

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

IN

PAGE

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 9956 S E C R E T

3. FOR THE HAGUE: DPOB AAS PER PARA TWO. IN JUNE 1970, RODRIGUEZ WAS REPORTED AS HOLDING CUBAN DIPLOMATIC PPT D/67/587, ISSUED HAVANA 6 SEPT 1967.

4. FILE: 201-865547. GPI.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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SECRET (When Filled In)		GROUP 1		1	5
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BY: _____ AT: _____ Z

DISSEM BY: LS PER: _____

ACTION UNIT: FILE, VR

ACTION: Eng. RILAN, clops h

JAN 5 4 22 PM '71

SECRET 051722Z JAN 71 CITE LONDON 7124

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

5 JAN 71 237738

REF WH MIAMI 09883 (L 234350)

1. IN ORDER MAKE STRONGER CASE WITH JAGUAR FOR COVERAGE
OF RODRIGUEZ, WOULD APPRECIATE SHORT SUMMARY DEROG INFO FOR
PASSING JAGUAR SINCE LONDON HAS NO TRACES.

2. FILE 201-865545. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

5 Jan 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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1	5
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BY: _____ AT _____ Z

DISSEM BY _____ PER _____

ACTION UNIT _____

ACTION NO. _____

JAN 5 2 04 PM '71

Marshall R
ALBRIGHT
TURBEVILLE

FILE, VR

EUR6. Rlan circlops. alicz. G

SECRET 051550Z JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 8910

5 JAN 71 237005

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID, LONDON

TYPIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 9914 (L235845)

1. STATION HAS REQUESTED LIAISON WATCHLISTING SUBJECT
REF AND RELATED ON WHOM WE HAVE ONLY FULL NAME. TO INCREASE
CHANCES EFFECTIVE LIAISON ACTION, WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIPT
DPOB AND, IF AVAILABLE, PASSPORT TYPE AND NUMBER.

2. FILE: 201-865545. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

5 Jan 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES 13	DOI	AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY	
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BY: _____ AT: _____						
DISSEM BY 53 PER _____						
ACTION UNIT		FILE. VR.				
ACTION NO. 539		R/AL WH 8, DEP				

SECRET 312214Z DEC 70 CITE DIRTECH 2696

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC ANNUE AQUATIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 9915 *R

SEND PHOTOS TO IDENTITY. GP-1.

SECRET

2 JAN 71 236095

CS COPY

SECRET

2 Jan 71
201-749651

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

406
DATE : 26 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 10

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	24/PROP	4	
2		5	
3		6	

OPS SET.

SEP 26 2021Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 35514

DIR INFO RINN CITE WAVE 3143

JMWAVE KUCAGE AMICE

REF DIR 05764 PARA 2 (COUT 85-41)*

1. WAVE PLANS START ACROSS BOARD TRAINING AMICE INFILS NEAR

FUTURE AS FOLLOWS: 04

A. (DANILO POZO CASTRO) PDDB SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS, HAVA
RPOV (25 NOV 1928) FATHER: (JESUS) MOTHER: (ISABEL) NO WAVE

TRACES. LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY.

B. (EUSTQUIANO GARCIA LEZCANO) PDDB MARTI, PROV MATANZAS.
(3 DEC 1914.) FATHER: (JOSE MARIA) MOTHER: (ANGELA) NO WAVE

TRACES. LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY.

C. MIGUEL A. DIAZ ISALQUE, PDDB MATANZAS, PROV MATANZAS.
14 FEB 1937. FATHER: MIGUEL ANGEL. MOTHER: DOLORES. WAVE

REFS: UFGA 1783. NO DEROG INFO. SUBJ INFIL AND EXFIL CUBA
WITH EXPERIENCE CLANDESTINE OPS PRIOR 17 APR 61. IMPRISONED AND
RELEASED. FORMERLY MEMBER OD, CUBA CLAIMS NO POL AFFIL.

LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY.

D. (OSCAR OLIVA CASTO) PDDB TRAINING (4-50) (CUBA-297742)

WAVE 4433.

E. (JUAN ESPINOSA GONZALEZ) PDDB TRAINING (7127) PDB REQUESTED

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 35514 WAVE 8143

WAVE 5218. ^{CIV 1535} SHIPPED JANUVE 1 APR 61. (221-368022).

J F. (FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ ELEJALDE, TARR 637.) (201-291775)

2. REQUEST POAS SUBJECTS A, B AND C AND ASSIGNMENT ON/PO
UPON COMPLETION TRAINING. 04

3. REQUEST POA (JESUS RIERA FERRER) POAS HAVA 12 MAY 1952.

FATHER: (JESUS) MOTHER: (FLORA) NO WAVE TRACES. LOCAL OBSERV
TRACE UNDERWAY. SUBJECT IS CANDIDATE FOR W/T TRAINING AS A 102
RADOP. PRQ PART ONE FOLL IN DISP.

ON OUTGOING BE SURE

TO INCLUDE RIMM AS INFO

AND NOTE TO RIMM AUTHORIZING TNG.

C/S COMMENTS: *HQS AWAITING WAVE PLAN INITIATE CAMPAIGN PREVENT EXECUTION
AMHNG/1.

**CABLES PRE-DATE CS FILES. COPIES MAY BE SEEN IN S/C ARCHIVES.

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5/pd

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29 BM
[COMMUNITY OF NATIONS FUND]

SUITE 2004, 347 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
MURRAY HILL 6-5121

February 20, 1963

9-7-63
See
DLC 2/1/80
JMM

Mr. Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue
1343 N E Miami Court
Apartment 17
Miami 32, Florida

Dear Mr. Diaz:

This will confirm our previous discussions with you wherein we agreed to employ you at the rate of \$200.00 per month to commence March 1st. As was explained to you at our last meeting, we are engaged in a study to determine the effect of large scale migration on given communities and the dislocations that result therefrom.

We feel that the Miami area is unique in that the dislocations caused by the influx of so many of your fellow countrymen furnishes an excellent opportunity to conduct this study.

It is anticipated that you will spend a large portion of your time in our New York offices, however; it will also require a substantial amount of travel on your part.

If you are still in agreement with this proposal please advise me as soon as possible. I would like to begin this study on March 1st.

Very truly yours,

06
(Roger Joyce)

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ORIG. *C-2-Rohlfing* 03
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW ☐ INDEX
EXT: 4550 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE: 2 June 65 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

2 SECRET

ROUTING

1	EW	5	FI-TC
2		6	CA
3	MIC	7	0
4	AG-EE-8		

TO: (PARIS) (BRUSSELS) (MADRID) JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C/P

INFO: FILE WE 6 of C/EPs of 102 of 102
FI FILM 2

TO: (PARI) INFO: (BRUS) (MADR) NAVE
15-4 15-5 15-2

CITE DIR

TYPIC KEYWAY MHVIPER

REFS: A. (PAR) 1448 (IN 80372)
B. (PAR) 0299 (IN 38992)

15850

1. PRESUME CANDIDATE MENTIONED REF A NOT FOR PURPOSES
TRAVEL TO HAVANA AS PER REF B BUT RATHER FOR CONTACT WITH PACETTE
ONLY. AMWHIP-1 UNABLE COME UP WITH CANDIDATE IN TIME FOR HAVANA
TRIP MENTIONED REF B.

2. HQS WILL DEFER INVOLVING AMWHIP-1 WITH PACETTE PENDING
OUTCOME (STATION) ATTEMPTS AT CONTACT.

15-4

END OF MESSAGE

Make HTP-1 f.7e

WE/3 (Silsby) (phone)
WE/20 (Salzahn) (phone)
WE/5 Rati (phone)
WH/C/MO Cini (phone)
WH/C/FL (Webster) (phone)
WH/C/CA

03
(4/4/65)
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

2-17 SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

ATTN: HRP/1
file

2 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMBUNNY-1 (201-775391) and
AMWHIP-1 (201-267966)

DATE: 25 May 1965, 1900-2030 hours

PLACE: Office of AMWHIP-1, 31 W. 47th St., New York, N.Y.

PRESENT: AMBUNNY-1, AMWHIP-1, and DAMICONE using alias of
Al MARIN

1. I had introduced AMBUNNY-1 and AMWHIP-1 to each other 24 May but the office was crowded, so there was very little opportunity to discuss operational matters. We met again on the above date, after business hours, and we were able to meet in private. Although AMWHIP told me that he was delighted with AMBUNNY-1 herself, as he said the "Cubans like that kind of girl -- not too fancy", he thought that her background -- particularly her previously working for the U.S. Ambassador in Bolivia, would make the operation very risky. He said that if it were discovered that AMBUNNY-1 was a penetration of the UNSNAFU-19 office (by the Cubans), his connection with ODYOKE would then be revealed, with the result that all his "connections" with UNSNAFU-19, and "Habana" would be lost. AMWHIP-1 opined that he thought it likely that the Cubans would check her out in Bolivia.

2. AMWHIP suggested the possibility of using a cutout to introduce AMBUNNY-1 to the UNSNAFU-19 installation. He said he would explain in detail at a later time, what he meant, obviously not wanting to reveal any more than necessary to AMBUNNY-1.

3. Also, AMWHIP-1 stated that he was unable to travel to Paris before mid-June, as he had some relatives coming to visit him from Italy. After checking with DI UBALDO, I subsequently informed AMWHIP-1 and AMBUNNY-1 that the Paris operation was off. Both expressed relief. I told AMBUNNY-1 that she could most likely still be utilized in Habana, and that we would discuss the possibilities at a later date.

Norris W. Damicone

SE

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SECRET

Harvey

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report, Meeting with AMWHIP-1

DATE : 21 May 1965, 1300-1430 hours


PLACE : National Airport

PRESENT Subject and DiUbaldo as Breitheim

1. On 20 May I phoned Subject and requested that he travel to Washington to discuss the background of his discussions with 02 (UN)NAFU-19 from which stemmed the suggestion that A-1 supply a French-English-Spanish speaking secretary to (U)19's mission in Paris. The meeting was quite short for as it turned out, the discussion between Subject and (U)19 on the topic of secretaries had taken place in March 1965, and had been little more than a casual sort of thing devoid of any specifics whatever and, in particular, devoid of any commitment by either party to proffer or to accept a proffered body. Nevertheless, Subject felt quite certain that slots would still be open in (U)19's mission and that a recommendation from him would suffice to effect favorable action by (U)19.

2. I sketched AMBUNNY's qualifications stressing the fact that she had gone to school in the U. S. , had worked here, and had done a hitch as a social secretary for the (American Ambassador in La Paz.) 08 Subject drew the obvious conclusions that it might be difficult to dummy up AMBUNNY's labenslauf adequately to prevent her from being "discovered" by the Cubans. At any rate, since she was our only candidate, Subject agreed to meet with her in New York so that together they could thresh out the pragmatics of the problem. The meeting was set for 22 May. Al Marin (alias) would participate in this meeting.

*Am Whitney
file*



6/17/65

SECRET

- 2 -

3. For the record, I should like to note that in the two and a half years since I had last seen Subject he had aged over 15 years. When I last saw him he was a round-faced, dark-haired, boyish person and has now been transformed into a very grey, very puffy, 50 year old man though I understand his chronological age is something short of 40. These observations had nothing to do with anything except they might indicate that Subject is living under a great strain. I derived the impression, which coincides with that I obtained the first time I met with Subject, that he is constitutionally oblique in his approach to matters. He is a very difficult person to corner. I am firmly convinced that to date in this operation, if it may be called that, we have never come close to placing Subject in the corner and that it is high time we do so. I do not imply that he is a man of ill will, rather that instinctively he is a man who slides off problems until such time as he feels he has sufficient evidence or is in the right posture to solve them. I should think it would be our task to exploit these natural capacities while at the same time attempting to assure that Subject is not sliding away from us.

DiU
Sidney P. Di Ubaldo

3 July 1962

TO: NKH
FM: AMS
RE: ZRRIFLE

1. Per our discussion of 2 July 1962, I expect that we shall proceed to transfer QJWIN to Baden-Baden per the proposal in QLLA-1463 dated 2 February 1962. LUXE/0489 dated 19 June 1962 stated that COS would have the full details of the capital outlay required by 23 June; however, the information has not been received as of 3 July. The last cable to the Station, DIR 18391 told COS to contact you directly on his arrival on 16 July.

2. With regard to candidates spotted by QJWIN, the two whom he spotted in Italy a year and a quarter ago can probably be used if needed, if we can accept the assessments of them by the Trieste Base contract agent, Magonetti. Magonetti's assessment is contained in OIRA 27542 dated 10 May 1961. The names of the two French candidates are contained in QLLA 1426 dated 15 December 1961. No action has been taken on these names regarding tracing or anything else. My handwritten notes attached to that dispatch contain fuller descriptions of the two people than appear in the dispatch.

3. ⁰³ The other spotting effort that can be made is through [Hank Manfredi] (TN) in Rome. Hank was well briefed on the qualifications desired and the security precautions to be observed in the spotting activity. COS Rome has a copy of the qualifications and restrictions in his safe; however, if [Manfredi] is told to proceed with his contact in Florence, I suggest that he be re-briefed in detail.

4. ⁰³ Frankly, all the rest of the paper in the file is crud except for the pay receipts, which are assembled in one envelope. I have already given the ZRRIFLE authorization paper signed by Helms and Skip has been given the QJWIN contract, including the extension to 1 March 1963.

5. The details which have yet to be worked out are
- a. The precise method of contact with QJWIN
 - b. The system of drawing funds for payments to him
 - c. An emergency contact for him (this should probably be COS LUXE).

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218R

6. Despite COS LUXE's viewpoint, I happen to know that QJWIN can do more spotting in Corsican circles whenever we want him to.

AMS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME CHECK, DOCUMENT SERVICE, AND PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION REQUEST			
RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)		DATE <i>Feb 20 9 42 AM '61</i>	
FROM: (Requester name) ① <i>T. McHale</i> ③	BRANCH <i>PT. M. O. S.</i>	ROOM <i>2522 RIT</i>	EXTENSION <i>3662</i>

TO	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX			<i>SSC</i>	<i>Please call when ready g & - attached</i>
REQUESTER <i>A. L. C.</i>		<i>Feb 24 1961</i>	②	
RID/FILES				
REQUESTER			③	
RID/DRS				
RID/201				
RID/ANALYSIS				
RID/MIS				
RID/INDEX				

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED	
SURNAME <i>BESTA</i>	GIVEN NAMES <i>Lamberto</i>
SPELLING VARIATIONS	
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.) <i>Owns Export-Import firm LAEE (or LABEX) in Milan</i>
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH <i>May 1918</i>	
CITIZENSHIP <i>Italian</i>	RESIDENCE <i>23 Via Teodosio, Milan, Italy</i>

RID/INDEX TO REQUESTER	<p align="center">RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce</p>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	
<input type="checkbox"/> CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

BE SURE ALL SUBJECT INFORMATION IS CORRECT

- ① Type or print all entries.
- ② On receipt of index card reproductions: draw a green diagonal line across items you don't want RID to obtain for you.
- ③ Edit (use green) the Copyflo listing to reflect: (a) Cards to be destroyed (green D). Examples: referenced document has been destroyed; less informative than a retained card leading to the same information; referenced information not significant. (b) Corrections and additions, including ∞ when card reflects all facts in document. (c) OK all cards that are correct as typed.

Could this trace be consolidated into an existing or new 201 file? ☐ yes ☐ no. (If yes, complete the following - no other form required.)

201 PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION					
201 -			(201 number will be supplied by RID. If new 201 number has been obtained by desk, note it in this space.)		
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS					
CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED		FILE TO BE KEPT		ACCESS RESTRICTED	
YES	NO	RID	DESK	NO	YES

ALWAYS RETURN THIS FORM WITH COPYFLO OF CARD REPRODUCTIONS. IF YOU HAVE REQUESTED A 201 PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION, ALSO RETURN PERTINENT DOCUMENTS.

BESTA, FNU
DOB ?

CIT ?

043-005-004
CIR -13754

TS 107273
PIO
SER. 7889

ALLEGED ITALIAN AGENT IN MILAN

*Cont for a
in RT*

BISTA, Lamberto

43-5-1-4334
CI 4-374
4 Apr 55
Att.

*ordered
trying
to locate
in RI*

we 14.

BESTA, Lamberto

NITA 436
(IN 28918)
24 Mar 54

[Handwritten signature]

BESTA, Roberto

(SMA-111 A)

*rolling
reporter*



Files are attached with pertinent items clipped....

Lamberto BESTA

April 1955 : Resident of Milan at Via Teodosio 23, collaborated for
brief period with ^{DEMIJO} ~~Demijod~~ regarding clandestine
traffic in strategic materials. Lives by trafficking in cigarettes and
other things - not excluding dope. Also maintains contact with
head of ²⁹ [French intelligence] in Italy in political field. Person of
doubtful honesty, braggart and capable of carrying out any kind of
activity for money. (Source DEMIJO)

March 1954: ¹¹ [Ital] service (Min of Int) offered to turn over to ¹⁵⁻²² [Milan station]
full control of PIC operation in which BESTA was involved. Hqs warned
"heads off" because of BESTA's extremely bad reputation - he has been
implicated in all sorts of contraband traffic as well as reputation
of completely ~~unanchored~~ unanchored intelligence operator.

Nov 1953: He was an attempted double agent operation b/ ¹¹ [Ital service] into
Yugo I.S.

Have not as yet rec'd State Dispatches
Referred to in Hun let "check"

3 July 1962

TO: WKH
FM: ANS
RE: ZRRIFLE

1. Per our discussion of 2 July 1962, I expect that we shall proceed to transfer QJWIN to Baden-Baden per the proposal in OLIA-1463 dated 2 February 1962. LUXE/0489 dated 19 June 1962 stated that COS would have the full details of the capital outlay required by 23 June; however, the information has not been received as of 3 July. The last cable to the Station, DIR, 18391 told COS to contact you directly on his arrival on 16 July.

2. With regard to candidates spotted by QJWIN, the two whom he spotted in Italy a year and a quarter ago can probably be used if needed, if we can accept the assessments of them by the Trieste Base contract agent, Magonetti. Magonetti's assessment is contained in OTRA, 27542 dated 10 May 1961. The names of the two French candidates are contained in OLIA, 1426 dated 15 December 1961. No action has been taken on these names regarding tracing or anything else. My handwritten notes attached to that dispatch contain fuller descriptions of the two people than appear in the dispatch.

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- c. An emergency contact for him (this should probably be COS LUXE).

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3/BR

6. Despite COS LUXE's viewpoint, I happen to know that QJWIN can do more spotting in Corsican circles whenever we want him to.

AMS

14-00000

The candidate: no name used; circa 43-45, 1.75-1.78, strongly built, broad shoulders, circa 85 kilos, slightly oval full face, blond hair combed straight back thinning in corners, thinning on top, rosa complexion, no eye color noticed, worker's hands, nose thin and curved outward a little, thin lips; chin full but not fat, makes impression of a handwerker; has been in prison Sante twice (burglary) - name does not begin with A,B,C,D - otherwise would have gone to Fresne prison; not known whether convicted; has own car; free to travel; 5 years POW in Germany; M. impression: good nerves; composed; can open usual safe; would work with someone previously unknown to him; M. would use him; willing to use gun; did not ask money; Hugo wants his cut. Lives 250-300 km from Paris; legal occupation unknown. Contact thru Hugo; can cut Hugo out with money. This candidate ready any time. Has no passport, but can get one. Can also get passport under phoney name. M. likes this one as candidate

Saw G and G's candidate 28 April with lokal in Paris; G contacted this candidate directly; candidate Henri ; description: circa 45 - 48, 1.75 - 1.78; dark brown hair; full, deep on forehead; shiny and combed back; half part on right; brown complexion; not quite square face; brown eyes; heavy eyebrows dark brown w/verbindung between eyebrows; bridge of nose depressed, nose somewhat small; normal ears; mouth schrag when he speaks; small scars on left cheek and small scar running from middle of nose on left side; brown hair on hands, no (finger); well dressed; hands well kept; fingertips (squared); smokes (French) Ami cigarettes; not a drinker; lives Paris; frequents Bar Le Corsaire, 110 Ave de Suffren; can be found there every day from 4:30 PM; specialist in safes - own tools; also holdups; in Sante prison; belonged after war to Lyon St. Etienne underworld; gave some facts of this which M knows to be true; wanted to know if should be armed for job - ready to go to the end; has a colleague with whom wants to work; not behind iron curtain and not in France; would be expensive; has expired passport, but no sweat in renewing it; M impression - would follow orders; better action man than Hugo's candidate, but not sure whether has safecracking experience to extent Hugo's man has; Has car - Dauphine, beige (?) #2461HS75 (Paris #); not married. M can contact him at tel SUF 46-90-- this is the bar. M told him two weeks to three months (also told Hugo's man the same but Gaillard's candidate wants to know in few weeks whether still hope. Could bring both candidates together into a team.

2 copy:

- 1) Santelli could not locate his cousin. Traveled
Marseille after telling Hugo + Padellaro taking
their contacts - lived in Hotel Du Globe,
Marseille.
- 2) Santelli met Patsaroni, Gen, married: 12-42-43,
works on RR in Marseille - lives in Marseilles, has
no children, solid person, can keep his tongue,
has been holdups, never caught, not evasive,
good connections in Corsican underworld in
Marseille; ht 1.70-1.72, medium build, top
of head bald, hair on sides is brown, oval face,
brownish complexion (but not dark), brown eyes,
smokes cigarette, French + Corsican,
born 40-45, working for RR a few years, lives
708 Rue St. Theresa; is close friend of Santelli;
→ is now looking for candidates to
propose in meeting him again. A + P
looked for a Felix Carboni (?),
professor of English, Corsican, lives in Marseille,
has a brother who was arrested by police
in a holdup. P. still looking for Felix.

P. understands completely what is sought.

3) Hugo: speaks a few horseing lars in
Transport Aldo (of obs.) - Name Juliette
Jaquillard, 155 Rue de Charonne, Paris
Tel. RO 06-45; met Hugo 29 Apr (call)
from Morille to see if candidate could be
Mr. Hugo
Hugo II
Hugo
Mr. Candidate; Hugo with Hugo & the
candidate 1/2 - 3/4 hour: ~~no~~

[The candidate: no name used; ca. 43-45,
1.75-1.78, strongly built, broad shoulders,
ca 85 kilos, slightly oval full face, blond
hair combed straight back thinning
in corners, thinning on top, rosa
complexion; nose color noticed, rough
hands, nose thin & curved outward a
little, thin lips; chin full but not
fat, ~~fit~~ makes impression of a
handwerker; ~~not~~ has been in prison
twice - name does not begin
Hugley } not A. B. C. D - otherwise would have gone
to French prison; not known relation

convicted; has money; likes to travel; 5 years
POW in Germany; M. impression; good
news, compared, can open mind safe, would
work w/ someone pretending, unknown to
him; M. would use him; willing to accept;
did not ask money; Hugo wants
his out. Lives 250-300 km from
Paris; legal occupation unknown.
Contact thru Hugo; can cut Hugo
out of money. This candidate
needs any time. Has no passport, but
can get one. Can also get ~~pass~~ passport
under phony name. M. likes this
one as candidate.

4) Saw E. & E's candidate 28 Apr near
liberal in Paris; E contacted this
candidate directly; ^{candidate's} name; description
ca 45-48, 1.75-1.78; dark brown hair
full; deep on forehead, thin, combed back,
half part on right; brown complexion;
not quite square face; brown eyes; ^{thin} eyebrows
dark brown w/ reddish brown between eyebrows;

bridges of nose depressed, nose somewhat
small; normal ears; ~~small~~ mouth
schwa when he speaks; ^{small} scars on
~~the~~ left cheek + small scar running
from middle of nose on left side;
brown hair on hands, no rings,
well dressed; hands well kept;
finger tips missing; smokes
Dor + Ann cigarettes; not a drinker;
hair fair; frequents Bar Le
Corsaire, 110 Rue de Saffron;
can be found there every day from
4:30 PM; ~~M. is a~~
specialist in safes - own tools;
also holdups; in Dante prison;
detained after war to Lyon-St.
Etienne underworld; gave some
facts of this which M. knows
to be true; wanted to know
if should be armed for job -
ready to go to the end; has a

from
Lyon

M. with
him
ca
2 hours

Colleague who ^{is back; not}
behind iron curtain & not in France;
would be personal; ~~not~~ has
expired passport, but no action in
renewing it; M. impression: would
follow orders; little action man
than Hugo's candidate but not sure
whether has organizing experience
either Hugo's man has. Has car:
Dauphine, beige (?), # 2461 H 5-25
(faint); not insured. M. can
contact him at tel: SUF 46-90 -
this is the bar. M. told him
2 wks to 3 mos (also told
Hugo's man the same) but
Richard's candidate wants to
know in few weeks whether
still hope. Could bring both
candidates together into a
team.]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. C5CI-316/00704-64

SUBJECT (fnu) RELOVA

DATE DISTR 1 September 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF 1964

INFO.

PLACE 2 Washington, D. C.

DATE ACQ August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments:

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

(fnu) RELOVA, pseudonym "Wilberto," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI) in Cuba. He resides at Calle 15 number 2419, Reparto Juan Manuel Marquez, Palya de Santa Fe, Mariano, Habana. 1,2,3,4,5,6

Headquarters Comments

1. An airline passenger manifest revealed that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet, probably identical with the above Subject, left Mexico for Habana on 8 July 1963 and was the holder of Cuban passport number D/63/415.
2. An [official Jamaican source] in a report dated 16 October 1963, stated that Osvaldo RELOVA, the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, arrived in Kingston on 14 October 1963. He was in Kingston for one week and lived at the Cuban Consulate office. RELOVA was reportedly making an inspection trip. RELOVA was born on 13 August 1930, in Habana. His home address was given as 15H 2419 Santa Fe, Habana. He carried Cuban passport number D/63/415, issued in Habana on 17 June 1963.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XX	CCR	FBI 2
REP	CINCLANT	CINCSO	#	T&NS				

(Notes: Field distribution indicated by "#")

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

W/SA/EOD 1	WE/5/R	1 CI/LIA	1 IE (CANADA)	LX-1650
W/SA/IOB	WE/MADR	2 CI/R&A	3 IE (BRITISH)	NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1
W/SA/R			1 WASH/BS	CSCI-313/00704-64
W/SA/CI		RID/AN		
W/SA/VE				COORDINATING
TOTALS	W/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1		LIAISON *	CHK:LD:SWK C/R&A

201-73713S

Form NO. 1

4/2V

3. In a report dated 19 October 1963, source unknown, it was stated that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penechet was appointed administrator of "Envases del Cerro, S.A." firm, located on Calzada del Cerro Avenue, Habana.
4. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 23 October 1963, revealed that Osvaldo RELOVA, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, left Kingston for Toronto on 21 October 1963, on TCA flight number 885.
5. An [official Canadian source], in a report dated 26 November 1963, said that Osvaldo RELOVA Penechet, born on 13 August 1930, was not the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada as previous reports stated. Rather, RELOVA, who was a frequent visitor to Canada, traveled as an "Embassy Inspector." He carried Cuban Diplomatic passport D/63/415 with Mexican visa number OF-7090; he had no Canadian visa. The address on his passport was given as 15/3 number 2-119, Santa Fe Ranch (sic), Habana. RELOVA entered Canada on 16 August 1963, destined to visit Jesus YANES Rodriguez, Cuban Commercial Attache in Montreal. He departed Canada for Mexico on 25 August 1963, in the company of Alberto MENDUCA.
6. A former Cuban Intelligence officer who has been living in the United States since 1963 and whose reporting over the past nine months has proven reliable, gave the following information on 21 July 1964, on Osvaldo RELOVA Penechet (presumably identical with RELOVA):

In early 1961, RELOBA was an administrator of a section of the Consolidated Hardware Stores and annexes. In late 1961 he went to see source to get help with an investigation on a Mr. BARRAL, Administrator of the Consolidated (sic). RELOBA was requesting source's aid in the belief that source was still working for G-2; source did not tell him otherwise. RELOBA is a new Communist who wants to be more than MARX and is trying to instruct everyone around him. Source said that RELOBA was born about 1934, is 164 pounds, five feet nine inches in height, has a medium thin build, a long face, and a long thin neck. He has dark eyes, black hair, is partially bald, and has a small, thin mustache.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00699-64

SUBJECT Julian NOVAS Fernandez

DATE DISTR. 27 August 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Source was shown a photograph of Julian NOVAS Fernandez and source identified him as a Cuban Intelligence Officer. Source saw NOVAS at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964 and assumed he was a functionary there. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

Headquarters Comments

1. Although source saw Julian NOVAS Fernandez at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964, the records of this Agency reveal that source was probably in error in assuming that NOVAS was assigned to that Embassy and it is more likely that he was just passing through. The following traces by this Agency is the basis for this conclusion.
2. An [official Jamaican source] in a report dated 24 March 1964, stated that Julian NOVAS Fernandez arrived in Kingston, Jamaica, on 18 March 1964, to take up his duties at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston as Commercial Attache. Source said that NOVAS has the appearance of an American and speaks excellent English. Since his arrival he has been especially occupied with girls. It should be noted that

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT CINCOS # I&NS								
(Notes: Field distribution indicated by "#".)								

REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

EX/SA/EOB	EX/SA/NOB	EX/SA/R	EX/SA/CI	EX/SA/AVE	1 CI/LIA	2 CI/RSA	3 IE/BRITISH	4 L/WASH/CD	5	EX-1645
										CSCI-316/00399-64
										NO PROJECT (AMNUC/1)
										COORDINATING
										REL CASING
										MARK: LD: SWK
										CI/RSA
16 MAR 1965										
EX/SA 7 (1), EX 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1										
LIAISON *										

201-747936

14-00000
His wife did not accompany him and source speculated that her arrival may be delayed in view of NOVAS' present inclination for feminine diversion.

3. In a report dated March 1964, this same source said that Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the Cuban Commercial Attache at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, was born on 2 September 1938, in Habana, Cuba. He carried diplomatic passport D/64/90 which was issued in Habana on 20 February 1964. His home address was given as Carman No. 18, Vibora. He arrived in Kingston from Mexico on 18 March 1964, on Mexicana Flight Number 305.
4. This same source, in a report dated 28 April 1964, stated that the wife of Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the recently arrived Cuban Commercial Attache, arrived in Kingston on 22 April 1964, via Mexico. Her name is Amarilis Marta VALDES Hijuelos and she was born on 19 May 1937, in Jiquani, Oriente, Cuba. VALDES has been indisposed since her arrival in Kingston; this is probably due to her advanced pregnancy. Her home address in Cuba is Avenida 31, Number 3622, Habana. She carried diplomatic passport D/64/239, issued in Habana on 9 April 1964.
5. This same source, in a report dated 9 May 1964, noted that the salary and allowances of the new Cuban Commercial Attache, Julian NOVAS Fernandez, suggests that he is the new Cuban Intelligence Service chief in Jamaica, succeeding Gerardo SANCHEZ Robert.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

It is the policy of the United States to oppose the disclosure of information which would be injurious to the national defense. The unauthorized disclosure of information of this nature is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CSCI 316/00693-64

SUBJECT Jose FERNANDEZ

DATE DISTR 21 August 1964

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES

RETURN TO CIA
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DATE OF 1964
INFO
PLACE Washington, D. C.
DATE ACQ August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Source identified a photograph of Comandante Jose FERNANDEZ and said that his nickname is "El Gallego." FERNANDEZ is the chief of all army training schools from cadets up. He is not connected with Cuban intelligence. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8

Headquarters Comments

1. In a report dated 11 May 1960, from an untested source, it was reported that one Jose FERNANDEZ, possibly identical with the above Subject, was a Cuban Ambassador on an arms buying missions in Rome.
2. In June 1962 a Cuban national, untested, whose father was an old army friend of Jose FERNANDEZ, aka "El Gallego," reported the following information:

FERNANDEZ is Chief of Artillery Schools in Habana Province; he frequently gives lectures on Artillery weapons at a School for Members of the Western Army (La Escuela para los Miembros de Ejercito Occidente).

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AJE	NSA	XXX	OCF	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT CINCOS 2 IANS								
(Note: Refer Distribution Indicated by "S")								

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA ROB 1	WE/5/R	1 CI/LIA	1 IE/CANADA		LX-1639
WH/SA MOB 1	WE/MADR	2 CI/REA	2 IE/BRITISH	11	NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1)
WH/SA/R			L/WASH/REI	11	CSCI-316/00693-64
WH/SA CI 4		RID/AM			
WH/WAYR 1					
TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1				LIAISON	COORDINATING RELEASED
					WMK:LD:8WK CI/RGA

201-333216

16 MAR 1965

3/pv

He was a captain in the army during BATISTA's time and was in prison for his part in the 4 April Movement until his release by CASTRO. FERNANDEZ was not known to be a Communist and, at the time of this report (1962), was not considered to be one. He attended artillery schools in the United States (dates and places unknown) and speaks English well. He is well educated and well trained for the position he holds. He is often referred to as "El Gallego Fernandez." FERNANDEZ allegedly was chief of the operation against the invaders of Playa Giron in April 1961. He was described as having been born about 1921, being six feet one inch tall, 185 pounds, having light grayish eyes, light brown hair, a fair complexion, white even teeth, and an oval face. He speaks with a Castillian accent.

3. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 17 July 1962, stated that Major Jose Ramon FERNANDEZ was the Chief of the Seccion Preparacion y Organizacion Combativa (Section for the Preparation and Organization of Warfare - SPOC), the Cuban Army's key man for defense against invasion, and the military brains of the country. He had access to all secret information. FERNANDEZ received his instructions exclusively from Fidel and Raul CASTRO with whom he is in personal contact. He received his military education in the United States. He is intelligent and reportedly not a Communist.
4. A Cuban national, untested, reported in September 1962, that the facilities of the Military Academy at Camp Managua were being utilized as a training center for officers, officer-candidates and non-commissioned officers. Major Jose FERNANDEZ, aka "El Gallego," has an office on the ground floor of the first building as you enter the camp. FERNANDEZ and a General Enrique LISTER prepared all the training schedules, pamphlets, and training aides, as well as joint exercises in which air ground (armor and infantry) have participated.
5. In a 14 November 1962 report, an untested source said that Comandante (fnu) FERNANDEZ is the only Cuban official who is completely within the confidence of the Soviets with respect to the military fortifications of the Habana area.
6. ²⁴ [An official Spanish Service] in a report dated 18 May 1963, stated that an unidentified "usually reliable source" said that Major Jose Ramon FERNANDEZ, known as "El Gallego," is the one who made the preparation for CASTRO's trip to the Soviet Union in February 1963. FERNANDEZ arrived in Habana from Moscow two days before CASTRO's surprise departure.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

7. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 7 August 1963, stated that she did not think FERNANDEZ was a Communist as he has always had Catholic tendencies but that he is a correct soldier and puts the military above everything. He is divorced and his ex-wife is living in Miami with their two daughters, Francis, born in 1951, and Alicia, born in 1955.
8. A source who is a high ranking Cuban military officer who has good contacts among Cuban officials (he has not submitted many reports, but they appear to have been accurate) reported in September 1963 that Major Jose Ramon FERNANDEZ Alvarez, Chief of Training, General Staff of the Cuban Rebel Army, is anti-Communist and a military type in the strictest sense of the word. He sticks to his military duties and scrupulously avoids politics; he keeps himself completely isolated from all political elements. He is proud of his present status and thankful to CASTRO for it; for fear of losing it he appears unwilling to undertake any kind of activity against the CASTRO regime. CASTRO is undoubtedly knowledgeable of FERNANDEZ' attitude and has sufficient confidence in him to retain him in his present position. CASTRO also is aware that he has few officers with the military discipline, know-how, and experience possessed by FERNANDEZ.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1/pv

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

REPORT NO. CS CI 316/00643-64

DATE DISTR. 11 August 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES CSCI-3/779,803
CS-311/00115-64

DATE OF INFO.

1964

PLACE & Washington, D. C.

DATE ACQ. August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

1. Guillermo ARASTAGUIA, pseudonym "Rene," is the chief of the Department of Technical Operational Support (MI) in the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI). He was formerly the secretary of Ramiro VALDES in the Departamento de Seguridad del Estado (Department of State Security - DSE), but ARASTAGUIA was a follower of Anibal ESCALANTE and because of a problem concerning ESCALANTE and because ARASTAGUIA was believed to be a homosexual, VALDES transferred him to the DGI. ARASTAGUIA went to the Youth Festival in Helsinki as a representative of the DGI and has traveled to Moscow three times.
2. ARASTAGUIA was born in 1934, is about five feet seven inches in height, has blond hair and green eyes. He is fat, has a chin that juts out, lips that are somewhat sunken, and has a rather high pitched voice and seems effeminate. 1,2,3

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Headquarters Comments

1. A report dated 6 October 1960, from an [official Ecuadorean] source, provided a list of Cuban Communists. One Guillermo ARRASTIA, aka "Rene," possibly identical with Guillermo ARASTAGUIA, was included and described as a first lieutenant,

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	NSX	OCB	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT CINCOS = IANS								
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "##")								

(Note: Field contribution indicated by "FF".)

WH/SA/DOE WE/5/P	1	CI/LIA	1	IF CANADA	II	LN-1681
WH/SA/DOE WE/MADE	2	CI/P&A	3	IF BRITISH	II	NO PROJECT (AMMIG)
WH/SA/CI	1		1	IF BR	II	CSCI-313/00643-34
WH/SA/CI	1	RID/AN	1			
WH/SA/CI	1					

6 WH/SA 7, (1), WE 1 (2), CI4, RID 1

LIAISON *

SWX

14-00000

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

executive, in G-2. ARRASTIA was reported to have the confidence of Raul CASTRO and Ramiro VALDES; and he was VALDES' righthand man in G-2.

2. An official roster listing the military staff personnel comprising the Intelligence Department, G-2, of the Cuban Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR) was received by a representative of this Agency from an untested source in a report dated 1 March 1961. Included on this list was one First Lieutenant Guillermo ARRASTIA Fundora, possibly identical with Guillermo ARRASTAGUIA.
3. In a report dated 28 October 1962, a list of identified and suspected Cuban intelligence officers was included, the list was received from an official liaison service.²⁴ One First Lieutenant Guillermo ARRATIA (or ARRASTIA) Fundora was included on the list and described as an identified intelligence officer on the G-2 Headquarters staff.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

11/27

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET 261700Z CITE 21-2 GUATEMALA 6381

26 MAY 66 2518Z

DIRECTOR

IS AMUG-1 DEBRIEFING (SPANISH VERSION) FORWARDED 22 HGGW-3947
CLEARED FOR PASSAGE 24 (TO LIAISON) IF SO, PLAN GIVE PRESENT COPY TO
86 [COL ARRIAGA] PLS ADVISE. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS SEND ADDITIONAL
COPY FOR [STATION] RETENTION.

SECRET 16-2

BT

SECRET

ANALYST	
REVIEWER	
APPROVAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

NNNN

19-6-10214
25 May 1966

5/12/

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

TO : Chief, WH Division
 ATTN : Barney Hidalgo
 FROM : Chief, Safehouse Branch

DATE: 21 August 1964

SUBJECT: Safehouse #405

REQUISITION: Your requisition for a domestic safehouse (Req. 64-9) routed to us through the Central Cover Staff (CCS 263) has been met by the following property in the manner herein described.

PROPERTY: A two bedroom furnished apartment, (Apt. G-32) located in the (Summit Hills Apartments), located at (16th Street) and (East-West Highway), (Silver Spring, Md.)

LESSOR: (Summit Hills Apartments East-West Highway, Silver Spring, Md.)

LESSEE: Mr. (Roger McK. Shea) a security cleared attorney with offices located at (3041 Wilson Blvd.) Arlington, Virginia. Office Telephone (JA 4-5510)

LEASE: The lease is on file in the Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics. The terms are for a six month period from 1 July 1964 through 31 December 1964.

COVER STORY: Mr. (Shea) has leased the apartment for his client Mr. V. Rodriguez who is in the Washington Metropolitan area and is associated with the (Inter-University Committee for Political and Social Action.)

CASE OFFICER: As stipulated by you, Mr. Barney Hidalgo has been designated as the responsible case officer. Any future change in case officer must be reported promptly to the Safehouse Branch.


FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS: All obligations for rent, utilities, and other related expenses, will be paid by Mr. (Shea) the lessee cutout. Bills received at the Safehouse should be passed to the Safehouse Branch upon receipt.

Edward U. Denison
 EDWARD U. DENISON

Orig. - Addressee
 1 - OL/RECD/SHB Official file

OL/RECD/SHB (JPRyan)bj/3683

SECRET



15/21

29

SUMMIT HILL PROPERTIES, INC.
16th Street & East-West Highway
Silver Spring, Md.

AMMUG
SUPPORT
FILE
B

REMINDER

August 17, 1964.

66

Dear Mr. (Roger Shea 8500 16th St., #G-32)

According to our records, your rent due August 1, 1964 - \$210.00 has not been received by this office. This, no doubt, is an oversight on your part and we will appreciate your check by return mail to cover same.

In this connection, you are advised that all rents are due and payable in full by not later than ten (10) days after same becomes due, and your cooperation will be appreciated.

Thanking you, we remain,

29

SUMMIT HILL PROPERTIES, INC.
Silver Spring, Maryland

Managing Agents

21 Aug 64
Not Paid
on 21 Aug
John Shea paid
03 would pay in cash
to DM
B

SECRET

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

TO: TSD/IB

Case 4983
DATE _____

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS
TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. 43 7002 DATED 12 Aug 64 AND PREPARED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH WH/SA/Proc 64-620 3 Aug 64

07
(Ernesto Jesus GARCIA Guzman)

31
11 (Ecuadorean PP # 19406)
31 (Ecuadorean Vacc Cert. #4314) 31
31 (I&NS Form I-94 (showing arrival in U.S. 28 July 1964.))

Note: We are also returning subject's Cuban Documents as follows:

1. Cuban Dipl. PP No. D/64/139
2. Cuban Ord PP 22560
3. Cuban Int. Vacc. Cert. 296598
4. Negative of subject

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/IB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed.

TSD/IB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

ALMUG/1

1 July 1964

Memo for the Records:

On 1 July 1964 ALMUG was transferred from safehouse #2 to the new apartment located at (8500 14²⁴th Street, Silver Springs, Maryland.) On arrival at the apartment, about 1430, the quarters were not ready and the furniture had not been put in place.

The apartment was ready at 2000 the same day. ALMUG's apartment does not have a phone nor was it furnished with kitchen utensils. Sheets, a radio, and kitchen utensils were purchased by ALMUG.

Miss Petrowski has made arrangements for the installation of a telephone.

Daniel Flores

VIVIAN:-

22 June

Following situation re Laddie:

- 1- Ed wants ~~all~~ balance of his May pay NOW.
- 2- (⁰³John Ryan) and (⁰⁶Roger Shea) are waiting for word from you
in order to call the people at (²⁹Summit Hill Apartments)
and give them 3 day notice before Laddie can move in.
(²⁹Summit Hill Apts) also would like to know (when notice
is given) what type beds to furnish apt with (double or
single-Lad does not care which.)

Buray


4/12

16 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SAFEHOUSE FOR AMMUG-1

1. The undersigned called Mr. ⁰³(John Ryan) of the Safehouse on 15 June 1964 Procurement Section to arrange for the Safehouse for AMMUG-1 at ^{8484 24}Summit Hill Apartments, 16th Street, Silver Spring, Maryland.)
2. Mr. ⁰³(Ryan) called on the morning of 16 June 1964 to say that a deposit had been placed on Apartment ²⁴(G-32) at ^{24, 10}3500 16th Street, Summit Hill Apartments, Silver Spring, Maryland.)
3. Security has been notified and the apartment is now being ⁰⁶checked. If everything goes well Mr. ⁰⁶(Roger SHEA) Attorney in Arlington, Virginia will sign the lease beginning 01 July 1964. The lease will be for Vladimir Rodriguez Lahera.


Vivian A. Petrowski

6/PV

30 June 1964

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: IN &S CARD

Called Mr. Knott in the Alien Affairs Staff for AMMUG-1's INS card. He will check with them to see if things are moving. As far as he knows they are trying to get MUG's file which might still be at the border.

Appt. set for 10 AM 2 July for fingerprint

SUBJECT: SAFE APARTMENT AT²⁴(SUMMIT HILL)

AMMUG-1 to move in on the ~~1st~~ 1st of July. Called there today to check if everything is ready. Will pick up lease from lawyer today and hand carry there tomorrow. Lou DeSanti and Daniel Flores taking MUG out there tomorrow. BUYING linens for the apartment out of ops expenses.

*O.K. MUG moving in.
will take lease & check
for remaining July rent
(\$160.00) with him.*

SECRET

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

26 JUN 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Leonard Libby, WH/SA/CI

THRU : Mr. (Walter Richardson) 03
Room GH 44FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations
and Operational Support)SUBJECT : COVERT SITE 24
Apartment G 32
Summit Hills Apartments
8500 16th Street
Silver Spring, Maryland
#353 598

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 19 May 1964 to the Chief, Safehouse Procurement Branch, Office of Logistics. This memorandum requested the procurement of a safehouse to be occupied by a Latin American. The safehouse was to be located in the Bethesda, Maryland area.

2. This will confirm verbal security approval provided the Safehouse Procurement Branch by this office for the use of the Subject Covert Site. Forwarded herewith is a report dated 18 June 1964 of the security survey conducted on the Subject premises. Your attention is directed to Section VI on Page 2 of this report which lists possible security hazards. This is brought to your attention so that you will be able to take appropriate action to prevent any compromise of activities at the Subject Covert Site.

3. For your information a search of Office of Security Indices in the names of the individuals listed in the attached report has failed to reveal any additional noteworthy or derogatory information identifiable with them.

4. Under no circumstances may classified material be stored in the Subject Covert Site. In addition, the Subject Covert Site may not be loaned to or utilized by another component of the Agency without the prior concurrence of the Central Cover Staff, the Safehouse Procurement Branch, Office of Logistics and this office.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

2/pv

SECRET

5. It is requested that the attached report be returned to this office in a sealed envelope marked, "To Be Opened By Addressee Only" when your office has no further need for it.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

James F. McNeil
Victor R. White

Attachment:

Report dated 18 June 1964

cc: Central Cover Staff
Safehouse Procurement Branch

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE OF SECURITY
Support Division

REPORT
OF
INVESTIGATION

THIS REPORT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. IT IS
LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY AND IS
NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE
YOUR AGENCY. IT IS TO BE
RETURNED TO THE OFFICE OF
SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONSISTING OF
REPORTS

SECRET

SECRET

FILE NO. 182 583

DATE 18 June 1964

SYNOPSIS


I.

The SUBJECT SITE is located in the east wing on the ground floor of an apartment building known as 6560 16th Street NW. The building is located in a large apartment development known as Summit Hills Apartments and is located a short distance off of 16th Street, a main Washington thoroughfare, and East-West highway, Route 24. Transportation and personal service facilities are readily available. Telephone service is on an individual subscriber basis. Fire and police protection are adequate. Only possible security hazard noted for SUBJECT SITE is the proximity of SUBJECT SITE'S windows to possible penetration from automobiles parked in an adjacent parking lot and people located at ground level on the outside of the SUBJECT SITE. Biographical data on the occupants of apartments in proximity to SUBJECT SITE are contained in the body of the report.

5/pv

FORM NO. 1125

REPORT NO.



SECRET

287 598

II. DESCRIPTION OF AREA

The SUBJECT SITE building is located in a modern, middle-class apartment development known as 24 Summit Hills Apartments, which is located along a main thoroughfare of Washington, D.C., (10th Street) and Route 10, East-West highway. The SUBJECT SITE building is located in Montgomery County, Maryland. To the south of the SUBJECT SITE building is another apartment building known as 24 10th Street, Summit Hills Apartments, which is located approximately fifty yards south of the SUBJECT SITE building. Between 10th Street and SUBJECT SITE building is located a large parking lot. Access to this parking lot, which is parallel to the east wing of the SUBJECT SITE BUILDING, can be gained from either East-West highway Route 10 by proceeding in a westerly direction or from 10th Street, a divided highway, which allows entrance to the parking lot for southbound vehicles only. To the west and north of SUBJECT SITE building are additional apartment buildings and parking areas. To the east of SUBJECT SITE building is 10th Street. SUBJECT SITE building is laid out in the form of a cross with wings extending north, south, east, and west. SUBJECT SITE is located in the extreme southeast corner of the east wing of SUBJECT SITE building. D.C. Transit bus service is available along East-West highway and at the parking lot located in close proximity to SUBJECT SITE is a bus stop for D.C. Transit. This parking lot is located directly north of the east wing of SUBJECT SITE building. Taxi cab service is also available. Complete personal services are located approximately 1/2 mile away in Silver Spring, Maryland, which can be reached by traveling east on Route 10. A bulk of parking area for automobiles surrounds the SUBJECT SITE building.

III. DESCRIPTION OF SITE

No interior inspection of the SUBJECT SITE was conducted. SUBJECT SITE may be entered through the main lobby entrance and from an outside entrance located midway on the south side of the east wing of the SUBJECT SITE building.

12/17
SECRET

SECRET

382 598

SUBJECT SITE is located on the ground level of the SUBJECT SITE building. No elevators are located at the rear of the lobby and a stairway to all floors of SUBJECT SITE building is located at the extreme east end of the east wing.

IV. COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Telephone service is provided by Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company on an individual subscriber basis.

V. FIRE AND POLICE PROTECTION

Police protection is afforded by the Montgomery County Police Department which has a substation located on Georgia Avenue in Silver Spring, Maryland. Fire protection is afforded by the Silver Spring Fire Department.

VI. POSSIBLE SECURITY HAZARDS

SUBJECT SITE is located on the ground floor of SUBJECT SITE building (below ground level) and, thus, SUBJECT SITE's windows are at ground level. Visual and technical penetration may be possible from the land area surrounding SUBJECT SITE building and from the parking lot located approximately fifteen yards to the south of SUBJECT SITE building and SUBJECT SITE. No other security hazards were noted and the closest building to SUBJECT SITE building is approximately fifty yards away.

VII. OUTLINE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit A - diagram depicting SUBJECT SITE building and area surrounding it.

Exhibit B - diagram of ground level floor of SUBJECT SITE building.

VIII. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Apartment G 10

This apartment is occupied by one Michael R. SCHRIER born 1922 in Maryland and married to Joan SCHRIER. He has been employed for years as an investigator by Paul M. SACHS, 520 Connecticut Avenue, NW, who is further

SECRET

3/17/74

383 598

described by credit sources as an attorney specializing in investment counseling. Additional information indicates that (SCHRIER) previously resided at (18 Perry Place) and was previously employed by (The WIGGAM) General (wig) shop. No detrimental credit information, police information, or House Committee on Un-American Activities records were reflected in the name of (SCHRIER) or his wife.

Apartment 118 (located directly over SUBJECT SITE)

This apartment is the residence of (Esther JOLLES) white female born (22 December 1892 in Russia) and her daughter (Mildred JOLLES) white female for whom two dates of birth are listed: (7 May 1924) and (March 1917), born New York. (Esther JOLLES) is the widow of (Joseph I. JOLLES) whom Montgomery County Health Department records reflected died of natural causes on 23 June 1960. Mr. (JOLLES) was formerly the president of the (Maryland Belt Parkway Development) Inc., Silver Spring, Maryland, and the (North Portal Construction Company). A previous address of (508 15th Street, NW) is reflected for (Joseph I. JOLLES) (Mildred JOLLES) and (Esther JOLLES).

Immigration and Naturalization records reflected that (Esther JOLLES) received a certificate of citizenship through derivative means on (March 1961). (Esther JOLLES) is not a naturalized citizen but received her certificate of citizenship through her father. Her Immigration and Naturalization file, derivative number (A-302705), alien number (215577) is located in Baltimore, Maryland. (Esther JOLLES) is employed as a homemaker. Credit sources reflect a credit rating ranging from poor to satisfactory in the name of (Joseph I.) and (Esther JOLLES).

(Mildred JOLLES) daughter of (Esther JOLLES) is employed as an analyst by the Quartermaster Corps, Department of the Army, Pentagon. An additional address of (Second and D Streets SW) is also reflected for (Mildred JOLLES) employment. (Mildred JOLLES) came to Washington from New York on 31 August 1945, is single, and has no dependents. Credit sources reflect poor to satisfactory credit ratings in the name of (Mildred JOLLES) no record for either (Mildred JOLLES) or (Esther JOLLES) was reflected at appropriate police agencies and the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

ESC 1ez

SECRET

SECRET**RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS**DB CASE NO. 4763

TO: TSD/DB

DATE _____

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS
TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. AB #6891 DATED 27 May 1964 AND PREPARED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH Refs: A, B, C, D, E, F, & G of AB MEMO #6891, 27 May 1964

Jaime Sanchez Papo (Alias)

1 - ³¹(Mexican Drivers License) No. 436747
1 - 1961 ³¹(Mexican Voters Cert) No. 6215

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/DB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/DB when no longer needed.

TSD, DB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

D-061

SECRET

2/12/

28 MAY 1964

SECRET*Libby*

20 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**SUBJECT: REJECTION OF AN APARTMENT FOR AMMUG-1**

24

1. The apartment at (Hunting Towers , Apt #731 West, Mount Vernon Avenue (Blvd.), Alexandria, Virginia was rejected because it has been exposed to the following KUBARK staffers and agent assets:


- 08 a. Mr. Dolf Luim with AMDIXIE-1 a Cuban who is the (Manager for Vanedadis Magazine) and lives in (Bogata, Columbia.)¹⁰
- b. Mr. (Mike Kline) with AMTOUT a principal agent in New York.⁰³
- c. (Horace Speed)⁰³ with AMCASH who is in New York.
- d. Lou De Santi with AMNIP-1 and Dr. Winston.

2. Due to the foregoing we find it necessary to request that another apartment be secured for AMMUG-1.

for Libby
Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI

Distribution:

- 1 - WH SA/Logistics
✓ 1 - AMMUG-1 File
1 - WH SA/CI Chrono

**SECRET**

20 MAY 1964

19-6-102/2

5/21

14 May 1964

Memorandum for the Record: Safehouse for AMMUG-1

1. Per verbal agreement with Mr. ^{ALL 03} (Ray Scofield) this date, it was

decided to use the following safehouse presently available for immediate use.

24
 HUNTING TOWERS
 MT. VERNON BLVD.
 APT. #731-WEST
 ALEXANDRIA

*Revisited
 C/WH/SA/CI
 this address
 is too well
 known.*

2. This apartment was viewed by C/WH/SA/CI yesterday and considered adequate for AMMUG-1. Undersigned and Mr. ⁰³ (Scofield) will inventory

household equipment on 19 May 1964 (tentatively) and move A-1 into

the abovementioned quarters a day or two thereafter, depending upon

when W-D Staffers are finished debriefing A-1. Mr. ⁰³ (Scofield) advised

that he will inform Mr. ⁰³ (John Ryan) Safehouse Branch, X3683, that it

will no longer be necessary for the Branch to inquire re prospective

apartments for A-1 in the N.W. section of Washington, per WH/SA 64-376

dated 6 May 1964

L
 Libby
 WH/SA/CI

128 201-749651/ Support

14 MAY 1964

5/12

ORIG : L.LIBBY:pap
UNIT : WH/SA/CI
EXT : 4431
DATE : 11 MAY 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-42

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH/SA 8
INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 6, WH 7, VR

11 May 64 22 05z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO: ~~PRITY~~
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ MEXI INFO
ACUATIC PBRUMEN AMMUG
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
REF: MEXI 9336 (IN 78050) ✓

CITE DIR
20506

IN 81839

- 31 1. KURIOT PREPARING TWO DOCUMENTS FOR REF CASE. FOR
(DRIVER'S LICENSE) REQUIRE FULL FACE NEGATIVE, NAME AND SIGNATURE
SPECIMEN IN ALIAS, DOB OF ASSET TO BE USED IN RECOVERY OF MAIL.
FOR (VOTER REGISTRATION) ASSUME "EMPLEADO" WILL SUFFICE FOR
OCCUPATION. 31
- 29 2. PLS FORWARD AIR MAIL ASAP TO (TRAVELERS ADVISORY SERVICE)
P.O. BOX 8064, S.W. STATION, WASHINGTON, 24, D.C.

END OF MESSAGE
C/S COMMENT: *REF RYBAT.

for C/WH/SA/CI *W. Walker*
WH/3/Mex1 - (Dick Scott) (by phone)
TSD/AD/ M. Walker, (by phone)
WH/SA/EOB *(R. Bryant)*
03

W. Fitzgerald
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

B. H. Cheever
BRUCE H. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

11-20
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
Copy No.
11 May 64

5/12

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

MOB	INT	OUT	BS	SB
2	IOS	1	PERS	AB
3	DOB	RPTS	LOC	CA
(CI)	SI	BF	HH	
		SEC	NS	

TO , DIRECTOR
FROM , MEXICO CITY

ACTION, DC/WI/SA 5 (WI/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1425-7 MAY 64)

INFO , DOP, ADOP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/WI 5, VR

SECRET 71753Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 9336

RYBAT TYPIC AMMUG

REF DIR 19477 X

1. SEE NO DIFFICULTY REF PLAN. MEXI OFFICER CAN CARRY LETTER AND INSTRUCTIONS TO MNTY. (OR BRIEF TDY MNTY OFFICER IN MEXI).


2. BELIEVE BEST HQS PREPARE MEXI (³¹IDENTITY DOCUMENTS) AS STATION HAS FORWARDED ALL EXEMPLARS. MOREOVER STATION LACKS FACILITIES FOR REPRODUCTION AVAILABLE HQS. (³¹VOTER'S REGISTRATION) AND (³¹DRIVER'S LICENSE) SHOWING ANY MEXICO CITY ADDRESS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AND SUFFICIENT FOR RECOVERY MAIL FROM GENERAL DELIVERY.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *AMMUG-1 ANXIOUS WRITE WIFE IN CUBA AND TELL HER HE OK.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED



Copy No.

AMMUG-1 file

7 May 64

3/12/1

Temp
copy in Cps file

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

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DESTROY ☐ 910. _____

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4	8

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INFO FILE UR WU/EGG 8, C1, C1112, C1115, C1115, F1, F1112, S206, CS/SG2
ADDP, DDP, SECURITY

SECRET 021952Z CITE [MONTEVIDEO] 5282
DIRECTOR INFO [SANTIAGO] JMWAVE [RIO DE JANEIRO]
REFERENCE: [SANTIAGO] 5331 (IN 83968)

3 NOV 67 R 85636

1. IF REFERENCE REQUEST CARRIED OUT WISH CONSIDER
HAVING AMMUG-1 ALSO VISIT [MONTEVIDEO] FOR SIMILAR PRESENTATION.
IF PLAN FEASIBLE, REQUEST EVALUATION AMMUG-1'S POTENTIAL IMPACT,
BOTH AS PERSON AND TIMELINESS HIS INFORMATION, FOR PRESENTATION
BEFORE [MINISTER OF INTERIOR] AND [CHIEF OF AVALANCHE].

2. BELIEVE SUCH BRIEFING IN NEAR FUTURE MIGHT ASSIST US
IN CONTINUING EFFORTS CONVINCE [GOU] NEED YM SUPPORT NEWLY CREATED
[DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE], UNIT FIRST OF ITS KIND AND FIVE
[AVALANCHE] OFFICERS SOON TO RETURN FROM WOFIRM TRAINING AND
BEGIN OPERATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

12/8/70

ANNEX A

SECRET

Field Distribution:
(1 copy each)

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 COS/Santiago
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 COS/Sao Paulo
 COS/Tegucigalpa
 COS/JMWAVE

REP/LANT

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 COS/Pretoria
 COS/Yaounde
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100

USE PREVIOUS EDITION

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE NO.

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INFO FILE, VR WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FE, CI/EC-2, FI/INT-2, CI/DA																					

SECRET 191645Z CITE (SAN SALVADOR) 6756

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

19 Apr 67 48874

REFS: A. ¹⁶⁻²⁶[SAN SALVADOR] 6727 (1-32525)
 B. ¹⁶⁻²⁶[SAN SALVADOR] 6711 (1-20433)

¹⁶⁻²⁶SUBJECT REF A NOT YET LOCATED BY ²⁷[NATIONAL GUARD] BUT
¹⁶⁻²⁶[STATION] WOULD LIKE AMMUG-1 TO STAND BY IF POSSIBLE FOR
 THIS AND OTHER OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES INVOLVING DGI
⁰⁷TRAINED ⁰¹[SALVADORANS] KNOWN TO AMMUG-1.

2. AT OUR REQUEST ⁰¹[JUSLOOP-1] HAS ORDERED ²⁴[ARREST] OF ¹⁶⁻²⁶
⁰⁴[JOSE REMBERTO CARRILLO CALDERON] (281-²³758959). ¹⁶⁻²⁶[STATION]
⁰⁴PASSED ⁰⁴[CARRILLO'S] ADDRESS IN ¹⁰[ANUACHAPAN] PLAN IS TO HAVE
⁰⁴[CARRILLO] BROUGHT TO ISOLATED ²⁹[NATIONAL GUARD] HEADQUARTERS
¹⁶⁻²⁶IN ⁰⁴[SAN SALVADOR] WHERE HE WILL BE INTERROGATED AND RE-
 CRUITMENT ATTEMPTED FOR JOINT OPERATION AGAINST PCES.

3. ⁰⁴[ALEJANDRO GONZALEZ MONTANO] (281-²³751265) IS SUBJECT
 OF REF B RECRUITMENT INDUCEMENT LETTER. WAS ARRESTED
 BY POLICE ON 29 MARCH 1967 FOR NOT POSSESSING LEGAL IDEN-
 TIFICATION CARD. UNILATERAL AGENT ⁰¹[JUMUD-13] CANNOT PROMISE
⁰⁴THAT ⁰⁴[GONZALEZ] CAN BE DETAINED ANY LONGER SINCE LEGAL HEARING
 HAS BEEN HELD AND HE IS TO BE RELEASED AS SOON AS RELATIVES

mana

SECRET

(20/25)

16-26
PAGE 2 (SAN SALVADOR) 6756 S E C R E T

POST NOMINAL BOND. IMMINENT RELEASE EXPECTED. (JUMUD-13)

SAID HE THOUGHT HE COULD ARREST (GOMEZ) AGAIN 15 DAYS AFTER

RELEASE AND HOLD HIM IN JAIL OVER WEEKEND TO ALLOW (STATION)

TO MAKE RECRUITMENT PITCH. (JUMUD-13), HOWEVER, NOT VERY

DEFINITE IN HIS OFFER AND SINCE HE HAS NOT BEEN THE MOST

EFFECTIVE AGENT IN THE PAST, (STATION) PREFERENCES COMPLETELY

UNILATERAL PITCH. AS SOON AS (GOMEZ) IS RELEASED AND

RELOCATED, WE WILL REQUEST AMNUG-1 PRESENCE (SAN SALVADOR)

TO MAKE UNILATERAL PITCH. IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO

FALL BACK ON JOINT RECRUITMENT PITCH IN JAIL, AMNUG-1'S

SERVICES WILL STILL BE NEEDED.

S E C R E T

BT

NRNN

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Do Not Reproduce

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DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG. <i>SC</i>		
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<i>WH 8</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RID COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED <input type="checkbox"/> TUBED	
INFO	<i>FILE VR, copies of 19-6-1027, copies of 19-6-1027</i>	

SECRET 251700Z CITE [GUATEMALA] 6251

DIRECTOR

25 MAY 66 25182

IS AMUG-1 DEBRIEFING (SPANISH VERSION) FORWARDED [HGGW] 3947

CLEARED FOR PASSAGE [TO LIAISON?] IF SO, PLAN GIVE PRESENT COPY TO

[COL ARRIAGA] PLS ADVISE. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS SEND ADDITIONAL
COPY FOR [STATION.] RETENTION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

AN	FI
19-6-1027	25 MAY 66
RETRACT X	

NNNN

19-6-1027
25 May 1966

5/920

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-311/01258-65

SUBJECT Policy Guidance Directives for
Cuban Intelligence Representatives
in Haiti

DATE DISTR 4 February 1965

NO. PAGES 6

REFERENCES CS-311/00115-64
CS-311/00345-64

DATE OF INFO. 1963

PLACE &

DATE ACQ. June 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in Haiti, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia -- DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN).

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: HAITI

Priority:

1. Plans of aggression against Cuba.
2. Progressive political forces.
3. Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.
4. Movement for solidarity with Cuba.
5. Strategic information.
6. The Communist Party of Haiti. (Party of Popular Accord.)

Important:

7. Relations with the United States.
8. Internal politics of the country.
9. Social situation.
10. Internal situation of the Armed Forces.
11. The Church.
12. Functions, characteristics, and information on members of the foreign service and the accredited diplomatic corps in the country.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from outside
downgrading and
downgrading

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI	2
REPCINCLANT I&NS									
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#").									

	LX-2307
	NP (AMMUG-1)
	CS-311/01258-6
For Distribution See Attached Page	
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<u>Hdqrs Dissem</u>		<u>WE/1</u>	1	<u>EE/GNVA</u>	1
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WH/SA/MOB	5	WH/POSN	1	NE/COLO	1
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WH/SA/Int	1	WH/PRIN	1	NE/BOMB	1
WH/SA/CI	30	WH/GORG	1	NE/CALC	1
WH/SA/SO/NS	1	WH/MANA	1	NE/MDRS	1
		WH/SJOS	1	NE/KUWA	1
CI/Staff	5	WH/SALV	1	NE/KARI	1
CI/Liaison	1	WH/TEGU	1	NE/DACC	1
CI/R&A	3	WH/GUAT	1	NE/LAHO	1
RID/AN	1	WH/LAPA	1	NE/RAWL	1
	99	WH/BOGO	1	NE/BAGH	1
AF/1	1	WH/QUIT	1	NE/BEIR	1
AF/2	1	WH/GAYA	1	NE/DAMA	1
AF/3	1	WH/LIMA	1	NE/ALEP	1
AF/4	1	WH/CARA	1	NE/JIDD	1
AF/R	3	WH/BUEN	1	NE/DAHA	1
AF/CI	1	WH/COBA	1	NE/TAIZ	1
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EE/C	1	WH/BHIA	1	WE/ROME	1
EE/IIS	1	WH/BEHO	1	WE/MILA	1
		WH/LGRE	1	WE/HAGU	1
FE/PMI/I	1	WH/RECI	1	WE/OSLO	1
FE/JKO/JO	1			WE/LISB	1
FE/JKO/K	1	WH/SA/WAVE	5	WE/MADR	1
FE/VNC/VN	1			WE/BARC	1
FE/R	4	AF/ALGI	1	WE/STOC	1
FE/CI	4	AF/ORNA	1	WE/LOND	1
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13. The press.
14. Operative data.

Necessary:

15. Condition of the national economy.
16. Governmental structure and functions of its organs.

Essential:

1. PLANS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA:

- a. Military pacts.
- b. Operations within the OAS (Organization of American States) and the JID (Junta Inter-Americana de Defensa - Inter-American Defense Board).
- c. Possibilities of a break with Cuba by the countries which have diplomatic relations with her.
- d. Possibilities of isolation through the application of Inter-American Treaties such as the Treaty of Rio and the Punta del Este agreements.

2. PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL FORCES:

- a. The Party of Popular Accord (PEP), strength, organization, leaders. Information on the same. Programs, ties with foreign leftist political parties. Propaganda methods. Attitude toward the Cuban Revolution.
- b. Other political organizations. Leaders, information on the same. Forces, propaganda methods, programs. Ties.
- c. Contact and knowledge, reaction to political and economic changes in Cuba.

3. ATTITUDE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARD THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:

- a. Toward the Second Declaration of Havana.
- b. With regard to Cuban-Soviet relations in questions affecting Cuba and world peace.
- c. With regard to accusations that Cuba is a base of Communist aggression against the Latin American countries.

4. MOVEMENT FOR SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA:

- a. Find out whether the Solidarity Movement has been organized, in what form it functions, who its directors are, etc.
- b. Find out the possibilities for demonstrations of active solidarity that the progressive organizations can offer.

5. STRATEGIC INFORMATION:

- a. Because of its nearness to our coasts and favorable position for carrying out any kind of action against Cuba, the search must be undertaken for information concerning the

possibility that imperialism is using this island as a base of operations against our country.

- b. Because of the lack of information to guide the search for concrete data and information, the established principle must be followed of working along the departmental lines, common to all sections of the Department.
- c. Notwithstanding what has been previously mentioned, we deem it advantageous to point out several important questions on which work must be begun immediately.

BASES OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS:

- a. Localization of camps or bases of operations of counter-revolutionary launches. Characteristics of the same. Ships encountered in this. Nationality of the individuals forming the crew of the ships, armaments of the same, plans and objectives of their attacks, and date when they will be carried out.
- b. Counterrevolutionary organizations which will participate in these activities, elements which will be in charge of the same, names, and functions.
- c. Utilization of Dominican elements (Trujillo followers) in this work.

ARMED FORCES OF HAITI:

- a. Organizations of the Armed Forces, units and troops, armaments, transport, and bases, commanding officers of the same. Budgetary allotments.
- b. Military agreements of a secret nature signed by Haiti with the United States for the Latin American countries. Terms of the same. Established agreements.
- c. Utilization of the territory of Haiti for carrying out Latin American army manoeuvres. Dates of the same and armies which are participating. Troops.
- d. Military concentrations of any type which are carried out on Haitian territory. Armies, units, and troops. Date.

6. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HAITI. (PARTY OF POPULAR ACCORD):

- a. Attitude toward the Second Declaration of Havana.
- b. Attitude concerning Cuban-Soviet relations.
- c. Attitude toward the lines followed by Cuba in the national and international political systems.
- d. Attitude with regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement:

In the case of China and the USSR.

In the case of Albania and the USSR.

With regard to Yugoslavia-China-USSR-Albania.

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With regard to peace.

With regard to peaceful coexistence.

e. Internal situation in the Party of Popular Accord:

Forces.

Activities.

Disagreements.

Leaders (information on the same).

f. Relations with leftist forces:

Disagreements.

Possibilities of uniting all of the leftist forces.

g. Methods of combat officially adopted by the party.

h. Work of the party in the cities and the countryside, tending toward the creation of revolutionary awareness in the people.

i. Relations of the party with the bourgeois parties.

j. Solidarity work with the Cuban Revolution.

k. Publicity media which the Party organizes.

l. Repression endured by the party at the hands of the Duvalier dictatorship. Status of the party with regard to legal and illegal operations.

m. Relations of the party with the Dominican Popular Socialist Party and the Communist Parties of other Latin American countries.

Important:

7. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES:

a. Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps.

b. Relations with North American credit organizations.

c. North American military assistance, role of the American military mission.

d. The North American Embassy. Information on the Ambassador and Embassy personnel.

e. Activities of the North American Intelligence corps.

8. INTERNAL POLICY OF THE COUNTRY:

a. Existing bourgeois political parties: composition, forces, propaganda methods, leaders, information on the same. Programs.

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- b. Relations of the bourgeois political parties with the "Yankee" Embassy, the monopolies, and the churches.
- c. Political organizations, information on the same, origin, ties. Orientation.
- d. Need of collaborators for information.
- e. Where the political parties obtain funds.

9. SOCIAL SITUATION:

- a. Conflicts of economic origin manifested as racial demands. Leaders, information on the same.
- b. Economic and political predominance of racial groups. Relations of these groups with the "Yankee" Embassy. Leaders, information on the same.
- c. Worker, student, and peasant organizations. Structure, strength, and orientation. Leaders, information on the same.

10. INTERNAL SITUATION OF THE ARMED FORCES:

- a. The armed forces. Structure. Social composition, organizations, equipment. Troops. Barracks or encampments.
- b. Couplist (coup d'état) groups within the Armed Forces. Information on Colonel Ornel, his ties, etc.
- c. Military relations of Haiti with other Latin American countries.
- d. Ideological training of the Armed Forces. Material and reasoning used.
- e. Information on soldiers who are in the International Organizations of the JID and U.N. and on the military attaches in the Latin American countries.
- f. Restrictive bodies; organization and activities.

11. THE CHURCH:

- a. Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.
- b. Situation between the native and foreign clergy.
- c. Participation of the Church in the internal political life of the country. Governmental opposition.
- d. Influence of the Church among the popular sectors; workers, peasants, students.
- e. Campaigns of the Church against Cuba, arguments.
- f. Relation of the Church with the plans of the United States.
- g. Influence of the Church on education in the country.

12. FUNCTIONS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INFORMATION ON MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN THE COUNTRY:

- a. U.N.
- b. OAS and JID.
- c. Officials in and from the Latin American countries.
- d. Information on the internal political life of the country, obtained in diplomatic circles.

13. THE PRESS:

- a. Information on journalists and the existing dissemination organs. The possibilities of using the journalists both in the country and abroad, for our work.

14. OPERATIVE INFORMATION:

- a. Possibilities of illegally penetrating into the country and taking advantage of the proximity of the eastern coasts of Cuba.

Necessary:

15. CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY:

- a. North American investments and their influence on the country.
- b. Belgian investments and their influence on the country.
- c. Other foreign capital and its influence on the country.
- d. Level of unemployment.
- e. Exports and imports, levels and characteristics.
- f. Characteristics of domestic capital. Economic areas of major investment, its relationships with foreign capital.
- g. Haiti's position with regard to Central American economic integration.

16. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANS:

- a. Relations between the Presidency and the Ministries.
- b. Information on personages closest to and most influential with Duvalier.
- c. The Congress. The most outstanding figures. Relations with the Government, the "Yankee" Embassy, and the monopolistic enterprises.
- d. The Judiciary persons holding high positions. Important laws. Restrictive laws. Relationships between the Judiciary and other authorities.
- e. Information on officials having authority over areas of the country.

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COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-311/00466-65
SUBJECT	Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in the Dominican Republic	DATE DISTR.	11 January 1965
		NO. PAGES	8
		REFERENCES	CS-311/00115-64 CS-311/00345-64

DATE OF INFO. 1963

PLACE &

DATE ACQ. June 1961

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in the Dominican Republic, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia--DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN). It may be noted that this directive was prepared during the régime of Juan Bosch Gaviño.

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO (sic)

Priority

1. Collective action.
2. Status of leftist forces.
3. Dominican Republic Armed Forces.
4. Dominican Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano).
5. Training camps and operations bases.
6. Counterrevolutionary organizations.
7. Repressive corps and CIA Santo Domingo.
8. Status of political parties or groups.
9. Solidarity with Cuba movement.
10. Relations with United States.
11. Church.
12. Armed forces internal situation.

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WH/5	1			WH/GORG	1	FE/OKIE	1
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WH/R	1			WH/SJOS	1	FE/SAIG	1
				WH/SALV	1	FE/KOBE	1
WH/SA/EOB	5			WH/TEGU	1		
WH/SA/MOB	5			WH/GUAT	1	NE/COLO	1
WH/SA/R	4			WH/LAPA	1	NE/NEED	1
WH/SA/Int	1			WH/BOGO	1	NE/BOMB	1
WH/SA/CI	30			WH/QUIT	1	NE/CALC	1
WH/SA/SO/NS	1			WH/GAYA	1	NE/MDRS	1
				WH/LIMA	1	NE/KUMA	1
CI/Staff	5			WH/CARA	1	NE/KAHI	1
CI/Liaison	1			WH/BUEN	1	NE/DACC	1
CI/R&A	3			WH/COBA	1	NE/LAHO	1
RID/AN	1			WH/MONT	1	NE/RAWL	1
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AF/1	1			WH/SAGO	1	NE/BEIR	1
AF/2	1			WH/RIOD	1	NE/DAMA	1
AF/3	1			WH/CURI	1	NE/ALEP	1
AF/4	1			WH/BRIL	1	NE/JIDD	1
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EE/K	1			WH/LGRE	1	NE/ALEX	1
EE/SA	1			WH/RECI	1		
EE/BR	1					WE/BRUS	1
EE/YA	1			WH/SA/WAVE	5	WE/COPE	1
EE/H	1			AF/ALGI	1	WE/HELS	1
EE/P	1			AF/ORNA	1	WE/OTTA	1
EE/C	1			AF/RABA	1	WE/ROME	1
EE/IIS	1			AF/CASB	1	WE/MILA	1
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FE/PMI/I	1			AF/ENRY	1	WE/OSLO	1
FE/JKO/JO	1			AF/BAKO	1	WE/LISB	1
FE/JKO/K	1			AF/DARE	1	WE/MADR	1
FE/VNC/VN	1					WE/BARC	1
FE/R	4			EE/VIEN	1	WE/STOC	1
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NE/Intel	1						
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Important

13. Functions, characteristics, and personal data on members of the foreign service, and of the accredited diplomatic corps.
14. The press.

Necessary

15. Status of the national economy.
16. Structure of the government and functions of its organs.

INFORMATION GUIDELINES AND OBJECTIVES
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO

Priority

1. Collective Action.

- a) Political and military agreements adopted by regional organs against Cuba in which the Bosch government participates. Meetings in which the government's participation in the adoption thereof may be agreed on. Dominican government proposals on the Cuban case, and collective aggression.
- b) Participation of the government in troops in the aggression, units which would participate in the aggression, their chiefs and strength.
- c) Joint military maneuvers which may be held in Dominican territory by Latin American armies. Participating armies and units thereof.
- d) Military concentrations of Latin and Yankee armies, objectives thereof; presence therein of Cuban mercenaries, their conditions, U.S. Sol. (sic; soldiers?) such as mercenaries of the Plaza Giron type, etc.
- e) Plans of provocations devised by the Dominican government in order to show Cuban Government intervention in the country's internal affairs.
- f) Measures on travel to or from Cuba.
- g) Possibilities for break in relations by countries that may have relations with Cuba.

2. Status of Leftist Forces

- a) Progressive forces: organization, leaders, strength, position, and argumentation in the revolutionary struggle.
- b) Possibility for armed struggle.
- c) Contradictions and degree of unity among the leftist forces.
- d) Publications--circulation.
- e) Repression against leftist forces.

- f) Contact with leftist forces in order to know their viewpoints regularly, at all times, and when we may need it, especially on political and economic changes which may take place in Cuba.
- g) Student, peasant, and labor movements. Organization, strength, leaders, relations with the leftist forces, degree of unity.
- h) U.S. and Church penetration in the mass organizations (labor, peasant, student).
- i) Possibilities of spontaneous manifestations of struggle.
- j) Possibilities of guerrilla movement: groups, organizations, leaders, weapons, popular support, relations with the leftist forces.
- k) Struggle in the city: groups, leaders, form of work, role of the labor and student movement, relations with the leftist forces, and with groups operating in the countryside.
- l) Relations of exiles with the insurreccional movement.

3. Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic

- a) Organization of the Dominican Armed Forces, units, and strength of the various corps. Bases, barracks, weapons, and transport of the Armed Forces. Locations.
- b) Budgetary allocations of the Armed Forces; allocations to each branch (Navy, Air Force, and Army).
- c) Existing bilateral agreements with the United States of a secret nature.
- d) Secret or public military pacts entered into by Santo Domingo with countries in the Caribbean area, agreements by them concerning special arrangements.
- e) Yankee military missions. Names, ranks, and functions of their members, their duties.
- f) Armed Forces units with anti-guerrilla training, their strength, time spent in anti-guerrilla training, instructors giving it, weapons, and transportation in the possession of the units. Leaders of the units.
- g) Other battalions or special units (parachutists, Rangers), units and strength, their leaders, transport, and weapons.
- h) Changes in armament; quantity and characteristics of the new weapons acquired.
- i) Participation by Dominican units in Central American or Caribbean military maneuvers, units participating, strength, their leaders.

4. The Dominican Communist Party (Dominican Popular Socialist Party, PSPD)

- a) Attitude toward the Second Havana Declaration.
- b) Attitude toward Cuban-Soviet relations.
- c) Attitude toward Cuba's political activities of a national or international nature.
- d) Position in regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement.
- e) In the case of China and the USSR.
- f) In the case of Albania and the USSR.
- g) As regards Yugoslavia, China, the USSR, and Albania.
- h) As regards Peace.
- i) Regarding peaceful coexistence.
- j) Internal status of the Party.
- k) Forces.
- l) Leaders (information concerning them).
- m) Disagreements.
- n) Relations with other leftist forces, disagreements, possibilities for unification.
- o) Methods of fighting officially adopted by the Party.
- p) Attitude of the Party toward the elections.
- q) Relations with the bourgeois parties and the government.
- r) Work for solidarity with Cuba.
- s) Publicity media.
- t) The establishment of permanent and temporary contact with the PSPD.
- u) Relations of the PSPD with other Latin-American Marxist parties.

5. Training Camps and Operational Bases

- a) Location of training camps for Cuban mercenaries, number of mercenaries in them. Type and duration of training, organizations participating in it. Plans and missions of the elements being trained. Leaders of the camps. Place where the Cuban mercenaries go, recruitment locations. Participation by national elements in the training of mercenaries of foreign nationality.

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- b) Presence of counterrevolutionary elements in the Dominican armed forces; names, assignments, and functions.
- c) Location of counterrevolutionary operational bases on Dominican soil; type of bases. Water craft or aircraft present on them. Counterrevolutionary organization which appears at the head of them. Elements participating. Type of water craft and their characteristics. Their weapons, objectives, and plans of attack; dates when they are to be carried out.

6. Counterrevolutionary Organizations

- a) Cuban counterrevolutionary organizations which are functioning in Santo Domingo; their leaders. Their contact with government personnel, especially with people in the new régime who are responsible for establishing such contact.
- b) Contact by the Bosch government with the magazine Bohemia in Exile of Miguel Angel Quevedo; financial support given it by him, and through whom.
- c) Contact with Carlos Prío and elements linked with the PRC; assistance to them. Contact with the counterrevolutionary organizations; contact with the political parties; elements through which it is effected.
- d) Methods of communication by the elements in Santo Domingo with the counterrevolutionary centers in Miami; through whom the communications are established, and what means are used for this purpose.
- e) Obtaining documents which prove that the Dominican government gives economic assistance to the counterrevolutionary elements.
- f) Counterrevolutionaries who are now working in the Dominican state apparatus or in Yankee aid institutions; disagreements between them and the Dominican workers.
- g) Connections between the counterrevolutionary organizations and the Trujillo régime. Documents proving these connections.

7. Repressive Bodies and CIA, Santo Domingo

- a) Repressive bodies which function in Santo Domingo. Their functions. Activities carried on by them. Their leaders and principal officers. Working methods. Plans and objectives.
- b) Intelligence organizations functioning in Santo Domingo. Leaders. Elements abroad. Their duties and functions. Activities carried on. Plans and objectives of Dominican Intelligence, principally against Cuba. Trujillist elements still functioning inside this body; duties and functions.
- c) Cooperation between the Dominican repressive bodies and those of the Latin American countries, especially those of Central America.

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- d) Meetings held with them, dates, and personnel participating in the meetings; locations. Plans discussed, agreements arrived at against Cuba, and the Movement of National Liberation. Plans and objectives of the national security forces with regard to the Movement of National Liberation, means and resources mobilized, agents infiltrated into the political movements, repressive methods prescribed.
- e) Contacts with Interpol. Cooperation with it. Restrictive measures regarding trips to Cuba. Agents.
- f) Foreign advisers of the repressive forces and intelligence bodies; names, ranks, and positions; their functions; cases in which they have participated.
- g) Leading functionaries of the CIA in the country; its office. Plans and objectives it pursues in Santo Domingo.
- h) Nationals who are working for the CIA; names, ranks, and positions. Their methods and plans. Purpose of their work.

8. Status of the Parties or Political Groups

- a) Their present status in regard to composition, strength, penetration, factions, leaders, programs, etc.
- b) Participation in the government.
- c) Relations of the political parties with the Embassy, the monopolies, the Church, and the Armed Forces.
- d) Organizations of a fascist type; relations with the government, the Yankee Embassy, the Church; leaders, members, structure, anti-Communist campaign, arguments, attacks upon Cuba.
- e) Provenience of the funds of the political parties.
- f) Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.
- g) Toward the Second Havana Declaration.
- h) In regard to Cuban-Soviet relations, in questions which affect Cuba and world peace.
- i) Concerning rightist and extreme rightist groups.
- j) Reactions to the economic and political changes taking place in Cuba.

9. Movement for Solidarity with Cuba

- a) Possibility of active demonstrations in favor of Cuba: groups, leaders, strength, organization, participants, relations with the forces of the left and other progressive forces.
- b) Repression directed at the movement for solidarity with Cuba.

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- c) Propaganda campaigns for and against. Periodicals; themes.

10. Relations with the United States

- a) Alliance for Progress.
- b) The American Embassy. Information on the activities of the Ambassador and the personnel of the Embassy. Relations with the reactionary organizations. Relations with the Church. Government functionaries in close contact with the Embassy.

11. The Church

- a) Ecclesiastical hierarchy. Information concerning it.
- b) Attitude and disagreements between the national clergy and foreign countries.
- c) Participation by the Church in the internal politics of the country.
- d) Secular organizations of the Church (such as young people, Catholic labor, Catholic knights).
- e) Penetration of the Church into the educational system of the country on various levels.

12. Internal Status of the Armed Forces

- a) Information on the military chiefs and the activities they carry on. Groups they observe. Trends and disagreements.

Important

13. Functioning; Characteristics and Information on Members of the Foreign Service of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Country

- a) United Nations, Organization of American States, the JID /Inter-American Defense Board/.
- b) Latin American functionaries in this country. To work with the diplomatic circles accredited to the country.

14. The Press

- a) Information on journalists and dissemination organs. Possibility of making use of them. Journalists in the country and abroad.

Required

15. Status of the National Economy

- a) United States investments (new and old).
- b) Participation by the national oligarchy in the economy. Industry, commerce, agriculture.
- c) Utilization and location of Trujillo's property.
- d) Trend of the level of unemployment.

- c) Relations of the country in regard to Central American economic integration.
- f) Possibility of a new economic policy of the United States monopolies in the country.
- g) Need for obtaining collaborators who will inform us periodically on economic questions.

16. Structure of the Government and Functioning of its Apparatus

- a) Character of the government, program, international policy.
- b) Relations between the Presidency and the ministries.
- c) Functioning of the Congress. Most prominent figures. Relations with the Yankee Embassy. Representation of the bourgeois parties and the social classes.
- d) The judiciary: personages occupying high positions; important laws. Repressive laws. Relations of the judiciary with the other authorities.
- e) Information on personalities connected with Juan Bosch.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba
SUBJECT Fernando FUENTES Coba
REPORT NO. CSCI-316/01228-64
DATE DISTR. 2 October 1964
NO. PAGES 2
REFERENCES

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DATE OF 1964
INFO.

PLACE & Washington, D. C.

DATE ACQ October 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Fernando FUENTES Coba was a lieutenant in the Cuban Police Force and worked in the Confidential Department under Commander Efigenio ALMEJEIRAS, Chief of Police. Although source cannot verify it, he heard that FUENTES was discharged from the police force because of problems relating to drugs. The last source heard of FUENTES, he was working in a printing establishment in Halifax, Canada. Source described FUENTES as being about five feet eight inches tall and 160 pounds. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7

Headquarters Comments

1. Included with a report dated 27 November 1959, was a complete list of the personnel employed by the Departamento Tecnico de Investigaciones (Technical Department of Investigations - DTI) as of 6 November 1959. Included on the list, was one Sargeant Fernando FUENTES Cobas who worked in Bureau "A," the section responsible for foreign intelligence operations for the Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (National Revolutionary Police - PNR).

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT CINCOS # I&NS								
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#")								

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA EOB 1	WE/5/R 1	CI/LIA 1	EX/CANADA 1	LX-1693 LX-1591
WH/SA MOR 1	WE/MADR 2	CI/R&A 3	EX/BRITISH 1	NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1)
WH/SA/R 1	(5-2)		L/WASH/CR 1	CSCI-316/01228-64
WH/SA/CI 1		RID/AN 1		COORDINATING: [Signature]
WH/NAVE 1				WIR: [Signature] swk
TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1				CI/ [Signature]

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4/7/74

-2-

2. An untested source gave a representative of this Agency a copy of a list of regulations issued on 15 May 1960 by the National Revolutionary Police, which came under the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, for the discipline of members of the Servicio Secreto Revolucionario (Cuban Revolutionary Secret Service - SSR). This document was signed by Fernando FUENTE Coba, Chief of the Confidential Section of the General Command of the National Revolutionary Police.
3. In a report dated 19 May 1962, an untested source, who was a guide and interpreter for the ICAP, a Cuban government agency which handled the needs of foreign visitors to Cuba, said that First Lieutenant Fernando COBAS was chief of the DTI until sometime in 1960 when he started working for the Tourist Police, a part of the PNR. In January or February 1961, COBAS transferred to the Transit Police.
4. In a report dated 20 September 1962, an untested source reported that Fernando FUENTES Covas was with the Policia Transita (Transit Police) in the DTI.
5. Another office of this Agency, in a report dated 26 December 1962, reported that Fernando FUENTES Coba, a Cuban national, had been convicted in 1957 of violation of the United States immigration laws. FUENTES was engaged in forging birth certificates to assist Cuban nationals to enter the United States as Puerto Ricans. FUENTES moved to Miami, where he became an ardent Castrista. In July 1959, he served as a provocateur in luring an American flyer, Rafael del PINO, to Cuba, ostensibly to smuggle someone out of Cuba. Because of his success in luring del PINO back to Cuba, where he was badly wanted by the Castro regime, FUENTES received an important position in the Confidential Bureau of the Cuban G-2, and for a time served as chief of the Bureau.
6. On 29 January 1963, a source whose reliability cannot be determined, reported that he had seen Fernando FUENTES Coba, described as a Castro agent, debark from the SS Shirley Lykes on 25 January 1963, at Port Everglades. 24
7. An ^{2417SH}official liaison service reported on 25 February 1963, that Fernando FUENTES Coba was born on 21 June 1928, in Habana, Cuba. FUENTES was a former permanent resident of the United States from 1946 to 1949, and served in the United States Army. At the time of this report FUENTES was described as a photographer with the Tourist Commission in Habana. Source, in a report dated October 1963, reported that FUENTES was settled in Halifax, Canada, and had obtained temporary employment.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba	REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00704-64
SUBJECT (fnu) RELOVA	DATE DISTR. 1 September 1964
	NO. PAGES 2
	REFERENCES

DATE OF 1964
INFO.

PLACE & Washington, D. C.
DATE ACQ August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments:

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

(fnu) RELOVA, pseudonym "Wilberto," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI) in Cuba. He resides at Calle 15 number 2419, Reparto Juan Manuel Marquez, Palya de Santa Fe, Mariano, Habana. 1,2,3,4,5,6

Headquarters Comments

1. An airline passenger manifest revealed that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet, probably identical with the above Subject, left Mexico for Habana on 8 July 1963 and was the holder of Cuban passport number D/63/415.
2. An [official Jamaican source] in a report dated 16 October 1963, stated that Osvaldo RELOVA, the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, arrived in Kingston on 14 October 1963. He was in Kingston for one week and lived at the Cuban Consulate office. RELOVA was reportedly making an inspection trip. RELOVA was born on 13 August 1930, in Habana. His home address was given as 15H 2419 Santa Fe, Habana. He carried Cuban passport number D/63/415, issued in Habana on 17 June 1963.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REP	CINCLANT	CINCSO	INSS					

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "Z")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

HL SA EOB 1 WE 5 R	1	CI LIA	1	IE CANADA	1	LA 1650
HL SA MOB 1 WE MADR	2	CI RAA	1	SIE BRITISH	1	NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1
HL SA R 1			1	L WASH [BR]	1	CSCI-316/00704-64
HL SA CI 1		RID/AN	1			
HL MAYE 1						COORDINATING [Signature]

4/BR

-2-

3. In a report dated 19 October 1963, source unknown, it was stated that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet was appointed administrator of "Envases del Cerro, S.A." firm, located on Calzada del Cerro Avenue, Habana.
4. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 23 October 1963, revealed that Osvaldo RELOVA, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, left Kingston for Toronto on 21 October 1963, on TCA flight number 885.
5. An official Canadian source, in a report dated 26 November 1963, said that Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet, born on 13 August 1930, was not the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada as previous reports stated. Rather, RELOVA, who was a frequent visitor to Canada, traveled as an "Embassy Inspector." He carried Cuban Diplomatic passport D/G3/415 with Mexican visa number OF-7090; he had no Canadian visa. The address on his passport was given as 15/3 number 2419, Santa Fe Banch (sic), Habana. RELOVA entered Canada on 16 August 1963, destined to visit Jesus YANES Rodriguez, Cuban Commercial Attache in Montreal. He departed Canada for Mexico on 25 August 1963, in the company of Alberta MENDUCA.
6. A former Cuban Intelligence officer who has been living in the United States since 1963 and whose reporting over the past nine months has proven reliable, gave the following information on 21 July 1964, on Osvaldo RELOBA Penechet (presumably identical with RELOVA):

In early 1961, RELOBA was an administrator of a section of the Consolidated Hardware Stores and annexes. In late 1961 he went to see source to get help with an investigation on a Mr. BARRAL, Administrator of the Consolidated (sic). RELOBA was requesting source's aid in the belief that source was still working for G-2; source did not tell him otherwise. RELOBA is a new Communist who wants to be more than MARX and is trying to instruct everyone around him. Source said that RELOBA was born about 1934, is 164 pounds, five feet nine inches in height, has a medium thin build, a long face, and a long thin neck. He has dark eyes, black hair, is partially bald, and has a small, thin mustache.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S E C R E T
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COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. **CSCI-316/00699-64**

SUBJECT Julian NOVAS Fernandez

DATE DISTR. 27 August 1964

NO. PAGES 2

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REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 1964

RACE & Washington, D. C.

DATE ACQ. August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Source was shown a photograph of Julian NOVAS Fernandez and source identified him as a Cuban Intelligence Officer. Source saw NOVAS at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964 and assumed he was a functionary there. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

Headquarters Comments

1. Although source saw Julian NOVAS Fernandez at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964, the records of this Agency reveal that source was probably in error in assuming that NOVAS was assigned to that Embassy and it is more likely that he was just passing through. The following traces by this Agency is the basis for this conclusion.
2. An [official Jamaican source], in a report dated 24 March 1964, stated that Julian NOVAS Fernandez arrived in Kingston, Jamaica, on 18 March 1964, to take up his duties at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston as Commercial Attache. Source said that NOVAS has the appearance of an American and speaks excellent English. Since his arrival he has been especially occupied with girls. It should be noted that

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GROUP 1
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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCB	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT CINCSO # I&NS								
None. Field distribution indicated by "##")								

1. "X" by photocopying and pasting the following information:

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WH SA MOB 1	WE MADR	2	CI R&A	3 IE BRITISH	1		CSCI-316/00699-64
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S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

-2-

his wife did not accompany him and source speculated that her arrival may be delayed in view of NOVAS' present inclination for feminine diversion.

3. In a report dated March 1964, this same source said that Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the Cuban Commercial Attache at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, was born on 2 September 1938, in Habana, Cuba. He carried diplomatic passport D/64/90 which was issued in Habana on 20 February 1964. His home address was given as Carman No. 18, Vibora. He arrived in Kingston from Mexico on 18 March 1964, on Mexicana Flight Number 305.
4. This same source, in a report dated 28 April 1964, stated that the wife of Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the recently arrived Cuban Commercial Attache, arrived in Kingston on 22 April 1964, via Mexico. Her name is Amarilis Marta VALDES Hijuelos and she was born on 19 May 1937, in Jiquani, Oriente, Cuba. VALDES has been indisposed since her arrival in Kingston; this is probably due to her advanced pregnancy. Her home address in Cuba is Avenida 31, Number 3622, Habana. She carried diplomatic passport D/64/239, issued in Habana on 9 April 1964.
5. This same source, in a report dated 9 May 1964, noted that the salary and allowances of the new Cuban Commercial Attache, Julian NOVAS Fernandez, suggests that he is the new Cuban Intelligence Service chief in Jamaica, succeeding Gerardo SANCHEZ Robert.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-311/01258-65
SUBJECT	Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in Haiti	DATE DISTR.	4 February 1965
		NO. PAGES	6
		REFERENCES	CS-311/00115-64 CS-311/00345-64

DATE OF INFO. 1963

PLACE &
DATE ACQ. June 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in Haiti, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia -- DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN).

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: HAITI

Priority:

1. Plans of aggression against Cuba.
2. Progressive political forces.
3. Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.
4. Movement for solidarity with Cuba.
5. Strategic information.
6. The Communist Party of Haiti. (Party of Popular Accord.)

Important:

7. Relations with the United States.
8. Internal politics of the country.
9. Social situation.
10. Internal situation of the Armed Forces.
11. The Church.
12. Functions, characteristics, and information on members of the foreign service and the accredited diplomatic corps in the country.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	NOX	OCR	FBI	2
REPCINCLANT I&NS									
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "2")									

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S-E-C-R-E-T
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Hdqrs Dissem

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WH/3 1
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WH/4 1
WH/5 1
WH/6 1
WH/R 1

WH/SA/EOB 5
WH/SA/MOB 5
WH/SA/R 4
WH/SA/Int 1
WH/SA/CI 30
WH/SA/SO/NS 1

CI/Staff 5
CI/Liaison 1
CI/R&A 3
RID/AN 1

AF/1 1
AF/2 1
AF/3 1
AF/4 1
AF/R 3
AF/CI 1

EE/K 1
EE/SA 1
EE/BR 1
EE/YA 1
EE/H 1
EE/P 1
EE/C 1
EE/IIS 1

FE/PMI/I 1
FE/JKO/JO 1
FE/JKO/K 1
FE/VNC/VN 1
FE/R 4
FE/CI 4

NE/AA/L&S 1
NE/AA/AP 1
NE/AA/E 1
NE/AA/I 1
NE/5/P 1
NE/6/C&I 1
NE/Intel 1

SR/CI 1
SR/CI/K 1
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SR/O/WH 1

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WE/5 1
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Field Dissem

WH/MEXI 1
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WH/MRID 1
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WH/PIBO 1
WH/POSN 1
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WH/PRIN 1
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WH/BOGO 1
WH/QUIT 1
WH/GAYA 1
WH/LIMA 1
WH/CARA 1
WH/BUEN 1
WH/COBA 1
WH/MONT 1
WH/ASUN 1
WH/SAGO 1
WH/RIOD 1
WH/CURI 1
WH/BRIL 1
WH/SAOP 1
WH/BHIA 1
WH/BEHO 1
WH/LGRE 1
WH/RECI 1

WH/SA/WAVE 5

AF/ALGI 1
AF/ORNA 1
AF/RABA 1
AF/CASB 1
AF/ACCR 1
AF/CNRY 1
AF/BAKO 1
AF/DARE 1

EE/VIEN 1
EE/SBUR 1
EE/CYRU 1
EE/ATHE 1
EE/SLON 1
EE/BERN 1

EE/GNVA 1
EE/ZURI 1
EE/HAMB 1
EE/KAVA 1

FE/DJAK 1
FE/MEDN 1
FE/SURA 1
FE/TOKY 1
FE/OKIE 1
FE/SEOU 1
FE/SAIG 1
FE/KOBE 1

NE/COLO 1
NE/NEWD 1
NE/BOMB 1
NE/CALC 1
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NE/KUWA 1
NE/KAHI 1
NE/DACC 1
NE/LAHO 1
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NE/BEIR 1
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NE/ALEP 1
NE/JIDD 1
NE/DAHA 1
NE/TAIZ 1
NE/CAIR 1
NE/ALEX 1

WE/BRUS 1
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WE/ROME 1
WE/MILA 1
WE/HAGU 1
WE/OSLO 1
WE/LISB 1
WE/MADR 1
WE/BARC 1
WE/STOC 1
WE/LOND 1
WE/PARI 1

Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP) 1
IE/British 1
L/WASH/BR 1

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11/BR

13. The press.
14. Operative data.

Necessary:

15. Condition of the national economy.
16. Governmental structure and functions of its organs.

Essential:

1. PLANS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA:

- a. Military pacts.
- b. Operations within the OAS (Organization of American States) and the JID (Junta Inter-Americana de Defensa - Inter-American Defense Board).
- c. Possibilities of a break with Cuba by the countries which have diplomatic relations with her.
- d. Possibilities of isolation through the application of Inter-American Treaties such as the Treaty of Rio and the Punta del Este agreements.

2. PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL FORCES:

- a. The Party of Popular Accord (PEP), strength, organization, leaders. Information on the same. Programs, ties with foreign leftist political parties. Propaganda methods. Attitude toward the Cuban Revolution.
- b. Other political organizations. Leaders, information on the same. Forces, propaganda methods, programs. Ties.
- c. Contact and knowledge, reaction to political and economic changes in Cuba.

3. ATTITUDE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARD THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:

- a. Toward the Second Declaration of Havana.
- b. With regard to Cuban-Soviet relations in questions affecting Cuba and world peace.
- c. With regard to accusations that Cuba is a base of Communist aggression against the Latin American countries.

4. MOVEMENT FOR SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA:

- a. Find out whether the Solidarity Movement has been organized, in what form it functions, who its directors are, etc.
- b. Find out the possibilities for demonstrations of active solidarity that the progressive organizations can offer.

5. STRATEGIC INFORMATION:

- a. Because of its nearness to our coasts and favorable position for carrying out any kind of action against Cuba, the search must be undertaken for information concerning the

possibility that imperialism is using this island as a base of operations against our country.

- b. Because of the lack of information to guide the search for concrete data and information, the established principle must be followed of working along the departmental lines, common to all sections of the Department.
- c. Notwithstanding what has been previously mentioned, we deem it advantageous to point out several important questions on which work must be begun immediately.

BASES OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS:

- a. Localization of camps or bases of operations of counter-revolutionary launches. Characteristics of the same. Ships encountered in this. Nationality of the individuals forming the crew of the ships, armaments of the same, plans and objectives of their attacks, and date when they will be carried out.
- b. Counterrevolutionary organizations which will participate in these activities, elements which will be in charge of the same, names, and functions.
- c. Utilization of Dominican elements (Trujillo followers) in this work.

ARMED FORCES OF HAITI:

- a. Organizations of the Armed Forces, units and troops, armaments, transport, and bases, commanding officers of the same. Budgetary allotments.
- b. Military agreements of a secret nature signed by Haiti with the United States for the Latin American countries. Terms of the same. Established agreements.
- c. Utilization of the territory of Haiti for carrying out Latin American army manoeuvres. Dates of the same and armies which are participating. Troops.
- d. Military concentrations of any type which are carried out on Haitian territory. Armies, units, and troops. Date.

6. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HAITI. (PARTY OF POPULAR ACCORD):

- a. Attitude toward the Second Declaration of Havana.
- b. Attitude concerning Cuban-Soviet relations.
- c. Attitude toward the lines followed by Cuba in the national and international political systems.
- d. Attitude with regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement:

In the case of China and the USSR.

In the case of Albania and the USSR.

With regard to Yugoslavia-China-USSR-Albania.

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- 4 -

CS-311/01258-65

With regard to peace.

With regard to peaceful coexistence.

e. Internal situation in the Party of Popular Accord:

Forces.

Activities.

Disagreements.

Leaders (information on the same).

f. Relations with leftist forces:

Disagreements.

Possibilities of uniting all of the leftist forces.

g. Methods of combat officially adopted by the party.

h. Work of the party in the cities and the countryside, tending toward the creation of revolutionary awareness in the people.

i. Relations of the party with the bourgeois parties.

j. Solidarity work with the Cuban Revolution.

k. Publicity media which the Party organizes.

l. Repression endured by the party at the hands of the Duvalier dictatorship. Status of the party with regard to legal and illegal operations.

m. Relations of the party with the Dominican Popular Socialist Party and the Communist Parties of other Latin American countries.

Important:

7. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES:

a. Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps.

b. Relations with North American credit organizations.

c. North American military assistance, role of the American military mission.

d. The North American Embassy. Information on the Ambassador and Embassy personnel.

e. Activities of the North American Intelligence corps.

8. INTERNAL POLICY OF THE COUNTRY:

a. Existing bourgeois political parties: composition, forces, propaganda methods, leaders, information on the same. Programs.

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- b. Relations of the bourgeois political parties with the "Yankee" Embassy, the monopolies, and the churches.
- c. Political organizations, information on the same, origin, ties. Orientation.
- d. Need of collaborators for information.
- e. Where the political parties obtain funds.

9. SOCIAL SITUATION:

- a. Conflicts of economic origin manifested as racial demands. Leaders, information on the same.
- b. Economic and political predominance of racial groups. Relations of these groups with the "Yankee" Embassy. Leaders, information on the same.
- c. Worker, student, and peasant organizations. Structure, strength, and orientation. Leaders, information on the same.

10. INTERNAL SITUATION OF THE ARMED FORCES:

- a. The armed forces. Structure. Social composition, organizations, equipment. Troops. Barracks or encampments.
- b. Couplist (coup d'état) groups within the Armed Forces. Information on Colonel Ornel, his ties, etc.
- c. Military relations of Haiti with other Latin American countries.
- d. Ideological training of the Armed Forces. Material and reasoning used.
- e. Information on soldiers who are in the International Organizations of the JID and U.N.; and on the military attaches in the Latin American countries.
- f. Restrictive bodies; organization and activities.

11. THE CHURCH:

- a. Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.
- b. Situation between the native and foreign clergy.
- c. Participation of the Church in the internal political life of the country. Governmental opposition.
- d. Influence of the Church among the popular sectors; workers, peasants, students.
- e. Campaigns of the Church against Cuba, arguments.
- f. Relation of the Church with the plans of the United States.
- g. Influence of the Church on education in the country.

12. FUNCTIONS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INFORMATION ON MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN THE COUNTRY:

- a. U.N.
- b. OAS and JID.
- c. Officials in and from the Latin American countries..
- d. Information on the internal political life of the country, obtained in diplomatic circles.

13. THE PRESS:

- a. Information on journalists and the existing dissemination organs. The possibilities of using the journalists both in the country and abroad, for our work.

14. OPERATIVE INFORMATION:

- a. Possibilities of illegally penetrating into the country and taking advantage of the proximity of the eastern coasts of Cuba.

Necessary:

15. CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY:

- a. North American investments and their influence on the country.
- b. Belgian investments and their influence on the country.
- c. Other foreign capital and its influence on the country.
- d. Level of unemployment.
- e. Exports and imports, levels and characteristics.
- f. Characteristics of domestic capital. Economic areas of major investment, its relationships with foreign capital.
- g. Haiti's position with regard to Central American economic integration.

16. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANS:

- a. Relations between the Presidency and the Ministries.
- b. Information on personages closest to and most influential with Duvalier.
- c. The Congress. The most outstanding figures. Relations with the Government, the "Yankee" Embassy, and the monopolistic enterprises.
- d. The Judiciary persons holding high positions. Important laws. Restrictive laws. Relationships between the Judiciary and other authorities.
- e. Information on officials having authority over areas of the country.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
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COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. CS-311/00466-65
SUBJECT Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in the Dominican Republic
DATE DISTR. 11 January 1965
NO. PAGES 8
REFERENCES CS-311/00115-64
CS-311/00115-64

DATE OF INFO. 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. June 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in the Dominican Republic, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia--DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Illegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN). It may be noted that this directive was prepared during the régime of Juan Bosch Gaviño.

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO (sic)

Priority

1. Collective action.
2. Status of leftist forces.
3. Dominican Republic Armed Forces.
4. Dominican Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano).
5. Training camps and operations bases.
6. Counterrevolutionary organizations.
7. Repressive corps and CIA Santo Domingo.
8. Status of political parties or groups.
9. Solidarity with Cuba movement.
10. Relations with United States.
11. Church.
12. Armed forces internal situation.

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#")									

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WE/PARI 1

Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP) 1
IE/British 1
L/WASH/BR 1

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

11/BR

Important

13. Functions, characteristics, and personal data on members of the foreign service, and of the accredited diplomatic corps.
14. The press.

Necessary

15. Status of the national economy.
16. Structure of the government and functions of its organs.

INFORMATION GUIDELINES AND OBJECTIVES
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO

Priority

1. Collective Action.

- a) Political and military agreements adopted by regional organs against Cuba in which the Bosch government participates. Meetings in which the government's participation in the adoption thereof may be agreed on. Dominican government proposals on the Cuban case, and collective aggression.
- b) Participation of the government in troops in the aggression, units which would participate in the aggression, their chiefs and strength.
- c) Joint military maneuvers which may be held in Dominican territory by Latin American armies. Participating armies and units thereof.
- d) Military concentrations of Latin and Yankee armies, objectives thereof; presence therein of Cuban mercenaries, their conditions, U.S. Sol. (sic; soldiers?) such as mercenaries of the Plaza Giron type, etc.
- e) Plans of provocations devised by the Dominican government in order to show Cuban Government intervention in the country's internal affairs.
- f) Measures on travel to or from Cuba.
- g) Possibilities for break in relations by countries that may have relations with Cuba.

2. Status of Leftist Forces

- a) Progressive forces: organization, leaders, strength, position, and argumentation in the revolutionary struggle.
- b) Possibility for armed struggle.
- c) Contradictions and degree of unity among the leftist forces.
- d) Publications--circulation.
- e) Repression against leftist forces.

- f) Contact with leftist forces in order to know their viewpoints regularly, at all times, and when we may need it, especially on political and economic changes which may take place in Cuba.
- g) Student, peasant, and labor movements. Organization, strength, leaders, relations with the leftist forces, degree of unity.
- h) U.S. and Church penetration in the mass organizations (labor, peasant, student).
- i) Possibilities of spontaneous manifestations of struggle.
- j) Possibilities of guerrilla movement; groups, organizations, leaders, weapons, popular support, relations with the leftist forces.
- k) Struggle in the city: groups, leaders, form of work, role of the labor and student movement, relations with the leftist forces, and with groups operating in the countryside.
- l) Relations of exiles with the insurrectional movement.

3. Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic

- a) Organization of the Dominican Armed Forces, units, and strength of the various corps. Bases, barracks, weapons, and transport of the Armed Forces. Locations.
- b) Budgetary allocations of the Armed Forces; allocations to each branch (Navy, Air Force, and Army).
- c) Existing bilateral agreements with the United States of a secret nature.
- d) Secret or public military pacts entered into by Santo Domingo with countries in the Caribbean area, agreements by them concerning special arrangements.
- e) Yankee military missions. Names, ranks, and functions of their members, their duties.
- f) Armed Forces units with anti-guerrilla training, their strength, time spent in anti-guerrilla training, instructors giving it, weapons, and transportation in the possession of the units. Leaders of the units.
- g) Other battalions or special units (parachutists, Rangers), units and strength, their leaders, transport, and weapons.
- h) Changes in armament; quantity and characteristics of the new weapons acquired.
- i) Participation by Dominican units in Central American or Caribbean military maneuvers, units participating, strength, their leaders.

4. The Dominican Communist Party (Dominican Popular Socialist Party, PSPD)

- a) Attitude toward the Second Havana Declaration.
- b) Attitude toward Cuban-Soviet relations.
- c) Attitude toward Cuba's political activities of a national or international nature.
- d) Position in regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement.
- e) In the case of China and the USSR.
- f) In the case of Albania and the USSR.
- g) As regards Yugoslavia, China, the USSR, and Albania.
- h) As regards Peace.
- i) Regarding peaceful coexistence.
- j) Internal status of the Party.
- k) Forces.
- l) Leaders (information concerning them).
- m) Disagreements.
- n) Relations with other leftist forces, disagreements, possibilities for unification.
- ñ) Methods of fighting officially adopted by the Party.
- o) Attitude of the Party toward the elections.
- p) Relations with the bourgeois parties and the government.
- q) Work for solidarity with Cuba.
- r) Publicity media.
- s) The establishment of permanent and temporary contact with the PSPD.
- t) Relations of the PSPD with other Latin-American Marxist parties.

5. Training Camps and Operational Bases

- a) Location of training camps for Cuban mercenaries, number of mercenaries in them. Type and duration of training, organizations participating in it. Plans and missions of the elements being trained. Leaders of the camps. Place where the Cuban mercenaries go, recruitment locations. Participation by national elements in the training of mercenaries of foreign nationality.

- b) Presence of counterrevolutionary elements in the Dominican armed forces; names, assignments, and functions.
- c) Location of counterrevolutionary operational bases on Dominican soil; type of bases. Water craft or aircraft present on them. Counterrevolutionary organization which appears at the head of them. Elements participating. Type of water craft and their characteristics. Their weapons, objectives, and plans of attack; dates when they are to be carried out.

6. Counterrevolutionary Organizations

- a) Cuban counterrevolutionary organizations which are functioning in Santo Domingo; their leaders. Their contact with government personnel, especially with people in the new régime who are responsible for establishing such contact.
- b) Contact by the Bosch government with the magazine Bohemia in Exile of Miguel Angel Quevedo; financial support given it by him, and through whom.
- c) Contact with Carlos Prío and elements linked with the PRC; assistance to them. Contact with the counterrevolutionary organizations; contact with the political parties; elements through which it is effected.
- d) Methods of communication by the elements in Santo Domingo with the counterrevolutionary centers in Miami; through whom the communications are established, and what means are used for this purpose.
- e) Obtaining documents which prove that the Dominican government gives economic assistance to the counterrevolutionary elements.
- f) Counterrevolutionaries who are now working in the Dominican state apparatus or in Yankee aid institutions; disagreements between them and the Dominican workers.
- g) Connections between the counterrevolutionary organizations and the Trujillo régime. Documents proving these connections.

7. Repressive Bodies and CIA, Santo Domingo

- a) Repressive bodies which function in Santo Domingo. Their functions. Activities carried on by them. Their leaders and principal officers. Working methods. Plans and objectives.
- b) Intelligence organizations functioning in Santo Domingo. Leaders. Elements abroad. Their duties and functions. Activities carried on. Plans and objectives of Dominican Intelligence, principally against Cuba. Trujillist elements still functioning inside this body; duties and functions.
- c) Cooperation between the Dominican repressive bodies and those of the Latin American countries, especially those of Central America.

- d) Meetings held with them, dates, and personnel participating in the meetings; locations. Points discussed, agreements arrived at against Cuba, and the Movement of National Liberation. Plans and objectives of the national security forces with regard to the Movement of National Liberation, means and resources mobilized, agents infiltrated into the political movements, repressive methods prescribed.
- e) Contacts with Interpol. Cooperation with it. Restrictive measures regarding trips to Cuba. Agents.
- f) Foreign advisers of the repressive forces and intelligence bodies; names, ranks, and positions; their functions; cases in which they have participated.
- g) Leading functionaries of the CIA in the country; its office. Plans and objectives it pursues in Santo Domingo.
- h) Nationals who are working for the CIA; names, ranks, and positions. Their methods and plans. Purpose of their work.

8. Status of the Parties or Political Groups

- a) Their present status in regard to composition, strength, penetration, factions, leaders, programs, etc.
- b) Participation in the government.
- c) Relations of the political parties with the Embassy, the monopolies, the Church, and the Armed Forces.
- d) Organizations of a fascist type; relations with the government, the Yankee Embassy, the Church; leaders, members, structure, anti-Communist campaign, arguments, attacks upon Cuba.
- e) Provenience of the funds of the political parties.
- f) Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.
- g) Toward the Second Havana Declaration.
- h) In regard to Cuban-Soviet relations, in questions which affect Cuba and world peace.
- i) Concerning rightist and extreme rightist groups.
- j) Reactions to the economic and political changes taking place in Cuba.

9. Movement for Solidarity with Cuba

- a) Possibility of active demonstrations in favor of Cuba: groups, leaders, strength, organization, participants, relations with the forces of the left and other progressive forces.
- b) Repression directed at the movement for solidarity with Cuba.

c) Propaganda campaigns for and against. Periodicals; themes.

10. Relations with the United States

- a) Alliance for Progress.
- b) The American Embassy. Information on the activities of the Ambassador and the personnel of the Embassy. Relations with the reactionary organizations. Relations with the Church. Government functionaries in close contact with the Embassy.

11. The Church

- a) Ecclesiastical hierarchy. Information concerning it.
- b) Attitude and disagreements between the national clergy and foreign countries.
- c) Participation by the Church in the internal politics of the country.
- d) Secular organizations of the Church (such as young people, Catholic labor, Catholic knights).
- e) Penetration of the Church into the educational system of the country on various levels.

12. Internal Status of the Armed Forces

- a) Information on the military chiefs and the activities they carry on. Groups they observe. Trends and disagreements.

Important

13. Functioning; Characteristics and Information on Members of the Foreign Service of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Country

- a) United Nations, Organization of American States, the JID /Inter-American Defense Board/.
- b) Latin American functionaries in this country. To work with the diplomatic circles accredited to the country.

14. The Press

- a) Information on journalists and dissemination organs. Possibility of making use of them. Journalists in the country and abroad.

Required

15. Status of the National Economy


- a) United States investments (new and old).
- b) Participation by the national oligarchy in the economy. Industry, commerce, agriculture.
- c) Utilization and location of Trujillo's property.
- d) Trend of the level of unemployment.

- c) Relations of the country in regard to Central American economic integration.
- f) Possibility of a new economic policy of the United States monopolies in the country.
- g) Need for obtaining collaborators who will inform us periodically on economic questions.

16. Structure of the Government and Functioning of its Apparatus

- a) Character of the government, program, international policy.
- b) Relations between the Presidency and the ministries.
- c) Functioning of the Congress. Most prominent figures. Relations with the Yankee Embassy. Representation of the bourgeois parties and the social classes.
- d) The judiciary: personages occupying high positions; important laws. Repressive laws. Relations of the judiciary with the other authorities.
- e) Information on personalities connected with Juan Bosch.

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DISPATCH		SECRET		PROCESSING	
Chief, WH Chief of Station, [Madrid] 15-27 Chief of Base, [Barcelona] 15-27 Chief, WE		XXX INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED AUG 16 1965 FBI - NEW YORK		ACTION INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED AUG 16 1965 FBI - NEW YORK	
FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE SUBJECT: Operational AMMUG/1 Identification of Manuel ESTEVEZ Perez					
ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files. Reference: [OSBW] 1022 23					
1. As requested in paragraph 2 of reference AMMUG/1 was queried for any information he might have on Manuel ESTEVEZ Perez. AMMUG/1 was unable to identify the name. 2. [15-27] [Barcelona]: If a photograph of the Subject is available, it is suggested that a copy be sent to WAVE to show AMMUG/1 for possible identification.					
					
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C) DIR-74952
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20 JAN 65 IN 63642

WOS	172	SS	SB
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1. AMBASSADOR DELAUNE FOLLOW UP APPROACH TO [PRESIDENT RIVERA] PENDING RECEIPT OF MEXI GOVT REACTION IN ⁰⁶ ~~Cuban Period~~ SURFACING. HE UNDERSTANDABLY WARY OF LETTING [RIVERA] TOO ENTHUSIASTIC OVER PROPOSAL WHEN ADAMANT MEXICAN REJECTION OF SURFACING NIGHT TORPEDO OP. ²¹⁻²⁶

2. WHILE [SALV] FEELS [WAVE] HAS PAPER RECEIVED REF A WILL MAKE INTERESTING PRESENTATION, HE NOT CLEAR ON WHO SLATED TO PRESENT IT. ASSUMED TO BE PRESENTED BY ^{not state} ~~State~~ AT REQUEST ⁶⁰⁶⁵ ~~GOES~~ AND ^{Cuban defector} ~~with latter then~~ BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO CAC FOR FURTHER DEBRIEFING. ¹⁶⁻²⁶

3. ^{RE EXPLOSION OF 1000 LB ON SALVADOR} 43-5701935-529, 91-0072 8, 19 9, -11-194, [STATION] FEELS IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE SURFACE NAMES OF NEW TRAINS FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

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IN 63642

Page 2

11
A. [GOES] WOULD HAVE TO ARREST ALL PERSONS MENTIONED OR IT WOULD APPEAR THAT [GOES] DOES NOT BELIEVE ~~Defector~~ INFO. ALTHO
06 [RIVERA] INDICATED THAT HE WILLING TO MAKE THE ARRESTS, [STATION] 18-26
INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW THROUGH DUE FEAR OF STIRRING UP [SALVADORAN] LEFTISTS, AND LACK OF JURIDICAL GROUNDS FOR PROSECUTION.

B. ALTHO ~~Defector~~ HAD KNOWLEDGE THAT AT LEAST 75 SALVADORANS RECEIVED G/V TRAINING BETWEEN APRIL 1963 AND APRIL 1964, HE WAS ABLE TO FURNISH ONLY 35 NAMES. OF THESE, LESS THAN HALF ARE KNOWN TO BE TRUE NAMES. WE THUS FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO MENTION ANY OF THE G/V NAMES, STAND ON THE 75 FIGURE, AND IMPLY THAT ~~Defector~~ HAS MADE NAMES OF ALL 75 AVAILABLE TO

11 [GOES] WHO PRESUMABLY AWAITING PROPITIOUS TIME TO ROUND THEM UP.

C. G/V TRAINEES HAVE BEEN INACTIVE SINCE RETURN FROM CUBA AND ONLY RECENTLY STEPS BEING TAKEN BY FURN MILITARY COMMISSION TO REACTIVATE THEM. SINCE ~~asset~~ IN KEY POSITION TO REPORT ON THIS BUILDUP, THERE IS GOOD CHANCE OF PASSING [GOES] 11
INFO AT LATER DATE WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM TO CATCH WHOLE GROUP RED HANDED WITH EVIDENCE ON WHICH THEY COULD BE PROSECUTED.
~~Defector~~ INFO COULD BE USED AT THAT TIME TO BOLSTER [GOES] CASE.

SECRET

VI