

10 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/TOMIC - Miss Stern

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Reorganization of Bulgarian  
National Committee dated April 23, 1952

1. I am disturbed by the fact indicated in this memorandum that the State Department, namely Campbell, is attempting to lay down the line almost to the precise language which Admiral Hiller uses with the political refugees.

2. It seems to me at some time or other that somebody will have to tell Campbell that while it is the State Department's job to make policy, the only way NCFE can possibly conform to Campbell's ideas is to appoint Campbell to deal with exiles and ask him whether he wants a job.

3. I have a feeling that this is going to come to a head one of these days and I wish you would build up a little file on Campbell and his efforts in this direction.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment  
Subject memo.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee  
2 cc - CIO

14-00000

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

6470

9 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Letters of Mr. C. D. Jackson Concerning  
Possible Communist Disturbances Among  
Hungarian Emigres.

REFERENCE: Your memorandum, above subject, 25 April 1952.

1. In compliance with your request, the allegations contained in Mr. Jackson's letters pertaining to Az Embor and Perenc Gondor have been forwarded to the FBI.

2. On the Henney case, it has been ascertained that the files of this Office contain considerable data relative to Henney's background and activities. There is no information of a derogatory nature in these files, however, to explain a refusal to issue a visa. No record appears of information being furnished either to the State Department or to the Immigration and Naturalization Service by CIA on Henney. OSO is now in process of preparing a reply to a query from the Immigration and Naturalization Service on him. OSO is, therefore, at a loss to offer an explanation of Henney's visa difficulties.

RECEIVED

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK  
Assistant Director  
Special Operations

SECRET

*Durkin has originals*

2-9187

RECEIVED 1011 01 1952  
708 Jackson Place, N.W. May 7, 1952  
Washington 25, D.C.

**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION**

**PRESENT:** Mr. W. J. Scripps, Detroit News  
Dr. Allen  
Mr. Norberg  
Mr. Korns

After arranging an appointment through his cousin, Senator Moody, Mr. Scripps called on the Director to discuss his proposal for a "Friendship Balloon Lift." Certain materials relating to this proposal had previously been transmitted to the Director by Mr. Allen Dulles.

In reply to questioning, Mr. Scripps asserted that he was well acquainted with the NCFE winds of freedom campaign, in which he had participated, but that he had not discussed his present proposal with NCFE. He said he had talked to many American business men, who were all enthusiastic and were prepared to donate the variety of products which he proposes should be included in the payloads. He said that his father was an ardent supporter of the project, along with a Mr. Fletcher, Vice President of the Caterpillar Tractor Company and Dr. Barnett. Mr. Fletcher spent some time in Russia, he said. When asked whether Caterpillar was in the balloon business, Mr. Scripps said no.

Other names mentioned by Mr. Scripps as being familiar with his proposal included Nick Haradi, identified as an ex-minister of the Hungarian Government; Frank Jewitt of General Mills (which holds a balloon research contract with the Office of Naval Research), who has given him a letter to an admiral; an Admiral Miller; and a Mr. Frank of CIA. (see below) Mr. Scripps also mentioned a Psychological Equipment Development Office located in the old Post Office building. (see below)

Mr. Scripps was troubled by security problems. It was apparent that he felt he had obtained confidential information from certain government sources which he could not disclose. At the same time, he stated that in order to work out his proposal in any detail, he would need access to information presently denied him. Therefore, he suggested that he be cleared for security by the appropriate agency.

As a result, it proved impossible to nail down the technical aspects of Mr. Scripps' proposal. In his formal presentation, he had described a balloon capable of carrying a 400-pound payload and costing \$5. In his conversation, he mentioned a vehicle capable of carrying 300 to 800 pounds, together with a staggered release mechanism--without

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SECURITY INFORMATION

price. To questions as to whether either type was in existence, Mr. Scripps replied that he was bound by confidences. In general, however, he did not foresee any technical barriers.

When asked how he would finance his proposal, Mr. Scripps said that he would begin with private contributions, with the thought that eventually the program would be taken over by the government. He laid stress on the need for early organization (e.g. fund raising, balloon stockpiling, crew training, selection of launching sites) in order that operations could be started immediately following a decision as to their desirability. He stated that 90 days would be sufficient to prepare for operations, once he got the "green light".

Dr. Allen expressed his personal interest in the proposal, but reminded Mr. Scripps that PDB's field was strategic rather than operational, and that in an operational proposal of such complexity, PDB could only give the matter a cursory review. Therefore, Dr. Allen stated his intention to forward the proposal to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, which was the proper body to give the project the detailed screening to which it was entitled. Dr. Allen also suggested that Mr. Scripps see C. D. Jackson.

Mr. Norberg then suggested that as an additional aid Mr. Scripps prepare a brief but fairly specific description of what he personally was prepared to do, along with an outline of the organization which would be needed to carry out the project. Mr. Scripps said that he would do so within the next week.

#### COMMENT


Joe Frank, when asked about Mr. Scripps, said he had met him several times between December 1950 and February, 1951. During this period of early planning for balloon operations, Frank said that Scripps proved quite helpful by quieting certain private enthusiasts, in addition to maintaining a discreet silence himself. Frank did not know for a fact that Mr. Scripps participated in the August operation, but judged that it was likely. In Frank's opinion, Scripps is a capable person with valuable connections in the business world and sufficient financial independence to be able to devote most of his time to good works. Frank thinks it would be a good idea to have him cleared as a consultant.

The Psychological Equipment Development Office mentioned by Mr. Scripps is believed to be the Physical Security Equipment Agency, a military development agency operated by the Air Force under an OSD charter. Its director is Col. H. M. McCoy. This agency is prepared to talk with anyone who has been cleared for security; otherwise individuals are asked to approach the services first.

#### Distribution:

Dr. Allen  
Mr. Sherman  
Mr. Norberg  
Mr. Gates Lloyd ✓

C:\NAKorn:ms



**SECRET**  
Security Information

7 May 1952

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Director, Plans  
**FROM:** Deputy Director Central Intelligence

1. In the course of a long conversation with C. D. Jackson and John Hughes on Thursday evening, 1 May, they raised a number of questions about NCPE, including the question as to whether Gearing could be made available for their work. Confidentially, they feel that Miller who is excellent on the administrative side will be badly in need of someone at his right hand who knows the political situation in Europe and the type of thing that cannot be learned by a few trips or a few books.

2. I told them that the Gearing problem was difficult, that we were considering it and hoped to come up with some answer in the near future.

cc: Mr. Braden ✓

**SECRET**  
Security Information

6 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION'S DIVISION

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden

SUBJECT: Liaison with NCPE

1. This memorandum will confirm the discussion between Mr. Thomas Braden, Chief, IOD, Mr. William Durkee, IOD and Mr. Prichett of SE/PC, on Thursday, 1 May, wherein it was agreed that shortly after Admiral Miller's return from Europe on or about 7 May, Mr. Braden would work out with NCPE the details of establishing limited liaison between the Chiefs of the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian Branches of SE/PC, and their opposite numbers at the New York office of NCPE. The above arrangement would be only a complement to the main liaison channel with NCPE which will remain through Mr. John Leich. It would, however, expedite action in situations where minor guidance is required in matters relating to the handling of the Albanian, Bulgarian and Rumanian Committees and where a precipitate unilateral decision on the part of the NCPE desk officer concerned might affect adversely CIA plans or operations.


2. It was generally agreed that to establish the relationship only the following need be arranged:

a. A brief covert introductory meeting between the respective country desk Chiefs during which the SE/PC Branch Chief could outline, in as far as was appropriate, the aims of the CIA program and after which mutual difficulties could be discussed and joint courses of action determined.

b. Establishment of an emergency link through a sterile CIA telephone which would permit secure liaison in special situations.

c. Institution of a system of preparing detailed Memoranda of Conversation for Mr. Braden's office in every instance where there was contact between an NCPE desk officer and his SE/PC opposite number.

3. Should any assistance be required from SE/PC in establishing this relationship Mr. Prichett, SE/PC/PO (Extension 3974) may be called.

  
GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH  
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SS

**SECRET**  
Security Information

6 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/IO

SUBJECT: Termination of Contract Between Mr. Henry F. Landowski  
and the National Committee for a Free Europe.

1. It would be appreciated if IO would assist this division by requesting from the National Committee for a Free Europe an agreement terminating the contract between the NCPE and Mr. Henry F. Landowski, signed 1 October 1951. Mr. Landowski's employment with CIA is being terminated and it is desired that for reasons of administrative regularity and considerations of security his contract with NCPE also be terminated.
2. In working out the phrasing of the termination agreement it is desirable that the following points be included:
  - a. The contract being terminated is that signed 1 October 1951 by Mr. Landowski on the one hand and Mr. Spencer Phenix for the NCPE.
  - b. It should be stated that the contract is being terminated "by mutual agreement" and that all benefits and obligations devolving upon the two parties are cancelled.
  - c. It is very desirable that this document also be signed by Mr. Phenix, who signed the original contract agreement for the NCPE.
3. If three copies of this termination agreement signed by the NCPE are returned to this office we will have Mr. Landowski sign and return a copy for the NCPE files.
4. It is our understanding that there is only one contract between Mr. Landowski and the NCPE, namely that of 1 October 1951. Mr. Landowski assures us that this is the only contract he has signed with the NCPE. However, it is possible that there may be a misunderstanding on this point by NCPE. Therefore it might be well to ask NCPE if they believe Mr. Landowski

to have

**SECRET**  
Security Information

*Orig to Burke 5 May*

**SECRET**  
Security Information

to have any other written obligations to them and if so, specifically to include all such in the termination agreement.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH  
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

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Security Information



-512-9553

McCAMPBELL & COMPANY  
INCORPORATED  
Forty Worth Street  
New York 13, N.Y.

April 28, 1952


Dear Frank,

I found the attached memorandum of real interest as providing a clear-cut explanation of a matter relating to N.C.F.E. which you are doubtless asked about from time to time. It occurred to me that you might like to have this as covering the basic policy used in the selection and employment of exile personnel for various branches, particularly for the work of Radio Free Europe. To my mind it provides an answer to inquiries which come to us and others as to how and why such personnel is chosen.

Since Min Miller is away and won't be back for several weeks I am taking the liberty of sending this copy to you in his absence. He and others at 57th Street read it before he went away and endorsed it.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John H. Hughes", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

NCPE EXILE PERSONNEL SELECTION IN RELATION TO  
(1) EXILE POLITICS,  
(2) RFE BROADCAST POLICY, AND  
(3) EXTERNAL CRITICISM

- I -

INTRODUCTORY HISTORY

A. Formative Stage

At its inception, the National Committee for a Free Europe believed that its Iron Curtain broadcasting operation, Radio Free Europe, could and should be developed and pursued through the medium of "National Councils" or "Committees of Liberation" composed of exile groups from the target countries. It was considered that prominent exile leaders and personalities of each nationality group could express to their captive countrymen, entirely without American advice and guidance, the message of hope which NCPE proposed to send. This concept was not fulfilled. Experience in attempting to weld a talented, dedicated group of exiles into a non-partisan broadcasting operation early demonstrated that without American control the mission of RFE would be lost in the jungle of exile-world politics. It soon became evident that the leadership among the exiles was neither sufficiently strong nor personally willing to rise above the political cross currents, factional rivalries, and splinter-group weaknesses characteristically reminiscent of the political affairs of all Eastern European countries. These factors militated against the original plan of permitting

exiles, through their loosely organized Councils or Committees, to wholly develop, manage, and control RFE broadcasting.

Since the advent of RFE was the most important development affecting the exiles which had occurred since their flight from home, they quickly understood and applauded its implications and potential effect on their futures. Through this instrument they could once again become prominent and powerful in the affairs of the homeland; once more they could contend for place and power.

Selection of personnel for the purpose at hand quickly became a political football of rival leaders, personalities, and groups. Rightists, Leftists, Centrists, Labor Elements, and Splinter-groups argued with us for advancement of their particular personal or political views. Sponsorship of their own adherents as RFE employees through whom such views would be broadcast to their captive countrymen became the pattern of their pseudo cooperation. This pattern was followed to such an extent that ordinary progress and sensible development of our basic purpose of truly free broadcasts under exile control soon appeared to be not only impracticable, but dangerous. For example, the National Councils Division attempted to inaugurate broadcasts to Czechoslovakia under the auspices of a Czechoslovak National Council. The Council was and is made up of exile personalities of differing political views and parties. Its factions proceeded to engage in endless disputes and irreconcilable claims for control of script production and program content. Slovak "Separatists" arguing for the total independence of Slovakia

sought that objective, while Czechs desired opposite views to be aired and advocated the rebirth of pre-war Czechoslovakia. Each group sponsored and insisted upon employment of its own more or less qualified adherents upon the assumption that its special views would be thereby expressed to the captive Czechoslovak audience of RFE. Similar activities were pursued by Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Poles until the futility of permitting the exile Councils to control the destiny and broadcasting policies of RFE was made clear beyond refutation. It became tragically obvious that uncontrolled exile-world Councils and professional politicians could not agree on personnel selection or program content.

In spite of every effort to induce harmony in and obtain proper cooperation from the "Councils", "Committees", and individuals, RFE was confronted with an impasse. The alternative theory and present policy of American selection of non-political exile personnel was the only way out. It has worked. Technically qualified personnel produce properly oriented programs -- and have been doing so with documented success since July, 1950. Disappointed exile politicians, professional exile camp followers, disturbed American special pleaders, and alarmed Communist Agents all scream, snipe and snivel -- but RFE programs are doing the job.

NCFE-RFE records of this stage can be supplied by Frederic R. Dolbeare, Vice-President, National Councils Division, and Robert E. Lang, Director, RFE. The current policy has the complete endorsement of these officers and of the Board of Directors of NCFE.

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B. Development Stage

Upon the collapse of the original concept of broadcasting under exile auspices, RFE necessarily utilized some exile personnel endorsed and recommended by the leaders of the various nationality groups. As technical radio facilities came into being, exiles with radio background or writing talent were required for the production of programs. This involved using individuals eminently qualified by experience to do a radio job of script writing, announcing, acting, etc. without regard for the fact that such individuals might be at odds with one or another political faction or leader of an exile "Council". It also involved elimination of proven inefficient, inept or unworthy individuals without regard for their exile "Council" sponsorship. In either instance criticism of RFE was predictable and indeed was always forthcoming -- often in virulent and dishonest form.

The day to day operation of RFE developed new techniques and long range plans which made it impossible to employ non-entities of no political color or conviction. The best people to produce programs in harmony with NCFE-RFE purposes and policies necessarily were persons known in their own countries for their views on domestic political affairs and their anti-Communist activities. Hard-hitting propaganda required hard-hitting personalities whose known association with RFE and its programs would add validity and significance for our captive audiences. Gradually, therefore, the nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich were staffed with tested, qualified exiles who had been

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identified publicly with domestic political philosophies at issue in their own countries. Many, in fact most of the staff people are controversial figures among their own countrymen in exactly the same way that prominent Americans are controversial in our political arena. Many indeed are members of the Councils, but are men of sufficient stature to give their primary allegiance to the non-partisan policy of RFE. The decisive factor is that there be no controversy or question about their anti-Communist convictions and records.

At this point, it must be noted that our target countries have been subject to repetitive political ferment prior to and following World War II, as well as the successive occupations of Nazi and Communist Armies.

The temper of the times, therefore, in which these exiles have lived for the past fifteen years has been one of excitement, bitterness, recrimination, rivalries, and personal turmoil -- all stemming from both domestic and foreign struggles for power. The times have produced a bumper crop of refugee traitors, collaborators, and opportunists and at the same time have developed pure Western style democrats, true national patriots, and unselfish honest men. The exile who stood by placidly through the era is not much good, however talented, as a militant messenger of hope via RFE; exiles who were honorably active in public affairs at home and who had radio talent were, therefore, the only kind of personnel suitable for RFE purposes.

As the necessity for American operational control of nationality desks became self-evident, the only feasible personnel policy was to

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employ properly qualified individuals, regardless of exile politics. In the execution of this policy individuals who were useless were eliminated without regard for political sponsors. This process still goes on. Similarly, talented exile personalities recruited from any source were employed wherever needed. This process still goes on. Both processes are in vogue with a healthy disregard for exile political nuances and protests. Neither process is satisfactory to self-styled exile leaders, since it follows that the appointment of an individual sponsored by one faction as a representative of its views inevitably will evoke howls of rage and criticism from the opposite faction. This is an accepted fact of exile life. We have to live with it and get on with the job.

C. Summary

Our formative and development experiences evolved the present and continuing exile personnel policies of KFE. Exile desk employees, whether at New York or Munich, must respond to three tests:

- (a) Security clearance,
- (b) Endorsement of technical proficiency,
- (c) Sufficient stature to eliminate exile partisan interests from program content.

- II -

CRITERIA AND METHODS OF PERSONNEL SELECTION

A. Recruitment -- General Principles

The best source of exile personnel is referral by "non-professional" exiles themselves. Among all nationalities there are

many talented refugees who need employment and who can supply RFE's need for script writers, actors, announcers, etc. Accordingly, desk staffing has been accomplished by examining the qualifications of duly recommended individuals, whether the recommendations come from political personalities or otherwise. Selection is based on the ability of the individual to fill a need efficiently in turning out or participating in planned programs. Recruitment is determined only by ideological security, independence of exile politics, and personal ability. This is not to say that many individual exiles having decided personal convictions and well-known political records are not employed, but a positive statement is made that those exile employees now produce RFE programs reflect the policies and guidance of RFE rather than promotion of partisan objectives and personalities.

**B. Recruitment -- Detailed Procedures**

The personnel complement of each RFE nationality desk is founded on a hard core of dependable individuals, usually two or three people, including the chief of the desk. "Dependability" is established by exhaustive inquiry at all available sources to establish the desirability, reliability, technical proficiency and security of the working core of the desk. Sources used are:

- (a) Exile political personalities in the United States,
- (b) Exile references of high standing and known impartiality in the United States and Overseas,
- (c) Overseas contacts and personal knowledge of our American representative in Europe (Royall Tyler-Paris),
- (d) Checks and balances of our political advisor at Munich (W.B. Griffith),



- (e) British Broadcasting Corporation, where applicable,
- (f) Voice of America, where applicable,
- (g) Special confidential sources.

These tests having been applied, confidence is placed in these initial personalities, and particularly in the Desk Chief, to carry forward recruitment of additional personnel as needed in collaboration with the American Director of RFE (Robert E. Lang, New York) and his associate officials. The leading personalities of each desk know what is expected of them and since they respond to the established criteria, the resulting full personnel complement is a group of exiles who, notwithstanding their personal political views, are suitable and capable program production people. They meet our basic requirement of daily production of truly free and properly constructed propaganda broadcasts capable of evoking the widest possible audience response in our target countries.

In brief, the mission of RFE being conceived as a marketing problem, the best available salesmen are procured, trained, and utilized to sell the market.

#### C. Recruitment -- Special Security Measures

Since RFE, although a private enterprise, is by extension a collateral instrument of American national policy, special precaution is exercised to insure the ideological security of all employees, including exiles. In the case of exile personnel specifically, the

14-00000

additional approval of the Personnel Director of NCFE is required before employment either at New York or Munich. Thus, even if a proposed exile employee meets all the described criteria, he may not be employed without this ultimate approval.

The Personnel Director of NCFE utilizes appropriate and dependable sources of information to determine the acceptability of personnel from a security standpoint. His sources are investigative in nature and are conclusive as to the ideological record and security acceptability of the proposed employee. In doubtful cases the Personnel Director consults with the Vice-President in Charge of the National Councils Division and with the Director of Radio Free Europe. These three officers of NCFE jointly follow a policy of rejecting candidates about whom there is the slightest doubt. It is to be clearly understood that in making decisions of this kind the conflicting interests and frantic representations of politically-minded exile leaders and groups are ignored. Acceptance or rejection of candidates is wholly based on ideological security and talent value.

D. Summary

- (1) All nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich are staffed by individuals who have passed all tests described above.
- (2) All programs produced and aired by the nationality desks are checked and scrutinized by American supervisory personnel for ideological content, audience acceptance and conformity to basic NCFE-RFE policies.
- (3) These conditions have been progressively in force since July, 1950.

### III

#### RFE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL

##### A. General Comment

The programs aired by RFE are not left to whim or chance. All programs and the personnel responsible for them are controlled by a written policy manual. The manual sets forth in minute detail the position and policy of RFE on every topic beamed to our target countries. The manual is the daily guidance of all employees, both American and Exile; deviation from its rules is not permitted. Continuous scrutiny of manuscripts and resultant broadcasts is maintained by American employees to insure that there are no deviations.

The policy manual of RFE represents the considered views of the responsible officials, including the Board of Directors, of NCPE. It is a statement of the principles and purposes of NCPE expressed in operational form. It is considered and maintained as strictly confidential document, but it is of course available for examination by any proper authority.

The policy manual is in strict conformity with current American national policies as evidenced by the following quotation from Article One:

"As a non-governmental radio station responsible to the millions of American citizens who support it, RFE cannot take a line contrary to United States Government policy or to the beliefs of the American people reflected in the Constitution of the United States and in American Institutions."

14-00000

The above quotation is understood by exile personnel particularly to be a solemn injunction against ideological program content which in any way violates the letter and spirit of American policy and ideals. It is a guarantee to the American people and to our captive listeners that RFE and the men who make its programs are uncompromisingly opposed to the Communist regimes now in power in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries.

B. RFE Policy Defined by Handbook (Direct Quotations)

1. The purpose of RFE is to contribute to the liberation of the Nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-dominated regimes by which they are, for the time being, ruled.

2. The central characteristic of RFE is that it is the instrument of men who are engaged in fighting for freedom and justice. As such, it encourages resistance to every tyrant, great and small, in the countries it addresses. Its speakers speak -- as men of good will who seek to contribute to the elimination of old enmities and the building of an enduring European democratic order.

3. As a free forum in which exiles speak to their own people RFE is particularly dedicated to arguments by which exiles seek to persuade their listeners of all devouring ambitions of Soviet Imperialism, the cruelty and unworkability of Communist Institutions,

and the proven advantages of the democratic way of life for the worker, and the peasant, the administrator, and the business and professional strata of society.

4. RFE takes counsel with exile leaders and is respectful of their views, but its policy is not designed to further the aspirations of any single exile leader or party.

5. RFE policy is further based upon acceptance of the principle that each of the liberated peoples shall be free to determine for itself the political and social institutions under which it will live once it has been liberated.

6. Finally, the following summary in the nature of a specific limitation on program content is quoted:

"It is indispensable that all concerned grasp clearly that RFE is a multi-national station established to contribute to the liberation of all the peoples it addresses, and not merely of one of those peoples. RFE policy is therefore commanded by the limitation that nothing may be said over its facilities to one national audience which will destroy the confidence in RFE of its other audiences or which is likely to induce any of its audiences to prefer communist rule to a liberation which might appear to promise domination by a neighboring people."

## SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed NCFE Support on the Exile Organized  
Refugee Aid Committee in France

REFERENCE: Letter Dated 20 March 1952 from Marc to Willa,  
Enclosing 27 January 1952 Report on the Exile  
Organized Refugee Aid Committee in France,  
from Roger L. Bull.

1. The reference, recently forwarded to us by NCFE, recommends NCFE support for organized refugee relief committees in Paris. As a follow-up, Miss Mary Augustine, of NCFE's New York staff, is currently surveying refugee organizations in Western Europe. When the results of this survey have been given to us, we plan--in conjunction with the interested area desks--to prepare a study with recommendations concerning the utilization of exile committees in Europe.

2. In the meantime, the reference is forwarded for your information.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment 1  
As stated above

Distributions:  
Addressees - original  
CIO - 1  
IO/TONIC - 1  
RI - 2

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

20 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT F. JOYCE  
Policy Planning Staff  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Future Balloon Operation

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.

2. Will you advise me as to (a) whether you wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether you want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time?

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment  
Ltr from Min Miller  
dtd 1 Apr 52

CIO:TWB:ah

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 cc - IO/TEHC  
1 cc - CIO  
2 cc - RI

**SECRET**

In reply refer to: W-2016

28 April 1952

Dear Spencer:

Here is a brief of the material that is wanted in respect to the slave labor issue.

This is of great importance, as you can well imagine, but for your information we find ourselves in something of a box on this because having pressed for the hearings, it is essential to gather good evidence and not be embarrassed by something we have sought to obtain.

I hope, therefore, that you will give it your top consideration and let me know if you can come up with anything. In addition to the kinds of evidence listed here, you will note that private organizations may testify.

Sincerely,

Oliver E. Hadwood

Enclosures

2 Memoranda 14 Apr 52

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Spencer Phenix  
1 cc - IO EEO.  
1 cc - IO/TOMIC  
2 cc - CIO ✓  
2 cc - RI

*see chrono for 2d enclosure*



SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

14 April 1952

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Gathering Evidence on Slave Labor Issue - to be presented  
Ecosoc Hearings

A. Type of evidence that is desired:

1. Scholarly studies - Laws, administrative regulations showing the de jure and de facto application of laws pertaining to labor.
2. Documentary evidence - Passes, identity cards, ration cards, release papers, etc. Anything indicating the place, name of camp, administrative documents, etc. Photostatic copies accepted if the original is unavailable for retention. Seals, stamps, and signatures desirable.
3. Testimonial
  - a. Written testimony - probably in the form of answers to a questionnaire. These testimonials may be either:
    - (1) Anonymous. (As few as possible)
    - (2) Authorized use of the name, either confidentially, for release only before the court, where many sessions will be closed to the public, or the name may be released to the public.
  - b. Tape recordings - Some excellent testimonials could perhaps be tape recorded.
  - c. Statistical form - The bulk of this testimonial can also be reduced to a statistical form.
  - d. No hearsay testimony is wanted.
4. Witnesses - A few of these should be presented by each group. However, the witnesses should be most carefully chosen to insure that they are really genuine, really were in a concentration camp, and not in some internment or intermediate camp, and that they spent a considerable amount of time there, without having been convicted by due process of law. Furthermore, these witnesses should be of high caliber, highly literate, capable of presenting their story clearly, and standing up to close cross-examination, without having to alter their story.

SECRET  
CURRENT INFORMATION

- 2 -

B. Principal targets to hit: State is especially anxious that we assist by reaching those persons, and those areas hardest to reach, and on which there exists the least evidence.

1. Individuals: The persons that present the greatest interest are civilians, who have been in Soviet Concentration Camps since the last war. Soldiers are considered secondary evidence, as with them a difference must be made and clearly drawn between PW camps, and concentration camps, where soldiers and civilians both were put to work at hard labor. Well known persons who have testified before should not be used. The effort must concentrate on new evidence of recent date.
2. Areas: In order to establish clearly that the concentration camp forms an integral part of the Soviet Communist political and economic system, it is vital to prove conclusively the existence of concentration camps in all countries which have fallen under Soviet domination. Thus evidence is especially needed on the following areas:

Poland  
Baltic nations  
East Germany  
Hungary  
Rumania  
Bulgaria  
Albania  
China  
N. Korea  
Russia (Material on Russia, if gathered, should be of very recent date.)

The areas in which to operate most successfully, are the followings:

Sweden (Balts, Poles, Russians)  
Germany (All kinds)  
Trieste area (Central European refugees)  
Northern Greece (Bulgarians, Rumanians)  
Yugoslavia??? (They have evidence - will they cooperate?)  
Eastern Turkey???  
Iran (Reportedly, there are a good number of escapees, from Soviet Russia. These might be Azerbaijani, Armenians, Georgians, even Persians, providing an entirely new source of evidence.)  
Hong Kong  
Formosa (Reportedly a groups of former inmates here)  
S. Korea (N. Korean PW's, Chinese PW's - might locate existence of camps in Korea and China).  
Japan (Former PW's. Some were in Siberian Slave Labor camps.

C. Organizations which should do the work: These organizations need not have any special qualifications just so long as they are bona fide organizations. State recommends that we try to get a diversity of

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 3 -

such organizations to present evidence. Twenty different organizations would be an optimum to aim for. They should represent different interests, such as labor groups, veterans organizations, emigre organizations, church groups, and several of them should have an international character.

- D. *Your capabilities:* What type of organizations do you have that could organize interrogation teams, draw up lists of persons to interview, and go out and gather the material for presentation to the hearings?

What areas could the organizations you have in mind, work in?

What national groups could they concentrate on?

How much operational support would they require from us? (Money, intelligence support)

How large are their capabilities: types of material that they can present, how thoroughly can they be expected to cover the field they are assigned? How many former inmates can they contact? 100? 200? 500?

Do they have U. S. State Department representatives in their areas to which they can turn, who would assist them in complying with all the regulations and requirements, which must be met to be accepted by the Economic and Social Council as a group which will present testimony. (It might be best if we obtained a sort of form application, which we could disseminate to the field, where necessary.)

The choosing of the organization must be done at an early date. Applications were to be in on the 31st of March, but State is certain that if they are submitted without undue delay (by mid-May) they would be accepted.

SECRET

SECRET

25 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Continuance of Project FJSCOPE

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 21 April 1952 regarding the desirability of continuing Project FJSCOPE, which provides a monthly allotment of \$75.00 to Walter F. Kammerer for services rendered to this division.
2. Although Mr. Kammerer is used as a consultant for SE, he is called upon from time to time to furnish information outside his capacity of consultant which would not justify the payment of consultant fees.
3. It is felt that the monthly stipend of \$75.00 covers these extra activities, and we should like to have Project FJSCOPE continued.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH  
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

*orig to Dir  
2 May 1952*

SECRET

24 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF EASTERN EUROPE

ATTENTION: Mr. O'Meara

SUBJECT: Future of Strasbourg Free Europe University Students

REFERENCE: C/IO Memorandum to C/AS of 20 March 1952,  
Same Subject as Above.

1. There are attached hereto lists of students, together with biographical data, of the Free Europe University, according to the national groups of your interest (Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary), as submitted to us on 14 April 1952.

2. When this information was given to us the following caveat accompanied it:

"You realize that the families of most of these students are in most vulnerable positions behind the Iron Curtain and the information we secured from them we promised to keep strictly confidential. Of course, some of the cases can be camouflaged for public consumption but we have to keep faith with these youngsters and for that reason names can not be identified with even skeleton outlines of their careers."

3. The individual responsible for the administration of the Free Europe University has explained to us that:

"The date of the completion of their studies in each case is impossible to furnish with any accuracy for the simple reason that French university courses are not arranged with the same exactness that characterizes the custom of American colleges and universities. On this point I can give you two bits of information. First, that in no case is it expected that any student would continue as a member of the College de l'Europe Libre for more than a maximum of three years. Also, of the present student body it is expected that 25-40 will finish their academic work at the University of Strasbourg at the end of the current university year."

SECRET

- 2 -  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
**SECRET**

Accordingly, we have requested that we be provided with a list, together with any available information regarding the political orientation and plans for the future, of the estimated 25 to 40 students who expect to complete their academic work at the end of the current University year. When this list is available we shall transmit the information to you.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

**Distribution:**

Addressee - Original & 6

CIO - 1

IO/DOFO - 1

IO/NEV - 1 ✓ (1 cc given Nancy)

RI - 2

CIO/NEV:bw

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

24 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, OO

SUBJECT: Your Memorandum 29 February 1952 on "Hungarian  
Exile Activities"

I was interested in your report on Nagy and his efforts to set up a Hungarian Government-in-Exile. I note in paragraph 5 that you say your contact is hoping to receive more information from them. Since I think this situation has been cleared up by other events, I would not want you to press your contact to stir Nagy to further action by a request for more information. If, however, Nagy does give you more information, we should very much like to see it.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

CWO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - OOD/JPC  
1 cc - IO/WHIC  
1 cc - CIO  
2 cc - RI

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT L. JONES  
Policy Planning Staff  
Department of State

SUBJECT: State Department Paper on "The Functions of RFE  
and RFP"

1. Thank you for forwarding to us the State Department memorandum on the functions of RFE and RFP. I am sorry that there has been a delay in replying to it. The chief reason has been our efforts to obtain a written statement of position from the RFE Executive Board, and particularly from Robert Lang, the Director of RFE. After long considering the matter, Lang has expressed a desire to talk personally with you about the subject, and I understand that since the elapsed time he has had one opportunity for a conference with you on the problem. I agree with the view you expressed to him -- that there ought to be further conferences -- but nevertheless want you to know our own views without further delay.

2. I think that there is a basic element of misunderstanding in the State Department paper. That is the idea which seems to me to be implicit in it that the exiles do not broadcast. In fact, the exiles do all the broadcasting. By and large, these men are not political figures but technicians, writers and newsmen having somewhat the same training and point of view as those who do similar work for American companies. Frequently, also, exile leaders from within the National Councils are asked to make personal broadcasts. This practice will continue. All in all, so great is the exile domination of RFE broadcasts that in many instances these broadcasts have taken on the tone and coloration of indigenous radio in the countries to which they are aimed. Wherever possible, that is the aim of RFE -- to compete within each country as an indigenous national station.

3. In addition, even allowing, however, for this misunderstanding, as I believe it to be, the State Department paper presents a point of view with which I cannot agree. This is that the National Councils could in practice be placed in charge of RFE. I am almost



SECRET

certain they could not be. No statement made by RFP, no line of policy that RFP could pursue, no suggestion or propaganda line that RFP could follow could be done in the name of the National Councils so long as the members of each Council are incapable of reaching a group decision or of reaching a majority decision which the minority would not attempt to subvert. It seems to me that there is only historical value in talking about what the original concept of the National Councils was. The concept has changed, and the change was necessary to correspond to the fact. The fact is the inability of each National Council to speak as a single voice.

h. Without further discussion, therefore, I am unprepared to ask RFP to make a major change in its policy such as the State Department paper suggests. I understand that you and Mr. Braden have agreed with Admiral Miller and Mr. Long to discuss this problem thoroughly with the people who are concerned in the State Department and I hope that after these discussions we may reach an agreement on the matters which the paper raises.

CHARLES W. MILLER

CIC:Tap/eh  
(24 Apr 52)

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
2 cc - S.R. (1 for DU/1)  
1 cc - AD/C  
1 cc - CIO  
1 cc - IO/EMHC  
1 cc - IT/OCG  
1 cc - SE/CIC  
2 cc - RI

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert V. Joyce  
Policy Planning Staff  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Testimony of Adolph A. Berle, Jr.  
on behalf of Nicolas Kalaza

1. Thank you for your memorandum of 14 March 1952 transmitting to us Mr. Campbell's memorandum of 13 March regarding the testimony of Adolph A. Berle Jr. on behalf of Nicolas Kalaza. This is to inform you that we are in complete agreement with the views which you and Mr. Campbell have expressed.

2. We feel that it is indeed most regrettable that Mr. Berle in his testimony made certain remarks offensive to the Cretzianu-Visolani group. In March, Mr. Grew received Mr. Cretzianu in an attempt to disclaim any responsibility on the part of W.P.A. for Mr. Berle's statements and also to request Mr. Cretzianu that Mr. Berle had spoken in a private capacity and as attorney to Mr. Kalaza. This interview was followed by a letter from Mr. Grew to Mr. Cretzianu on 26 March, in which these same views were set forth.

3. We shall make a serious attempt to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future. We are returning your file as you requested.

THOMAS W. BRYEN

Enclosure

CIO/REN/H V:BJJ (17/4, re-typed 21/4)

Distributions:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - CIO

1 - IO/OTO

1 - AEC

1 - W.P.

2 - RI

1 - CIO

NBV

15 March

Mr Dallas told me this am  
that Cretzmann sent a copy of this  
testimony to Mr Brew together  
with a letter inquiring "how come?" -  
Brew & Alvin dined yesterday  
& agreed that Berle was way off  
base and Brew is preparing a  
letter to Cretzmann telling him that  
Berle had no right to attack C.  
as he did; a <sup>draft</sup> copy of this letter  
will go to Berle prior to mailing  
for his comments.

As Alvin put it to me - "It's  
in the works & there's nothing more  
for us to do about it at this time" -

[Have Dallas handle the above]  
by phone.

Mr. Lloyd

17 March 52

Mr. Fishburne C/SE/PC 5  
X 3091, X 495 brought this  
in today. He said that the  
DD/P is concerned about it.  
Ellen was not in, but called  
in at 5 and was transferred  
to Mr. Fishburne.

Mr. Fishburne stated that  
Malaya is a Rumanian industrialist,  
a crook and an opportunist, who  
cooperated with the Communists  
and supported the Nazis. (Send) OBO  
files is in progress and will be in  
Mr. Fishburne's hands.) Berle's  
unilateral action (~~at~~ identifying  
NGFE with this cause) involves a  
~~violation~~ of state policy, will stir up the  
evils who will think this does

represent US policy—and is generally very bad.

What appears needed is:

- (a) High-level rapping of Berle's knuckles
- (b) Official denial or
- (c) NC7E denial of this as NC7E position

P.S. Berle is wrong in identifying Malaya as a partisan of Radescu.

Henry

17 March

Mr. Braden:

This is another example of interference and partiality on the part of NCFE.

Mr. Berle had 1) no right in testifying in this case and 2) no business endorsing the Radescu faction as against the Cretzianu-Visolani Group.

Major Fishburn would like the document back today, room 1201 J.

Ellen

SECRET

Security Information

2-7043

MAR 20 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Testimony of Adolph A. Berle, Jr., on behalf of  
Nicolas Malaxa; Complaint of the State Department.

1. Please note the attached memoranda from Bob Joyce and John Campbell, dated March 14 and March 13, respectively. Will you please prepare a brief memorandum for Messrs. Joyce and Campbell informing them that we are in complete agreement with their views concerning Adolph Berle's statements, and moreover that action has been taken to inform the Cretsianu-Visoianu group that Mr. Berle had no right whatsoever to make remarks of this kind in his capacity as a member of the Board of NCPC. You can obtain the details of what has been said from Mr. Grew and Mr. Dulles in order to strengthen and round out your memorandum to Messrs. Joyce and Campbell. (It is my understanding that Mr. Grew received Mr. Cretsianu for the purpose of denying any responsibility on the part of NCPC for Mr. Berle's remarks, which he made in his private capacity and incidentally as attorney for Malaxa.) Will you please let Mr. Horton see the memorandum which you write to Messrs. Joyce and Campbell.

2. For your information, I have recently been informed by a very knowledgeable Romanian that, in his opinion, some good has resulted out of this highly improper and messy business of Berle's. This Berle attack on Cretsianu was partially responsible, in the judgment of my informant, for Cretsianu's sudden turn-about and agreement to shake hands with and sit down beside Messrs. Gafencu and Davila. "It's an ill wind ...", etc.

Although the following question may not be entirely in your field, I should appreciate your getting up a statement for my information concerning the present status of and our proposed future use, if any, of Julius Fleischmann. I have just heard through the grapevine that he considers his usefulness to us at an end and that he is severing all connection with this Agency. This disturbs me, as I consider Mr. Fleischmann to be an intelligent and able man who has already gained enough experience in our line of endeavor to be of value to us. If my information is by any chance correct, then I do not understand why we so lightly cast him aside. I hope that I am wrong and that he may be severing official connections only to continue his work in a more subtle manner.

Signed: FRANK G. WIMER

SECRET

Frank G. Wimer

cc: DRY  
ADPC  
C/SX

Security Information

Attachment: Described memoranda and transcript of Berle testimony.

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer to: **W-2003**

18 April 1952

Dear Min:

When you were here Wednesday, you handed me a letter from Michael E. Thompson about General Henryey.

I have looked into this and find that Thompson promised on his last trip to Washington that he would give us certain facts about Henryey's new visa application which were necessary when the old visa application expired on 21 March. We never have received these facts from Thompson.

Will you kindly, therefore, ask Thompson to get together for you the facts on the new visa application -- its number, where it was made, etc. -- and we will go ahead and act as we said we would. We can't act without them.

Sincerely,

CIO/TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - IO/Exec Off.  
2 cc - CIO  
2 cc - HI

TWB Mentioned above to Adm. Miller by  
telephone on 17 Apr 52.

eh

**SECRET**



April 15, 1952

Dear Oliver:

When I last saw you, I spoke of the General Hennyey matter explaining the great importance that the Fund places on expediting the arrival of General Hennyey in this country for Fund purposes. I later mentioned this matter in detail to one of your liaison associates who has these matters in hand. I explained that it is considered imperative that all possible assistance be developed looking toward the sponsored arrival of General Hennyey in the shortest possible time. I now refer you to our letter of March 2, 1952, which I delivered in person to Mr. Abramson. That letter contains all of the necessary data for action in the case.

We have just been informed that the unconscionable delay in the processing and approval of General Hennyey's entry presently will be made the subject of public protest by elements of the Hungarian National Council. The details of this situation will be more fully explained by Leonard L. Stamm who will hand you this letter. For your convenience, I am attaching a copy of our letter of March 2 above cited, and I would further state that we believe that extraordinary action should be taken to affect the immediate processing of General Hennyey by entry permit or otherwise. Our representatives in Munich are in daily contact with General Hennyey and can be of particular assistance in the event you desire to use extraordinary means to expedite his departure for the United States.

Sincerely,

*Michael E. Thompson*

C O P Y

March 2, 1952

Dear Mr. Minetti:

General Gustav Hennyey is Representative of the Hungarian National Council in Western Germany and a person in whom the Fund places trust and confidence in its dealings with the problems of the Hungarian National Council. The Fund has been desirous for some time that General Hennyey come to the United States, and believes that his visit here would be most helpful to the present activities and future of the Hungarian National Council.

An opportunity presented itself last fall for General Hennyey to emigrate to the United States as a displaced person. He was granted a visa by the Consul General in Munich on November 21, 1951, EC Number 256411, D.P. Commission Validation Number A-7037, Sponsor Mr. Louis Rado, 182 Main Street, Poughkeepsie, New York. Subsequent to the issuance of his visa his file was sent by the local representative of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Services in Munich to the Office of the Attorney General in Washington for special consideration under No. 3-CFR 17557. Neither General Hennyey nor the National Council have been able to determine why his case has been held in suspense, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Indeed, in response to one inquiry General Hennyey was told that the file in question had been lost. As stated above, the Fund attaches great importance to General Hennyey's visit to the United States, and considers this visit to be of high operational importance, since it will deeply affect the work of the Hungarian National Council. We shall be very grateful for any assistance which you can render in the expedition of the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. I may add that General Hennyey's visa will expire on the 21st of this month, and he also will lose his rights owing to the expiration of the Displaced Persons Act in the near future should he not be able to emigrate promptly.

Sincerely yours,

Allen Dulles

Notes:

1. Liaison associate is  
Bill Knott, Alien  
Control Chief. —  
Security Branch.
2. #2:  
Bela Fabian of the  
Hungarian Nat. Council  
is about to write a  
rough letter to the  
NY Times.

Then.

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. At a meeting in John Devine's office at noon on 16 April at which were present Messrs. Devine, Smith, Lang, Lumbie, Braden and Admiral Miller, Mr. Smith presented the program for the Crusade for Freedom for next year, which I attach. The budget estimate is just over \$500,000 and the central idea is to campaign across the nation for signatures and dimes on behalf of a pledge to preserve, maintain and spread freedom.

2. There are other ideas connected with this, namely a freedom train which will carry the scroll and dimes of the people of the United States from point to point and which eventually will come to Washington where the signatures attached to the scroll will be presented to the new Congress and the new President. Essentially, however, and in terms of our relations with the State Department, the program is intended to avoid specific mention of what the money is being raised for; thus, for example, there will be no publicity about what transmitters cost and how important it is to raise the money. Instead, the campaign will be kept very general and RFE-RFA and VOA will be mentioned only incidentally as one means of spreading the idea of freedom.

3. Mr. Devine presented the program to Messrs. Sargeant, Kohler and Compton and received their approval. I have therefore notified Admiral Miller that there is no objection on behalf of the State Department to the plan presented for the 1953 Crusade for Freedom.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment  
Program for Crusade

CGO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDGI (thru DD/P)

1 cc - ADPC


1 cc - DMIC ✓

2 cc - CGO

2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET



17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Conference at Princeton Inn

You asked me to remind you of Admiral Miller's request that you speak to David Bruce about his attendance at Admiral Miller's proposed conference at the Princeton Inn on Saturday, 10 May at 10:30 AM. You will recall Admiral Miller's mention of the fact that the idea of the conference is attributed to Mr. Bruce, dating back to a luncheon conversation that he had in Paris with C. D. Jackson and the Admiral.

*Thomas W. Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO:TEP/en

Orig - DDGI  
2 cc - CIO  
2 cc - ZI

SECRET

## SECURITY INFORMATION

**SECRET**

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

SUBJECT: Bulgarian National Committee

1. This is to confirm our oral report to you of the President of NCFE's report to us of his 15 April 1952 conference with Dimitrov on this subject.

2. Admiral Miller reported that he had presented the agreed upon plan to Dimitrov, without threatening to cut off funds. Dimitrov's first reaction was that the plan was a maneuver to oust Dimitrov. The end result, however, was that Dimitrov was to think the plan over and give his views on it in return. It was further suggested that a council meeting would be held on 30 April or as soon thereafter as possible. However, Admiral Miller stated that this meeting would probably not occur before mid-May, since the two members coming from Paris would probably not arrive before that time. A quorum would not be possible without them.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO/NEV:bw

## Distributions:

Addressee - original

CIO - 1

IO/OTO - 1

IO/Ex.Asst. - 1

RI - 2

**SECRET**

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Reports of Leon Dennen

1. Almost without exception, the Dennen reports, of which thirteen have been examined to date, duplicate reports already received, but do not contain as much information as the reports being obtained from other sources or from the same sources as those used by Dennen. Of the reports, only one has been disseminated. The Department of State's comment on that report was that a similar one had been received.

2. For your convenience, a brief analysis of the thirteen reports is presented below:

Hungary

1. Csepel Arsenal in Hungary

Comment: This report, consisting of a list of names of directors or top officials in various Hungarian industrial enterprises, was considered of marginal value. The persons listed were identified with overt positions and have been mentioned in a number of overt Hungarian publications.

2. Report on the Activities of the Hungarian Embassy and Consulate in Paris.

3. Report on Hungarian Socialist Group in France.

Comment: Information is thin and overt. These reports duplicate in part reports already received in greater detail.

This material probably comes from persons who have contact or knowledge of the Hungarian Legation, but who have not actually "penetrated" the Legation.

4. Survey of Political Conditions in Hungary from 1951 through the Early Part of 1952.

Comment: Frankly overt material, obtained (or could have been obtained) from a close reading of published material. Of marginal value as representing the viewpoints of former Hungarian industrialists.

Note to DDCI: I just talked to Min Miller about the Dennen situation. He would like to withdraw his objections to his overt use of Dennen.

**SECRET**

SECRET

5. Hungary's Productive Capacity in Relation to Hungarian Plan for 1952.

Comment: Report was thin. Information on mines and factories was already known.

Overall Comment: Continuation of reports similar to the above is not recommended.

Poland

1. Polish Industry Gears for War Production.
2. Polish Coal Production.
3. Poland is Preparing Reserve Industrial Staff with Knowledge of Languages.
4. Report on Poland.

Comment on the 4 reports:

Most, if not all of this information, had been previously received through our regular channels.

The material is not disseminated to customer agencies who have overt access thereto.

5. WIN Report

Comment: A verbatim extract (42 pages) of a 100 page report which we had already received. (In this connection, please note CIE's memorandum of 28 January 1952, which is attached).

Rumania

1. Admiral Cadre School in Bucharest

Comment: Evaluation here P3. Evaluation by State A2, but State had previously received the information.

Estonia

1. Elections of People's Judges and Lay Assessors in Estonia.
2. Some More Important Developments in Soviet Estonia in 1951.

Comment: These reports duplicate information we have received. This is true, primarily because Johannes Mikhelson is the source. Mikhelson is a WH-1 agent, is also used by Mr. Angleton, and is on Jannen's ICFTU-in-exile payroll.

SECRET



- 3 -

Sweden

1. Soviet Propaganda in Sweden

Comment: This report is also a duplicate. (See preceding comment).

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Distribution:

Addressee - original

NE - 1

EE/SO - 1

EE/PC - 1

SE - 1

CIO - 1

IO/DOIO - 1

RI - 2

7 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Leon Dennen

1. We provided for Leon Dennen \$71,000 for the period 1 August 1951 to 30 June 1952 for a project to be operated by NCPE in Europe. (Dennen did not, as I understand it, assume his work in Europe until c. 1 October 1951.) The \$71,000 included an allotment of \$6,000 for ten monthly payments of \$600.00 for special intelligence activities. Otis recently informed us, however, that of the \$600.00 per month allotments, Dennen had asked for and received a total of only \$250.00 all told.

2. On 2 April, Admiral Miller stated that Dennen's work was absolutely worthless as far as NCPE and RFL were concerned.

Dennen's intelligence reports have been evaluated as having practically no usefulness; and, as you know, in his intelligence "gathering", he has crossed some of K's wires. In both OPC and OSO, there is such suspicion of Dennen, that no one has been willing to give him direct guidance for fear that it would merely enlarge Dennen's knowledge of our operations.

3. When Dennen returns, my recommendation is that we tell him that while we may discontinue support to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, we feel that, since we have a Paris NCPE representative, we should use this channel—or some other channel not involving additional expense.

4. Meanwhile, since the ICFTU in exile is of primary interest to EE, and of some interest to SE and WE, I have asked Mr. Bross, Mr. Horton, and Mr. Scott their views on continued support to the organization and, after a go-round with them, I will send up a further report to you.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

CIO/REV:bw

Distribution:

Addressee - original

CIO - 1

IO/DOFO - 1 ✓

RI - 2

SECURITY INFORMATION  
**SECRET**

In reply refer to: W-1999  
S  
16 April 1952

Dear Min:

We have a 2 April report from our friends across the street documenting certain criticisms which Mr. Visolani has made of NCFE. Some of this criticism stems directly, I believe, from his reaction to Mr. Ferle's testimony in the Malaxa case. Another of his complaints stems from the appointment of Comarnescu to a position with the Free Europe University at Strasbourg.

This report raises several questions with me. I should consider it a great favor if you would have prepared for me a review of the whole Rumanian National Committee as to factions, alignments and with recommendations regarding what might be done to improve the Rumanian Committee.

Sincerely,

Oliver Redwood

CIO/NEV:bw

Distributions:

Addressee - original  
CIO - 1  
IO/Admin. Off. - 1  
IO/DOIO - 1  
RI - 2

**SECRET**

April 2, 1952

Mr. Visoianu called at his request to inform us of the highlights of his recent trip to Europe. He had first attended the meeting of the Eastern European Section of the European Movement in London, then visited France, Germany and Italy.

Mr. Visoianu said that in Germany he had talked with Chancellor Adenauer, Secretary of State Hallstein, and other officials of the Bonn Government, as well as with Mr. Rober and other Allied officials. He said that the Germans were sympathetic to his discussion of Rumanian affairs and showed some interest in the problems of Eastern Europe. They, emphasized, however, that Germany's present position did not enable them to speak in terms of any positive policy at this time. Mr. Visoianu got the impression that the Germans were now, and would be in the future, even more actively interested in Rumania and other Eastern European countries than were France and Italy. Mr. Visoianu felt that France had completely abdicated its position in Eastern Europe and was entirely wrapped up in its own domestic problems and relations with Germany.

Mr. Visoianu also discussed in Germany the question of Rumanian refugees there (most of whom are Iron Guardists) and of the rather large community of Volksdeutsche who came to Germany from Rumania at the close of the war. He said that the German authorities would like to have this group returned to Rumania at such time as the country might be liberated, both because they contributed to Germany's over-population problem and because they would represent, as they have in the past, a possible instrument for German policy in Rumania. As a Rumanian, Mr. Visoianu was not over anxious to add to the numbers of the German minority but felt that a free Rumanian Government would not deny the right of return to those who wished to do so.

Mr. Visoianu talked at length with Mr. Tyler in Paris. He retains his distrust and dislike of the NCFE, which he says can never assist effectively in bringing about unity in the Rumanian emigration since it supports one group 100% and persecutes the other group 100%. He was particularly incensed about Mr. Barle's recent intervention in the Malaxa case. He said that he regarded the situation as having very serious implications not only for the emigres but also for the future of the country itself. He denounced Radescu's conduct, giving numerous examples, as detrimental to the true interest of Rumania. One of his more specific complaints against the NCFE was the appointment of Comarniciu as head tutor (or some such title) at the Free Europe University in Strasbourg. He said that Comarniciu had no education and no qualifications for the post but was there merely because he was of the Radescu faction which NCFE favored.

Mr. Visoianu saw King Michael in England but he did not indicate whether there were any new developments with respect to the King's position toward the present disunity in the Rumanian emigration.

RECEIVED  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

In reply refer to: W-1970

15 April 1952

Dear Min:

Looking through the recently inherited files, I notice a special fund which has its origin in the Poole era. For the present fiscal year \$10,000 has been drawn and accounted for, as a John Waterfield accounting statement dated 27 January 1952 indicates. You will note there is a cash balance as of 27 January of \$5,578.

This is one of those things that questions will always be raised about. I know there is good precedent for it, however, in business firms and maybe we should continue it. In any event, I wanted to bring it to your attention and to be sure you knew of its existence.

Sincerely,

Oliver F. Hadwood

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - IO/ExOff.  
2 cc - CIO ✓  
2 cc - RI

In reply refer to: W-1984  
15 April 1952

Dear Min:

One of your employees, Miron Batarin, prior to accepting employment with your firm, was interviewed by us. With your permission we should like to continue processing papers for his employment. If you wish to keep him, we should like to know that so that we can close out the case.

Sincerely,

Oliver E. Hadwood

CIO:NBV/eh

Orig - Addressee  
2 cc - CIO  
1 cc - IO/Ex.Off.  
2 cc - RI

SECRET

COPY

SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

SE/PC

NO.

DATE

10 Apr 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. CIO			12 Apr	TWB	Forwarded per your request of 2 April 1952.
2. DD/P			16 Apr	CVH	TWB
3. ADPC				CDGB	Noted - I hope we have heard the last of complaints about this lovely handled affair from RFE, NCFE, Embassy Attache etc. etc. etc. I regret what I have said before - it is wrong for us to try to use NCFE RFE as cover for covert opr.
4. CIO				TWB per NBV	
5. SE/PC Mr. Watson					
6. Mrs. Bailey					
7.					
8.					FGW 12 April 52
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

Tom : 10 April

I think if I  
were you I would  
forward this to  
DDP with a note  
on cover sheet:

---

Forwarded per  
your request of  
2 April 1952  
JWB done 12 Apr  
sh  
1952

---

Note para 10. FGW will  
understand the main trouble.  
n.



**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

13 APR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Henry Landowski

1. Attached is a detailed summary of the events surrounding the attempted utilization by Opc of Henry Landowski as a contract agent in Athens. Landowski was stationed in Athens by SE/PC with the cover of a journalist under contract with RFE to provide that organization with news of refugees coming into Greece from certain countries. Landowski was not integrated into RFE; he was associated with RFE under a contractual arrangement meant to provide him with a reasonable explanation for his income and office.

2. The relationship was not a successful one for several reasons:

a. Landowski himself was poorly suited for the assignment, and did not bring the necessary experience and skill required to maintain smooth working relations with RFE.

b. The Landowski assignment was not, in fact, compatible with RFE's decision to station a regular staff officer of its own in Athens. Since the functions of the two men appeared to overlap to an unreasonable degree, both were put in an awkward position.

c. RFE is not organized or designed to maintain covert relationships with contract agents notionally associated with it.

d. The liaison between CIA/opc and RFE was not, during the period under consideration, fully satisfactory in this instance. Quite minor problems became serious because of a lack of complete understanding between the two organizations.

3. This division concludes from the case that neither RFE nor (by inference) its parent, NCFE, is suitable for use as a cover instrument. An agent under cover is seen in the Landowski instance as raising staffing and organizational problems RFE has not been set up to handle. Because of the unsuitability of the arrangement, and because of the security risks involved, Landowski is being recalled from Athens, and will be disposed of as securely as possible.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH  
Chief for Policy Coordination, SI

**SECRET**

Attach: (1)

1. As stated in para. 1

Distribution: (See nr. 2)

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

10 APR 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Henry Landowski

1. Attached is a detailed summary of the events surrounding the attempted utilization by Ops of Henry Landowski as a contract agent in Athens. Landowski was stationed in Athens by SE/PC with the cover of a journalist under contract with RFE to provide that organization with news of refugees coming into Greece from certain countries. Landowski was not integrated into RFE; he was associated with RFE under a contractual arrangement meant to provide him with a reasonable explanation for his income and office.

2. The relationship was not a successful one for several reasons:

a. Landowski himself was poorly suited for the assignment, and did not bring the necessary experience and skill required to maintain smooth working relations with RFE.

b. The Landowski assignment was not, in fact, compatible with RFE's decision to station a regular staff officer of its own in Athens. Since the functions of the two men appeared to overlap to an unreasonable degree, both were put in an awkward position.

c. RFE is not organized or designed to maintain covert relationships with contract agents notionally associated with it.

d. The liaison between CIA/ops and RFE was not, during the period under consideration, fully satisfactory in this instance. Quite minor problems became serious because of a lack of complete understanding between the two organizations.

3. This division concludes from the case that neither RFE nor (by inference) its parent, EC/E, is suitable for use as a cover instrument. An agent under cover is seen in the Landowski instance as raising staffing and organizational problems RFE has not been set up to handle. Because of the unsuitability of the arrangement, and because of the security risks involved, Landowski is being recalled from Athens, and will be disposed of as securely as possible.

GRAHAM M. YATSEVITCH  
Chief for Policy Coordination, SE

Attach: (1)  
1. As stated in para. 1  
Distribution: (See pr. 2)

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

**Distribution:**

**Addressee - Orig. & 1**

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

The Case of Henry Landowski

1. On 10 January 1951, at the request of Ops Athens, SE/PC (thru EE-1) requested an operational clearance on Henry Landowski, then residing in Athens. Landowski, a Polish citizen by birth, was naturalized a US citizen on 25 July 1950. He is now 33 years old. The PC Field Station wished to use him as a contract agent under cover in Greece, engaged principally in PW work and in recruiting and handling other agents. The clearance was granted on 30 May 1951, and on 15 June Landowski signed a contract in Athens.

2. The field dispatch outlining Landowski's capabilities and the work envisaged for him described him as a free-lance journalist, resident of Greece for several years (his mother was married to a Greek), familiar with the Greek language and fluent in Polish and German, and having certain contacts in Greek government circles. His success in interviewing refugees from the satellite countries had come to the station's notice, and it was believed that under cover of such interviews he would be useful in gathering material for propaganda use and in spotting and recruiting agents.

3. The field station suggested that a cover organization be established to operate as a news agency in Athens with ostensible headquarters in New York. This agency would notionally specialize in refugee news for press and radio, and would appear to draw its main financial support from a contract with Radio Free Europe for the supplying of broadcast material on refugee topics. It was the field's plan that this news service would also furnish cover to other Ops personnel in the future, when it might plausibly expand as a business enterprise. To forward this idea, SE/PC called on Mr. Thompson, Chief of SP, on 11 July 1951 for his assistance in

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obtaining RFE's

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SECURITY INFORMATION

obtaining RFE's cooperation. Mr. Thompson later informed this division that a Mr. Phenix of RFE agreed to the contractual relationship proposal, but wished it made clear that RFE would not give cover to Landowski in the guise of a regular RFE employee. This was understood and agreed to by this office.

4. During Landowski's covert training in Washington, in July and August, the Commercial Division was consulted regarding the various aspects of creating a fictitious corporation, Europe News Service, along the lines outlined above. The difficulties of legal incorporation and of maintaining plausible US headquarters for such a firm, according to the Commercial Division, made this inadvisable. It was therefore decided, after consultation with the Legal Division, that a personal contract between Landowski, supposedly representing the "Europe News Service," and RFE would be sufficient and would obviate the risks of building a cover firm out of nothing.

5. During a brief conversation between Mr. Lang of RFE and SI/PC's case officer for the Landowski matter, the following points were covered: Mr. Lang was particularly interested in whether Landowski could actually provide useful material to RFE, and was told that this was the case. Mr. Lang said the desired contract could be arranged merely by his requesting it at an Executive Committee meeting of RFE. In answer to an inquiry, Mr. Lang said no standard RFE contract form existed, but that in drawing the Landowski contract he would use the noncommittal phrasing of the RFE/Free Federation of Journalists contract, in which a definite monthly payment was stipulated without any mention of specific returns from FFJ (which, Mr. Lang said, is a subsidized organization). He was reassuring as to whether RFE's

accounting mechanism

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# SECURITY INFORMATION

accounting mechanism was secure enough to permit large (\$1000) monthly payments to Landowski without questioning the extent of his services. Mr. Lang stated that there was no security risk from RFE's internal accounting or contracting procedure. He then mentioned that RFE planned to send one of their own employees to Athens later, probably "around the end of the year." Although surprised, since this plan had not been mentioned to Mr. Thompson by Mr. Phenix during the original discussion of Landowski in July, the case officer did not go further into this, feeling that Landowski would have three months to establish his cover in Athens prior to the arrival of the RFE man.

6. In accordance with arrangements made with Mr. Lang, Landowski was instructed to report in New York for a week's briefing in RFE affairs, and on 24 September called at RFE's offices and asked for Mr. Lang's assistant, Mr. Weld. Their meeting was most unsatisfactory, as Mr. Weld was not familiar with Landowski's background and standing with RFE, had arranged no training for him, knew of no contract, and was himself busy with preparations for a trip to Europe. Upon receiving this information in a phone call from Landowski, the division requested Mr. Lazarus of PT to phone RFE and inquire into the status of the contract, and to urge that a preliminary draft be submitted to us. After several days delay, during which one contract was drawn by RFE, submitted to Landowski who signed it, and then withdrawn and destroyed by RFE officials, a new contract was finally executed by both parties without this office knowing its terms. Landowski later stated that he had felt it imperative to sign what was given him in order to end his conspicuous position in RFE's offices, where he had spent the better part of several days in the waiting room. His training consisted of little more than a tour of RFE's installation.

SECRET

7. While Landowski was in New York, the SR/PC case officer was informed that Mr. Sperling, who is in charge of RFE's European headquarters at Munich, was in Washington for debriefing and would be available for a few minutes discussion relative to Landowski. In this discussion Mr. Sperling advised that Mr. Rampft, the regular RFE employee mentioned by Mr. Lang as going to Greece "around the end of the year," was actually leaving in a week. As this would of course make it very difficult if not impossible for Landowski to explain his activities, on arriving in Athens several weeks after Rampft had installed himself as the RFE representative, the case officer protested that this was counter to the spirit of the existing agreement. Mr. Sperling, however, said the Rampft assignment to Greece had been planned a year earlier, and that it was not possible to change it. He added that he would help Landowski in every possible way, however, and asked that Landowski visit his office in Munich prior to starting work in Athens, for a thorough grounding in RFE's European programming operations.

8. At this point, the question of Landowski's cover was carefully reviewed by this division, and a decision was made not to attempt to put the man into Athens under an RFE contract if Rampft were going out as the regular representative of that organization. It seemed certain that both men would be awkwardly placed, and that their ostensible functions would overlap unreasonably. The assignment of one or the other would have to be withdrawn, and, through the division's channel to RFE (Mr. Lazarus), the withdrawal of the Rampft assignment was requested. RFE's reply was affirmative and the division was informed that Rampft was to be sent to Trieste instead.

9. However, upon

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9. However, upon Landowski's arrival in Athens on 16 October, he found that Rampft was already there, contrary to the above understanding. Landowski consequently found himself obliged to justify his position, and particularly his requests for access to refugees, as Rampft had already presented his credentials to the Greek authorities, the American Embassy, the American military authorities, and the international press representatives in Athens.<sup>1</sup> Landowski flew to Munich to confer with Mr. Sperling, who in an effort to resolve the problem, suggested that Landowski change the name of his supposed firm from "Europe News Service" to "Radio News and Recording Service" and that he specialize in wire recordings of refugee interviews. A new contract was therefore drawn in Munich, using the suggested title.

10. On 18 October a cable was received from Mr. Wisnor in Athens relative to Rampft's presence there. This cable (IN 35284), for relay to Mr. Jackson of NWPY and Mr. Lang of RFE, stated that the Athens station was concerned lest Rampft prove as troublesome as one Ira Hamilton in Turkey. On the same date an Opc Athens cable (IN 34940) inquired if Rampft were cleared and if he knew Landowski's CIA affiliation. Upon requesting PY to obtain this information, this office was informed that Rampft was cleared and that he had gone to Athens on personal orders from Mr. Lang. On

6 November a

1. In a subsequent intelligence report to Defense, the US Military Attache in Athens referred to the peculiar Rampft/Landowski situation, the obvious hostility between the men, the Johnny-come-lately status of Landowski contrasted to Rampft's prior arrival, and the MA's own reluctance to agree to Landowski's access to refugees in the face of Rampft's attitude and the apparent lack of official sponsorship for Landowski.

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# SECRET

6 November a cable (IN 39122) was received from Ops Athens referring to the unsatisfactory situation resulting from Rampft's appearance in Athens and stating that, if a permanent RFE representative were actually necessary in Athens, it should be someone other than Rampft, who was reportedly lacking in security sense and said to be a heavy drinker. Through the case officer assigned to this matter, this division thereupon requested Mr. Braden's help in learning from RFE how much Rampft knew of Landowski's covert activities, whether Rampft would conduct his own work in a manner acceptable to the CIA Senior Representative in Athens, Mr. John Baker, and whether Rampft had been instructed to cooperate with Landowski without attempting to oversee his activities. No answer has been received to these queries.

11. Late in November the division was advised by Security that unspecified derogatory information had been received regarding Landowski; the field station was consequently instructed to hold up his use pending fuller information. Early in January, upon receiving an adverse completed report from Security, the field was instructed to return Landowski to Washington for termination. It was considered unwise to inform Landowski, while still in Greece, of the reason underlying his recall; he has consequently been told that the dual RFE representation in Athens (Rampft and Landowski) was no longer workable and that RFE had insisted on keeping its own man. He believes that a new RFE assignment may be possible for him after his return here late this month (his trip has been delayed by his mother's recent death in Athens).

12. The Landowski problem has now become one of recall and disposal. Quite aside from the RFE relationship, the man has not performed well,

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has not

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

has not handled his affairs in a secure or professional manner, and is not wanted by the field station. The division plans to terminate his, read him out of any connection with RFE, and arrange that he be placed with a commercial firm for employment as a junior public relations man. Simple dismissal is not regarded as secure; continued employment by the Agency is undesirable, hence the need to find him employment of sorts until his familiarity with CIA activities has cooled.

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SECRET 3147

P-552

L-217

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

2-7866

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

CIO

NO.

68829

DATE

8 April 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. DD/P Col. Taylor.		10		CT	
2. <del>SECRET</del>					
3. ER				QJ	
4. <del>CPY/OPC</del>					
5. DCP		17 April	18 April	JHK	
6. C-20					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					


Mr. Brewer:  
George:  
FBI asks that you attempt to get from State the information which Tom Braden asks for. He asks that I bring to your attention the following 2 points:  
a. The Director does not feel it would be advisable to launch any balloon operations until after the PA campaign has died down a bit.  
b. The Brits, through Adam Watson, have raised the question of balloon operations with FBI and want to discuss these operations during the forthcoming PU-State meetings on policy.

P. Taylor, 3rd

566- Co for m tsk - JHK

I will call O'Neave

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION



8 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Letter from Admiral Miller

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.

2. Can you take the time to get a policy decision from the State Department as to (a) whether they wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether they want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time?

*Thomas W. Braden*  
THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment

Ltr from Adm Miller 1 Apr 52.

CIO:TBH/eh

Orig - Addressees

1 cc - ADPC

2 cc - CIO

2 cc - RI

SECRET

C  
O  
P  
Y

Dear Oliver:

We need to get a firm commitment with respect to the Crusade's next balloon operation.

Our best target from the point of view of geography and RFE radio coverage is Czechoslovakia. We can go into Poland and Hungary somewhat less efficiently. If Hungary should be the target, we will presumably still have the problem of clearance from the British to launch from their Zone, and failing that should have to back up to our Zone.

We need an absolute minimum of three months to prepare a balloon operation; the longer notice the better. A date of special significance to the target country is perhaps of some slight additional desirability from the psychological point of view. It is, however, not essential. From the point of view of our campaign schedule, an initial launching date of about August 20th would be ideal. This would allow the story on the operation and its effect to become known at the opening of our September campaign.

We have in storage in Munich 50,000 packages (of two each) of razor blades, 100,000 zippers, 72,000 packets of needles (five to the packet), and 150,000 cakes of soap (1/2, 3/4 and one ounce sizes). All of the above except needles were donations to the Crusade, and the needles were at cost. We have had to tell Gillette and Talon twice (at Christmas and at Easter) that the operation for which they supplied their products had been delayed. We should very much regret having to do this again.

I do not know what keeps putting this off the track. It is my information that the boys in the big house were initially enthusiastic about the idea, and the record will show that Ambassador Briggs thought it most valuable in Czechoslovakia, witness his special request that this means of communication be used at the time of the Czech Freedom Train break-out.

I would appreciate your getting us as soon as possible a positive and (barring an act of God) irrevocable approval for a balloon operation into a specified target country at a certain date, with agreement in principle on the nature of the operation -- i.e., of an order of magnitude of 60,000 to 75,000 vehicles, bearing the above mentioned materials together with messages. To repeat, by far the best target is Czechoslovakia; our preferred date: around August 20th.

Let us not make this approval in principle (with firm date and target) contingent on a budget, except in a general way. With an approval in hand, we can proceed with plans and supply a fairly accurate budget, which will depend somewhat on such things as whether we can use the P-20 balloons on hand for the short flight to Prague or whether we will have to resort to P-50's for the longer flight into Poland or from the U.S. Zone of Austria into Hungary.

Sincerely,

/s/ Leonard

**SECRET**

SECURITY INFORMATION

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, RE-2

SUBJECT: Future Balloon Operation

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.
2. Will you advise me as to (a) whether you wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether you want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time.

THOMAS W. BRADEN  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

Attachment  
Ltr from Min Miller  
dtd 1 Apr 52.

CIO:TWE/eh

Orig - Addressee  
1 cc - IO/TOMIC  
1 cc - CIO  
2 cc - RI

**SECRET**

14-00000

**SECRET**

7 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Labor Service Companies

The exact text of a 27 March 1952 letter from the Political Advisor of RFE at Munich to the President of NCPE is supplied below for your information.

"This is in respect to the various Labor Service Companies made up of Eastern European exiles now existing in Germany.

"There have been Polish Labor and Guard Companies ever since the war and these are what their name implies. There have been set up, however, within the last year Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Labor Service Companies here. These latter two represent an activity with which our friends are directly involved. I have been informed by them upon my inquiry that should any reference be made by satellite propaganda to these companies it is desired that in any RFE comment upon it that these companies should be treated as being what their name implies.

"The Czechoslovak Company included both Czechs and Slovaks, although I understand that the Slovak Separatists here make violent efforts to have a separate one for themselves. The Bulgarian Company is at present made up almost entirely of adherents of Dimitrov. Further recruiting, however, in this respect is now going on with a policy of barring both Bulgarian National Front and Dimitrov followers.

"I am also informed by my friends here that active planning is now under way in respect to the Aertsen Amendment. I should much appreciate it if we could keep informed of any developments in this respect here for possible use in RFE broadcasts and for conversations with friends."

THOMAS L. BRADLE  
Chief  
International Organizations Division

cc: SE

LA

CIO/NEV:bw

Distributions: 1 IO/DOO - 1

CIO - 1

RI - 2

**SECRET**

C  
O  
Y*John B. Miller*STRICTLY PRIVATE

27 March 1952

Dear Admiral Miller:

This is in respect to the various Labor Service Companies made up of Eastern European exiles now existing in Germany.

There have been Polish Labor and Guard Companies ever since the war and these are what their name implies. There have been set up, however, within the last year Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Labor Service Companies here. These latter two represent an activity with which our friends are directly involved. I have been informed by them upon my inquiry that should any reference be made by satellite propaganda to these companies it is desired that in any RFE comment upon it that these companies should be treated as being what their name implies.

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I am also informed by my friends here that active planning is now under way in respect to the Kersten Amendment. I should much appreciate it if we could keep informed of any developments in this respect here for possible use in RFE broadcasts and for conversations with friends.

Sincerely,

/s/ BILL

W. E. Griffith

cc: Mr. Leich  
Mr. Galantiere



**SECRET**

Security Information

ER-2-7715

5 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : National Committee for a Free Europe - Radio  
Free Europe - Miscellaneous Recommendations for  
Action

REFERENCE : Memorandum from C/IO to D/DCI, DD/P and ADPC  
dated 27 March 1952

1. I have read the reference memorandum which I note contains quite a number of recommendations for action, some of which apply to the undersigned.

2. I would like to participate in the Princeton bull session but believe it unnecessary for CIA to be represented by so many people. If Mr. Dulles is going I should prefer to drop out. A further reason for reluctance on my part to attend this meeting is that I have already passed on to the NCPE people interested all of the ideas and information which I have on the principal theme of this discussion. I therefore feel that, until after the forthcoming meeting with the British or the development of the Psychological Strategy Paper, which is being laboriously ground out by Admiral Stevens' Ad Hoc Committee, I would have nothing new to contribute. However, if Mr. Dulles is unable to attend and you feel that I should go, I would be willing to do so.

3. Concerning your report of Frank Altschul's feeling of grievance, I should be glad to sign a letter to him if Mr. Dulles agrees that I am the proper person to do this. Pending Mr. Dulles' consideration of this matter, will you please prepare in draft form for my signature a friendly letter to Mr. Altschul in which you might comment upon the fact that NCPE-RFE now represents one of the most potent weapons in our entire arsenal, and following with an acknowledgment of the very important contribution which Mr. Altschul made toward the development and shaping of this instrument.

**SECRET**

Security Information

*1 Navy - will  
you do  
this -  
Nathan & Dulles -  
Mr. Dulles' letter  
31 March 52  
a copy of which  
you have.*

SECRET

Security Information

4. I am somewhat confused by the contents of the action paragraph following paragraph 3, in which you indicate that we are continuing to urge NCFE to extend cover assistance to the Kirk Committee. On the basis of our most recent conversations with Mr. Dulles and Admiral Miller, I was under the impression that you were trying to dig up some other forms of cover - particularly in view of the reluctance of the NCFE Board to extend the Crusade cover to the Kirk Committee. Perhaps this paragraph of the reference memorandum has been overtaken by events. —

yes.

5. I understand that you are getting up a memorandum on the Landowsky case. I am relieved to hear that Landowsky has been recalled from Greece and that it is not intended to have him return.

1 N.B.V.

Done 11/15/52  
Frank G. Wisner  
FRANK G. WISNER

cc: DDCI (with reference memorandum)

SECRET

Security Information

This comes up  
at PRC - or  
is scheduled on  
Friday. After  
that, we need  
to advise Admiral  
to apply to 1848  
- if PRC  
approves, that is  
M.

**SECRET**  
 SECURITY INFORMATION  
 PROCEDURE  
 FOR  
 TPLEDIC TRANSFERS

2 APRIL 52

- Step 1.    a. Facility (TPTONIC, PILLAR or what have you) sends letter of request to MEDIC.
- b. Facility sends certified true copy of request (1a.) to IO (via area division involved if not for TPTONIC as set forth in Step 2 below).
- Step 2.    FOR TPTONIC only (Includes BGCAREBOX)
- a. IO prepares letter for ADFC's signature, addressed to MEDIC, authorizing MEDIC to transfer funds requested by TONIC to TONIC on basis of 1a. above if request is in order.
- b. MEDIC receives letter of authority (2a.).
- c. MEDIC transfers funds to TONIC on basis of 2b. and at the same time prepares a letter of transmittal addressed to TONIC, copy to IO.
- d. TONIC, upon receipt of funds from MEDIC (2c.), prepares a letter of acknowledgment addressed to MEDIC, certified true copy to IO.
- e. IO prepares letter addressed to CFD, signed by IO, transmitting receipts 2d. together with certified true copy of letter 2a. (See 2f below).
- f. IO prepares letter addressed to CFD, signed by IO, requesting CFD to reimburse MEDIC for the total amount of receipts 2e. Note: Letters 2e and 2f are hand carried to CFD together.
- g. CFD, on basis of 2f transfers funds to MEDIC.
- h. MEDIC acknowledges receipt of 2g by letter to IO.
- Step 3.    FOR OTHER THAN TPTONIC and BGCAREBOX (after Step 1)
- a. Area division authorizes CFD to transfer funds from "XXX" Project to MEDIC for transfer to facility by letter, signed by appropriate area division chief. (Note: This letter comes to IO whose responsibility it is to determine that funds are available in "XXX" Project).

**SECRET**

# SECRET

## SECURITY INFORMATION

### Step 3. FOR OTHER THAN TPTOMIC AND BGCARBOX (CONTINUED)

- b. IO prepares letter to CFD with letter 3a attached for ADPC's signature requesting CFD to transfer funds to MEDIC. (See 3c. below).
- c. At same time letter 3b. is prepared, a letter for ADPC's signature is prepared by IO authorizing MEDIC to transmit the funds to facility (addressed to MEDIC).
- d. MEDIC receives letter of authority 3c.
- e. MEDIC acknowledges receipt of funds which CFD transmits (3b).
- f. MEDIC transfers funds to facility on basis of 3d and at the same time sends letter of transmittal to facility, copy to IO.
- g. Facility, upon receipt of funds from MEDIC, prepares a letter, addressed to MEDIC, acknowledging receipt of funds 3f., certified true copy to IO. (See 1b.)
- h. IO upon receipt of letter 3g. prepares letter addressed to CFD and transmits same together with copy of letter (certified true copy) 3c.

NOTE: It will be the responsibility of the Administrative Office/IO to verify that funds are in fact allotted for each project before preparing the above papers.

PAM

#### Distribution:

EXO/IO - Original  
Adm O/IO - 1 copy  
FY/Maggio - 1 copy

SECRET

Provisions of Proposed Agreement Between NSAF and CIA

It is proposed that an agreement which will include the following be entered into by NSAF and CIA.

1. A statement to the effect that subject to the security, program, budgetary, and policy controls and the veto authority of CIA set forth below, NSAF has administrative and operational responsibility for the conduct of its operations.
2. A provision that NSAF will submit to CIA an annual operating plan and supporting budget for the programs which it plans to undertake during each fiscal year. The approval of such operating program and budget by CIA will include authority to NSAF to proceed as necessary in their judgment to accomplish the objectives set forth in the approved program, subject to controls set forth below.
3. A provision that NSAF will maintain adequate accounting and fiscal controls.
4. A provision that NSAF will undertake only those programs which have been approved by CIA.
5. A provision that CIA will provide funds to NSAF for approved programs.
6. A provision that CIA will furnish national policy guidance to NSAF for the conduct of such programs and that NSAF will conform to such policy.
7. A provision that NSAF will conform to security regulations to be prescribed by CIA. These will include the security clearance of necessary personnel, obtaining of security agreements from all visiting personnel, and necessary physical security measures.
8. A provision to the effect that the general organizational structure and salary scales including allowances will be approved by CIA.
9. A provision that the president and vice-presidents of NSAF will be employed subject to the concurrence of CIA.

SECRET INFORMATION

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10. A provision that CIA will have veto authority over activities to be undertaken by ~~NSA~~ which are contrary to other <sup>of</sup> CIA or national policies. *(NSA reported that this would seldom be exercised)*
11. A provision with respect to the termination of operations under this agreement.
12. A provision with respect to indemnification of ~~NSA~~ <sup>you</sup> directors, officers, and employees by ~~NSA~~.
13. A provision that defines the liability of ~~NSA~~ to each director, officer, and employee of ~~NSA~~.
14. A provision to the effect that ~~NSA~~ <sup>you</sup> will provide CIA with regular progress and financial reports.
15. A provision that ~~NSA~~ <sup>you</sup> will have authority to conduct such surveys and audits of ~~NSA~~ activities as it deems necessary.

SECTION

# BUTYRAL COM ITT E FOR A BUTT PROOF

## Problem

To clarify the relationship of BUTT to CIA and the respective responsibilities and authorities of each for the conduct of BUTT operations.

## Background

There is no currently effective clear statement as to the respective responsibilities and authorities of BUTT and CIA for the conduct of operations. This has resulted in a number of misunderstandings and problems with respect to the administration of this project by CIA.

## Discussion

In order to define the respective responsibilities and authorities of BUTT and CIA, it is proposed that an agreement be entered into between BUTT and CIA which will in effect provide for:

- a. Policy, program, budgetary, security control, and veto power by CIA.
- b. Subject to such general controls direct administrative and operational control over its operations by BUTT.
- c. The working out of machinery for submitting annual operating programs and supporting budgets by BUTT for approval by CIA (and major subsequent additions thereto)
- d. Adequate progress, financial, and other reports by BUTT to CIA.

An outline of the principal provisions of such an agreement is set forth in Attachment A.

It is the consensus of all concerned in CIA that something like the above is essential. There is one technical point of difference, however, between the ID Division and the Administrative Staff Section. This is the matter of a CIA regulation (Memorandum for All Staff and Division Chiefs



SECRET

Subject: Categories of Personnel (From John W. Corris)  
to the effect that all witting personnel of CIA proprietary organizations must have a contract relationship with CIA. The underlying reasons for this requirement are (1) general control, (2) security control, and (3) to provide a basis for establishing a legal liability to such personnel in the event of a claim of any kind. It is the view of the IO Division that the above three requirements could be better and more cleanly met by one agreement between CIA and NRP, rather than by several separate agreements between witting individuals and CIA.

The office of the General Counsel, CIA, has indicated informally that there is no legal objection to such an agreement between NRP and CIA. He also concurs informally that one contract between NRP and CIA is preferable to several contracts between individuals and CIA.

#### Recommendation

1. It is therefore recommended that the IO Division be authorized to negotiate an agreement with NRP in coordination with the office of General Counsel and other CIA units which will incorporate the substance of the provisions in Attachment A.
2. It is also recommended that the DDC or other appropriate CIA authority set aside the agency regulation requiring that all witting personnel of proprietary projects be required to execute a contract with CIA.

SECRET

Mr Broder —

At Post — here's the  
answer to the State Paper  
on RFE. Sorry for the  
delay. Please let me know  
if it's OK w. you —

I do think that our  
difference w. State on this is  
very basic — and that we  
can't continue to operate on  
2 different premises. Maybe  
this should be thrashed out  
in a high level policy meeting.

Ellen

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

C  
O  
P  
Y

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joyce

January 23, 1952.

FROM: EE - Mr. Barbour

The Functions of NCCE and RFE

In our experience with NCCE and RFE two interpretations of their functions, between which the pendulum swings from time to time, have developed. One which is set forth in the paper in the mission of NCCE and RFE, gives dignity and importance to the National Councils as the leadership organs of the Eastern European peoples in their struggle against the respective Communist dictatorships and defines the principal function of RFE as providing a way of communication between these councils and the homelands in conducting the liberation struggle. In the other view, which tends to govern RFE operations at the present time, the RFE is apparently considered a predominantly American enterprise with the objective of achieving a bigger, better, more hard-hitting, and more publicized propaganda program than the VOA but not differing fundamentally from the character and course that VOA has already marked out. The latter interpretation reduces the position of exiles connected with the RFE to that of professional employees engaged by the Americans, and the National Councils are given no direct responsibilities.

As between these two theses, EE agrees generally with the first. If RFE continues along its present course it will in our opinion become in the end simply another VOA (in fact the programming of the two organizations tends already to seek a common denominator) and disappoint the exiles and the peoples in their homelands. This will lead to competitive issues with VOA as is already the case with the Baltic language programs. If RFE is to achieve its first promise and full justification it must become the Voice of Eastern European freedom speaking through the mouths of the Eastern European leaders themselves.

EE believes that unless the RFE broadcasts are made in the name of the National Councils and the free exile leaders of Eastern Europe can speak regularly to their people by this medium the National Councils will never become more than creatures of arrested development and, deprived of the possibility of realizing one of their most important functions, will preoccupy themselves with sterile partisan rivalry and internal differences.

As the reference memorandum points out, if the National Councils are to assume this important responsibility in relation to the RFE they must become effective organizations. EE likewise agrees that the

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Hungarian National Council, being the only National Council which is active in any degree as a unified and effective leadership group, should be given the proposed RFE responsibilities at once and that as soon as the other national groups become effective organizations RFE facilities should be made available to them.

Such a course raises two problems which do not seem sufficiently treated in the reference paper, namely (1) the means of bringing about the formation of unified and effective National Councils, and (2) the extent and character of supervision to be exercised over National Councils once they undertake RFE activities.

EE concurs that NCFE should devote itself as a priority and primary function to fostering the creation of effective National Councils. The reference paper suggests that to this end NCFE give more attention to the problem and take more positive measures in the nature of intervention in assisting the national groups to solve their difficulties. It seems to EE that by the very nature of the arrangement whereby the National Councils operate in the American milieu and receive financial assistance from the NCFE intervention is inevitable and that the NCFE has not refrained from intervening. The problem apparently is not whether the NCFE should intervene in the affairs of the National Councils but what kind of intervention should prevail. EE continues to believe that the ideal situation obtains when a National Council operates effectively with the least possible intervention, and that a national group should be encouraged to achieve effective organization and operations through its own efforts. Excessive intervention and certain types of intervention can produce such harm as to defeat the very purpose we seek to realize, that is, the development of strong, dignified, and important leadership organizations to conduct the national liberation effort from abroad. The wrong types of intervention inimical to this objective include actions which are widely construed as (1) being in favor of, or in opposition to, one candidate or party as against another in the organization of a National Council, (2) representing an attempt to impose a policy with respect to the future constitutional organization of a state or in relation to foreign states or foreign population groups, or (3) relegating exile leaders to a subordinate position of being employees of the Americans. Intervention of the foregoing types must be avoided by all means, yet on the other hand it is essential to assure, by intervention if necessary, that no National Council falls under dictatorial rule and that individuals are held to accountability so that our undertaking does not degenerate into simply a pensionary system for subsidizing the conduct of party politics.

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- 3 -

The strongest force in inducing the national exile groups to pull themselves together into some kind of unified and active councils may well be our insistence that until they do so they will not become eligible to take over the proposed RFE responsibilities. If one National Council receives access to RFE facilities this should prove an incentive to the others without our intervention to put themselves in order so that they may do the same.

As to the supervision to be exercised over the National Councils which have taken charge of the broadcasting efforts to their respective homelands, it is obvious that they will need extensive professional assistance, whether by Americans or by their own nationals, in preparing the day-to-day programs. The councils will probably wish of their own initiative, after they have discovered what daily programming involves, not to go beyond (a) policy determination as to type of programming, (b) utilization by the political and intellectual exile leaders of the opportunity to speak from time to time to their people, and (c) decision on selection of certain program items. If this assumption is correct then our controls might properly be limited to (1) providing each group a recorded outline of American foreign policy for guidance if they discuss any phase of this subject or its implications, (2) preventing partisan abuses such as the disproportionate use of the RFE by one party although making sure that the representatives of each may have access to RFE facilities if ~~national or professional assistance is necessary~~ party representatives so wish, and (3) conducting an ex post facto review of programs in avoiding abuses of any type. In general it would be desirable to allow the councils the maximum scope of activity and responsibility in the RFE effort they are capable of undertaking in order to nurse the health and vitality of these councils as leadership organizations in the liberation struggle.

FR:EE:HC/edeler/ml  
January 23, 1952

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED		RESTRICTED	CONF	TIAL	SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION)		(SEE BOTTOM)			
<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>					
TO		INITIALS	DATE		
1	Mr Braden	JNB			
	ANTONIC - Personnel				
3	File our office				
4					
5					
FROM		INITIALS	DATE		
1					
2					
3					
<div style="display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;"> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> ACTION</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION</div> <div style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> FILE</div> </div> <p>REMARKS: Toew: Adm M. left this with us. We have all read. Also John Shields has read. He suggested that we keep - instead of his retaining it in his file. Nancy O.K. It's a good paper.</p>					
SECRET    CONFIDENTIAL    RESTRICTED    UNCLASSIFIED					

April 1, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Admiral Miller

FROM: Mr. Myers

Attached is presentation describing our exile personnel policy. This paper is prepared in two parts, the second part of which is not yet in type. The part delivered herewith is, I feel, a precise rebuttal of any overall uninformed criticism to which we have been subjected.

In every instance where there has been specific criticism involving individuals employed at New York or Munich we are in a position to rebut charges of Communist infiltration and to defend every member of the staff thus attacked.

Upon the impression that it is an adequate statement in writing, it can be delivered, if you so desire, to Mr. Ehrans for a study and contrast with the supposed allegations he presumably has under scrutiny. Should Ehrans ask for information of a specific nature, Part Two of this paper can then be furnished him if you wish to do so.

*JEM.*

NCPS EXILE PERSONNEL SELECTION IN RELATION TO  
(1) EXILE POLITICS,  
(2) RFE BROADCAST POLICY, AND  
(3) EXTERNAL CRITICISM

- I -

INTRODUCTORY HISTORY

A. Formative Stage

At its inception, the National Committee for a Free Europe believed that its Iron Curtain broadcasting operation, Radio Free Europe, could and should be developed and pursued through the medium of "National Councils" or "Committees of Liberation" composed of exile groups from the target countries. It was considered that prominent exile leaders and personalities of each nationality group could express to their captive countrymen, entirely without American advice and guidance, the message of hope which NCPE proposed to send. This concept was not fulfilled. Experience in attempting to weld a talented, dedicated group of exiles into a non-partisan broadcasting operation early demonstrated that without American control the mission of RFE would be lost in the jungle of exile-world politics. It soon became evident that the leadership among the exiles was neither sufficiently strong nor personally willing to rise above the political cross currents, factional rivalries, and splinter-group weaknesses characteristically reminiscent of the political affairs of all Eastern European countries. These factors militated against the original plan of permitting



exiles, through their loosely organized Councils or Committees, to wholly develop, manage, and control RFE broadcasting.

Since the advent of RFE was the most important development affecting the exiles which had occurred since their flight from home, they quickly understood and applauded its implications and potential effect on their futures. Through this instrument they could once again become prominent and powerful in the affairs of the homeland; once more they could contend for place and power.

Selection of personnel for the purpose at hand quickly became a political football of rival leaders, personalities, and groups. Rightists, Leftists, Centrists, Labor Elements, and Splinter-groups argued with us for advancement of their particular personal or political views. Sponsorship of their own adherents as RFE employees through whom such views would be broadcast to their captive countrymen became the pattern of their pseudo cooperation. This pattern was followed to such an extent that ordinary progress and sensible development of our basic purpose of truly free broadcasts under exile control soon appeared to be not only impracticable, but dangerous. For example, the National Councils Division attempted to inaugurate broadcasts to Czechoslovakia under the auspices of a Czechoslovak National Council. The Council was and is made up of exile personalities of differing political views and parties. Its factions proceeded to engage in endless disputes and irreconcilable claims for control of script production and program content. Slovak "Separatists" arguing for the total independence of Slovakia

sought that objective, while Czechs desired opposite views to be aired and advocated the rebirth of pre-war Czechoslovakia. Each group sponsored and insisted upon employment of its own more or less qualified adherents upon the assumption that its special views would be thereby expressed to the captive Czechoslovak audience of RFE. Similar activities were pursued by Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Poles until the futility of permitting the exile Councils to control the destiny and broadcasting policies of RFE was made clear beyond refutation. It became tragically obvious that uncontrolled exile-world Councils and professional politicians could not agree on personnel selection or program content.

In spite of every effort to induce harmony in and obtain proper cooperation from the "Councils", "Committees", and individuals, RFE was confronted with an impasse. The alternative theory and present policy of American selection of non-political exile personnel was the only way out. It has worked. Technically qualified personnel produce properly oriented programs -- and have been doing so with documented success since July, 1950. Disappointed exile politicians, professional exile camp followers, disturbed American special pleaders, and alarmed Communist Agents all scream, snipe and snivel -- but RFE programs are doing the job.

NCFE-RFE records of this stage can be supplied by Frederic R. Delbeare, Vice-President, National Councils Division, and Robert E. Lang, Director, RFE. The current policy has the complete endorsement of these officers and of the Board of Directors of NCFE.

## B. Development Stage

Upon the collapse of the original concept of broadcasting under exile auspices, RFE necessarily utilized some exile personnel endorsed and recommended by the leaders of the various nationality groups. As technical radio facilities came into being, exiles with radio background or writing talent were required for the production of programs. This involved using individuals eminently qualified by experience to do a radio job of script writing, announcing, acting, etc., without regard for the fact that such individuals might be persona non grata with one or another political faction or leader of an exile "Council". It also involved elimination of proven inefficient, inept or unworthy individuals without regard for their exile "Council" sponsorship. In either instance criticism of RFE was predictable and indeed was always forthcoming -- often in virulent and dishonest form.

The day to day operation of RFE developed new techniques and long range plans which made it impossible to employ non-entities of no political color or conviction. The best people to produce programs in harmony with NCPE-RFE purposes and policies necessarily were persons known in their own countries for their views on domestic political affairs and their anti-Communist activities. Hard-hitting propaganda required hard-hitting personalities whose known association with RFE and its programs would add validity and significance for our captive audiences. Gradually, therefore, the nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich were staffed with tested, qualified exiles who had been

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identified publicly with domestic political philosophies at issue in their own countries. Many, in fact, most of the staff people are controversial figures among their own countrymen in exactly the same way that prominent Americans are controversial in our political arena. Many indeed are members of the Councils, but are men of sufficient stature to give their primary allegiance to the non-partisan policy of RFE. The decisive factor is that there be no controversy or question about their anti-Communist convictions and records.

At this point, it must be noted that our target countries have been subject to repetitive political ferment prior to and following World War II, as well as the successive occupations of Nazi and Communist Armies.

The tempo of the times, therefore, in which these exiles have lived for the past fifteen years has been one of excitement, bitterness, recrimination, rivalries, and personal turmoil -- all stemming from both domestic and foreign struggles for power. The times have produced a bumper crop of refugee traitors, collaborators, and opportunists and at the same time have developed pure Western style democrats, true national patriots, and unselfish honest men. The exile who stood by placidly through the era is not much good, however talented, as a militant messenger of hope via RFE; exiles who were honorably active in public affairs at home, and who had radio talent were, therefore, the only kind of personnel suitable for RFE purposes.

As the necessity for American operational control of nationality desks became self-evident, the only feasible personnel policy was to

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employ properly qualified individuals, regardless of exile politics. In the execution of this policy individuals who were useless were eliminated without regard for political sponsors. This process still goes on. Similarly, talented exile personalities recruited from any source were employed wherever needed. This process still goes on. Both processes are in vogue with a healthy disregard for exile political nuances and protests. Neither process is satisfactory to self-styled exile leaders since it follows that the appointment of an individual sponsored by one faction as a representative of its views, inevitably will evoke howls of rage and criticism from the opposite faction. This is an accepted fact of exile life. We have to live with it and get on with the job.

C. Summary

Our formative and development experiences evolved the present and continuing exile personnel policies of RFE. Exile desk employees, whether at New York or Munich, must respond to three tests;

- (a) Security clearance,
- (b) Endorsement of technical proficiency,
- (c) Sufficient stature to eliminate exile partisan interests from program content.

- II -

CRITERIA AND METHODS OF PERSONNEL SELECTION

A. Recruitment -- General Principles

The best source of exile personnel is referral by "non-professional" exiles themselves. Among all nationalities there are

many talented refugees who need employment and who can supply RFE's need for script writers, actors, announcers, etc. Accordingly, desk staffing has been accomplished by examining the qualifications of duly recommended individuals, whether the recommendations come from political personalities or otherwise. Selection is based on the ability of the individual to fill a need efficiently in turning out or participating in planned programs. Recruitment is determined only by ideological security, independence of exile politics, and personal ability. This is not to say that many individual exiles having decided personal convictions and well-known political records are not employed, but a positive statement is made that those exile employees who now produce RFE programs reflect the policies and guidance of RFE rather than promotion of partisan objectives and personalities.

B. Recruitment -- Detailed Procedures

The personnel complement of each RFE nationality desk is founded on a hard core of dependable individuals, usually two or three people, including the chief of the desk. "Dependability" is established by exhaustive inquiry at all available sources to establish the desirability, reliability, technical proficiency and security of the working core of the desk. Sources used are:

- (a) Exile political personalities in the United States,
- (b) Exile references of high standing and known impartiality in the United States and Overseas,
- (c) Overseas contacts and personal knowledge of our American representative in Europe. (Royall Tyler-Paris).
- (d) Checks and balances of our political advisor at Munich (W. E. Griffith).

- (e) British Broadcasting Corporation, where applicable,
- (f) Voice of America, where applicable,
- (g) Special confidential sources.

These tests having been applied, confidence is placed in these initial personalities, and particularly in the Desk Chief, to carry forward recruitment of additional personnel as needed in collaboration with the American Director of RFE (Robert E. Lang, New York ), and his associate officials. The leading personalities of each desk know what is expected of them and since they respond to the established criteria, the resulting full personnel complement is a group of exiles who, notwithstanding their personal political views, are suitable and capable program production people. They meet our basic requirement of daily production of truly free and properly constructed propaganda broadcasts capable of evoking the widest possible audience response in our target countries.

In brief, the mission of RFE being conceived as a marketing problem, the best available salesmen are procured, trained, and utilized to sell the market.

#### C. Recruitment -- Special Security Measures

Since RFE, although a private enterprise, is by extension a collateral instrument of American national policy, special precaution is exercised to insure the ideological security of all employees, including exiles. In the case of exile personnel specifically, the

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additional approval of the Personnel Director of NCFE is required before employment, either at New York or Munich. Thus, even if a proposed exile employee meets all the described criteria he may not be employed without this ultimate approval.

The Personnel Director of NCFE utilizes appropriate and dependable sources of information to determine the acceptability of personnel from a security standpoint. His sources are investigative in nature and are conclusive as to the ideological record and security acceptability of the proposed employee. In doubtful cases the Personnel Director consults with the Vice-President in Charge of the National Councils Division and with the Director of Radio Free Europe. These three officers of NCFE jointly follow a policy of rejecting candidates about whom there is the slightest doubt. It is to be clearly understood that in making decisions of this kind the conflicting interests and frantic representations of politically minded exile leaders and groups are ignored. Acceptance or rejection of candidates is wholly based on ideological security and talent value.

D. Summary

- (1) All nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich are staffed by individuals who have passed all tests described above.
- (2) All programs produced and aired by the nationality desks are checked and scrutinized by American supervisory personnel for ideological content, audience acceptance and conformity to basic NCFE-RFE policies.
- (3) These conditions have been progressively in force since July, 1950.



## III

RFE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNELA. General Comment

The programs aired by RFE are not left to whim or chance. All programs and the personnel responsible for them are controlled by a written policy manual. The manual sets forth in minute detail the position and policy of RFE on every topic beamed to our target countries. The manual is the daily guidance of all employees, both American and Exile; deviation from its rules is not permitted. Continuous scrutiny of manuscripts and resultant broadcasts is maintained by American employees to insure that there are no deviations.

The policy manual of RFE represents the considered views of the responsible officials, including the Board of Directors, of NCFE. It is a statement of the principles and purposes of NCFE expressed in operational form. It is considered and maintained as a strictly confidential document, but it is of course available for examination by any proper authority.

The policy manual is in strict conformity with current American national policies as evidenced by the following quotation from Article One;

"As a non-governmental radio station responsible to the millions of American citizens who support it, RFE cannot take a line contrary to United States Government policy or to the beliefs of the American people reflected in the Constitution of the United States and in American Institutions".

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The above quotation is understood by exile personnel particularly to be a solemn injunction against ideological program content which in any way violates the letter and spirit of American policy and ideals. It is a guarantee to the American people and to our captive listeners that RFE and the men who make its programs are uncompromisingly opposed to the Communist regimes now in power in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries.

B. RFE Policy Defined by Handbook (Direct Quotations)

1. The purpose of RFE is to contribute to the liberation of the Nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-dominated regimes by which they are, for the time being, ruled.

2. The central characteristic of RFE is that it is the instrument of men who are engaged in fighting for freedom and justice. As such, it encourages resistance to every tyrant, great and small, in the countries it addresses. Its speakers speak ... as men of good will who seek to contribute to the elimination of old enmities and the building of an enduring European democratic order.

3. As a free forum in which exiles speak to their own people RFE is particularly dedicated to arguments by which exiles seek to persuade their listeners of the all devouring ambitions of Soviet Imperialism, the cruelty and unworkability of Communist Institutions

and the proven advantages of the democratic way of life for the worker, the peasant, the administrator, and the business and professional strata of society.

4. RFE takes counsel with exile leaders and is respectful of their views, but its policy is not designed to further the aspirations of any single exile leader or party.

5. RFE policy is further based upon acceptance of the principle that each of the liberated peoples shall be free to determine for itself the political and social institutions under which it will live once it has been liberated.

6. Finally, the following summary in the nature of a specific limitation on program content is quoted:

"It is indispensable that all concerned grasp clearly that RFE is a multi-national station established to contribute to the liberation of all the peoples it addresses, and not merely of one of those peoples. RFE policy is therefore commanded by the limitation that nothing may be said over its facilities to one national audience which will destroy the confidence in RFE of its other audiences or which is likely to induce any of its audiences to prefer communist rule to a liberation which might appear to promise domination by a neighboring people."

SECRET

In reply refer W-1968  
to:

31 March 1952

Dear Sir:

On one of the matters which we discussed on Wednesday, i.e., the matter posed in Mr. Hughes' letter, we require your assistance from you. We have gone over this topic thoroughly and find that this is the situation.

a. The number of indigenous people which we will agree to include in their plan on our behalf is very limited.

b. This being the case, we require from you a compilation of names of indigenous people, not to exceed thirty, whom you would consider indispensable for the re-establishment of an operation similar to that of Kenneth's firm in another area, in time of real heat. It is possible, but not absolutely certain, that we can arrange to include this group of thirty in our provisions for time of trouble.

c. Moreover, we feel that it would be unwise for us to approach the Department of Defense officials at this time.

d. We, therefore, suggest that you approach the Department of Defense directly and independently with no reference to the fact that we have an interest in the matter as a whole, and with no reference to our interest in any part of it (e.g. the number thirty above). We feel that General Clay and other influential citizens who are concerned with your organization may be of assistance in the direct approach which we have recommended.

I need not assure you that this cause is one of special interest on our part; nor do I need to stress the practical considerations within the assisting Department which compel us to declare our own limitations and to suggest the direct independent approach, for you are, I am sure, the first to understand a problem of this type.