

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
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 PAGE 3 OF 3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX

☐ RETURN TO

☒ FILES

403810

PER

B C. NASSAU "GUARDIAN" 27 APRIL 1973 HAS CABINET OFFICE PRESS RELEASE WITH NOTE TEXT, AND REPORTS THAT ABACO ERRINGTON WATKINS AND FRIEND, CHARLES "CHUCK" HALL, IN LONDON SEEKING SUPPORT FOR "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO."

D. SAME ISSUE HAS WATKINS'S DENIAL HE IN LONDON FOR MERCENARIES OR THAT HE WOULD RESORT TO OR CONDONE VIOLENCE. HE SAID HE LOBBYING HAVE BAHAMAS INDEPENDENCE BILL AMENDED TO EXCLUDE INDEPENDENCE FOR ABACO AND SAID WILL DO EVERYTHING LEGALLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY TO ACHIEVE WISHES AND DESIRES OF PEOPLE. WATKINS SAID GOBI CHARGES WERE EFFORT TO DISCREDIT HIM.

E. DEPARTMENT COMMENT: PROMPT RELEASE OF NOTE TO LOCAL PRESS AND RADIO SUGGESTS IT EXERCISE FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSUMPTION.

3. POUCHING SUMMARY EXTENSIVE FILE ON WERBELL (201-259910).

4. FILE 201-259910. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 2 MAY 1973
 ORIG: EASTON C. WARNER: KMS
 UNIT: WH/7/CAR
 EXT: 7493/1956

[Signature]
 AC/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
 CL BY: 019722

[Signature]
 2.51 William P. [unclear]

FBI cable dated 7 May '73

Subject: Edwin Marger;
Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
IS - GREAT BRITAIN

FBI document dated 13 June 73.
from Atlanta, Ga..

Subject: Edwin Marger;
Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, III

14-00000

FBI document dated
16 Mar 73
(re-mitchell werbell)

[illegible]

FILE# _____ UNIT # _____ DATE _____
CAPTIVE SEC DISSEM BY _____ PLS _____
CONF INFO PP. VR FILE

10:22 CCMH 8

4. FILE: 201-259910; 201-244213; 201-252552. 22 JAN 1961 UN-OK

45515

ORIG		UNIT		DATE	
AUTH		UNIT		SIGNATURE	
RELEASE		UNIT		DECLARATION	
OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT	OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT

A musical score for a piano piece, featuring a treble and bass staff with various notes and rests.

FBI document dated
18 April '72

(re: Mitchell L. Werbell, III -
Assoc. w/ Haitian exiles)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM:		EXTENSION	NO.	
John K. Greaney Assistant General Counsel		7521	DATE: 8 November 1971	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across columns after each comment.)	
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. General Counsel			LNH	<p>1-3. I have reviewed the attached transcript and find nothing classified. I feel, however, it would be advisable for Erma Geiss to sign the reply since WerBell's counsel has sent me written interrogatories in this proceedings.</p> <p><i>Lawrence R. Houston</i> Lawrence R. Houston General Counsel</p> <p>CONCURRENCE:</p> <p><i>W. K. Karam</i> Deputy Director for Plans</p> <p>245</p>
2.				
3. DD/P 3C34 Hqs.				
4.				
5. DD/SEC 4E60 Hqs.				
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14-00000 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000
Dept of the Army
Memo for: Deputy Asst Secty of Defense

From: Security Policy & Review Branch

Subj: Wer Bell, Mitchell Livingston III OSD No. 69

Dated 6 Oct 71

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OCC 71-1618
11 NOV 1971

Mr. George MacClain
Director, Information
Security Division
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. MacClain:

Subject: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III
OSD No. 69-59

In accordance with your request of 13 October 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed the Official Report of Proceedings in the subject case. The Official Report of Proceedings does not contain any information pertaining to the CIA which should be classified.

It should be noted, however, that the lack of classification does not mean the CIA subscribes to or validates the testimony contained in the Official Report of Proceedings and this review should not be interpreted as an endorsement by this Agency of the statements contained therein.

Returned herewith is the Official Report of Proceedings.

Sincerely,

ERMAL P. GEISS

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

Enclosures

Memo fr Examiner, ISCRD, 9/22/71
ISCRD memo, 9/23/71
ISD memo, 9/27/71
Army response, 10/6/71
Vol 1, OSD No. 69-59
Vol 2, OSD No. 69-59

2.46

201-259910

Office of the Asst Secretary of Defense

Memo dated 13 Oct 71

Subj: War Bell, Mitchell Livingston III - OSD No. 69-59

Office of Asst Secretary of Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division

Memo dated 22 Sep 71/1971

Subj: Wm Bell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 6959

Office of Asst. Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 23 Sep 71

Subj: Wbr Bell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No 69-59

14-00000

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense

Memo dated 27 Sep 71

Subj: Wm Bell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 69-59

ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> BLOTTED <input type="checkbox"/>		REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	
AT: _____		GROUP: _____	
DATE: 8		PER: 11	

File Werbell

FILE VR. C/PA/AN, DDP, ADDP, C/FE/IND 4, C/FE/LOC 2
 C/FE 4
 C/FI 2, C/CI, C/SAVA, D/SETUP 4, C/SOD 3 (13)

SECRET 121148Z NOV 71 CITE BANGKOK 24725 (SEGERQUIST ACTING)

DIRECTOR PHNOM PENH VIENTIANE SAIGON

RYBAT SECUR

REF: DIRECTOR 88114 KNOTAL

12 NOV 71 467962

1. MR. MITCHELL A. WERBELL, MILITARY ARMAMENT CORPORATION (FORMERLY AN ELEMENT OF WERBELL'S GEORGIA BASED FIRM OF SIGNICS WHICH REPORTEDLY WENT BANKRUPT), IS BACK IN BANGKOK ATTEMPTING TO SELL HIS WARES (MACHINE PISTOLS AND SNIPER RIFLES). THE REF MESSAGE CITES THE FACT THAT HQS HAS A LENGTHY 201 ON SUBJECT (201-259910) AND THAT HE IS CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, A WHEELER-DEALER AND A PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE HAS ON OCCASION ALLUDED EITHER TO BEING AN LNLUTE REP OR HAVING LNLUTE BACKING.

2. SUBJECT MET WITH SEVERAL LNCUFF OFFICERS ON 5 NOV 71 AND RELATED THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING AGAIN TO INTEREST THE THAI GOVERNMENT IN PURCHASING HIS PRODUCTS. SUBJECT CLAIMS TO BE PERSONAL FRIEND OF AIR CHIEF MARSHAL DAWEE AND THAT HIS SAMPLE WEAPONS WERE CONSIGNED TO DAWEE IN ORDER TO BRING THEM INTO THAILAND. 3. SUBJECT ADVISED LNCUFF THAT GEN. KRIANGSAK ORDERED.

SECRET

2.43

13 NOV 71 11 11/11

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PAGE TWO BANGKOK 24725 S E C R E T

ONE HUNDRED MACHINE PISTOLS AND TWENTY SNIPER RIFLES. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAD MET WITH H.S.H. ADMIRAL DISKUL, CHIEF AIDE DE CAMP TO H.M. THE KING AND CLAIMS HE WILL SELL HIS MACHINE PISTOL TO THE ROYAL PALACE GUARDS. FURTHER CLAIMS HE WILL HAVE AUDIENCE THIS WEEK WITH H.M. THE KING.

4. FOLLOWING HIS CURRENT THAILAND VISIT, ON 16 NOV 71 SUBJECT AND MR. JASON M. STONE (201-296992) PLAN TRAVEL PHNOM PENH. PLAN TO CONTACT MR. LADD AT PHNOM PENH. ACCORDING LNCUFF SUBJECT PLANS CONTACT CAMBODIAN MIL. AUTHORITIES FOR POSSIBLE WEAPONS SALES. SUBJECT HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITEMS FOR GEN. POXSAMAN IN BANGKOK.

5. MR. JASON M. STONE IS HEAD OF BANGKOK BASED FIRM OF ASSOCIATED CONSULTANTS COMPANY LTD. HE IS CHINESE, WHO WORKED WITH WERBELL IN SEA DURING WWII. SUBJECT NOW REPRESENTS BELGIAN ARMS FIRMS AND IS REP FOR PILATUS PORTER AIRCRAFT.

6. FOLLOWING PHNOM PENH VISIT WERBELL PLANS TRAVEL TO LAOS IN PILATUS PORTER, PROBABLY WITH STONE.

7. DUE RESTRICTION ON PASSING DEROG ON U.S. CITIZEN, BELIEVE BEST APPROACH TO FOLLOW IS CAREFUL ADVICE TO LOCAL

SECRET

2.43

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(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

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ION UNIT FILE VR

ION NO.

PAGE THREE BANGKOK 24725 S E C R E T

MAISON THAT SUBJECT HAS NO OFFICIAL LNLUTE RELATION

AND CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN ANY BUSINESS DEAL. GP-1

S E C R E T

* C/S APPARENTLY WRONG REF.

SECRET

243

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 71-1570

REGISTERED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

28 October 1971

Mr. David H. Henretta, Jr.
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division
Suite 602, Lynn Building
1111 North 19th Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Henretta:

I am returning herewith the Interrogatories sent with your letter of October 26, 1971 and which I have executed before a Notary Public as requested.

Since the xerox copy of Mr. Joseph Liebling's letter did not contain some of the formalities that were in the original, I have noted this in my answer to Interrogatory III.

I trust this takes care of what you need.

Very truly yours,

s/ Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

Encl. - Interrogatories

2.02

INTERROGATORIES

Section 1001, Title 18, United States Code. Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any Department or Agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

I.

Please state your name, address and professional position and indicate how long you have served in this position.

ANSWER: Lawrence R. Houston, Esquire
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
General Counsel
Twenty-four years

II.

In your official capacity as General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, did you receive a letter dated February 16, 1971 from Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense?

ANSWER: Yes

III.

Attached to these interrogatories is a three page document marked "Gov. Ex 14". Are pages 2 and 3 a xerox copy of the letter referred to in Question II?

ANSWER: Yes. The xerox copy does not have handwritten salutation, signature or printed letterhead; however, the text of the original and the xerox copy have been compared and found to be identical.

If the Answer to III. is in the affirmative did you subsequently respond to this letter?

ANSWER: Yes

V.

If affirmative, is page one of the attachment, "Gov. Ex 14", a xerox copy of your responding letter to Mr. Liebling?

ANSWER: Yes


2.42

VI.


If affirmative, is the information in the letter dated 23 February 1971
(in answer to the questions posed in the letter dated 16 February 1971) true
and correct to your best knowledge and belief?

ANSWER: Yes

The foregoing answers to the Interrogatories made by me are true and correct
to the best of my knowledge and belief.


Lawrence R. Houston

Subscribed and Sworn to before me
a person authorized by law to
administer oaths, this 24
day of October 1971.


Gerald H. Jones
Notary Public
Fairfax County, Va.
My Commission Expires May 12, 1973

Office of Asst Secretary of Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division

Letter dated 26 Oct 71

Re: WerBell, Mitchell L. III, Docket No. 228

☐ UNCLASSIFIED
 ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY
 ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
 ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET				
SUBJECT: (Optional) Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III (MIN-056-71)				
FROM: Deputy Director, DCS 912 Key Bldg.		EXTENSION 2265	NO. <i>OGC 71-6387</i> DATE 15 March 1971	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. John K. Greaney, OGC 7D01 HQ				
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14-00000
NIM-056-71

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : John McConnell
John Greany (OGC)
Chief, Miami Field Office

10 March 1971

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of scrapes, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Greany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.


4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OGC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/css

SECRET



Gun Shipment Figures Played Dramatic Roles

By Bruce Galphim
Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA, Dec. 2—The two top officials of an Atlanta firm under investigation for receiving guns shipped from Vietnam through Eglin Air Force Base in Florida are no strangers to controversy or dramatic situations.

One was actively involved in plans to set up an anti-Castro base in Haiti, and both were in the Dominican Republic during the 1965 American intervention to put down a revolution.

Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, vice president of Sionics, an Atlanta weapons research and manufacturing firm, was indicted 2½ years ago on charges of violating a federal law forbidding preparation of a military expedition against a friendly nation from American territory.

The indictment against WerBell and six others was made after customs agents raided an island camp near Marathon, Fla., where they seized a small arsenal of weapons and found 75 battle-clad exiles and Americans.

Not on Island

WerBell himself was not on the island at the time of the raid.

Only four weeks after WerBell was accused, the U.S. attorney in Miami announced the charge was being dismissed, "on the authority of

the attorney general" Ramsey Clark. The federal attorney, William A. McGowan Jr., said he could not make any further comment on why the charge was being dropped.

WerBell commented briefly that he was unhappy because "I've lost my one claim to notoriety."

At the time of the indictment, WerBell was quoted by the Atlanta Constitution as admitting an "extremely combative role" in the anti-Castro base plans.

The federal indictment had alleged a conspiracy to ship guns and munitions from Atlanta and New York to Miami.

But WerBell told a reporter at the time of the indictment that he had withdrawn his support from the Haitian base plan when it appeared to be headed toward direct military action.

"If I'm called upon again to fight Communists in the western hemisphere, I'll do it," he said. "Anything I've done has served the best interest of the United States."

"I've been involved in anti-Communist activities a long time," he said. "I've helped the Dominican government fight the Communists."

Aided Newsman

In the Dominican action two years before, WerBell was credited with pulling a wounded American newsman out of a bullet-riddled car in Santo Domingo. The newsman, Miami Herald photographer Doug Kennedy, had been accidentally wounded by U.S. Marine gunfire.

Fred N. Brown, president of Sionics, also was in the Dominican camp at the time, as

an official for an American development corporation.

At one point during the fighting, he said a few days afterward, he and some 200 other Americans were "lined up against a wall" by armed revolutionaries at a Santo Domingo hotel.

He said the rebels were looking for Cuban nationalists, and that he managed to slip inside the hotel, where American embassy officials negotiated safe conduct. He was evacuated by helicopter to a U.S. warship.

"The Communist movement has actually defeated itself by forcing the United States to adopt such a firm policy," he commented at the time.

Both the Dominican fighting and the Marathon raid occurred before WerBell and Brown founded Sionics.

An Air Force officer at Eglin is under investigation for his role in three shipments of small arms from Vietnam. WerBell denied reports that the weapons were intended for right-wing anti-Negro groups and said he himself, while in Vietnam, had had the captured weapons sent to Atlanta via Eglin for laboratory research.

Viet Arms Shipment to Fla. Aired

By Bruce Galphin

Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA, Dec. 1 — An Atlanta weapons manufacturer said today that he and not an Air Force officer was responsible for three now-controversial shipments of small arms from Vietnam to Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

And, said the businessman, Mitchell L. Werbell III, "We were trying to do a favor for everybody."

"It's a shame they have taken a nice officer like (Lt.

Col.) Paul Marriott and made a scapegoat of him. Marriott didn't even know about it."

Marriott, chief assistant of the Eglin Armament Laboratory, is under investigation for his role in the gun shipments. The Air Force has not yet released a report on findings of its investigation.

Werbell is vice president of Sionics, an Atlanta weapons research and manufacturing company.

He said he spent time in Vietnam supervising the test- ing of flash and sound sup-

pressors manufactured by his firm. While he was there, he said, various South Vietnamese organizations and military officials gave him guns.

Werbell said he was interested in testing the Sionics suppressors on captured Russian-designed AK-47 machine guns, and that he sent a crate back to the states via Eglin. They were officially registered, were delivered to Atlanta and are now "in various stages of disassembly in our laboratory," he stated.

Washington Post - 2 December 1969

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211-259910

memo from OGC
23 Feb 71

OGC-71-0248

Request concerning
affiliation of
WerBell + C.I.A.
(assumed "NO")

MEMORANDUM FOR: Hon. Joseph J. Liebling

Joe: You may already know it, but if you do not, WerBell's lawyer, Edwin Marger, has taken this line before. He was counsel for a British pilot, Hawke, who was tried in Buffalo in 1966 for flying B-26s to Portugal without export licenses. Marger developed the theory that these flights had CIA approval and support. This was totally untrue as we testified at the trial, but Marger seemed convinced that he had a case. He seems to be easily convinced by his clients.

Let me know if you want anything more.

s/Larry

23 February 1971
(DATE)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 February 1971

The Honorable Joseph J. Liebling
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Security Policy)
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Liebling:

Re: WerBell, Mitchell L., III

In response to your letter of 16 February 1971 concerning Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III's alleged affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency, we have investigated the matter thoroughly, and based on all the information available, the answer is "No" for each of your questions numbered 1 through 6.

You should be advised that Mr. WerBell voluntarily contacted a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency's Domestic Contact Service in Coral Gables, Florida, and at Mr. WerBell's initiation furnished voluntary information for the period 16 December 1965 - 19 November 1966 with eleven contacts. It should be noted that the function of the Domestic Contact Service is to receive information which individuals feel is of interest to the United States Government. The office is overtly listed in the telephone book under the Central Intelligence Agency and, therefore, is readily available for contact.

If Mr. WerBell suggests an affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency, he is hereby authorized to divulge the details of his alleged affiliation in the hearing so that he may not use ostensible security as a means of avoiding answering questions.

Sincerely,

Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

201-259910

Office of Asst Secretary of Defense

Letter dated 16 Feb 71

Re: Werbell application for an industrial
security clearance.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☐ INTERNAL
ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

REGISTRATION REQUEST

FROM:

FI/DCG/INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER
2 E 03EXTENSION
5045

NO

ISRM

36075

DATE

~~22 MAR 1972~~ 22 MAR 1972TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)1. IP/201 Section
GA 20

2.

3. IP/~~201~~ SD/
GB 34

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5. FI/ISR
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5 - 3: PLEASE RUSH
ABSTRACTING

201-259910

ABSTRACT X INDEX

DATE ~~21 MAR 1972~~ 22 MAR 1972

233

FORM
3-62

610

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS☒ SECRET☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ INTERNAL
USE ONLY☐ UNCLASSIFIED

No Record in FR/INDEX. 23 March 1972

UTILIZATION	RE-CHECK
DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE	
TO: DCS	TO: SECURITY
TO: DD	TO: CCS
FORM NO.	DOI NO.

SIGNATURE: Loretta Neishly

SECRET

DATE: 23 March 1972

(20-38)

FORM 1797

UNCLASSIFIED PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET (When Filled In)

ADDRESSEE REMARKS	I S R LOG		NATIONAL FILE NO.	DATE
	NEW	RE-REGISTRATION		
	UTILIZATION	RE-CHECK		
	DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE			
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FORM 1797 UNCLASSIFIED PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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SIGNATURE		DATE	FORM NO.	DOI NO.

No Objection to Registration. DCS reserves the right to contact subject in accordance with its responsibilities under NSCID 2, DCID 2/3 and 2/3.1 but will waive this right by mutual agreement if his intended use so requires.

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key

FORM 1797 UNCLASSIFIED PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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22 Mar 72

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no CCS objection
23 Mar 72
go allright
for Chief/CCS/CCB

FORM 1797 UNCLASSIFIED PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

DW-2

CHECK ONE		CS COPY		DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	
1. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NEW <input type="checkbox"/> RE-REGISTRATION <input type="checkbox"/> DE-REGISTRATION		2. ISRN NO. 36,075		3. DATE 22 MARCH 1972	
4. 7-03 Ext. 5435 DEADLINE: 1400 HRS., 24 MARCH 1972		5. 201 NO. 59910			
6. NAME (Last, First, Middle) W E R B E L L, Mitchell Livingston, III					
7. ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS WER-BELL					
8. DATE OF BIRTH CA 1918		9. PLACE OF BIRTH Pennsylvania		10. CITIZENSHIP USA	
11. RESIDENCE Highway 350, Powder Springs, Cobb County, Georgia					
12. PRESENT EMPLOYER Defense Systems, Inc., Powder Springs, Georgia				13. OCCUPATION President	
14. ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA Past Emp: Rich's Dept. Store, Atlanta Former OSS Officer in CBI Theater, WW II					
T R A C E R E S U L T S	15. RED INDEX REMARKS ref 3-23-72 JAS				
	16. RED/CE REMARKS				
17. RESULTS					
18. TO: S & DR		19. DATE 24 March 72		20. NATIONAL FILE NO. 238852 Army	
21. 1. The ISR has no record of a current operational interest in Subject. This is <u>not</u> a registration.					
22. NOTE: This request for registration in the ISR was changed to a utilization check at the request of Mrs. Goodall, USAFAC, 24 March 1972.					
23. EVB					
24. 23 MAR 1972					
25. DROP DATE		26. REASON DROPPED			
27. CS COPY 233					

SECRET



Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA ~~REAL~~ SDO ONE CRS

● ROUTINE

IN: 953234

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR -314/05249-73

DIST 20 JUNE 1973

COUNTRY BAHAMA ISLANDS

DOI 15 JUNE 1973

SUBJECT ANTICIPATION THAT ABACO SECESSIONISTS
WILL NOT RESORT TO VIOLENCE

ACQ 16 JUNE 1973

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BAHAMIAN SERVICE.

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ANY VIOLENCE AND/OR ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE ABACO SECESSIONISTS DURING THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS. TROUBLE IS NOT EXPECTED FROM THE COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO AND ERRINGTON W A T K I N S, LEADING SPOKESMAN FOR THE ABACO SECESSIONISTS AND FORMER FREE NATIONAL MOVEMENT (FNM) MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. TROUBLE MAY, HOWEVER, OCCUR AFTER INDEPENDENCE.

2. WATKINS IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN ERRATIC PERSONALITY WHO COULD TAKE EXTREME ACTION IF ABACO WERE IGNORED BY THE GOVERNMENT AFTER INDEPENDENCE OR NOT GIVEN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

S E C R E T

256

IN 953234

TDRR-314 05249-73

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

IN THE MEANTIME, WATKINS VALUES HIS POLITICAL CAREER AND WISHES TO REGAIN HIS PARLIAMENTARY SEAT. HE, THEREFORE, IS NOT LIKELY TO ATTEMPT ANY VIOLENT ACTION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE BAHAMAS PRESS REPORTED ON 13 JUNE 1973 THAT WATKINS HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM THE FNM. ON 15 JUNE THE BAHAMAS PRESS REPORTED THAT WATKINS HAD DECLARED HIMSELF AN INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATIVE IN PARLIAMENT AND THAT THE COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO WOULD BE CONVERTED INTO A POLITICAL PARTY.)

3. (BAHAMIAN SERVICE COMMENT: IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT WATKINS' NEW POLITICAL PARTY WILL BECOME A SIGNIFICANT FORCE IN THE BAHAMAS. A FEW OTHER FNM MEMBERS, INCLUDING POSSIBLY SIR ROLAND SYMONE TTE, CLEOPHAS ADDERLEY AND MICHAEL LIGHTBOURN, MAY JOIN THE NEW PARTY, ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE ALSO EXPELLED FROM THE FNM. IN THE FUTURE, A THREE PARTY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE THE PROGRESSIVE LIBERAL PARTY, THE OPPOSITION FNM AND THE NEW WATKINS PARTY MAY EMERGE IN THE BAHAMAS.) 61.83 700

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1), (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

Trace Request from AF-OSI

Case # 04D74(24C) 3232

~~Revised~~
Dated 8 May 70

FBI document dated 5 May 70
from Atlanta, Ga.

Subject: Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, III

Sionics Lab

Route I, Powder Springs,

Georgia

FBI document
dated 13 Mar '70
Bureau file: (NI) 62-108665
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell,
III - Neutrality Matters

26 february 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Washington Evening Star Article entitled "The Story of CBS and the Plot to Invade Haiti"
which appeared in the 26 February 1970 Edition

1. Subject article reported that a CBS cameraman, James WILSON, had contacted CIA agents in Houston while on a space shot assignment in 1966, and that the CIA had informed the FBI, who called on WILSON and referred him to U.S. Customs.

2. WH Division has ascertained that on 30 June 1966, a James WILSON called the CIA Duty Officer of the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) office in Houston, Texas, and subsequently related a story about a proposed plot being staged in the U.S. to invade Haiti and overthrow the Duvalier Government, and that CBS had convinced the parties involved that they should allow CBS to photograph and televise a Special Program on the preparations. WILSON requested and received assurances from the DCS officer that he would not be identified as the source of this information.

3. On 6 July 1966, WH Division sent a blind memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of State which forwarded a resume of WILSON's story to the DCS, without identifying the source. The memorandum stated that the source's motive for disclosing this information was to alert the U.S. Government to a potentially embarrassing situation if it were involved in an insecure operation. The JMWAVE Station also passed a resume of this information to the U.S. Customs Bureau in Miami.

4. Except in connection with this report, there is no record of any operational involvement by the Agency with WILSON.

201-259916

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, SOD/GB


SUBJECT : Possible Clandestine Planning Involving
Haiti

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, dated
30 January 1970

1. WH/7 conveyed the substance of your first memorandum on this subject to the FBI, which has now advised us that the Office of Special Investigations, USAF, and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department, have both had recent investigative interest in WERBELL's activities.

2. Under these circumstances, WH/7 suggests that LTC Cochrane be advised to inform an appropriate USAF security office of Mr. WERBELL's statements. This should insure that any follow-up inquiry concerning those statements would be properly coordinated with such other investigations as may be in process.

David L. Smock
C/WH/7



21-259910

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/7

SUBJECT: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

REFERENCE: Memorandum for C/WH/7, Same Subject,
dated 15 January 1970

1. On 28 January 1970, Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, Vice President of SIONICS, Inc., told LTC Barney Cochrane, USAF, that he had not been contacted by any interested representative of the U.S. Government concerning the information pertaining to Haitian plotting passed previously. Mr. WerBell said that his reference to the plan being initiated in Canada is a blind and that the plotting is based in Haiti. He also stated that he has been approached to provide the equivalent of five million dollars worth of arms to the group and that the plotting has French backing.

2. The above information was received from LTC Cochrane by LTC Charles Williamson, USMC, and is provided to WH/7 for disposition and action. This information, to the best of our knowledge, has not been acted upon by SACSA; however, Mr. WerBell is concerned that no action is being taken or apparent interest shown.

Casimiro Barquin
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

20 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III

REFERENCE : Memo from C/SOD/GB to C/WH/7 dtd 15 Jan 1970
Subject: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving
Haiti

1. Andrew Bacuzzi, SOD/GB, advised 19 January 1969, after my phone call to Mr. Barquin pointing out the third agency aspect of the Werbell report, that Col. Williamson has checked with his friend Col. Cochrane, and that the latter stated he had taken no other action with this info and intended to take none. Col. Cochrane apparently regards the info as being none of his own official business and was telling his friend (Williamson) about it as a private citizen.

2. Suggest we just use Williamson as the source.

James P. Mullen
C/WH/7/HT

Distribution:

1 - 201-259910

1 - 100-9-16

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2.25

201-259910

SOD 70-657

15 JAN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/7

SUBJECT: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

1. The Vice President of SIONICS Inc., Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, contacted LTC Barney Cochrane, USAF, assigned to SACSA, in early January 1970 and said that he learned of the existence of plans for a special clandestine operation based perhaps in Canada against President Duvalier's regime within the next four months. Mr. WerBell said that he believes this effort has a good chance of success since it is well financed and directed. Mr. WerBell conveyed to LTC Cochrane that he is willing to reveal all that he knows concerning the organization and its plan to interested U. S. authorities.

2. The above information was obtained from LTC Cochrane by LTC Charles Williamson, USMC, assigned to SOD/GB. SOD and the Office of Security have an extensive file on Mr. WerBell who has a long history of worldwide involvement in borderline and sometimes illegal international gun deals. It is felt by LTC Cochrane that Mr. WerBell's story is plausible and warrants further investigation. Mr. WerBell's motive for revealing this type of information at present could be an effort to relieve pressure on his firm and himself for gun deals that did not conform to U. S. export control regulations and are being investigated and warrants pending.

3. To the best of our knowledge, no action has been taken on this information by SACSA.

Casimiro Barquin
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

Cable from FBI dated 22 Jan 70

Subj: Mitchell Livingston Webb III, Internal Security - White

RG: R. LEHMAN:gt
 DT: WH/7/UT
 I: 1349-5595
 DT: 19 JAN 1970

TOTAL COSTS:

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4		8

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INDEX

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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-259916

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(classification)

1072 519 1120 1140

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(reference number)

1953

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR

003875

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI

MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO THIS AGENCY'S CSCI 316/02323-69

DATED 27 JUNE 1969; SUBJECT: WERBELL, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON III,
A COPY OF WHICH WAS SENT TO YOUR BUREAU.

2. IN EARLY JANUARY 1970, A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING SUBJECT. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, WERBELL HAS STATED THAT HE KNOWS OF PLANS FOR A SPECIAL CLANDESTINE OPERATION AGAINST PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S REGIME IN HAITI SCHEDULED TO OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS. WERBELL SAID THE OPERATION, WHICH MIGHT BE BASED IN CANADA, IS WELL FINANCED AND DIRECTED AND, IN HIS ESTIMATION, HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. SOURCE SAID WERBELL EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO REVEAL ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO INTERESTED U.S. AUTHORITIES CONCERNING THE PLANS AND THE ORGANIZATION BEHIND THE CLANDESTINE OPERATION.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

Continued

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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OFFICE**

CG 57 NC

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MESSAGE FORM
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4	6	1

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(classification) **SECRET** (date and time filed) PAGE TWO (date) (time) (reference number) 003879

SOURCE COMMENTED THAT WERBELL'S MOTIVE FOR REVEALING THIS INFORMATION TO U.S. AUTHORITIES AT THIS TIME MAY BE THE HOPE OF RELIEVING PRESSURE ON HIS FIRM AND HIMSELF FOR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BELIEVED TO BE PRESENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS.

3. THE FILES OF THIS AGENCY REFLECT THAT WERBELL IS VICE PRESIDENT OF SIONICS, INC., OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA, AND THAT HE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS BY YOUR BUREAU IN CONNECTION WITH HIS NUMEROUS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS AGENCY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION WHICH YOUR BUREAU CAN OBTAIN CONCERNING THE ALLEGED OPERATION REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: Memo for C/WH/7 from C/SOD/CB
Subject: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti
Dated : 15 January 1970

5
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3
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1

J. Roman
C/CI/LIAISON

C/WH/R _____
SOD/CB _____ WILLIAM A. BROE
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER **SECRET** AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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801-259910

SECRET

87 JUN 1969

TO: Chief, Counterintelligence Division
Directorate of Special Investigations
The Inspector General, USAF

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: 0 WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III

1. Reference is made to your request dated 28 May 1969 concerning Subject, born 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The files of this office contain the following information:

2. According to a summary report dated 19 March 1969, compiled from numerous documents, Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 when it was discovered that he was involved with anti-CASTRO plotters in the Dominican Republic. Further investigation disclosed Subject to be unscrupulous--a wheeler-dealer and promoter of grandiose schemes, with a history of materializing in areas and situations where he can make a quick profit. The report also revealed that Subject, in his foreign dealings, had misrepresented himself as an employee of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. In March 1969 Subject was in Thailand conducting or attempting to conduct business with the Royal Thai Government.

CSCI-316/02323-69

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Department of State

CC: Defense Intelligence Agency

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

RID/CE: JKS/MB/nkc

BASED ON: DIR-88114, 19 March 1969 (to Bangkok)

FILE IN: 201-259910*

SECRET

Trace Request from AF, Counterintelligence Division,
Directorate of Special Investigations

File No 04D 74 (24c) 3232 dated 28 May 69

SECRET - TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - FTBA-33,068
DATE - 30 JUNE 1969
FILM - NONE
INDEX - NONE
FILE - NONE
TO - CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION
INFO - NONE
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, BANGKOK
SUBJECT - ~~O~~ SIONICS INC. PROPOSAL TO RTG FOR SNIPER TRAINING
PROGRAM
ACTION - NONE
REF - FTBW-16321

1. STATION HAD SEEN PUBLICATION CITED PARA ONE OF REF.
2. WEBBELL FIRST CAME TO ATTENTION OF STATION IN LATE MARCH 1969, WHEN HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH BPP IN BANGKOK. AFTER RECEIVING DIR 38114 IN RESPONSE TO OUR TRACE REQUEST, WE SUGGESTED TO BPP THAT THEY WOULD DO WELL TO AVOID HIM. WE HEARD NOTHING OF HIM FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. HOWEVER, IN LATE APRIL AND EARLY MAY HE WAS BACK IN THE SPOTLIGHT AND, WE DISCOVERED, IN TOUCH WITH A VARIETY OF RTG AND U.S. MILITARY ELEMENTS. WE PROMPTLY PASSED THE GIST OF HIS REPUTATION TO KEY PERSONALITIES IN THE MISSION INCLUDING AMBASSADOR, DEFENSE ATTACHE, ARPA, SA/CI, U.S. ARMY CIC, OSI AND J-2 MACTHAI. WE PARTICULARLY STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SPONSORED IN ANY WAY BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HIS NAME HAS COME UP CONSISTENTLY FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND WE HAVE PULLED VERY FEW PUNCHES IN DESCRIBING HIM, EITHER TO AMERICANS OR THAIS. IN FACT, WE WROTE A MEMORANDUM EXPRESSING OUR RESERVATIONS, PASSED IT TO J-2 MACTHAI, AND SUGGESTED HE BRIEF THE J-2 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ACCORDINGLY. WE ALSO SENT A BURN NOTICE MESSAGE, BANGKOK 3055, TO ALL FE STATIONS.


3. AFTER DYNAMIC BEGINNING, WEBBELL IS NOW SUFFERING EXPECTED

SECRET

TELEPOUCH

FTBA-33,068

PAGE ONE



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201-259910

SECRET

TELEPOUCH

FIBA-33,268

PAGE TWO

SETBACKS. THE EMBASSY HAS REFUSED TO ENDORSE HIM AND HIS PRODUCTS.

MACTHAI HAS AGREED TO FURNISH TO RTG SOME OF THE ITEMS HE WAS

ATTEMPTING TO PEDDLE, AND RTG HAS COOLED CONSIDERABLY RE SIONICS

PARTICIPATION IN ANY ASPECT OF COUNTER INSURGENCY EFFORT. WEP-

BELL'S RUNNING MATE, M/GEN WATSON, HAS ALREADY LEFT THAILAND.

WERBELL IS SUPPOSED TO LEAVE SHORTLY. WE WILL MISS HIM.

EDGAR N. DANAGE

I'll bet

DISTRIBUTION VIA TELEPOUCH

2 - CHIEF, FE DIVISION

14-00000
State Dept. Telegram
BANGKOK 8458 dated 25 June '69
Subject: Export License for
Ingram Submachine Gun

SECRET TELETYPE

1112Z 26- 1112Z-16301

FILE - 201-259910

DATE - 23 JUNE 1963

INDEX - NONE

FILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, BANGKOK

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

SUBJECT- SIONICS, INC. PROPOSAL TO RTG FOR SNIPER TRAINING
PROGRAM

ACTION - NONE

REFS - A. DIRECTOR 27114

B. DIRECTOR 25804

C. BANGKOK 3055 /IN 666027

1. POUCHING PRIORITY UNDER TM 403749 COPY OF SIONICS
PROPOSAL "NEUTRALIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST TERRORIST THREAT
IN THAILAND" OBTAINED LOCALLY FROM LHMREAD WHICH STATION MAY
OR MAY NOT HAVE SEEN.

2. PROPOSAL ESSENTIALLY HAS CIVILIAN FIRM INSERTING
ITSELF INTO MILITARY ADVISORY ROLE WITH OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF
PEDDLING ITS HARDWARE AT SUBSTANTIAL PROFIT YET COVERING
ITSELF WITH SEMI-OFFICIAL AURA. IF THAIS FALL FOR APPROACH
OF THIS SORT, THEY WILL EVENTUALLY REALIZE THEY HAVE BEEN
TAKEN AND THIS COULD HAVE FAIRLY SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON
THAI-US RELATIONS. WE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED SINCE PER REF
C WERBELL HAS BEEN KNOWN FOR REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS RETIRED
COLONEL AND AS LOCAL CHIEF OF WOFIRM. FYI, WE UNDERSTAND
SOME HARDWARE ITEMS IN PROPOSAL ARE QUITE GOOD BUT NOTE THAT
SUCH ITEMS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH REGULAR MAP CHANNELS
AT LOWER COST.

SECRET TELETYPE TELETYPE

FTS-16301

PAGE ONE

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CS COPY

201-259910

2-7

3. REALIZE THAT STATION IS NOT IN POSITION TO EXERT VETO OVER SIGNED PROPOSAL BUT FEEL IT INCUMBENT UPON WOFIRM TO APPRISE SA/CI, VACHTAI, AMBASSADOR AND ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES OF WENBELL'S BACKGROUND AND OUR VERY STRONG RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THIS PROPOSAL TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY **TO THE DEFEAT OF COMMUNIST TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION IN THAILAND** AS ADVERTISED, AND EVEN STRONGER RESERVATIONS RE ANY OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH WENBELL.

4. FURTHER CHECK OF 201 FILE INDICATES SUBJECT REFS ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE IN APRIL 1943, WAS COMMISSIONED 2ND LIEUTENANT IN SIGNAL CORPS JUNE 1944 AND ASSIGNED TO CHINA-BURMA THEATER. SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO OSS FROM APRIL UNTIL DECEMBER 1945 WHEN HE RETURNED TO WOLADY AND WAS DISCHARGED AS 1ST LIEUTENANT. IN ADDITION TO FOUR CAMPAIGN MEDALS, SUBJECT WAS AWARDED SOLDIERS MEDAL FOR PERSONAL HEROISM EXHIBITED IN SAVING THE LIFE OF CHINESE SOLDIER WHO FELL INTO ELECTRICAL TRANSFORMER. RECORD INDICATES NO FURTHER MILITARY SERVICE.

JOHN W. GILCHRIST

ATTACHMENT, U/S/C

AS STATED ABOVE

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

2 - OCS, BANGKOK


Headquarters:

- 1 - FE/TBL/T
- 1 - RI/SD
- 1 - CI/OPS/FE
- 1 - SOD/GB/MS

FE/TBL/T/RGWeidner/SOD/GB/MS/
CTWilliamson:dsr/1742

CI/OPS/FE W. Johnson (In Draft)

ACFE/TBL Robert D. Kennedy



SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

FIDW-16301

PAGE TWO END

CFE William E. Nelson

217

23 June 1969

CS COPY

201-259910

14-00000
Dept of State Telegram

STATE 101507 dated 20 JUNE '69

Subject: Export License for
Ingram Submachine Gun

State Dept. Telegram

BANGKOK 8235 dated 20 June '69

(re: import license)

State Dept. Telegram

STATE 087398 dated 29 May 69

Subject: Starlight Scopes and
Silencers

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		INFO: _____		FILE VR _____		

PAGE 2 BANGKOK 3055 S E C R E T

3. WERBELL IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, BORN 1919, SERVED IN OSS, HAS SHAVEN HEAD AND HANDLEBAR MUSTACHE. REF ADVISES THAT FULL DETAILS OF HIS BACKGROUND SHOULD NOT BE PASSED TO LIAISON SINCE HE IS U.S. CITIZEN. HOWEVER, STATES THAT LIAISON CAN BE INFORMED, SHOULD HE APPEAR IN YOUR AREA, THAT HE HAS AN UNSAVORY REPUTATION, HAS NO U.S. GOVT CONNECTIONS, AND ANY DEALINGS WITH HIM SHOULD BE APPROACHED WITH EXTREME CAUTION.

4. FOR SAIGON: WE UNDERSTAND THAT WERBELL RECENTLY VISITED SAIGON AND DID HIS THING WITH GEN. ABRAMS, WHO WAS SUITABLY IMPRESSED, AND WERBELL IS NOW SETTING UP A SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM.

5. FILE: 201-259910

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SECRET

26 May 1969

Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya
Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Supreme Command, RTAF
Bangkok, Thailand

Dear Air Chief Marshal Dawee:

Sionics, Inc. is pleased to submit this proposal in response to the urgent requirement to neutralize the communist terrorist threat in the border areas of Thailand. This requirement was first brought to our attention during the recent trip to threatened border areas of Thailand made by yourself, Air Vice Marshal Manob, and Major General Prasart, accompanied by our field representative to Thailand, Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III.

This urgent requirement was of course further discussed with you during your recent visit to Washington to attend the funeral of General Eisenhower.

In consequence we have prepared a pilot program with the objective of neutralizing the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand. We have entitled the program "Neutralization of the Communist Terrorist Threat in Thailand" with short title NCTTT. In scope the NCTTT encompasses five major phases and spans a twelve month program. Basically we offer a proven program based, in part, on the outstandingly successful U. S. 9th Division Sniper Program in the Delta of Vietnam. Finally, and most importantly, this program is also based on Special Operations programs executed by members of the Sionics organization during wartime, counterinsurgency and guerrilla operations executed in South Asia, Europe, South America, Dominican Republic, and Vietnam.

We have selected a team of highly qualified experts whose combined capabilities represent all the disciplines required to the planning and execution of this program.

14-00000
-2-
In view of the above, Sionics, Inc. assures you that the full resources of the Corporation will be provided for the successful performance of this work. We look forward to the opportunity of serving the Royal Thai Government in order to contribute to the defeat of Communist terrorism and subversion in Thailand.

With Warm Personal Regard and Respect.

Sincerely,

Sionics, Inc.



Fred N. Brown
President

FOR THE
REALIZATION OF THE
COMMUNIST/TERRORIST THREAT
IN THAILAND

VOLUME I: OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL

6 May, 1969

Mr. Chief Marshal Pracha Chulakap-ao

Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Supreme Command, JCS

Bangkok, Thailand

Prepared by: MONICS, INC.

Atlanta, Georgia

PROPRIETARY NOTICE

The data furnished herein--

shall not be disclosed outside the Royal Thai Government or the United States Government or be duplicated, used or disclosed in whole or in part for any purpose other than to evaluate this proposal, provided that if a contract is awarded to this offeror as a result of or in connection with the submission of such data, these Governments shall have the right to duplicate, use, or disclose this data to the extent provided in the contract. This restriction does not limit these Governments' right to use information contained in such data if it is obtained from another source.

S I O N I Q S, I N C.
Atlanta, Georgia

III. PROGRAM DISCUSSION

IV. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A. Objective

B. Program Title

C. Scope

D. Schedule

E. Organization and Management

V. PROGRAM OPERATIONS

A. General concept

B. Operations Planning

1. Phase I: Planning, Preparation and Installation of Training Center

2. Phase II: Organization and Training

3. Phase III: Deployment and Insertion of Hunter/Killer Teams; Initiation of Operations

4. Phase IV: Evaluation

5. Phase V: Expansion of Operations

VI. CONCEPTS, POLICIES AND RELEVANT PROGRAMS

STATE OF NEW YORK
IN SENATE
JANUARY 1, 1968

- FIGURE 1. Operational Schedule WCTT
FIGURE 2. Organization and Management WCTT
FIGURE 3. Prov. SO H/S Fltr.
FIGURE 4. Equipment
FIGURE 5. Labor
FIGURE 6. Prov. SO H/S Company

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This proposal is presented by SIONICS, Inc. in response to urgent requirements to neutralize the communist terrorist threat in Thailand as voiced by responsible members of the Royal Government of Thailand.

We have examined the problem in detail and have concluded that the unique capabilities of SIONICS, Inc. can provide one answer to stopping Communist terrorism in Thailand. We have either worked on, are working on, or will soon become involved in projects of this type, which will insure immediate working knowledge of the essential elements for problem solution.

We have established firm liaison with the Royal Thai Government and U. S. Government organizations in Thailand to include Supreme Command Headquarters, WDC, U. S. Embassy, USOM, ARMA, SUPFAC, MACV, MACV. Additionally, SIONICS has established wide and successful relationships with U. S. Government and industrial organizations concerned with the problem.

In consequence, it is considered that SIONICS, Inc. would be fully capable of executing the program proposed and of expanding it to help solve the final problem of arresting communist subversion in Thailand. It is our opinion that the methodology, format, and related matters are well described in this proposal.

Our task will be to field a team of professional and highly qualified military technicians, backed by appropriate support and resources, that will be fully capable of executing this plan to the complete satisfaction of the Royal Thai Government. To

and we have personnel immediately available that represent a blend of counter-insurgency operational experience and technical know-how.

In view of the nature of the problem, this proposal is basically an outline plan indicating how the operation will be accomplished. This volume presents our operational proposal, along with a proposed management plan, a summary of corporate experience, and the resumes of the military and technical personnel STORMICS, Inc. proposes to assign to the effort. The Cost Proposal is submitted separately as VOLUME II.

14. PROBLEM
The program in which will contribute to the neutralization of the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand.

11. PROBLEM DISCUSSION

a. Fundamental requirements for Problem Solution

THAISEC, Inc. consider that the basic success of this plan will depend in large measure of fielding a team of knowledgeable individuals who:

1. Know Thailand and the considerable Communist threat to its border areas.
2. Know the principal personalities in the Royal Thai Government (RTG) concerned with neutralizing the Communist threat.
3. Know the principal U. S. Government officials in Thailand, South Vietnam, and Washington, D. C. concerned with assisting the RTG in neutralizing this threat.
4. Fully understand the threat of Communist terrorism and subversion and possess the knowledge and skill to counteract this threat.
5. Know and be able to apply firsthand the tactics, techniques, organizational and training procedures, and weapons and equipment techniques/employment to defeat this threat. and
6. Possess long experience and proven skills in defeating an insurgent threat.

14-00000
B. Systematic Introduction of Military Judgement

By definition the neutralization or defeat of

Communist terrorism consists of the specialized application of counter-insurgency operations by the employment of intelligence; psychological operations; hunter-killer operations to include jungle, mountain, air, riverine, border, and village security operations; communications; logistics; specialized training and equipment, and other techniques. SIONICS, Inc. considers that the techniques designed by our Corporation to neutralize Communist terrorism in the border areas of Thailand is based on sound past experience in this field and would lead to the development of a wide-spread organization and system within the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF), the Border Patrol Police (BPP), and the Thai National Police (TNP) to counteract this threat throughout the country.

Establishment of a system and organization to neutralize the Communist threat cannot be accomplished without reliance on sound and informed military judgement based on proven techniques. SIONICS, Inc. has pioneered in the development of these techniques which permit the systematic development and use in analysis and execution of military and technical judgement.

The techniques and equipment developed for this purpose are designed and operate for the "usual or normal" case in which they will be used under combat conditions. The capability that accrues from the employment of these techniques and equipment in unusual or peculiar situations should be considered a bonus effect rather than an expected mode of operation.

3. Critical Factors Related to Solving the Problem

Operational planning for successful counter-insurgency operations requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy, weather, terrain, his force, operations and capabilities, and intimate knowledge of the population within the operational area. Additionally, one of the critical factors in counter-insurgency operations is the psychological operations effort that must be geared with any operation of this type. The key to success of these operations is to identify, infiltrate, block, ambush, harass, and otherwise neutralize the enemy. The basic concept of operations is to strike him when he is most vulnerable, in his rear areas, when he is moving to his objective, or just before he commences his attack. In order to operate in this environment, special operational detachments, or hunter-killer teams, will be needed. The individuals that man these teams as well as those who command and direct them, will have to be specially trained, equipped, organized, and, above all, psychologically prepared for these operations.

As a final note this operation to be successful must be fully supported by the Royal Thai Government, the Chief of Mission to Thailand, Chief JUSAC, and COMUSMACV.

14-00000
a. Purpose

to arrest or neutralize Communist terrorism in the border areas of Thailand.

b. Program Title

Neutralization of Communist Terrorist Threat in Thailand (NCTT).

c. Scope

The scope of this program encompasses a twelve month, five phase operation as follows:

Phase I - Planning, preparation, and installation of Training Center.

Phase II - Selection of personnel, organization of first SO Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon (SO H/K Pltn.) and Training Program.

Phase III - Insertion of Platoon into Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility, initiation of Hunter/Killer operations, organization, training and insertion of two additional SO H/K Platoons.

Phase IV - Evaluation of operations to include amending operational concepts, organization, planning, logistics and administration.

Phase V - Expansion of operations with three SO H/K Platoons. Continuance of operations to include deep penetration missions. Preparation for further expansion of NCTT as required.

d. Schedule

See Figure 1.

SIONICS, Inc. will have immediately available a team of selected military and technical experts to work on the project. These personnel, led by Mr. Mitchell L. Werbell, III, SIONICS field representative in Thailand and Vietnam, will be backed by appropriate civilian technical personnel who would provide expertise as required in the general fields of sniper and special operations training and the maintenance of the operational equipment and weapons. The Corporation would assign these people to projects in accordance with their individual capabilities.

Program Schedule -- See Figure 1 (NCTTT Program Schedule, Twelve Months).

During the first week after initiation of the program, Mr. Werbell, as program manager, will meet with selected Supreme Command and Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) personnel for the initial establishment of NCTTT planning and organization of the joint MRDC/SIONICS Operations Planning Group (JSOPG). At this time he will receive an indoctrination orientation and guidance from appropriate Supreme Command and MRDC personnel. Coordination, communications channels and liaison requirements will be established. In this regard, it is anticipated that a period of from two to three weeks will be required for this initial planning and the establishment of basic and detailed joint operational plans.

During the next two weeks period, joint activity will consist of the selection of appropriate Sniper Training Team personnel from RTA units and Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon personnel from appropriate RTAF, BPP and TNP

units in Thailand. In this regard, the Sniper Team should be drawn if at all possible from the ten previously trained sniper personnel presently on duty with the Black Panther Division in Vietnam. These personnel were trained in the U. S. 9th Division Sniper Training Program in the Vietnam Delta. During this Phase personnel will be organized into the SO H/K Platoon structure.

During the period 6th through the 12th week, Platoon personnel would be undergoing the sniper training program consisting of basic firing positions and integrated acts of shooting. Additionally, during this period, JSOPG would establish standing operating procedures and effect the liaison with appropriate RTAF, RFP and TNP units in the joint Tactical Area of Operations Responsibility (TAOR) selected for the pilot program for the First Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon. Thus, at the end of the third program month, the first teams would be selected, organized, trained and ready for insertion into the TAOR.

During the next phase, the operational phase, the three Hunter/Killer teams of the First Provisional SO H/K Platoon would be inserted into the TAOR and established with appropriate Thai military and para-military border control units. At this time SIO/ICS advisory and technical personnel would be working closely with appropriate JSOPG opposite numbers in order to insure proper employment of the teams. It is important to note here, however, that at no time would SIO/ICS team personnel be expected to actually direct or enter into operational activities of the Special Operations Hunter/Killer

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...should be engaged and prohibited
from entering into any form of combat activity, whatsoever.

* During the operational phase, (4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th months) the RTG personnel would follow closely SO activities and conduct with their counterparts continuous evaluation of team activities. During the entire operational phase continuing evaluation of the NCRTT Program would be carried on. At some time between the 5th and 6th months a mutual decision would be made with PRDC officials for recommendations to be made to the RTAF Supreme Command for the expansion of team activity and the inclusion of the two additional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoons into a Special Operations Hunter/Killer Company for further operations and protection for additional villages. These operations would be continued to include deep penetration operations as appropriate and permissible providing the RTG obtains permission for across the border operations "in hot pursuit" of Communist terrorists. During the entire insertion and operational phase, it is to be underscored that psychological operations will be conducted at all times in conjunction with Special Operations Hunter/Killer team activity. The final three months of the 12 month NCRTT program schedule would be devoted to further expansion as necessary of Special Operations Hunter/Killer team activity and/or organization of further Special Operations Hunter/Killer Companies for employment throughout the border areas of Thailand.

Organization and Management (See Figure 2)

Because of the importance which SIONICS, Inc. attaches to the proposed program, we will keep close top management cognizance of this project. The responsible officer (Mr. Werbell) is a Director and Vice President of SIONICS and will report directly to the President of the Corporation. In this manner, we can assure you that to the extent necessary, the full resources of the Corporation can be made available to guarantee a fully satisfactory program.

In managing this project we proposed to guarantee continually and consistency throughout the entire period of this effort. The key to this, of course, rests with the personnel assigned. Frequent changes in personnel will be avoided, and if changes are required, because of new skills being required, replacement personnel will be phased in with adequate overlap wherever possible. A full resume on Mr. Werbell may be found in Part VI of this proposal. It is to be noted that he has had considerable experience in the counter-insurgency field, having served in South Vietnam and the Far East for SIONICS since September of 1968. He has had long experience in weapons and clandestine operations dating back to World War II at which time he was a parachute unit Commander of a special operations group in OSS units operating in the Far East. Since that time he has been continuously interested in development of exotic weaponry and is the holder of several patents in this field. Since 1958, he has devoted practically all of his time in anti-communist activities throughout Central and South America

and has advised a number of Central American governments on counter-insurgency activities and development of weapons for this purpose.

The program manager would be assisted by a staff of extremely competent experts chosen from his wide cognizance and knowledge of counter-insurgency experts throughout the free world. He would be assisted when necessary by Major General Harold E. Satsen, Director of SIONICS and in charge of technical planning. His knowledge and background in corporate planning, world-wide government, and corporate contracts is considered invaluable to the SIONICS group.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General Concept

The purpose of this program will be to strike the Communist insurgents where they are most vulnerable and to mesh the operations of selected Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams into present Royal Thai Government ongoing Counterinsurgency Programs based on the proven and historic causes of victory over the Communists:

Aggressive anti-guerrilla tactics.

Removal of sections of the population thus depriving insurgents of contact with the people.

Removal of the support of the population.

In attacking Communist terrorist vulnerability, the Special Operations Hunter/Killer program will be designed to operate against the enemy and concentrate on the following categories of insurgent vulnerability:

1. Insurgent base area system which, although fragmented, is a coherent complex of combat, combat support, and combat service support facilities and activities which embrace populated as well as remote areas. In this, Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams will, in the final phases of the operation, be directed to attack or operate on the perimeters of insurgent base area systems.

2. Insurgent combat units in avoiding prolonged combat may use escape routes that will subject them ideally to ambush by Hunter/Killer Teams. In this, the classic principals of "the hammer and anvil operation" will be employed. Helicopter

1. Immediate development of Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams will aid in effective and swift team insertion and withdrawal at the operational moment.

2. Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams will operate within the urban areas and village compounds in order to operate directly within the population against and within which communist terrorists operate.

3. Operational Phasing

1. Phase I - Planning, Preparation, and

Installation of Training Center.

Initiation of planning by SIOHCS Program Manager with the Supreme Command and the Military Research and Development (MRDC) selected personnel. Establishment of a Joint MRDC/

SIOHCS Special Operations Planning Group (JSOPG) to develop detailed plans for the organization, training and operational employment of an MRDC Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon. In this, the JSOPG may be expanded to include selected personnel from JUSMAG, USOM, and ARPA as required.

2. Training Center and Program

(1) Establishment of the Training Center

The RTG Sniper School and Special Operations Training Center will be established at a location to be designated.

As a basis for school personnel, a team of one officer and ten NCO's will be selected. In order to save the five to six weeks

required to train this team it will be necessary to draw this team from the ten members of the RTA Black Panther Division who

graduated from the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School in Vietnam.

Each member of the team must be in experienced and familiar

with M-14 accurizing techniques. Additional RTA offices and

personnel will be required to staff the Center with instructors

in special operations, artillery fire adjustment, navigation,

map reading and deception operations. A certain number of Train-

ing Center command administrative personnel will also be required.

(2) Training Facility

A sniper training facility will be constructed

to accommodate 30 students. The facility should include a 40

point firing range and adjacent classrooms. The range should

be built with target facilities at 150, 300, 600, and 900 meters.

A moving target should be built on the 300 meter butt in addition

to the fixed targets at that position.

c. Equipment

(1) The sniper teams of the 30 M/K Pltn.

will be equipped with National Match Grade M-14 rifles obtained

by urgent RTG request to JUSMAG. These rifles are glass bedded

into impregnated stocks which are impervious to water. The rifles

are carefully tuned to provide a high degree of accuracy.

(2) The accurized M-14 rifles will be

equipped with a 3-9 variable power adjustable ranging telescope

sight (ART). The telescope is mounted in conjunction with a

ballistic cam. The sight reticle includes a pair of stadia

lines. By varying the power of the telescope until the stadia

lines define a 30 inch area on the target, the ballistic cam

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adjusted the sight to the proper elevation for that distance.
Errors due to range estimation are virtually eliminated with
this system. An alternate M-14 authorized rifle could be
equipped with the M34 telescope. These sights are a fixed 2.2
power telescope with a post reticle. Using the M34 the sniper
must accurately estimate the gun target range and either hold
over the target or adjust the elevating mechanism on the sight
to the estimated range.

(3) For night operations at least one half
of the sniper rifles will be equipped with the VARGO Starlight
Scope. VARGO Starlight Scopes will be mounted on the M-14 rifles
at the sniper school and zeroed during training. The sniper
retains his own scope/rifle/suppressor combination during sub-
sequent operations. This procedure assures retention of zero
even though the sight is dismounted during daylight operations
and remounted for night operations.

(4) The ammunition used in sniper training
and combat must be 7.62mm U. S. National Match Grade.

(5) All M-14 sniper rifles will be filled
with the SIGROCK-LAW-1 noise suppressor. (See Inclosure 1 for
complete description). As noted above, each student will retain
his own rifle/scope/suppressor combination during subsequent
operations.

(6) Additional to the basic sniper rifle/
scope/suppressor combination, the SO M/K Pich. will be equipped
with alternate noise suppressed weapons on as required by the

and the maintenance, demolition, and individual equipment
all items provided as required.

2. Phase II - Organization and Training

a. Selection of Personnel

The JSOPC will, during the 4th and 5th week select a total of 80 highly qualified and motivated personnel. Students accepted into the sniper program will be selected from volunteers. Those who are selected must have 20/20 vision, have qualified as an expert rifleman and be well motivated soldiers. Experience in competitive marksmanship is preferred but is not mandatory.

b. Organization

See Figure 3.

The First NTC Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon will be organized into a Platoon Headquarters and three Hunter/Killer teams as shown. Double Slotting will be authorized during Phase II to provide for an estimated 30% attrition rate. This figure is based on the average attrition rate at the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School in Vietnam. Thus, total training strength will be 2 officers, 12 NCO's, and 66 Junior NCO's or enlisted men for a total of 80 officers and men. Operational strength will be as shown on Figure 3.

c. Training Program

Prior to selection and organization of selected student candidates for the NTC Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon (SO H/K Pltn.) a training program will be prepared and rehearsed with the following as basic precepts:

(i). The training will be of six weeks duration and include basic firing position, and the integrated action of footings, trigger squeeze, or the control, sight alignment, and sight picture. Students will be taught the techniques of estimation, lead and engaging moving targets. Instruction will be provided on the methods for estimating wind over extreme ranges so that a firer can offset his point of aim to place the bullet on target. Following this, students will learn the methods of zeroing M-14 accurized rifles equipped with the adjustable ranging telescopic sight (ARS), the VARGO Starlight Scope or the fixed power M-14 telescopic sight, and the SIONICS-RAW-2 suppressor. Night firing will be included in the course and each student will learn to engage targets with his starlight scope at ranges of 150, 300, and 600 meters.

(ii). In addition to marksmanship training, students will be schooled in adjustment of artillery fire, day/night land navigation, map reading, and deception operations (See Table A). Each of these subjects is important to the sniper. He frequently must select his position from a situation map and then travel to that location at night. It is essential that he select the optimal position, know his position in relationship to friendly units and be able to navigate to his pre-selected position. The ability to accurately adjust artillery fire is important to a sniper. He frequently must adjust illuminating rounds skillfully so that illumination is placed on target in such a manner as to illuminate the target and not compromise

the sniper's position or that of an adjacent friendly unit.

(iii) Qualification firing will be conducted during the last week of the course. Silhouette targets will be engaged at 100, 300, 600 and 900 meters with eight targets being engaged by each team during two qualifying courses. Ten points will be awarded for a first round hit and five points for a second round hit. A maximum score is 160 points. A minimum qualifying score is 130.

(iv) Experience gained from the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School shows that approximately 50% of the students successfully complete the course. Thus, at least double the number of final candidates required should be selected to attend the school.

d. Equipment

See Figure 4.

3. Phase III - Development and Insertion of Hunter/Killer Teams, Initiation of Operations

a. Insertion (See Figure 5.)

During this phase the First RTG Provisional SO R/K Pltn. will be inserted into a tactical Area of Operational Responsibility (TAOR) under operational control of a Royal Thai Army or Border Patrol Police unit. The Platoon will operate under operational control of the RTA or BPP Commander who will be advised in the employment of the Special Operational Team and the three Hunter/Killer Teams by selected members of the JSOPG.

B. Initiation of Operations

Initially and until fire teams are established,

snipers will be ordered to carry out the following type mission:

(1) Ambush Patrols:

Snipers from B/A Teams will be attached to RA or RT units and deployed with ambush patrols. This technique has been the most successful method of employment. Two techniques will be used extensively:

(a) Snipers accompany a platoon ambush.

When employed with a platoon ambush, the snipers will remain close to the platoon command post. When an element of the platoon observes enemy activity, the snipers are alerted to that location. They then engage selectively at night with the starlight scope and M16A2 suppressors or with the M16 scope and M16A2 suppressor during daylight. If there is but one Viet Cong in the area, he is taken under fire by a sniper. In this way the ambush position and location of automatic weapons are not compromised due to the quiet operation of the rifle. When a group of communists approach the killing zone, the snipers engage the leaders and radio operators while the platoon fires into the general kill zone. Another technique will be used in an ambush is that of having the snipers fire tracers to mark the flanks of an enemy force which has approached the position in an area other than the specified kill zone. Snipers are also used to engage the enemy who reaches the ambush site in order to attempt to draw fire

signature. This avoids the disclosure of automatic weapons positions and detonation of flares, mines or other anti-disturbance devices.

(i) Snipers with Security Element in Ambush.

The second method of employment will be that of placing snipers and a five to eight man security element in a carefully selected sniper/ambush position. The general area will be selected by the WTA or BPP commander after considering enemy activity in the area and the advice of the sniper team. The team will then be moved to a WTA or BPP forward position where it is joined by the security element equipped with M-16's, an M79, and an AN/PRC-25 radio. The sniper/ambush position will be occupied just prior to dark and selected to provide maximum range of fires and location within a reasonable distance from a friendly unit. The snipers maintain continuous surveillance of the area. Eye fatigue at night is minimized by having the snipers alternate use of the starlight scope throughout the night. The M79 is an especially useful weapon at the sniper/ambush position. As an example, the enemy frequently have been observed in a tree line or vegetated area in which a shot was not possible due to low light level. Using tracer fire and by directing M79 fire into the area, the security element forced the enemy to move and expose themselves to subsequent sniper fire.

(ii) Stay-Behinds

M/K Teams trained for long range operations will be extremely effective in engaging enemy ambushers who follow

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A team of 100 men as it moves from one location to another. In this case, a sniper team with a 5-3 team security element is selected to provide long range observation of the route over which the unit will travel and pick off the enemy as they follow in ambush. Sniper with their telescope sights and M16-2 suppressors will be able to engage the enemy at ranges out to 900 meters. At extreme ranges, the enemy will usually not be cautious about his cover and concealment. Thus, he presents an excellent target for the M/R team.

(iii) Off-set

(a) A VARIO Xenon search light will be used to illuminate covertly an area with pink light. The starlight scope is sensitive to a portion of the infrared band that is pink and near the visible light portion of the spectrum. By using a pink filter on a Xenon search light an area can be illuminated with invisible light that registers in the starlight scope. This phenomena will be used in two types of sniper activity; village or perimeter security and ambush operations. Employment of the rifle/scope/suppressor combination will frequently result in the enemy receiving many casualties before he has been taken under fire.

(b) Ambushes will be conducted by placing a searchlight equipped 1/4 ton vehicle 1200 to 1500 meters from a road intersection. Snipers equipped with starlight scopes and M16-2 suppressors will be placed 300 meters from the intersection and maintain radio contact with the searchlight operator. The sniper

will control the covert illumination of the intersection and surrounding area. When the command is given in the kill zone they will be ordered by the sniper team. When, by off-setting the light from the searchlight and blinding the searchlight, and 1/4 ton vehicle in a position remote from the ambush site, the enemy in the kill zone will not be alerted by the noise of the running vehicle engine.

(c) The VASO pink light/sniper combination will be employed in base camp security operations. The searchlight, mounted on a 1/4 ton vehicle responds to radio equipped sniper teams in positions either on the perimeter or on ambush positions outside the perimeter. The background noise of a village or fixed base camp usually conceals the noise of the engine and activity of the searchlight crew. In forward base camps the searchlight remains in the center of the base camp and, by swinging its beam through 360 degrees, covertly illuminates avenues of approach into the position. With this method it is again essential that the sniper teams maintain radio contact with the searchlight crew. The pink light is particularly useful during the dark of the moon period.

(iv) Counter Sniper

H/K Teams are effective in countering enemy sniper activity. Each team, equipped with its telescopic sight and M9 Spotting Scope, will search the area of suspected sniper activity. The optical equipment permits a detailed search of distant areas. A recent example, in Vietnam, is

shot at a unit, after having been fired on by a Viet Cong sniper from the same position. The team searched the tree line and the Viet Cong sniper was discovered in a tree at 720 meters distance. While one team member held the wind using the M42 spotting scope, the other man fired one round, killing the Viet Cong sniper.

(v) Night Hunter Operations

Night Hunter Operations will be conducted to mark targets. A sniper team of 2 men placed in a lead helicopter observe the ground with the starlight scopes mounted on their rifles. When the enemy is sighted, the snipers engage with tracers. Helicopter gun ships, following at a higher altitude then engage the targets. Artillery HE and illumination are adjusted on target as necessary.

(vi) Special Operations

The Special Operation Team, sniper-trained, will be employed under Platoon Commander control for coup-de-main, sabotage/dereliction, and sniper activities against the enemy as dictated by the situation and requirements of the 4th/5th unit counter-terrorist plan.

3. Subsequent Operations

As experience is gained with combined Sniper teams and host unit CIA or BPP operations, the Special Operations and Hunter/Killer Teams will gradually expand operations to fulfill their basic roles -- that of independently operating teams moving silently to interdict, ambush and destroy the enemy

c. Psychological operation.

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2.12

4. Phase IV - Evaluation

The NCTTT Program will be subject to close and continuing evaluation by a MRDC Test and Evaluation Team organized and fielded by the JSOPG. Comprehensive records and test data will be gathered and analyzed in order to amend operational concepts and organizations as well as administrative, logistical, and training techniques as required. The Test and Evaluation Team should adhere to accepted principles of field experimentation as appropriate; e.g., the evaluation should be an elaboration of common sense and convenient ordering of evaluation matters so that the Hunter/Killer Teams encounter minimum interruptions.

Upon completion of the Evaluation Phase the T&E Unit will make appropriate recommendations to MRDC for continuation and expansion of the NCTTT Program beyond the 12 month planned period.

5. Phase V - Expansion of Operations

See Figure 1.

As indicated on Figure 1, preparation for the Expansion of Operations Phase commences in the tenth week of the NCTTT with the organization of the Second RTG Provisional SO H/K Platoon. The six-week training program for the Second Platoon starts the 13th week upon graduation of the First Platoon. The second Platoon deploys in the 18th week and conducts Phase III operations as described in Paragraph D above.

Commencing with the 14th week, the Third Provisional RTG SO H/K Pltn. is organized commencing training the 18th week, and Phase III operations the 24th week.

At the end of Phase III there will thus be three platoons totaling, three Special Operations and 2 Sniper units still teams operating against the communist terrorists in the field.

At the end of Phase III (end of 3 months) and following recommendations of the MRDC T&E Team, the Supreme Command will have two options.

(a) Organize the three platoons into a Provisional Special Company (See Figure 6) and continue further operations, or

(b) Reassign Special Operation Teams to RTA, MRD, and MRD units as required and continue further operations.

During the final three months of the NCTTT Program, operations will be progressively expanded to provide for protection of additional villages. Operations will be continued deep into enemy controlled areas utilizing helicopter or parachute insertion techniques. HALO parachute insertion techniques will be employed in areas where the enemy is especially vigilant. Operations should be carried out whenever possible to ambush, attack, harass, and pursue the enemy as far as 10 to 20 miles inside the borders of LAOS, providing HALO permission is obtained. In order to accomplish this, safe areas should be established within friendly or other indigenous tribal villages for team rest, recuperation, and eventual extraction by helicopter or fixed aircraft. Wherever possible, similar operations should be conducted through the BURMESE border.

6. Future Operations

At the end of Phase V the NCTTT should have proved itself as one of the most effective counter-insurgency programs available to the RTG. As an example, in 6 months operations the 72 snipers of the U. S. 9th Division attained over 600 confirmed kills, the majority of which were made at night with the M-14 rifle/Starlight Scope/SIONICS-MAW-A2 suppressor combination. In effecting this admirable record, 1.37 cartridges were expended per kill. At the current cost of 28¢ for one National Match cartridge, this averages to 38¢ per kill. This is obviously an oversimplification, but it highlights an extremely successful and economical method of countering communist terrorism along the borders of Thailand.

As a final note, this type of operation is as yet in its nascent stages. Complete operational techniques that will result from execution of the 12 month NCTTT will undoubtedly disclose additional and more effective techniques of killing or neutralizing communist terrorists in Thailand and will contribute immeasurably to bringing stability and RTG control into its border areas.

NCTTT PROGRAM
CONTRACT MONTHS




FIGURE 1 - OPERATIONAL SCHEDULE
NCTTT

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



FIGURE 2 - ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
NCTTT

RTG PROVISIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS
HUNTER/KILLER PLATOON



STRENGTH
 10
 33 Jr. NCO/EM
 43 total

FIGURE 3 - RTG PROV. SO H/K PLTN.

2.18

RTG PROVISIONAL - SPECIAL OPERATIONS
HUNTER/KILLER PLATOON

LIST OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

1. PLATOON HEADQUARTERS (1 Set)

a. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

2 M-14 Accurized Rifles
2 ART Sniper Scopes (M-84 Scope, Alternate)
2 Sionics MAW-A2 Suppressors
2 VARO Starlight Scopes
2 M-16 w/MAW-A1 Sup.
1 PRC-25 or Ekv. Radio Trans./Recvr.

b. PLATOON WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT POOL (1 Set)


8 M-16 x/MAW-A1 Sup.
8 M-10 Ingram SMG w/Sionics Sup.
8 Pistol (To be desig.) w/Sionics Sup.
5 Cases B-40 Mini-Hand Grenades
10 Cases HALFA 35mm Phosphorus Grenades
1000 Rounds .38, .45 or 9mm Flare Bullets
Demolition and Incendiary Equipment and Supplies as required

c. 50 H/K OR H/K TEAM EQUIPMENT (4 Sets)


9 M-14 Accurized Rifles
9 ART Sniper Scopes (M-84 Scope, Alt.)
9 Sionics MAW-A2 Suppressors
9 VARO Starlight Scopes
1 PRT-4 Radio Transmitter
9 PRT-9 Helmet Radio Receivers
Demolition and Incendiary Supplies and Equipment as required

FIGURE 4 - EQUIPMENT

NCTTT
TACTICAL AREA OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(TAOR)
TYPICAL H/K TEAM AREA DEPLOYMENT



RTG PROVISIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS HUNTER KILLER COMPANY



STRENGTH

5 O
19 NCO
100 Jr. NCO/EM
124 Total

FIGURE 6 -RTG PROV. SO H/K COMPANY

PART I: Planning, Preparation, and Training Phases

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: _____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase I: Planning, Preparation
and Installation of Training
Center, through
Phase II: Organization and Training

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

	<u>Totals</u>
Salaries (direct charges at actual rate):	
Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level:	
_____ man-mos. @ \$ _____ av. per man-mo.	\$ _____
Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level:	
_____ man mos. @ \$ _____ av. per man-mo.	\$ _____
Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technician level:	
_____ man-mos. @ \$ _____ av. per man-mo.	\$ _____
Total billable salaries:	\$ _____
Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at _____ %	\$ _____
Overtime premium pay _____ Estimated at _____ %	\$ _____
Office and Secretarial:	\$ _____
Purchased expendable materials and services:	\$ _____
Travel:	\$ _____
Long-distance communication charges:	\$ _____
TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS	\$ _____
FIXED FEE (7%)	\$ _____
TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee	\$ _____

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability
of arms and equipment through Thai or U. S. Government
official channels.

PART II: Operational and Evaluation Phase

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: _____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase III: Deployment, Insertion and
initiation of Operations, through
Phase IV: Evaluation of Program

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

	Totals
Salaries (direct charges at actual rates):	
Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level: _____ man-mos. @ \$ _____ av. per man-mo.	\$ _____
Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level: _____ man-mos. @ \$ _____ av. per man-mo.	\$ _____
Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technician level: _____ man-mos. @ \$ _____ av. per man-mo.	\$ _____
Total billable salaries:	\$ _____
Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at _____ %)	\$ _____
Overtime premium pay Estimated at _____ %	\$ _____
Office and Secretarial:	\$ _____
Purchased expendable materials and services:	\$ _____
Travel:	\$ _____
Long-distance communication charges:	\$ _____
TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS	\$ _____
FIXED FEE (7%)	\$ _____
TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee	\$ _____

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability
of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government
official channels.

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TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: _____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase V: Expansion of Operations

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

Salaries (direct charges at actual rates):

Totals

Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level:
_____ man-mos. @ \$ _____ av. per man-mo.

\$ _____

Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level:
_____ man-mos. @ \$ _____ av. per man-mo.

\$ _____

Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technical level:
_____ man-mos. @ \$ _____ av. per man-mo.

\$ _____

Total billable salaries:

\$ _____

Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay
incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at _____ %

\$ _____

Overtime premium pay Estimated at _____ %

\$ _____

Office and Secretarial:

\$ _____

Purchased expendable materials and services:

\$ _____

Travel:

\$ _____

Long-distance communication charges:

\$ _____

TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS

\$ _____

FIXED FEE (7%)

\$ _____

TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee

\$ _____

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability
of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government
official channels.

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ASKING FOR TRACES ON MITCHELL L. WERBELL. WISH TO BRING
TO YOUR ATTENTION REF WHICH REPLIED TO RECENT STATION
REQUEST FOR TRACES ON WERBELL. SUGGEST YOU MAY WISH PASS
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COORD William Johnson CI/OPS/FE (Telecord)

William W. Wells
ACFE

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Clifton R. Strathern
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