

Replication Report: The Effect of DACA Eligibility on Full-Time Employment Among Mexican-Born Hispanic Immigrants

Independent Replication Study

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Abstract

This study replicates an analysis examining the causal effect of eligibility for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program on full-time employment among Mexican-born Hispanic immigrants in the United States. Using data from the American Community Survey (2006–2016), I employ a difference-in-differences research design comparing individuals aged 26–30 (DACA-eligible treatment group) to those aged 31–35 (ineligible control group) as of June 15, 2012. The preferred estimate indicates that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 4.1 percentage points ($SE = 0.011$, 95% CI: $[0.020, 0.062]$, $p < 0.001$). This effect is robust to the inclusion of demographic controls, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Pre-trend analysis supports the parallel trends assumption underlying the difference-in-differences design. The results suggest meaningful labor market benefits from DACA eligibility, with particularly pronounced effects among those with higher education levels.

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1 Introduction

The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, implemented on June 15, 2012, represents one of the most significant immigration policy changes in recent U.S. history. The program provided eligible undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States as children with temporary relief from deportation and work authorization for renewable two-year periods. Understanding the labor market effects of this policy is crucial for informing ongoing debates about immigration reform and the economic integration of undocumented immigrants.

This replication study examines the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment among Mexican-born Hispanic immigrants. The analysis focuses on individuals who were non-citizens and likely undocumented at the time of DACA's implementation, comparing those who were young enough to be eligible for the program (treatment group) to those who were marginally too old to qualify (control group).

The research question guiding this analysis is: *Among ethnically Hispanic-Mexican, Mexican-born individuals living in the United States, what was the causal impact of eligibility for DACA on the probability of full-time employment (defined as usually working 35 or more hours per week)?*

1.1 Policy Background

DACA was announced by the Obama administration on June 15, 2012, and began accepting applications on August 15, 2012. To be eligible for DACA, individuals had to meet several criteria:

1. Arrived in the United States before their 16th birthday
2. Had not yet reached their 31st birthday as of June 15, 2012
3. Lived continuously in the United States since June 15, 2007
4. Were present in the United States on June 15, 2012
5. Did not have lawful immigration status (citizenship or legal residency) at that time
6. Were currently enrolled in school, had graduated from high school, obtained a GED, or were honorably discharged veterans
7. Had not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or multiple misdemeanors

The program provided successful applicants with two primary benefits: (1) deferred action on deportation for two years, renewable, and (2) eligibility for work authorization. These benefits were expected to improve labor market outcomes by removing barriers to formal employment and reducing the risks associated with working without documentation.

In the first four years of the program, nearly 900,000 initial applications were received, with approximately 90% approved. While the program was not restricted to any particular national origin, the majority of eligible individuals were from Mexico, reflecting the demographic composition of the undocumented immigrant population in the United States.

1.2 Research Design Overview

This study employs a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design to estimate the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The identification strategy exploits the age cutoff in DACA eligibility: individuals who had not yet turned 31 as of June 15, 2012 were eligible, while those who had already turned 31 were not.

The treatment group consists of individuals who were ages 26–30 as of June 15, 2012, while the control group consists of individuals who were ages 31–35 at the same date. By comparing changes in full-time employment between these groups from the pre-DACA period (2006–2011) to the post-DACA period (2013–2016), we can estimate the effect of DACA eligibility under the assumption that both groups would have followed parallel trends in the absence of the policy.

2 Data

2.1 Data Source

The analysis uses data from the American Community Survey (ACS), obtained through IPUMS USA. The ACS is a nationally representative survey conducted annually by the U.S. Census Bureau, collecting detailed demographic, economic, and housing information from approximately 3.5 million households per year.

I use the one-year ACS samples from 2006 through 2016, excluding the 2012 sample due to the timing of DACA implementation (June 15, 2012). Since the ACS does not record the month of data collection, observations from 2012 cannot be reliably classified as pre- or post-treatment.

2.2 Sample Construction

The analysis sample is constructed by applying the following sequential filters to the full ACS data:

1. **Hispanic-Mexican ethnicity:** Individuals must be identified as Hispanic-Mexican ($HISPAN = 1$). This filter reduces the sample from 33,851,424 to 2,945,521 observations.
2. **Born in Mexico:** Individuals must be born in Mexico ($BPL = 200$). This further reduces the sample to 991,261 observations.
3. **Non-citizen status:** Following the instructions to assume that non-citizens without immigration papers are undocumented, I restrict the sample to non-citizens ($CITIZEN = 3$). This yields 701,347 observations.
4. **Age restriction:** Individuals must be aged 26–35 as of June 15, 2012. Age is calculated using birth year ($BIRTHYR$) and birth quarter ($BIRTHQTR$), with those born in quarters 3–4 (July–December) having their age adjusted downward by one year since they would not have had their birthday by June 15. This restricts the sample to 181,229 observations.
5. **Arrived before age 16:** To satisfy the DACA requirement of arriving before the 16th birthday, I calculate age at immigration using $YRIMMIG$ and $BIRTHYR$, and exclude those who arrived at age 16 or older. This yields 47,418 observations.
6. **Continuous residence since 2007:** As a proxy for the requirement of continuous residence since June 15, 2007, I require that the year of immigration ($YRIMMIG$) be 2007 or earlier. All individuals satisfying the previous criterion also satisfy this one, maintaining 47,418 observations.
7. **Excluding 2012:** The year 2012 is excluded from the analysis due to the ambiguity of pre/post classification. This yields the final analysis sample of 43,238 observations.

2.3 Variable Definitions

2.3.1 Outcome Variable

The primary outcome is **full-time employment**, defined as an indicator equal to 1 if the individual reports usually working 35 or more hours per week ($UHRSWORK \geq 35$), and 0 otherwise. This definition aligns with standard Bureau of Labor Statistics conventions for full-time work.

2.3.2 Treatment Variable

The treatment indicator equals 1 for individuals aged 26–30 as of June 15, 2012 (the DACA-eligible “treatment group”), and 0 for individuals aged 31–35 as of the same date (the “control group”).

2.3.3 Time Period Variable

The post-period indicator equals 1 for observations from 2013–2016 (after DACA implementation), and 0 for observations from 2006–2011 (before DACA implementation).

2.3.4 Control Variables

The following demographic control variables are included in some specifications:

- **Male:** Indicator for male gender ($\text{SEX} = 1$)
- **Married:** Indicator for married with spouse present ($\text{MARST} = 1$)
- **Has children:** Indicator for having at least one own child in household ($\text{NCHILD} > 0$)
- **Education:** Categorical indicators for high school degree ($\text{EDUC} = 6$), some college ($\text{EDUC} = 7\text{--}9$), and college degree or higher ($\text{EDUC} \geq 10$), with less than high school as the reference category
- **State fixed effects:** Categorical indicators for state of residence (STATEFIP)
- **Year fixed effects:** Categorical indicators for survey year (YEAR)

2.4 Sample Weights

All analyses use person weights (PERWT) provided by IPUMS to account for the complex survey design of the ACS and produce nationally representative estimates.

3 Methodology

3.1 Difference-in-Differences Framework

The difference-in-differences estimator compares the change in outcomes between the treatment and control groups over time. Formally, let Y_{it} denote the outcome (full-time employ-

ment) for individual i in year t , D_i denote the treatment indicator, and $Post_t$ denote the post-period indicator. The basic DiD model is:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 (D_i \times Post_t) + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

The coefficient β_3 on the interaction term captures the DiD estimate—the causal effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment under the identifying assumption of parallel trends.

3.2 Extended Specifications

To assess robustness and improve precision, I estimate several extended specifications:

3.2.1 Model with Demographic Controls

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 (D_i \times Post_t) + X'_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where X_{it} is a vector of demographic controls including gender, marital status, presence of children, and education level.

3.2.2 Model with State Fixed Effects

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 (D_i \times Post_t) + X'_{it} \gamma + \alpha_s + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where α_s represents state fixed effects that control for time-invariant differences across states in labor market conditions and policy environments.

3.2.3 Model with Year and State Fixed Effects

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_3 (D_i \times Post_t) + X'_{it} \gamma + \alpha_s + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

where δ_t represents year fixed effects that control for common time trends affecting all individuals. Note that the inclusion of year fixed effects absorbs the main effect of $Post_t$.

3.3 Pre-Trend Analysis

The validity of the DiD design rests on the parallel trends assumption: in the absence of DACA, the treatment and control groups would have experienced parallel changes in full-time employment over time. While this assumption is fundamentally untestable, I assess its plausibility by testing for differential pre-trends between the groups.

The pre-trend test estimates separate interaction effects for each pre-period year relative to the reference year (2006):

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_i + \sum_{t=2007}^{2011} \gamma_t \cdot \mathbf{1}(Year = t) + \sum_{t=2007}^{2011} \delta_t \cdot D_i \cdot \mathbf{1}(Year = t) + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (5)$$

Under parallel trends, the coefficients δ_t should be close to zero and statistically insignificant. A joint F-test of $\delta_{2007} = \delta_{2008} = \delta_{2009} = \delta_{2010} = \delta_{2011} = 0$ provides an overall test of the parallel trends assumption.

3.4 Event Study Analysis

To visualize the dynamic effects of DACA and further assess parallel trends, I estimate an event study specification with year-specific treatment effects relative to 2011 (the last pre-treatment year):

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_i + \sum_{t \neq 2011} \gamma_t \cdot \mathbf{1}(Year = t) + \sum_{t \neq 2011} \delta_t \cdot D_i \cdot \mathbf{1}(Year = t) + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (6)$$

The coefficients δ_t trace out the year-by-year difference between treatment and control groups, normalized to zero in 2011.

3.5 Standard Errors

All standard errors are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust (HC1) estimation to account for potential heteroskedasticity in the error terms. This is particularly important given the binary nature of the outcome variable.

4 Results

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the analysis sample by treatment status and time period.

Table 1: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status and Time Period

Variable	Control (Ages 31–35)		Treatment (Ages 26–30)	
	Pre-Period	Post-Period	Pre-Period	Post-Period
Full-time employment rate	0.646	0.614	0.615	0.634
Male (%)	56.7	54.8	56.2	55.9
Married (%)	49.2	53.5	34.2	46.9
Mean age	29.9	35.9	24.7	30.7
Mean education (EDUC)	4.76	4.65	5.11	5.06
Observations	11,683	6,085	16,694	8,776
Weighted N	1,631,151	845,134	2,280,009	1,244,124

Several patterns emerge from the descriptive statistics. First, the control group has slightly higher full-time employment rates in the pre-period (64.6% vs. 61.5%), which may reflect the effects of age on labor force participation. Second, the treatment group experiences an increase in full-time employment from the pre- to post-period (61.5% to 63.4%), while the control group experiences a decline (64.6% to 61.4%). This differential pattern suggests a positive effect of DACA eligibility.

The groups are similar in gender composition (approximately 55–57% male) but differ in marital status, with the control group being more likely to be married. Educational attainment is slightly higher in the treatment group, which may reflect cohort effects in educational access.

4.2 Visual Evidence: Trends in Full-Time Employment

Figure 1 displays the year-by-year trends in full-time employment rates for the treatment and control groups.




Figure 1: Full-Time Employment Rates by Year and Treatment Status (Weighted)

The visual evidence supports the DiD identification strategy. Both groups show similar downward trends during the 2008–2011 period, likely reflecting the effects of the Great Recession. After DACA implementation in 2012, the treatment group shows a clear recovery and eventual increase above pre-recession levels, while the control group shows a more modest recovery. The gap between the groups narrows substantially in the post-period, consistent with a positive effect of DACA eligibility.

4.3 Main Results: Difference-in-Differences Estimates

Table 2 presents the main difference-in-differences estimates across multiple specifications.

Table 2: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of DACA Effect on Full-Time Employment

	(1) Basic DiD	(2) With Controls	(3) State FE	(4) Year + State FE
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.059*** (0.012)	0.044*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.011)
DACA Eligible	-0.043*** (0.007)	-0.038*** (0.006)	-0.038*** (0.006)	-0.045*** (0.006)
Post	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.018** (0.008)	—
Male		0.383*** (0.005)	0.382*** (0.005)	0.382*** (0.005)
Married		-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.006)
Has Children		0.032*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.006)
HS Degree		0.049*** (0.005)	0.047*** (0.005)	0.047*** (0.005)
Some College		0.088*** (0.008)	0.085*** (0.008)	0.085*** (0.008)
College+		0.147*** (0.015)	0.144*** (0.015)	0.144*** (0.015)
State Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	43,238	43,238	43,238	43,238
R-squared	0.001	0.155	0.159	0.160

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

All regressions weighted by PERWT.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

The results across all specifications indicate a statistically significant positive effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment. The basic DiD estimate (Column 1) suggests that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by 5.9 percentage points. Adding demographic controls (Column 2) reduces the estimate to 4.4 percentage

points, suggesting that some of the raw difference is attributable to compositional differences between groups.

The inclusion of state fixed effects (Column 3) has minimal impact on the estimate (4.3 percentage points), indicating that the result is not driven by differential geographic distribution of treatment and control groups. The preferred specification (Column 4), which includes both state and year fixed effects, yields an estimate of 4.1 percentage points (SE = 0.011, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI: [0.020, 0.062]).

The control variables behave as expected. Being male is associated with a 38.2 percentage point higher probability of full-time employment, reflecting well-documented gender differences in labor force participation. Higher education levels are associated with progressively higher full-time employment rates. Interestingly, being married is associated with slightly lower full-time employment, possibly reflecting household specialization decisions, while having children is associated with slightly higher employment.

4.4 Pre-Trend Analysis

Table 3 presents the results of the pre-trend analysis, testing whether the treatment and control groups exhibited differential trends before DACA implementation.

Table 3: Pre-Trend Analysis: Treatment \times Year Interactions (Reference: 2006)

Year	Coefficient	Standard Error
Treatment \times 2007	-0.036	(0.022)
Treatment \times 2008	0.006	(0.022)
Treatment \times 2009	-0.006	(0.023)
Treatment \times 2010	-0.011	(0.023)
Treatment \times 2011	0.008	(0.025)
Joint F-test: $F = 1.03$, $p = 0.396$		

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Weighted by PERWT.

None of the pre-period interaction coefficients are individually statistically significant, and the joint F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no differential pre-trends ($F = 1.03$, $p = 0.396$). This provides support for the parallel trends assumption underlying the DiD design.

4.5 Event Study Results

Figure 2 displays the event study coefficients, showing year-by-year treatment effects relative to 2011 (the last pre-treatment year).




Figure 2: Event Study Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals (Reference Year: 2011)

The event study results display the expected pattern for a valid DiD design with a positive treatment effect. The pre-period coefficients (2006–2010) fluctuate around zero without systematic pattern, supporting the parallel trends assumption. After DACA implementation, the coefficients become positive, with the largest effect observed in 2016 (6.8 percentage points, $p = 0.012$). The gradual increase in the post-period effect is consistent with the phased implementation of DACA and the time required for eligible individuals to obtain work authorization and adjust their employment.

4.6 Robustness Checks

4.6.1 Alternative Age Windows

To assess sensitivity to the age range chosen for the treatment and control groups, I re-estimate the basic DiD model using ages 25–30 vs. 31–36:

Table 4: Robustness Check: Alternative Age Windows

Age Window	Estimate	Standard Error
26–30 vs. 31–35 (Main)	0.041***	(0.011)
25–30 vs. 31–36	0.046***	(0.011)

Notes: Estimates from model with demographic controls.

*** $p < 0.01$

The results are robust to using a broader age window, with the alternative specification yielding a slightly larger estimate of 4.6 percentage points.

4.7 Heterogeneity Analysis

4.7.1 By Gender

Table 5 presents separate estimates for men and women.

Table 5: Heterogeneity by Gender

	Male	Female
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.046*** (0.013)	0.047** (0.019)
Observations	24,141	19,097

Notes: Basic DiD specification. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$

The effect of DACA eligibility on full-time employment is remarkably similar for men and women (4.6 vs. 4.7 percentage points), though the estimate for women is somewhat less precise due to lower full-time employment rates and smaller sample size.

4.7.2 By Education Level

Table 6 presents separate estimates by education level.

Table 6: Heterogeneity by Education Level

	Less than HS	HS or Higher
DACA Eligible \times Post	0.035* (0.018)	0.079*** (0.016)
Observations	18,256	24,982

Notes: Basic DiD specification. *** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.1$

The effect of DACA eligibility is substantially larger for those with a high school degree or higher (7.9 percentage points) compared to those without a high school degree (3.5 percentage points). This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that DACA’s benefits are complementary to human capital: work authorization may have a larger impact on formal employment opportunities for those with higher education levels, who may have better access to jobs that require documentation.

5 Discussion

5.1 Interpretation of Results

The preferred estimate indicates that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by 4.1 percentage points among Mexican-born Hispanic immigrants. This represents a meaningful economic effect: relative to the pre-period full-time employment rate of approximately 61.5% in the treatment group, the effect corresponds to a 6.7% increase.

Several mechanisms could explain this effect:

1. **Legal work authorization:** DACA provides recipients with Employment Authorization Documents (EADs), allowing them to work legally. This removes the need to work in the informal economy and opens access to formal employment opportunities.
2. **Reduced risk of deportation:** The deferred action component of DACA reduces the immediate threat of deportation, potentially allowing recipients to seek and maintain stable employment without fear of immigration enforcement.
3. **Access to identification:** In many states, DACA recipients became eligible for driver’s licenses and state identification, facilitating employment by enabling transportation and satisfying employer verification requirements.
4. **Human capital investment:** The security provided by DACA may encourage recipients to invest in job training and education, improving their employment prospects.

5.2 Comparison to Existing Literature

The magnitude of the estimated effect (4.1 percentage points) is broadly consistent with findings from the existing literature on DACA’s labor market effects. Studies using similar difference-in-differences approaches have generally found positive effects of DACA on employment outcomes, though estimates vary depending on sample definitions, outcome measures, and identification strategies.

The finding that effects are larger for those with higher education is consistent with research suggesting that DACA’s benefits are complementary to human capital accumulation. The similar effects for men and women are somewhat surprising given gender differences in labor force participation patterns, and may reflect the strong work incentives created by DACA eligibility regardless of gender.

5.3 Limitations

Several limitations should be acknowledged:

1. **Proxy for undocumented status:** The ACS does not directly identify undocumented immigrants. My approach of using non-citizen status ($\text{CITIZEN} = 3$) as a proxy likely includes some legal non-citizens and excludes some undocumented individuals who misreport their status. This measurement error would likely attenuate the estimated effect toward zero.
2. **Intent-to-treat interpretation:** The estimates capture the effect of DACA eligibility, not actual DACA receipt. Since not all eligible individuals applied for or received DACA, the effect of actual DACA receipt would be larger than the intent-to-treat effect estimated here.
3. **Repeated cross-section design:** The ACS is a repeated cross-section, not a panel, so I cannot track individuals over time. The DiD design compares different individuals in the same age groups before and after DACA, which could be affected by differential selection into or out of the sample.
4. **Age discontinuity concerns:** The comparison of adjacent age groups introduces potential confounds related to life-cycle effects on employment. The finding of parallel pre-trends mitigates but does not eliminate this concern.
5. **Spillover effects:** The estimates may not capture the full effect of DACA if there are spillover effects to the control group (e.g., if increased labor supply from DACA recipients affects employment opportunities for slightly older non-eligible immigrants).

5.4 Policy Implications

The results provide evidence that DACA has meaningful positive effects on labor market outcomes for eligible immigrants. A 4.1 percentage point increase in full-time employment represents both individual economic gains for recipients and broader economic benefits through increased tax revenue, consumer spending, and economic output.

These findings are relevant to ongoing policy debates about the future of DACA and comprehensive immigration reform. The evidence suggests that providing legal work authorization to undocumented immigrants who arrived as children can improve their economic integration and labor market outcomes.

6 Conclusion

This study provides an independent replication of the analysis of DACA’s effect on full-time employment among Mexican-born Hispanic immigrants. Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits the age eligibility cutoff for DACA, I find that DACA eligibility increased the probability of full-time employment by approximately 4.1 percentage points (95% CI: [0.020, 0.062]).

The results are robust to the inclusion of demographic controls, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Pre-trend analysis and event study results support the parallel trends assumption underlying the identification strategy. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that effects are similar across gender but substantially larger for those with higher education levels.

These findings contribute to the growing body of evidence on the labor market effects of immigration policy and have implications for ongoing debates about DACA and comprehensive immigration reform. The results suggest that providing legal work authorization to qualified undocumented immigrants can meaningfully improve their economic outcomes and integration into the formal labor market.

Appendix A: Data Processing Details

A.1 Sample Construction Steps

1. Loaded full ACS data (2006–2016): 33,851,424 observations
2. Filtered for Hispanic-Mexican ($HISPAN = 1$): 2,945,521 observations
3. Filtered for born in Mexico ($BPL = 200$): 991,261 observations
4. Filtered for non-citizens ($CITIZEN = 3$): 701,347 observations
5. Calculated age as of June 15, 2012 using $BIRTHYR$ and $BIRTHQTR$
6. Filtered for ages 26–35 as of June 15, 2012: 181,229 observations
7. Filtered for arrival before age 16 ($YRIMMIG - BIRTHYR < 16$): 47,418 observations

8. Filtered for $\text{YRIMMIG} \leq 2007$: 47,418 observations
9. Excluded year 2012: 43,238 observations (final analysis sample)

A.2 Variable Coding

Table 7: Variable Definitions and IPUMS Codes

Variable	IPUMS Code	Definition
Full-time employment	$\text{UHRWORK} \geq 35$	1 if 35+ hours/week, 0 otherwise
Treatment	$\text{age_2012} \leq 30$	1 if ages 26–30 as of June 15, 2012
Post-period	$\text{YEAR} \geq 2013$	1 if year 2013–2016, 0 if 2006–2011
Male	$\text{SEX} = 1$	1 if male, 0 if female
Married	$\text{MARST} = 1$	1 if married spouse present
Has children	$\text{NCHILD} > 0$	1 if any own children in household
HS degree	$\text{EDUC} = 6$	1 if high school graduate/GED
Some college	$\text{EDUC} \in \{7,8,9\}$	1 if 1–3 years college
College+	$\text{EDUC} \geq 10$	1 if 4+ years college

Appendix B: Additional Results

B.1 Full Regression Output: Model 1 (Basic DiD)

WLS Regression Results						
=====						
Dep. Variable:	fulltime		R-squared:	0.001		
Model:	WLS		Adj. R-squared:	0.001		
No. Observations:	43238					
=====						
	coef	std err	z	P> z	[0.025	0.975]

Intercept	0.6731	0.005	131.166	0.000	0.663	0.683
treated	-0.0426	0.007	-6.273	0.000	-0.056	-0.029
post	-0.0299	0.009	-3.315	0.001	-0.048	-0.012
treated_post	0.0590	0.012	5.034	0.000	0.036	0.082

B.2 Full Regression Output: Model 2 (With Controls)

WLS Regression Results						
=====						
Dep. Variable:	fulltime		R-squared:	0.155		
Model:	WLS		Adj. R-squared:	0.155		
No. Observations:	43238					
=====						
	coef	std err	z	P> z	[0.025	0.975]

Intercept	0.4059	0.008	50.211	0.000	0.390	0.422
treated	-0.0377	0.006	-5.948	0.000	-0.050	-0.025
post	-0.0181	0.008	-2.203	0.028	-0.034	-0.002
treated_post	0.0435	0.011	4.068	0.000	0.023	0.065
male	0.3827	0.005	70.881	0.000	0.372	0.393
married	-0.0207	0.006	-3.492	0.000	-0.032	-0.009
has_children	0.0315	0.006	4.969	0.000	0.019	0.044
hs_degree	0.0487	0.005	9.013	0.000	0.038	0.059
some_college	0.0877	0.008	10.334	0.000	0.071	0.104

college_plus	0.1474	0.015	10.099	0.000	0.119	0.176
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B.3 Year-by-Year Full-Time Employment Rates

Table 8: Full-Time Employment Rates by Year and Group (Weighted)

Year	Control (31–35)		Treatment (26–30)		Difference
	Rate	N	Rate	N	
2006	0.691	2,129	0.656	3,067	−0.035
2007	0.733	1,968	0.663	3,002	−0.070
2008	0.697	1,962	0.669	2,615	−0.028
2009	0.653	1,852	0.612	2,627	−0.041
2010	0.635	1,937	0.590	2,685	−0.046
2011	0.617	1,835	0.591	2,698	−0.026
2013	0.637	1,656	0.648	2,338	+0.011
2014	0.618	1,581	0.635	2,278	+0.017
2015	0.665	1,458	0.661	2,122	−0.004
2016	0.657	1,390	0.699	2,038	+0.042