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m. Another officer, Seymour Young, wrote in 1965:

"After reading and re-reading this man's various files, I began to feel that this man in his position would be an ideal 'agent of influence'. It was noted that he is always in a crisis area and usually in advance of the crisis and writes articles which are more concerned with the Communist successes."

n. In about August 1965, SZULC was sent to Madrid as the NYT representative for Spain and Portugal. He stayed overseas until December 1968. He was present in Prague during the Soviet invasion of August 1968 and in December he was expelled, apparently for being too inquisitive. However, the [West German Service] has remained suspicious of the circumstances of SZULC's expulsion and the details have never been clarified. (It is interesting that SZULC wrote articles reflecting the official CZECH line concerning the defection of General Jan SEJNA who was in the Czech Intelligence service.)

o. SZULC was reported by an FBI source to have gone horseback riding with Boris V. YAROCHEVSKIY, a suspect KGB officer, in Washington in June or July 1971. SZULC's file reflects no regular contact with Bloc diplomats.

p. In 1972 and 1973 SZULC covered Watergate extensively and demonstrated an extreme bias against the CIA. By July 1972, SZULC's inquiries of the Department of State and his articles had taken on a distinctly anti-US Government tone. His coverage of guerrilla and terrorist groups

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was less sure than in earlier days and was frequently sensationalist and full of inaccuracies. (See, especially, article in NYT for 14 July 1972 on a terrorist Headquarters in Zurich and other wild statements.)

q. Since 1974 SZULC's articles have been highly critical of the Agency and he has used the background information he gathered in the 1960's to attack the Agency and to criticize its operations.

r. In May 1975 SZULC accused the Agency of rifling the files of U.S. Senators. This was only one of many irresponsible and false articles he wrote trying to discredit the Agency. One of the more spectacular efforts was a series in Esquire magazine, in which, among other things, he charged that the U.S. intelligence community had a hidden budget of \$25 billion dollars and a network of 200,000 spies.

s. In, Inside the Company: A CIA Diary, Philip AGEE credits SZULC's daughter, Nicole, for having "obtained vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C." There is reason to believe, particularly in view of the extreme views Tad SZULC has manifested in the past two years, that he may have aided his daughter in her "research."

SUMMATION

The case against Tad SZULC as a foreign agent is weak. However, his most recent activities are entirely consonant with the view that he has already served the Soviets well and can

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end his career as an overt propagandist taking advantage of the current furor over the CIA to do the greatest possible damage. The current paralysis of all anti-Communist action by the Agency attests to the effectiveness of AGEE, SZULC, the Soviets, et al.

B

NOTE: (See attachment from a highly sensitive source. Any use of the SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment requires C/CI approval.) The source reported that Nicole, while working with the DGI in Cuba to expose the Agency, said that except for her father, her whole family were "fascists." She said that her father quit the NYT because of the restrictive editorial policy and he wished to write according to his beliefs.

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LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/[Marty Miller]:rp

2 Attachments, a/s

Copy filed: 201-50539

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14 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez (AMLEO-3) (201-249386)

1. Born 7 April 1922 in Havana, Cuba, the son of a native-born American citizen, RABEL was brought up in comfortable circumstances. He attended high school in Cuba, completed the last year in New Orleans, Louisiana, and entered Tulane University in September 1938. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in December 1940 and eventually saw combat in France, Belgium, Germany and Austria. After discharge in December 1945, RABEL returned to Cuba to attend the University of Havana and this began a life of job changes, moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba, and, in general, rootless living.

2. RABEL's background reads like that of a man with no allegiances or loyalties and no particular goals. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a picture of unreliability. It is probable that RABEL's rootlessness and apparent unreliability applied both to his relations with CASTRO and to those with the Agency. It is quite possible, therefore, that he not only served the Agency in a superficial way but that he did the same for CASTRO at various times when it suited his purposes. Without postulating this sort of dual role (one which fits very well with his previous life) it is almost impossible to explain some of the reasonably good things he did for the Agency and the quite certain allegations that he was a CASTRO agent. This explanation is not fully satisfactory, but it does explain his career better than the charge

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that he was a CASTRO agent from the beginning. The question that must remain unanswered is whether he betrayed the AMTRUNK Operation. He was not arrested until September 1965 (when AMTRUNK had already run its course) but it appears quite certain that he cooperated with the DSE after his arrest and while he was in prison.

3. RABEL joined in the clandestine activities against BATISTA in March 1952, first amongst the exiles in the U.S. and then after late 1952 from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban armed forces to further his plotting and was assigned to the Cuban General Staff. He was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mission in Cuba from November 1954 until April 1956. During his entire period in the Cuban army, RABEL was involved with dissident Army elements; when they attempted a coup in April 1956, RABEL was arrested. He was released shortly thereafter, worked in the chicken business for a year and then returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers (Luis RABEL Nunez). In October 1957 he returned to Cuba and became involved with the 26th of July Movement but had to leave a year later when he was brought to the attention of the BATISTA forces because of a bomb explosion. He smuggled weapons to Camilo Cienfuegos for about a year and then in October 1958 he joined the Cienfuegos group. Shortly after the CASTRO victory, CASTRO called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until February 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendas Campesinas.

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He held this job until he defected to the U.S. in December 1962. It is worth noting that he rarely pursued one activity in one place for more than a year at a time from 1945 to 1962.

4. RABEL gave Alfonso RODRIGUEZ the following reasons for his defection:

a. Communist pressure, hounding, and the basic enmity of the Communist Party toward him. (This appears very reasonable in view of his service in the U.S. Army and training in some aspects of intelligence, such as prisoner interrogation. In addition, his schooling in the U.S. and the reasonable economic circumstances would not have been recommendations from the Communist point of view.)

b. Strong backing by Fidel which protected him from more serious attacks from the Party. (This, too, seems entirely reasonable. His family farm was near the farm Fidel's father managed and RABEL and Fidel had known each other as children. In addition, RABEL's long involvement in the anti-BATISTA movement and with Camilo Cienfuegos were probably in his favor in CASTRO's view.)

c. An obligation to protect the non-Communists in his department, which prevented his earlier defection, and uncertainty of his reception in the U.S. (In view of the number of defections from RABEL's department, there were, in fact, people to protect. Since RABEL had served in the U.S. Army, and probably felt the U.S. was his second

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country, he could well have had questions about his reception after serving in the CASTRO government.)

d. His resentment against the confining nature of a Communist State. (Since he never stayed in one place more than a short time in his entire life, to have been restricted to Cuba must have seemed a punishment.)

5. RABEL was used to pitch⁰⁴ [Dr. Marta FRAYDE Barraue] in ⁰⁸ [Paris] in ⁰⁸ [July] 1963, and to check out leads for the AMTRUNK Operation. One of his leads led to the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10. Later, in early 1964, RABEL was leader of the Rebel Army Group supported by the American Legion in Miami and was involved in the Rebel Army Radio program.

6. There is no specific evidence (except the accusations below) that RABEL was involved in a suspicious way with the CASTRO regime during this period, but his desire to exfiltrate his wife and children was a constant source of difficulty between him and the Station. This problem led to his eventual termination in July 1964 and to a great deal of resentment on his part. He conspired constantly, from mid-1963 until his capture in Cuba in September 1965, to get into Cuba to exfiltrate his wife and children.

7. RABEL was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967, which is a strong indication that the charges that he worked for the DSE while in prison were true. Moreover, there is some indication that he may have attempted a provocation at Cuban behest immediately after his capture. There are two firm accusations that RABEL was a

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Cuban agent as early as July 1963 (which would have been when he was screening names for the AMTRUNK Operation), one from ⁰¹(LITAMIL-9) and the other from Fernando REY reported by ⁰²(VASLOUCH-1. As mentioned above, these charges could well be true; yet RABEL could have fulfilled his duties for CASTRO superficially, for his own purposes, and not necessarily have compromised his work with the Agency until he was captured. The difficulties he had in exfiltrating his wife could have been, partially, punishment by CASTRO for not fulfilling his duties as an agent; otherwise, had his work in the U.S. been valuable, CASTRO could have facilitated the exfiltration of RABEL's wife so that RABEL could continue his work as an agent undisturbed.

⁰³
LAD/JFK Task Force 1977 [Marty Miller]rp
Copy filed: 201-249386

Attachments: 4

- A- 10 Feb 1964 Memo for the Record
- B- 6 Mar 1963 dispatch UFGA-7998 with Att.
- C- 20 Feb 1963 cable WAVE 4730 (IN 71127)
- D- 30 Sep 1963 dispatch UFGA-11375

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14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez (AMICE-27) (201-312091)

1. MORENO was born on 25 August 1921 in Havana, Cuba. His father was a Cuban Senator (1940-44) and the Cuban Minister of Public Works (1944). MORENO became a lawyer and continued to live in comfortable circumstances. He became involved in the anti-BATISTA movement, apparently in the late 1950's, and ultimately in the 26th of July Movement. After the revolution, one of his clients was Camilo CIENFUEGOS. In Miami after defection, he was associated with the JURE.

2. MORENO's specific activities in the anti-BATISTA movement were not reported and apparently were unexceptional. A point worth noting about his activities before defection is his acquaintance with Tad SZULC, at least by 1959, and with Jorge VOLSKY. MORENO's background as a lawyer did not prepare him for active revolutionary involvement. When he defected in April 1961, therefore, he associated with anti-CASTRO exiles, particularly VOLSKY, but did not become actively involved. He was assessed in 1963 as being unfriendly to CIA.

3. About February 1963 MORENO and Enrique CAYADO Ribera reportedly collaborated in the formulation of an operational plan to overthrow the Castro government. They discussed it with Jorge VOLSKY, who then passed it to Tad SZULC. VOLSKY and SZULC apparently conspired to have the plan presented to the "political authorities" (Robert HURWITCH and the KENNEDY Administration) in Washington in order to by-pass the dis-

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trusted "operational authorities" (the CIA). (VOLSKY originally took full credit for the plan, called "Leonardo Plan," which eventually became known as the AMTRUNK Operation.)

4. The Leonardo Plan was well thought-out and caught the fancy of the KENNEDY Administration. HURWITCH bought it to the CIA with the blessings of the Department of State. Thus, from the very beginning, SZULC, VOLSKY, and MORENO, each of whom had outside interests to some degree in conflict with AMTRUNK, were involved in AMTRUNK policy and planning meetings. Moreover, all three were to some degree antipathetic to the Agency for various reasons and were difficult or impossible to control.

5. MORENO's indiscretions were a serious problem that limited his effectiveness as a direct participant in the AMTRUNK Operation by arousing the concern of other participants. While the Station attempted to cut out VOLSKY and SZULC after the initial policy discussions in Washington, VOLSKY always remained involved to some degree and kept SZULC fully informed. Under the circumstances, the censure of MORENO for talking to SZULC was just an attempt to plug one of many leaks. The fact is that MORENO, SZULC, and VOLSKY believed they had an inside track in Washington because of their contacts there and all three disliked following Agency instructions that conflicted with their own diverse interests. However, because JMWAVE Station and AMICE-14 (Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue) objected to MORENO's continued involvement in the AMTRUNK Operation after learning of his free talk with SZULC and others, the Station

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terminated MORENO's involvement in the sensitive aspects of AMTRUNK in November 1963.

6. Since MORENO was one of the original authors of AMTRUNK and already disliked the Agency, one can imagine his feelings at that juncture. He sulked, refused at first to take a position on the Rebel Army Radio Program, and caused problems in general. By January 1964 MORENO was actually interfering in the AMTRUNK Operation (by giving demoralizing, conflicting information to AMTRUNK-9, for example) and attempting to debrief returnees on behalf of VOLSKY and SZULC. MORENO was fired, therefore, by RABEL on Station instructions, from the Rebel Army Radio Program in February 1964 and terminated by the Station as of 5 March.

7. Shortly after his termination, MORENO, using VOLSKY as an intermediary, approached Mr. G. Harvey SUMM with a proposal similar to the Leonardo Plan. The COS met with SUMM on 1 April 1964 and advised him how to put off MORENO.

8. In August or September 1964, MORENO left Miami and took a position as a Spanish-language professor in South Carolina.

CONCLUSION:

MORENO apparently was a sincere anti-CASTRO revolutionary, but his dislike for and distrust of the Agency, which was undoubtedly stimulated by SZULC and VOLSKY, made his involvement in AMTRUNK a liability to the security of the operation. It appears that MORENO, like many Cubans of the upper middle

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class, had little sense of security. It is obvious that he trusted SZULC and VOLSKY far beyond what normal prudence would dictate. He probably was not a CASTRO agent, but he did help leak operational details and general plans to people who helped to spread the information more widely and who, themselves, were not trustworthy.

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LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977 [Marty Miller]:rp

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL	ATTN-TO DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HRA 9438
TO INFO	Chief, WHD Chief, EE		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-050539
FROM	Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro	DATE	20 June 1962
SUBJECT	BEDOX/Operational SMEDIFY Information Concerning Tad SZULC (201-050539)	RE "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
ACTION REQUIRED	FYI	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
REFERENCE(S)		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	

1. Attached is a SMEDIFY report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes SMEDIFY's traces on SZULC.
2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source: Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial Mission, in Brazil)

Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on Latin America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source: Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)

Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Frederick L. Rouzky
FREDERICK L. ROUZKY

Distribution
4 - WHD w/attachment
1 - EE w/attachment
1 - Sao Paulo
2 - Files
19 June 1962/bcj
REC'D RIDIAN 22 June 62

(10/CC) → The attached info was not sent to the FBI because according to Rio/EE 5 Jul '63 & after discussion with your Room & office of Mr. R. Helms, we are not to send any info out of the Agency on subject. Any inquiries - domestic - should be referred to the FBI.

C. L. H. [unclear] 6/11/62

ATT. H

2nd June, 1961.

Tadeusz SZULC

143(2) ✓

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.

2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.
3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULC does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.
4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

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201-50539

Tadeusz SZULC

Born: c. 1926.

Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955.

Occupation: Journalist.

June 1947: Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSE. Is on good terms with the Polish Legation whom he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo. He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.

Dec. 1947: Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press sub-source: circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of Harold HORAN of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American New York: Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper "Diretrizes".

Feb. 1948: Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.

March 1948: Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.

Sept. 1949: Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache, the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept. of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles. Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the WILEYS, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.

June 1951: Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent. He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in 1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.

June 1951: Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with Igancy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA. The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American citizenship through having married an American woman.

Sept. 1951: : Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject volunteered that he obtained much information on the differences of policy between the British and American Governments on the Persian problem through his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS. He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the Shah of Persia.

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING

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ACTION

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INFO

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

ABSTRACT

MICROFILM

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK

Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCES

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

Distribution:
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Reported from Project AMTRUN
Classification: 19-6-84/3
68-496/16
7 Sub: 1 VOLSKY
WASH. D.C.

DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED

15 April 1963

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-8381

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

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AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed. There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

NEW YORK TIMES

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

RABBIT MULLER

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent material. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

See
DIR 3:745

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31 March 1963

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW

I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, working out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

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per CSN 43-43

Removed from Project AMTRUNK
CS Classification: 19-6-84/3
JOB # 08-496/46
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the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a 21 year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasion a great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

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2. AMTRUNK/3, a 22 year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

B. TASKS

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at A/3's father's farm in the Galera section (AMS 3885 II) (Coords 993614).
2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.
3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira.
4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.
5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.
6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.
7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

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C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrates will make their way to ~~A/3's father's~~ farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.
2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangement, as yet, is not definite.
3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaissance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.
4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by ~~A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ~~, located ~~one kilometer~~ from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named ~~Pedro CRUZ~~. ~~CRUZ~~ is ~~35 to 40~~ years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon ~~CRUZ~~ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:

a. ~~Roman HERNANDEZ~~, who lives a few kilometers away in ~~Sierra del Atzacapo~~. ~~HERNANDEZ~~ owns a small farm and a butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is ~~37 to 40~~ years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.

b. If ~~CRUZ~~ is unsuccessful in getting ~~HERNANDEZ~~ truck he will contact ~~Augusto MACHEN~~ who operates a farm next to ~~A/3's father's~~ farm. He is ~~45-50~~ years old, married, no children, wife's name is ~~Lucila~~. He was the ~~mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte~~ in 1954. He owns a jeep.

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c. Another contact of A/3 is Ramon CALZADILLA, age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Corojo #1, Cotorro, Havana. He owns a butcher shop in the Cotorro section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

a. Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 35, born in Havana. He is a physician who lives and practices medicine in Havana. IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRIN.

c. Sergio MENDEZ, age about 50, born in Cienfuegos, a former senator (1954) as well as the former head of the Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara. A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZ.

d. Isabel MENOCOL, age about 35, born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private tutoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's English teacher and offered support to the underground. MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

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e. Glenn BANCALTA, age 23-24, born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary.

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. Jorge VALS, age late 30s early 40s, married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims VALS has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. VALS primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels VALS is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of VALS and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to VALS in 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa, age early 40s, served in the U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camillo Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos, DUARTE was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the military secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention DUARTE as an opportunist.

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c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

Clester RODRIGUEZ, age late 30s early 40s, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province. He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

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to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his ~~father's farm~~ with maritime reception capabilities.

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient number of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana. However, he has not seen ~~VALES~~ and ~~DUARTE~~ for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on ~~DUARTE~~ conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that ~~DUARTE~~ is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims ~~DUARTE~~ is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that ~~DUARTE~~ has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of ~~DUARTE~~ which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his ~~father's farm~~ and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named ~~DUARTE~~ would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

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3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply represents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made four black infiltration/exfiltration trips to and from Cuba and PBPRIME, and has an excellent knowledge of the northern Matanzas area. He is easy to work

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with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.

3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a [redacted] year old fisherman from the [redacted] area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.

2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Director of Finance
1212 Key Building

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE _____

27 February 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE _____

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1. Inspector General
2 E 24 HOS.

27 Feb 1974

2. Buckenridge

3. Richard

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4. ~~Yours~~ W'gat

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27 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Howard Hunt

1. At the recent request of the Deputy Director for Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched its records to determine if we could find any payment to Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately \$30,000 that required no accounting.

2. We have searched the following records:

- a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 to June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI, the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff, CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security. We have checked various items that were reflected in these expense records but have identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.
- b. The ¹⁵⁻²Madrid Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington Office accountings to determine if there were funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during the year he served under non-official cover in Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt either in his true name or his two identified pseudonyms.
- c. Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period 1960-1972 and have found nothing in these travel claims that were not consistent with normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation, per diem.
- d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's advance account for the period he was under non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and have

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SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

determined that \$33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and from Madrid with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of \$1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for write-off by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without further accounting.

3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.

4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non-salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966:

Account opened: 13 July 1965

13 July 1965	\$10,000
22 July 1965	5,000
15 September 1965	5,000
6 October 1965	5,000
19 July 1966	<u>5,000</u>
	\$30,000

All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings.

5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without him incurring operational expenditures.

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SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

6. The Office of Finance has not found operational expenditures except for the \$1,600 mentioned above. Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational expenditures if incurred would have been charged.

7. Another possible course of action is to request the Director to approve my asking [a cleared contact] at Chase Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.

8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be finished by the end of the week.


Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance

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Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item



[**SECRET - SENSITIVE**]

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. **Action:** This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

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B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

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severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two", course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.
3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.
5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.
6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.
7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.
8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

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B. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locke Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locke refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the Liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli. Direct approaches to several of these services either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the services underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make greater use of their national assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican.

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through Liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

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particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral operations and where appropriate in conjunction with liaison services.

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England, Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada. No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban communications.

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable/prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are being individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further exploitation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations:

Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:
In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

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H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cubans, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

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Drafting
23 Nov. 1962

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OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBA

1. SITUATION:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National objectives with respect to Cuba are essentially as follows:

a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.

b. ^{Further} Discredit the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.

d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split

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on Cuban-Bloc relationships.

II. MISSION:

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national objectives with respect to Cuba.

III. TASKS:

A. Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
 - a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
 - b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
 - c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
 - d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
 - e. Military and militia order of battle.
 - f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain within the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
 - g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships.
 - h. Economic

B. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin-American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.

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2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

C. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.
2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.
3. Harass Free World Trade with Cuba.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.
3. Develop and exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet bloc members.

E. Resistance:

1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel and logistic support for any significant internal

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resistance group or uprising.

2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military plans against Cuba.

IV. DELIVERATION:

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop the following program:

A. Intelligence (EX) / Counter Intelligence

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. The following types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba ~~as in Cuban Government posts abroad.~~
Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.
2. Spotting/recruiting/training Cubans in Government posts abroad.
- 23 Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.
- 34 Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information or who can provide significant operational support.
- 45 Expansion of communications intelligence particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

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3. Maintain refugee debriefing programs.
7. Maximize utilization of liaison services for above programs.
- B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. A propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.
2. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.
3. Continue propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.


C. Paramilitary:

The program will be basically for developing and maintaining a minimum stand-by capability for use in the event of a significant up-rising or in the event of implementation of U. S. Military plans.

The following program is considered essential:

1. Maintain the capability to infiltrate/exfiltrate limited numbers of personnel and/or limited

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amounts of equipment.

2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to meet requirements levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military contingency plans. Where internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.

V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

None

VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. Personnel

B. Estimated Budget

FY - 63

FY - 64

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**AMTRUNK Operation - Interim Working Draft,
Dated 14 February 1977,
with Attachments**

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AMTRUNK Operation

INTERIM WORKING DRAFT

14 February 1977

1. It is possible that the AMTRUNK Operation might have been a political action operation run against the U.S.G./CIA. (See the separate memorandum on "Operations to Split the Castro Regime.")

2. In late 1962 or early 1963, pressure was exerted on CIA by Higher Authority (State Department and the White House) to consider a proposal for an on-island operation to split the CASTRO regime. The proposal was presented to Mr. HURWITCH, the State Department Cuban Coordinator, by Tad SZULC¹ (AMCAPE-1) of the New York Times. On 6 February 1963, Albert C. DAVIES, (Lt. Col. on military detail to WH/4 - Cuba) met with SZULC² at SZULC's residence, to discuss the plan. SZULC referred to it as the "Leonardo Plan." While at first hesitant, SZULC³ finally revealed that Dr. Nestor MORENO (AMICE-27) was one of its prime originators. SZULC said that he first thought of bringing the plan to the attention of President KENNEDY, as he had had a standing invitation, since November 1961, for direct contact with President KENNEDY, Attorney General KENNEDY, or Mr. McGeorge BUNDY, on matters concerning Cuba. He decided against that approach, however, and instead determined to use the Cuban Coordinating Group. SZULC later said that George VOLSKY⁴ (AMTRUNK-1) masterminded the plan, assisted by MORENO. It was agreed that CIA representatives would meet with SZULC and the two Leonardo planners, MORENO and VOLSKY, in Washington.

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The follow-up meeting on 9 February (in a safehouse) was attended by HURWITCH, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, Dr. Nestor MORENO, and David MORALES, Col. A. DAVIES and Alfonso RODRIGUEZ of the CIA.

3. A 11 February 1963 memorandum from RODRIGUEZ to the Chief, SAS, expressed definite interest in the operation with certain recommendations which included having JMWAVE Station put its operational mechanism into gear to have the Cuban personnel of the operation (now called AMTRUNK) ready for infiltration by mid-March 1963. Following a review of the AMTRUNK Project, JMWAVE forwarded a lengthy dispatch to Headquarters⁵, dated 8 April 1963, which recommended that the operation be terminated soonest. Since it was a Headquarters originated operation, JMWAVE also requested Headquarters decision as to continuance or termination. A Headquarters cable to JMWAVE on 10 April 1963 concurred that the AMTRUNK operation should be terminated for a number of reasons, including the fact that CIA could not at that time be certain that hostile elements were unaware of the plan. A 17 April 1963 cable from Headquarters to JMWAVE Station advised that SZULC had informed HURWITCH that JMWAVE had given VOLSKY responsibility to decide whether or not the operation was to continue. It seems that Headquarters had intended to use VOLSKY, with his concurrence, only as a funding channel for the AMTRUNK operation if the AMTRUNK principals were willing to proceed with the operation independently. In any case, for some reason, CIA continued to

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support the operation. The two principals, MORENO (AMICE-27) and Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14) claimed to have contact with high-level GOC officials. They completed four infiltration missions to Cuba and were terminated in March 1964.

4. Early phases of the operation resulted in the on-island recruitment of Ramon Tomas GUIN Diaz (AMTRUNK-10), Modesto Orlando OROZCO Basulto (AMTRUNK-9), and Carlos PEDRAZA Aguilar (AMTRUNK-11). GUIN was arrested in February 1966. (CUBELA was arrested at the same time, separately.) OROZCO, after reportedly running scared, was exfiltrated and terminated in March 1964. He returned to Cuba in December 1964 on an independent exfiltration mission and apparently remained in Cuba. There is some speculation that he might have been G-2. His knowledge of the identity of internal AMTRUNK agents, caused a planned infiltration mission to be scrapped. PEDRAZA was arrested in December 1965, tried for alleged CIA activities and given a 30 year prison sentence. JMWAVE Station advised in March 1966 that four former AMTRUNK internal assets were arrested for counterrevolutionary activities during early 1966, in addition to CUBELA and GUIN, and that all of the principals of the AMTRUNK network active during 1963 and 1964 had been rolled up. The Cuban press reportedly identified DIAZ (AMICE-14) as the clandestine infiltree who recruited GUIN.

COMMENT: It appears that the opposition might have succeeded in obtaining CIA financial and material support for an operation which was controlled by the planners. They succeeded, it seems, in identifying, neutralizing, and exposing

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on-island anti-Castro forces, and tying up CIA time, money, and manpower for an operation of their own creation. Following are some reasons which might have contributed to its failure:

a. The controversial nature of the principal initiators, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY and MORENO. The AMTRUNK operatives made it known that they were anti-U.S.G. and anti-CIA and accepted assistance only to accomplish their own purposes. They were not under CIA control.

b. SZULC, although reportedly not directly involved in the operation, was kept fully informed of its activities by MORENO and perhaps others.

c. SZULC's direct contact with the White House, if true, placed him in a position to pass U.S. policy information on Cuba to the opposition. (There is a note by Richard Helms on a 23 September 1963 cover sheet requesting Alfonso RODRIGUEZ to maintain periodic contact with SZULC on Cuban matters at Presidential request going back many months.)

⁶
d. RABEL (AMLEO-3), who "defected" to the U.S. in 1962, was knowledgeable of on-island AMTRUNK targets. RABEL, following termination, returned to Cuba allegedly to bring out his family, and never returned. There is a possibility that he was a CASTRO agent.

e. CUBELA was knowledgeable of at least some of the AMTRUNK agents. GUIN (AMTRUNK-10) was a codefendant in the CUBELA trial. (Believe GUIN may have been given a stiffer sentence than CUBELA and may still be in prison.)

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CUBELA was given a relatively light sentence, considering the magnitude of the crime. Immediately following sentencing he functioned as a prison physician, and reportedly was driving a jeep unescorted, which is unusual treatment unless one is trusted by the regime. He reportedly is now practicing medicine as a private physician in Havana.

f. The questionable activities and current whereabouts of AMTRUNK-9. We have learned of the other AMTRUNK agents who were wrapped up but we have been unable to determine precisely where AMTRUNK-9 is. There is some indication that he might have been G-2.

g. There was overlap with other operations: the AMLILAC's, placing CUBELA cache, etc.

NOTE: Cables cited in this paper, and other selected papers from the AMTRUNK Project, are readily available in the LAD/JFK Task Force office for review if needed.

LAD/JFK Task Force/Chris Hopkins:rp

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14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Tadeusz (Tad) Witold SZULC (AMCAPE-1) (201-50539)

1. SZULC was born on 25 July 1926 in Warsaw, Poland. He arrived in Brazil from Lisbon on 3 August 1940, and came to the U.S. in October 1947 under sponsorship of U.S. Ambassador John C. WILEY, the husband of his mother's sister. He became a correspondent for the New York Times (NYT) in 1953, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special Congressional bill.

2. SZULC has been under suspicion as a hostile foreign agent since 1948 when the FBI reported (apparently from a ~~British~~ source) that he was a Communist. He brought himself to the attention of CIA in August 1959 in Santiago, Chile by claiming (falsely) to be "cleared" and requesting contact with an Agency representative. This was the first of many such incidents in Latin America, and resulted in a warning to all Latin American Stations to beware of SZULC and his efforts to interview Agency personnel. It also resulted in continuing watch of his movements and activities because they represented a threat to the cover of Agency personnel. By 1960 his reputation was so widespread that several different CIA officers called for an investigation that would clear up "once and for all" his suspected connections with a hostile intelligence service. He was in frequent contact with Communist Party leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America, constantly sought out and elicited information from U.S. Embassy officers,

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frequently mentioning the name of other CIA officers with whom he was acquainted.

3. Although the suspicions have increased, and SZULC's anti-Agency activities have become much more serious and blatant in the 1970's, it has not been possible to clear up any of the suspicions about his motives or his possible connections with a foreign intelligence service. There have been numerous reviews of his files and the interest in his activities has extended from the case officer level to the DCI. In fact, it is not possible to come to any clear conclusion about this man, and the notes below are simply illustrative of the kinds of things that keep the suspicions alive. It is important to note that SZULC's activities can be explained by the combination of his personality, ambition, and the demands on an investigative reporter for the NYT. He is an aggressive, insensitive, and persistent journalist with the family connections (Ambassador Wiley) and ability to develop the kinds of contacts appropriate to a successful correspondent for a paper like the NYT.

4. Nevertheless, there are elements throughout his entire career that are almost designed to arouse suspicion. For example, a ~~British~~ source in Rio de Janeiro (see Attachment A) reported that SZULC was "directed" by the Polish regime in Warsaw to seek employment in U.S. journalistic circles. This report runs like a thread throughout his file and is repeated and garbled in several versions over the years. The report

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has never been adequately explained and was apparently never reported in full to ~~London~~ by the ~~British~~ representative in Rio. This report and other questions that arose early in his career (his contacts with a cousin who was a Press Attache in the Polish Embassy in Rio) were, however, just the earliest elements that aroused suspicion.

5. Because he became so well-known to so many Agency officers, his name and reputation have become subject of discussion on many occasions. One senior operations officer stated in 1975 that a Soviet agent could not be more beneficial to the Soviets and the Communist cause than SZULC has been. Although he presented a generally anti-Communist view prior to quitting the NYT in 1972, it is noteworthy that he arranged extensive, favorable TV coverage of the Communist-dominated Ligas Campesinas in Northeast Brazil and that one of the most important anti-Castro operations, AMTRUNK, in which he was involved from the beginning, was disastrous for all participants. More indicative of his true beliefs, however, are the articles he has written since Watergate. They have become increasingly critical of the CIA and of the USG generally and have damaged U.S. image and prestige.

6. The notes below are somewhat random examples of elements in SZULC's file that bring him under suspicion. As mentioned above, they in no way point to a firm conclusion. For further information on SZULC during the period 1963 - 1964, see the CI review prepared at Miami Station on Jorge VOLSKY in 1964.

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a. The 1948 FBI report that SZULC was involved in supplying the Polish Legation in Rio with information from his personal contacts and from Ambassador John C. Wiley has been repeated in various versions throughout SZULC's file. The FBI has found similar allegations made by other sources who knew SZULC at that time. In addition, several sources have mentioned SZULC's relations with his cousin, Ignacy SACHS, who was the Press Attache in the Polish Embassy in 1947 and 1948, although there is no indication that SACHS had intelligence connections.

b. SZULC's marriage to the daughter of the American manager of the English language newspaper in Rio de Janeiro, the Herald, lasted only until SZULC had permanent residence in the U.S. and appears to have been carried through for that purpose.

c. By 1949 (SZULC was only 23) he had come to the attention of the ~~Rio Station~~ because of his dealings with the Polish Legation and because investigation revealed his father had some (apparently innocent) business dealings with Russians visiting Brazil from Mexico.

d. In 1954, about a year after he was hired by the NYT, SZULC obtained a sensational story, by telephone, from a Communist leader in Guatemala. This launched his career with the NYT.

e. In 1956 SZULC was investigating Brazilian nuclear policy for the NYT. Although a legitimate topic, it was somewhat unusual for him and the timing seems unusual for NYT interest.

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f. In 1959, on a trip to Santiago, Chile, SZULC claimed to be "cleared" and requested an interview with an Agency representative. This was the first of numerous such requests. In addition, it was in about 1959 that he also began making a point of telling Agency personnel the names of other Agency officers he had identified.

g. An article SZULC wrote on Cuba for the NYT in December 1959 was hailed as an antidote to the excessively favorable reports of his colleague, Herbert MATTHEWS, but in fact his article was largely favorable to Fidel CASTRO and to CASTRO's plans for Cuba. It is only in comparison with MATTHEWS blatantly pro-CASTRO articles ^{that} / SZULC's piece/can be considered balanced.

h. By September 1960, SZULC was in the forefront of those advocating action against CASTRO. (It was he who finally brought the Leonardo Plan to Washington in 1963. See AMTRUNK Operational paper).

i. In April 1961, shortly after John F. KENNEDY was innaugurated, SZULC was transferred to Washington by the NYT. Although a reasonable transfer, it is noteworthy that in a very short time SZULC claimed that he had a standing invitation to go directly to the President, the Vice President, the Attorney General, McGeorge BUNDY and Robert HURWITCH on Cuban matters.

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j. SZULC persistently sought a continuing contact with an Agency representative in Washington shortly after he arrived until it was granted in December 1962. The first contact was with Albert C. DAVIES (Lt. Col. on military detail to CIA - Cuba), and was arranged at the behest of Colonel GROGAN, the Assistant to the Director, on SZULC's request.

k. In early 1963, at President KENNEDY's urging, contact with SZULC was made into a formal relationship and was continued until October 1964. The meetings were used by SZULC to cross check his information from other sources, including various Cuban exiles and the Department of State. He became, by virtue of his contacts with the exile community and throughout Washington, one of the most knowledgeable people in the area of Cuban affairs, anti-CASTRO activities, and U.S. Government policy. (See CI study on Jorge VOLSKY for more information on this period.)

1. The Agency officer, Alfonso RODRIGUEZ, who maintained official contact with SZULC in 1963 and 1964 said in July 1964:

"The special friendship and mutual admiration society that has existed between Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, and Manuel RAY and the JURE is not something that is transparent or easily explained. This alliance may be something unholy and Machiavellian; I just do not know, but I can find no evidence to prove it."

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m. Another officer, Seymour Young, wrote in 1965:

"After reading and re-reading this man's various files, I began to feel that this man in his position would be an ideal 'agent of influence'. It was noted that he is always in a crisis area and usually in advance of the crisis and writes articles which are more concerned with the Communist successes."

n. In about August 1965, SZULC was sent to Madrid as the NYT representative for Spain and Portugal. He stayed overseas until December 1968. He was present in Prague during the Soviet invasion of August 1968 and in December he was expelled, apparently for being too inquisitive. However, the ~~West German Service~~ has remained suspicious of the circumstances of SZULC's expulsion and the details have never been clarified. (It is interesting that SZULC wrote articles reflecting the official CZECH line concerning the defection of General Jan SEJNA who was in the Czech Intelligence service.)

o. SZULC was reported by an FBI source to have gone horseback riding with Boris V. YAROCHEVSKIY, a suspect KGB officer, in Washington in June or July 1971. SZULC's file reflects no regular contact with Bloc diplomats.

p. In 1972 and 1973 SZULC covered Watergate extensively and demonstrated an extreme bias against the CIA. By July 1972, SZULC's inquiries of the Department of State and his articles had taken on a distinctly anti-US Government tone. His coverage of guerrilla and terrorist groups

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was less sure than in earlier days and was frequently sensationalist and full of inaccuracies. (See, especially, article in NYT for 14 July 1972 on a terrorist Headquarters in Zurich and other wild statements.)

q. Since 1974 SZULC's articles have been highly critical of the Agency and he has used the background information he gathered in the 1960's to attack the Agency and to criticize its operations.

r. In May 1975 SZULC accused the Agency of rifling the files of U.S. Senators. This was only one of many irresponsible and false articles he wrote trying to discredit the Agency. One of the more spectacular efforts was a series in Esquire magazine, in which, among other things, he charged that the U.S. intelligence community had a hidden budget of \$25 billion dollars and a network of 200,000 spies.

s. In, Inside the Company: A CIA Diary, Philip AGEE credits SZULC's daughter, Nicole, for having "obtained vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C." There is reason to believe, particularly in view of the extreme views Tad SZULC has manifested in the past two years, that he may have aided his daughter in her "research."

SUMMATION

The case against Tad SZULC as a foreign agent is weak. However, his most recent activities are entirely consonant with the view that he has already served the Soviets well and can

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end his career as an overt propagandist taking advantage of the current furor over the CIA to do the greatest possible damage. The current paralysis of all anti-Communist action by the Agency attests to the effectiveness of AGEE, SZULC, the Soviets, et al.

B

NOTE: (See attachment/ from a highly sensitive source. Any use of the SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment requires C/CI approval.) The source reported that Nicole, while working with the DGI in Cuba to expose the Agency, said that except for her father, her whole family were "fascists." She said that her father quit the NYT because of the restrictive editorial policy and he wished to write according to his beliefs.

LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/~~Marty Miller~~:rp

2 Attachments, a/s

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL	ATTN - To DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. 44 Feb 77 SZULCman HBRA 9438
TO	Chief, WHD Chief, EE	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-050539	
FROM	Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro	DATE 20 June 1962	
SUBJECT	BEDOX/Operational SMEDLEY Information Concerning Tad SZULC (201-050539)	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
ACTION REQUIRED	FYI		

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached is a ~~SMEDLEY~~ report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes ~~SMEDLEY~~'s traces on SZULC.

2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

~~ALBICUSPID~~ from ~~ALBICUSPID~~-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source: Henryk HRANKOWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial Mission, in Brazil)

Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on Latin America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer.

~~ALBICUSPID~~ from ~~ALBICUSPID~~-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source: Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)

Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Frederick L. Rouzky
FREDERICK L. ROUZKY

Distribution
4 - WHD w/attachment
1 - EE w/attachment
1 - Sao Paulo
2 - Files
200 w/att. WH
19 June 1962/bcj

REC'D RIDIAN 22 June 62

the attached info was not sent to the FBI - because according to Rio/CC 5 Jul '63 & after discussion with Gene Ramage & office of Mr. R. Helms, we are not to send any info out of the Agency on subject. Any information - domestic - should be referred to the FBI.

C. H. [unclear] 2014/1

2nd June, 1961.

Tadeusz SZULC

(14)3(64) ✓

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.

2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.
3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULC does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.
4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

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att. to 14BIA 9438

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20 JUN 62
201-50539

Tadeusz SZULC

Born: c. 1926.
Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955.
Occupation: Journalist.

June 1947: Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSE. Is on good terms with the Polish Legation whom he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo. He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.

Dec. 1947: Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper "Diretrizes".
sub-source:
Harold HORAN of
New York:

Feb. 1948: Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.

March 1948: Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.

Sept. 1949: Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache, the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept. of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles. Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the WILEYs, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.

June 1951: Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent. He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in 1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.

June 1951: Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with Igacy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA. The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American citizenship through having married an American woman.

Sept. 1951: Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject volunteered that he obtained much information on the differences of policy between the British and American Governments on the Persian problem through his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS. He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the Shah of Persia.

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14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez (AMICE-27) (201-312091)

1. MORENO was born on 25 August 1921 in Havana, Cuba. His father was a Cuban Senator (1940-44) and the Cuban Minister of Public Works (1944). MORENO became a lawyer and continued to live in comfortable circumstances. He became involved in the anti-BATISTA movement, apparently in the late 1950's, and ultimately in the 26th of July Movement. After the revolution, one of his clients was Camilo CIENFUEGOS. In Miami after defection, he was associated with the JURE.

2. MORENO's specific activities in the anti-BATISTA movement were not reported and apparently were unexceptional. A point worth noting about his activities before defection is his acquaintance with Tad SZULC, at least by 1959, and with Jorge VOLSKY. MORENO's background as a lawyer did not prepare him for active revolutionary involvement. When he defected in April 1961, therefore, he associated with anti-CASTRO exiles, particularly VOLSKY, but did not become actively involved. He was assessed in 1963 as being unfriendly to CIA.

3. About February 1963 MORENO and Enrique CAYADO Ribera reportedly collaborated in the formulation of an operational plan to overthrow the Castro government. They discussed it with Jorge VOLSKY, who then passed it to Tad SZULC. VOLSKY and SZULC apparently conspired to have the plan presented to the "political authorities" (Robert HURWITCH and the KENNEDY Administration) in Washington in order to by-pass the dis-

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trusted "operational authorities" (the CIA). (VOLSKY originally took full credit for the plan, called "Leonardo Plan," which eventually became known as the AMTRUNK Operation.)

4. The Leonardo Plan was well thought-out and caught the fancy of the KENNEDY Administration. HURWITCH bought it to the CIA with the blessings of the Department of State. Thus, from the very beginning, SZULC, VOLSKY, and MORENO, each of whom had outside interests to some degree in conflict with AMTRUNK, were involved in AMTRUNK policy and planning meetings. Moreover, all three were to some degree antipathetic to the Agency for various reasons and were difficult or impossible to control.

5. MORENO's indiscretions were a serious problem that limited his effectiveness as a direct participant in the AMTRUNK Operation by arousing the concern of other participants. While the Station attempted to cut out VOLSKY and SZULC after the initial policy discussions in Washington, VOLSKY always remained involved to some degree and kept SZULC fully informed. Under the circumstances, the censure of MORENO for talking to SZULC was just an attempt to plug one of many leaks. The fact is that MORENO, SZULC, and VOLSKY believed they had an inside track in Washington because of their contacts there and all three disliked following Agency instructions that conflicted with their own diverse interests. However, because JMWAVE Station and [AMICE-14 (Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue)] objected to MORENO's continued involvement in the AMTRUNK Operation after learning of his free talk with SZULC and others, the Station

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terminated MORENO's involvement in the sensitive aspects of AMTRUNK in November 1963.

6. Since MORENO was one of the original authors of AMTRUNK and already disliked the Agency, one can imagine his feelings at that juncture. He sulked, refused at first to take a position on the Rebel Army Radio Program, and caused problems in general. By January 1964 MORENO was actually interfering in the AMTRUNK Operation [(by giving demoralizing, conflicting information to AMTRUNK-9, for example)] and attempting to debrief returnees on behalf of VOLSKY and SZULC. MORENO was fired, therefore, by RABEL on [Station instructions,] from the Rebel Army Radio Program in February 1964 and [terminated by the Station as of 5 March.]

7. [Shortly after his termination,] MORENO, using VOLSKY as an intermediary, approached Mr. G. Harvey SUMM with a proposal similar to the Leonardo Plan. The [COS met with SUMM on 1 April 1964 and advised him how to put off MORENO.]

8. In August or September 1964, MORENO left Miami and took a position as a Spanish-language professor in South Carolina.

CONCLUSION:

MORENO apparently was a sincere anti-CASTRO revolutionary, but his dislike for and distrust of the Agency, which was undoubtedly stimulated by SZULC and VOLSKY, made his involvement in AMTRUNK a liability to the security of the operation. It appears that MORENO, like many Cubans of the upper middle

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class, had little sense of security. It is obvious that he trusted SZULC and VOLSKY far beyond what normal prudence would dictate. He probably was not a CASTRO agent, but he did help leak operational details and general plans to people who helped to spread the information more widely and who, themselves, were not trustworthy.

LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/~~Marty Miller~~:rp

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DISPATCH

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TO,	Chief, Special Affairs Staff	PRIORITIZED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
INFO.		X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
			NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
			ABSTRACT	
			MICROFILM	

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.
2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

MORENO

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

SZULC

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Add: 1 Volsky
WASH, DC

Distribution:
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AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed.
There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

NEW YORK TIMES

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

RABEZ Nunez

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

See
DIR 31745

31 March 1963

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEWI. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUAROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, working out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUAROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

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JON # 68-496/46
Date: 7 Fold: 1

the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel 08

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a (21) year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended (Catholic Social) University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasion a great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

2. AMTRUNK/3, a (22) year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in (August) 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

B. TASKS

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at A/3's father's farm in the (Galera) section (AMS 3885 III, Coords 993614). 08
2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.
3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his (father's farm) and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira. 08
4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.
5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.
6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.
7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

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C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltees will make their way to [A/3's father's] farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangement, as yet, is not definite.

3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaissance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the 24 two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by [A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ] located 1 kilometer from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named [Pedro CRUZ]. [CRUZ] is (35 to 40) years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon [CRUZ] to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:

a. [Roman HERNANDEZ] who lives a few kilometers away in [Sierra del Arzobispo]. [HERNANDEZ] owns a small farm and a [butcher shop] in the area and also owns a truck. He is (37 to 40) years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.

b. If [CRUZ] is unsuccessful in getting [HERNANDEZ's] truck he will contact [Augusto MACHIN] who operates a farm next to [A/3's father's] farm. He is (45-50) years old, married, no children, wife's name is [Alicia]. He was the [mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte] in 1954. He owns a jeep.

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c. Another contact of A/3 is (Ramon CALZADILLE) age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is (Corojo #1, Cotorro,) 08 Havana. He owns a (butcher) shop in the (Cotorro) section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

06, 08.

a. (Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25) years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

06, 08

b. (Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55) born in 08 Havana. He is a (physician) who lives and practices (medicine) in Havana. 06 IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of (medicine) 08 at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. (IGLESIAS) is also a close friend of (Elsa NEGRIN) 06

c. (Sergio MENDEZ) 06 age about (50) 08 born in Cienfuegos, a former (senator (1954)) as well as the former head of the 08 (Railroad system in Cuba.) Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. 06 MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The 08 husband of this daughter, however, works for (Che Guevara.) A/2 has maintained correspondence with (MENDEZ.)

d. (Isabel MENOCOL) 08 age about (35) 08 born in Havana, single. Subject is an (English) teacher who runs a small private 08 (tutoring) school in (English) 08 in Havana. She was A/2's 08 (English teacher) and offered support to the underground. 06 MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

e. (Gloria BAMCIALBA) age (23-24) born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from (1959 to 1960). She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in (Guanabo Beach) during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at (Guanabo Beach) in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary.

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. (Jorge VALS) age (late 30s early 40s) married. Subject holds the rank of (Captain) in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims (VALS) has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. (VALS) primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels (VALS) is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of (VALS) and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to (VALS) in (1962) prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

b. (Jose DUARTE Oropesa) age early (40s) served in the (U.S. Army) during World War II. According to A/2, (DUARTE) was made commander of the (5th Military District) by (Camilio Cienfuegos). Following the disappearance of (Cienfuegos) (DUARTE) was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said (DUARTE) started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the (military) secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that (DUARTE) was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually (DUARTE) was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 (DUARTE) was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention (DUARTE) as an opportunist.

c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

(Lester RODRIGUEZ) age (late 30s early 40s) married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as (head of) one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working (in INRA) in Oriente Province. He claims (RODRIGUEZ) assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

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to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his (father's farm) with maritime reception capabilities. 24

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient number of supporting assets to provide for his⁰⁶ safety while in Havana. However, he has not seen (VALS) and (DUARTE) for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on (DUARTE) conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that (DUARTE) is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims (DUARTE) is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. (A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that (DUARTE) has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of (DUARTE) which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his (father's farm) and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named (DUARTE) would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

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3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply re-
sents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made four black infiltration/exfiltration trips to and from Cuba and PBPRIME, and has an excellent knowledge of the northern Marianas area. He is easy to work

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with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27⁰⁸

- 08 3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a [49]⁰⁸ year old fisherman from the Cardenas area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.
2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.
3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.
4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.
5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.
6. Establish internal and external communications.
7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti-Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used previously for infils and exfils. One is "Tango" (Garcia Lezcano) ⁰⁶ Tango is a brother of (Eustiquiano Garcia Lezcano (201-307338)) ^{06,08} whom A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who was already being utilized elsewhere. The other contact is the owner of the (Salina (salt drying beds)) ⁰⁶ A/14 has not yet been able to recall this individual's name. ⁰⁶
2. Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco Leguas, on the mainland. Key contacts here are (Antonio ⁰⁶ Garcia) (not related to Tango, above) and (Pablo Lopez) ⁰⁶ both of whom have small farms in the area.
3. Town of Marti. Contact here is "Perico" LNU. Subject is about 50 years old, is employed by (INRA) ⁰⁶ and has a jeep which was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.
4. City of Cardenas. Contact is (Pedro Barbi) ⁰⁶ owner of the (Bate Marino restaurant). Subject is a close friend of A/14 who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime receptions. ⁰⁶ (Barbi) would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to Havana. Owns a car.
5. City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here named (Carlos) ⁰⁶ Pedraza who also assisted A/14 in underground activities in 1961. Subject is (60) ⁰⁶ years old, married, and is a forman ⁰⁸ of public works in the city. Subject has a son (Carlos) ⁰⁶ now in New York City. ⁰⁶ (Pedraza) will be contacted for transportation to Havana. Owns a car.
6. Varadero. "Fifo" (Pineiro) ⁰⁶ owns a car and was formerly a close friend of A/14. Subject was formerly active in the underground ⁰⁶ and might be used by A/14 in the event he could not use (Barbi) or (Pedraza) ⁰⁶ for obtaining transportation. ^{06,08} (Pineiro) is the brother of the communist (Manolo Pineiro, aka "Barba Roja"), but is reported to be anti-communist himself.
7. Havana ⁰⁶
 - a. (Adolfina (Suarez) More) ⁰⁶ Subject is single and lives with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mistress) and can be used as safehouse keeper. Subject is ⁰⁶ sister of (Rafael (Suarez) More) a (Commandante in the Navy) ⁰⁶ who, according to A/27, was at one time (chief of naval operations.) ⁰⁶ His present assignment or location is unknown.

- 06
b. (Manuel (Garcia) Sanchez) Is a close friend of A/14 and is uncle of (A/14's wife) 06 Can be used for operational support, a car, and safehousekeeping. Was formerly a Lt. in Oriente under (Calixto Garcia) 06 but no longer in army. A/14 believes he is now an administrator of some type of industry in Havana.
- 06
c. (Maria Josefa (Isalgue)) Subject is aunt of A/14 and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car. Was formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.
- 06
d. (Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torre) Subject is a relative of A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing. Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his sixties.
- 06
e. (Bebo (Orozco)) To be recruited by A/14 as his principal agent in Havana. Subject and A/14 previously worked together in the underground. 06 (Orozco) was in the Sierra with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from the army in February 1959, although he has maintained many contacts within the army. Was one time active in the 06 Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was a friend of (Capt. Bernardo Corrales) who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio. Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into Cuba without his absence having been known to the authorities. Was responsible for safehousekeeping (Vargas Gomez) 06 for nearly one month when authorities were searching for him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on defeatable army officers. He is also known to A/27, but not well. A/14 was last in touch with (Orozco) by letter about two months ago. 06
- f. Ramon (Guin) Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27 as principal agent. Would be used for operational intelligence and spotting among disaffected army officers. Would be kept entirely compartmented from (Orozco) 06 Guin is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14, both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is anti-Communist and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an overthrow of the government.

06-defendant in CUBELA trial - in prison -

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g. Target personalities who are suspected of being disaffected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather information in Havana are as follows:

1. Comandante "Macho" Parra
2. Cdte. Oscar Guerra
3. " Jose Pinares
4. Capt. FNU Lawton
5. " Manuel Avila
6. Cmdte. Rene de los Santos
7. " Pedro Miret
8. Capt. Juan Nuiy
9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More
10. Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville
11. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos
12. Capt. Sandy Olivares
13. " Jose Fernandez Alvarez

These names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and in most cases also with AMLEO/3. In a majority of cases there appears to be some evidence to indicate the subjects may be disaffected. In the case of Jose Pinares however, it would appear that he is completely loyal to the regime. This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14. RI files were negative on Avila and Lawton.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and with disguises. Both of them have previously lived in the Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in Secret Writing (SW) and will plan to train at least two and possible three agents in Havana in SW, prior to their own exfiltration. In addition, it is planned to train A/27 and A/14 in OWVL. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans will have been laid on with the agents. In the event that a change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary, an OWVL message could be sent to the agents. Any urgent and immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents during their short stay in Havana would be on a prearranged open code system by commercial telegram. Such a system will be worked out to cover several possible contingencies. Internal communications of whatever net is organized by A/27 and A/14 will be arranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead drops.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The LCFLUTTER examinations on both AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 were inconclusive. Although it is the opinion of both the case officers and the training personnel who have been in close contact with these individuals that both agents are

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highly motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point will remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that A/27 would refuse a second LCFLUTTER examination if asked. It is believed that A/27 was withholding information during the LCFLUTTER and subsequently. The nature, seriousness, and possible consequences of this are as yet not clear.

2. A/27 has told at least two people something about this operation. Although he says that he did not give any details of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in very general terms with two individuals whom he named at the time of the LCFLUTTER test. One of these is a friend of Gutierrez Menovo and one a friend of Vargas Gomez.

THERE SOME SUSPICION he was G-2 agent.

3. AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the past two years. Although it is difficult to assess how well he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks, it is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts might be considered really close. AMICE/14 has been out of direct touch with his operational contacts since July 1961.

4. The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent upon having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.

5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking. Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of withholding support to the operation. Control however will remain tenuous at best and A/27 will continue to be a difficult handling problem.

6. On the positive side of the ledger is the calibre of the agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and highly motivated. Both agents have experience in clandestine operations, particularly A/14 who has made a number of previous clandestine entries and exits and has many operational contacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in training.

V. FUTURE PLANS

During the week of 1 through 6 April, the team will receive maritime instruction. During the week 8 through 13 April, they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, disguise training, and further operational planning sessions.

VI. COMMITMENTS

1. According to AMICE/27, the following principle, which he feels is a commitment from ODYOKE, was enunciated during his initial trip to ZRMETAL: "ODYOKE will recognize a new Cuban

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government which is anti-Communist and which operates on democratic principles; ODYOKE does not desire to impose a government of its own choice upon Cuba". A/27 has made a big point of discussing this "commitment". It is apparent that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links Batista and KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batistianos in a post-Castro government.

2. All AMTRUNK group members think that they received a commitment while in ZRMETAL that ODYOKE would support their operational plan, with funds, training, logistical support, and technical assistance, but would leave control of the operation entirely in their hands. In other words, they are not working for ODYOKE or KUBARK in any sense. On this point they are very sensitive.

3. Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give "official recognition" to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that these individuals will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime. This means recognition of an individual's participation in the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific government formed by the conspirators themselves.

4. Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the commitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL. PEGGINS has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as commitments.

5. The only commitment made by JMWAVE through PEGGINS has been that if any of the AMTRUNK group were killed or captured while on the mission, their families in PBPRIME would be assisted for a "reasonable amount of time" financially. PEGGINS declined to state what that time would be or how much financial assistance would be involved.

6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no commitment will be made at this time to support any internal group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives and that this extends specifically to no promise to support active sabotage with demolitions.

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20 April 1977

SUBJECT: Identification of Sensitive Source

The sensitive source cited in paragraph 4, page 29, of Book V - Final Report of SSC to Study Governmental Operations - was an audio operation against the Cuban Embassy in Paris, France encrypted UNSIERRA. It is defunct and the files are retained in Archives in Warrenton. The French Desk will order for us if needed.

A copy of the referenced communication, PARI 1664 (IN 69266) dated 27 November 1963, is attached. It was located in Volume 4 of Rolando CUBELA's official file, 201-252234. UNSNAFU-12, cited in paragraph 3 of that cable, is Marta FRAYDE, a Cuban alternate delegate to UNESCO and an unwitting FI source at that time.

Please note that a copy of this cable was provided to Mr. Breckinridge to carry to a meeting on 11 June 1976 with Senators Hart and Schweiker.


Chris Hopkins
LAD/Task Force (JFK)

Attachment: a/s

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14 January 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez (AMLEO-3) (201-249386)

1. Born 7 April 1922 in Havana, Cuba, the son of a native-born American citizen, RABEL was brought up in comfortable circumstances. He attended high school in Cuba, completed the last year in New Orleans, Louisiana, and entered Tulane University in September 1938. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in December 1940 and eventually saw combat in France, Belgium, Germany and Austria. After discharge in December 1945, RABEL returned to Cuba to attend the University of Havana and this began a life of job changes, moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba, and, in general, rootless living.

2. RABEL's background reads like that of a man with no allegiances or loyalties and no particular goals. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a picture of unreliability. It is probable that RABEL's rootlessness and apparent unreliability applied both to his relations with CASTRO and to those with the Agency. It is quite possible, therefore, that he not only served the Agency in a superficial way but that he did the same for CASTRO at various times when it suited his purposes. Without postulating this sort of dual role (one which fits very well with his previous life) it is almost impossible to explain some of the reasonably good things he did for the Agency and the quite certain allegations that he was a CASTRO agent. This explanation is not fully satisfactory, but it does explain his career better than the charge

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that he was a CASTRO agent from the beginning. The question that must remain unanswered is whether he betrayed the AMTRUNK Operation. He was not arrested until September 1965 (when AMTRUNK had already run its course) but it appears quite certain that he cooperated with the DSE after his arrest and while he was in prison.

3. RABEL joined in the clandestine activities against BATISTA in March 1952, first amongst the exiles in the U.S. and then after late 1952 from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban armed forces to further his plotting and was assigned to the Cuban General Staff. He was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mission in Cuba from November 1954 until April 1956. During his entire period in the Cuban army, RABEL was involved with dissident Army elements; when they attempted a coup in April 1956, RABEL was arrested. He was released shortly thereafter, worked in the chicken business for a year and then returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers (Luis RABEL Nunez). In October 1957 he returned to Cuba and became involved with the 26th of July Movement but had to leave a year later when he was brought to the attention of the BATISTA forces because of a bomb explosion. He smuggled weapons to Camilo Cienfuegos for about a year and then in October 1958 he joined the Cienfuegos group. Shortly after the CASTRO victory, CASTRO called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until February 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendas Campesinas.

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He held this job until he defected to the U.S. in December 1962. It is worth noting that he rarely pursued one activity in one place for more than a year at a time from 1945 to 1962.

4. RABEL gave Alfonso RODRIGUEZ the following reasons for his defection:

a. Communist pressure, hounding, and the basic enmity of the Communist Party toward him. (This appears very reasonable in view of his service in the U.S. Army and training in some aspects of intelligence, such as prisoner interrogation. In addition, his schooling in the U.S. and the reasonable economic circumstances would not have been recommendations from the Communist point of view.)

b. Strong backing by Fidel which protected him from more serious attacks from the Party. (This, too, seems entirely reasonable. His family farm was near the farm Fidel's father managed and RABEL and Fidel had known each other as children. In addition, RABEL's long involvement in the anti-BATISTA movement and with Camilo Cienfuegos were probably in his favor in CASTRO's view.)

c. An obligation to protect the non-Communists in his department, which prevented his earlier defection, and uncertainty of his reception in the U.S. (In view of the number of defections from RABEL's department, there were, in fact, people to protect. Since RABEL had served in the U.S. Army, and probably felt the U.S. was his second

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