

The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment Among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-Born Non-Citizens: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Replication Study 04

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Abstract

This study examines the causal effect of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born non-citizens in the United States. Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2006–2016, I employ a difference-in-differences research design comparing individuals who met DACA eligibility criteria to a control group of similar immigrants who were ineligible due to the program’s age cutoff. The preferred specification, which includes year and state fixed effects along with demographic controls, estimates that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by 0.21 percentage points, though this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels (95% CI: –0.82 to 1.23 percentage points). The raw difference-in-differences estimate of 11.2 percentage points is substantially larger but confounded by age and other compositional differences between treatment and control groups. Event study analysis shows no clear evidence of differential pre-trends, though the post-DACA coefficients do not show a consistent treatment effect pattern. These results suggest that while DACA may have had modest positive effects on full-time employment for eligible individuals, the evidence is not strong enough to definitively conclude that the program increased full-time employment among this population.

Keywords: DACA, immigration policy, employment, difference-in-differences, causal inference

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1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, implemented on June 15, 2012, represents one of the most significant immigration policy changes in recent U.S. history. The program provides temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children and meet specific eligibility criteria. Given that DACA explicitly provides legal work authorization, a natural question arises: did the program improve employment outcomes for eligible individuals?

This study addresses the following research question: *Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born people living in the United States, what was the causal impact of eligibility for DACA on the probability of being employed full-time, defined as usually working 35 hours or more per week?*

Understanding the labor market effects of DACA is important for several reasons. First, employment is a fundamental measure of economic integration and self-sufficiency. Second, the program's stated goal of providing work authorization suggests that employment effects should be one of the primary metrics for evaluating its success. Third, debates about immigration policy often center on the economic contributions of immigrants, making rigorous evidence about employment effects valuable for policy discussions.

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design, comparing changes in full-time employment among DACA-eligible individuals before and after the program's implementation to changes among a control group of similar Mexican-born non-citizen immigrants who were ineligible due to the program's age cutoff. This design leverages the quasi-experimental variation created by DACA's eligibility rules.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on DACA and its eligibility requirements. Section 3 describes the data and sample construction. Section 4 details the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 provides robustness checks and additional analyses. Section 7 discusses the findings and their limitations. Section 8 concludes.

2 Background on DACA

2.1 Program Overview

DACA was announced by the Obama administration on June 15, 2012, through an executive memorandum from the Secretary of Homeland Security. The program allows certain undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children to apply for a two-year renewable period of deferred action from deportation and to obtain work authorization.

The program began accepting applications on August 15, 2012. In the first four years of the program, nearly 900,000 initial applications were received, with approximately 90% approved. After the initial two-year period, recipients could apply for renewal, and many did so.

2.2 Eligibility Requirements

To be eligible for DACA, applicants must meet the following criteria:

1. **Age at arrival:** Arrived in the United States before their 16th birthday
2. **Age limit:** Had not yet reached their 31st birthday as of June 15, 2012 (i.e., born after June 15, 1981)
3. **Continuous residence:** Lived continuously in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. **Physical presence:** Were present in the United States on June 15, 2012
5. **Immigration status:** Did not have lawful status (citizenship or legal residency) on June 15, 2012
6. **Education/military:** Currently in school, graduated from high school, obtained a GED, or are an honorably discharged veteran
7. **Criminal history:** Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors

2.3 Expected Effects on Employment

DACA is expected to affect employment through several channels:

- **Legal work authorization:** The most direct effect is that DACA recipients can legally work, potentially opening access to formal sector jobs and reducing the risk of employment-based discrimination.
- **Driver's licenses:** In many states, DACA recipients became eligible to obtain driver's licenses, which can expand geographic job access and open employment opportunities requiring driving.
- **Reduced deportation fear:** The temporary relief from deportation may encourage recipients to seek more stable employment or invest in job-specific human capital.

- **Employer confidence:** Employers may be more willing to hire individuals with documented work authorization, potentially improving job matches.

3 Data

3.1 Data Source

The data for this analysis come from the American Community Survey (ACS) as provided by IPUMS USA. The ACS is an annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that collects detailed demographic, social, economic, and housing information from approximately 3.5 million households each year.

I use the 1-year ACS samples from 2006 through 2016, excluding 2012 due to the mid-year implementation of DACA (June 15, 2012). This leaves 10 years of data: 6 pre-treatment years (2006–2011) and 4 post-treatment years (2013–2016).

3.2 Sample Construction

The analysis sample is constructed through the following steps:

1. **Hispanic-Mexican ethnicity:** Restrict to individuals with HISPAN = 1 (Mexican Hispanic origin)
2. **Mexican-born:** Restrict to individuals with BPL = 200 (born in Mexico)
3. **Non-citizens:** Restrict to individuals with CITIZEN = 3 (not a citizen). Per the research instructions, non-citizens who have not received immigration papers are assumed to be undocumented.
4. **Working age:** Restrict to individuals ages 16–64
5. **Valid immigration year:** Exclude observations with missing year of immigration

After applying these restrictions, I further subset the sample to construct treatment and control groups based on DACA eligibility criteria.

3.3 Treatment and Control Group Definition

Treatment Group (DACA-Eligible): Individuals who meet all of the following criteria:

- Arrived in the U.S. before age 16 ($YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR < 16$)

- Born after June 15, 1981 ($\text{BIRTHYR} \geq 1982$, or $\text{BIRTHYR} = 1981$ and $\text{BIRTHQTR} \geq 3$)
- Immigrated by 2007 ($\text{YRIMMIG} \leq 2007$)

Control Group (Age-Ineligible): Individuals who meet the arrival and continuous presence criteria but were too old for DACA:

- Arrived in the U.S. before age 16
- Born before 1981 (too old for DACA's age cutoff)
- Immigrated by 2007

This control group choice leverages the arbitrary age cutoff in DACA eligibility. Individuals just above and below the age cutoff are expected to be similar in many respects, differing primarily in their DACA eligibility status.

3.4 Key Variables

Outcome Variable:

- *Full-time employment:* A binary indicator equal to 1 if $\text{UHRSWORK} \geq 35$, and 0 otherwise. UHRSWORK measures usual hours worked per week.

Treatment Indicators:

- *DACA Eligible:* Binary indicator for meeting DACA eligibility criteria
- *Post:* Binary indicator for years 2013–2016 (post-DACA implementation)
- *DiD:* Interaction of DACA Eligible and Post

Control Variables:

- Age and age squared
- Female ($\text{SEX} = 2$)
- Married ($\text{MARST} = 1$)
- High school education or higher ($\text{EDUC} \geq 6$)
- Year fixed effects
- State fixed effects (STATEFIP)

3.5 Sample Statistics

Table 1 presents sample sizes at each stage of the sample construction process.

Table 1: Sample Construction

Sample Restriction	N	Percentage
Full ACS sample (2006–2016, excl. 2012)	33,851,424	100.0%
Hispanic-Mexican (HISPAN = 1)	2,945,521	8.7%
Mexico-born (BPL = 200)	991,261	2.9%
Non-citizens (CITIZEN = 3)	701,347	2.1%
Excluding 2012	636,722	1.9%
Ages 16–64	561,470	1.7%
Valid immigration year	561,470	1.7%
Analysis Sample		
DACA eligible (treatment)	83,611	—
Age-ineligible (control)	53,026	—
Total Analysis Sample	136,637	—

Notes: Sample construction for the DACA replication analysis. The analysis sample includes only individuals who meet all DACA criteria (treatment) or who meet the arrival age and continuous presence criteria but were too old for DACA (control).

4 Empirical Methodology

4.1 Identification Strategy

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design to estimate the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The key identifying assumption is that, in the absence of DACA, trends in full-time employment would have been parallel between the treatment and control groups (the parallel trends assumption).

The DiD approach compares the change in outcomes for the treatment group before and after DACA implementation to the change for the control group over the same period:

$$\text{DiD} = (\bar{Y}_{T,\text{post}} - \bar{Y}_{T,\text{pre}}) - (\bar{Y}_{C,\text{post}} - \bar{Y}_{C,\text{pre}}) \quad (1)$$

where $\bar{Y}_{T,t}$ is the average outcome for the treatment group in period t , and $\bar{Y}_{C,t}$ is the

average outcome for the control group.

4.2 Regression Specification

The main regression specification is:

$$Y_{ist} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{DACA}_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 (\text{DACA}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \mathbf{X}'_i \gamma + \alpha_s + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (2)$$

where:

- Y_{ist} is a binary indicator for full-time employment for individual i in state s at time t
- DACA_i is a binary indicator for DACA eligibility
- Post_t is a binary indicator for the post-DACA period (2013–2016)
- \mathbf{X}_i is a vector of individual-level controls
- α_s are state fixed effects
- δ_t are year fixed effects
- ε_{ist} is the error term

The coefficient of interest is β_3 , which captures the differential change in full-time employment for DACA-eligible individuals relative to the control group after DACA implementation.

All regressions are estimated using weighted least squares (WLS) with ACS person weights (PERWT) to produce population-representative estimates.

4.3 Model Specifications

I estimate four specifications of increasing complexity:

1. **Model 1:** Basic DiD without controls
2. **Model 2:** DiD with demographic controls (age, age², female, married, education)
3. **Model 3:** DiD with demographic controls and year fixed effects
4. **Model 4 (Preferred):** DiD with demographic controls, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects

4.4 Event Study Specification

To examine the parallel trends assumption and trace out the dynamic effects of DACA, I also estimate an event study specification:

$$Y_{ist} = \beta_0 + \sum_{t \neq 2011} \theta_t (\text{DACA}_i \times \mathbf{1}[Year = t]) + \mathbf{X}'_i \gamma + \alpha_s + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (3)$$

where 2011 serves as the reference year (the last pre-treatment year). The coefficients θ_t trace out the treatment effect over time relative to the reference year. Pre-treatment coefficients (2006–2010) that are close to zero and not statistically significant would support the parallel trends assumption.

5 Results

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status

Variable	Treatment (DACA Eligible)	Control (Age-Ineligible)	Difference
Age	22.73	39.38	-16.65
Female	0.447	0.402	0.045
Married	0.218	0.555	-0.336
High School+	0.578	0.466	0.112
Full-time Employed	0.484	0.663	-0.179
Employed (any)	0.581	0.710	-0.128
N	83,611	53,026	

Notes: Weighted means using ACS person weights (PERWT). Treatment group includes individuals meeting all DACA eligibility criteria. Control group includes individuals who met arrival age and continuous presence criteria but were born before 1981.

Several notable differences between groups emerge. The treatment group is substantially younger (mean age 22.7 vs. 39.4 years), reflecting the age-based eligibility criterion. The treatment group has a higher proportion of females, is less likely to be married, and has

higher educational attainment. Notably, the treatment group has a lower baseline rate of full-time employment (48.4% vs. 66.3%), which largely reflects their younger age.

5.2 Raw Difference-in-Differences

Table 3 presents the raw difference-in-differences calculation.

Table 3: Raw Difference-in-Differences: Full-Time Employment Rates

Group	Pre-DACA	Post-DACA	Difference
DACA Eligible (Treatment)	0.452	0.521	0.069
Age-Ineligible (Control)	0.678	0.635	-0.042
Difference-in-Differences	0.112		

Notes: Weighted means using ACS person weights. Pre-DACA period is 2006–2011. Post-DACA period is 2013–2016. DiD = $(0.521 - 0.452) - (0.635 - 0.678) = 0.069 - (-0.042) = 0.112$.

The raw DiD estimate suggests that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by 11.2 percentage points. The treatment group experienced an increase of 6.9 percentage points, while the control group experienced a decrease of 4.2 percentage points. However, this raw estimate does not account for compositional differences between the groups or secular trends that may have affected employment differentially by age.

5.3 Regression Results

Table 4 presents the main regression results.

Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Regression Results

	Model 1 Basic	Model 2 + Controls	Model 3 + Year FE	Model 4 + State FE
DACA Eligible × Post	0.1117*** (0.0056)	0.0136** (0.0053)	0.0033 (0.0052)	0.0021 (0.0052)
DACA Eligible	−0.2253*** (0.0035)	0.1205*** (0.0050)	—	—
Post	−0.0425*** (0.0045)	−0.0526*** (0.0043)	—	—
Age	—	0.0817*** (0.0008)	0.0817*** (0.0008)	0.0817*** (0.0008)
Age ²	—	−0.0010*** (0.0000)	−0.0010*** (0.0000)	−0.0010*** (0.0000)
Female	—	−0.3109*** (0.0024)	−0.3101*** (0.0024)	−0.3102*** (0.0024)
Married	—	0.0189*** (0.0028)	0.0195*** (0.0028)	0.0189*** (0.0028)
High School+	—	0.0821*** (0.0025)	0.0830*** (0.0025)	0.0798*** (0.0025)
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
R ²	0.036	0.212	0.214	0.221
N	136,637	136,637	136,637	136,637
95% CI for DiD	[0.10, 0.12]	[0.00, 0.02]	[−0.01, 0.01]	[−0.01, 0.01]

Notes: Weighted least squares estimates using ACS person weights. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for full-time employment (UHRSWORK ≥ 35). Model 4 is the preferred specification.

The results show a striking pattern: the estimated effect of DACA eligibility decreases substantially as controls are added. In the basic DiD specification (Model 1), the treatment effect is 11.17 percentage points ($p < 0.01$). Adding demographic controls (Model 2) reduces the estimate to 1.36 percentage points ($p < 0.05$). Adding year fixed effects (Model 3) further reduces the estimate to 0.33 percentage points (not significant). The preferred specification with both year and state fixed effects (Model 4) yields an estimate of 0.21 percentage points, which is not statistically significant (95% CI: -0.82 to 1.23 pp).

The large reduction in the estimated effect when controls are added suggests that much of the raw difference-in-differences is driven by compositional differences between treatment and control groups, particularly age, rather than the causal effect of DACA eligibility.

5.4 Event Study Results

Figure 1 presents the event study coefficients.




Figure 1: Event Study: Year-by-Year Treatment Effects

Notes: The figure displays coefficients from an event study regression with 2011 as the reference year. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The red dashed line indicates DACA implementation in 2012.

The event study results provide mixed evidence. The pre-treatment coefficients (2006–2010) are close to zero and mostly not statistically significant, which is consistent with

the parallel trends assumption. However, there is some suggestion of a modest positive pre-trend, with the 2008 coefficient being statistically significant. The post-treatment coefficients (2013–2016) are also small and mostly not significant, with only the 2016 coefficient reaching statistical significance. This pattern does not show a clear jump at the time of DACA implementation, which would be expected if the program had a substantial immediate effect on employment.

5.5 Parallel Trends

Figure 2 displays the trends in full-time employment for treatment and control groups.




Figure 2: Trends in Full-Time Employment by DACA Eligibility Status

Notes: The figure displays weighted full-time employment rates by year for the treatment group (DACA-eligible) and control group (age-ineligible). The vertical dashed line indicates DACA implementation in June 2012. 2012 is excluded from the analysis.

The figure reveals several important patterns:

1. There is a substantial level difference between the groups, with the control group having higher full-time employment rates throughout the period. This reflects the older age composition of the control group.
2. Both groups show a decline in full-time employment during the Great Recession (2008–2011), followed by recovery in the post-2012 period.

3. The treatment group shows a steeper recovery in the post-DACA period compared to the control group, which is consistent with a positive treatment effect. However, this pattern could also reflect differential age-related employment dynamics.
4. The pre-DACA trends are roughly parallel, supporting the identifying assumption, though the treatment group's employment rate appears slightly more volatile.

6 Robustness Checks

6.1 Alternative Outcome: Any Employment

Table 5 presents results using any employment (employed = 1 if EMPSTAT = 1) as an alternative outcome.

Table 5: Robustness: Alternative Outcome (Any Employment)

	Full-Time	Any Employment
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0021 (0.0052)	0.0016 (0.0052)
95% CI	[-0.008, 0.012]	[-0.009, 0.012]
N	136,637	136,637

Notes: Preferred specification (Model 4) with year and state fixed effects and demographic controls. Standard errors in parentheses.

The results using any employment as the outcome are similar to the main results, with an estimated effect of 0.16 percentage points that is not statistically significant.

6.2 Subgroup Analysis by Gender

Table 6 presents results separately for males and females.

Table 6: Robustness: Subgroup Analysis by Gender

	Full Sample	Males	Females
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.0021 (0.0052)	-0.0238*** (0.0066)	0.0239*** (0.0083)
95% CI	[-0.01, 0.01]	[-0.04, -0.01]	[0.01, 0.04]
N	136,637	77,277	59,360

Notes: Preferred specification (Model 4) with year and state fixed effects and demographic controls. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Interestingly, the subgroup analysis reveals heterogeneous effects by gender. For males, DACA eligibility appears to have *decreased* full-time employment by 2.4 percentage points ($p < 0.01$). For females, DACA eligibility appears to have *increased* full-time employment by 2.4 percentage points ($p < 0.01$). These offsetting effects explain the null result in the pooled sample.

This pattern is somewhat puzzling. One possible explanation is that DACA eligibility may have encouraged some males to pursue education rather than full-time work, while enabling females to enter the formal labor market. However, this interpretation is speculative and warrants further investigation.

6.3 Sample Composition Over Time

Figure 3 displays the sample size by year.




Figure 3: Analysis Sample Size by Year

Notes: The figure displays the number of observations in the analysis sample by year. Red bars indicate pre-DACA years (2006–2011); blue bars indicate post-DACA years (2013–2016). 2012 is excluded.

The sample size is relatively stable across years, ranging from approximately 12,900 to 14,700 observations per year. There is no dramatic change in sample size around the DACA implementation date, suggesting that selection into the sample is not a major concern.

7 Discussion

7.1 Interpretation of Results

The main finding of this analysis is that DACA eligibility had a small, statistically insignificant effect on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born non-citizens. The preferred estimate suggests an increase of 0.21 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from –0.82 to 1.23 percentage points. This null result is robust to alternative specifications and outcome measures.

The stark difference between the raw DiD estimate (11.2 pp) and the regression-adjusted estimate (0.21 pp) highlights the importance of controlling for compositional differences between treatment and control groups. The raw estimate is confounded by the substantial age difference between groups and does not represent the causal effect of DACA eligibility.

The heterogeneity by gender is notable and deserves attention. The finding that DACA decreased full-time employment for males while increasing it for females could reflect several mechanisms:

- DACA may have enabled males to pursue education, reducing their full-time work in the short run
- DACA may have removed barriers to formal employment that disproportionately affected females
- The results may reflect statistical noise rather than true heterogeneity

7.2 Limitations

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting these results:

1. **Control group selection:** The control group consists of older immigrants who may face different labor market conditions than younger DACA-eligible individuals. While controlling for age partially addresses this, age may interact with the treatment effect in ways that are not captured by the regression.
2. **Imperfect identification of eligibility:** The ACS does not directly identify undocumented status or DACA eligibility. I proxy for undocumented status using non-citizenship, but this includes some legal permanent residents who simply have not naturalized. This measurement error likely attenuates the estimated effects.
3. **Intent-to-treat interpretation:** The estimates represent the effect of DACA *eligibility*, not the effect of actually receiving DACA. Since not all eligible individuals applied for or received DACA, the treatment effect on the treated would be larger than these intent-to-treat estimates.
4. **General equilibrium effects:** The analysis focuses on partial equilibrium effects and does not account for potential labor market spillovers to non-eligible workers.
5. **Education requirement:** DACA has an education/military service requirement that cannot be observed in the ACS. Some individuals classified as eligible may not meet this criterion.

7.3 Comparison to Prior Literature

The existing literature on DACA’s labor market effects has produced mixed findings. Some studies have found positive effects on employment and earnings, while others have found null or small effects. The null result in this analysis is consistent with studies that find modest effects of DACA on extensive margin employment outcomes, while larger effects may be concentrated on intensive margin outcomes (hours, wages) or other measures of job quality.

8 Conclusion

This study examined the effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born non-citizens in the United States. Using a difference-in-differences design comparing DACA-eligible individuals to age-ineligible controls, I find that DACA eligibility had a small, statistically insignificant effect on full-time employment (0.21 percentage points, 95% CI: -0.82 to 1.23 pp).

The null result masks interesting heterogeneity by gender, with DACA appearing to decrease full-time employment for males while increasing it for females. This heterogeneity warrants further investigation.

Several caveats apply to these findings. The control group of older immigrants may not be an ideal counterfactual for younger DACA-eligible individuals. Measurement error in identifying undocumented status likely attenuates the estimates. And the intent-to-treat design means that the effects of actually receiving DACA benefits would be larger than these estimates of eligibility effects.

Despite these limitations, the analysis provides useful evidence on the employment effects of DACA. The program does not appear to have dramatically increased full-time employment among eligible individuals, though it may have had modest positive effects that are difficult to detect with precision. The heterogeneous effects by gender suggest that DACA may have affected labor market decisions differently for men and women, potentially reflecting interactions with educational investments or gender-specific labor market barriers.

Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures




Figure 4: Difference-in-Differences Illustration

Notes: The figure illustrates the difference-in-differences calculation. Solid circles show observed outcomes for the treatment group; solid squares show outcomes for the control group. The hollow circle shows the counterfactual outcome for the treatment group (what would have happened without DACA, assuming parallel trends). The DiD estimate is the difference between the observed and counterfactual treatment group outcomes in the post period.

Table 7: Full-Time Employment Rates by Year and Treatment Status

Year	Treatment	Control
	(DACA Eligible)	(Age-Ineligible)
2006	0.469	0.717
2007	0.483	0.724
2008	0.478	0.698
2009	0.439	0.657
2010	0.429	0.627
2011	0.430	0.630
2013	0.481	0.629
2014	0.508	0.636
2015	0.539	0.643
2016	0.558	0.633

Table 8: Event Study Coefficients

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	95% CI
2006	0.0092	0.0110	[−0.012, 0.031]
2007	0.0107	0.0109	[−0.011, 0.032]
2008	0.0242	0.0110	[0.003, 0.046]
2009	0.0125	0.0109	[−0.009, 0.034]
2010	0.0201	0.0108	[−0.001, 0.041]
2011 (ref)	0.0000	—	—
2013	0.0144	0.0109	[−0.007, 0.036]
2014	0.0113	0.0110	[−0.010, 0.033]
2015	0.0089	0.0112	[−0.013, 0.031]
2016	0.0254	0.0113	[0.003, 0.048]

Appendix B: Data Documentation

IPUMS Variable Codes

Table 9: Key Variables and Codes

Variable	Description	Key Values
HISPAN	Hispanic origin	1 = Mexican
BPL	Birthplace	200 = Mexico
CITIZEN	Citizenship status	3 = Not a citizen
BIRTHYR	Birth year	Continuous
BIRTHQTR	Birth quarter	1-4
YRIMMIG	Year of immigration	Continuous
UHRSWORK	Usual hours worked/week	0-99
EMPSTAT	Employment status	1 = Employed
SEX	Sex	1 = Male, 2 = Female
MARST	Marital status	1 = Married, spouse present
EDUC	Education	6+ = HS or higher
STATEFIP	State FIPS code	1-56
PERWT	Person weight	Continuous

Sample Selection Criteria

1. Hispanic-Mexican: HISPAN = 1
2. Mexico-born: BPL = 200
3. Non-citizen: CITIZEN = 3
4. Working age: AGE $\in [16, 64]$
5. Valid immigration year: YRIMMIG > 0
6. Treatment group: Arrived before age 16, born after June 1981, immigrated by 2007
7. Control group: Arrived before age 16, born before 1981, immigrated by 2007