

necessary in the past, is not satisfactory at present. Added to this has been the theme that there must be a re-thinking of what NCFE has done, is doing, and should do in the future. Our efforts are beginning to bear fruit. We have found that these lines have struck a responsive chord among the working personnel of NCFE. In many ways, the current RFE difficulties in Germany -- unfortunate as they are -- have been helpful, for they have made it clear to everybody concerned, including Mr. Lang, that re-thinking of objectives and techniques based on cooperative effort by NCFE and CIA as a whole is vital if the organization is to do its job effectively.

6. To reformulate our own and NCFE's ideas, the IO Division has been and is carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NCFE. In some of these discussions, Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the State Department has been a direct participant. The IO Division has also been exploring these matters with officials of CIA and the Department of State.

7. These discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects which can generally be described as follows:

- a. What is NCFE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellite nations; what is American policy; what modifications are likely?
- b. How can NCFE, especially the Division of Emigre Relations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain but in the free world? For example: How can NCFE securely engage in further activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations Slave Labor Hearings and the International Red Cross Meetings at Toronto?
- c. Should NCFE continue to support emigre councils, or should some other technique be developed which can enable it to make more effective use of emigres for psychological warfare purposes?
- d. How can the Research and Publications Division, the Division of Intellectual Cooperation, and the Free University best contribute to these efforts?
- e. Is NCFE efficiently organized? What, for example, is the effect of the Division of Emigre Relations' dealings with emigres on the position of RFE in Europe, etc.?
- f. How the formidable research and information resources of NCFE can securely be used by CIA?
- g. How can NCFE be geared more closely to the activities and needs of CIA?

- 4 -

h. Analysis of Radio Free Europe's effectiveness, programming, political position in Germany, how RFE can be used to support CIA operations specifically, alternate broadcasting sites for RFE etc.

i. How can CIA give specific guidance to RFE? What kind of information is wanted, for example, by RFE? What studies and means of overcoming jamming can be made available to RFE? How can American and British legations in the satellites best provide guidance and information for RFE?

7. These are some of the topics being discussed. In a few weeks the time will come in my opinion when the main outlines of this common thought will be sufficiently clear so that the working officials of NCPE, including Mr. Lang, should meet with officials of CIA and the Department of State for two main purposes:

a. A briefing on U.S. policy toward CIA operations behind the Iron Curtain so that these officials will see clearly the way in which they are expected to fit into total U.S. efforts, and the manner in which they should operate.

b. Analyze and contribute, in some detail, to the main lines of thought developed in order to arrive at comprehensive working policy for NCPE, and detailed methods of its cooperation with CIA.

8. For the foregoing reasons, I suggest that Mr. Lang does not, at this time, come down to meet the CIA officials as suggested by Mr. Helms but that Mr. Lang's visit be a part of the IO Division's over-all effort to gain working control over NCPE as briefly outlined above.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

IO:TONIC:WPD/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)

1 cc - AC/OP/DD/P

~~1 cc - CPP~~

1 cc - IO/TONIC

1 cc - CIO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Formation of a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organisation

REFERENCE: Memorandum to IO, Subject: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization, dated 12 September 1952

1. The NCFE negotiations for a united Rumanian refugee organization appear to be culminating successfully. Although a number of differences have been resolved, a few controversial matters remain. These points have been discussed several times, both with the NCFE and the refugees, but are of such importance as to warrant special attention and emphasis at this moment.

2. The most urgent problem, the one most likely to nullify the recent efforts and cause further difficulties, is that of General Radescu. The problem is to find a position which the General will consider sufficiently important for him and which we will consider sufficiently innocuous to ensure that he cannot interfere with the Committee. A majority of the refugees are in accord on the necessity for placing limitations of activity on the General. For operational reasons, we require such limitations. The existing good relations between the NCFE and the General should be utilized to persuade the General that a passive, honorary position is the only way to guard his health for, by implication, later action. He must be made to realize that he is not being shelved but is being saved. If he cannot be prevailed on to adopt this attitude, he will have to be told with complete frankness that his obstructionism cannot be tolerated, that he will have to remain passive outside, rather than within, the new organization or risk losing the assistance he now receives. The first method is the more desirable, and it is suggested that the General's secretary, Farbu Niculescu, be informed of the NCFE's intention and warned of the latter step if his cooperation is not obtained in expediting the General's acceptance of a passive role. Niculescu should be dealt with quite frankly and informed of the consequences, to him as well as to the General, if he does not cooperate.

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NOV 26 1952

Security Matters

3. In regard to paragraph 4 of reference memorandum, the matter of the Council apparently has not been discussed thoroughly with the refugees. The importance of an organization for the masses of refugees, controlled by the Executive Committee of 16-17, should not be underestimated. The working commissions proposed by Visoianu (European Federation Movement, PW, publications, etc.) should be drawn from the Council rather than from the refugees at large. Further, there are many refugees for whom the Committee has no need, nor we at present, who desire to participate in a refugee organization. That the desire to belong to something is particularly strong among the younger refugees, i.e. those of potential operational value, is evidenced by the number who have affiliated with the Iron Guard, other fanatic organizations, student, and professional groups. Membership should be open to large numbers of refugees (exclusive of hard-core Iron Guards, Communists, criminals, etc.), and should be manifested by membership cards. To strengthen the sense of participation small annual dues could be required or subscription to the Committee newspaper (which would be subsidized so that subscription cost would not be excessive). The formation of this Council is considered particularly worthwhile since it offers a way to draw worthy refugees from less desirable organizations and to develop their usefulness for the future.

4. With respect to the secret fund in the possession of Mr. Cretzianu of the Rumanian National Committee, we do not consider that an issue should be made of the disbursing and control of this money. Both Visoianu and Cretzianu have agreed to account for the funds and to auditing of the books. It is possible that a finance committee, consisting of Cretzianu and one or two others, will be appointed in the new organization to handle the subsidies and to audit the secret fund.

5. Reports that Gafencu has developed an intransigent attitude toward the new committee have been received from several sources. As Mr. Polbeare is in Europe and is a friend of Gafencu's, it is suggested that he attempt to obtain again Gafencu's cooperation with the current negotiations.

6. It is requested that this memorandum be forwarded to the NCHE so that the information may be of immediate assistance in the negotiations planned for this week.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

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SECURITY INFORMATION

26 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
SUBJECT: Results of debriefing of Czech Defector
REFERENCE: Memo from Bob Joyce 17 Nov. 52, attaching State Cable from Frankfurt #313

1. I am sure Bob Joyce will upon reflection not allow himself to be troubled by the remarks of one Czech defector to the State Department Mission in Germany.

2. These are the facts:

a. Radio Free Europe has been most careful in its handling of the subject of liberation. They have not in the past nor do they now allow anyone to speak on the air of "liberation now".

b. Attached for your information is a detailed guidance on this subject issued by Radio Free Europe -- policy which governs all of their broadcasts.

c. As an example of how careful Radio Free Europe is on this subject, RFE did not use Mr. John Foster Dulles' recent controversial campaign speech on the subject of liberation because they believed that even though it was news and a statement made by a responsible American, it might be misinterpreted behind the Curtain.

3. I think that Radio Free Europe has maintained excellent discipline on this subject. You can imagine that it is under considerable pressure from Iron Curtain emigration to take the line of early rope for liberation in the prospect that in some way American public opinion and world opinion might be thus committed to a policy of liberation by armed forces.

4. I would be glad to have you show this memorandum to Mr. Joyce if you care to do so. He should know that everyone is constantly on the alert and carefully watching the problem he raises.

THOMAS M. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment
Special Guidance
dtd 2 Sept. 52

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CIO:WPD-TWB/eh 1 cc - IO/TOMIC
Orig & 1 - Addressee 1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

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SECURITY INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

25 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, P & P

SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Robert Lang

1. I spent an hour and a quarter in New York on Friday, 14 November, with Mr. Robert Lang of Radio Free Europe. The major portion of this time was devoted to a briefing by Lang of the RFE structure and the position which RFE occupies in it, including the philosophy of RFE operations. Lang gave an impressive performance and struck me on such short acquaintance as an individual of ability, judgment, and energy.

2. Mr. Lang made quite a point of the fact that his operation inside RFE is virtually independent. He intimated that he receives no guidance from the President or other officers and has expended considerable effort in the past seeing to it that an iron curtain is kept between RFE and the top command of RFE. He said that if RFE had not developed and expanded according to a philosophy which it itself had originated, it would have got nowhere and would still be frustrated by what he kept referring to as the "old State Department line" as exemplified by the views of Devitt Poole, Fred Dolbeare, and others. He then pointed out that he had received virtually no guidance, policy or otherwise, from this organization. Also he claimed to suffer from lack of contact with us. He stated that when he saw Mr. Dulles a week or so ago, it was the first time he had talked to anyone in authority here in many a moon. As far as Mr. Braden and company are concerned, he said that they dealt largely with Admiral Miller and his immediate staff. It was clear that he would prefer to deal directly with Washington. He also feels inhibited by the fact that he has to cajole Admiral Miller into permission to come to Washington. He cited as evidence an incident recently when he felt obliged to ask a friend in the State Department to intercede with Admiral Miller to permit him to come down here for consultation.

3. There was nothing bitter or frustrated in Mr. Lang's remarks. Rather he struck me as an individual who was discussing the facts of life, be what they may.

4. I told him that I would discuss with you the wisdom of having him come down here for a day some time in the next week or so

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- 2 -

in order to spend a couple of hours around a table with Tracy Barnes, Al Ulmer, Eric Tims, and other appropriate individuals, at which session he would have an opportunity to get forth his problems and invite whatever assistance we as an organization can provide.

5. After you have read the foregoing, I would like to talk with you and Mr. Braden for the purpose of passing on DD/P's reactions to my suggestion.

W
Richard Helms
Acting Chief, Operations, DDP

cc: Chief, IO ✓

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Security Information

DEAP 1387

24 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Dr. J. H. Retinger

1. Please note and return to Mr. Dulles the attached letter from Dr. J. H. Retinger who has asked Mr. Dulles for an appointment during his visit in Washington between November 25 and 28. You will also note that Mr. Dulles does not propose to answer the letter nor (presumably) to grant the appointment. I am not sure whether you are familiar with the background on Retinger including our past difficulties with him. If you are not, I think it is important for you to have a look at the files which include numerous items of derogatory information concerning Retinger and his declared hostility toward the National Committee for Free Europe. We went to the mat with our British friends in what I believe proved to be a successful effort to have Retinger removed from the key position which he held on the so-called McMillan Committee. (You are aware of the fact that the British Service is now working with the McMillan Committee and in support of it.)

2. Retinger's position as Secretary General of the European Movement -- as evidenced by the letterhead -- is probably known to you. Because of our interest in this activity, it is important for you and the appropriate members of your staff to be fully on notice of Retinger's connection and past performance. I could not be very enthusiastic about or too hopeful for the production of genuinely constructive results -- in keeping with policies of the United States Government -- of any organization of which Retinger would be the Secretary General. To the extent that his loyalties can be determined, it is clear that they do not run toward the United States.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)

Letter to DDCI from Dr. Retinger
dated 15 November 1952.cc: DDCI
C/PP**SECRET**

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DF 1371

21 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : Leland Stowe; IAS Approval of NCFE Request.

1. This memorandum will record the understanding arrived at in a conversation today with Colonel Edwards, Chief of IAS, and reported orally to Mr. Durkee by me. Admiral Miller telephoned me today with an urgent request that we give our authorization and approval to the use of Mr. Stowe for a further period of six months in the capacity of a consultant to RFE and not as a regular employee. This was the same basis ~~as~~ was finally approved for the first period of six months which is about to expire.

2. In discussing this matter with Colonel Edwards I refreshed his recollection as to certain features of the original arrangement, including the fact that Stowe is an extremely capable individual who has attracted other good people, notably Russell Hill, into the effort, and who has no serious security raps against him. (He is not regarded as a loyalty or security risk but rather as a source of possible embarrassment in view of certain earlier writings of his.) Admiral Miller informed me and I passed on to Colonel Edwards the fact that there have been no questions or flurries of any kind concerning Stowe and the further fact that he has been doing a very effective job. Colonel Edwards approved from a security standpoint the continuation of Mr. Stowe as a consultant to RFE for a further period of six months.

3. I requested Mr. Durkee to so advise Admiral Miller at the earliest possible moment. I assume he has done so.

FW
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/PP

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE				
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
NC FE		2. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
		BRITISH		Nov. 1952
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
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PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<div style="margin-bottom: 10px;">14.</div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT FILED IN THE CONTROL SECTION BY <u>TS-81191</u></p> </div>				
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		<div style="text-align: center;">➔</div>		

NOV 1 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division
Thru: FI Plans

SUBJECT: NCFF Employment of Mr. Brutus Coste

1. This is to advise you that, due to delay in our operations, the NCFF has been requested to provide interim employment for Mr. Brutus Coste.

2. We have been informed that the NCFF/NEEC has offered Mr. Coste a contract for the preparation of a study on integration of the Rumanian with the Soviet economy. However, in view of Subject's knowledge of the refugee political situation and interest in propaganda measures, a position utilizing this background would be more advantageous to the NCFF and this Division than the proposed economic study.

3. It is requested that the proposed employment of Subject be discussed with the NCFF and that we be informed of the action taken. This Division is prepared to reimburse the NCFF for Subject's salary if such is desired. It is understood that Subject will continue, during the period of NCFF employment, to perform for this Division certain assignments which will not interfere with his NCFF work.

4. Your approval of the proposal for such employment is requested.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SE-5/MCNewsom/kp (19 Nov. 1952)

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee

1 - RI

2 - SE-5

1 - IO

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10200 1306

Executive Registry
3-4257

13 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. Jan Nowak

1. At your request, I had a conversation today with Mr. Jan Nowak, head of the Polish radio desk of RFE in Munich. I am sorry that you did not get to see him. Our conversation reminded me that our work is terribly important, which is a nice reminder on a busy afternoon.

2. I say "important" because Nowak reviewed with me the letters he had received from listeners in Poland and these, together with his own enormous enthusiasm for the work he is doing, reminded me that our long days in Washington have an effect on the lives and hopes of people far away. Nowak, who was in the Polish resistance during the war and who on one of his three escapes from Poland at one time spent several weeks in Switzerland where he had made contact with your representatives, later worked for the BBC and he pointed out that at no time during the war was he given to feel by the BBC the sense of responsibility and mission which he feels in his job in RFE. He said he was told when he was brought to RFE that the responsibility for the programs was his and that if at any time programs went on the air which were irresponsible, then he would lose his job. He says that when he has questions which he thinks might influence United States policy, he confers beforehand with Griffith and the Americans in Munich, and sometimes arguments ensue, but he feels, and I am certain he feels sincerely, that he has an equal share with Americans in a great effort to carry the truth back home.

3. I say "terribly" important because Nowak, like other exiles, wonders out loud how long our work can continue to have an impact. He is himself convinced that every Polish soldier is a potential ally of the West but he wonders, and makes his listener wonder, how long we can expect this sympathy among a rising generation for which the past is inexorably fading.

4. Nowak made one point which I am sure he intended for your ears, that he was afraid that "certain people in Germany" who had contacts into Poland might lead his friends behind the Curtain to

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betray themselves unnecessarily and tragically. He said that he had heard that these people had promoted behind the Curtain a whispering campaign among the Poles at the time of the recent elections to the effect that the elections were to be postponed. He seemed to think this an unnecessary risk for those who took part in it. He also said that he had been approached by these same people who asked him to urge the Poles by broadcast to cross out the names of the Communist candidates when they voted. He learned only later, he said, that the system of voting at the last election was such that in order to cross out candidates it was necessary to step out of the ballot box and do it in the open before witnesses. He had in any event refused such suggestions. I got the impression that he feels some of our people are a little immature.

5. I liked him. As I say, seeing him made me proud of what we are doing.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

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NOV 4 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: DD/P's Memorandum to you 30 October 1952 entitled,
 "National Committee for Free Europe, RFE, and Related
 Matters"

1. You will be interested to know, I am sure, that Mr. Wisner's friend, Mr. Georgescu, has recently been most helpful. Through his efforts and the cooperation of Jim Pekich of SE European Division, I believe that NCPE is on the threshold of a unified Rumanian National Council.

2. I'm in entire agreement also with Mr. Georgescu's observation on the personnel set-up within NCPE. As you know, Mr. Dolbeare is concerned about his role. He is the first to admit that his strength is ebbing, and that he should retire. I think it must be agreed also that Mr. Dolbeare has done a splendid job, a job that would have been, and will still be, difficult for a man in the prime of life.

I have discussed this problem in confidence with Francis B. Stevens. As a result of my inquiries about a possible successor to Mr. Dolbeare, Mr. Stevens suggests that Mr. Nathaniel Penistone Davis is a person eminently qualified to do this job. I would be interested in knowing whether Mr. Wisner knows this man.

3. I believe also, Mr. Georgescu's misgivings about Mr. Yarrow are well-founded. In the last two months, Mr. Yarrow has taken an increasingly prominent position in Mr. Dolbeare's Division, as a result of Mr. Dolbeare's physical inability to do a full time job. Mr. Yarrow is blunt, and inclined to be dictatorial. He has a predilection for direct action in situations that rightly call for finesse and careful development. For these reasons, in addition to the fact that he is of Russian extraction and speaks with a heavy accent, I am convinced that he should not replace Mr. Dolbeare. In my opinion, under the right leadership, Mr. Yarrow could continue to make a valuable contribution to NCPE's dealings with emigres as an administrator.


I believe that such a solution is politically possible, for NCPE in this phase of its activities is going through a period of groping and painful reorientation. I hope that the start we have made in working out a re-statement and a re-direction of activities within Division of Emigre Relations will provide a program of positive projects which will supply ammunition for psychological warfare, both behind the Iron Curtain and in the Free World. Such a program will call for an efficient administrator versed in exile affairs -- a position for which Mr. Yarrow is well qualified. Under the political leadership of a person of Mr. Davis' caliber, for direct dealings with emigres, I feel that the Division of Emigre Relations will be able to clear up present inefficiencies and contribute effectively to NCPE's over-all mission.

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WILLIAM P. DURKEE
 Chief, IO/TONIC

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Security Information



30 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe, NCWE, and related matters.

1. This memorandum is to inform you of a number of items which have recently come to my attention and to which I think you should give consideration and take necessary action. V. C. (Eica) Georgescu, who is an old friend and a very helpful consultant of the Agency, came to see me the other evening and discussed certain aspects of NCWE. Eica has been working on both factions of the Rumanians in an effort to bring them together, and I think that his criticism is, on the whole, constructive. He states that entirely apart from the question of factionalism among the Rumanian groups and other national groups, there is the greatest amount of inefficiency at the desk level of NCWE. This results from having too many politicians and diplomats in positions of authority and too few persons of any practical experience; too much time is consumed and too much of the general effort goes completely to waste as the result of endless political discussions, much of it entirely theoretical. It would be desirable to review the entire personnel set-up within NCWE at an early date and place in charge of the various desks individuals who are capable of administering their people and running a show. Such persons could be advised and assisted by the politicians and the diplomats, but they would have the responsibility for getting things done. Finally, Eica told me very confidentially that he thought Polbeare, who has never been strong, was getting weaker and weaker, and he voiced some misgivings about Pernie Yarrow. He said that he does not know Yarrow at all well, but has the impression from others that Yarrow is high-handed and dictatorial in his dealings and that his background is not particularly suitable for a person who is to hold a position of so much responsibility in dealing with Southeastern European nationals.

2. I think I have already told you that Victor Kiesel, the writer of the hostile pieces which you brought to my attention, complained about the treatment that he received from Finis Farr, who he said had led him to believe that he was going to be called upon for advice and assistance to the Agency. There were no follow-ups and Kiesel was snuffed. Kiesel also singled out for sharp attack Captain Ginfger, who he said he believed was in a high place in CIA and who was a thoroughly incompetent and undesirable

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individual. He referred to Ginzler as a "we, too kick" -- whatever that means in Brooklynese. He also said that Ginzler is a "pseudo-intellectual" and a "saddle-headed liberal". Bionel expressed himself as being annoyed that a person like Ginzler should be used by the Agency while a person like himself should be ignored.

3. I hear that Howard Chapin is back at work but that his physical condition is not at all good and that the cause of the paralytic effect was not determined by the doctors.

4. At the Director's staff meeting this morning, he again raised the matter of our using the American Heritage Foundation for cover and possibly fund-raising purposes in connection with NSRR, CIA and the Freedom Crusade. He explained for the benefit of Mr. Dulles that the directors of the American Heritage Foundation have met recently and agreed to provide assistance to us and to make available to us their sponsorship, good name, etc. According to the Director, Mr. Sam Pryor has been primarily responsible for this decision although Winthrop Aldrich and D'Arcy Brophy were to some extent instrumental. The Executive Secretary of the Foundation, who was scheduled to visit Washington on 12 October, will be coming down sometime shortly after November 1. At that time we should be ready with concrete proposals as to the manner in which we would like to make use of the Foundation and its various assets. We would, of course, want to coordinate whatever is developed in this connection with the work that Henry Ford has undertaken to do for the Crusade this year. After some discussion it was agreed at the meeting that the American Heritage Foundation might be brought in either during the forthcoming Crusade campaign or immediately thereafter, depending upon what should appear to be most desirable. At the very least we should use the Foundation for cover purposes, since by advertising the support of this well-known organization, we would gain a very solid and substantial point of attribution as the source of funds. We might also wish to channel funds into the Crusade or directly into one or both of the two committees through the American Heritage Foundation. (This would require some straightening-out with the Treasury Department authorities to guarantee against any subsequent investigation.) Finally, the Crusade might be conducted in future years under the bannerhead of and in the name of the American Heritage Foundation. The li. shots in the Foundation would not want to work at fund-raising themselves, and they have been assured that we would not ask them to do so. It would be up to us to provide the nuts and bolts of the effort.

cc: C/P

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

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Security Information

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29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN
International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Change of name of Baltic Panels

With reference to your memorandum of October 15, 1952 concerning the desire of the Baltic Panels to change their names to the Committee for Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively, I wish to inform you that the Department perceives no reason to oppose such a change.

It is suggested however, that NCPE insist that the new names for the Baltic Panels be precisely those mentioned in your memorandum of October 15. It is our feeling that if the panels were to be called National Committees, for example, confusion might arise with respect to other organizations from these countries already in existence and the impression might be created that the committees are of greater political significance than we wish them to be.

ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

C/IO

NO.

DATE

10/23/79
29 Oct 52

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FILED		
1. CPP		8 NOV 1979	not	CRB	as a matter of incidental info, Drew Pearson gave a big plug for contributions to the Crusade on his TV program last night (Nov. 9) a.c.u
2. DD/P			13 NOV 1979	JBL	
3. C-IO				JWB	
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SECURITY INFORMATION

29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. While in Detroit yesterday, I talked with Charles Moore, who is the Director of Public Relations for Ford Motor Company, and also with Henry Ford. I was merely paying a friendly call on Moore but he raised the matter of the Crusade and asked Mr. Ford to come in and talk about it. They are both very unhappy with Mr. Walsh, who is Admiral Miller's man on the Crusade and whom Miller secured from the State Department, and I also gathered the general impression of dissatisfaction with Miller and his whole effort -- "If we had known what kind of an outfit we were working with, we wouldn't have taken it over." On the other hand, both Mr. Ford and Moore said that they were "going ahead full steam and intended to see the job through to the best of their ability".

2. I think there is no action to be taken here and merely pass this on for your information, but it does bring to mind again what I think is growing evidence that the Crusade is more trouble than it is worth.

3. I think this ought to be the last Crusade for Freedom and that we ought to give thought to alternatives. We are now taking steps to take the Committee for Free Asia out of the Crusade next year, substituting a permanent fund-raising office in San Francisco, token donations from three Agency foundations, and making a serious attempt to obtain some money from Asian groups and contacts. Some other cover is obviously needed and we are thinking in terms of the American Heritage Foundation or other possibilities that may occur. We should take similar steps for the National Committee for a Free Europe.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, EE DIVISION
CHIEF, SE DIVISION
CHIEF, IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: Attempts of persons outside the Agency to influence
Agency and State Department policy with respect to
National Committee for a Free Europe

1. I have had reports from several sources that persons outside the Agency and outside the State Department have attempted to influence Agency operations and State Department policy in respect to the National Committee for a Free Europe. Two of these persons, it is reported, are Carmel Offie and Maynard Barnes.

2. To the extent that Messrs. Offie and Barnes are aware of our continuing relations with NCCE, their awareness constitutes a danger to our successful conduct of the operation. I therefore ask you and members of your Division to refrain from any contact with these gentlemen or with others who, by virtue of their suspicions or knowledge but without any official capacity whatever, are attempting to grind their personal axes through the National Committee for a Free Europe.

Handwritten: Not sure
3. I have also had reports from several sources that members of this Agency who happen to hold strong personal views on the conduct of exile activities by NCCE have, in their direct relations with the exiles, encouraged the exiles to oppose NCCE decisions and policies. Please transmit to your respective staffs my strong aversion to this kind of in-fighting. I call your attention to the agreement signed by myself and Mr. George Kennan of the State Department on 13 February 1949, which reads in part:

"Exiles and refugees will be referred to the New York Committee for all matters of an operational nature, including the provision of support and facilities for themselves and their activities."

The same memorandum states that "Certain operational activities will not properly fall within the province of the New York Committee" and reserves these activities to this Agency, but these reserved operational activities were clearly not intended to embrace the encouragement of the exiles to fight decisions made by the Committee as to "the provision of support and facilities for themselves and their activities".

4. ~~Please also convey to members of your staff that I shall not tolerate further violations of the established policy set forth above.~~

Handwritten: If there is any hint whatever to these reports, I am sure that you will all agree that we should resolve our differences inside the agency

FRANK G. WISER
Deputy Director (Plans)

*see covering memo
+ page 2 in
Chrono 21 Oct*

Analysis of Memorandum by Mr. Crighton Scott

The following memorandum, I believe, discusses most of the points raised by Mr. Scott.

1. Scripts prepared in Munich are almost never read by Americans before broadcast although the general content of each broadcast is agreed upon in programming conferences between the American and exile staffs. The reasons why the broadcasts are not read by Americans before they go on the air are as follows:

a. Because the natural inclination of Americans is to change the broadcasts, and such changes, RFE officials feel, are likely to lessen the "genuine" quality of exile broadcasts for the listeners.

b. Because the exiles feel themselves to be patriots working for their countries, and the submission of scripts to Americans before they are broadcast would be regarded by the exiles as casting doubt upon their allegiance and fervor.

The American staff believes that it can exercise policy control by suggestions during program discussions rather than by making deletions and corrections in the scripts themselves.

2. During my trip to Europe in June, I asked Mr. W. E. Griffith, Political Advisor for RFE, to institute the service of regularly translating the most sensitive RFE broadcasts after the fact. He has complied with this request and CIA now receives English translations of Munich scripts within a month after broadcast. CIA also receives an immediate teletype summary of all Munich broadcasts, as well as a weekly consolidated summary of all broadcasts. To provide for immediate English translation of all RFE programs after the fact would require an enormous staff of translators.

3. No doubt RFE has made the mistakes Mr. Scott mentions in connection with the items about the weakness of the Iron Curtain and the ease of crossing it, and the Czechoslovakian currency devaluation. On the first point, Mr. Scott's dates are in error, for RFE did not go on the air until July 4, 1950. Assuming that he means that such broadcasts were made from that date until April 1951, it should be noted that this was the very beginning of RFE when all of its broadcasts originated in New York. Such broadcasts certainly are not being continued. I assume they were the result of inexperience. The

- 3 -

will be discontinued when HISS goes out of existence, and they should not be reestablished. You will remember that at the hearings which considered NCFT's 1953 budget, the officials of NCFT asked for \$500,000 to cover the expected loss of such privileges and because we felt that this was unjustified, we asked and were granted the right to retain this money in the CIA reserve pending further justification.

5. Mr. Scott's complaint that the Information Service of RFE has been too expensive and naive is probably correct. In part this is the result of CIA's inability, for justifiable security reasons, to make information on a large scale available to RFE. However, the Information Service is being reorganized. There is reason to believe that excellent professional newsmen, such as Russell Hill and Ed Chamberlayne will provide the competence necessary for an increase in efficiency.

6. In sum, Mr. Scott's criticisms and complaints seem a mixture of fact and fiction animated by a personal antagonism. His is but one of a number of such attacks by former employees. Our own approach to Radio Free Europe should be not so much an assessment of past success and failures, as an examination of future opportunities. A powerful instrument has been created, in the main successfully, in an incredibly short time. Where it goes from here, giving due consideration to criticism such as Scott's, seems to us to be our priority task.

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

27 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: President's Committee on Immigration and Naturalization

1. The attached memorandum, greatly modified in form by the General Counsel of NCFE, is to be presented tomorrow afternoon at an open hearing of the President's Committee which is conducting hearings on the McCarran Bill.
2. I was informed of this proposed presentation on Friday afternoon, October 17. I obtained the attached from Mr. Greenlea, NCFE General Counsel, today. NCFE does not know that Mr. Greenlea has been in touch with us and should not know.
3. I suggest that you review, with Mr. Wisnor, whether NCFE should make such a presentation. In essence, the presentation is an attack on the McCarran Bill. I suggest that, perhaps, NCFE should not testify for two reasons:
 - a. This is close to a clear example of a tax exempt charitable organization, attempting to influence legislation and;
 - b. The political implications are liable to be an embarrassment for CIA.
4. Apparently, NCFE is making this presentation in the hopes of receiving wide publicity so they will be in a position to say to the emigrees with whom they deal, "look what we are trying to do for you."
5. I urge your rapid concern, for the presentation is due to be made tomorrow afternoon.

William P. Durkee
WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC

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14-00000

The National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., was formed in 1949 when a group of private citizens joined together for positive action against Soviet enslavement. It concentrates its efforts on the 100 million Central and Eastern Europeans today living under inhuman conditions of force and fear. This tyranny, imposed by Soviet Russia in flagrant violation of her solemn guarantees, precludes the enduring world peace desired by free men everywhere. The National Committee for a Free Europe is the American peoples' answer to the Kremlin's despotic rule.

The Committee seeks:

- (1) To pierce the Iron Curtain with messages of moral and practical value through the facilities of [Radio Free Europe] thus taking the fight to the enemies' camp;
- (2) To build for the future by educating young refugees from Communism through the [Mid-European Studies Center] here in the United States, and the [Free European University in Exile] in Strasbourg, France. In this manner we attempt to preserve the cultural heritage of the past which the enemy seeks to destroy;
- (3) To develop political unity and a dynamic platform of aims and principles among the exile groups through the [Division of Exile Relations];
- (4) To assemble, analyze and distribute knowledge about current conditions in the captive area;
- (5) To create active public support, both moral and material, for these activities.

- 2 -

Vital to the work and well being of the National Committee for a Free Europe are its approximately two thousand alien associates. 60 percent of these aliens are in Europe, with the rest residing either temporarily or permanently in the United States. At the present time over one hundred of these aliens residing here face imminent deportation.

It might be inserted parenthetically at this point that all of these aliens presently facing deportation have attempted to remain within the spirit and the letter of the law, but because of the absurdities of the law have been forced into the position of being wilful violators of it. We do not speak, either now or at any point in this discussion, about evaders of, or fugitives from, justice, but shall only refer to individuals of good faith, attempting to the best of their ability to conform to the rules and regulations of the country which they believe, often mistakenly, to be the refuge of the afflicted.

At various times during the history of our organization it has been necessary for the National Committee or its subsidiaries to ask certain aliens with particular talents to come to the United States on extremely short notice. They were, of course, admitted as visitors. After these ^{These} aliens had arrived in the United States, ^{the aliens} they were immediately faced with the problem of attempting in some manner to regularize their status here ^{from visitor to permanent} so that trips back and forth from Europe for visa renewal purposes would not be necessitated. Under the present immigration law the only possibility of ^{accomplish having other} obtaining such regularization was by having

change

the alien apply at an American Consulate in Canada, await the issuance of a visa number, and then having the alien personally pick up the visa at the appropriate consulate. This procedure usually took from a year to 18 months. But ^{with method} ~~this mode of regularization~~ will cease under the new law, since aliens will not be admitted into the United States from Canada without having first completed certain residential requirements there.

[The only manner of safeguarding the residence of an alien visitor in the United States at present is to attempt to get unlimited extensions of his visitor's visa. This is of course impossible.] The alien finds himself, therefore, in the position of being deportable to the country from which he came, and in most cases after having stayed in the United States for over a year, the respective governments will refuse him permission to return. In the end the alien finds himself in a position worse than the one which he enjoyed while residing in a Displaced Persons camp in Germany.

Students supported by our Mid-European Studies Center find themselves in an even more embarrassing position. They are allowed to come to the United States as students providing their re-entry permits to the countries from which they come are still valid. Any student who comes to take advantage of our scholarships comes for at least a period of from two to four years and is therefore unable to maintain his residence abroad and keep his scholarship at the same time. They soon arrive at the point where they cannot return to Europe, cannot continue their studies here, and are constantly harrassed by officers of the Immigration Service.

(Those students studying at our Free Europe University in Exile in Strasbourg

Under the present law it is impossible to safe guard the residence of the alien if an alien has been a visitor in the U. S. but it is impossible to safe guard the residence of the alien if an alien has been a visitor in the U. S.

cannot come to the United States to continue their studies at graduate schools here, because most of them are chargeable to heavily oversubscribed quotas. *Why if they come on student's*

Our work here in the National Committee for a Free Europe is essentially psychological. Our associates in Radio Free Europe, the Division of Exile Relations, etc., cannot do efficient, effective, or productive work *because without fear of imminent deportation* when they are constantly being harassed by officials of the Immigration Service. *Under these conditions* When their stay in the United States is on a day to day basis they cannot devote their full energies to the work for which they came to this country. ~~While it is true that~~ *Most* of them intend to return to the country of their origin when Communist domination is overthrown there, *but until then* they must have some assurance that they can remain peacefully here until that moment. Therefore, it would seem appropriate that some provision be made in the immigration laws that *students and* temporary visitors in the United States *fitting these categories* be allowed to adjust their status to that of temporary, if not permanent, residence in the United States.

~~Another aspect of the law which should be considered is the fact that~~ *Many* of the exile leaders of various Iron Curtain countries were admissible to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 as amended. However, when asked by the Immigration authorities whether they intended to remain in the United States temporarily or permanently, they answered in all honesty that they intended to remain here only until their own countries had been liberated from the yoke of Communist tyranny. *Then* ~~of course~~, by their own admission they were ~~therefore~~ automatically barred from adjusting their status from that of temporary visitor to permanent resident. ~~In the case of~~ *Our* student associates,

- 5 -

they are obliged by the Committee as a requisite to receiving a scholarship, to sign a statement agreeing to return to the country of their origin when liberation comes so that their training will be of direct help in the cause of building a free world. ^{written in} It is indeed unfortunate that ~~both the present law and the forthcoming one makes no provision~~ ^{any} for political refugees except in the case of those individuals who are admitted to the United States under diplomatic standing and subsequently ^{leave} ~~leave~~ the service of their government. ^{which is the case?}

At the present moment individuals awaiting adjustment under this particular section of the I.R.A. law are in an extremely precarious position. All of them have a lifetime of political activity behind them, and therefore the administrative delay in processing their applications, completing investigations, etc., has been interminable. Now, most of them are receiving notices from the Department of Justice stating that since their applications have not been processed within the time limit, they are now eligible for deportation proceedings which will be effected forthwith.

^{written in} Both the present ~~and~~ the future immigration laws make no provision for administrative discretion in the enforcement of the deportation laws. Should the local commissioner be allowed to use his discretionary powers in the matter of deporting individuals such as those discussed, the problem ^{of his immutability} in great part would be ~~cleared up~~ ^{eliminated}.

The national quotas system is completely out of accord with present worldwide conditions. Almost all of the Iron Curtain countries, with the possible exceptions of Czechoslovakia and Poland, have annual

*For information
immigration
are we
solving
this.*

*Do we want to desecrate
immigrants?*

- 6 -

quotas of only 100, and these quotas are almost all oversubscribed to the year 2000. Should the mortgages laid on these quotas by the Displaced Persons Act be removed, or if Hungarians, for example, were able to borrow from the British quota, we should be able to bring to the United States many aliens possessing particular skills whose services are urgently needed by this organization. Many of our aliens are highly skilled technical, professional, medical or scientific men whose training, experience and ability would most certainly be prospectively beneficial to the United States.

It is because of the heavily oversubscribed condition of the quotas of Hungary, Bulgaria, etc., that most of the applications for visas, made as long as two years ago in American Consulates in Canada, are being returned unprocessed, with the notation that no action can be taken on their application due to the imminent approach of the effective date of the new law.

Neither the present law, nor the new law makes proper provision for Displaced Persons who are bona fide visitors to the United States. None of these people have passports from their own countries, since all of them have rejected the political party presently holding sway there. As a result they are traveling on French, German, or other free country affidavits of identity or travel documents. Before a visa can be extended under the law, the travel documents and re-entry permits must be valid for a period of sixty days beyond the date of application. These countries will not extend these documents since the bearers are not nationals of the issuing country. This, in effect, means that these visitors can only

remain for a period of from six to nine months, and then must return to Europe, oftentimes without being able to complete the work for which they came.

Finally, it would seem that some provision could be made for the rapid processing of the visas of both prospective immigrants and prospective visitors so that in case of necessity an alien can be brought quickly to the United States without the usual two year delay.

Generally speaking, if some drastic changes are not made in the Immigration laws at the earliest possible moment, we can foresee the virtual disbanding the National Councils Division of this organization, and a serious curtailment of the quality of the broadcasts from Radio Free Europe, and, ~~although it is not a propos to the present matter, we should like to point out that~~ ^{while} these broadcasts are making a terrific impact behind the Iron Curtain. One has only to read the virulent attacks against our organization printed in the Communist press all over the world to be assured of their effectiveness. The propaganda value to the Communist cause of the mass deportations now being planned of these well-known exiles is of course immeasurable.

When Public Law 414 was being debated in the Congress, it was submitted that the present Immigration and Nationality Act was one riddled with inconsistencies and completely engulfed in "red tape." We respectfully submit that the forthcoming law is full of even more inconsistencies, is completely unaware of present world conditions, will in effect stop all immigration except from those countries which are socially acceptable, and will create an impassible labyrinth of restrictive red tape.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

23 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)


SUBJECT: Maynard Barnes and Carmel Offie

1. In conversation the other day you asked me through what channel Maynard Barnes and Carmel Offie were stating their opinions on the matter of NCFE's request to move the administrative headquarters of the exile countries from Washington to New York, and who was listening to Barnes and Offie.

2. The channel seems to be the Southeastern European Division and in particular Colonel Yatsevitch, SE/CIP. The Southeastern European Division maintains an extremely skeptical view of NCFE activities in the exile field and has gone to considerable trouble, through exiles as well as through Barnes and Offie, to create the greatest possible objection not only to the recent move of the exiles but to NCFE in general. I am attaching an article by Edgar A. Mowrer which was written at the behest of Mr. Offie and was originally intended to be the first of a series. We have been successful in having the series idea dropped.

3. While I believe that there is some justification in the points the SE Division continually makes about the exile record of the New York Committee, I think the inter-governmental squabble which is aroused by the Division's repeated attempts to use exiles, members of the State Department, and others as a sounding board for its own lack of sympathy with NCFE makes it difficult for the National Committee to fulfill its charter and for CIA to control day-to-day operations without interference from the State Department and others from outside the Agency.

4. I suggest that you send the attached memorandum to the Chiefs of EE, SE and IO. It is worded in such a manner that it will not reveal this reference.


THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

2 Attachments

1. Mowrer article.
2. Suggested memo.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

*sig to
Dunbar*

13 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

FROM : Chief, ROM/OIS

SUBJECT : Exchange of Intelligence Information between the
NCPS and the DD/P Offices

1. The National Committee for a Free Europe is the reservoir of a great wealth of intelligence information, particularly in the field of psychological warfare. A four-day survey of the NCPS conducted by an OIS case officer indicated that three NCPS components - the Research and Publications Service, the Mid-European Studies Center, and the Radio Free Europe - can make a very valuable contribution to the operational intelligence required by the DD/P offices.

2. It is the purpose of this memorandum to suggest a procedure for the most effective use of the NCPS intelligence potential. The most practical approach seems to be as follows:

a. At this time it does not appear necessary to establish a continuous flow of raw and finished intelligence from the NCPS to the DD/P offices. Rather, we would like to use NCPS facilities whenever individual cases indicate that such action is advisable.

b. We would like to maintain a direct relationship with the NCPS for the purpose of enlisting its support in the work on our individual cases. When the nature of the case indicates that the NCPS can make a valuable contribution to it, we could make arrangements through the Chief of IO/TOMIC, to make direct contact with one of the security-cleared NCPS officers. A permanently-designated OIS case officer (A. Slatton and/or H. Knoepfmacher) would then proceed to New York to discuss the substantive research problems in the NCPS and reach an agreement on the scope of NCPS support.

3. It is recognized that the final authority on all contacts with the NCPS rests with the Chief of IO/TOMIC, and that the latter may direct and limit such contacts whenever he desires.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

4. We suggest that, for the purpose of meeting security requirements, the two OIS case officers assigned to NCFE liaison be given permanent cover which would be arranged by the NCFE Personnel Officer and the Chief of IO/TONIC.

5. It is recognized that the relationship between ROM/OIS and the NCFE must be based on mutual exchange of information. We are, therefore, prepared to provide such intelligence research support to the NCFE as may be given within security limits and our manhour capabilities. The requests for intelligence support from the NCFE would be channeled to ROM/OIS through the Chief of IO/TONIC.

6. Our proposals contained in this memorandum have been discussed with the Chief of IO/TONIC and an understanding has been reached on all points covered. It is requested that the suggested procedure be approved.

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 807

OCT 10 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PI

FROM : C/RQM/PI

SUBJECT : Survey of the National Committee for a Free Europe

1. This memorandum serves to inform you of a four-day survey made of the National Committee for a Free Europe by Alexander Shatton of RQM/CIS. The survey has uncovered a great wealth of information, contained both in raw files and finished reports, which is of operational intelligence interest. We are now making arrangements, through the IO Division, for continuing access to the NCPE files and for direct liaison with the NCPE Staff.

2. In the course of his conversation with Shatton, the President of the NCPE (Admiral Harold Miller) expressed concern over the fact that he had not been notified of Shatton's arrival and stated that he does not look with favor at CIA individuals working in the NCPE without his knowledge. Although Shatton informed him that his visit had been cleared with the IO Division, Admiral Miller remained somewhat unconvinced that the arrangements had properly been made. I suggest that this misunderstanding be brought to the attention of the IO/P, so that he may be informed of the facts in the event the matter is brought up by Admiral Miller in his contacts with the DCI and the DDCI.

3. Mr. Shatton's visit to the NCPE headquarters took place on 16, 17, 18 and 19 September.

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Security Information

ODP 72

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SECURITY INFORMATION

AWP, 8 Oct: m...
~ X TWIS

4 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division,
P & P Staff

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe's Request for
Funds to Build a Gymnasium at the Free University-
in-Exile; Reclamer of Admiral Miller.

1. I believe that I told Mr. Braden last evening of the telephone call which I had received from Admiral Miller and of what I had said in response to his request for funds to build the gymnasium. I want to make it clear that I offered him no specific encouragement, and confined my remarks to a statement that if he wished to draw up a proper application we would study it very carefully. I told him that this seemed to us an unnecessary expense and one which I would find difficult to defend with the Director in light of our present economy drive.

2. I should greatly appreciate a thorough staff job being done on this matter to relieve me of the necessity of thinking up all of the arguments pro and con, especially the latter. Will someone please dig up in the Congressional Records the speeches made during the last session of Congress in condemnation of the State Department's lavish approach to the educational and cultural exchange program? If we were ever forced to defend this Free University program, I think we would be extremely vulnerable on the score of having spent \$50,000 for a gymnasium or anything like it. This is the icing on the cake and has the sound of being definitely in the luxury category. There is also the very questionable wisdom of our spending additional money on "permanent plant", when we cannot be sure how long we will be able to continue our support of this enterprise, nor for that matter how long the present flow of student material will continue.

3. Please -- let us sharpen up our thinking and our pencils as well. In the final analysis I shall probably have to veto this proposition, and will certainly do so unless it is much more convincingly supported than heretofore. However, I would like some help on this.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

1 Oct rec'd

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: NCFE-SE Division Conference on Rumanian
Refugee Situation

REFERENCE: Memo to Chief, IOB, Subject: Current U. S.
Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee
Organisation, dated 12 September 1952.

1. It is requested that the referenced memorandum be forwarded to the NCFE for study prior to the conference (ref, para. 8) between NCFE representatives and personnel of this Division.

2. Due to the importance of the negotiations with the Rumanians, no action should be taken on the plan outlined in the memorandum until after the conference is held. The Division representative to be assigned on TDY in New York (ref, para. 7) will be designated prior to the conference.

3. We have been informed that Mr. Visoianu has not received an acknowledgment of his letter and proposal. It is suggested that the NCFE write Mr. Visoianu, expressing appreciation for his communication, and inform him that the NCFE has been studying various proposals and hopes that within the next few weeks further discussions can be arranged.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

25 Sept. '52

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Request for Budget Revision for NCFF

REFERENCE: Memo to DD/A and DD/P from Comptroller 13 Sept. 52

1. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the subject memorandum requesting a budget revision for NCFF are explained in the supporting data attached to that memorandum. Items totaling \$78,343 to be released from the reserve held by CIA, summarized in those paragraphs, are for material support of substantive operations already approved. Release of these items to NCFF is concurred in by International Organizations Division. It is recommended that the sum of \$78,343 be released to NCFF.

2. The item in paragraph 3, i.e. \$60,000 for nine months' operating expenses from July 1952 through March 1953 for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, Paris, is concurred in by the IO Division. The reason for its concurrence is as follows:

- a. Support in the amount of \$71,000 for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile through NCFF was undertaken by a memorandum for the DD/P dated 1 September 1951, Lewis S. Thompson, Chief, Special Projects, OPC.
- b. In early June 1952, the matter of continuing support for the ICFTU in Exile was reviewed by the DD/CI, Admiral Miller and Mr. Braden. It was decided that the ICFTU in Exile would continue to be subsidized in the amount of \$60,000 for a nine months' period, running from July 1952 through March 1953.

3. A cable, IN-34233, from Mr. Braden indicates the Chief of the Paris Station and Mr. Braden have discussed the possibility of ending relations with the ICFTU in Exile. Mr. Braden indicates he wishes to take up this matter with the DD/CI on his return.

- 2 -

h. It is therefore recommended that the sum of \$60,000 be released to NCFE to enable them to continue payments as already agreed. If the support for the ICFW in Exile should be terminated, funds remaining in NCFE's hands can be applied to other proposed activities now held for justification by CIA.

GERALD E. MILLER
Chief

Political and Psychological Warfare

Attachments
Reference memo with
attachments.

IO/TOMIC:WPD:jp/eh
(24 Sept 52)
Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addressee
IO/TOMIC - 2 cc
CIO - 1 cc
RI - 1 cc

SECRET

1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Library of Congress Eastern European Acquisitions

REFERENCE: Fund Memorandum No. 513, 2 September 1952

1. SE Division has noted with interest that effective August 20, 1952, the Washington research staff of the NCFE will begin processing books and publications received from the Iron Curtain countries by the Library of Congress. These acquisitions represent a very valuable source of information which this Division is presently unable to exploit, since we have no personnel with the language qualifications required to review all that is received for our specific interests.

2. Referenced memorandum indicates that the NCFE has arranged to microfilm portions of given books containing items of propaganda or informational value. One copy of the print will be mailed to the New York research desks, while the original microfilm will be sent by pouch to Munich, presumably for RFE. This Division requests that an additional copy of the print be obtained on a continuing basis by IO for further analysis by the interested Area Divisions and for pouching to our field stations which have indicated a specific interest in this material. It is suggested that the copy be broken down into sections corresponding to the Area Divisions interested in order that this material may receive immediate attention by the appropriate Area Division.

3. SE Division would appreciate receiving your comments regarding this request since we are anxious to utilize this material as soon as possible and wish to make other arrangements if these suggestions are found impractical.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

Copy to EE

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SECURITY INFORMATION

24 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT: Assignment of Mobile Radio Facility (MR-50)

1. According to Messrs. Rowland and Edmond Brown arrangements have been made to utilize the MR-50 in Germany.
2. The completion of the transaction is awaiting a test that is being undertaken by outside engineers through General Maclelland. This test, I am told, is necessitated by the fact that there is not available a complete specification of the equipment.
3. It is estimated by Mr. Brown that the test will be completed in a few weeks.

(5)

W. LLOYD ECHER
Acting Chief
Psychological Staff Division

FP/CPY:CLE:mas

Distribution:

Addressee	- original & 1
Mr. Rowland	- 1
✓ Mr. Brown, 10	- 1
CPY	- 1
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<i>Handwritten signature</i>	- 1
RI	- 1

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17 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION
ATTENTION: Mr. W. P. Durkee, Chief, IO/TOMIC
SUBJECT: Refugee Stipendiaries of NCSE
REFERENCE: Secret Memo dtd 12 August 1952 from Chief, IO/TOMIC,
to Chief, SE; Subject: List of Stipendiaries of NCSE.

1. In compliance with your request of 12 August, the referenced memorandum was circulated to the various interested branches of SE Division. Of the thirteen Rumanians listed as stipendiaries of NCSE, only one, Mr. Brutus Coste, is on the payroll of SE Division. However, it has been our understanding that Mr. Coste has received no stipend since December, 1951. We would appreciate a further check on the status of Mr. Coste with respect to his reported stipend. No other duplications were reported.

2. It is requested that in addition to the referenced list of stipendiaries, IO Division obtain from the NCSE and RFE a list of all refugees employees from within the SE area (Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia) who may be employed in any capacity, with their salaries and job titles. Such information has not been available to the interested branches in the past, but experience has shown that the availability of this data on a current basis would be most helpful to the responsible case officers.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

PP:CA:Crans:bar

Distribution:

Addressee - Orig & 1

SE/PP - 2

RI - 2

SECRET

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF DIVISION
 ATTENTION: Mr. E. J. Harrison, PY Evaluation
 SUBJECT: IPDMIC Use of PY Guidance Papers

1. In discussing this subject, the following facts of TDMIC operations should be kept in view:

a. TDMIC prepares its own daily guidance papers, written by a special staff which has at its disposal a European-wide news-gathering apparatus.

b. State Department overnight policy guidances are regularly delivered to TDMIC on the day of issue.

2. Guidance papers from PY are dispatched as soon as they are received. For instance, Special Guidance on Bacteriological Warfare, dated August 7, 1952, and Weekly Propaganda Guidance No. 9, dated August 8, 1952, were sent on August 11.

3. The value of PY guidance papers for IPDMIC was taken up with TDMIC officials last May. Their observations are contained in the following quotations from their letters to this Division:

a. The Chief Programming Official wrote:

"We have received several of these papers in the past couple of months. They are extremely useful for the following reasons:

a. They set forth clearly U. S. policy on one issue or another;

b. They occasionally report thinking in quarters from which we hear nothing directly;

c. They usually contain pertinent quotations of expression of views by the enemy which we can make use of (both published and other sources, such as interrogatories);

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6. They want it us to learn what lines are being laid down for propaganda addressed to other audiences than ours (other than central and eastern Europe).

"On the other hand, when these papers deal with our targets, they sometimes reveal a sharp divergence from our thinking and our points of view. Where this is owing to the fact that they have in mind black, while we deal in white, the difference can be legitimate. But even so, we find proposals that seem to us illogical, and now and then extremely unwise."

- b. The President of the organization wrote:

"You enclosed a paper giving additional guidance material for propaganda countering Communist BW charges. All the lines therein suggested have been successively used by us since February 25 or thereabouts when the topic first arose.

"Papers of this kind are of great use, provided they arrive promptly. By promptly is meant, either in anticipation of an event, or an expression of views on the day the event occurs."

- c. The Deputy Director, Radio, wrote:

"With regard to the paper (Prop-103, dated 23 March 1952) that you enclosed, I checked Bob's department and they advise that from the beginning we have made the points specified in 6(a)3 and 5, 6(b)2, 9(a)1 and 2, 9(d), 9(e), 10.

"As a matter of information, to our particular audiences we may, instead of 6(b)1, that the Soviet Union is trying to persuade the leaders of German heavy industry, militarists, and ex-Nazis to go into partnership with it; and instead of 6(c) that the prohibition of alliances is fraudulent, Moscow intending, as in August 1939, to ally itself with a reactionary Germany against our peoples. Again to our audiences, we say instead of 9(a)2 that the German problem can be solved, and that the Western powers are attempting to solve it in the interest of the security of our audiences. We are glad to see that our line parallels that laid down in 9(d) and (e)."

4. A fair summary of the use of FY guidance papers for RFE is as follows:

SECRET

- 3 -

a. They are useful insofar as they contain ideas that have not occurred to TONIC's own people or in reference to events that are not a matter of public knowledge.

b. In most cases the guidance papers arrive so late that TONIC is already engaged in treating the next stage in the development of the propaganda theme suggested.

c. As PY guidance papers, therefore, are at the moment another contribution to the thinking of TONIC officials, it is not possible to point to specific uses of the material suggested.

d. To be most useful, propaganda guidance from PY should treat the development of special themes that have a specific relation to precise U. S. Government operations and objectives aside from general U. S. foreign policy goals. To be most useful to RFE, such guidance should be developed over a period of time in anticipation of the actual facts or operations making up such programs.

EDMONS BROWN
Acting Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/TONI CWPB/cb

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - PI

SECRET

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Current U. S. Attempt to form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Chief, IO Division, Subject: SE Division Plan for Rumanian Exile Organization, dated 28 May 1952

1. In view of the considerable length of time since NCCE opened negotiations for Rumanian refugee unity and subsequent developments, a reappraisal of the situation and a delineation of final action are required.

2. It is evident that expression of NCCE interest in the Council of Political Parties (actually it has been directed primarily toward the National Peasant Party) has had the desired effect on the two refugee groups in the United States, by raising the specter of a third force developing and being recognized by the Americans. It has also made the King aware of the seriousness with which the Americans regard the division between the two groups. Further, it has incited the Iron Guard to adopt a "democratic" facade in the hope, perhaps, of fitting eventually into the resulting organization. However, in spite of the success of the maneuver, further encouragement of the CoPP and the RPH could well prove dangerous to our overall objective of unifying the refugees, by adding fuel to their differences.

3. Careful consideration has been given to the various worthwhile proposals and counter proposals which were advanced in the course of the recent discussions. It is hoped, in this connection, that the NCCE has made it entirely clear to all the participants that this series of discussions was undertaken purely to explore the possibilities for agreement in concert with the refugees themselves, and that after hearing all sides of the question, the NCCE will present for their consideration a "package" proposal, on the basis of which final agreement should be reached. It is believed that the revision of the original plan, set forth below and embodying certain features which have developed in the course of the last three months, can provide a solution acceptable both to this organization and to the refugees. Operational considerations, the desirability of maintaining a reasonable degree of control, the necessity for taking into account the refugee concept of democratic procedures, as well as the firm stand on size taken by the Rumanian National Committee, these are all important factors affecting the problem. The final organization should be small enough to control, sufficiently selective to attract prominent exiles, inclusive enough to contain the rank and file, and of an optimum size to carry out its functions effectively.

SECRET

4. An organizational form of a large passive Council, to which all Rumanians who meet certain qualifications could belong, but with all action vested in a small Executive Committee, offers a practical way to satisfy both U. S. and refugee requirements. The name of this overall organization should be the "Rumanian National Committee" since this would provide a sense of continuity and would facilitate acceptance of the proposal by Visolani and the King. It would be formed by an expansion of the present Rumanian National Committee into the Executive Committee of approximately twenty persons. Membership in the Council would be extended to the rank and file by means of letters announcing the new organization and inviting participation. The "Council" of the Rumanian National Committee would include members from all countries and would not meet in session. Radescu should be designated honorary president of the Council. The Executive Committee would be the functional unit of the organization. It would appoint sub-commissions and groups to perform the work of the Committee and designate representatives of the Rumanian National Committee at various refugee centers in Europe, South America, and the Near East. A membership card would be issued to all who affiliate with the Council. Members of extremist groups would be excluded in principle from membership in the Rumanian National Committee, except in certain cases passed upon by the Committee and accepted by us. A newspaper would be published and distributed in liberal quantities.

5. The Executive Committee headquarters would be in New York City and work in conjunction with the NCRC and representatives of CIA. It is recommended that the position of chairman of the Executive Committee be held for a term of one year, elective by members of this committee only. Its members should be:

Constantin Visolani, Chairman

Gheorghe Assan
Cornel Bianu
Vintila Bratianu
Nicolae Caranfil
Edmond Ciuntu
Brutus Coste
Alexandru Cretzianu
Anton Crihan
Carlos Davila
Mihail Parcasanu
Grigore Gafencu
Emil Gillezan
Mircea Ionescu
Augustin Popa
Iancu Zissu

6. As the first step in achieving the organization outlined above, it is suggested that the NCFE reply to Visoianu's memo expressing appreciation and inviting him to a discussion of his proposal. At this meeting, the NCFE should present the ideas outlined in paragraph 4 as the American view of the compromise which, after careful study, appears to offer the best possible solution. In the discussion, the NCFE should indicate that this plan is the result of much thought by interested groups after discussions with many refugees, that it has attempted to aid the refugees because of its interest in them and their country's welfare, and that it is prepared to support a Romanian refugee organization in a number of ways. Visoianu should be invited to recommend the people whom he considers desirable for the Executive Committee. He will have been briefed by CIA prior to the meeting and will propose the same list generally as that in paragraph 5. The NCFE should then request Visoianu's cooperation and active participation in forming an organization along the lines suggested in paragraphs 4 and 5. It will suggest that Visoianu, Fene and Crihan work with Gafencu, Chilezan and Coste for this purpose. Each of these gentlemen should be approached by CIA and NCFE prior to the opening contact meeting of the group. If any substitutions are made in the participants, CIA should be consulted prior to the time arrangements are completed. After this group has worked out details of the organization and consulted with the others suggested for the Executive Committee, the NCFE will issue invitations to a general meeting of this Committee and will assist in getting the other organizational details underway. Sub-commissions should be established immediately, using the refugees who have been participating in the recent NCFE discussions. Arrangements will be made for Visoianu and Gafencu and an additional delegation to be named later, to go to England to inform the King of the agreements reached and the details of the new organization.

7. During this phase of activity, it is recommended that someone from this Division be assigned on TDY in New York to work closely with the NCFE and advise on any necessary changes. CIA will contact certain refugees to ensure their cooperation prior to the initiation of this phase of activity.

8. This plan has been coordinated with the Department of State. It is requested that the details be forwarded to the NCFE and a meeting arranged to discuss the implementation.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SECRET
Security Information

11 September 1952.

the Record
MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Conversation with Admiral H. B. Miller on Wednesday,
the 10th of September.

The following is a memorandum of my conversation with Admiral Miller in New York on Wednesday, September 10th. I would like to preface this account with the observation that Admiral Miller seems to be in a highly emotional state and generally suspicious of those around him.

(1) Larry deNeufville

Admiral Miller reported his meetings with Larry deNeufville in Paris and indicated a difference in his projected use of Larry deNeufville and that envisaged by deNeufville, which Admiral Miller presumed represented CIA's interests. Miller proposes to use deNeufville as one of a three man brain trust, one of whom is Louis Gallantier and the other is still unnamed. He mentioned that he had originally considered deNeufville as an aide in administrative matters but had been informed that deNeufville was not equipped for such duties.

(2) VOA

Admiral Miller indicated that RFE was having difficulties with VOA, especially with the new Information Intelligence Unit created by the State Department, under the direction of Donald Shea, to provide information for VOA's broadcasts to the Iron Curtain countries. These difficulties included the preventing of RFE's information people from interviewing escapees.

(3) Information Service — Leland Stowe

Admiral Miller indicated that he was more than satisfied with Leland Stowe's activities, and that with the exception of RFE correspondents in London and Paris, they were satisfied with present personnel. He also stated that Russell Hill had become RFE correspondent in Germany. He further indicated that he will make every effort to keep Leland Stowe on after the expiration of the present six-month consultative contract.

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Security Information

- 2 -

(4) Father Morlion

Admiral Miller stated that he had conferences with Monsignor Cardini who stated that Father Morlion's information was not reliable. Admiral Miller reported that McDonald, the RFE correspondent in Rome, held the same view. Admiral Miller exhibited some suspicion of the actions of Mr. Delbeare in trying to sell him the matter of Father Morlion and Anna Brady, but stated if that was what Mr. Dulles wanted, that was all right with him.

(5) Crusade for Freedom

Admiral Miller indicated he was going to give two days a week to the Crusade for Freedom.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Acting Chief,
International Organizations Division

AC/IO:WPD/cmm

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee (via C/FP, and DD/P)
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/Tonic
2 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

110 WEST 57TH STREET

NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TELEPHONE PLAZA 7-7600

CABLE ADDRESS: NATECOMM

September 8, 1952

Mr. Thomas Braden
2203 Foxhall Road, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Braden:

At the suggestion of Admiral Miller, I am enclosing six copies of the new Committee brochure "Weapon in the Struggle for Freedom." If you would like to have additional copies, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,



Samuel S. Walker, Jr.
Director, Research and
Publications Service

SSW:bvb

SECRET
Security Information

2 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Security Procedures in the FEUE

Those present: Captain Sabalov, Dr. Tyson, Thomas
Meyers, Francis Hand, Bob Cunningham,
John Runney

1. The purpose of this meeting was to inform the Office of Inspection and Security of the security arrangements made in the selection of students for the Free University in Exile.

2. As a result of the discussions, an outline by Captain Sabalov of his security procedures, it was agreed:


a. That the present security practices were satisfactory and that the nature of the security problem does not call for the kind of security scrutiny necessary in Radio Free Europe.

b. That the FEUE is an excellent source of information for CIA and that in consequence Captain Sabalov will make available to this Agency:

1) A list of all applicants to the Free University with biographical data.

2) A list of all student with biographical data given general scholarship aid in Europe.

3. That no contacts by CIA with the Free University in Exile will be undertaken except by headquarters action or by field stations through Mr. Royal Tyler.


WILLIAM P. BURKE
IO/TONIC

SECRET
Security Information

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Security Information

ER-3-2387

8 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Plans
Acting Chief, International Organizations

FROM: Deputy Director Central Intelligence

1. Mr. Phenix when he was recently here advised me that the Board of NCPC desired to change its name from "National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc." to "Free Europe Committee." The purpose of this was to avoid confusion with the multitude of "national committees" for various purposes, some of them subversive.

2. This proposed change was discussed at the morning meeting with the Director and Deputies and no objection was found if the Committee really wanted to do it. I suggest that C/IO confirm this to Phenix as they want to set the legal steps in motion.

ALLEN W. DULLES

CONFIDENTIAL

Security Information

11 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Admiral Miller Letter about NCFF Personnel
mentioned at the PRC Meeting on Friday, 8 August

1. Attached hereto is Admiral Miller's answer on behalf of NCFF to numerous requests for personnel records of NCFF in order to provide CIA with basic information about this project.

2. In view of NCFF's reticence to provide us with such basic information, Mr. Braden and I have discussed the possibility of whether we could effectively perform a liaison function here for you without such information, and we are agreed that we cannot. As you know, it is not our purpose to use this information to harass people in New York or to quibble about salaries or details of assignments. We do think that the only way CIA can perform its responsibility toward NCFF is to keep itself fully informed in every field of NCFF's activity, and that knowing which employees are doing what is essential information.

3. You suggested at the PRC meeting on 8 August that you might be able to give us a hand in our effort to get this information.

WILLIAM P. DUKKEE
C/IC/DRIC

Attachment
As stated.

IO/TN/C:WPD/ch

Orig - Addressee

1 cc - CIO

2 cc - TNIC

2 cc - FI

see pink for attachment

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

7 August 1952

TWB
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief, International Organizations Division
SUBJECT: Request While on Travel Orders

Please contact Larry d'Neufville to obtain debriefing paper of Sperling and to be present at further verbal debriefing of Sperling. Sperling will be available in Paris from the 15th of August to the 2nd of September.

W.P.D.
WILLIAM P. DURKEE
C/IO/TOMIC

SECRET
Security Information

6 Aug 52

9

PRIORITY SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO REEVES FOR THOMAS BRADEN FROM LPA--SECURITY INFORMATION --CITE
NY -3124

JOHN C. HUGHES RPT JOHN C. HUGHES SAYS:

"THE BULL-AUGUSTINE REPORT OF JULY 20 WAS PREPARED IN PARIS AND
DISTRIBUTED BY ROYALL TYLER FROM THERE. IMMEDIATELY ON READING IT
I PROPOSED A MODIFICATION OF THE NAME FOR THE PROPOSED OPERATION SO
AS TO DEFINE MORE ACCURATELY ITS PURPOSE. I SUGGESTED WE CALL THE
PROJECT FREE EUROPE EXILE CENTERS, AND THIS NAME WAS ACCEPTED.

"IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT EVER SINCE NCPE HAS BEEN IN ACTIVE
OPERATION, INCREASING ATTENTION HAS BEEN PAID BY US TO THE PROBLEM
OF THOSE REFUGEES IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO ARE NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRIES
WITH WHICH NCPE IS CONCERNED, AND SUBSTANTIAL SUMS HAVE BEEN PLACED
IN THE HANDS OF THOSE NATIONAL COUNCILS WHICH SHOWED INITIATIVE IN
THIS PARTICULAR FIELD TO ENABLE THEM TO BUILD UP THE MORALE OF
THEIR HOMELESS NATIONALS. THE PRESENT REPORT AND ITS PROPOSALS
LOOK TO A MORE EFFICIENT PERFORMANCE ON A SOMEWHAT LARGER SCALE OF
WHAT IS ALREADY BEING DONE. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS RESULT, WE RECOMMEND
EMPLOYING A SMALL AMERICAN STAFF (OF ABOUT EIGHT PEOPLE) TO SUPERVISE
AND CONTROL THE ENTIRE OPERATION.

THE NCPE BUDGET FOR 1952-53 FOR WORK OF THIS CHARACTER INCLUDED
APPROXIMATELY RPT APPROXIMATELY 3,000,000 TO CONTINUE PREVIOUSLY.

2112,000

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-2-

APPROVED PROGRAMS. THE BULL-AUGUSTINE RECOMMENDATIONS SHOW THAT A MORE EFFICIENT AND SOMEWHAT MORE COMPREHENSIVE OPERATION (FOR EXAMPLE POLISH REFUGEES ARE NOW TO BE COVERED) WILL CL RPT COST ABOUT \$400,000 FOR THE TEN MONTHS—SEPTEMBER THROUGH JUNE, AN INCREASE OF ONLY \$100,000.

"THIS PROGRAM IS NOT A NEW ONE FOR NCPE AND IT INVOLVES NO RESETTLEMENT HOUSING OR LARGE SCALE SUBSISTENCE EXPENDITURES. IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH OR DUPLICATE ANYTHING THAT IS NOW BEING DONE BY RPT BY OFFICIAL UNITED STATES AGENCIES NOR DOES IT INVOLVE ANY LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS. IT REPRESENTS AN EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NCPE REALLY IS CONCERNED WITH THE MORALE OF REFUGEES REACHING WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES. WE SEE NO REASON, THEREFORE, WHY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT NEED BE CONSULTED AT THIS TIME. PLEASE DISCUSS WITH MR. DULLES RPT DULLES."

GR-351

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

5 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC - Budget FY 1953

1. Returned herewith as requested are the budget data for the fiscal year 1953 received by CM in the late afternoon of 2 August 1952 for review, evaluation and specific comment.
2. Only a cursory examination of such data is possible within the time presently available. While from the information submitted it does not appear that any of the estimates shown are greatly out of line, it must be pointed out that CM does not feel that it is in a position to intelligently evaluate the proposed budget with respect to the program and operational purposes contained therein.
3. It is felt desirable, however, that sufficient detailed information pertinent to the organizational and management features of the project should be made available to CM to permit a review and examination of those aspects in conjunction with the related proposed budget provisions.

PRESTON L. SWTPHEN
Chief, Commercial Division

CM/HLS/fh

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
3 - CM
2 - RI/PI

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

5 August 1952

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PRESTON L. SUTPHEN
Chief, Commercial Division

CM/HLS/rh

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
3 - CM
2 - RI/PI

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

TONIC

August 5, 1952

Dear Dick:

Tom Braden, one of our friends will be coming over in your direction soon.

Please show him every courtesy and everything that we have in the way of operations. It is essential that he know our operations thoroughly, and all wraps are off.

Sincerely yours,

H. B. Miller

Mr. Richard J. Condon
Radio Free Europe
APO 407-A
c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Royall Tyler - Paris
cc: George Caesar - Lisbon ✓
cc: Oliver Hadwood - 635-10

AUG 6 1952

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Security Information

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P
Y**SECRET**
Security Information

R 3-1338(2)

4 August 1952

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1. It is understood by Sponsor and the Fund that activities of the Fund will be conducted in accordance with the following principles:

a. The fund will present to the Sponsor on or before 1 May of each year a proposed program and financial budget for the fiscal year beginning on 1 July. In general, this presentation will include detail comparable to other Sponsor budget presentations and, of course, must include as a minimum sufficient information to enable the Sponsor to analyze the program from both a budgetary and policy viewpoint.

b. After subjecting the program and budget to normal Sponsor review and analysis, the Sponsor will advise the Fund as to the specific activities of the over-all program which the Sponsor desires to support and as to specific amounts approved for expenditure in connection with each Fund division, including a small General Administration Contingency Fund which can be used at the discretion of the Fund for minor unforeseen requirements of any division. Exceptions, limitations, or other special provisions will be stipulated where appropriate. The Fund will undertake major activities other than those approved in its annual program only when mutually agreed by the Sponsor and the Fund. Transfer of funds from one Fund division to another division will not be made except by prior mutual agreement of the Sponsor and the Fund.

c. A reasonable reserve fund will be held by Sponsor and provided for in the budget to take care of unforeseen emergencies or contemplated activities which have not been sufficiently developed to permit detailed budgetary planning. Releases will be made from this fund to the Fund as appropriate upon presentation of proper justification to the Sponsor.

d. The Fund will furnish the Sponsor with such regular financial reports reflecting its operations as may be necessary to enable the Sponsor to properly account for the Fund expenditures. The Fund will also furnish the Sponsor with copies of audit reports made to the Fund by the firm of Certified Public Accountants employed for that purpose by the Fund with the approval of the Sponsor.

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

- 2 -

Security Information

e. In order that the Fund may have available at all times sufficient net liquid assets to provide for liabilities which would exist in the event unforeseen liquidation became necessary, Sponsor will provide the Fund with an adequate liquidation reserve which will be held by the Foundation and invested in United States Government obligations of a readily convertible variety mutually agreed by Sponsor and the Fund. This reserve will be made available to the Fund as required, to be used only for the purposes of liquidation as mutually agreed by Sponsor and the Fund.

f. In case of liquidation, the assets of the Fund remaining after payment and discharge of all debts and liabilities of the corporation shall, as required by the Fund by-laws, be distributed "to such tax-exempt charitable organizations as shall be determined by the Board of Directors, in its discretion," but it is understood that the Fund will, in fact, designate the tax-exempt charitable corporation known as "The 1848 Foundation" as the recipient of such net assets.

g. The Sponsor will provide the Fund with appropriate guidance and the Fund, to the extent it is apprised thereof, will insure that all Fund activities are conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. Government policy and the Sponsor policy and mission. It is moreover recognized that developments unforeseen at the time of the approval by the Sponsor of any annual program may require the termination thereof, or any portions thereof, at any time by the Fund either at its own instance or at the request of the Sponsor.

h. The Fund will accept restricted gifts from private donors, other than Crusade for Freedom, Inc., only when mutually agreed by the Fund and the Sponsor.

i. The Fund may submit budgetary revisions either quarterly or whenever proposed new activities or unforeseen developments require a significant change in approved budgets.

j. Within the limits of approved budgets, the Fund will requisition funds from the Sponsor quarterly unless unanticipated requirements necessitate interim requisitions.

k. To promote their common security interest, the Sponsor will keep the Fund continuously advised as to desirable security procedures and the Fund will be free to request specific security guidance from the Sponsor at any time. The Fund will not elect or appoint a director, officer, key executive or any other person who will have knowledge of the Sponsor-Fund relationship without the prior specific concurrence of the Sponsor. In respect of employees who will

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Security Information

SECRET

- 3 - Security

not have knowledge of the Sponsor-Fund relationship, the Fund will, nevertheless, obtain appropriate security clearances from the Sponsor prior to employment.

2. Where appropriate, detailed procedures will be cooperatively developed by the Fund and the Sponsor to insure the effective implementation of the principles outlined in this Memorandum of Understanding.

For that purpose a liaison office in Sponsor's organization will be designated by Sponsor. Except on financial and budget matters which will be handled by the Fund with Sponsor's Office of Administration, and on matters which the Fund desires to take up with the Director of Sponsor or his immediate Deputies, relations between the Fund and Sponsor will be coordinated by or through this liaison office and, except as above, any matters which the Fund desires to bring to the attention of Sponsor may be referred to or through such liaison office.

Initialed as of this 4th day of August 1952:

/s/ A.W.D.
(Mr. Dulles)

/s/ H.H.M.
(Admiral Miller)

SECRET

Security

UNCLASSIFIED		RESTRICTED		CONFIDENTIAL		(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION) (NO BOTTOM)	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP							
TO		INITIALS	DATE				
1	CPP						
2	DD/P						
3	DDCI						
4							
5							
FROM		INITIALS	DATE				
1	C/IO	TWB	8 Dec				
2							
3							
<div style="display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;"> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> ACTION</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> FILE</div> </div> <p>REMARKS:</p> <p>This may interest you as evidence of the good team spirit we have among some of our operating campaigners. It was left behind by Alan Valentine in his personal files.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>TWB</i> TWB</p>							
SECRET		CONFIDENTIAL		RESTRICTED		UNCLASSIFIED	

14-00000

PRIVATE
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
CONFIDENTIAL

20P 1610
11/4

110 WEST 57TH STREET

NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TELEPHONE PLAZA 3-7600

CABLE ADDRESS: NAFREEEOM

August 1, 1952

Mr. Alan Valentine, President
Committee for a Free Asia, Inc.
245 California Street
San Francisco, California

Dear Alan:

It was good to see you, if just for an instant,
in Washington.

For your private ear, I might tell you that we
won our battle hands down. Merely to confirm this, our
Executive Board is having lunch in Washington with Allen
and Bedell next Monday. This will be a general talk, but
I am sure that policies will come up for discussion.
Happily, everything seems to be sailing along in good
shape.


I checked down there regarding any taboo con-
cerning your help on the Crusade for Freedom campaign. I
think there was a misunderstanding here. They have no
thought of providing a complete taboo. Their thought was
that all other operation should not stop and your time be
devoted wholly to the Crusade.

Actually, we will call upon you for very little
help. When Dick Walsh comes out to talk with you within
the next ten days, he will give you a complete fill-in on
what assistance we would like to have. I am sure you will
have no trouble in giving us this assistance.

With regard to the wording of the language by
which we transmit the money to you -- I am going to try
to get a Board Meeting together on Tuesday at which time
the necessary action will be taken to clear our forward-
ing letters to you insofar as capital expenditures go.

My very best regards.

Sincerely,


H. B. Miller

PRIVATE
AND
CONFIDENTIAL

HBM:mlm

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

Aug 1, 1952
JUL 1 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ID Division

SUBJECT : List of Rightist Rumanian Refugees.

1. In accordance with a request of Mr. John Leich for information on any questionable members of Gen. Radescu's League of Free Rumanians, transmitted herewith is a list of a number on whom information is available. Information on others will be forwarded to you as received.

2. Most of those listed have been connected with the Iron Guard groups, either as members or as fellow travelers, or with other groups whose ideology is in conflict with U. S. policy. The names preceded by an asterisk are considered unsuitable for employment in any American organization.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE Division

Encl.
List

SE/5/PCNewsome (13 August 1952)

1 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE Division
Chief, SE Division
Chief, VE Division
Chief, FY Division
Chief, Budget and Analysis Division
Chief, Operations Division

SUBJECT: TPTONIC Budget

1. Attached for your specific comments and evaluation is the TPTONIC proposed budget for fiscal year 1953.
2. It will be necessary to have your comments and initials on the cover sheet by Tuesday noon, August 5.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

1 - EE
1 - SE
1 - VE
1 - FY
1 - AL/BD
1 - OD/CO
1 - CIO
2 - IO/TONIC
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July 2 ^{Draft} not sent

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: NCFE-CIA RELATIONS

1. When this Division was delegated the responsibility of conducting CIA relations with NCFE it was immediately apparent that a variety of problems existed which made effective action on the part of IO Division difficult if not impossible. These difficulties may be generally summarized as follows:

- (1) Satisfactory mechanical procedures to provide information to CIA and to insure effective cooperation and coordination of activities by CIA and NCFE did not exist. This was true not only in financial matters, such as the orderly submission of budgets and financial reporting, as well as security, but was also true of attempts to give NCFE policy guidance and to insure that NCFE's activities did not compromise CIA operational activities.
- (2) The attitude of the responsible officials of NCFE was one largely of non-cooperation in terms of NCFE and CIA efforts being joint to achieve the same objective. Indeed NCFE's attitude was that they are a separate organization with the responsibilities of a corporation in the State of New York, and that the role of CIA's representatives in dealing with them was one of being their salesmen rather than partners, that once their general activities were approved and financed, their responsibilities to CIA were fulfilled.

(3) NCFE has not only failed to provide information about its activities, but had generally expanded its relations with government agencies in an effort to play one agency against another and, indeed, in many cases play the personnel of one agency against other personnel in that agency. A general feeling of suspicion and distrust pervaded CIA's relationships with NCFE.

2. In an attempt to properly discharge its responsibilities IO Division has attempted to solve the above problems by (a) preparing an agreement or directive which ~~states~~ sets out the joint responsibilities of CIA and NCFE and (b) which clearly states NCFE's duties and responsibilities to this Agency. To implement this agreement IO Division has, or is in the process of, creating orderly procedures by which this agreement will be put into effect.

3. If IO Division is to succeed in its task, which in our opinion is well begun, two conditions are ~~in our opinion~~ essential:

(1) That there be a single point of liaison between NCFE and CIA and that CIA act as the sole official governmental liaison with NCFE. It should be said that this does not mean that officials of NCFE will not consult with higher authorities in CIA, but that when they do, those responsible in IO Division will be fully informed.

(2) That NCFE clearly understands with whom they are to deal in CIA and that those with whom they deal on a regular basis are responsible officials entitled to respect as such--

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officials whose responsibilities are to lend their
cooperation and guidance insofar as it is necessary to
achieve common objectives.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: CIA Investigation of Relations

PROBLEM

It is likely that at a meeting you will hold Monday, 1 August, with members of the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe, these Directors will maintain they do not wish to sign or to accept a directive and/or agreement as to relations between NCFE and CIA, which has been approved by the CIA administrative staff and the International Organizations Division of CIA.

DISCUSSION

At the time responsibility for CIA dealings with NCFE was transferred to the IO Division, a survey was undertaken by this Division with the help of the CIA administrative staff under Mr. Wolf. The following was found to be the status of relations between CIA and NCFE:

1. Budget and Financial Relations.

a. No orderly submission of budgetary requirements on the part of NCFE has ever been established or practiced. For example, the CIA approved budget for the fiscal year 1952 was substantially different than the budget upon which NCFE based its activities. Bad communication has existed.

b. CIA has not exercised any form of control over NCFE expenditures after initial approval. For example, NCFE has been free to switch funds allocated for one project to some new project or to pay for extending an old one without further reference to CIA.

c. Monies raised by NCFE through the Crusade for Freedom or monies advanced by CIA and unspent at the end of the fiscal year have not been considered in the granting of funds for a new fiscal year.

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d. When budgets have been presented by NCFE, they have not been presented with reasonable thoroughness or accuracy nor have they indicated expenditures which are reasonably certain and those which are projections of possible activities for which NCFE has nevertheless asked for funds.

e. In certain instances, i.e. grants to certain national councils, NCFE makes expenditures for which there is no adequate accounting to NCFE and on which the Committee has had little or no information on how the money is spent.

2. Financial Reporting.

a. It is unquestioned that the internal business and accounting procedures of NCFE are excellent. However, adequate financial information has not been presented to CIA.

b. Security.

As the recent case of Leland Stowe indicates, NCFE has disregarded essential security considerations in the hiring of personnel. Neither the Security Officer, CIA, nor any other branch or component of CIA, has anything but extremely inadequate information as to who is on the NCFE payroll.

c. Policy Control.

In its relations with emigres through its National Councils Division and in its radio broadcasts through RFE, NCFE has in many cases not received adequate guidance from CIA and the State Department and in some instances not followed the guidance provided. CIA is seldom informed by NCFE of its proposed activities other than in its over-all budgetary presentation.

d. Coordination of CIA Activities with NCFE.

NCFE's activities in radio broadcasting, which account for three-quarters of its yearly budget, are almost entirely transferred overseas. The action of its 1400 or more overseas personnel often cut across CIA's own field operations. NCFE has not accepted coordination in this field.

3. IO Division and Administrative Staff Proposed Actions to Solve These Difficulties.

The IO Division with the assistance of the CIA Administrative Staff has prepared a memorandum of agreement to serve as a guide in

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the conduct of relations between CIA and NCFF. This agreement provides the following:

a. Adequate budget information upon which to evaluate the purposes and probable success of proposed NCFF activities as well as an adequate financial reporting system by NCFF so that this Agency can at all times be aware of and insure the approved expenditure of funds by NCFF.

b. Adequate security arrangements so that every employee of NCFF has been given a security clearance necessary for the proper protection of this operation.

c. The IO Division is to be the sole channel of liaison by NCFF to CIA and the State Department. The purpose of this provision is to insure adequate preparation and consistent policy guidance for NCFF in all its varied activities and to afford a single point of liaison and coordination with State Department and the area divisions of CIA. It is by no means intended to prevent officials and directors of NCFF from discussing problems with higher authorities and in fact the IO Division cannot give policy guidance without reference to higher authorities. In the past, however, NCFF has conducted liaison with many of the area divisions in CIA, with the State Department and with various officials in CIA, and there has been a resultant confusion.

d. The agreement provides for the submission of monthly reports by NCFF as to the status of its substantive activities.

4. Attitudes of NCFF.

The basic attitudes of NCFF about themselves is summed up by the comments on the first draft of the above-mentioned agreement by Spencer Phemix:

a. "Our friends can refuse to supply funds for disapproved activities but cannot legally or properly be given the 'right to disapprove or modify any activities or require abandonment, modification, or change in emphasis, in any of the existing programs'."

b. "Again, no agreement between our friends and ourselves can legally diminish our corporate right to spend our corporate funds . . ."

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c. It is unacceptable that private consent of CIA should be required as to the appointment of new directors and officers.

d. The money given to NCFF by CIA is given first to the ISHS Foundation and this money is then donated to NCFF. CIA therefore has no right to inquire into policies or expenditures although "normally we would consult our friends".

5. Basic Attitude of CIA.

CIA has a duty and responsibility to insure affirmatively the conduct of the NCFF program in accordance with the CIA mission and with the DCI's responsibility to higher authority. A course of action based upon the view that NCFF's autonomy is such that it cannot accept the above-mentioned agreement, or some form thereof, might under conceivable circumstances, i.e. a change in the viewpoint of the German Government where most of NCFF's employees are located, the possibility of high-level changes in NCFF, or the growing insistence on the part of the exiles for armed liberation, lead to action not consistent with the DCI's responsibility. At present a situation exists in which CIA and the Division charged with CIA responsibility cannot exercise that responsibility.

6. Recommendation.

The PRC has reviewed this agreement and has refused to approve the budget of NCFF until this agreement or a modification acceptable to NCFF is adopted. The Director has approved this decision and it is suggested that he stand upon it.

L. K. WHITE
Acting Deputy Director
(Administration)

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - ADD/A (for DDCT)
1 cc - "
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

ER-3-1369

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations
FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

Attached is a memorandum which was handed me by Spencer Phenix covering a confidential report made by two NCCE people with regard to NCCE's action in connection with refugees. I have not read this in full and would like your recommendation and analysis so as to spare me this if possible.


ALLEN DULLES

Encl.

CONFIDENTIAL

July 15, 1952
Revised July 30, 1952

AN NCPE APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION

- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

Reduced to its simplest terms, the European refugee problem can be resolved, saving liberation, only by the assimilation, or at least the integration of the refugees into the countries which receive them or by their emigration to countries better able to do so. National and international programs vast in scope and cost are required for these purposes, and it is obviously not within NCPE's power or interest to engage directly in them. But, in an indirect way, while paying attention only to its direct and fundamental interests, NCPE can contribute to the success of both types of programs, at least so far as they concern refugees from the ten NCPE countries.

The first step is, of course, for NCPE to analyze its position in relation to the European refugee situation and to formulate a policy accordingly. NCPE has been a constantly and rapidly growing organization, fully occupied with the immediate problems of expansion which have confronted it. NCPE has been deprived of the opportunity to pause and consider the consequences of its expansion in a changed situation, much less to deal with these consequences.

Several basic factors have combined to alter NCPE's position in relation to the European refugee situation. While IRO operated, NCPE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees, who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. IRO's several successor organizations have yet to prove their ability effectively and completely to perform its functions. During the early years of NCPE's existence, the frontier countries, Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain, were absorbed in post-war reconstruction or subjected to military occupation and hence were generally not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCPE in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of most of the exile National Councils were in the U.S. under nominal U.S. control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. As conditions approach the normal in each of these countries, NCPE's grounds for self re-assurance become less solid. Until its May 1, 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting

the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the West. This, however, is no longer the case.

Fundamentally, any NCFE interest in the European refugee situation is an aspect of the general NCFE relationship with exiles. In the changed European situation in which this interest is and will be manifested NCFE should reconsider its basic instruments for such relationships: the National Councils. Their exceptions, gaps, and shortcomings should be carefully analyzed and the conclusions drawn therefrom. The inadequacy of the National Councils as a basic instrument in the changed situation in Europe will be indicated in this report. Certain adaptations of this instrument and the creation of new ones will be required if NCFE is to carry out its functions and realize its potentialities.

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WHY NCFE IS CONCERNED IN THE EUROPEAN
REFUGEE PROBLEM AND WHY THIS CONCERN
SHOULD BE PROPERLY AND EFFECTIVELY
MANIFESTED.

A. The Extent of NCFE's Concern to Date :

In the past NCFE has not directly concerned itself with the over-all problem of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. This policy of NCFE has manifested itself in the following ways. NCFE has consistently made it clear that its chief interest lies in what it regarded as the political and intellectual elite of emigrations from the various Iron Curtain countries. Certain elements of this political and intellectual elite, however, realized the necessity and the importance of channeling some of their activities toward the mass of their respective emigrations on a national basis. This realization was dictated either by humanitarian or strictly realistic political principles, or by a combination of the two. Accordingly, these elements of the elite approached NCFE with their proposals for NCFE material and moral support of such activities. These proposals differed widely and were implemented at varying periods over the last three years, with the result that presently NCFE is indirectly supporting refugee activities on a national basis at an annual amount of \$118,168.00, and with the further result that these activities are confused, haphazard, erratic, ill-coordinated and unjustly and inexplicably disproportionate. Some nationality groups, as for instance the Hungarians, have been receiving relatively large amounts for refugee activities, with other groups, as for example the Poles, who have a large emigration, receiving nothing.

The vehicles for the channeling of this support have also differed widely. Originally, NCFE's theory in providing support for such activities was based upon the existence of National

Councils or Committees, the idea being that the National Councils should themselves undertake such activities in order to gain for themselves the necessary standing in their respective emigrations. This was not altogether inconsistent with NCFE's policy of emphasis upon direct assistance only to the intellectual and political elite, but was a subsequent development thereof.

The most ambitious and long-lived of these National Councils' refugee projects has been the Refugee Service of the Hungarian National Council, which is the best and almost sole surviving example of NCFE's original theory. The record, however, even of this prize example, is an extremely spotty one (details to follow in a descriptive report to be submitted separately). More importantly, the reasons for the spottiness of the HNC's record are not all attributable to the HNC itself; many, indeed, are due to the situation in which the HNC's approach to the refugee problem, which has provided financial support, but little or no guidance or moral support. * *Religious has had to operate and within at time to NCFE*

In the Rumanian case, NCFE's support for refugee activities was originally channeled through the Rumanian National Council, which ceased to enjoy NCFE recognition in 1950. Since that time, NCFE support for Rumanian refugee activities has been given to Rumanian Welfare, Incorporated, an organization entirely outside the National Council category, and which includes Americans on its Board of Directors.

In the Czechoslovak case, NCFE has channeled its support for refugee activities through the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, a National Council, which was the victim of a political split lasting from January 1951 until July 4, 1952. The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, in turn, channeled some of this support to an organization which enjoys the status of voluntary agency, the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees. This organization, like Rumanian Welfare, Inc., includes Americans on its Board of Directors, which is chaired by Professor James Shotwell. Unlike Rumanian Welfare, however, the AFCE in Germany and Austria received from IRO or HICOG and USCOA facilities and/or financial support as did other larger organizations such as the NCWC, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches, the American Joint Distribution Committee, etc. which shared with it the status of voluntary agency. There is no doubt that Czechoslovak refugees have been, to some extent, the victims of the political fluctuations of their leadership in the U.S., and that, in a sense, NCFE must also accept some responsibility for allowing the political situation to have had repercussions of this nature.

A/ In the case of the Albanians, no specific sums in the budget (which has been provided by NCFE) of the National Committee for a Free Albania have been earmarked for aid to Albanian refugees; although despite this the NCFA has, it is reported, due chiefly to close American supervision in Rome, managed to do more for Albanian refugees in Italy than other National Councils, as for instance the HNC and HNC in Italy.

In the case of the Poles, because of the failure of the Polish emigration to produce a united national council which could be recognized by NCPE, no financial support whatever has been given by NCPE to Polish refugee activities, although the Poles have one of the most sizable emigrations of all the nationality groups with which NCPE cooperates, and although the Poles have an organization, American Polish War Relief, a voluntary agency, which seems to be at least as effective, if not more so than the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees or Rumanian Welfare, Inc., organizations with which it is roughly comparable.

In the case of the Yugoslavs, which is probably the most difficult case of all, from the U.S. and the NCPE point of view as well as from the viewpoint of the individual refugee, NCPE has confined itself to contributing small amounts to the Benevolent Association of Free Citizens of Yugoslavia in London, in order that certain exiled leaders who rendered signal services to the Allied cause during World War II, through their participation in the revolt of March, 1941, which led Yugoslavia to resist the Nazi Invasion - might receive small stipends. Although this aid is rendered through an organization abroad, to exiles residing abroad, it is in line rather with NCPE's policy of providing assistance to a political and intellectual elite than with the policy of indirect support through National Councils or other organizations of refugee activity. No Yugoslav National Council, enjoying NCPE recognition, has ever emerged due to the delicate situation of Western policy vis-a-vis Tito's government.

In the case of the three Baltic States, although NCPE has been provided, both in the U.S. and abroad, with the instruments which have most nearly proved themselves capable of efficient, just and honest use of funds for refugee activities, no such funds have been placed at the disposal of the three Baltic Consultative Panels or their counterpart committees in Germany and elsewhere abroad.

Originally, also, although the principle was never clearly defined or rigidly adhered to, and, at present, is as much departed from as observed, it was felt that CFE-supported refugee activities should be restricted, as much as possible, to the type of assistance which a consulate would render to its citizens who found themselves in difficulties in a foreign country. Such assistance would according to this line of thinking only occasionally and in cases of extreme and immediate need, be material; essentially it would consist of advice, translation and verification of documents and direction of the refugee to the appropriate agency capable of furnishing him with the type of further assistance, material or otherwise, which might be required. It has always been recognized, however, that the various National Councils acting as consulates for their anti-Communist compatriots, who could not turn to the legally-recognized Communist embassies, legations or consulates of their countries for help, would have to provide some material assistance for those who turned to them for help, if only a tram ticket, to allow them to visit the various international and local social agencies who could help them, or

the price of a meal or a night's lodging which would carry them over the necessary period of time which it always takes until the machinery of other agencies can be persuaded to start grinding for the assistance of these people. However, as time went on, NCFE assistance was also being given, directly or indirectly, to agencies which gave particular attention to material aid, as for instance the APCR and Rumanian Welfare, neither of which has any clear and responsible relation with a National Council, yet each of which has been the victim, to some extent, of the vagaries of exile politics.

Some of the elements which seem, either consciously or unconsciously to have been operative in the development of this NCFE policy of only limited and indirect concern with the over-all problem of refugees from Eastern Europe were the following :

1. Refugees in the mass were already the direct concern of a large, well-staffed and well-financed international organization, the IRO, which meant that the problems confronting the National Councils and other organizations of the exile elite were limited in scope.

2. Until the initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia on May 1, 1951, NCFE (through RFE or any other instrument) was not itself an active factor in the refugee problem. It was not directly associated with the refugee himself, either through indirectly stimulating him to flee or through his increased value for information purposes.

3. The National Councils and Committees were considered to be a suitable instrument qualified to deal with the refugee problem in the limited manner in which it confronted them during the existence of IRO. It was felt that any credit for assistance to refugees could appropriately be given to the national councils, which would in turn reflect to the credit of NCFE, the U.S. and the Free West in general.

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THE CHANGED SITUATION U.S. AND EUROPE

While IRO operated, NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. Even before IRO disappeared, care and maintenance of refugees in and out of camps had passed to the various local national authorities. IRO's functions of protection and care for the refugee in both legal and material aspects respectively from arrival to emigration have been divided

among these governments and two international agencies, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and PICNS, none of which has been provided with the means adequate to the performance of their tasks assigned it, and the latter of which are only just becoming fully operational. In consequence of IRO's closure the various voluntary agencies, such as NCRC, LWF and WCC, etc., have been deprived of facilities which were provided by IRO in the past, with the result that they have been compelled to curtail their activities. Neither of IRO's successors has assumed the vast and vital coordinating function performed by IRO, with the result that the present confusion is discouraging. It may develop that the New State Department - NSA program for neo-refugees will clarify this confused situation, but at present it, itself, is as yet an unknown factor and naturally rumors regarding it at the field level have thus far only served to confound the confusion.

The period of IRO's existence coincided with the period of mass emigration, whereas at present emigration possibilities are small and uncertain, with the result that to the hard core remnant, which cannot be moved, is being added to the small but steady flow of new arrivals, most of whom are unable to emigrate and who must also face the appalling employment conditions in the frontier countries of Germany, Austria, Italy and Trieste (in the other frontier countries of Greece and Turkey the situation is probably similar) and the intermediary receiving countries such as France and Britain. Out of the more slowly moving remnants, particularly in the frontier countries, the possibility exists for the formation of more stable national committees, which would hence be more susceptible of control.

During the early years of NCPE's existence the frontier and intermediary receiving countries were either absorbed in post-war reconstruction or were subject to military occupation and hence were not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCPE, in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of the exile national councils were in the U.S. under nominal NCPE control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. There are now strong indications that the situation is more rapidly approaching its more normal aspect and that it is still in the process of change in this direction.

In January the British-backed Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement held its first main meeting in London; in April the French Comité National pour l'Europe Libre emerged; and in June the Germans attempted to bring about the emergence of a central organization of refugees, which, in its composition reflected traditional German sympathies with the Separatist movements of Eastern Europe, a policy which is in direct conflict with that of NCPE and RFE. Although the authorities, particularly in the frontier countries, probably lack

special financial means to engage in activity on an NCPE-scale, they do possess, by virtue of their control of the legal and welfare framework within which the refugee must exist, the means to extend or withhold benefits so as to influence the refugee's political situation to their advantage. It seems reasonable to suppose that as these nations gain in strength and independence this process will continue at an increasing rate.

As a result of the factors described above, the refugee finds himself in an increasingly hostile environment, deprived of an effective international protector and incapable, alone, unaided and unaided clearly to see his interests and defend them from exploitation. The Czechoslovaks and Poles in Germany provide striking examples of shortsighted, aimless exile pre-occupation with sterile political maneuvering to the advantage of their German hosts. At the same time, the voluntary agencies in Germany, which, after IRO's demise, were granted certain facilities by HICOG must, after the ratification of the contractual agreements, look to the German Government for whatever facilities it may choose to grant them.

Until its May 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the West. Since that time, however, the steady expansion of RFE's activity and its increasing need of refugees as informational sources have led to strong accusations that RFE is evading its responsibilities and failing to accept the consequences of its own effectiveness. Although RFE expressly refrains from specifically inciting its audiences to flee, its comparisons of life in the West with life in the East inevitably constitute an indirect encouragement to escape. These accusations and resentment are ill-concealed among the representatives of the various international and voluntary agencies.

RFE's information service men, who, of RFE's personnel, are in closest contact with the refugees, sympathize with this criticism and wish that they could do more for the refugees than they are presently able to do on their own. These RFE information gatherers are in competition with an endless series of rivals seeking this valuable commodity. They usually present the refugees who have been helpful in providing them with information with presents of food, cigarettes or money. Although they would like to be in a position to ~~offer~~ more than this for their informants, they cannot, for, as they explain, they are not in the welfare business. One of their special difficulties is to persuade the refugees to come to them in the first place. Almost universally they have reported that if the refugees were made to realize that Free Europe was doing something for them, they would be more willing and even eager, to come to the RFE information offices in the camps to give freely of their information. Furthermore, RFE's propaganda can be dangerously weakened by the boomerang effect of the few disillusioned refugees who return to their homelands.

In consequence of the closure of IRO and the absence of any authority capable of organizing and controlling the refugee national committees a double vacuum exists. In respect to the first vacuum, the UN High Commission, PICARE, the voluntary agencies and the State Department program have yet to prove their ability to fill it. In respect to the second vacuum, the British, the French, the Italians, the Austrians and the Germans have the possibilities of filling this vacuum. Of these, the German interest is most likely to provide the most direct and immediate conflict with NCFE-RFE interests. The fact that the Germans have demonstrated an interest in these committees and particularly in support of the Separatist elements indicates that these committees are not without political importance. Because of the political ambitions or honest desire to serve of their leaders and of the need of the refugees for spokesmen and representatives in their dealings with local authorities, such committees will always exist, whether or not they are controlled or supported. If these committees are to be controlled at all, it is obviously to NCFE's advantage that they be controlled by NCFE. It would be dangerous to assume that this control could be exercised solely through the "leaders" residing in the U.S. as the opportunity exists for these leaders and for those in Europe to play off one Western Power against another. It has already been demonstrated in one case that the branch of a national council, with headquarters in the U.S., due to the exigencies of the local situation may be obliged to follow a policy which is quite contrary to the interests of NCFE.

In addition to the major double vacuum described above, our survey has disclosed the existence of a number of minor vacuums in exile representation which have been filled by unscrupulous self-appointed national representatives whose presence has been largely responsible for the skepticism and mistrust with which exile representatives are frequently regarded by the international and voluntary agencies. This unfortunate factor may be traced to the lack of recognized accreditation for such representatives, to the absence of any responsible and consistent field supervision, control and backing of worthy and qualified representatives. In this regard, representatives of the UN High Commission and the voluntary agencies have expressed a definite interest in efforts to order the chaotic situation of the national representatives.

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RECONSIDERATION OF NCFE'S BASIC
INTEREST IN ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH EXILES AND REFUGEES: THE
NATIONAL COUNCILS.

As we have shown above, it is to NCFE's interest to attempt to order this confused situation, and if the attempt is to be made, careful consideration must be given to the selection of the tools which are to be used. The Division of NCFE which has hitherto dealt with NCFE's relations with the exiles, and indirectly with the refugees, has been the National Councils Division. This Division

has used as its basic instrument the National Councils and Committees which have their headquarters in the U.S. NCFE's experience over the past three years has served conclusively to modify the initial view of the National Councils as suitable instruments for the creation not only of an atmosphere of positive and constructive cooperation, but even for the effective implementation of NCFE policy and purpose.

The divisive factors of exile have resulted in :

1. The absence of any Polish National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;
2. The absence of any Rumanian National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;
3. A prolonged split (a year and a half) in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia;
4. A precariously balanced Hungarian National Council.

Other factors have produced a Bulgarian National Committee which is unsatisfactory from almost every point of view. Genuine and productive reform of the BNC will doubtless prove a prolonged and difficult process. This leaves the NCFE with a National Committee for a Free Albania, which could stand reform and which, nevertheless, has always been closely supervised by Americans and with the three Baltic Consultative Panels which were established entirely by NCFE in the first instance.

No single national council during its existence, with the possible exception of the three Baltic Consultative Panels, has demonstrated itself as being capable of even reasonably efficient and just administration of its own affairs. In each case NCFE has been obliged to step in, at first exercising only cursory supervision, but at present attempting to introduce systems of closer administrative and financial control and supervision, which, unless made sufficiently rigid, will doubtless prove as unsatisfactory as they have been in the past.

Where national councils do exist branches or sections of these councils which have demonstrated their effectiveness can and should be used where practical to implement on a secondary level NCFE projects and policies. For the primary implementation of these projects and policies, however, a more permanent, ordered and controllable apparatus must be found, one not liable to the naturally disruptive tensions of exile life. Even where unity in a national council can be produced, experience has proved that its continuity is at best tenuous and unreliable, with the result that the council becomes a delicate and cumbersome apparatus which must subordinate the achievement of practical goals to the maintenance of this temporary and elusive unity.

Further factors disclosed by our survey reinforce the conclusion that if NCFE is, as we believe it must, effective, to

develop its interest in the European refugee field, a new instrument must be found. These factors also tend to indicate roughly some of the qualities which this instrument must possess.

1. No single exile organization engaged in refugee activity, including those receiving NCFE support, is consistently good in all of its local branches. This observation applies also to those organizations receiving NCFE support which do not fall into the national council category (the APGR and Rumanian Welfare).

Conclusions:

In its activity in the European refugee field, NCFE must be completely free to select the organizations and individuals with which it may consider it practical to cooperate on any level. NCFE must therefore not be committed to support or to cooperate with any organization in all its parts and must be free to sever connections at any time with any organization or its parts (individuals or sections) with which it finds it no longer practical to cooperate. NCFE must be completely flexible in this operation.

2. The refugee in Europe is confronted with a situation which is fluid in all its aspects. He faces since the closure of IRO, a multitude of uncoordinated agencies, the continued existence of some (the voluntary agencies) is uncertain; the operations of others (the UN and UNHCR) remain to be developed fully; the scope and activity of another (the State Department Program) is in the rumor stage. He is uncertain, suspicious and fearful of the new status and intentions of the local national authorities under whose immediate jurisdiction he must live. He faces the after-effects of mass emigration, which, although it ceased some time ago, has deprived him of the most qualified of his compatriots and hence of stable national leadership. For himself, the limited, uncertain and uncoordinated emigration on an individual basis which still exists offers but faint hope for departure from the frontier countries. He faces almost impossible employment conditions, depending upon local situations and seasonal work which often requires his being shifted from place to place as the employment situation dictates. The majority, however, must stay in the camps or on the sole. He faces shifting camps which are often moved or dissolved by the local authorities. These factors combine to produce a demoralizing feeling of impermanence and insecurity. They are, in turn, aggravated by the unsympathetic attitude of the countries in which the refugee finds himself, an attitude which frequently approaches hostility and which is not improved by the presence in these countries of embittered expelled ethnic minorities who were once the citizens of the refugee's homeland. The homeland is a deplorable feeling of apathy, hopelessness, isolation and abandonment and a total lack of any sense of direction or purpose.

Conclusions :

NCF's approach to the refugee and his problems must be broad in order that it may impart a feeling of purpose, direction, continuity and security. This approach must have an attractive national flavor which will appeal to the refugee's desire to belong, without encouraging his chauvinistic tendencies, and, indeed, should provide a positive substitute for them. To implement this approach NCF's instrument in the field must again be supremely flexible but susceptible of close and rigid control. This instrument must be capable of conveying an impression of seriousness, responsibility and constructive interest, thus inspiring a feeling of confidence on the part of the authorities and agencies as well as the refugees.

3. In general it may be observed that in the frontier countries there is a notable lack of knowledge of NCF's role in support of the admittedly limited and relatively negligible refugee activities in which it is thus far indirectly engaged. RFE is, of course, widely known and almost as widely criticized for its failure to accept responsibility for its part in the refugee problem. FEUE is usually known, but only vaguely and secondarily, and in many cases the picture of its scope, activities and goals is distorted. There is a dim awareness of FEUE's connection with RFE, but a general failure to draw any conclusions therefrom.

Conclusion :

To engage in refugee activities of any nature or extent without clearly identifying and labelling NCF as the organization ultimately responsible for these activities is a needless and senseless failure to exploit a possibility in the form of enhanced NCF prestige and greater sympathy and cooperation with the work of RFE and FEUE on the part of both refugees and other active agencies. Particularly from the point of view of RFE's essential relationship to the refugees it is a serious mistake not to do so. Therefore the instrument which NCF employs for its work in this field must be identifiable only as an NCF operation, clearly related to RFE and FEUE.

4. It has been mentioned previously that the international and voluntary agencies tend to regard the exile representatives with skepticism and tend to hold them at arm's length. This attitude seems partially to result from their ignorance of exile politics and their understandable reluctance to become involved therein. Their ignorance and disinterest has in several cases led them to choose refugee assistants and advisors of unfortunate political background and tendencies from the NCF point of view. Again, however, as mentioned above, the representatives of several of these agencies have expressed a definite interest in having these insuppressible refugee groups somehow organized and controlled.

Conclusion :

Responsible and direct American control would therefore

do much to dispel this negative attitude and would pave the way for a more positive and productive cooperation between the national refugee groups and the agencies active in their behalf. This control would also, it is reasonable to suppose, help to fill vacuums in exile representation of the kind described above.

5. Another weakness of the organizations surveyed in the frontier countries is their almost universal tendency in greater or lesser degrees to discriminate politically or personally in the distribution of assistance. There is no comparison between the extent of this weakness in the tense and unsettled atmosphere of the frontier countries and the more normal environment of the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain. In addition to the injustice of such discrimination, definite opportunities are lost through failure seriously to attempt to win over, through less narrow assistance, elements (such as the Czech and Slovak Separatists, Hungarian extremists and the Schwabs) which now oppose or in the future might oppose the political and national structures which HCFE recognizes and supports.

Conclusion :

Again, close HCFE guidance and control are indicated so that injustices may be reduced and broader HCFE aims implemented, rather than thwarted by narrower interests of short-sighted and unenlightened refugee representatives.

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HCFE'S INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
MIGHT BEST BE UNDERSTOOD BY CONSIDERING ITS PRE-
SENT INSTRUMENTS AND GOALS. -- THE
FRENCH STATE'S POLICY IN REFUGEE. (1938).

A. HCFE's approach

If HCFE is to modify its present instruments and create new ones to manifest its interest in the problem of refugees in Europe, it should first formulate a broad and comprehensive approach to the refugee as a type of person in whom and in whose problems this interest is to be shown.

This approach will, by the nature of HCFE's interest in the refugee, differ markedly from those of other organizations active in the field.

All these organizations, the intelligence agencies, the local national governments, the UN High Commissioner and the voluntary agencies, are interested in the Czechoslovak or Rumanian or Pole who crosses the border because, respectively, he might be a Communist agent or have information, he is or might be a political refugee or because he is a human being in need. HCFE is interested in him because he is a Czechoslovak or Rumanian

or Pole -- a citizen of a country whose people were promised at Yalta certain rights and privileges which they have not received because of the violent interference of a Communist Russia. This is also the fundamental theoretical reason for RFE broadcasts to the Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Poles in Poland, etc. The fundamental practical reason is of course the interest of the United States in these nations and peoples as European political factors.

RFE obviously cannot create a military machine capable of liberating the nations of Eastern Europe. It is interested quite simply in promoting the existence of certain attitudes, interests and activities which will one day contribute to the successful fulfillment of the promises made at Yalta. RFE is interested that mothers should teach their children certain truths to counter Communist lies; that workers should react in certain ways to Communist pressures; that students should understand the fallacies of the system which they are being seduced or forced to serve. In short, RFE wishes to direct Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, Poles in Poland and Hungarians in Hungary to act in the enlightened self-interest of their respective nations. The fact that this enlightened self-interest, as supported by RFE, coincides with our own and other broader interests serves only to underline its importance.

We have tried to point out in this report the extent to which the presence and activities and problems of the refugees from NCRF countries in Western Europe cannot but be of interest to NCRF. Again, NCRF need not concern itself directly with the feeding, housing, employment and emigration of these people, any more than RFE should itself undertake to raise an army.

This is not to say ^{that} NCRF may not find it advisable to continue to use limited welfare funds in its work with refugees. But its principal tasks will be to protect its interests by attempting to produce some order out of the chaos of refugees activities by giving to the refugee and his representatives a sense of direction and belonging which the other agencies active in the field are admittedly unable adequately to provide. Without it, the refugee in Europe almost inevitably sinks into a state of hopeless and isolated apathy. He belongs to nothing but the tense and quarrelsome fraternity of his fellow abandoned. Sitting unoccupied all day, his only activity soon becomes the endless intrigue of the political parties. With few books and less communication with the outside world, and particularly, without constructive leadership and guidance, the parties become almost the only organizations with a national flavor open to the refugee. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that refugee nationalisms become chauvinistic and ideas, of national interest, subordinated to the narrow and petty goals of the political parties.

The voluntary and other agencies and the local national authorities can hardly provide a constructive substitute since they only approach the refugee as such, reinforcing his apathy by their much needed gifts, unable to offer allegiance to anything other than the Churches, opposed or reluctant to undertake any

attempt at support or guidance of his national tendencies. In all fairness, it should be noted, however, that the current approach to the refugee on the part of all these agencies is a conscious and considerable improvement on the exaggerated and incentive-killing IRO dolo system.

But if NCFE approaches the new and old, as well as the older DP, not as a needy "refugee" but as a citizen of his country who simply finds himself in a difficult position on this side of the Iron Curtain rather than on the other side, it should be possible to appeal to his desire for national continuity and then to some extent appeal to his ideas of his own enlightened self-interest in much the same way that such appeals are provided for the escapee's compatriots at home by RFE.

This approach would also take into account the significant fact that many of the new arrivals, (estimates run as high as 80%) are not real "political refugees". They leave their countries for economic reasons or because they are fed up or simply want to try out the conditions in the West which are described to them as so much superior to those in their homelands. Among these people there are of course many misfits, incompetents and undesirables. No one should delude himself with a picture of all refugees as worthy, deserving, honest people persecuted by a Communist regime and fleeing for their very lives.

NCFE interests, however, override this unfortunate reality: no individual who leaves a satellite country for any reason whatever should be allowed to fall into such a condition of disillusionment that he should consider returning or even consider sending word of his discouragement home. One such return or report of personal disillusionment can produce a most unfortunate countereffect to RFE and other Western propaganda. It is an accepted fact that there have been such cases and they are in fact regarded as one of the factors contributing to the present lower arrival rate of new escapees.

Granted this approach to the escapee and the old refugee and DP as a citizen, and the desire to promote among these people the idea of concern for their real self-interests, the idea which most adequately describes this approach is that of the "consulate".

The functions of a consulate are to protect the interests of the citizen abroad. Material assistance is provided only in cases of emergency -- the consulate's principal task is to take an active interest in guiding the citizen to those local agencies best able to satisfy his wants and to suggest approaches and attitudes most likely to benefit him during his stay abroad. The most glaring and urgent example of the need for such consular guidance may be found in the necessity for protecting the Czechoslovaks in Germany not only from the political oppression of the Germans, but from their own senseless, destructive and shortsighted political maneuverings.

B. Modifications of NCFE's present instrument.

As indicated above, it will of course be useful and desirable to incorporate in this approach and in the new instrument, (FECS), designed to implement it, features, (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument which have demonstrated their effectiveness. However, also as mentioned earlier, in order to assure the freedom of action and freedom of choice of the new instrument, certain modifications of these features of the present instrument will be required.

1. It will first of all be necessary that those features (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument considered suitable for incorporation in FECS be separated administratively and financially from their headquarters, since FECS will operate on the basis of the following procedural approach:

Such individuals or organizations will be incorporated in FECS on one primary basis -- their proved effectiveness in the past and/or their promise of effectiveness under NCFE guidance; their retention will be dependent upon their ability successfully to continue this performance. This is of course basically an adaptation of part of the approach which has enabled RFE and RPS to make effective use of qualified exile personnel for the attainment of their own goals.

2. For the undirected and uncoordinated system of almost complete lack of control which has hitherto generally prevailed in NCFE's relationship to refugee activities and exile organizations, will be substituted a system of control which will preserve at least the illusion of freedom through the incorporation of qualified exile organizations and individuals and the selection of others to fill gaps which such organizations and individuals have proved unable to fill. The fact of their ultimate responsibility to NCFE should be made abundantly clear. That this is in no way incompatible with the atmosphere of an illusion of freedom in which FECS's exile employees will be working is amply proved by the success of RFE national desks. It will be made clear to these employees that they should consider themselves to be working as consuls and consular assistants under a civil service program. They should be given the impression that the responsibility for the success of FECS in its attempts to assist the refugees lies in their hands, and that its failure for reasons of favoritism or dishonesty would constitute an evasion of their patriotic responsibility.

C. Functions and potentialities of FECS.

The underlying purpose of FECS is of course to serve the policies and basic interests of NCFE.. We have tried to indicate the extent to which its work with the refugees would be directly to these interests. Other interests which FECS would have the purpose of serving might be:

1) The prevention of misunderstandings on the part of the

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refugees and other agencies active in the field regarding all phases of HCFE work, and particularly that of FEUS and RFE.

2) The attempt to keep the HCFE European Representative and the RFE Political Advisor informed of exile political developments in Europe which might affect their operations and to control and guide these developments wherever possible to the advantage of HCFE and RFE. For example, HCFE, designed to wage political warfare on a broad front, was recently almost outflanked in Germany. Some organized means of preventing such occurrences, or at least of reporting their development, should be provided.

1. The primary function of FECS is to approach the refugee as a citizen and by so doing to try and set up conditions and introduce a spirit which will make it possible for the refugee to escape from the apathy which is his traditional lot and become a positive factor in the struggle of the West. FECS will attempt to perform this function in several ways:

a. Normal consular activity. FECS will engage in the normal consular activities of interventions on behalf of refugees with the local authorities, voluntary agencies, international agencies such as the UN High Commission, or wherever else it might effectively and usefully do so. It will provide translations, verify documents, advise refugees on all relevant matters in conjunction with these other agencies and generally interest itself in all aspects of the refugee's life and problems.

b. Material assistance. While material assistance should be kept to a minimum, it must be recognized that FECS will be required to provide more help of this kind than the normal consulates, since the physical condition of the person appealing for assistance will almost invariably be poor. Other organizations are better set up to provide such material needs, and FECS should of course attempt to cooperate with their already extensive efforts to prevent duplication. But FECS must have available emergency welfare funds in order to escape the accusation that it is a feather bed or another operation to "use" the refugees.

c. Refugee morale. The fundamental practical target of all FECS operations should be the improvement of refugee morale. This morale depends on two factors: the refugee's frame of mind and the atmosphere in which he lives.

The refugee's frame of mind should be improved in several ways. The first of these is the citizenship approach which is to govern all FECS operations. It should be manifested as soon as possible after the refugee's arrival and clearance, if only in the form of a greeting and briefing from someone not interested in milking the refugee of information and asking him questions. This briefing might include a description of the voluntary agencies which might assist the refugee, a description in simple terms of his legal status and, of course, of the FECS program, including the names and addresses of its representatives in the camps or

areas to which the refugee might be sent. The refugee might also be saved considerable disillusionment if at this time he were given a carefully worded description of the difficult economic situation in which he will be obliged for some time to remain. For example in Germany, the refugee should be told of the presence of large numbers of refugees from the East Zone and of the German government's natural desire to assist them. A representative of one of the voluntary agencies suggested to us that the refugees are rarely made to understand that they are initially accepted into countries faced with unusually severe economic problems.

Secondly, the refugee's frame of mind might be improved by the installation of reading rooms containing publications in the national languages, some of them geared especially to the refugee and his problems. For example, some of the useful exile-organized refugee aid Committees such as the Anglo-Rumanian in London and the Hungarian Office in Munich produce regular bulletins containing local legal and employment news of interest to the refugee. Such bulletins should receive a wider distribution and others like them should be created. In this connection, it should be noted that RFE publications are not reaching the refugees, among whom our survey has indicated they would be most welcome and are much needed. Also in the reading rooms, radios should be provided in response to the desire, frequently expressed to us, of hearing RFE and other broadcasts in the national languages.

The organization of constructive meetings, discussions and national celebrations would provide an outlet for refugee enthusiasm if they were supervised by competent leadership. Similarly, FECS should stimulate and possibly provide the means for self-help work projects, such as the painting of barracks, the planting of gardens and the organization of sewing circles, language courses or discussion groups, etc....

The second factor involved in the question of refugee morale is that of his environment, the atmosphere in which he lives. ~~To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved in which he lives.~~ To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved by the organization, as noted above, of constructive outlets for the energies now dissipated in chauvinistic and petty political internal and international strife, both of which have at times led to murder in the camps.

FECS major effort in this direction, however, should be directed toward bridging the gap in a constructive manner between, on the one hand, the voluntary and international agencies and the local authorities; and, on the other, the essential national interests of the refugee. Occasionally representatives of the voluntary agencies have mentioned the fact that refugees sometimes cooperate with them best when the situation has been explained by one of their national representatives. For the reasons of suspicion on the part of these agencies cited earlier, this is not always done. FECS could provide a responsible instrument for so doing.

The principal gap which exists at present between the various authorities and the refugees is over the question of assimilation, or, as it is usually described, "integration" and "adaptation". There is a natural feeling on the part of these agencies and authorities that in view of the restriction of emigration possibilities, the only alternative open to many of the refugees is to adapt themselves to their environment. The refugee, is, however, quite understandably reluctant to do so: He plans to return to his country when it is liberated "next year"; he is sure he will emigrate shortly; particularly in Germany, he may strongly dislike or distrust the local population. There is also of course the determining factor of employment possibilities -- one of the aspects of the refugee problem with which FECS cannot and need not directly concern itself.

Indirectly, however, FECS can contribute to its resolution. For example, in Germany, the problem of national schools, which has been a score point, suggests a suitable compromise. The refugees have struggled to maintain full-time national schools for their children, sometimes succeeding with HSEF and other external support, while the local and international authorities have insisted that refugee children attend German schools. The refugee must be made to understand that it is to his children's interest to allow them to adapt as long as the essential elements of national culture can be preserved. This requirement could be and in some instances is already being met by extra-curricular instruction in the national language, history and culture.

In the same way the refugee must also be shown that by refusing to adapt, he may make of his national group an ingrown, despised and distrusted minority. If on the other hand, he shows willingness to adapt to the situation in which he finds himself, he is much more likely to obtain not only physical but psychological benefits in the form of broader practical experience, with the possibility that this experience may one day be of use to him in his own homeland. This is a difficult point which the mass of refugees will be reluctant to grasp. Some of their more intelligent leaders, however, -- the kind which FECS hopes to employ -- might be able to explain its importance. Also, the experience of one camp director in Trieste has proved that it is not impossible to get results through healthy national competitions; if the Rumanians paint their barracks, the Hungarians feel more obliged to paint theirs. While probably ineffective among the hardened older refugees, shame might successfully be used among new arrivals, as for example, "If you say you intend to return after liberation, what will you tell your friends that you did for Poland in emigration? That you helped create friends for Poland by keeping the neatest barracks in Germany --- or that you sat around a pigsty all day doing nothing? That you refused to take a job in a construction company because it was beneath you, or that you helped to build a stronger and more prosperous west to hasten the day of liberation?" Arguments of this kind were not wholly without effect on strikers, and shirkers, during the war. Doubtless they have been tried by representatives of the voluntary agencies, etc., but FECS representatives should

have additional authority for such arguments by virtue of their membership in one division of an organization actively working in many ways for the liberation of the refugees' homelands.

Also, just as the presence of extracurricular schools, by their guarantee of the preservation of the essentials of national culture, encourage attendance at German schools, so the manifestations of NCFE's similar interest on the local level through FECS might liberate the refugee from the anxiety for maintaining his traditions within his smaller group and so diminish his reluctance to attempt some measure of adaptation. In this connection the citizenship approach applies particularly, since FECS must demonstrate that NCFE is not only generally and broadly interested in keeping satellite culture alive (in the DIO and (see at FEUE), but also in keeping the individual refugee living outside a camp, in touch with his compatriots and traditions not only through personal contact but by making available to him publications in his language, etc; In this way the refugee might be encouraged in his slow process of adaptation to strange and in many cases hostile environment.

This is again a vast problem affected by many factors far beyond the scope of FECS or NCFE. It is almost certainly true that if more respectable and worthwhile jobs were available to refugees, much of their apparently nationally based aversion to adaptation would disappear.

But if FECS makes emphasis on adaptation one of its major points of policy, and makes this fact clear to the local national and international authorities, and then actively implements this policy as suggested above, it will almost certainly find itself most sympathetically regarded by these authorities.

2. These are but a few of the functions which FECS should be able to perform; anyone regularly active in the field could probably suggest many more. There are, however, certain broader potentialities for the development of this instrument which might be briefly suggested here.

In the first place, it should be possible to gain some advantage, beyond the fact that they come to us, from the presence of the refugees in the West. FECS might be able to produce such an advantage.

To brand this approach as hopelessly idealistic is to ignore the extraordinary practical results achieved at Camp Valka from July 1951 to January 1952 by the German camp commander at that time, von Homeyer. When von Homeyer, with no previous experience of these problems arrived, Valka was in terrible situation. Knifings and riots were frequent and the Nuremberg police were not only on constant alert, but a force of 28 men was maintained at the camp.

Von Homeyer began by calling the national representatives together, and it took him two weeks to get them into one room.

Finally, when they had assembled, he gave them hell and explained it would be a waste of time for them to try to alter or influence the situation in their own countries from Valka. He told them he believed the cause of many difficulties was the personal interest of many of the leaders in preparing the way for big roles at home after liberation. He then presented his idea of forming the first European community at Valka. He told the national representatives he had no support from Munich — he was on his own and asked for their help and cooperation. One by one they came to him and agreed.

Von Homeyer's technique of making friends with the people, with whom he soon acquired an excellent reputation, was an effective instrument in swinging their national committees to his side, for aware of his popularity, they hesitated not to show active cooperation. As a means of delegating self-administration of the camp to elected representatives, von Homeyer was about to establish a small parliament when he was recalled by reasons of a German administrative snafu in which favoritism played a part. Just before his departure, the Nuremberg chief of police approached him and asked that he request the withdrawal of the permanent squad, which the chief felt was no longer required due to the enormous progress in camp behaviour.

After von Homeyer's replacement by an unimaginative bureaucrat, the situation at Valka relapsed into violence. Yet his influence lingered, and delegations from the national groups visited him, begging him to return to the camp. Later, when the situation became even worse, delegates from the German administrative personnel at Valka also came to urge that he return. This was just before our talk with him, and the employees brought with them tales of the latest killings. Obviously von Homeyer's idealistic and far-sighted approach to the refugee problem had made a profound impression not only upon the refugees themselves but on Germans associated with the problem in a practical way.

Von Homeyer's European community approach might be borne in mind in connection with NCPS's espousal of the policy of Federalism. Similarly the EACS citizenship approach might have the potentiality of being broadened to provide grass-roots emphasis on this aspect of NCPS's policy. The idea of European citizenship for refugees is not original or new, but it might provide NCPS and RFE with a useful propaganda weapon.

Von Homeyer's realistic and productive idealism perhaps also indicates the necessity for at least trying to uncover and support more positive elements than the usual exile political leaders, even though it is believed likely that the latter will be able to regain control of their political machinery and return to power after liberation. For this reason, not to attempt the production of more constructive leaders and attitudes more amenable to NCPS and US interests is an example of infatuation with "hard-boiled" realism for its own sake.

Another potential use of FECS might be in conjunction with certain proposals advanced by individual RFE staff members. These call for the use of refugees as sounding boards for group reactions to new broadcast themes and as sample groups for testing basic satellite country attitudes. Refugees helped by FECS might be more interested in contributing to such projects; conversely, FECS efforts to restore their feeling of belonging to the struggle for liberation of their countries would be immeasurably assisted by this opportunity for them to assist in the sharpening of this potent "sister weapon".

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NCSE and RFE exile employees who by and large form a privileged class among the refugees as a result of being relatively well paid, should be encouraged to contribute small but regular amounts of their salaries on a voluntary deduction basis to refugee welfare. Some RFE employees have already done this on an informal basis and have expressed a desire to do so on a regular deduction basis but have been discouraged by the information that this would involve a violation of RFE regulations. In view of the success of a similar welfare fund instituted by the Polish Labor Service Companies attached to the U.S. Army in Germany, it is recommended that this possibility be investigated. FECS might prove a sure means of channeling such aid to the refugee.

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The form for refugees in Turkey established by the Gazi Khan Bessolt Committee which has an international aspect resembling Von Homoyer's approach would qualify for inclusion in the FECS program, although no specific proposal can be made until after a detailed field survey.

D. Proposed organizations of FECS.

1. FECS will be a service section of NCSE under the directorship of NCSE's General European Representative. General policy headquarters will therefore be in Paris as well as the operational subsection responsible for the administration of the FECS branches in England and France. This will have the advantages of removing the general policy headquarters from the immediate tensions and pressures of the frontier countries. The Director will have the task of general policy coordination of FECS with other NCSE divisions and of gaining on a high level the acceptance of and cooperation with FECS by the national and international authorities concerned, perhaps by emphasis on the contribution which FECS could make to their efforts to resolve the refugee problem.

2. Operational headquarters under the direction of a FECS Deputy Director will be in Munich, the point closest to the refugees' geographical center; from Munich the German refugee reception center at Vilsbiburg and the Austrian equivalent at Wels are each within half a day's drive, or less.

3. The Deputy Director will be responsible for the implementation on the operational level in all areas of all the functions of FECS in line with policies established by the Director. The Deputy Director will be responsible for general operational policy coordination with the national and international authorities and voluntary agencies locally active.

4. The Deputy Director will have six Area Assistants :
- 1) North Germany, center Bonn or Hannover.
 - 2) South Germany, center Munich and Witten.
 - 3) US and French zones of Austria, center Salzburg and Wels.
 - 4) British zone Austria and Trieste - possibly two assistants
 - 5) Italy, center Rome.
 - 6) Paris, London and Benelux, center Paris.
 - 7) Greece and Turkey; probably will require one area assistant each. However, no field survey of the refugee situation in these two countries has as yet been possible.

The duties of these Assistants will be to provide guidance, inspiration and close administrative and financial supervision of the various national sections of FECS in their respective areas. These Area Assistants must have considerable administrative and financial latitude in order that FECS may possess the high degree of flexibility essential to its effective exploitation of the fluid refugee situation. They must be fully informed of all employment and emigration possibilities, projects of voluntary agencies, etc. Their cooperation and relations with local authorities and active agencies must be close and their relations with them always excellent.

4. FECS will, in each area where it is to operate, form National Sections. These National Sections will be recruited and appointed by FECS. They may or may not include individual representatives of organizations already locally active. In rare cases in the frontier countries, but almost entirely in England and France, proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees will become the local National Sections. In cases where no proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees exist, the FECS Area Assistant will recruit with the help and approval of the Deputy Director a National Section Chief, who will in turn, with the approval of the Area Assistant, recruit his own paid assistant or associate where necessary, and as many as local volunteer section member-representatives as may be required by the amount of work, geographical distribution of the refugees, etc.

5. Possible organization of FECS national sections :

England

- a) Albanians : special case

- b) Bulgarians : Mrs Karnatoyanova as Section Chief
- c) Czechoslovaks : Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee
- d) Estonians : Association of Estonians in Great Britain
- e) Hungarians : Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
Possibly Father Henkey-McNaig
- f) Latvians : Latvian Welfare Association
- g) Lithuanians : Lithuanian Association in Great Britain
- h) Poles : Polish Ex-Combatants Association
- i) Rumanian : Anglo-Rumanian Refugee Committee
- j) Yugoslavs : Yugoslav Welfare Committee (special case)

France

- a) Albanians : special case
- b) Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France
- c) Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques
- d) Comité d'Entr'Aide Estonien
- e) Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois
- f) Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France
- g) Association Lithuanienne de Bienfaisance
- h) Polish Section Chief and probably two paid assistants
to be recruited and appointed.
- i) CAROMAN
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief and one paid assistant to be
recruited and appointed (Special case).

Germany

- a) special case
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- c) Czechoslovak Section, paid Associate and one paid
assistant to be recruited and appointed.
- d) Estonian National Committee
- e) Hungarian Office, plus Hungarian Relief Action

- f) Latvian National Committee plus Latvian Red Cross
- g) Lithuanian National Committee
- h) Polish Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.
- i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
Chief
- j) Yugoslav Section/and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed (Special case).

Austria

- a) Special case-Albanians
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- c) Czechoslovak Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- d) Estonians - none
- e) Hungarian Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.
- f) Latvians - none
- g) Lithuanians - none
- h) Polish Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of APWR Salzburg representative, Mr. Knileki.
- i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of Colonel Bojovic (Special case).

Trieste

- a) special case-Albanians
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- c) Czechoslovaks - none
- d) Estonians - none
- e) Hungarian Section Chief and one paid assistant to be appointed. Possible use of Prof. Ternay as half-time Chief with full time assistant.
- f) Latvians - none
- g) Lithuanians - none
- h) Polish Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

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- i) CAROMAN Trieste delegate and staff (Mr. Di Demotrio)
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).

Italy

- a) Special case- Albanians
- b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- c) Czechoslovaks - none
- d) Estonians - none
- e) Hungarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- f) Latvians - none
- g) Lithuanians - none
- h) Polish Section Chief and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed
- i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed
- j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).

Note : In cases where no national section is provided due to the insignificant numbers of refugees present or probable, it is assumed that the Area Assistant could handle the needs of special arrivals or cases if existent.

E. PROPOSED ANNUAL BUDGET FOR FREE EUROPE CONSULAR SERVICE.

1. Salaries

a. Americans

- | | |
|--|--------------|
| 1) Deputy Director | \$ 12,000.00 |
| 2) 5 Area Assistants at
\$1,500.00 per year.
(the duties of the sixth Area
Assistant, covering France, Britain
and the Benelux countries might be
performed by a member of the staff
of the Paris office). | 37,500.00 |
| 3) Executive Secretary to Deputy Director | 4,000.00 |

4) Bookkeeper (possibly locally hired)	<u>\$ 3,000.00</u>
5) Quarters and living allowances (35% rough estimate : \$ 19,775.00)	<u>\$ 56,500.00</u>
	19,775.00
Total American Salaries	\$ 76,275.00
b. Exile Salaries	
1) ^{24 1/2} National Section Chiefs and Associates at \$350 per month	83,500.00
2) 10 paid assistants for National Sections at \$150 per month	12,000.00
Total salaries Exiles and American	\$ 177,775.00
2. Travel in Europe and Maintenance of cars at \$200 each for 7 American staff members (\$1,400.00 per month)	16,800.00
3. Two Annual Round trips U.S. - Europe	2,000.00
4. Rent, stationery, telephone, etc. for Deputy Director's office	6,000.00
5. Expenses (travel, stationery, postage, etc. for 24 1/2 National Section Chiefs at \$30 a month per person)	8,820.00
6. Monthly subsidies to Exile-Organized Refugee Aid Committees	
a. Bulgarian Refugee Committee - London (Mrs. Karastoyanova)	3,000.00
b. Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee (London)	3,000.00
c. Estonian Consulate - Welfare Division (London)	2,000.00
d. Latvian Welfare Association (London)	2,000.00
e. Lithuanian Welfare Committee (London)	2,000.00
f. Polish Ex-Combattants Association (London)	10,800.00
g. Anglo-Roumanian Relief (London)	5,400.00
h. Yugoslav Welfare Committee (London) through E.A.P.C.Y.	2,000.00
i. Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France (Paris)	4,800.00