synthetic control approach. Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman (2017) estimate a 2–3 percentage point increase in employment using a similar DiD design with different sample restrictions.

6.3 Limitations

Several limitations should be acknowledged:

1. **Measurement error in eligibility:** The ACS does not directly identify DACA recipients or all eligibility criteria. The constructed eligibility measure likely includes some ineligible individuals (those not meeting education/military or criminal history requirements) and may misclassify borderline cases. This measurement error likely attenuates the estimated effect, making the results conservative.

2. **Non-citizen proxy for undocumented:** Using non-citizenship as a proxy for undocumented status will include some legal non-citizens who would not benefit from DACA (as they already have work authorization). This introduces classification error, again likely attenuating the estimate.

3. **Selection into the survey:** Undocumented immigrants may be less likely to respond to government surveys. If DACA changed survey response rates differentially, this could bias results, though the direction is unclear.

4. **General equilibrium effects:** The analysis captures partial equilibrium effects and does not account for potential labor market spillovers to non-DACA workers.

5. **External validity:** The restriction to Mexican-born Hispanic individuals means results may not generalize to DACA-eligible populations from other countries.

7 Conclusion

This study provides causal evidence that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment among Mexican-born non-citizen Hispanic immigrants. Using a difference-in-differences de-

sign with ACS data from 2006–2016, I estimate that eligibility increased full-time employment by 2.2 percentage points (95% CI: [1.48, 2.99]).

The findings are robust to alternative specifications, samples, and outcomes. Event study analysis confirms parallel pre-treatment trends and shows effects emerging gradually in 2014–2016, consistent with the timing of DACA implementation. Placebo tests find no spurious effects in the pre-treatment period.

These results contribute to our understanding of how immigration policy affects labor market outcomes. They suggest that providing work authorization and protection from deportation has meaningful positive effects on employment for affected individuals. From a policy perspective, the findings indicate that programs like DACA can improve labor market integration for eligible immigrants.

Future research might examine longer-term effects, impacts on other outcomes such as wages or industry of employment, and potential spillover effects on non-DACA workers. Additionally, natural experiments arising from policy changes (such as the 2017 attempted rescission and subsequent court cases) could provide further evidence on DACA's effects.

Appendix: Variable Definitions

Table 6: IPUMS Variable Definitions

Variable	**IPUMS Name**	**Definition/Coding**
Survey Year	YEAR	2006–2016 (excluding 2012)
Hispanic Origin	HISPAN	1 = Mexican
Birthplace	BPL	200 = Mexico
Citizenship	CITIZEN	3 = Not a citizen
Year of Immigration	YRIMMIG	Year arrived in U.S.
Birth Year	BIRTHYR	Year of birth
Birth Quarter	BIRTHQTR	1=Jan-Mar, 2=Apr-Jun, 3=Jul-Sep, 4=Oct-Dec
Age	AGE	Age in years
Sex	SEX	1 = Male, 2 = Female
Marital Status	MARST	1 = Married, spouse present
Education	EDUC	General education attainment ($\geq$6 = HS+)
Employment Status	EMPSTAT	1 = Employed
Usual Hours Worked	UHRSWORK	Hours usually worked per week
Person Weight	PERWT	Survey weight
State	STATEFIP	State FIPS code

Appendix: Full Regression Results

Table 7: Full Regression Results: Preferred Specification (Model 4)

Variable	**Coefficient**	**SE**
Intercept	0.2466	0.0132
DACA Eligible	−0.0231***	0.0031
Eligible × Post (DiD)	0.0223***	0.0038
Age	0.0294***	0.0006
Age Squared	−0.0004***	0.0000
Female	−0.4199***	0.0013
Married	−0.0059***	0.0014
High School+	0.0437***	0.0013
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	
State Fixed Effects	Yes	
N	507,423	
R-squared	0.194	

Note: The large negative coefficient on "Female" reflects that women have substantially lower full-time employment rates than men, controlling for other factors. The negative coefficient on "Married" may reflect that married individuals (especially married women) are less likely to work full-time. The positive age effect (with negative quadratic) captures the standard lifecycle pattern of employment.

Appendix: Event Study Coefficients

Table 8: Event Study Coefficients (Reference Year: 2011)

Year	**Coefficient**	**SE**	**p-value**
Pre-Treatment Period			
2006	−0.0016	0.0090	0.863
2007	0.0034	0.0087	0.697
2008	0.0108	0.0087	0.216
2009	0.0077	0.0086	0.369
2010	0.0094	0.0083	0.258
Reference Year			
2011	0.0000	—	—
Post-Treatment Period			
2013	0.0107	0.0081	0.185
2014	0.0235**	0.0081	0.004
2015	0.0380***	0.0081	0.000
2016	0.0391***	0.0081	0.000

The pre-treatment coefficients (2006–2010) are all close to zero and statistically insignificant, supporting the parallel trends assumption. The post-treatment coefficients show increasing effects from 2013 to 2016, with statistically significant effects emerging in 2014.

Appendix: Sample Sizes by Year and Group

Table 9: Sample Sizes by Year and DACA Eligibility Status

Year	Not Eligible	Eligible	Total	Eligible %
2006	41,834	4,989	46,823	10.7%
2007	42,820	5,507	48,327	11.4%
2008	44,011	5,998	50,009	12.0%
2009	46,392	6,548	52,940	12.4%
2010	50,059	7,246	57,305	12.6%
2011	52,145	7,960	60,105	13.2%
2013	40,950	8,275	49,225	16.8%
2014	39,718	8,248	47,966	17.2%
2015	39,310	8,356	47,666	17.5%
2016	38,837	8,220	47,057	17.5%
Pre-DACA Total	277,261	38,248	315,509	12.1%
Post-DACA Total	158,815	33,099	191,914	17.2%
Grand Total	**436,076**	**71,347**	**507,423**	14.1%

The increasing share of DACA-eligible observations over time primarily reflects the aging of the sample: individuals who were too young to be in the working-age sample in earlier years enter in later years, and the DACA-eligible population by construction is younger.

Appendix: Full-Time Employment Rates by Year

Table 10: Full-Time Employment Rates by Year and DACA Eligibility

Year	**Not Eligible**	**Eligible**	**Difference**
2006	0.598	0.470	−0.128
2007	0.596	0.479	−0.117
2008	0.591	0.481	−0.110
2009	0.528	0.418	−0.110
2010	0.517	0.417	−0.100
2011	0.511	0.406	−0.105
Pre-DACA Mean	0.557	0.441	−0.116
2013	0.537	0.450	−0.087
2014	0.555	0.490	−0.064
2015	0.565	0.518	−0.047
2016	0.579	0.538	−0.041
Post-DACA Mean	0.558	0.499	−0.059
DiD Estimate	**0.0564** (simple) / **0.0223** (regression)		

The gap in full-time employment between eligible and ineligible groups narrowed from about 11.6 percentage points pre-DACA to about 5.9 percentage points post-DACA, yielding a simple DiD estimate of 5.7 percentage points. The regression-adjusted estimate of 2.2 percentage points accounts for compositional differences between groups.