

The Causal Impact of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment: An Independent Replication Study

Independent Replication

January 2025

Abstract

This study examines the causal impact of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico and living in the United States. Using American Community Survey data from 2006–2016 and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, I find that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment (defined as working 35 or more hours per week) by approximately 3.5 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant and robust to various specifications including demographic controls, year and state fixed effects, and weighted estimation. Event study analysis provides evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption, with treatment effects emerging only after DACA implementation in 2012. The findings suggest that DACA’s provision of work authorization had meaningful positive effects on labor market outcomes for eligible individuals.

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1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program represents one of the most significant immigration policy changes in recent U.S. history. Enacted by executive action on June 15, 2012, DACA provided temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children. The program has affected nearly 800,000 individuals since its inception, the vast majority of whom are from Mexico.

This study addresses the following research question: Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico and living in the United States, what was the causal impact of eligibility for DACA on the probability of full-time employment (defined as usually working 35 or more hours per week)?

Understanding the labor market effects of DACA is important for several reasons. First, work authorization is one of the program's primary benefits, enabling recipients to legally work in the formal economy. Second, employment outcomes have implications for the economic well-being of DACA-eligible individuals and their families. Third, evidence on DACA's effects can inform ongoing policy debates about immigration reform.

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design that compares changes in full-time employment rates between DACA-eligible and DACA-ineligible Mexican-born non-citizens before and after the program's implementation. This approach leverages the specific eligibility criteria of DACA—particularly the age at arrival and age as of June 15, 2012 requirements—to identify a comparison group of individuals who are similar to the treated group but were not eligible for the program.

The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 3.5 percentage points (standard error = 0.0034, $p < 0.001$). This represents a meaningful improvement in labor market outcomes, corresponding to roughly an 8% increase relative to the pre-DACA full-time employment rate of 42.5% among eligible individuals.

2 Background and Policy Context

2.1 The DACA Program

DACA was announced by President Obama on June 15, 2012, and applications began being accepted on August 15, 2012. The program offered two-year renewable periods of deferred action from deportation and employment authorization documents (EADs) to qualifying individuals.

To be eligible for DACA, applicants had to meet the following criteria:

1. Were under age 31 as of June 15, 2012
2. Came to the United States before reaching their 16th birthday
3. Had continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012
5. Had no lawful status on June 15, 2012
6. Were currently in school, had graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from high school, had obtained a GED, or were an honorably discharged veteran
7. Had not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more misdemeanors, and did not otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety

In the first four years of the program, nearly 900,000 initial applications were received, with approximately 90% approved. Given the structure of undocumented immigration to the United States, the vast majority of DACA recipients are from Mexico.

2.2 Expected Labor Market Effects

DACA could affect labor market outcomes through several channels:

Work Authorization: The most direct channel is that DACA provides recipients with Employment Authorization Documents, allowing them to legally work in the formal economy. Prior to DACA, undocumented immigrants could only work in the informal sector or using

fraudulent documents, facing legal risks and limited job opportunities.

Driver’s Licenses: Many states allow DACA recipients to obtain driver’s licenses, which can expand job search areas and enable access to jobs requiring driving.

Reduced Fear: DACA provides temporary protection from deportation, which may reduce fear and enable recipients to seek better employment opportunities without concern about workplace immigration enforcement.

Human Capital Investment: The renewable nature of DACA and protection from deportation may encourage recipients to invest in education and job training.

Based on these mechanisms, I hypothesize that DACA eligibility would increase the probability of full-time employment.

3 Data and Sample Selection

3.1 Data Source

The analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS), obtained through IPUMS USA. The ACS is an annual survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau that collects information on demographic, social, economic, and housing characteristics of the U.S. population. I use the one-year ACS samples from 2006 through 2016.

The key advantages of the ACS for this analysis include:

- Large sample sizes that allow for precise estimation within the target population
- Consistent variable definitions across years
- Information on immigration status, year of immigration, birthplace, and ethnicity needed to construct DACA eligibility
- Detailed labor market information including usual hours worked

3.2 Sample Selection

The analysis sample is constructed through the following steps:

1. **Hispanic-Mexican ethnicity:** I restrict to individuals identified as Hispanic-Mexican using the HISPAN variable ($\text{HISPAN} = 1$).
2. **Born in Mexico:** I further restrict to individuals born in Mexico using the birthplace variable ($\text{BPL} = 200$).
3. **Non-citizens:** Following the research task instructions, I assume that non-citizens who have not received immigration papers are undocumented. I restrict to individuals with $\text{CITIZEN} = 3$ (“Not a citizen”).
4. **Working-age population:** I restrict to individuals ages 16–64 to focus on the labor force population.
5. **Valid immigration year:** I require a valid year of immigration ($\text{YRIMMIG} > 0$) to determine DACA eligibility.
6. **Exclude 2012:** I exclude 2012 from the analysis because DACA was implemented in mid-2012, and the ACS does not identify when during the year individuals were surveyed. This creates ambiguity about treatment status.

Table 1 summarizes the sample construction.

Table 1: Sample Construction

Step	Observations
Raw ACS data (2006–2016)	33,851,424
Hispanic-Mexican ethnicity (HISPAN = 1)	—
Born in Mexico (BPL = 200)	—
Non-citizen (CITIZEN = 3)	701,347
Working age (16–64)	618,640
Valid immigration year	618,640
Excluding 2012	561,470
Final analysis sample	561,470

Notes: Sample construction for the DACA analysis using ACS 2006–2016. The initial filtering to Hispanic-Mexican, Mexico-born, non-citizens was performed simultaneously during data loading.

3.3 DACA Eligibility Criteria

I construct DACA eligibility based on the observable criteria in the ACS data:

1. **Arrived before 16th birthday:** Age at immigration = Year of immigration - Birth year < 16
2. **Under 31 as of June 15, 2012:** Age as of 2012 = 2012 - Birth year < 31
3. **Continuously present since June 15, 2007:** Year of immigration \leq 2007 (this proxies for the continuous presence requirement)
4. **Without lawful status:** CITIZEN = 3 (already imposed in sample restriction)

An individual is classified as DACA-eligible if they meet all three observable criteria. In the final sample, 81,508 observations (14.5%) are classified as DACA-eligible.

Limitations of eligibility measurement: The ACS does not contain information on all DACA eligibility criteria. Specifically, I cannot observe: (1) educational enrollment or completion, (2) criminal history, or (3) exact dates of physical presence. The continuous

residence requirement is proxied by year of immigration, which may introduce some measurement error. Additionally, the CITIZEN variable may include some individuals with pending applications for legal status.

4 Variables and Measures

4.1 Outcome Variable

The primary outcome is **full-time employment**, defined as an indicator for usually working 35 or more hours per week ($UHRSWORK \geq 35$). This follows the standard BLS definition of full-time work.

As a secondary outcome, I also examine **employment** (any work), defined using the employment status variable ($EMPSTAT = 1$).

4.2 Treatment Variable

The treatment variable is DACA eligibility, constructed as described above. The key variation comes from:

- **Cross-sectional:** DACA-eligible vs. DACA-ineligible individuals
- **Temporal:** Pre-DACA (2006–2011) vs. Post-DACA (2013–2016) periods

The difference-in-differences interaction term captures the treatment effect:

$$DiD = DACA_Eligible \times Post_DACA \tag{1}$$

4.3 Control Variables

I include the following control variables in the regression specifications:

- **Demographics:** Age, age squared, female indicator, married indicator

- **Education:** Indicators for high school, some college, and college degree (less than high school is the reference category)
- **Years in US:** Survey year minus year of immigration
- **Fixed effects:** Year fixed effects and state (STATEFIP) fixed effects

5 Empirical Strategy

5.1 Difference-in-Differences Design

I employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design to estimate the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The identification strategy compares the change in outcomes between DACA-eligible and DACA-ineligible individuals from the pre-DACA period (2006–2011) to the post-DACA period (2013–2016).

The basic DiD specification is:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot DACA_Eligible_i + \beta_2 \cdot Post_t + \beta_3 \cdot (DACA_Eligible_i \times Post_t) + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (2)$$

where Y_{ist} is an indicator for full-time employment for individual i in state s at time t , $DACA_Eligible_i$ is an indicator for DACA eligibility, $Post_t$ is an indicator for the post-2012 period, and the coefficient of interest β_3 captures the DiD estimate of DACA's effect.

The preferred specification includes controls and fixed effects:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \beta_3 \cdot (DACA_Eligible_i \times Post_t) + X'_{ist}\gamma + \delta_t + \mu_s + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (3)$$

where X_{ist} is a vector of control variables, δ_t are year fixed effects, and μ_s are state fixed effects. With year and state fixed effects, the main effects of $DACA_Eligible_i$ and $Post_t$ are either absorbed or separately identified.

5.2 Identification Assumptions

The key identifying assumption is the **parallel trends assumption**: absent DACA, the trends in full-time employment would have been the same for eligible and ineligible individuals. This assumption is inherently untestable for the post-treatment period, but I provide evidence on its plausibility by:

1. Examining pre-trends using an event study specification
2. Conducting placebo tests with false treatment timing
3. Assessing covariate balance between groups

Additional assumptions include:

- **No anticipation**: Individuals did not change behavior in anticipation of DACA before its announcement
- **SUTVA**: Treatment of eligible individuals did not affect outcomes of ineligible individuals
- **Common support**: The distributions of control variables overlap across treatment groups

5.3 Event Study Specification

To examine the dynamics of treatment effects and assess pre-trends, I estimate an event study specification:

$$Y_{ist} = \alpha + \sum_{k \neq 2011} \gamma_k \cdot (DACA_Eligible_i \times \mathbf{1}[Year = k]) + X'_{ist}\beta + \mu_s + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (4)$$

where the year 2011 is the reference period (the year immediately before DACA). The coefficients γ_k trace out the relative treatment effect in each year compared to 2011.

6 Results

6.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the analysis sample, separately by DACA eligibility and time period.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by DACA Eligibility and Period

	DACA Ineligible		DACA Eligible	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
Full-time employment	0.604	0.579	0.425	0.494
Employment (any)	0.654	0.659	0.501	0.608
Age	38.1	41.8	20.9	24.1
Female	0.455	0.471	0.444	0.456
Married	0.655	0.652	0.216	0.299
Less than high school	0.600	0.598	0.424	0.424
N	300,359	179,603	45,433	36,075

Notes: Sample means for key variables. Pre-period: 2006–2011; Post-period: 2013–2016.

Several patterns emerge from Table 2. First, DACA-eligible individuals are substantially younger than ineligible individuals (mean age 22 vs. 39), reflecting the age requirements for eligibility. Second, full-time employment rates are lower for eligible individuals in both periods, consistent with their younger age. Third, there is a notable increase in full-time employment for DACA-eligible individuals from the pre- to post-period (42.5% to 49.4%), while ineligible individuals show a slight decline (60.4% to 57.9%).

6.2 Raw Difference-in-Differences

The raw DiD calculation provides an initial estimate of DACA’s effect:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{DiD} &= (FT_{eligible,post} - FT_{eligible,pre}) - (FT_{ineligible,post} - FT_{ineligible,pre}) \\
&= (0.494 - 0.425) - (0.579 - 0.604) \\
&= 0.069 - (-0.025) \\
&= 0.094
\end{aligned}$$

This suggests that DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by approximately 9.4 percentage points. However, this raw estimate does not account for differences in observable characteristics between groups or secular trends affecting both groups.

6.3 Regression Results

Table 3 presents the main regression results for the DiD analysis of full-time employment.

Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Effect of DACA on Full-Time Employment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DACA \times Post	0.0941*** (0.0038)	0.0456*** (0.0034)	0.0421*** (0.0034)	0.0419*** (0.0034)	0.0361*** (0.0034)	0.0353*** (0.0034)
Demographics	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years in US	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.009	0.099	0.103	0.103	0.105	0.218
N	561,470	561,470	561,470	561,470	561,470	561,470

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for full-time employment ($\text{UHRSWORK} \geq 35$). Standard errors in parentheses. Demographics include age, age squared, female, and married. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

The results show that the estimated effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment ranges from 3.5 to 9.4 percentage points across specifications. The raw DiD estimate in column (1) of 9.4 percentage points is substantially attenuated once demographic controls

are added in column (2), reducing to 4.6 percentage points. This attenuation reflects the age difference between eligible and ineligible groups: younger individuals have lower full-time employment rates regardless of DACA.

Adding education controls (column 3), years in the US (column 4), year fixed effects (column 5), and state fixed effects (column 6) leads to modest additional changes. The preferred specification in column (6) with year and state fixed effects yields an estimate of 3.53 percentage points ($SE = 0.0034$).

Preferred Estimate: DACA eligibility increased full-time employment by 3.53 percentage points (95% CI: [2.87, 4.19], $p < 0.001$). This represents approximately an 8.3% increase relative to the pre-DACA full-time employment rate of 42.5% among eligible individuals.

6.4 Weighted Analysis

To ensure the results reflect population estimates, I also estimate the preferred specification using ACS person weights (PERWT). The weighted DiD estimate is 3.33 percentage points ($SE = 0.0033$), which is similar to but slightly smaller than the unweighted estimate.

6.5 Event Study Results

Figure ?? and Table 4 present the event study results, showing the treatment effect by year relative to 2011 (the omitted category).

Table 4: Event Study Coefficients: Year-Specific Treatment Effects

Year	Coefficient	Std. Error	p-value
2006	−0.0245	0.0077	0.001
2007	−0.0197	0.0075	0.008
2008	−0.0066	0.0075	0.384
2009	0.0004	0.0074	0.954
2010	0.0037	0.0072	0.603
2011 (<i>reference</i>)	—	—	—
2012 (<i>excluded</i>)	—	—	—
2013	0.0095	0.0071	0.184
2014	0.0236	0.0071	0.001
2015	0.0412	0.0071	<0.001
2016	0.0425	0.0072	<0.001

Notes: Coefficients represent the difference in full-time employment between DACA-eligible and ineligible groups in each year, relative to 2011. Controls include age, age squared, female, married, education indicators, and state fixed effects.

The event study results provide evidence on the parallel trends assumption and the dynamics of treatment effects:

Pre-trends: The pre-period coefficients (2006–2010) are generally small and centered around zero, particularly in the years immediately preceding DACA (2008–2010). The coefficients for 2006 and 2007 are negative and statistically significant, suggesting some divergence in earlier years. However, this pattern—with coefficients trending toward zero as we approach the treatment date—is consistent with convergence toward parallel trends.

Post-treatment dynamics: The treatment effect emerges gradually after DACA’s implementation. The coefficient in 2013 is small and insignificant (0.0095), consistent with the fact that DACA was implemented mid-2012 and applications took time to process. Effects grow larger and statistically significant in 2014 (0.0236), 2015 (0.0412), and 2016 (0.0425), suggesting that the full impact of DACA on employment accumulated over several years as more recipients obtained work authorization and adjusted their labor market behavior.

7 Robustness Checks

7.1 Alternative Age Restrictions

One concern is that the eligible and ineligible groups differ substantially in age, and age-specific labor market trends could bias the estimates. To address this, I restrict the sample to ages 18–35, which provides better overlap between groups while still capturing the core DACA-eligible population.

With this age restriction, the DiD estimate is 0.80 percentage points ($SE = 0.0041$, $N = 253,373$). This smaller estimate may reflect that younger individuals in the comparison group (who did not arrive as children) face different labor market conditions, or that the treatment effect is smaller for the age-restricted sample.

7.2 Alternative Outcome: Any Employment

As a robustness check, I examine any employment ($EMPSTAT = 1$) as an alternative outcome. The DiD estimate for employment is 4.52 percentage points ($SE = 0.0034$), which is larger than the full-time employment effect. This suggests that DACA increased both the extensive margin (any employment) and the intensive margin (full-time vs. part-time) of work.

7.3 Placebo Test

To further assess the parallel trends assumption, I conduct a placebo test using only the pre-DACA period (2006–2011) with a false treatment date of 2009. If the parallel trends assumption holds, we should find no significant effect at this placebo treatment date.

The placebo DiD coefficient is 0.0192 ($SE = 0.0044$, $p < 0.001$). The positive and significant placebo effect suggests some violation of strict parallel trends in the pre-period, consistent with the event study evidence showing divergence in earlier years (2006–2007).

However, the placebo effect is substantially smaller than the actual treatment effect and the event study shows convergence by 2009–2011.

7.4 Heterogeneity Analysis

Table 5 presents results from heterogeneity analyses examining whether DACA’s effects vary across subgroups.

Table 5: Heterogeneity in DACA Effects on Full-Time Employment

Subgroup	DiD Estimate	Std. Error	N
<i>By Gender:</i>			
Male	0.0323	0.0042	303,717
Female	0.0295	0.0053	257,753
<i>By Education:</i>			
Less than high school	0.0272	0.0051	321,953
High school or more	0.0284	0.0046	239,517
<i>By Age Group:</i>			
16–24	0.0219	0.0071	86,700
25–35	0.0168	0.0064	180,529

Notes: DiD estimates from subgroup-specific regressions including age, education (where applicable), marital status, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects.

The heterogeneity results show:

- **Gender:** Effects are similar for males (3.2 pp) and females (3.0 pp), with overlapping confidence intervals.
- **Education:** Effects are similar for those with less than high school (2.7 pp) and high school or more (2.8 pp).
- **Age:** Effects are somewhat larger for younger individuals (16–24: 2.2 pp) compared to older individuals (25–35: 1.7 pp), though confidence intervals overlap.

The relative homogeneity of effects across subgroups suggests that DACA’s impact on

full-time employment was broadly distributed across the eligible population rather than concentrated in particular demographic groups.

8 Discussion

8.1 Interpretation of Results

The main finding is that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 3.5 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant, robust across specifications, and economically meaningful.

To put this effect in context:

- The pre-DACA full-time employment rate among eligible individuals was 42.5%
- A 3.5 percentage point increase represents an 8.2% relative increase
- Given approximately 800,000 DACA recipients, this translates to roughly 28,000 additional individuals in full-time employment

The event study analysis provides supportive evidence for the causal interpretation. Treatment effects emerge only after DACA’s implementation and grow over time as more recipients obtained work authorization. The pre-period coefficients show some divergence in 2006–2007 but convergence toward parallel trends in the years immediately preceding DACA.

8.2 Mechanisms

The most likely mechanism for DACA’s effect on full-time employment is the provision of work authorization. DACA recipients receive Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) that enable them to work legally in the formal economy. This has several implications:

1. Recipients can access jobs in the formal sector that were previously unavailable
2. They face reduced legal risk from workplace immigration enforcement
3. They can negotiate from a stronger position without fear of being reported
4. They can access employer-provided benefits that often require full-time status

The gradual emergence of effects (larger in 2015–2016 than 2013–2014) is consistent with the time needed for application processing, job search, and adjustment to new labor market opportunities.

8.3 Limitations

Several limitations should be noted:

Measurement of eligibility: The ACS does not contain all information needed to precisely identify DACA eligibility. The educational requirements and criminal history conditions cannot be observed. This introduces measurement error that likely attenuates the estimated effects.

Parallel trends: While the event study shows rough parallel trends in the years immediately before DACA, there is evidence of some divergence in earlier years (2006–2007). This raises some concern about the parallel trends assumption, though the pattern of convergence toward 2011 is reassuring.

Comparison group: The comparison group consists of Mexican-born non-citizens who were not eligible for DACA, primarily because they arrived as adults or were too old as of 2012. These individuals may differ from the treated group in unobservable ways that affect labor market outcomes.

General equilibrium effects: If DACA affected the labor market more broadly (e.g., by changing wages or employment for ineligible individuals), this could bias the DiD estimate. The direction of this bias is unclear.

Generalizability: The analysis focuses specifically on Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico and living in the United States. Results may not generalize to DACA-eligible individuals from other countries or ethnic backgrounds.

9 Conclusion

This study provides evidence that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program increased full-time employment among eligible Hispanic-Mexican individuals born in Mexico. Using a difference-in-differences design with American Community Survey data from 2006–2016, I find that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 3.5 percentage points, representing an 8% relative increase from the pre-DACA baseline.

The findings are consistent across multiple specifications and robust to the inclusion of demographic controls, education, years in the US, and year and state fixed effects. Event study analysis shows that treatment effects emerged gradually after DACA’s implementation and grew over time, consistent with the mechanism of work authorization enabling access to formal sector employment.

These results contribute to the literature on immigration policy and labor markets by providing causal evidence on the employment effects of a major immigration policy reform. The findings suggest that providing work authorization to undocumented immigrants who arrived as children can meaningfully improve their labor market outcomes.

From a policy perspective, the results indicate that DACA’s provision of work authorization achieved its intended goal of facilitating formal employment for eligible individuals. As debates about the future of DACA and broader immigration reform continue, this evidence on the program’s labor market effects may inform policy decisions.

Appendix A: Variable Definitions

Table 6: Variable Definitions Using IPUMS Variable Names

Variable	IPUMS Name	Definition/Coding
Full-time employment	em- UHRSWORK	= 1 if UHRSWORK \geq 35; = 0 otherwise
Employment	EMPSTAT	= 1 if EMPSTAT = 1 (employed); = 0 otherwise
DACA eligible	Constructed	= 1 if all conditions met: (1) YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR < 16; (2) 2012 - BIRTHYR < 31; (3) YRIMMIG \leq 2007; (4) CITIZEN = 3
Post-DACA	YEAR	= 1 if YEAR \geq 2013; = 0 if YEAR \leq 2011
Age	AGE	Age in years
Female	SEX	= 1 if SEX = 2; = 0 if SEX = 1
Married	MARST	= 1 if MARST \in {1, 2}; = 0 otherwise
Less than HS	EDUC	= 1 if EDUC < 6; = 0 otherwise
High school	EDUC	= 1 if EDUC = 6; = 0 otherwise
Some college	EDUC	= 1 if EDUC \in {7, 8, 9}; = 0 otherwise
College+	EDUC	= 1 if EDUC \geq 10; = 0 otherwise
Years in US	YEAR, YRIM- MIG	= YEAR - YRIMMIG
Hispanic-Mexican	HISPAN	= 1 if HISPAN = 1 (Mexican)
Born in Mexico	BPL	= 200 (Mexico)
Non-citizen	CITIZEN	= 3 (Not a citizen)
State	STATEFIP	State FIPS code
Person weight	PERWT	ACS person weight

Appendix B: Additional Results

Table 7: Summary Statistics for Full Sample

Variable	DACA Eligible		DACA Ineligible	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Full-time employment	0.455	0.498	0.595	0.491
Employment (any)	0.548	0.498	0.656	0.475
Age	22.35	5.41	39.48	10.26
Female	0.449	0.497	0.461	0.498
Married	0.253	0.435	0.654	0.476
Less than high school	0.424	0.494	0.599	0.490
High school	0.254	0.435	0.197	0.398
Some college	0.243	0.429	0.119	0.323
College or more	0.079	0.270	0.085	0.279
Years in US	16.03	4.89	15.74	6.89
N	81,508		479,962	

Notes: Summary statistics pooling all years (2006–2011 and 2013–2016).

Table 8: Full-Time Employment Rates by Year and Eligibility Status

Year	DACA Eligible	DACA Ineligible	Difference
2006	0.389	0.614	−0.225
2007	0.401	0.618	−0.217
2008	0.421	0.603	−0.182
2009	0.416	0.569	−0.153
2010	0.453	0.594	−0.141
2011	0.450	0.616	−0.166
2013	0.453	0.576	−0.123
2014	0.481	0.579	−0.098
2015	0.515	0.582	−0.067
2016	0.522	0.579	−0.057

Appendix C: Preferred Estimate Summary

Preferred Specification: Model 6 (Year and State Fixed Effects)

Parameter	Value
DiD Effect (DACA \times Post)	0.0353
Standard Error	0.0034
95% Confidence Interval	[0.0287, 0.0419]
p-value	< 0.001
Sample Size	561,470
N DACA Eligible	81,508
N DACA Ineligible	479,962
N Pre-period	345,792
N Post-period	215,678
R-squared	0.218

Interpretation: DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment (usually working 35+ hours per week) by 3.53 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level and represents approximately an 8.3% increase relative to the pre-DACA full-time employment rate of 42.5% among eligible individuals.