

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 -(Grande Bretagne).

AFF. GIBSON C/VERGES -

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que j'ai fait citer la Société des NOUVELLES EDITIONS INTERNATIONALES pour l'audience du 13 avril prochain.

Or, je viens d'apprendre que celle-ci est mise en faillite et que Monsieur PINTA, Syndic de faillite, a été nommé par jugement du Tribunal de Commerce.

Je ne vois pas, dans ces conditions, l'intérêt que vous avez à poursuivre le paiement de sommes qui vous sont dues par cette Société dont le passif dépasse de loin tout actif.

Voudriez-vous, je vous prie, me donner vos instructions définitives compte tenu de cette situation.

Je vous indique d'ailleurs que vous pouvez produire à la faillite entre les mains du syndic, mais que bien entendu celui-ci vous demandera un jugement pour pouvoir inscrire votre créance toute théorique contre la Société qui, comme je vous l'indique plus haut n'a que des dettes et aucun actif.

J'attends donc de vos nouvelles et vous prie de croire, chers Madame et Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

S. SCHWARTZENBERG,
Avocat à la Cour.

JAI# 798462

201

Elony soft
200



Jay Gibson, funded in
CEPA-0006, 26/1/67, filed
GREBONY logs.

DBB 71942, 25 January 1967 100-300-004

Abstracted from pages 38 and 37

q At a meeting held on August 14, 1966, STANFORD mentioned that Robert Williams allegedly has \$1,000,000 available for the use of RAM.

NY T-10 advised on September 26, 1966, that STANFORD prior to moving to Philadelphia on September 18, 1966, discussed RAM and ROBERT F. WILLIAMS with him. According to the source, STANFORD has alleged WILLIAMS has money available for RAM.

During the course of the conversation, STANFORD stated that the contact man between RAM in the US and R. Williams' is one Richard GIBSON in Paris, France. STANFORD stated that GIBSON passes on messages from WILLIAMS and will be the man contacted by whoever is designated as a courier to go to China to get the money.

Source also stated that he was told Richard GIBSON was living in the OEE Crystal Hotel (phonetic), Paris, France, and was working out of the La Royale Cafe (phonetic), Paris, France.

SECRET

Gibson



088 - 61450

SECRET
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 105-93072

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

BY LIAISON

Date: October 24, 1966
To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: RICHARD GIBSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

A source of this Bureau who has furnished reliable information in the past recently advised that during the Fall of 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist organization stated that one Richard Gibson was suspected of being a spy for the Central Intelligence Agency. According to this individual, Gibson recently had been in Milan, Italy, in the company of a female secretary from Paris, whose home is in New Rochelle, New York. At that time Gibson remarked his travel and activities were possible because he had married a wealthy English woman. Other things were said which aroused the suspicions of the Italian.

According to our source, the Italian pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist subsequently relayed his suspicions concerning Gibson to Rene Raindorf, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belgium (Marxist-Leninist). Raindorf reportedly thereafter met in Brussels, Belgium, with Gibson although he had indicated the Belgian pro-Chinese communists would look into the charges of the Italian Marxist-Leninist.

CS COPY

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201-306052

Chase

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: **34**

TO: JAMES M. MURPHY
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 31 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE BID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/3

DISSEM BY: 30/3 PER S

FROM: DIRECTOR

INFO: VR FILE EURB, AF7, CA2, CCS3,
C1/OA, C1/OPS, FI, FI/INTZ C1/IC2

CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET** (DATE AND TIME FILED)
REFERENCE NUMBER: **32195**

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH

TO: LCPIPTT INFO LONDON

REF: LCPIPTT 7388 (IN 83410)

DTDORIC GREBONY

1. RE REF PARA 7: GHANA DESK REP MET GREBONY FOR ASSESSMENT WITH VIEW TOWARD HIS POSSIBLE LATER USE AGAINST GHANA TARGET. DISCUSSION HODEE EDWARDS WAS GENERAL PROBING OF GREBONY RELATIONSHIP AND ESTIMATE HIS PERSONALITY. WHILE GREBONY MAY HAVE INFERRED POSSIBILITY RELATED OPERATION ^{AL} ~~EDWARDS~~ COMMISSION, WOFAC REP AVOIDED SUGGESTING SUCH WAS PLANNED MUCH LESS INTENT. IN FACT, DESK HAS NOT DEVELOPED SUCH DETAILED HQS PLANS FOR GREBONY OPERATION GHANA, GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES IN DEVELOPING SITUATION ON GROUND. WHEN AND IF CLEAR FOCUS SUCH OPERATION WORKED OUT AND AGREED WITH ACCRA STATION, WEST AFRICAN TRIP WOULD PRESUMABLY BE FIRST STEP.

2. WHILE SUCH TRIP MENTIONED TO GREBONY AS PROBABLY USEFUL, EMPHASIZED TO GREBONY THAT VIETNAM IS TOP PRIORITY AT THIS TIME. STRONGLY FEEL HE SHOULD SIT TIGHT AND PLAY OUT THIS STRING WITHOUT PLANNING FOR EXTENSIVE AFRICA SWINGS, PARTICULARLY AFTER HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM ~~WOLADY~~ WOLADY TDY. WITH VIET TRIP AND RUSSELL FOUNDATION MORE IMMEDIATE HIGHER PRIORITY TARGETS CLOSE TO HOME AT THIS TIME, SEE LITTLE VALUE AND UNNECESSARY RISKS IN OVEREXTENDING HIM IN WIDE AFRICA SWINGS OF LESS IMMEDIATE INTEREST. THIS EVEN MORE TRUE FOR EAST AFRICA GIVEN STATION VIEWS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: ☐ FILE RID ☐ INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: _____ PER: _____

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VN, FILE

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH

(CLASSIFICATION) **SECRET** (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICT)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 32195

PER AJDA 1989 ON NEED FOR LONGER STAY, WITH ACCOMPANYING COVER AND CONTACT PROBLEMS, AND INDICATIONS OF PROBEAH HOSTILITY, NATURE AND EXTENT OF WHICH WE CANNOT IMMEDIATELY ASSESS. HQS VERY SATISFIED WITH GREBONY PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT SO FAR. WHILE UNDERSTAND HIS TEMPERAMENTAL INCLINATION TO PRESS FOR ACTION ~~IN~~ ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVING TRAVEL, HE SHOULD BE ASSURED, IF NECESSARY, THAT SUCH DEMONSTRATION OF ~~USE~~ ^{BEING CONSTANTLY USEFUL} NOT NEEDED AND ~~IT~~ NOT ALWAYS IN BEST INTERESTS PROJECT DEVELOPMENT.

3. REF PARA 8: WILL BE POUCHING LONGER REPORTS ON GREBONY VISIT HERE WHICH DELAYED BECAUSE OF PRESSURE OTHER WORK. KASSTWATER RETURNED TO GREBONY ORIGINALS FINEMAN AND OTHER CORRESPONDENCE HE LEFT, BUT SENDING COPIES WE END MADE OF THESE AND REPORTS HE SUBMITTED ON WOLADY CONTACTS BY TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST 722028.

4. RE PARA 9 REF: YES. WE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER THAT RAISE BE MADE AVAILABLE TO GREBONY BY TRANSFER FROM COVER FIRM, WHICH WE WILL EXPECT ARRANGE SOON (AWAITING CLEARANCE ON ONE ~~IF~~ INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE CUT IN). CAN YOU MAKE DIRECT TRANSFER UNTIL THIS IS ~~IT~~ SET UP.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/4/3. Foy (in draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

JAMES M. MURPHY
CHIEF, CA/CS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION CA/4 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RID COPY		ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED <input type="checkbox"/> TUBED	
INFO FILE VR, CA2, EUR8, WH/C8, FE8, SAVA 2, AF7, CI, CLOPS, CILIC2, CILIC, FI, PLINTA		UNIT _____ TIME _____ BY _____	

25 AUG 68 183410

SECRET 251622Z CITE LCPIPI 7388 (CILIBERTI ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE

DTDORIC GREBONY

1. RODIGAST (R) GREBONY/1 (G) AS SCHEDULED
 23 AUGUST. BALANCE VOLADY REPORTING BEING POUCHED
 AS WELL AS NEW RPORTS. G PLANNING TRAVEL PARI
 BRUS-ROTTERDAM POSSIBLY FRANKFURT, VIENNA 2-12
 SEPT. ROD WILL MEET G ANTWERP 8 SEPT.

2. ROBERT WILLIAMS IN LETTER TO G
 25 JULY FROM PEKING SAID HOPES BE EUROPE LATER IN
 YEAR PROBABLY GOING SWEDEN TO MAKE SPEECH. ALSO
 ADVISED HE MAY TRY PUBLISH CRUSADE FROM PEKING
 AND ASKS G'S HELP WITH DISTRIBUTION. ATTACKED
 HYPOCRITICAL RACIST CUBANS. (THIS INFO BEING
 DISSEMINATED).

SECRET

THIS IS EXCLUSIVE INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE
 DISCLOSED TO ANY OTHER AGENCY OR INDIVIDUAL
 WITHOUT THE EXPRESS WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE
 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, FBI
 25 AUG 68 183410

SECRET

PAGE 2 LCPIPI 7388

SECRET

3. Q THINKS ENTRY NORTH VIETNAM MAY BE DIFFICULT AT PRESENT BECAUSE OF MILITARY SITUATION AND PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE DESIRE NOT TO ENTERTAIN ELEMENTS OPENLY HOSTILE SOVIET UNION. LIONEL MORRISON SAYS WILLIAMS CAN'T GO HANOI AT PRESENT. RICHARD WARD TOLD FINEMAN ENTRY WOULD BE DIFFICULT. GRAY IN SAN FRANCISCO SAID HIS TOUR POSTPONED INDEFINITELY BECAUSE OF MILITARY SITUATION.

4. AT KATZENBACH SUGGESTION Q MADE PRECISE APPOINTMENT NORTH VIETNAMESE JOURNALISTS SAW AND DINH, LONDON 26 AUGUST WHICH KATZENBACH INFORMING JAGUAR TO ALLOW SURVEILLANCE.

5. RE DIR 26709, Q HOPES OBTAIN FURTHER INFO MOCK TRIAL FROM RALPH ROSENBAUM, US LEFTISTS CONNECTED RUSSELL FOUNDATION BUT WHO OPPOSED TO TROTSKYISTS. Q'S STRATEGY IS EXPOSURE FOUNDATION AS RIFE WITH CONFLICTS AND INFILTRATED BY TROTSKYISTS.

SECRET

Handwritten notes and stamps at the bottom of the page, including a large rectangular stamp with the word "SECRET" in the center.

SECRET

PAGE 3 LCPIPIIT 7388 S E C R E T

6. POUCHING FULLER REPORT Q CONVERSATIONS
SUTHERLAND NEW YORK WHICH Q TOLD KAMMERMAYER BY
PHONE. SUTHERLAND INSISTED CARMICHAEL HAS NOT
ACCEPTED RUSSELL INVITATION.

7. IF NOT SENT, PLEASE CABLE DETAILS
HQS PLANS FOR Q OPERATION GHANA INVOLVING HODEE
EDWARDS DISCUSSED WITH Q AT HQS. WOULD THIS BE
IN FRAMEWORK Q VISIT WEST AFRICA AND APPROXIMATELY
WHEN? WHERE DOES THIS PLACE EAST AFRICA TRIP,
NOT MENTIONED TO Q BY HQS?

8. ASSUME HQS POUCHING ALL Q VOLADY REPORTING AS WELL
CORRESPONDENCE. FOR EXAMPLE Q HAS NO COPY LETTERS
FROM FINEMAN ON PARIS SITUATION WHICH SUBMITTED
KAMMERMAYER.

9. CAN RAISE OF \$120 IN Q TAKE-HOME AFTER
TAXES BE MADE EFFECTIVE 1 SEPTEMBER? PLS CABLE
WHEN BEGINNING DEPOSITS SO CAN NOTIFY Q.

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106
1

Cable sent answering 9 in affirmative.

8 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: Field Traces on GREGORY, A 201-306052

This is to inform you that there were no additional traces on GREGORY, A from the Field Stations--Algiers, Rome, Paris, or London. Negative traces from Frankfurt Station.

Ann Jane Long
CA/CF

201 file

201-306052

2

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO BIDDING REQUIRED

**ONLY QUALIFIED DESIGNS
CAN JUDGE INDEXING**

SECRET//NOFORN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith is the text of the Provisional Operational Approval on QREDOHY/1. An Operational Approval is awaited pending receipt of final Agency traces which, we understand have not yet come in. Your attention is directed to paragraph 3 and to paragraph 5. The latter will be the subject of further correspondence in the future.

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Paris/LCPIPT w/att.

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8. Not applicable. The Agent is not in the status of a tour of assignment but will be exploited in his current operational role as long as it is viable.
9. This request is not for interim cover.
10. No relative is witting for such emergency contact, nor is Benefits and Counseling Branch involvement applicable in this case.
11. None.
12. Agent has served in the U.S. Army, is not now eligible for induction.
13. Spouse is not witting and not clearable.

D. Operational Information

1. Type of Operation. FI. Duration is indefinite. Should be considered a penetration asset of a hostile propaganda establishment, rather than of an organized hostile intelligence service. No one, other than those indicated, are to be made witting.
2. Location: The Agent is to reside in London, with a possible alternative of Rome.
3. The Agent should be free to visit Cuba, all European countries, West Africa and E. Africa (particularly Tanzania) as well as North Vietnam and China. Impossible to anticipate the time or duration of such visits, which will, however, be at his (and our) control.
4. Special groups Agent should be able to contact: Not applicable.
5. Approximately \$2,500 to \$3,000.
6. Not applicable.
7. Communications channels desired: None.
8. Cover Suggestions: None not already expressed in previous documents prepared by CA Staff in identifying the cover mechanism and requesting IEF approval.

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II The arrangement between the cover firm and GREGORY/1 should be on the basis of a regular subvention to GREGORY/1 to act as a foreign stringer contributing feature-type material to the press service. An agreement having been ostensibly entered into by GREGORY/1 and the cover firm during the former's trip to the U.S. (expected around 20 July), a regular monthly check should be forwarded to GREGORY/1 by the cover firm, along with any correspondence it may see fit (suggestions for pieces to write, comments on pieces received etc.)

III The following steps are proposed to set this cover in motion:

- A. At a meeting on 6 July, GREGORY/1 will be instructed to write a number of U.S. news media organizations stating that he expects to travel to the U.S. shortly, describing his news background and indicating he would be interested in developing some outlets for his writing. The cover organization is one of those addresses.
- B. CIA's contact in the cover organization receives this letter and, pursuant to our direction, writes an answer stating 1) what his firm does, 2) that it would be very interested in handling GREGORY/1's product if it seems to fit the needs and 3) that it would be ready to reimburse some of GREGORY/1's expenses if he could come to Chicago to discuss the matter further.
- C. GREGORY/1 does not meet the contact in the cover organization. He is briefed to offer the story, on his return, that he had entered into a regular arrangement with the cover firm to produce feature material usable by the cover firm (not specifying the frequency) in return for which he is to receive a monthly retainer.
- D. Any letter GREGORY/1 may later wish to send to the cover firm should be given to us in copy preferably before it is sent.
- E. Copies of any correspondence initiated by the cover firm should be made available to CIA and, particularly, to the Project Case Officer.

James M. Murphy
Chief, CA/CP

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28 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

VIA: Chief, CCS/NC

SUBJECT: Request for Approval for Operational Use of
U.S. Free-Lance Writer - QREBONY/1

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval pursuant to CSI 240-6, 10 January 1963, paragraph 6, governing operational involvement of personalities in the field of journalism. This request concerns cover support for QREBONY/1, an asset currently handled by CA Staff, and involves the cooperation of Russell R. DeBow, a Chicago city official and proprietor of the Negro Press International Inc. QREBONY/1 was granted a POA on 23 May 1966, and a full operational approval is pending. The project under which he is handled was approved by Acting ADDP on 14 June 1966. Mr. DeBow was granted a Covert Security Approval on 19 April 1966.

2. QREBONY/1 is an American Negro expatriate journalist and author presently residing in London. He is the author of one novel and numerous contributions to a wide variety of publication, such as the Kenyon Review, Monthly Review, The Nation, The Liberator and others. He worked as a reporter for the Philadelphia Afro American in 1950, for Agence France Presse in 1959, for CBS in 1960 and, in Europe, for the now defunct, pro-Chinese magazine Revolution. As a result of broad contacts and acceptance among radical, pro-Chinese and Negro militant circles, he has offered valuable access to important targets spanning four continents, and has demonstrated considerable skill in elicitation and exploitation of contacts for intelligence purposes in the process. The immediate and paramount operational objective for this agent is to gain direct access to hostile political targets in North Viet Nam and China. The outstanding requirement to be met in support of this objective, and of his continued effective exploitation generally, is the development of a backstopped and viable explanation for at least a portion of his income, which presently derives almost exclusively from clandestine CIA support. The proposal outlined below represents the conclusion of considerable research, including an interview with Mr. DeBow, to identify suitable cover arrangements which would make possible this explanation.

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3. Mr. DeBow, a lawyer, is an Administrative Assistant to the Mayor of Chicago as well as a long time, if casual, contact of Domestic Contacts Service. His background includes assignment to the Intelligence Division of the Chicago police and cooperation with CIA in the course of a trip to Africa in 1961. Mr. DeBow also is part owner and in effective control of a very small feature syndicate in Chicago, the Negro Press International, Inc., which distributes rewritten news to Negro newspapers in the United States on a subscription basis.

4. On 20 June 1966, Mr. DeBow was approached by representatives of CA Staff and Central Cover Staff, acknowledging CIA connection, and interviewed with a view to determining the feasibility of using his service to backstop modest payments to QREBONY/1 for real or ostensible contributions of feature stories and reporting. (Since the contact was made to develop information pertinent to the present request for DDP approval, the interview was conducted on a hypothetical basis: QREBONY/1's identity was not revealed nor were any commitments entered into.) This conversation, despite its limitation, demonstrated clearly that such an arrangement involving Mr. DeBow and his firm would be practical from Mr. DeBow's point of view and well suited to the needs of the QREBONY Project. Mr. DeBow grasped the problem involved and suggested various means by which he could plausibly implement a cover arrangement should this be our decision. He was made aware of and understood the incongruity between his and QREBONY/1's ostensible political positions, and stated that this need offer no impediment to creation of the type of relationship which would be involved. The nature of Mr. DeBow's feature service and its modest size clearly enhance its usefulness and appropriateness for our objectives. Mr. DeBow, in conclusion, expressed his agreement in principle to participate in this cover support activity should CIA, on further review of its needs, decide to proceed with a request for his cooperation.

5. In the light of the very favorable response from Mr. DeBow and the determination, from reviewing the outlines of his operation, that it would be a uniquely appropriate backstopping for QREBONY/1, your approval is requested to recontact Mr. DeBow and establish with him suitable cover

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arrangements for this purpose.

for Cord Meyer, Jr.
CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
Covert Action Staff

RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

Thomas Stange
Chief, CCS/RC

APPROVED:

AA *DDP* *P. Gorge*

30 June '66

3

SECRET

SECRET

27 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: QREBONY/1 - Amendment of Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. The Memorandum of Oral Commitment with QREBONY is amended effective 15 June 1966 to provide indemnification in the amount of \$10,000 in case of death, and payment of \$800 per month up to \$10,000 to his wife in case of total incapacitation or disappearance.

2. It is anticipated that a trip planned for late summer or early fall will take QREBONY into VC controlled areas of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and China. Indemnification is intended to apply to death or disability resulting from air accident, act of war, or for disappearance.

3. Without being able to specify the possible circumstances, it is intended that such indemnification as outlined above be deemed to apply to loss of life or functions suffered by QREBONY as a direct result of his KUBARK relationship during the trip. Such indemnification, if made, must be presented to his widow by a cover mechanism which would hide KUBARK involvement.

Signed Thomas Mc Kinley


Thomas Mc Kinley
CA Staff Contract Approving Officer

CA/PERS/RHBELL:bg (24 Jun 66)

Distribution:

- 2 - Addressee
- 1 - CPD
- 1 - CA/Pers
- 1 - CA/Chrono

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, KUWOLF		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief, KUDESK; Chief, EUR		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIIT		XXX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	DTDORIC/Operational QRPY/QREBONY/Photo of QREBONY/1 and Contact		MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>Forwarded under separate cover is a photograph of QREBONY/1 with one of his contacts.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Zaffaresi</i> Karen H. ZAFFARESI (Rans)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>FEDRAHIM, Gora</i></p> <p>Attachment use Photo use</p> <p>Distribution 3-C/KUWOLF w/att usc 2-C/KUDESK w/o att 1-C/EUR w/o att</p> <p style="text-align: right;">S/C ATT'D BY RE/AM Dated <u>13 JUN 1966</u></p> <p style="text-align: right;">201-306052 JUN 2 1966</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLA-3903	DATE 1 June 1966	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	NOS FILE NUMBER 200-124-156/3	

SECRET

DTDORIC/QRPREY/QRREBONY

To: Chief, WOLF

LSC Att to OFLA-3903

Photo: Do not bend.



SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,

CA/CF - James Murphy

NUMBER

201 - 312252

SUBJECT

ORZECV/1

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

10 February 1966

Lab

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

(1) POA is granted to utilize Subject in an international context to exploit his contacts and/or associations with a wide variety of personalities and organizations (particularly Cuban and Chinese) engaged in "anti-imperialist" propaganda operations. Subject will be expected to renew his old relationships and expand his circle of contacts with Afro-Asian national liberation leaders, pro Chinese Communist, and similar personalities and to report general political and biographic material relative to the interests, activities and plans of such individuals and their organizations.

(2) Requirements passed to Subject will be confined, insofar as it is operationally feasible, to instructions for the refinement and completeness of the reporting he is capable of providing from his normal intercourse with source personalities. Disclosure of classified information will be held to a minimum, he will not be given operational assignments supporting or servicing other KUARK Operations, nor will he participate directly and/or wittingly in the spotting and/or recruitment of other agents.

(3) In addition to this background, certain of Subject's past statements and behavior are inconsistent with, and give rise to an uncertainty about, the nature and degree of his presently professed motivations and loyalties. It is impossible to resolve this uncertainty with the knowledge now available. At the present time, therefore, it is believed that his bona fides have not been established to an extent which would warrant handling him in any way than "at arms length".

X To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

APPROVAL

BY

DATE

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

23 May 1966

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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DECLASSIFICATION

(1)

Continuation of PCA - 201 - 368052 - 23 May 1960

(4) This case has been discussed in detail on several occasions between representatives of CI/CA, CI/ICG, and CA/CE and there is agreement that it is primarily because of Subject's background and contacts that he is of interest and, therefore, it is believed, if he is handled with circumspection, the possible benefits to be derived justify the security risks involved in the use of Subject within the limits set forth above.

(5) Polygraph is recommended at least once a year.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

WOMOSE
GREY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE					
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT			DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
			2. RI FILE NO.		
			3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
			7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST		6. DATE PROCESSED		10. DISSEMINATED IN	
				11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE			13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION					
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; margin: 20px auto; width: 80%;"> <p>GIBSON, Richard Th 201-306052</p> <p>9 May 1966 poa ca James Murphy 7767</p> <p style="text-align: center;">THERE IS A RECORD OF THIS 201</p> <p style="text-align: center;">/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">THERE IS A RECORD OF THIS 201</p> <p style="text-align: center;">/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT</p> </div>					
15.					
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.				201	30
				60	52

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO Chief of Station, London (APTS. KATZENBACH)

XX

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INFO Chief, KUBARK

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM Chief of Station, Paris (LCPIPT)

MICROFILM

SUBJECT DUDORIC/Operational
GREGORY GREGORY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA 45254

1. At his 6 April meeting with RODIGAST, GREGORY/1 pointed out that his brother-in-law (the accountant) still thinks that GREGORY receives regular income from an American radio or news feature service, paid through Switzerland, and undeclared for tax reasons (GREGORY's and the American company's taxes).

2. RODIGAST thought that if the brother-in-law finds this story hard to believe he may guess that GREGORY is really working for KUBARK and may have passed this information on to the British. Thus he would be the source of the story relayed in reference.

3. At the same meeting, on another subject, RODIGAST asked GREGORY whether he had ever told anyone pointblank that he (GREGORY) is a Chicom agent. He said that he never had. RODIGAST broke in: "or the agent of any other country, including GUYANA?" GREGORY said he had not.

Karen H. ZAFFARESI

Distribution:

- 2 - COS, London
- ✓ 3 - C/KUBARK
- 1 - C/SE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

201-306052
200-124-156/3
APR 18 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

OELA-3731


15 April 1966

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET


DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, KUWOLF		NEC AID	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO Chief, NE; COS, Cairo; COS, Dar-es-Salaam; Chief, AP COS, London; Chief, WL; Chief, KUWESK; COS, Rome; CIR		XXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPI			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational CAPREY/QREBONY/QREBONY/1's New Contact, Carole Piña			RECORDFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>1. We are manifesting reports and correspondence concerning QREBONY/1's new contact, Carole Piña, an American, age 31, born in New York City (possibly Bronx County), whose father's last name was Appel or Appell. Her husband's name is Carlos Piña (Mexican), but she is separated from him and he is seeking a divorce. She holds US passport, No. D633873, issued 5 August 1963 in New York; it comes up for renewal in August (at which time she expects to be in Rome). She is afraid that her having traveled to Cuba in 1964 with a Progressive Labor delegation will hurt her chances of getting a renewal of her passport.</p> <p>2. Subject had been having a series of political and amorous affairs during her stay in Dar, and was in serious trouble when Q met her. After rejecting Dennis Thombeah's advances, she was in serious danger of being declared a prohibited immigrant; Q befriended her, and he and Colman Ferrer of the Cuban Embassy (who had been having an affair with her) saw that she got out of Dar safely. Q was to meet her in Cairo (but in fact had no intention of doing so) and later caught up with her in Rome. She indicated a desire to work with Q (without quite knowing for whom she would be working--he hinted rather broadly to her that he was in cahoots with "our friends in the East," but it will be noted that in one of her letters there is this disarming phrase: she warns him about how to deal with certain persons and adds: "Be cool with them--do not show your true colors (what-ever they are)").</p> <p>3. Q seized on the opportunity of using subject as an unwitting informant and eventually agent on the same basis. She submitted to an interview on tape in a Rome hotel room which lasts about 2-1/4 hours, in which Q debriefs her on her knowledge of every Tanzanian, liberation movement, or Bloc personality with whom she had contact, and in view of her attractiveness and willingness she knew quite a few. (She had some amusing run-ins with ODYOKE personnel in Dar, which we shall edit out of the tape only for a fee.)</p>			
Distribution 3-C/KUWOLF 2-C/KUWESK 2-COS/London 2-COS/Dar 2-COS/Rome 2-COS/Cairo 1-C/NE 1-C/WE 1-C/AP			
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
		OFLA-3638	30 March 1966
		CLASSIFICATION	MQS FILE NUMBER
		SECRET	200-124-156/3



MAR 31 1966

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLA-3638
<p>4. Q feels that she is emotionally unstable--his firmness in dealing with her, his making it clear he was not out for her body, have made him a guardian and true friend. She seems to be a good political reporter, understanding her own (confused) political yearnings and where her various contacts stand; she also seems to have a good memory for details. Q says that her "anti-revisionism" is incipient anti-Communism. He could eventually recruit her as an ODYOKE witting agent, but that would take a lot of time and trouble; with much less effort he could effect a false-flag recruitment, and indeed, he has already done this on an informal basis by making it clear that he was collecting material for his Chicom friends. She would undertake further assignments for him. He actually asked her, "Suppose I asked you to go somewhere, would you go?" To which she replied, "If it's not cold." It is unlikely, however, that she would be able to return to Dar because of Phombeah's hostility. Wherever she goes, her main asset will be her physical attraction.</p> <p>5. She could be debriefed further on any point raised in the tape interview. The ideal would be to have the questions by the time Q goes to Rome in the second half of April, but this does not seem to be a likely possibility.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Karen A. ZAFFARESI</p> <div style="text-align: center; border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 20px auto; width: 150px;">SECRET</div> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;">2072</div>		

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OZLA-45,254
TO INFO	Chief, KUWOLF Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, LCPIPIT		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 200-124-156/3 MAR 31 1966
FROM	Chief of Station, London		DATE 30 March 1966
SUBJECT	DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY Relations with JAGUAR		RE "45" - (CHECK "Y" ONE)
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED			INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
<p>REFERENCES</p> <p>Ref: LOND 2425, 2 March 1966</p> <p>1. A number of lengthy and fruitful discussions have been held with JAGUAR officers regarding our continued running of QREBONY in the U.K. Their comments on the quality of QREBONY's reporting have been reported from time to time. Similarly, we will not dwell here on the mechanical arrangements we have evolved (with SMOTH's agreement) to expedite the passage of information to JAGUAR, on the one hand, and avoid duplicate reporting (principally by passing the same materials as CS dissemi to SMOTH) on the other hand. Suffice it here to say that achieving both of these goals, without compromising QREBONY as a source throughout both JAGUAR and SMOTH (due largely to the wide range of areas he reports on), is a complex problem. We think we have reached a mutually satisfactory arrangement for achieving both aims.</p> <p>2. What we are concerned with here, then, is JAGUAR's permission for us to run QREBONY from here, for the time being at least. The exact phrasing from JAGUAR's letter, agreeing to our request is: "With regard to the continued use of QREBONY by your service on a temporary basis while he remains in this country we have no objection to this provided we are kept fully informed of as much detail as possible."</p> <p>3. JAGUAR pointed out that QREBONY operates in the same areas as some of JAGUAR's own agents, and this necessitates a fair amount of frankness regarding his activities in the U.K. We have made every effort to date to display to them that frankness. In return, JAGUAR has been cooperative, if not downright helpful. In one of our discussions, SWILL confidentially stated that one of their sources had quoted a sub-source as saying that QREBONY had admitted to him that he is a KUBARK agent. We assured JAGUAR that QREBONY is under instructions not to reveal his KUBARK relationship, of course; that QREBONY is not supposed to be recruiting any sub-agents and has not done so; that the remark could well have been made in jest, in reference to the charges levelled against QREBONY three years ago (or longer). We told JAGUAR that it would obviously be advantageous for us to know to whom QREBONY is alleged to have made the statement, and we would be grateful if JAGUAR could tell us. We have repeated this request in writing, but with no reply to date. SWILL stated at the time that he had doubts about whether they could identify to us the person who had made the statement; he was sure that they could not go back to their agent for elaboration without showing an undue interest in QREBONY. We may yet hear who the person was. All this is repeated here merely to indicate how far JAGUAR will go to be helpful, and how far, to date, they will <u>not</u> go.</p>			
<div style="text-align: right;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;"> COPY 1 Sent to [] [] [] </div> </div>			
CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.	

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO OELA-45,254
<p data-bbox="406 319 1250 425">4. This, then, reflects the state of our relations with JAGUAR as it relates to QREBONY. We trust that this will be of value to Headquarters and LCPIPIT in planning QREBONY's future.</p> <div data-bbox="844 446 1153 659"><p data-bbox="844 542 1153 585">George H. KATZENBACH</p></div> <p data-bbox="406 595 714 734">Distribution: 2-Chief, KUSOLF 3-Chief, WE 2-Chief, KUDESK 2-Chief, LCPIPIT</p>		

SECRET

29 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT: Cover Arrangements for GREBONY/1

This memorandum contains information solicited by CCS to implement cover arrangements, already proposed by CA Staff and approved by DDP, involving Russell R. deBow of Chicago and CA Staff asset GREBONY/1. It is keyed to the headings set forth in the "Nonofficial Cover Request for Individual, Headquarters Edition."


A. General Information

1. GREBONY/1 (previously carried as STEBONY). No previous request has officially been forwarded for cover support.
2. Currently a Contract Agent. Currently compensated at the rate of \$7,200 per year with a \$1200 nonaccountable allowance.
3. Agent has not nor will be reviewed by the Agency's medical psychiatric assessment and evaluations Staff. He is already overseas and will remain there.
4. The Agent uses a complex of related cover stories, based primarily on exaggerated implications of fact: Namely, that his income derives from free-lance journalism and money available from his wife's family. Some quarters suspect or believe that he may possess funds from the CFR, but this has never been alleged by the Agent himself.
5. Agent is available now for cover.
6. Agent is overseas.
7. GREBONY Project.

B. Biographic Information

1. DPOB: 13 May 1931, Los Angeles, California; M; Negro; None; U.S.; No prior citizenship; Married; 3 children; 30 Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, London NW 8.
2. Adult and minor dependents are already in place and sharing the same residence. No readily available biographic information. He has 2 sons and one daughter, ranging in age from one to ten years.

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GREBONY - 211 file

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3. BA Kenyon College 1950; Foreign graduate study 1951-52.
4. Reporter, Philadelphia Afro American 1950; Miscellaneous: public relations--Italian Film Exports 1951; 1952-54 U.S. Army; 1957-58 Agence France Press, Paris; 1960-61 CBS news, New York.
5. M.A.
6. Perceptive, aggressive but effective in personal relationships, literate.
7. Agent has fairly sizeable, but not pressing, debts to his in-laws. He lives modestly within his income from us.
8. Has resided only in U.S., Algiers, Paris and London, although he has travelled widely in other areas.
9. Fluent in French, competent in Italian and Spanish, and can read German.

C. Security Considerations

1. Agents has been receiving CA support for 13 months. FGA granted 23 May 1966 with caution requiring care in view of the considerable derogatory information developed as a result of the Agent's past association with left-wing and radical organizations.
2. Agent is aware of U.S. intelligence interest, has not been explicitly apprised of CIA involvement but no doubt suspects it.
3. Agent has never entered any installations associated with CIA.
4. There is no U.S. identification of the Agent with CIA outside of Staff personnel. British intelligence (see paragraph 5 below). His wife (whose family resides in England) is unwitting.
5. The Agent is known in true name to the MI-5 and MI-6 of the United Kingdom.
6. None. It should be noted that the contemplated cover will not be a relationship which the Agent (any more than the cover) will proclaim or flaunt, given the fact that in his highly anti-American circle, such a connection would be regarded as unsavory. The purpose of the cover is to backstop the Agent's story that he receives income from hack journalism which he keeps separate from his "real" if unrewarding involvement with radical politics.
7. No.

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

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE				
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
		2. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<p>14.</p> <p>ORFHOVY 201-306052 SEX M DOB ?</p> <p>200-124-156/02 PALP-06112 30 MAR 66</p> <p>CIT ? NCC ? SUNJ PPTS HIS FAMILY SITUATION DIFFICULT BECAUSE MUST LEAVE APT 1 JUN AND MAKES LOT OF DIFFERENCE WHETHER MOVE IS PERMANENT /ALLOWING LONG-TERM ADVANTAGEOUS LEASE OR PURCHASE/OR TEMPORARY.</p> <p align="right">R 6605110149</p> <p align="right">FILE IN 201-<u>306052</u></p>				
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.				

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-68)

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, KUWOLF		XOCCX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIIT			ONLY QUALIFIED CLERK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT CDDT/DORIC/Operational Assessment of QREBONY/1			MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>Ref: OFLW-1494</p> <p>1. Forwarded herewith is a 6-1/2 page answer by RODIGAST to the questions posed in reference. If any further clarification is required by Headquarters, please advise.</p> <p>2. With regard to QREBONY/1's overt tax return, it has been determined that declarations must be filed by all citizens with over \$600 income. If it turns out that QREBONY/1 cannot justify a \$600 income from overt sources, and we think he cannot, he simply has no declaration to file and will be advised to so state to the Embassy.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Zaffaresi</i> Karen H. ZAFFARESI</p> <p>Attachment h/w As stated above</p> <p>Distribution 3-C/KUWOLF w/att h/w</p>			
<div style="text-align: center;">  </div> <div style="text-align: right;">  </div>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
	OFLA-3627	29 March 1966	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQ'S FILE NUMBER 201-306052	

A. QR-BONY/1 (Q) gives the convincing impression that he is at home in his new work. He responds well to suggestions and instructions, adds suggestions of his own for improving the plan-- an indication that he wishes to please. In the beginning he showed a tendency to raise minor objections involving personal material problems (e.g., inconvenience to family life of a long tdy) but less of this was remarked as he came to realize that requirements were to be reasonable and he was to be treated as a human being with his own problems.

He has stated that he would not continue his present involvement with target personalities and institutions if it were not that we wish him to, i.e., his own inclination would be to withdraw from the political fringe. Rodigast feels that this is consistent with his background, which was not a party career; in his youth he was willfully apolitical and hostile to the "movement"; later he was involved in opposing party people in his New York work; in Paris he didn't get along with his party friends (the affair of the forged letter) and of course broke with the magazine crowd there.

He seems to be genuinely committed to working against enemies of ODYCKE, ready to accept even deeper commitment; he has expressed no reservations as to what he will do. He doesn't object to reporting on old friends, fellow FBPRIMERS, et al. He raised no objection to FLUTTER, or using s/w techniques (which he took with him on a trip to what was then a very hostile area, where he had known enemies, and where there was a recent history of dealing roughly with outsiders). When orders conflict with personal desires (for example, when he planned to spend a weekend in a city he enjoys but was told he should proceed immediately to his next stopping place), he obeys without hesitation.

The foregoing is a collection of miscellaneous facts, but taken together they paint the portrait of a promising agent, both in terms of motivations and abilities.

B. Rodigast's knowledge of Q's attitude in the months prior to recruitment (June 1965) is limited. Rodigast has the impression Q had simply reached the end of his rope-- he had nowhere to go, he had earlier decided that he would like to work for or at least cooperate with ODYCKE (although earlier attempts to make contact met with no success). The humane treatment received at the hands of his recruiter, the subsequent sympathetic handling by his case officer, undoubtedly convinced him that he had not made a mistake.

The material factor is not to be underestimated. The demoralizing position of living on his wife and worse, on her family, must have lowered his resistance to any possible alternative. Rodigast simply doesn't know how Q might have responded to a reasonable offer from enemies of ODYCKE at that point. The prospect of immediate engagement at a decent wage may have been decisive.

Since that time, Rodigast feels Q's motivation has been reinforced and perhaps considerably altered: he has been asked to do obviously necessary tasks, and so he can feel he is needed by someone; he has been given reasonable instructions on how to accomplish them; he sees that others are concerned for his personal safety and material wellbeing. Rodigast has taken pains to avoid giving the impression that there was any confusion or error or difference of viewpoint in running the project (even at a time when there were plenty of all three); such problems were

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resolved before being taken up with Q, and thus he has a somewhat rosy view of the operation. The satisfaction of accomplishment (i.e., being able to produce useful answers to our questions) is surely a factor in his present attitude.

Though light-skinned, with a voice and accent which would be considered acceptable in any PEPREML society, Q is extremely sensitive to the fact that he is a Negro. He has not said or suggested any such thing to Rodigast, but this is so obvious a factor in his correspondence (even discounting the extent to which the correspondence is part of his conscious cover) that it seems to Rodigast that it must be a factor in his life. On the other hand, Rodigast has known another Negro who was a close friend of Q (and now one of his major enemies, as a result of the Paris forged letter incident and contributing events) who was so sensitive about race that he makes Q in retrospect seem like an Uncle Tom.

Still, Rodigast does not believe Q could be handled by someone who is not genuinely a "nigger lover", i.e., who could not convey a convincing image of a person for whom a color difference was not a barrier (Q would surely detect the false "pal"). Q has mentioned anti-Negro prejudice as a reason for his refusal to cooperate with ODENTY officers who talked to him while he was in New York. In fact, Q deals with his present case officer as a possible if not a true friend; they share an interest and involvement in writing, English literature, living happily abroad, etc.; Rodigast has tried to read Dante in the original and Q has done so; Rodigast would like to write a novel and Q has published one; Rodigast doesn't know much about the post-logical positivists who interest Q but probably gives a convincing impression that he would like to know about them, and just might be capable of understanding them. What all the foregoing means is that in Q we have an accomplished person, and it is a useful tactic to treat him if not as a superior than at the very least as an equal.

There remains the possibility that opportunistic reasons are primary: Q joined the organization and stayed with us because he could not do as well in any other job, could in fact get no job (because of his background, his alien status abroad, etc). Rodigast does not exclude this, although he feels that whatever the original motivation, it has been strengthened and perhaps converted into something more worthy. But even if his primary motivation remains material, the history of the project over its first nine months suggest it is a viable one.

C. Q has lived in the underground for so many years without breaking that it is likely he will be able to continue to do so. He thinks fast, handles himself well in matters presenting security problems. He is not fully trained for clandestine activity. Rodigast's long meetings with him always include advice on one or more specific aspects of clandestine work, which when added up may be taken to represent a short course, but that is all. The lack of training has led Q to do or say things which Rodigast would not have wished him to do or say, and whenever possible this has been brought to Q's attention, and he seems responsive to such instruction.

Rodigast would not recommend that Q be given a training course, but this would not preclude more formal sessions with Rodigast during which Rodigast could give more complete instruction on various phases of clandestine work.

Q gives the impression of not being easily moved. He has already survived violent attacks, questioning by legislative committees and police (including abroad), public denunciation; now that he has KUBARK as a friend he should resist at least as well as before. One negative trait is his need to take revenge for injury, and this tendency must be controlled; his instinct to be spiteful to an enemy could conflict with a longer-range plan.

It is to be hoped that the present situation regarding his wife (who believes him to be working for the arch foe of PERIME) will be possible to maintain. She doesn't like the situation much, but accepts it, and apparently hasn't betrayed his "confidence". If he is moved to another city which both Q and his wife would consider agreeable (Rome) she would probably be even happier and less likely to revolt, especially if a quarters allowance helped them get out of their present financial straits (they can pay rent and buy food but not save or repay debts— so his wife says he is doing an unpleasant thing without even being able to say they are better off than they were in Paris). If he were sent to a less agreeable place for six months or a year (say Dar) he would want to settle his wife in a desirable place (London but preferably Rome) for the children's schooling; here too her attitude would depend on their material position and on the possibility of his being able to visit on occasion (if he were in Dar, say, and she in Rome, he would return for visits— which would also be cover for his meetings with his case officer). Rodigast recommends that once in place, Q's basic wage be raised (as promised in June 1965) from \$600 to \$800, but that he also receive quarters and if possible an educational allowance.

D. Q says he is a local PBRIMER. He now does act like one. Rodigast feels the evidence for his loyalty is at least as good as it is for most other PBRIMERS he knows. Early in their relationship (probably mid-June 1965 in Paris) Q had said he had turned away from the revolutionary movement and toward his own country; even though there were opportunistic reasons for him to have done so, he is seemingly not anti-PBRIME. His views on Negro problems in PERPIME probably have not changed, but he never was a black nationalist, and has many friends, besides his wife, who are white). He might not agree with ODYAKS policy in Vietnam, Cuba, or elsewhere— he obviously has not been questioned on his personal beliefs— but his dissent, if dissent there be, is not disloyalty, and in any case should not prevent him from executing KUBARK policy to the letter. Undoubtedly he has a leftist economic orientation, but there is no evidence that it is an orthodox Marxist one (or that it ever was).

He seems to like Rodigast; in any event they work well together. He has made no effort to develop a warm relationship with Rodigast, however, apparently feeling that this is not necessary, might not be appreciated, and would conflict with the compartmentalization so obviously kept in force by Rodigast (who hasn't told Q his true name, address, marital status, or any other personal fact which might lead to identifying him). Seemingly Q does not believe the name which Rodigast used at their introduction was a true name, for he didn't bother to remember it (the last name), and all this would tend to discourage the building up of a personal friendship.

It is probable that he respects rather than scorns KUBARK for its decent treatment of him. KUBARK through Rodigast has always kept its promises, Rodigast has never been a minute late for a meeting (Q has

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rarely been a minute or two late, and in recent meetings--presumably because he feels that Rodigast's never-failing appearance on the precise second of the meeting must mean that this is required KUBARK practice-- he has been even more precise. Rodigast is always ready with a suggested solution to a security or other problem which will be faced by Q in carrying out a new assignment.

On the other hand, part of Q's satisfaction with KUBARK might derive from a feeling that KUBARK is a "soft touch". Rodigast does not recommend that anything be done to change Q's opinion (if he really does hold it); Rodigast feels that we are going to pay Q as much whether he likes us or doesn't, and for the same money we might as well make sure he likes us and will do his utmost for the organization rather than simply be a timeserver keeping up appearances. If given cause for resentment, his behavior is unpredictable, for he hasn't much to lose-- reputation for loyalty, good name, etc. One solution would be to give him enough so that he would indeed stand to lose much.

Q appears to possess a realistic, sane view of ODENVY, what its people are like, what can and can't be done by it. As already indicated, he seems to be as loyal a PBPRIMER as other people who don't give much thought to the matter, certainly a lot more loyal than his background would lead one to expect. In any case, we have no recent evidence to contradict his statement that he considers himself to be a loyal PBPRIMER; it may just be true. If it isn't, this won't make any difference to the project as it is understood by Rodigast.

Q is unlikely to hold sympathetic feelings for ODENVY, having had what he described as an unfortunate experience or two with them. On the other hand, he is sophisticated enough to assume that his reporting on PBPRIMERS is of concern to ODENVY, and he must know that his own suggestion for tdy in PBPRIMS to contact target institutions and old friends there would put him into ODENVY territory. He would probably accept any necessary collaboration without showing that he didn't like it.

E. Rodigast does not believe Q is at present working for another service, but it is difficult to know what would happen if another service approached him. Rodigast assumes he would report this to us, just as he reported in detail the overtures by two persons apparently working with the services of the country in which he resides. As part of the present operation involves the possibility that Q will in fact be approached by the opposition, and Q is aware of this, one assumes he is prepared to remain loyal to KUBARK; one would also assume he would recognize the heightened value of his services to us should he be approached by the other side and continue to remain loyal to us.

Q certainly would not agree to work for an opposition service for peanuts, but if offered a considerable sum of money (given that he just breaks even in his present arrangement with us, in the thinking of Q's wife), there is no telling what he would do. When recruited, Q was told he would get a raise once he got settled "in place" (to \$800), and when this promise is kept he will have enough extra money to begin to pay debts and buy clothing, and thus have more concrete evidence of the material advantages of his present arrangement.

Rodigast would be very surprised if Q agreed to work for an opposition service not for financial reasons but through ideology.

Q likes to live well. He believes in wearing good clothes, staying in good hotels, being able to invite others out for food and

drink. He says that in the revolutionary movement poverty is no virtue, but merely indicates lack of influence. He says that the most popular persons are those who can dispense money, alcohol, and women. This may well be true. It is certainly true that such a role would please Q immensely (that is, having a plush apartment in which he could entertain target personalities, satisfying KUBARK's requirements and his personal desires).

P. Q must be dealt with firmly, with continued serving of requirements and planned itineraries for trips. At the same time, it is obvious that he improvises well when left without instructions; he is versatile, and can create situations which will result in an intelligence product. Rodigast's method is to suggest reasonable plans and to be ready to show that they can be implemented, and how they can, anticipating objections.

While there is no evidence that if left alone Q would drift, dragging out an assignment to fill time, it is possible that he would. He has not written as many free-lance articles as Rodigast would have liked him to, because each requires thinking out a subject, gathering material, selecting a point of view and thinking of the public to which it would be addressed-- a lot of work for articles meant to serve mainly as cover, for publication in obscure organs, or perhaps merely to be used to convince editors that he was active. On the other hand, he produced the first issue of the newsletter in record time, following instructions to the letter (indeed, accepting what must at times seem like petty editorial changes made by Rodigast). Perhaps he produced the latter so efficiently because he saw in it added prestige, an opportunity to get his name back before the public in a respectable context.

Ideological motivation would not seem to be a level of control in his case. What is most important is his contentment with being (he hopes) a permanent part of a large organization, with a steady salary (he has never said this, of course); the power of ODY KB is less important than its known reputation for keeping its promise to pay, something one doesn't find among the opposition groups known to Q, and he finds new examples of this daily.

Doubtless, his tendency to bear a grudge is a factor here-- Q is now in a position where he can thumb his nose at some of his enemies.

Rodigast feels that considerate dealing with Q, letting him know where he is going, what he can expect, not changing the rules abruptly or pulling a rug from under his feet, letting him see the possibility of small but certain increases in material benefits in the course of his career, compose the ideal formula for handling him. In the course of time, the ideological factor, which is perhaps marginal at this time, would probably be reinforced, could one way be a major factor. Q, meanwhile, must feel that the persons who deal with him are concerned with his material wellbeing and also of his physical safety, appraising the risks in his work and understanding that not all assignments will bear fruit. Our relationship with Q could be destroyed very rapidly if we failed to pay him as promised, or wasted his time with make-work, or came him confusing or contradictory instructions which suggested that KUBARK was not the all-powerful institution he may now think it is.

G. Very early in our relationship Q said that he would like to make a career in KUBARK, outside now, perhaps inside some day. He would work in FBPRIM or abroad. There was no indication then, and has been none since, that he regards the present relationship as a distasteful one to be terminated as soon as conditions permit.

He would like to settle in an expatriate's paradise, such as Paris or Rome, presumably involved in journalism and other writing. If he could do these things in connection with his work for us, so much the better.

H. Q is conscious of the need for security and handles himself well—as well as an amateur could in this context. But he is far more naive about techniques and especially the nuances of technique than Rodigast would have expected in one who had been involved in the revolutionary movement for so long. He often needs instruction on obvious points, and responds quite well to it, the exception being his clumsy handling of the s/w method—he is an intellectual and not a technician, and Rodigast assumes that he (Rodigast) would not do much better if forced to use some technical system.

Q is quite observant. He will recall a personal remark made to him by Rodigast from one month to the next. His reports written some time after the event are thorough and apparently accurate.

He read A Spy and His Master by Christopher Felix, and has mentioned it a couple of times when a remark by Rodigast reminds him of something said in the book.

Rodigast doesn't think that even after training Q would be very good at throwing off surveillance (for example) as he seems too matter of fact to be sly, and perhaps slightly lazy about what might be gratuitous behavior (e.g., changing subway trains or taxis just on the assumption that someone might be following him). Rodigast's solution is not to depend on Q for such things, but to attempt to plan meeting and stage other operations so as to minimize the need for dependence on Q's skill in such areas. After patient briefing Q does understand the need for tradecraft efficiency, and as already noted he follows the advice.

I. At first Q was quite concerned about money—he needed an advance for clothes, for travel, etc. His requests were really plaints, and he may have left the impression that he thinks of nothing but money. It was the complex of a poor boy who never had anyone he could turn to—despite a scholarship he had to leave a fine college after a brilliant freshman year. Once he received his advance and began receiving his money at the beginning rather than at the end of each month, and when he realized that he would receive complete and prompt reimbursement of expenses, he began to relax. Now he submits accountings without himself totalling the figures or keeping his own record (Rodigast knows this for he has seen Q's notes), so he must rely on us to tell him how much he claimed for (even Rodigast would never do that). He is, in sum, relaxed.

The same ease is to be noted in his substantive work; he submits his reports knowing he has done his best, and done well; he accepts compliments with a very slight nod. When Rodigast first met Q in a hotel room, Q had something of the hunted man. He still seems harried, slightly nervous at the moment of contact, but on the whole he is more sure of himself.

At the outset, Q would argue about assignments, suggesting alternatives, worrying about not having time to buy tickets, or enough money to pay for them. Now he accepts instructions without a murmur,

even when they contradict a previous tentative plan. His excellent response to instructions may be his desire to please, his satisfaction with his job, or personal pride in accomplishment. Whatever the reason or reasons, the fact is that he does respond well.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPT	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief, KJWOLF		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	Assessment of QREBONY		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See below

It would prove very useful to us--both as a contribution to the preparation of the Project Outline now in progress and as a backgrounder for possible discussions of QREBONY's operational utilization--if RODIGAST could provide us with an interpretive assessment of him based on the impressions and judgements he has been able to develop over the past months. We have some such initial assessments, of course, and can infer more from current reporting. However, we would like to get the benefit of RODIGAST's unique and direct contact, now that QREBONY has passed through a breaking-in phase and settled down in a regular relationship which, at its inception, is certainly a difficult one for most people to adjust to. We would suggest the following outline of topics for RODIGAST to follow:

- A. Estimate of loyalty to ODYOKE and QREBONY's psychological adjustment--his comfortableness--in working for ODYOKE clandestinely: his attitude, as RODIGAST can infer it, toward targets hostile to ODYOKE: in short, his ideological motivation.
- B. Estimate of his motivation generally: his personal reasons for association with KUBARK.
- C. Psychological suitability and staying power in leading a "double life". Possible or actual strains on him by virtue of his wife's attitude. Qualms about the "morality" of his position or fears about being found out.
- D. His own views of his patriotism or loyalty. His attitude toward RODIGAST, KUBARK, ODYOKE and ODENVY.
- E. His susceptibility to approach or control by an opposition service.
- F. Methods of control to which he is most, and least, responsive. What represents the effective lever of his control--internal ideological

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPT

continued

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLW-1494	DATE 17 MAR 1966	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQ'S FILE NUMBER 201-306052	
<p>Distribution: 1 - RI (201-306052) 2 - CA/CF</p> <p>ABSTRACT X</p>	ORIGINATING		
	OFFICE CA/CF	OFFICER James M. Murphy	TYPIST ajl
	COORDINATING		
	OFFICE SYMBOL CI/ICG	DATE 15 March 1966	OFFICER'S NAME Goodrich (in draft)
	RELEASING		
	OFFICE SYMBOL C/CA	DATE 7 MAR 1966	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE C. F. Meyer, Jr.

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLN-1494
<p>motivation? financial need? resentments? a desire to identify himself with ODYNOKE's power? or some combination of these?</p> <p>G. His longer range plans, if any.</p> <p>H. His security consciousness--i.e. his efficiency in tradecraft.</p> <p>I. Any changes in his attitudes or personality which RODIGAST has detected over the period of their association.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">HOWELL D. KAMBERMEYER</p>		
FORM 53a E-60 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	<div style="text-align: right; font-size: 1.5em; margin-bottom: 5px;">201-306052</div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED </div> <div> PAGE NO. 2 </div> </div>

104-10217-10225

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

SECRET/IDEN

MARKED FOR INDEXING

Chief of Station, London for LCPIPIT

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, London

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, WOLIMR

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: RYBAT/DTDORIC/PLORPHONE/MHPRORKE/STFLIMFLAM Training

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 294821

1. Being forwarded USC are copies of the QRPHONE/1 training report, the JEMINIMUM evaluation, contact reports of meetings with QRPHONE/1, a WOGEAR review of QRPHONE/1's book and some notes made by the STFLIMFLAM Headquarters officer, Harvey B. DAITCHMAN (IDEN), after his meetings with QRPHONE/1. These are for the information of both LCPIPIT and London Station and, taken together, should give you both the flavor of the variety of measures taken to assess the operational potential of QRPHONE/1.

2. During PAUPEROS' TDY at Headquarters we discussed the necessity of having QRPHONE/1 undergo an intensive seven day STFLIMFLAM training program to be conducted by DAITCHMAN. It is our opinion that in order for this training to be of maximum benefit, QRPHONE/1 and DAITCHMAN ought to be ensconced in a safehouse facility which provides security, comfort and an atmosphere conducive to learning. It is important that the training be conducted in a locale which will allow QRPHONE to give his full attention without being disturbed by his multitude of business and social contacts. Therefore, we recommend that LCPIPIT rent a cottage or beach house away from London for the duration of the training cycle. In discussing this with QRPHONE, he readily agreed and indicated that there would be no difficulty in getting away from his family for as long as we thought necessary. He

Attachments:

A. As Stated (u/s/c)

B. Iden Sheet (u/s/c)

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DATE

OEPW-1814

4 AUG 1972

CLASSIFICATION

NO. FILE NUMBER

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200-124-156/1

200-124-156/3

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PREVIOUS EDITION.

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DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYDAN	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEKW-1814
<p>simply would tell them and his business contacts that he was traveling on the continent. Please advise us of the dates which are determined to be convenient to PAUPEROS and QRPHONE/1. The Headquarters officer would prefer either the third or fourth week of September, and certainly not before.</p> <p>3. As indicated in the reference we solicit comments from LCPFIT and London Station on the results of our varied assessments of QRPHONE/1 and our decision to move ahead in the new operational directions described in OEKW-1661. We view the coming year as a trial one for these purposes and the Project Renewal has been submitted with that understanding clearly described.</p> <p>4. Since QRPHONE/1 might refer to conversations he had with Andrew F. TELQUIST (P), PAUPEROS should know that TELQUIST used the alias "Bob" in all his meetings with QRPHONE/1.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Allan W. TEUTSCHMAN</p> <p style="text-align: right;">200-124-156/1 200-124-156/3</p>		
FORM 53a 8-64 (40)	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYDAN	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED PAGE NO. 2

17 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WOLINE

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRFHOM/1,
Training Program "SHAW"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of WOMOLD, From Chief,
WOLINE, dated 23 May 1972,
Subject: "Covert training for QRFHOM/1"

1. QRFHOM/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, FROTH was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, FROTH was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, FROTH brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for JACOBSON and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any trying to speak of for subsequent preparation of cover plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop cover plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week -- and then with only one written one and one that he revealed orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

S/C ATT-1 to OEPW-1814 CS COPY

200-124-156/1
200-124-156/3

On Tuesday, July 4th, his publisher appointed him baby sitter for the publisher's ten year son and there went any hope of getting any casing done that day. At least one time, he mentioned that he did not go to bed till two that morning and as he had left the afternoon before, he had stated that he had meetings starting at four thirty that afternoon. With all that, he nevertheless was fully alert and attentive every minute of every training session.

6. In his developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer -- and a real dumb one he was. In such circumstances, FLORES had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the casing for meeting sites, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. When TELOQUIST, during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job," FLORES had earned that accolade all by himself. The instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

7. At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of TELOQUIST. He played his agent role excellently well and made the exercise a meaningful one for FLORES. The three trips to New York by TELOQUIST must have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming TWR trip, but they were efforts well spent.

8. No man, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our FLORES has his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (maybe not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 leaf torn out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from these few words, to run off his plan without a single pause for an oh, ah, or, etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, so smoothly did his mind and thoughts run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have so facile a mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full so important an act as a recruitment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

9. This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for FLORES's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. FLORES felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the other dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the paper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing -- area

description, access, hours of availability, the opposition, pros and cons as to suitability -- it was all there. He just didn't like to write out that upon which he could report orally.

10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he dashed those off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Same thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting -- no pause to think, to review, to reconstruct, to remember -- just an IBM-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a certain report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, after the second meeting in the developmental series, the instructor said: "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" And, as already reported above, FROTH preferred to save the training time and he answered "I will save time to write it". In this case, time was of the essence because TELOUIST had to see the report before the next meeting. To sum up this item: When FROTH feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, Mr. Sweet said, were excellent. No jumping to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading FROTH's report on his actions during the countersurveillance exercises, marvelled at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants FROTH had made, including their ages (but always made each man an inch or two shorter than the actual height -- which FROTH admitted he does consistently), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every compass direction. (In the first countersurveillance exercise, sprung on FROTH without a moment's prior notice, he made one of his two surveillants. In the second one, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. These were two different teams from the New York WOBONE ____). Concluding his admiration of FROTH's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructor: "You should be very proud of him".

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of FROTH's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, then spends time to browse in a book shop. Then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear

half cautious. These are a typical New Yorker's habits. The instructor, also a New Yorker, is guilty of the identical actions. We are highly kinetic in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a cross-way street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always one S.O.B. that doesn't get the word". By sheerest coincidence, when the instructor was on his way to the safe site to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a cross-way street and was bowled over by a hippie on a loaded bike -- going the wrong way. Only the large heavy file case the instructor was carrying kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, FRODO is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. One last note on the counter-surveillance exercises: He chose his positions well and he camouflaged his actions beautifully. One example: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three way conversation. They reported one incident as follows: "So rapid were FRODO's movements, that when he met a friend of his, he hardly paused to speak with him, just waved him off". The second surveillant: "No, it didn't look like that at all, to me. To me it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped FRODO and asked him for directions and FRODO gave them and just went about his business". FRODO's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin and asked him for the Museum which I knew perfectly well is on 55th Street. I turned around as he pointed south to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand".

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the team was surprised to note in FRODO's report that FRODO even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed FRODO into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the team compared notes and decided that FRODO may have made two of them but could not possibly have made the third man. The team captain, on reading FRODO's report, was stunned to see that FRODO had indeed made the third man also, but good.

18. FRODO had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with an instructor in the New York office. After relating the fine job that FRODO had done, the instructor's report concluded: "A first rate performance by FRODO, who's obviously been around -- both coverwise and for real".

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be faulted. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomats, as Mr. Grant held himself out to be, would properly be seen dining).

Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that FHOME himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safe-site complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safe-site from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own cover exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop cover plan) so he was given cover plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: FHOME is a promi man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade FHOME, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOLAH/CRIMM/1/ANAN. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF WOLAH

SECRET//RYBAT

18 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/1

1. I met with QRPHONE/1 for much of the 12th of July and wearing two hats. We first went through the third phase of the training exercise in which I had been playing the role of an agent prospect whom he was to assess and recruit, and then later in the OTR safehouse I identified myself as the Headquarters officer responsible for his project. Incidentally, he did an excellent job in all three phases of the training exercise and did particularly well on the recruitment itself. QRPHONE/1 is clever, imaginative, has an excellent grasp of this aspect of tradecraft and handled himself particularly well in a complex and changing training scenario.

2. As the Headquarters staff officer responsible for his project, I described in detail the reasons for the long, serious look at his performance these last several months, the changing intelligence and operational requirements we face, and the careful scrutiny he had been given as we began to map out new directions for him, all of which ended with this advance four-week training program, testing, and evaluation and substantive briefings. He said he was a bit confused by the WOMUSE briefing of last week so I explained how that tied in with this evening's planned discussion on the China program.

3. We discussed his itinerary, personal plans and the pacing of the next several months, all of which were clarified to his satisfaction.

a. He will be debriefed on 24 July at 1000 hours at the OTR safesite in NYC following his return from the operational trip around the country.

b. I will meet him for the final operational briefing session at 1000 hours on 26 July in the same OTR safesite.

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ON E. O. 11652, EXECUTIVE ORDER
§ 1.2(b), (2), (3) & (4) (which are of 1952)
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AND METHODS

RYBAT

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c. He will depart New York the night of 26 July on the 8:00 p.m. TWA flight to London.

d. This will get him in London in time for a previously scheduled ops meeting with PAUPEROS on 27 July. He leaves on 1 August for a one-month vacation touring most of Europe with his family and spending one week in Malta.

4. Before the arrival of DAITCHMAN we discussed other operational matters as follows:

a. His friend in New York City, Richard Ward, (Apt. 11K, 372 Central Park West) recently returned from Hanoi and Paris with the manuscript of a new book written by Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk titled "My War with CIA." Sihanouk gave the manuscript to Wilfred Burchett who gave it to a North Vietnamese friend to give to Ward. Ward was asked to find an American publisher and he, in turn, asked for QRPHONE/1's help. Burchett is an old friend of Ward's and stays at his apartment whenever he visits New York. The manuscript has already been given to a publisher in Europe. QRPHONE/1 asked if we would be interested in a copy. I told him to get one if he could do so without straining his cover.

b. His friend, Lyle Stuart, the publisher, has been trying to buy the American branch of the Oxford University Press, and apparently is about to consummate the deal. He offered QRPHONE a job as his European representative if the deal goes through.

c. Per TEUTSCHMAN's request I asked QRPHONE to give his instructor a copy of the long list of names and organizations given to him by Sibecho. Also per Ken's request, and in answer to my question, QRPHONE said he received the magazine published by the Turkish party in Collards Book Shop in London.

5. From 5:00 p.m. until a little after midnight on 13 July, DAITCHMAN of FE Division briefed QRPHONE/1 in substance on the STFLIMFLAM program, our interest in having QRPHONE/1 pursue such a role, and explained the great amount of dreary work that would be involved in learning the communist dialectic thoroughly if the whole venture were to be successful. I will make no effort to condense these seven hours

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of ethereal discourse, but QRPONE was fascinated, captivated by it and clearly interested in pursuing that long murky path to "enlightenment." /DAITIC/ did an outstanding job in setting the stage, describing the target, and then explaining step by step how he and QRPONE/1 and PAUPEROS would work together as the operation progressed. Regarding QRPONE's upcoming trip in the U.S., /DAITIC/ explained exactly how QRPONE should act as he meets each of his friends and how he should develop his new-found "interest" in studying Marxist-Leninism as he meets with those various people. QRPONE was very responsive, took notes, had ideas of his own, but more importantly, was very appreciative of the tactical advice that /DAITIC/ described. QRPONE/1 will meet the following people over the next ten days.

- a. Richard Ward in New York City.
- b. Libel Bergman in Newark (on three different occasions)
- c. Benjamin Blake, Milton Henry and a fellow named Boggs in Detroit (he's with NAR).
- d. Don Wright, Herb Block, and Sidney Lens all in Chicago.
- e. LPWEAKLY/1 and family in Chicago
- f. Davida Fineman and Saul Landau in San Francisco.
- g. The Martin Luther King Foundation in Atlanta.

8. All of the above were carefully chosen because of who they were, what organization or philosophy they represented, or their interest in the Chinese, and the extent to which the whole would knit together and form a viable base which QRPONE can use as a springboard when he returns to London. /DAITIC/ urged QRPONE to join, or in some cases rejoin, Marxist study groups in London including the one conducted by Manchanda. The role that QRPONE should play with these groups, as well as others in Europe who were singled out during various parts of the conversation, was also spelled out in detail. By the end of the evening QRPONE had clearly in mind what it was all about, what he should do next and the purpose of our reconvening on the 24th and 26th to decide finally what it all amounts to.

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7. I asked QRPONE to call on the sterile line using the "Mr. Stanley" indicator on Monday afternoon, 21 July. This is simply to check in and let us know he is on the way and how things have come thus far. He calculated that he needed another \$500.00 for the U.S. portion of his overall trip since LCPIPIT apparently had not anticipated this when he was given his original advance. I arranged through the good offices of in New York to get \$500.00 to QRPONE today.

8. QRPONE asked if we had any intelligence requirements for him to pursue while he is in Malta. I said Ken would brief him on those requirements on the 24th of July if we had any. Incidentally, QRPONE mentioned that Libol Bergman comes to New York City every Thursday and told QRPONE that he could be reached on telephone number 265-2500. QRPONE said if we cared to we might want to track that number and see where Bergman hangs out.

Andrew F. TELQUIST

SECRET/RYBAT

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31 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Final Contact with QRPHONE/1 in New York City

1. As arranged previously, I met with QRPHONE/1 at the WOHOLD safesite in New York City from 1000 hours to 1230 26 July. The meeting was intended to wrap up loose ends, convey our decision to pursue the STFLIMFLAM program (providing QRPHONE/1 himself was amenable), and to make clear that we expect measurable operational progress within the next year.

2. Although QRPHONE/1 had been debriefed on 24 July by other Headquarters officers regarding his trip around WOCORK, I asked him to review it again for my information so I could put it clearly in perspective as it related to our plans for him in the coming year. I'll not bother with the details here because such have already been written for the record elsewhere, but suffice it to say that QRPHONE/1 was both pleased and relieved at the reception he got from his old contacts because of the reflection these receptions had on his own bona fides. The allegations of his BKTRUST affiliation which had floated through Europe were never mentioned by his WOCORK contacts; on the contrary at least one of them urged QRPHONE/1 to return soon to WOCORK because this is where the action is. This same individual gave QRPHONE reading materials on the Communist dialectic and urged him to study them closely. This greatly impressed QRPHONE because it showed how accurate were the briefings given him by the Headquarters STFLIMFLAM officer and demonstrated that we knew our tactics.

3. I then reviewed with QRPHONE/1 the reasons for our long close scrutiny of him and his performance these last several months followed by our selection of him for advance training, testing, and redirection in the strong hope we had that he would accept this new task because of its priority importance to our national collection requirements. I asked

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QRPHONE/1 his impressions of it all, his reaction to the STFLIMFLAM proposal, and whether he would accept its demanding obligations. QRPHONE said he certainly would and that he found it a real challenge to his intellect and his operational skills. The tedious study of the dialectic would not deter him. His only concern was how he should actually play it as he developed relationships with appropriate party members and, ultimately, the Chinese in SMORANGE. I pointed out he needn't concern himself with the last point because that would be part of the purpose of the ten-day training program in SMORANGE in September which would be given him by the Headquarters STFLIMFLAM officer. I said the training would require total emersion for ten days straight, probably in some secluded beach house on the coast where all involved could reside full time. He said this would present no problem cover-wise; he would simply tell his family he had gone to the continent. I said that PAUPEROS would be working out the details of this with him, probably after his return from vacation.

4. I said that given QRPHONE/1's past performance, his credentials with the radical left, and his apparent interest in vigorously pursuing the STFLIMFLAM program we expected to be able to measure in six to eight months the likelihood of his being able to achieve all the STFLIMFLAM objectives based upon the progress he would have made by then with his Chicom contacts. Should it appear that the STFLIMFLAM operation would not succeed we would be discussing alternative courses of action with him by the end of the year. He did say that of all the countries in Europe where his STFLIMFLAM and radical left potential is probably the best, Italy would be first and Denmark second.

5. I told QRPHONE/1 that his meeting with PAUPEROS had been moved to 31 July as he requested, reviewed his European vacation plans and his Malta trip and wished him the very best of luck. At this point QRPHONE/1 certainly seems willing and able aggressively to pursue our operational plans. We shall see.

Andrew F. TELQUIST

SECRET/RYDAI

WOGear Review of African Liberation Movements

In general, the author has done a reasonably good job describing the historical development of the various African liberation movements, especially when one considers the complexity and number of splits and mergers that have occurred within and among the movements over the years. There are several glaring inaccuracies, however, in the author's conclusions about the current position and effectiveness of the several Portuguese African liberation movements.

Regarding Angola, the author characterizes the MPLA as an ideologically-oriented group (i.e., Soviet doctrine) that has failed to grasp and utilize to its advantage the tribal realities that exist in Angola. The author fails to acknowledge, however, that the MPLA has had some success, albeit limited, in building a movement that is national and multiracial in character rather than tribally oriented. Despite its urban intellectual leadership, the MPLA has had some success winning local support in rural eastern Angola.

By contrast, GRAE ranks a poor second. From inception, its primary base of support has been the large Angolan refugee population of Bakongo tribesmen who live in southwestern Zaire. Although the organization has won some support among Bakongo kinsmen across the border in northwestern Angola, it has failed to broaden its base because of its thinly disguised regional and tribal make-up. Moreover, Roberto's unwillingness to delegate authority or compromise have produced chronic disputes at the leadership level. The author's conclusion that GRAE is a formidable force to be reckoned with in the future of Angola is contradicted by the fact that the MPLA is by far the largest and most effective of the three nationalist groups opposing the Portuguese in Angola.

MOZAMBIQUE

The present FRELIMO leadership does not appear to be in the state of disarray in 1972 that the author believes it is. Although some differences undoubtedly persist, the present leaders seem to have closed ranks somewhat since the departure of Simango in late 1969. For the present, any internal squabbles that may exist are not noticeably affecting FRELIMO's fighting abilities inside Mozambique.

RHODESIA, SOUTH WEST AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA

Reasonably straightforward and up to date. No serious deficiencies.

14-00000

Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JBMIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JBMIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manual-manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Page 2
ORPHONE/1

Subject is not by nature a role player, and it would not be operationally advantageous to have him switch roles, for he cannot psychologically handle role playing over a period of time. He has worked hard to establish an identity for himself, and could not cope as effectively with a new one.

Conclusion:

Subject is a bright, extremely ambitious, and aggressive individual who appears to be motivated to work for the Agency by three needs: 1) a need to be accepted and liked; 2) a materialistic need; and 3) as a vehicle to be vindictive to former loyalties, i.e., the far left or radical movement in this country.

Though he is capable of switching loyalties, and his life history attests to this fact, it is very difficult to predict his future behavior since so much depends on his life circumstances. One statement that can be made is that, given his personality, it is very doubtful if he would return to his former allegiances. But if not personally involved with someone from this agency who can give him acceptance and support, he is likely to look elsewhere for his need satisfactions.

PAS Formula: 14(E+u+c R+c+ Uoo)I+

Notes on QRPONE by Harvey B. DAITCHMAN

1. Revolutionary Image: Discussed briefly how it is obtained. Pointed out there is a pattern to it which is discernable among revolutionaries. It is usually issue oriented in the beginning, the war being one of the key issues, and it gradually evolves into a desire to engage in practical activities which usually expressed best on a continuing basis through work in an organization. Also connected with this process is the gradual development of a different "outlook." It is usually a mixture of idealism and Marxism-Leninism-socialism-Mao Tse-tung thought. Usually unstructured but developing.

It is possible in this stage to move from one group to another without any particular approbation being attached for this transience. This is particularly so if one starts way outside a M-L-ist group and moves inward towards it. Quite a different thing to start in a M-List group and go out.

Also in development of a new outlook one comes to study a variety of revolutionary literature. This can take one into different areas, anarchism, GW advocacy, revolutionary nihilism, socialism, Marxist-Leninism, etc. However, to get to latter it must be done logically.

2. Tightly Structured Op: Emphasis upon tight, controlled contacts which seek to accomplish a specific purpose--collection of info not necessarily one nor always one. Purpose is to lay ground work for future developments. Purpose to establish certain contacts which can be later used in either positive or negative fashion. Structured conversation is also essential. It too should seek to accomplish something, directed so as to be useful to future development of op: e.g., desire to have an explanation for an action to be undertaken later--so bring up in conversation with someone so that can use that conversation later as explanation for interest in a subject, knowledge of a subject, etc. It is checkable.

3. Study: Most important aspect in opening phases of op. Without correct study and without development (understanding) of "correct outlook" one will always be a dilettante to the, outside looking in, someone who is useful to them "under certain conditions," but not someone who is reliable, and not a dependable revolutionary. This is really the key, the ideological tool, it will open doors that cannot otherwise be entered.

4. Contacts: Those to be exploited now and those to be used in or for future time. In the beginning the contacts which are developed are to be used as a means of building his justification for having begun the serious study of Marx,

Lenin, and Mao. This must be discussed with people so that many are aware of it. These conversations will be later used when he explains how and why and when he became interested.

5. Diffuse Nature of Op: In beginning op has a diffuse nature. It is necessary to make many contacts. Some will be more useful than others, but all have potential for use in one circumstance or another. Since we have no way of knowing how or from whom the Chinese collect their intelligence, seek out, or otherwise spot budding revolutionaries we can assume that some one of his acquaintances will report his interest in Mao, etc. We can assume that through some of his activities Chinese will build up his dossier so that at a later date when we go directly to the Chinese for help they can look in their dossier and see that x number of months ago, etc., various things were reported. Etc.

6. Ops as a Process of Development: Permit no diversions or detours which might become permanent. This would include targets of opportunity, etc. Must always maintain correct operational line and cannot reach target by following various diversionary tributaries in the temporary interest of collecting marginal intelligence. Must be prepared to sacrifice diversionary tasks in pursuit of main goal or objective. If tangential things are folled up we then have a different op, and a new op line, must be cautious with this. Ops line serves as guide for whole op from beginning to end.

7. Tactics in Op: Must always be carefully thought out so as to insure forward development of op. Something must be seen emerging or useful, or having potential future value for development of op, otherwise it is pointless to undertake it. Tactics are details. Details are most important aspect in day to day running of op. They must be paid attention to, must be contributory, must be carried out in correct sequence, and we must keep in mind that at one or more points it is these details which will be subject of the scrutiny of the opposition. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE DETAILS APPEAR LOGICAL TO THIS OPPOSITION, even if they may seem illogical to us at times. Our logic is not the same as communist logic.

8. Ops is Step by Step Process: Op should/or can be divided into steps, phases, stages, segments, whatever. Each phase should dovetail into the next. To some extent a general outline can be developed. Each of the major phases should be sub-divided into stages so that they can be dealt with step by step. For example: Three broad categories:

1st Phase: All initiatives are ours. We do all the work, lay ground for future stages. We have a flexible line which permits making maximum contacts to be correctly exploited. We give training. Also devise concrete activities for him to carry out.

2nd Phase: Chinese and others have shown interest. We will exploit this interest. After he has completed first phase we will begin to make structured contacts with the Chinese. In these contacts he will show that he has a grasp of the ideology, is interested in learning more, desires to study more intensively. Will use as negative examples: his book, Panthers, some aspects of Bergman's behavior, the unstructured and undisciplined nature of most revolutionary activists in U.S., particularly among the blacks, or whatever may seem appropriate at time contact is made. However, will seek their help to further his study and will indicate recognition of need to return to U.S. in order to undertake correct role in revolutionary struggle. At this stage we will have an idea of interest of Chinese. We will be able to determine whether we can expect progress or not. If they prove willing to help they will then be asked to guide his further study, to help him. Through this help they will be able to see the development which has taken place. We should get a good feeling of their willingness to guide him after a couple of meetings. If we are shut out then must make ops judgement from that point on--can always target against Soviets and use Chinese as negative example. If they are interested we will then lose some aspects of our initiative, but in essence the more initiative we lose to them, the more they try to direct him, the deeper he becomes involved with them, which is our objective--one of them. He must continue his study.

3rd Phase: Continue his study; continue his contacts all around, but by now should have significant contacts and can dispense with the more general "sparrow" approach. Once certain of their willingness to help we ask about a trip to Peking to study after which he wants to return to U.S. and take active role.

Recognize that this may be a sticking point. We don't want him here. However, this idea has to always be in the forefront as far as the Chinese are concerned otherwise they have little reason to be interested in him. This MUST appear to be his goal. We may be able to circumvent it later for one reason or another, or it might be useful to bring him back temporarily. This decision must be reserved for that time.

These stages and sub-stages must be further divided if we are to understand the operation correctly and are to carry it out correctly. Each action he is asked to undertake must be seen leading to something concrete in the next or another step. The whole op goes STEP BY STEP. We do not insert unrealistic objectives, or those which would be desirable but may be difficult. This is a waste of time. We only seek to do what is possible--possible is what can be turned into reality.

Emphasis must be made on "step by step" approach and must be maintained. Otherwise we can trip ourselves up by trying to accomplish something which is out of sequence FOR THEM. For

example: He has read Marx and Lenin. We might say he's quite familiar with it. We could then say that he will read Mao and after that he will be able to pretend to be a Maoist. All of this is true. He could say it and act like he and others thought a Maoist should act. However, appearance and essence are not synonymous. It might appear to non-Maoists that our troop is a Maoist because he can talk as good a game as anyone else--or better than those who have not studied as much--but the essence of being a Maoist is not contained in such superficialities. Nor is the essence of being a Marxist-Leninist so contained. He cannot, for example, bloom or emerge as a Maoist and find acceptance with the Maoists. They know the process it takes to get there: "Several years of assiduous study can produce good results." (Some Chinese quote on studying Mao.)

9. Their Weapon is Also Our Tool: Once we understand correctly how they wield their weapon, the dialectical method, it can serve as our tool to pry our way into their camp. Through proper study and understanding we can develop and promote Q's superiority among his friends and acquaintances. To Marxists he will be much more acceptable and his intel product will probably be enhanced since they will talk on subjects they might not have touched upon in the past, he will be more trusted, and also he will have better recognition of key developments in Marxist world through better understanding of their reality.

10. Some activities which we might consider enroute.

a. Start His Own Study Group: Chinese would be very interested. Unlike most study groups with which I am familiar he would stress study of ideology--in correct way. However, to prevent them from profiting from such study they can be tied in knots for months dealing with a variety of ideological problems. There is no point in our developing for their use good revolutionaries. However, it would provide reason for frequent contact with Chinese in order for them to help him in the development of his group. Would probably lead him into contact with other interesting types. Might have it for "Americans only" abroad--to avoid problems with Brits: whatever:

b. Might Talk About Starting a One Man Institute for Studying African Revolution: could put out a four page broadsheet for peanuts. It would discuss various African problems. His book gives him good reason for such study. He might draw one or two people to him. Can use this too as basis for approach to Chinese. He will have come to recognize that he had not painted the true picture of national lib struggle in his book and through his broadsheet he seeks to rectify some his ideas.

c. He could seek to do another book on "The Dialectics of African Revolution." Here again the help of various communists, Marxist-Leninists, and particularly the Chinese in providing guidance (correct guidance) would give him frequent access and contact--providing the Chinese are willing to help.

d. Start a Broadsheet for American Revolutionaries Abroad: This would give him contact with a wide variety of radical U.S. types abroad. It would also have feed back into the American scene and in part fulfill his requirement to have an active role with U.S. revolutionary developments. Etc. Etc.

e. There are other activities which he might also undertake. The above are a few ideas of what we can do to "promote" QRPHONE. He can do a number of different things at the sametime since much of it overlaps and is hence compatible. However, each must be structured, carefully handled, with great attention to the details. STEP BY STEP.

Some Words of Caution: Our experience clearly indicates that it is incorrect to rely upon either the agent or the station to provide the impetus. This seems to be true for a number of reasons. Case officers change often, chiefs of ops, bases, or stations change--there is not much continuity. We are thinking of a long term operation which, as it grows, becomes very complex. It is not easily understood by someone who gets involved after it has been going for sometime. It is even more true of changes in station leadership whose attitude is largely developed on his subjective feelings from reading only cable traffic. The initiative, the operational ideas, etc. are best kept in Hqs. There is so much more information here to work with, people with whom one can talk, staffs, etc. Also most officers in the field simply do not have the time to sit down and plan in the kind of detail that is needed to continue and develop the op. It calls for solid knowledge of the communist reality in order to insure that no errors creep in those contacts he may make. It calls for someone to have the time to read, study, certain publications, articles, etc., and then to figure out whether or not a given publication or article can be used to make a useful contact, write a useful letter, etc. If so, how, and then go the field with the idea, and concrete directions about how it should be used. Case officers most likely won't be exposed to the same material and probably wouldn't have the planning time necessary, or the various resources of Hqs to do what needs to be done.

This is not to suggest that the field has nothing to say. However, if the understanding can be clearly made that this is in fact a joint operation, with Hqs having an opportunity for big input, with the understanding that the only thing which matters to all concerned is the correct development of the operation in the given concrete conditions and not either the Hqs or the field trying to establish some kind of supremacy of rights over the other--there is a good chance of success.

200-124-154/1
200-124-154/3

Under Separate Cover Attachment B to OEPW-1814

IDEN - Andrew Ness

S/C ATT. 2 to OEPW-1814

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200-124-156/1
~~200-124-156/3~~

SECRET/NOFORN

Agent Profile - QRPHONE/1

QRPHONE/1 is an American citizen and a singleton agent who has been a recruited asset for some seven years. He has extensive contacts among leftist, radical, and communist movements in Europe and Africa and was able to sustain his relations with many such figures for operational purposes in spite of a formal disassociation some years ago. Originally a member himself of a radical pro-communist group, his disenchantment with internal personal and political dissension in an organization to which he had firmly committed himself led later to his acceptance of an operational relationship with the Agency. Although targeted after his recruitment at the plethora of new left and radical elements in Europe, essentially for intelligence collection purposes, QRPHONE/1 has recently been redirected toward the Chinese Communists with a view to ingratiating himself and seeking their guidance and support as he demonstrates an interest in more effectively acting on their behalf. Our ultimate objective is to precipitate invitations to Mainland China which will lead to successively higher echelons of contact within the Chinese Government.

To prepare QRPHONE/1 for this demanding task, extensive retraining, assessment and remotivation were recently accomplished and selective recontact was made by him with his more influential and pertinent communist contacts. Reactions to QRPHONE/1's alleged desire to more fully commit himself to the communist Chinese cause and the assistance rendered thus far by these communist contacts are encouraging indicators of the potential success of this agent to achieve our goal.

Although a complex man to manage operationally because of his own background and the mix of his ideological and professional motivations, QRPHONE/1's intelligence and personality are such as to well equip him to meet the challenge of the tests the Chinese are likely to throw his way. He is based in England, as is his case officer, and operational meetings are held in secure safe sites, sometimes on the continent.

QRPHONE/1 has produced numerous intelligence reports on communist and radical targets in addition to his covert action functions as a journalist and author. His long-term tenure with the Agency will be determined in part by the degree of success of his new Chicom directions.

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1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/1

1. On 24 July 1972, Andy Ness (in alias as Andy), Frank Falko (in alias as Frank) and the undersigned (in alias as Ken) converged on the OTR safesite in New York City to meet with QRPHONE/1 in order to debrief him on his trip through WOCORK.

2. The discussion was started by having QRPHONE relate the details of his trip on a city by city basis describing the people he met and his reception by them. It should be noted here that several of the individuals that QRPHONE was to have seen were out of town or unavailable, however, QRPHONE will correspond with these individuals in order to maintain his relationship with them.

NEWARK

QRPHONE met with Leibel Bergman at his home and stayed overnight (14-15 July) as his guest. QRPHONE told Bergman that he had decided to make a full-time commitment to the study of Marxist-Leninist (M-L) doctrine in order to become more proficient in M-L theory and would like to join the RU to further this ambition. Bergman's reaction, according to QRPHONE, was enthusiastic. Bergman gave QRPHONE some M-L literature (which was the same as the literature Andy gave him several weeks ago to study) which he felt would be helpful. Bergman stated that if QRPHONE was really interested in becoming involved in the M-L movement he should return to WOCORK because that "was where all the inconsistencies were." Bergman invited QRPHONE to



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take part in some M-L study groups but didn't say what exactly would be studied. The following are some general comments QRPHONE provided about Bergman. Bergman doesn't like Newark, he has been mugged several times and would like to go back to California; however, that is not possible at this time, so Bergman will instead move to New York City. Bergman is pleased with the current development of the RU. He said that the recent trip to China by several RU members was successful and that the trip had been pleasant for them. QRPHONE commented that it appears that Bergman does not have the same control of the RU that he formerly had, although he is regarded as the "guru" of the RU.

NEW YORK

QRPHONE said that Richard Ward is attempting to sell the English language rights of Prince Sihanouk's book My War With the CIA. Ward had been trying to get Lyle Stuart to purchase the rights but Stuart's antipathy toward Wilfred Burchett, "that old Communist" according to Stuart, was too great. Burchett apparently wrote the forward and Stuart doesn't want to publish anything with his name on it. QRPHONE, in our presence, called Stuart and convinced him to at least read the manuscript of the book before he turned it down. Ward has a South Vietnamese student living with him as a combination houseboy/companion. This student, whose name is David Truong, is the son of the South Vietnamese presidential candidate Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran in the 1967 South Vietnamese election on a peace platform and who is now in prison. QRPHONE said that this student has amassed a large collection of books on intelligence, that the books are expensive and that he doesn't have any idea where the money to buy the books came from. He also said he doesn't think Truong has immigration papers to stay in WOCORK legally. I asked if Truong was in any way involved with the recent attempt to hijack a plane to Hanoi. QRPHONE stated that Truong knew the hijackers and might have known something about the attempted hijacking because the hijackers had also stayed at Ward's apartment.

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Ward is going to France soon for a vacation with a girlfriend he refused to identify because he feels his apartment and phones are bugged "by at least ten intelligence agencies." Before he goes on vacation he intends to stop in Paris and meet with DRV and PRG officials as well as with Wilfred Burchett. (Ward also met with Jane Fonda prior to her recent trip to the DRV). Ward will try to visit QRPHONE in London sometime in September before he returns home. Ward claimed that a "wealthy benefactor" gave him some \$1000 to cover the cost of his vacation. Ward himself is broke and makes only about \$60 per week salary.

DETROIT

QRPHONE was unable to see Milton Henry, leader of the New Republic of Africa, who was on vacation in Japan. He did manage to see FNU Boggs, who is apparently no longer involved with radical organizations but who is acting as a clearinghouse for black and white radicals. QRPHONE characterized Boggs as less doctrinaire and less dogmatic than he had been in the past. Boggs' feeling about the black radical movement is that it is in considerable disarray.

CHICAGO

QRPHONE saw LPWEAKLY/1 who told him that he was trying to get an invitation to visit China. LPWEAKLY/1 told QRPHONE that if he went he would see about taking him along. This was the first that QRPHONE knew about LPWEAKLY/1's plans. QRPHONE was unable to see either Sidney Lens or Hal Block because they were out of town. He did corroborate the fact that Block had recently been to China. QRPHONE spent some time with Don Wright, who was a member of the RU delegation to China. Wright is now a full-time RU official responsible for organizing RU cells in the Mid-West and seems committed to revolution although he doesn't speak in M-L terminology. Wright stated that one problem now facing the RU involves national exposure, i.e., getting minorities to become involved with the RU. This is a change from past RU philosophy which was that

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minority groups should form their own organizations separate from the RU. QRPHONE said Wright is very bitter toward the Black Panther movement and thinks that Eldridge Cleaver is "bad" and that Huey Newton and Bobby Seale are "corrupt".

SAN FRANCISCO

In San Francisco QRPHONE stayed with Davida Fineman. The mysterious M, who appeared in several of her letters to QRPHONE, is Martin Nichols, a Marxist scholar of note who translated into the English the entire Fundamentals of Political Economy. He was once a member of the RU.

Emotionally, Davida is not as depressed as she was several months ago, even though her brief exposure to the world of labor union organizing was a failure. Her comments about the RU were to condemn the Bruce Franklin group (Venceramos Organization) which she said is going to bring disaster to the whole RU because of its predilection for violence before the groundwork for revolution has been laid. Fineman feels that Robert Avakian, a high RU official, is less wild and erratic than in the past and has in fact become a good M-L.

QRPHONE saw Paul Richards, Hodee Edwards' son-in-law. Richards is a former CP member from the Mid-West, which he left because of the people. He feels that the Mid-West is a part of the country where the Government ought to test nuclear warheads. QRPHONE also met with Earl and Lee Rose. Earl was in the RU delegation to China where he must have caused some embarrassment to the delegation by his naivete. He attempted to meet African revolutionaries, particularly members of the MPLA, which he didn't realize were Moscow-oriented. Rose asked QRPHONE to write and send him material on the various African liberation movements. Lee Rose works for Bell Telephone Company although Earl, her husband, is unemployed.


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ATLANTA

QRPHONE went to the Martin Luther King Center for Social Change, formerly the Martin Luther King Foundation, where he met with Tom Porter, the head staffer of the organization. There was recently a split in the Center and the Executive Director, a Dr. Scott, was forced out of office. The office is still vacant and, according to Porter, will remain so for the immediate future. The reason for the continued vacancy is apparently to allow Coretta King and other members of the Board of Directors to maintain direct control. Porter is a former writer for Freedom Ways Magazine. QRPHONE said that Porter knew of him but didn't say exactly how. QRPHONE told Porter he would consider writing a brief on the Center for LPWEAKLY. QRPHONE said that the Center is going to establish a foreign affairs staff which will be headed by Jack O'Dell, an old CP member.

3. After QRPHONE's discourse on his trip, Andy discussed in broad terms what he could expect in the next year with regard to securing entre to the Chinese. QRPHONE was told that once he was proficient in M-L he would be expected to go out and test his knowledge with various individuals and organizations in order to gain access and become known to the Chinese. Andy emphasized it wouldn't be easy, that QRPHONE would have to be diligent and patient, but that in the end, if he was successful, the benefits would be many. QRPHONE accepted this.


Kenneth Rosen
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/KRosen:ckj (1 August 1972)

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Pho 201

TSD/BAB MEMO #275-72
20 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rod Sweet, Chief CA-3

ATTENTION : Mr. Ken Rosen, Rm 3D18

SUBJECT : ORPHONE/1

1. Attached is the psychological assessment of ORPHONE/1. A preliminary verbal read-out was given on 7 July in which it was stated that Subject was an emotionally stable individual. We still support this statement, but a more in-depth analysis revealed there are certain aspects of his personality that are susceptible. These are discussed in the report. If any part of the report is unclear or requires further discussion, please contact us. Meanwhile, we would appreciate receiving follow-up information on Subject's performance in order to help us refine and improve our methods of assessment.

James M. Keehner
TSD/BAB

Attachment:
Report

14-00000

Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JBMIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JBMIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manual-manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Page 2
ORPHONE/1

Subject is not by nature a role player, and it would not be operationally advantageous to have him switch roles, for he cannot psychologically handle role playing over a period of time. He has worked hard to establish an identity for himself, and could not cope as effectively with a new one.

Conclusion:

Subject is a bright, extremely ambitious, and aggressive individual who appears to be motivated to work for the Agency by three needs: 1) a need to be accepted and liked; 2) a materialistic need; and 3) as a vehicle to be vindictive to former loyalties, i.e., the far left or radical movement in this country.

Though he is capable of switching loyalties, and his life history attests to this fact, it is very difficult to predict his future behavior since so much depends on his life circumstances. One statement that can be made is that, given his personality, it is very doubtful if he would return to his former allegiances. But if not personally involved with someone from this agency who can give him acceptance and support, he is likely to look elsewhere for his need satisfactions.

PAS Formula: 14(E+u+c Rct+c+ Uoo)Lt

I HIGH (Digit Span) LOW E
INTERNALIZER

Self Contained
Inner Directed
Physically Inactive, contemplative
Values ideas, symbols

EXTERNALIZER

Responsive, reactive
Outer Directed
Physically Active, relating
Practical, concrete, realistic

R HIGH Block Design LOW F
REGULATED

Organized
Focused
Persistent
Rote learning
Emotionally insulated
Memory good for procedures and routines

FLEXIBLE

Loose
Diffuse attention
High imagination
Trial and error
Spontaneous, expressive, sensitive
Memory good for feelings and impressions

A HIGH (Picture Arrangement) LOW U
ADAPTIVE

Versatile role player
Socially responsive and suggestible
Socially imitative
Reflects group behavior
Overestimated

UNIFORM

Limited role player
Socially guarded and negativistic
Often ignored
Socially specialized or stereotyped
Often in conflict with group behavior
Underestimated

OS 0257-72

SECRET

17 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff
 ATTENTION: Mr. Jim Anthony

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1,
 Training Program "SHAW"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of Training, From Chief,
 Covert Action Staff, dated 23 May 1972;
 Subject: "Covert Training for QRPHONE/1"

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty-seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, PHONE was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, PHONE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, PHONE brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for JEMINIMUM and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any casing to speak of for subsequent preparation of commo plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop commo plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week -- and then with only one written one and one that he reviewed orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

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On Tuesday, July 4th, his publisher appointed him baby sitter for the publisher's teen age son and there went any hope of getting any casing done that day. At least one time, he mentioned that he did not go to bed till two that morning and as he had left the afternoon before, he had stated that he had meetings starting at four-thirty that afternoon. With all that, he nevertheless was fully alert and attentive every minute of every training session.

6. In his developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer -- and a real dumb-dumb he was. In such circumstances, PHONE had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the casing for meeting sites, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. When Mr. Rod Sweet, during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job," PHONE had earned that accolade all by himself. The instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

7. At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of Mr. Sweet: He played his agent role excellently well and made the exercise a meaningful one for PHONE. The three trips to New York by Mr. Sweet must have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming TDY trip, but they were efforts well spent.

8. No man, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our PHONE has his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (maybe not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 leaf torn out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from these few words, to run off his plan without a single pause for an uh, hm, er, etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, so smoothly did his mind and thoughts run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have so facile a mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full so important an act as a recruitment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

9. This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for PHONE's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. PHONE felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the other dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the paper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing -- area

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description, access, hours of availability, the opposition, pros and cons as to suitability -- it was all there. He just didn't like to write out that upon which he could report orally.

10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he dashed those off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Same thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting -- no pause to think, to review, to reconstruct, to remember -- just an IBM-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a certain report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, after the second meeting in the developmental series, the instructor said: "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" And, as already reported above, PHONE preferred to save the training time and he answered "I will make time to write it". In this case, time was of the essence because Mr. Sweet had to see the report before the next meeting. To sum up this item: When PHONE feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, Mr. Sweet said, were excellent. No jumping to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading PHONE's report on his actions during the countersurveillance exercises, marvelled at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants PHONE had made, including their ages (but always made each man an inch or two shorter than the actual height -- which PHONE admitted he does constantly), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every compass direction. (In the first countersurveillance exercise, sprung on PHONE without a moment's prior notice, he made one of his two surveillants. In the second one, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. These were two different teams from the New York Office of Security). Concluding his admiration of PHONE's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructor: "You should be very proud of him".

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of PHONE's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, then spends time to browse in a book shop. Then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear

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tail conscious. These are a typical New Yorker's habits. The instructor, also a New Yorker, is guilty of the identical actions. We are highly kinetic in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a one-way street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always one S.O.B. that doesn't get the word". By sheerest coincidence, when the instructor was on his way to the safesite to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a one-way street and was bowled over by a hippie on a loaded bike -- going the wrong way. Only the large heavy film case the instructor was carrying kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, PHONE is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. One last note on the counter-surveillance exercises: He chose his positions well and he camouflaged his actions beautifully. One example: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three way conversation. They reported one incident as follows: "So rapid were PHONE's movements, that when he met a friend of his, he hardly paused to speak with him, just waved him off". The second surveillant: "No, it didn't look like that at all, to me. To me it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped PHONE and asked him for directions and PHONE gave them and just went about his business". PHONE's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "--- where I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin and asked him for the Museum which I knew perfectly well is on 55th Street. I turned around as he pointed south to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand".

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the team was surprised to note in PHONE's report that PHONE even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed PHONE into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the team compared notes and decided that PHONE may have made two of them but could not possibly have made the third man. The team captain, on reading PHONE's report, was stunned to see that PHONE had indeed made the third man also, but good.

18. PHONE had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with Mr. Harry Webster, an instructor in the New York office. After relating the fine job that PHONE had done, Mr. Webster's report concluded: "A first rate performance by PHONE, who's obviously been around -- both coverwise and for real".

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be faulted. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomats, as Mr. Sweet held himself out to be, would properly be seen dining).

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Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that PHONE himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safesite complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safesite from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own commo exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop commo plan) so he was given commo plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: PHONE is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade PHONE, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOMOLD/QRPHONE/1/SHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:


CALEB L. BATTEN
DC/OS/ALT/TR

Originated by:
Aristides G. Lazarus

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REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION (Always handcarry 1 copy of this form) PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK		DATE 10 March 1972	
TO: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	FROM: Ann Jane Long CA/B3	
	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY		
	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY		
SUBJECT: (true name) Richard Thomas Gibson		PROJECT QRPHONE	
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA, OR ALIASES QRPHONE/1		CI/OA FILE NO.	
		RI 201 FILE NO. 201-306052	SO FILE NO.
1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		<input type="checkbox"/> PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		<input type="checkbox"/> PROPRIETARY APPROVAL	
<input type="checkbox"/> PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		<input type="checkbox"/> COVERT NAME CHECK	
<input type="checkbox"/> COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		<input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL INQUIRY (SPECIFY)	
<input type="checkbox"/> CONTRACT TYPE A		<input type="checkbox"/> CONTRACT TYPE B	
<input type="checkbox"/> SECURITY AND RELIABILITY DETERMINATION			
2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE International			
3. FULL DETAILS OF USE See PRQ Part II, page 3, Section VI, 4 and 5.			
4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER			
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		YES	NO
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM? Identified but subject doubtless suspects CIA		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No FBI - All info from them has been received and reviewed.			
F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.			
G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES	<input type="checkbox"/> NO
IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY See Memorandum dated 15 February 1966			
5. PRQ STATUS			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRQ I OR BIO DATA IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		Updated	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRQ II OR EQUIVALENT WILL BE FORWARDED PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF POA. 1 COPY		Updated	
6. R.I. TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT			
<input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD	<input type="checkbox"/> WILL FORWARD	<input type="checkbox"/> NON-DEROGATORY	<input type="checkbox"/> DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED
7. DIVISION TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT previously sent			
<input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD	<input type="checkbox"/> WILL FORWARD	<input type="checkbox"/> NON-DEROGATORY	<input type="checkbox"/> DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED
*8. FIELD TRACES ** NA previously sent			
<input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD	<input type="checkbox"/> WILL FORWARD	<input type="checkbox"/> NON-DEROGATORY	<input type="checkbox"/> DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED
9. CRS/ISG ** NA			
<input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD	<input type="checkbox"/> WILL FORWARD	<input type="checkbox"/> NON-DEROGATORY	<input type="checkbox"/> DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED
SPECIAL CHECK NSA INDICES		10. FI/D ** CS REFS TO FI/D (BR. FILES)	
<input type="checkbox"/> NO RECORD	<input type="checkbox"/> WILL FORWARD	<input type="checkbox"/> NON-DEROGATORY	<input type="checkbox"/> DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED
*LIST AREAS CHECKED	**IF NOT CHECKED - WHY?	NOT APPLICABLE	OTHER (EXPLAIN)
Comint no additional since last check 1966			
SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER Roderick I. Sweet		EXTENSION 1055	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF <i>[Signature]</i>

FORM 772 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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AMENDMENT TO PRQ PART I

Name: Richard Thomas Gibson

DPOB: 13 May 1931 Los Angeles, California

Section II, 12

**Present Residence: 32 Hartwood Road
Stanford Brook, London W. 12 (owner)**

Section X

Monique Gibson Female Born 1966 U.K. U S. Citizen

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PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION		PRQ NO. 																		
INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER		DISPATCH NO. 																		
<p>1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is <u>not</u> to be shown to the subject.</p> <p>2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 13d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.</p> <p>3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.</p> <p>4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.</p> <p>5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.</p>																				
1. CRYPTONYM QRPPHONEA formerly QREBONY/1	2. PSEUDONYM 																			
SECTION I CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT																				
1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED. <div style="text-align: center; padding: 20px;">No change</div>																				
2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO <u>ANY</u> RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM. See previous Part II <div style="text-align: center; padding: 10px;">Yes To any Case Officer introduced to him by RODIGAST, or Aaron C. IAGINESTRA.</div>																				
3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN. See Previous Part II																				
<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 60%;">Aaron C. IAGINESTRA</td> <td style="width: 10%;">known to Subject as</td> <td style="width: 30%;">"Mike"</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Louise R. CONGREVE</td> <td>" " "</td> <td>"Louise Chapman"</td> </tr> <tr> <td>XXXXX</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Isabelle R. PRIMMI</td> <td>" " "</td> <td>"Ann"</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nowell D. KAMERMAYER</td> <td>" " "</td> <td>"Jim"</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Marie M. LUEBBERT</td> <td>" " "</td> <td>"Pat"</td> </tr> </table>			Aaron C. IAGINESTRA	known to Subject as	"Mike"	Louise R. CONGREVE	" " "	"Louise Chapman"	XXXXX			Isabelle R. PRIMMI	" " "	"Ann"	Nowell D. KAMERMAYER	" " "	"Jim"	Marie M. LUEBBERT	" " "	"Pat"
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Nowell D. KAMERMAYER	" " "	"Jim"																		
Marie M. LUEBBERT	" " "	"Pat"																		

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SECTION II	MOTIVATION AND CONTROL
<p>1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. (Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.") See Previous PRQ Part II</p> <p>This image of BKTRUST as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in QRPONE/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of BKTRUST and of the importance of his contribution to the XXXXX BKTRUST EFFORT. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case,</p>	
<p>2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. (If no control, or if there is a lack of control, explain.)</p> <p>QRPONE/1 is dependent upon a BKTRUST salary and has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. QRPONE/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.</p>	
SECTION III	COVER
<p>1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.</p> <p>Subject and RODIGAST use a journalist/literary agent cover in the unlikely event their clandestine meetings are compromised. Other officers will use cover of both being Americans in a foreign country.</p>	
<p>2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.</p> <p>Freelance journalist, authers, and as a sympathetic leftist</p>	
<p>3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE (Will work) (Is working).</p> <p>BKTRUST</p>	
SECTION IV	INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING
<p>1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.</p> <p>No change from previous PRQ Part II</p>	
<p>2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS (Agents, relatives, friends) WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.</p> <p>None</p>	
<p>3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.</p> <p>See Previous PRQ Part II Reporting Instruction with emphasis on spotting and assessment reports 14-16 Oct. 1970</p>	
SECTION V	COLLABORATION POTENTIAL
<p>1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.</p> <p>No change</p>	

PRQ PART II

QRPHONE/1

SECTION II

Motivation and Control

1. but every one of the wild anti-BKTRUST stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

Having accepted BKTRUST employment for a combination of reasons, it must be added that QRPHONE/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

QRPHONE/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. BKTRUST has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

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SECTION VI

OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

No Change

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

No Change

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES. Subject will operate under free lance journalist cover and as a sympathetic leftist to develop contacts in the target milieu of Afro-Asian radical, pro-commie groups and solicit information from them on their activity, plans and views. Subject will also contact, assess recruit and possibly handle assets in these groups. In pursuit of operational objectives, he may be required to join a radical organization and/or travel to Bloc countries.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

No PM duties or use are anticipated. Selective CA exploitation within his cover situation - i.e. as a provocateur or means to surface anti-Soviet material from a "National Liberation" standpoint - will be continually possible.

SECTION VII

PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

None

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

SECTION VIII

AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject has MOA providing for salary of \$950.00 per month, (tax free), reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources.

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SECTION XIII

AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

None known

SECTION XIV

GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject speaks fluent but foreign-accented French. He has a functional speaking command of Spanish and Italian and can read German. Except for his language, he could pass as an Algerian.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRO PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLAUDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Research, files, correspondence and assessment by previous case officers

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

None anticipated

SECTION XV

EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

SECTION XVI

MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

BGSWIRL EXAMINATION OF SUBJECT on 21 September 1970 (no deception reported).

DATE

10 March 1972

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

5
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SECRET


7 MAR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE

1. A review in some depth of Project QRPHONE was conducted in January 1972 by DC/CA and me with Branch 3 personnel, with the participation of Richard Berkey (now of Branch 4, formerly QRPHONE Case Officer at LCPIPIT). Attached at Tab A are the questions which formed the basis for the review. A full record of the responses to these questions and the review discussion is not practical so I have attempted below to summarize the general conclusions which emerged. Attached at Tab B are two charts prepared by Branch 3 for the review plus a rough draft "CI Assessment" which they also prepared.

2. FI and CA/ Excluding FBI Sensitive Reports, QRPHONE dropped from 137 reports in FY 1968 to 6 reports in FY 1971. His FI reports have evidently not been used as a basis for CA activities since 1967. This situation is apparently due to a variety of factors: the character of the man himself, restrictions placed upon him, a changing political context which compounded targetting difficulties, the complications of his own security situation, and the method by which he was handled. It was agreed that QRPHONE does have inherent skills which should have an application to either FI or CA work. He is politically attuned; he writes well; he can handle contacts in several languages; he knows how to move internationally; he has an engaging social personality; he has an established (if controversial) reputation as a left-oriented journalist/writer with some scholastic credentials. The problem remains one of focussing his talents and determining the platform from which he should operate.



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3. Mobility. QRPONE can be viewed as essentially mobile and has expressed a willingness to possess these are, however, qualifications on this. He move small children and an unwitting, anti-US, white, hasish wife, who would only be willing to leave her Eeland if the overt job to which QRPONE was going was clearly a step upward in his career.

4. Handling. The method by which QRPONE has been handled, i.e. mainly through Rodigast (although there has been direct LCIPIT contact recently), is unnecessarily cumbersome and not suited to the close consultation needed to explore QRPONE's future directions. Having been declared to the British Services the most secure place to meet QRPONE is in the UK and he should be handled directly by an LCIPIT officer.

5. Security. QRPONE cannot escape the record of allegations that he is Agency-connected. What he can do, however, is face-up to these charges, challenge them and deny them. There may thus always be some element of suspicion attached to him, but, as time passes without definite proof of such a connection, its impact on his activities may be minimized and he may be able to engage in effective work inspite of it.

6. Sub-agents. It was felt that QRPONE may possibly have a flair for recruiting and handling sub-agents. It was believed that this should be explored and that he should be given relevant training, based in New York. This would also provide the opportunity for Headquarters exploration with him of his future development.

7. Future Focus. What QRPONE's own thoughts might be on his most natural course of development are not clear. He may have an inclination toward African Liberation Movements--the subject of his most recent major writing--but it could be questioned whether on this or on anti-fedayeen work, there is sufficient Agency interest to merit such focus. He has no significant base in the American black community (rather the contrary) which would make him of interest to others on this basis. His overt political orientation is described

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as "radical," but it is an intellectual "radicalism," not revolutionary. Further, he is basically a theoretician not a personal activist by nature. He might be asked and might undertake an activist role—but it is felt that it would not sit naturally upon him and would probably not achieve whatever access might have been postulated. Within his theoretician, non-activist context it was nevertheless felt that the probably-to-be-expanded field of Chinese Communist activities in Europe provided the focus which might most usefully be explored. The expansion of Chinese Communist activities in Europe may come quite slowly but, in view of the probable shortage of assets in this field, it was a matter on which we should have some patience. It is also a field which could be explored without QRPHONE's needing to move. Whether he focusses on this field or another, however, QRPHONE needs to develop some job or organizational base which will make him interesting as a target himself to those we wish to focus him on. At the present time his cover does not provide a power or influence base and he is essentially completely dependent upon us.

8. CA Staff Termination/Redirection Responsibility.
It was felt that in this process of redirection of QRPHONE, CA Staff should retain responsibility for QRPHONE. Even if a London-based assignment did not work out and it was decided to move QRPHONE to another area CA Staff should keep the project during the trial period and with this the responsibility for termination if the trial proved unsuccessful. If the trial was successful, on the other hand, then we would have discharged our responsibility for QRPHONE and could relinquish control.

9. Some time has passed since the above discussions took place. I am not aware of the extent to which there may already have been a follow-up to them. Needless to say, they have decided field implications in which LCPIFIT needs to be consulted, should they be pursued.

James E. Knott
Programs Officer
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee	1 - CA/B4-Berkey
1 - ADC/CA	2 - CA/PO
1 - C/CA/B3	
1 - CA/B3-Sweet	

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AGENT EVALUATION

NAME: QRPHONE/1

DATE: 18 January 1971

PROJECT: QRPHONE

STATUS: Contract Agent (Under
a Memorandum of Oral
Agreement)

OVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: International correspondent for "Sunday supplement" type color magazine distributed by twenty major newspapers in the U.S. Also represents owner of this color magazine in other of his business ventures in Europe. This overt job was assumed in December 1970. Prior to that, Q/1 was the London representative of small U.S. news service. Q/1 does free lance journalism and is an occasional contributor to several magazines and newspapers.

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANCE RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has been said over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/1's motivation:

A. His basic image of JKLANCE is positive.

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B. This image of JKLANCE as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in Q/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of JKLANCE and of the importance of his contribution to the JKLANCE effort. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case, but every one of the wild anti-JKLANCE stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

C. In his political evolution over the years, Q/1 has become active in at least two "causes". In both instances he saw these causes undermined by petty jealousy and factional struggles and in both cases he was personally harmed as a result. The product of this situation has been a certain disillusionment with "causes" and a cynical political outlook. (In other circumstances this might be called political maturity.) Q/1 now tends to view political trends as a detached observer rather than a participant.

D. Following on the foregoing thought is the fact that he is an American (and does not consider himself disloyal). Given his citizenship and his disinclination to feel "involved" in the currents of the radical left, he has been perfectly willing to accept employment by JKLANCE to report on those currents. He does not give any indication that he views this as "squealing" on his friends -- indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

E. On a more mundane level, it must be realized that Q/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. He was without a job and was living off the charity of his wife's family. JKLANCE has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

F. Having accepted JKLANCE employment for a combination of the reasons set forth above, it must be added that Q/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

G. In assessing the relative importance of these several factors which make up Q/1's motivation, the undersigned would stress that C and E were probably the immediate causes of his acceptance of recruitment while A and D were more underlying. B and F have arisen since recruitment and probably play an important role in his current motivation.

WIFE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: Q/1's wife is not witting of his JKLANCE affiliation. She was allowed to believe that he was working indirectly for the Chinese. She certainly is aware of the past JKLANCE accusations which have been leveled at Q/1, but as far as Q/1 can determine (and this is not a subject on which he can come right out and ask a direct question) she continues to accept the Chinese story. It should be added that Mrs. Q/1 is British and is the holder of some rather typical "left" anti-JKLANCE attitudes. It should also be noted that the relationship between the two is fraught with a variety of problems thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. Certainly the whole subject of Q/1's activities is one which Mrs. Q/1 views with misgivings and which is simply not discussed -- lest it lead to acrimony. Mention should also be made that Mrs. Q/1 seems to accept as legitimate the small amount of money received from Q/1's cover and to regard this as a genuine stringer relationship.

RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and responds well to Case Officer handling. He is a most willing asset requiring no special handling care -- other than the normal professionalism expected in the handling of a sensitive asset such as Q/1.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE: Q/1 is willing to accept guidance and criticism -- provided it is constructive. If anything, he may sometimes be too willing. His willingness occasionally exceeds his sense of security and it then falls to his handler to bear in mind security and/or operational considerations which may affect his pursuit of a given target. However, this should not be over dramatized.

RESPONSIVENESS: Q/1 is most responsive to requirements levied upon him. In this connection it should be recalled that his ability to respond fully is usually restricted by the nature of his relationship with his informants; i.e., since he is only eliciting the information from unwitting informants he is rarely able to press for all the desired details.

JKLANCE CONTROL: Q/1 is dependent upon a JKLANCE salary and he has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. We hasten to add that Q/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Q/1 has a good sense of personal security and his handler makes an effort to build upon this at every opportunity. As cited above, Q/1's enthusiasm sometimes leads to his failure to consider all aspects and implications of a given situation.

OTHER SECURITY AND COVER SITUATIONS: The past allegations of Q/1's affiliation with JKLANCE, many pre-dating his actual recruitment, add an extra dimension to Q/1's cover situation. We have no indication that any of these allegations are based on any proof, nor have they produced a significant reduction in his number of contacts.

ABILITY TO WORK WITHOUT SUPERVISION: Q/1 is a self-starter and can work well for extended periods without supervision.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS: Q/1 poses only a minimum administrative burden. He is not overly concerned about his administrative and financial position, allowances, payments, etc. He merely expects JKLANCE to do the fair thing by him. However, on the rare occasion when JKLANCE has failed to perform as he expected, he can be very upset.

REPORTING: Q/1 is a journalist by training. He is an effective reporter -- both in terms of ability to elicit and writing style.

PERSONAL ENERGY AND ENDURANCE: Q/1 is quite energetic and can continue his efforts on a sustained basis.

LANGUAGES: In addition to his (native) English, Q/1 can speak French, Italian and German. *AND SPANISH*

WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: Q/1 is quite willing to travel -- and even enjoys it!

AREA KNOWLEDGE: Q/1 is quite widely travelled in Europe and Africa and consequently has acquitted an extensive area knowledge.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ABILITY: Q/1's present operating context does not provide an adequate basis to evaluate these talents. It is assumed that he has a satisfactory competence in both these areas, however.

WEAKNESSES; PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: Q/1 has no major weaknesses, either personal or professional which inhibit his operational use. The existence of his "reputation" as a JKLANCE asset -- which is believed by some and rejected by others of his contacts is a definite limitation on his employment.

CAREER POSSIBILITIES: Q/1 has mentioned to his handler that he hopes to be able to make a career of his relationship with JKLANCE. He enjoys the work and presumably the financial security. However,

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the combination of the security factors operative in this case and the unlikelihood of Q/1's continued access to targets of interest over a prolonged period argue against his being regarded as a career asset.

Aaron C. Laginestra

AARON C. LAGINESTRA
FIELD CASE OFFICER

COMMENTS OF SUPERVISOR: This is another thoughtful evaluation of this agent, and reflects the views of the agent handler as well as of the Case Officer.

I doubt that we have really divined Q/1's motivations for working with JKLANCE, and this evaluation should be read as the best stab we can make at this enigmatic subject.

*I disagree - I
think we do know. [initials]*

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
CHIEF, LCPIPIIT

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Red Sweet
CA/B3

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

5 January 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DC/CA/B3

2.

3.

C/CA/B3

4.

DC/CA/3

5.

Nov 8.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

5 Jan

A

6 Jan

D

6 Jan

A

- I'm all for the long-range objective - attached an assessment of 211 by Andy Hens, re: 211, intended to become a persuasive dialectician, will be of value.

3-4

PYI - attached background info on CR Phase alternatives may be useful to you prior our 17 Jan. meeting. This subject.

- I have been proposed to re-direct off to work to the East House. H.

FORM 8-42

610

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5 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT : Chicom Aspect of QRPHONE/1's
Operational Potential


1. In continuing my efforts to probe operational areas for the redirection of QRPHONE/1, I talked at length on 3 January with his former case officer (Mr. Richard Berkey) and received a very favorable prognosis regarding QRPHONE/1's mobility (i.e. his possible move to another European city or to Africa), his agent recruiting capability (preceded by additional training), and the prospects of making himself attractive to the Chicoms (again preceded by appropriate training).

2. In pursuit of the latter item I talked at length today with Mr. Andrew Ness, the FE Division expert on long-range Chicom and CP penetration programs. I described in detail QRPHONE/1's background, current status, and the variety of plans we have in mind and received Ness' reactions as follows:

A. The butterfly characteristics that QRPHONE has demonstrated thus far will never result in his becoming of interest to either the Chicoms or the Soviets for any operationally meaningful purpose. While the Soviets would perhaps see him as potential FI source, the Chicoms would not even do that.

B. Chicom officers abroad are still totally obsessed with Communist doctrine and its strategic and tactical application to a degree significantly more zealous than their Soviet counterparts. Therefore, in looking at potential foreign assets the Chicoms discard persons of shallow substance as far as their knowledge of Communism is concerned. They are interested in only those who have a serious intellectual understanding of Communist doctrine and a serious revolutionary goal. The thousands of leftists of whatever coloring floating around Europe are seen as only of marginal use to the Chicoms and certainly not the sort that they would take into their confidence.

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C. To become of long-term operational use to us in the sense of exploiting his possible long-term use to the Chicoms, QRPHONE/1 should do two things: join an existing "acceptable" organization such as the Trotskyite Party or a black radical party and, at the same time begin a serious study of Marxist/Maoist doctrine. As he gets into this program (preceded by some ten days training and close Headquarters direction) he should begin to seek out Communist intellectuals, party members, leaders of radical groups, etc., to ask questions about the dialectic, seek additional guidance, borrow books and so forth. In doing this he will in time come into the attention of the professional spotters the Chicoms have and begin to develop the sort of bona fides that the Chicoms, in time, will find appealing. He should also in this period seek out Chicom officials with the same requests for help. The key here is to demonstrate not that QRPHONE/1 is simply sympathetic, with Maoism or any other Communist shading but that he is a dedicated serious revolutionary.

D. A quicker way to come into the Chicom spotlight might be for QRPHONE/1 to join the Black Panthers, the SDS or one of the other radical groups with which the Chicoms are already known to be in touch. He will obviously have to sweat out a period of probation in joining any such group until he divests himself of his tattered leftist reputation and those JKLANCE accusations. Ness feels that a successful passing of this baptismal period will depend solely on QRPHONE/1's willingness to plunge wholeheartedly into a serious study of the terribly boring and lengthy volumes of the dialectic. As he demonstrates his capability to move more deeply into this field to the satisfaction of the "spotters" he will be accordingly provided additional help and encouragement by Chicom contacts and officials.

E. The Chicoms will be looking at him as a possible asset in their long-range targetting of the American revolution, hence QRPHONE/1's utterances ought to be couched in terms of his ultimate aim of contributing to and participating in the American revolution. In other words the Chicoms would see little or no use for QRPHONE/1 operationally in Europe or Africa (just as we would assess and recruit a Thai for operations in Thailand, not in Nigeria).

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F. Ness felt that should we pursue the above as a long-term operational goal for QRPHONE/1, the city in which this takes place is almost irrelevant. He could do it perhaps as well in an African setting as in Europe and his cover status i.e., with LPWEAKLY, really makes no difference because the Chicoms would test the fiber^{man} himself and would not be deterred by his external trappings.

3. In answer to my question, Ness said he would be happy to meet with QRPHONE to assess his potential in this area and then, assuming we all decided to go ahead with such redirection, Ness could train him and guide him thoroughly enough to get him well on the track by spending some seven to ten days with him on a concentrated program.



Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/RISweet:ckj (5 January 1972)

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
2 - CA/B3

SECRET

SECRET

28 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA Branch 3

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE

REFERENCE: My Memorandum, "Review and Planning,"
dated 23 November 1971

1. As stated in referenced memorandum we are beginning a review in depth of certain CA Staff projects. I propose to meet with you and relevant branch personnel to examine Project QRPHONE on or about 21 January 1972. Please advise me when the necessary preparations have been made for this review and we will fix a mutually convenient time.


2. Prior to our meeting, I request that the two charts of Part A of the attached listing be drawn up and copies sent to me and CA/PO. It is not necessary to prepare written responses to the questions posed in Part B of the attachment. These questions provide the basis for our oral review at the time the meeting is held.

Fred W. Valtin

Fred W. Valtin
Acting Chief
Covert Action Staff

CA-71-1369

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION

6053

NO.

DATE

17 DEC 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/CA

17

K

2.

3.

4.

5.

DC/CA

27/12

JH

6.

7.

C/CA/B3

27/12

DM

8.

Roch

9.

DC/CA/3

10.

C/CA/3

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

7-8-
let's
discuss
FYI.
DM

Hold for

4-5, 7 In discussing
with China Ops last
week, I called them
to take a joint look
with us in terms
of possible attractiveness
to CPR if, as I
assume, they become
more aggressive in
Europe. Want to
talk about this re
before my trip.

FORM
3-62

610

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17 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff


SUBJECT: QRPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
Dated 29 November 1971

1. What follows below are some initial comments of mine on the referent memorandum, per your request. We really feel in Branch 3 that for a variety of reasons, we need more time to deliberate on QRPHONE's future operational activity than the previous two weeks. Partly this is due to extended absence by the case officer in charge who has been plagued with a recurring illness--I believe you are familiar with this. It is also in part attributable to the Section Chief's being new to the position and having his time absorbed by matters of current priority. So if you don't mind, we should like to address ourselves further to this subject following the Christmas holidays. At that time we should like to initiate some meetings on this matter both with yourself and with other area components including representatives from CI Staff.

2. Background: Your memo, of course, was triggered by an earlier one of mine which proposed that QRPHONE become operationally engaged in attempting to establish a black Communist cell in either Paris or Rome. The purpose of this would be twofold--namely, to exacerbate relations thereby between the Soviet Union and mainland China through various low-key covert action undertakings, and in the process to further enhance QRPHONE's own credentials as a Maoist activist. This tentative assignment, it should be noted, arose because Branch 3 personnel had become increasingly aware of the possibility that QRPHONE's project status might be terminated in the not too distant future. While it is true that in the immediate preceding month or so, we have benefited from his intelligence reporting, it is all too clear that over the past two years, he has been of diminishing utility to CA Staff and other area divisions. In discussing his future with his recent case officer, Miss Chatelan, her recommendation was that unless something could be found for him in the near future, we should give serious consideration to terminating

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his services during the coming year. Thus my foregoing proposal arose from a desire on my part not to terminate an asset of proved capabilities without giving the agent in question suitable opportunity to become useful once more.

3. CI Type Review/ORPHONE Personal Security: Your memo makes out there have been frequent security reviews of ORPHONE's security status, and you question the efficacy of our doing still one more. On this let me point out that in making such a security assessment, we would be doing so in response to a current request by the area division concerned whose cooperation we need to direct this agent. One hardly needs stress that such a request probably should be honored in the interests of maintaining good relations even if its fulfillment means redundant work. But apart from this, the case officer also informs me that the case file does not contain any general summary of the alleged security breaches involving ORPHONE and their implications vis-a-vis his activities. It is true however that his security status has been reviewed for each annual project review and that assessments of his security status were made following each alleged breach, but no up-to-date summary exists. As for our own gut feelings on his personal security, one hazards that he is still in pretty good shape. I agree with you that many of the past charges leveled against him are of the same ilk as those leveled against other leftist colleagues (who do not have any Agency association) by their rivals. And as for the structure of his case officer relationship--that is, having him handled by a deep cover officer from an adjacent country--this would appear to be secure in the extreme (so much so that one would advocate that it be dropped due its operational inefficiency.)

4. Location: We tentatively agree that in all likelihood Paris should not be the venue for our proposed operational undertaking due the location of the Wright clan. Rome, however, might do very well. If not Rome, perhaps you or EUR Division might suggest another locale. As for the question as to whether or not the Rome station would want him permanently, only time and his own operational success could determine this. One hazards that if ORPHONE were able to make his way with some good local leftists and had promise of developing some kind of relationship with mainland China representatives, the station might come to regard him as a capital asset.

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