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boat" at this stage of the game and suggests that we maintain LICALLA at its present location and with its present operator, LIPSTICK-39. One alternative appears to be about as good as another in this case, and it is an acknowledged fact that LICALLA, at its present location, is a worthwhile and productive asset. Headquarters ideas and comments on the LICALLA Base would be appreciated.

At the present time it is planned to move LIPSTICK-39 and family to a furnished apartment when the time comes to remodel the LICALLA Base. After completion of the remodeling, LIPSTICK-39 and family will return to the present LICALLA Base.

4. PHOTO TRUCK

- (1) Target - Investigative asset used for taking surreptitious photographs of persons, places and things that are from time to time of interest to the Station and Headquarters.
- (2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-2, as indicated by the low numerical designation of his cryptonym, has been employed by KUBARK for several years. At the present time LIPSTICK-2 is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the photographic surveillance truck. He is also used occasionally to spot and rent operational apartments. In the past, LIPSTICK-2 has served as team leader of a low level surveillance team (which was compromised and subsequently disbanded), as a LIFEAT line inspector (when he was not busy with the photo truck), and as a static surveillance man (i.e., used as an outside sentry during the March 1958 entry of the LIMUST Base by KUTUBE/D, KURIOT and KUCLUB technicians. (NOTE: LIPSTICK-2 was assigned the task of watching the entire area during the day for any unusual activity on the part of target personnel. He was not told that he was to watch a specific house. He was dismissed from his static surveillance before dusk and the Headquarters technicians did not enter LIMUST until after 2030 hours.) LIPSTICK-2 is the brother of LIMEWATER (LIFEAT Project) and LIPSTICK-34 (LIPSTICK Surveillance team member) is LIPSTICK-2's wife's nephew. LIPSTICK-2's cover is buying and selling cars; however, about the only business he has in this connection is when he buys and sells cars for KUBARK. His cover is quite weak. He receives a monthly salary of \$3,200.00 (MN) plus \$600.00 (MN) per month for the use of his personal car.

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LIPSTICK-24 does not know GERENDE and, presumably, knows only LIPSTICK-2, with whom he works on the photo truck. His cover is as a salesman of electrical appliances; however, he does not pursue his cover job to the desirable extent. LIPSTICK-24 was recruited by LIPSTICK-2 about one year ago and is currently receiving a salary of \$1,000.00 (MN) per month. Since he has now worked a year for the Station, and performed satisfactorily, his salary should be raised to \$1,200.00 (MN) per month (LIEMPTV will provide for this increase).

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets LIPSTICK-2 two to three times a week. These meetings are arranged by phone and take place at previously selected contact points which can be referred to in telephonic conversations by innocent sounding code names. LIPSTICK-2 also knows GERENDE's true name, where he lives, and his phone number. In the past he has had occasion to telephone GERENDE at the latter's home. LIPSTICK-2 knows DINGLEY, and could, in an emergency situation, contact DINGLEY. However, GERENDE has been instructed to arrange a complete communications plan with LIPSTICK-2, including a reserve means of contact. For security reasons, GERENDE has been instructed to inform LIPSTICK-2 that his only contact is with GERENDE and that in the future he is not to contact anyone else in the organization without GERENDE's permission. Also, that should contact with GERENDE be disrupted, he is to await for the higher echelon to establish contact with him (all agents under GERENDE are being so instructed). This is particularly important in the case of LIPSTICK-2, since he has by-passed GERENDE in two or three instances in the past.

(4) Security - Probably the most serious security situation involving the photo truck, LIPSTICK-2 and LIPSTICK-24 is the basic knowledge of the LIPSTICK surveillance team that such an asset exists, even to the point that one of the team members (LIPSTICK-34) is the listed owner of the photo truck. The personal knowledge of LIPSTICK-2 about the LIFEAT operation also represents a security hazard of the first class. For example, if LIPSTICK-2 were compromised and arrested as a result of his activities, there is a possibility that he could compromise his brother, LIMWATER, the LIMITED Base and LIPSTICK-14, GERENDE and our interest in the highly sensitive LIMESA/LIMUST operation. (NOTE: According to the LIFEAT Case Officer and the former LIPSTICK Case Officer, both LIMWATER and LIPSTICK-2 have been reminded on several occasions during the past few years that they were not to discuss any aspect of their operations with each other. Also, LIPSTICK-2, to the best of the Station's

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knowledge, does not know the location of any of the LIFEAT Base houses).

A new truck should be purchased as soon as possible to replace the present truck. The new truck should be purchased in an assumed name and vehicle papers should list an untraceable address. LIPSTICK-2 has already been informed that he is to have no contact with LIPSTICK-14 or any other operational personnel he may know except, of course, LIPSTICK-24, with whom he works, and GERENDE, who supervises his activities. In addition to the above, the Station should begin thinking about a replacement agent for LIPSTICK-2 and every effort should be made to set up an independent and compartmented photo truck operation. This would permit the eventual termination of LIPSTICK-2, after we have given him several months to reduce his knowledge of current operations.

6.

LJERSEY

(1) Target - Foot surveillance and investigative support of other Station operations.

(2) Personnel - LJERSEY-4 is of a low social class and lives with his mother in a slum area of Mexico City. He is the sole support for his mother and several younger brothers and sisters. He is described by GERENDE as having a lot of ambition and a strong desire to improve his standard of living and position in life. The Station has found him to be a good observer and, consequently, adequate for static surveillance work. Although he now has his drivers license, he is not a capable driver and probably will never develop into one. GERENDE has been encouraging LJERSEY-4 to obtain employment as a salesman to supplement his KUBARK income of \$1,000.00 (MN) and to establish himself in a cover job. However, LJERSEY-4 has not yet obtained such employment. It is the Station's opinion that LJERSEY-4 is definitely an asset of limited value and will never develop into the high-calibre surveillance asset which the Station really needs.

LJERSEY-8's situation is about the same as LJERSEY-4's. He lives with his family and is currently taking highschool courses (LJERSEY-4 is doing the same). He is not an imaginative talker and has difficulty making up cover stories and spur-of-the-moment excuses and explanations - the vital qualifications for a good surveillance man. He is the best driver of the three LJERSEY

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team members and with more practice will probably develop into a capable and dependable driver. LIJERSEY-8 has recently shown a commendable amount of initiative where his cover situation is concerned. He has obtained a job as a commission salesman for UNDERWOOD typewriters and, according to GERENDE, is making a substantial amount of "pin" money. However, as in the case of LIJERSEY-4, LIJERSEY-8 is at best an asset of only limited value. LIJERSEY-8 also receives a salary of \$1,000.00 (MN) per month.

LIJERSEY-13 does not know LIJERSEYS-4 and 8 and vice versa. LIJERSEY-13 is better dressed than the other two team members and can pass as a better educated and more socially flexible individual. He speaks fairly good English. He performs pretext investigation assignments with facility and imagination and is adept at making up cover stories. In brief, he makes a good impression on the people he interviews. He is not a good driver and is too nervous to develop into one. His salary is \$1,000.00 (MN) per month.

(3) Communications - GERENDE has daily contact arrangements with the three LIJERSEYS. Prearranged meeting places are used on designated days of each week and the LIJERSEYS are instructed to go to each meeting. They have standing instructions to continue going to their meeting sites for two weeks; if they have not been contacted during that period of time, they can discontinue their communications plan and await contact by GERENDE or another appropriately selected agent at their respective homes. None of the LIJERSEYS have home telephones; hence, it is impossible to arrange any type of communications using this means. GERENDE is currently in the process of setting up new and more complete communications arrangements with the three LIJERSEYS.

(4) Security - Insofar as knowledge of other operations, personnel and assets is concerned, the LIJERSEYS appear to have the best security of any of the operations handled by GERENDE. New communications plans with the LIJERSEYS will do much toward increasing security and ability to meet contingencies. GERENDE will be instructed to give refresher training to all three LIJERSEYS in operational security, cover and communications. The major danger existing with the LIJERSEY team, and with any surveillance team, is the possibility of compromise and arrest by one of the local police agencies. Should this happen, GERENDE and his other operations would be placed in considerable danger.

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For this reason, it is not advisable to have GERENDE connected with a surveillance team and also contacting and directing the sensitive photo base houses. Therefore, until such time as a suitable asset can be developed or acquired to take over the LIJERSEY team, their actual surveillance assignments will be kept at the minimum.

(5) Recommendations - It is suggested that the LIJERSEY framework be used for the recruitment of at least three competent and higher class local nationals for use on surveillance assignments. After the recruitment of such individuals, it may be suggested that LIJERSEYS-4 and 8 be terminated. LIJERSEY-13 should remain as an independent investigative asset to conduct "credit" and other type of inquiries which he can do without help from other agents. LIJERSEY-5 has already been asked to spot prospective candidates of a higher social standing for use on a new surveillance team; however, even under optimum conditions, one and a half years will be required to get such a team functioning. In order to recruit the type of team member that will be most worthwhile to the Station, we must plan to pay a minimum starting salary of \$1,600.00 (MN) per month. The cost of living in Mexico is continually on the rise and where \$1,000.00 (MN) was a good salary one to two years ago, it really is not adequate today.

1.

LIFEAT

(1) Target - Conversations coming from two telephone taps, BGMORNING and Cuban exiles.

(2) Personnel - GERENDE lives in the apartment where these two lines are maintained. He personally processes the take from the lines and passes it to OUSLER for Station dissemination to Robert B. RIGGS (BGMORNING) and Calude K. Shyrock (Cubans). GERENDE, in accordance with LIFEAT procedures, is supposed to remain in this apartment seven days a week. However, this is impossible due to his other operational assignments and activities.

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets daily with OUSLER to pass the LIFEAT "take" and to discuss other operational matters.

(4) Security - It is not a good security practice to have a LIFEAT monitor working on anything except LIFEAT. Other duties, which GERENDE certainly has, limit one's capability for maintaining the required security alertness for telephone

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repairmen and others who might accidentally discover one of our LIFEAT taps. Also, should GERENDE be compromised through any of his other operations, it is conceivable that the EGMORNING and Cuban Exiles LIFEAT taps would be discovered by one of the local police agencies.

(5) Recommendations - It is suggested that a replacement be found as soon as possible to relieve GERENDE of his present LIFEAT duties.

8.

LICCOL-7

(1) Target - A planned technical installation against a person of interest to the Station and to Headquarters.

(2) Personnel - LIMITATION-5 and his wife, LIMITATION-6, are the LICCOL-7 Base House operators. LIMITATION-5 has been with KUBARK for several years. He was at one time the LIAXIOM Base House operator. He presently works for the DuPont Company. He dresses well, speaks some English and could be described as belonging to the rising middle class of Mexicans. His wife can do photographic work and has had previous experience with KUBARK in the dispatching of car surveillances by radio. LIMITATIONS-5 and 6 are not participating in any active work pending the installation of LICCOL-7 in their apartment. LIMITATION-5 receives a monthly salary of \$300.00 (MN) and LIMITATION-6 receives \$400.00 (MN) monthly.

(3) Communications - A complete communications plan does not exist between GERENDE and LIMITATION-5. At the present time it is only necessary for GERENDE to see LIMITATION-5 on pay day and when Harvey C. MULFORD desires to visit the apartment for technical surveys and other work. Therefore, GERENDE and LIMITATION-5 utilize an open code telephonic means of getting together. So far, this has worked quite well, but it will be necessary later to set up a more sophisticated communications system.

(4) Security - The operational aspects of LICCOL-7 are under the jurisdiction of Matthew S. DINGLEY; therefore, the author of this report is not familiar with the security ramifications, if any, surrounding this technical installation and the agents operating it.

(5) Recommendations - None.

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h. MISCELLANEOUS

Also on the payroll as worthwhile assets are GERENDE's brother-in-law, LIPSTICK-38, and his sister, LIPSTICK-40. GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 process and print all the LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA and truck photos. LIPSTICK-40 does non-sensitive translation work for the Station. Both LIPSTICKS-38 and 40 are handled by GERENDE. They do not have contact with other agents or with station officers. LIPSTICK-38 receives a monthly salary of \$1,000.00 (MN). LIPSTICK-40 receives the equivalent or \$1.75 U. S. in pesos per hour for her work.

Although it is not advisable from the security point of view to have any indigenous agent aware of all three of our LIMERICK photographic bases and the photo truck, the load on the Station photographer several months ago resulted in just such a solution to the problem. Previously, GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 had processed only the photographs from LIMITED, LILYRIC and the truck.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations have been included in several sections of this paper. These same recommendations, excepting those which have already been carried out or are in the process of implementation, are listed below in a composite form to facilitate the readers' overall comprehension.

- a. Continue the reorganization of communication arrangements with all agents.
- b. Relieve GERENDE of his LIPEAT duties (BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles taps) as soon as possible.
- c. Continue to use GERENDE for the time being as the principal agent in charge of LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA, the Photo Truck, LIJERSEY, LIMITATIONS-5 and 6, and LIPSTICKS 38 and 40.
- d. Arrange a warning system of communications for removing GERENDE to PBPRIME should he be compromised to one of the local police agencies.
- e. Purchase a new photo truck for use by LIPSTICKS 2 and 24.
- f. Begin planning for a compartmented photo truck operation which will later permit termination of LIPSTICK-2.
- g. Spot and recruit at least three indigenous agents from the middle class social level to form the nucleus of a new LIJERSEY

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surveillance team.

h. Eventually separate GERENDE from either LIJERSEY surveillance team duties or the three photographic base houses, preferably the former. The two types of activities are not compatible with each other and should not be handled by the same principal agent.

i. Implied, but not specifically stated elsewhere in this paper, is the suggestion that GERENDE be given a "cooling off" and training period of two to three months in PBPRIME. Of course, this will not be possible until other assets are developed to take over GERENDE's present duties. After his return from PBPRIME, GERENDE could be used to develop new support assets which would be completely compartmented from all of his previous operations, personnel and activities.

6. CONCLUSIONS

It would take several weeks of uninterrupted study of files to write a really comprehensive security review of GERENDE's operations and activities. However, based on the facts contained in this paper, it is the Station's opinion that GERENDE probably is not now known to the local police agencies as a KUBARK or PBPRIME agent. It is believed that GERENDE could be identified by the local police agencies at any time they choose to interrogate LIPSTICKS-12 and 30 in detail or when one of the other agent assets formerly or currently associated with GERENDE is compromised. Furthermore, if GERENDE is arrested, he could compromise most of the Station's support assets, plus the BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles portions of LIFEAT.

Given several months time, the slow process of compartmentation can be introduced into GERENDE's operations. Such compartmentation, however, will never reach the truly desirable point, but some improvement over the existing situation can be made. If GERENDE can emerge basically unscathed from the current incidents, then KUBARK will have an extremely valuable long-range support asset.

Quinton N. OUSLER


21 October 1958

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF RAMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIES

SECRET



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STATION, Mexico City		50-6-25/3	
Date of Station, Mexico City		23 July 1958	
Operational Security		SECRET - KAPOE 1000	
Security Review of Project LIPSTICK		MAILED FOR POSTING	
Comments on proposals in Paragraph 7		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
<p>1. References outlined the arrest of LIPSTICK-47, the subsequent arrests of LIPSTICK-12 and 30, their interrogation by the Mexican Secret Service and their eventual release from prison. References truly portrayed the incident with the following exceptions:</p> <p>a. None of the arrested men was tortured.</p> <p>b. LIPSTICK-45 was never arrested.</p> <p>c. Only LIPSTICK-12, 30 and 47 were arrested.</p> <p>d. LIPSTICK-29 was not taken from his home by force. In fact he was never arrested.</p> <p>2. While under detention the arrested men told the story as it appears in Attachment A which was written by LIPSTICK-30. It is not believed that the men told anything more likewise:</p> <p>a. The substance of the story was told to Station Mexico identically by three (3) separate and uncorroborated sources, i.e. from the arrested men, from the Attorney, Paul F. CARLSON, and from the Counselor of Canadian Embassy, Sidney WILKINSON.</p> <p>b. Each operation mentioned in Attachment A, which was susceptible to a check by the Secret Service, was investigated by them. However, no operation not mentioned in Attachment A was investigated by the Secret Service.</p> <p>c. LIPSTICK-47, who had only been with the team about one and a half months and who did most of the talking, did not know any information other than that in Attachment A.</p> <p>d. LIPSTICK-12 and 30, who knew considerably more about our operations, are both wise of sterner stuff than LIPSTICK-47 and have keener minds.</p> <p>e. The "ring of truth" that Attachment A has. It is not believed that the Secret Service is sufficiently sophisticated to extract such a believable story.</p> <p>f. The combined opinion of every Case Officer who has known LIPSTICK-12 and 30 that they did not reveal any information other than that contained in Attachment A.</p> <p>g. On 10 July 1958 LIPSTICK-12 and 30 were examined by Martin F. REMALEY on LCPATTER. REMALEY was satisfied that the results of this examination completely exonerated LIPSTICK-12 and 30 from any cooperation with the Mexican Police. The results of these tests are attached as Attachment B.</p> <p>3. In order to assess what possible damage might have been done to Station Mexico's operations if the arrested men had told the Secret Service everything they knew, there follows a list of those operations known to the arrested men:</p> <p>a. LIPSTICK-47 did not know anything more than he told the Secret Service as outlined in Attachment A.</p>		<p>33</p> <p>CLASSIFICATION</p> <p>SECRET/KAPOE</p> <p>PAGE NO.</p> <p>1</p>	

SECRET	CLASSIFICATION
GROUP - SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL	GROUP - SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP - SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL	GROUP - SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP - SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL	GROUP - SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP - SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL	GROUP - SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

b. LIPSTICK-12:

(1) He was recruited by LIPSTICK and knows that he works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity LIPSTICK is employed.

(2) He knows that LIPSTICK, LIPSTICK-3 and LIPSTICK-6 work for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacities they work.

(3) He knows the true names of Thomas G. LIPSTICK, Edward P. SECHEN, Matthew S. DIBBLEY, Oliver U. SCANTLEB, Wilfred O. CLOVER, Raymond S. GENDRE, Harvey P. DEGENHOLTZ, Boyd I. ROBINSON and Clyde K. SERTACK.

(4) He knows all of the details of the FURBIE 9 and RUSSE operations.

(5) He participated in the raid on Alfredo Guerra Borges' apartment.

(6) He knows of LIPSTICK Car #3 (photo truck).

(7) He knows all of the present LIPSTICK surveillance team and LIPSTICK-2 and it who used to be with the team.

(8) Through surveillance, he knows of the following operations:

LIPSTICK	Samuel Brooks
LIPSTICK	Marice Halperin
LIPSTICK	3 indigenous employees of the U.S.
Roland Abbiato (Francis Rosen)	Industry in Mexico City
LIPSTICK	LIPSTICK
Alfred Kaufman & Martha Dodd Stern	LIPSTICK
LIPSTICK-3	RELIANCE (Michael ROX & Jose Maria
LIPSTICK-1	RELIANCE
Surveillance of various officials of the Partido Comunista Mexicano	
Surveillance of various Soviet officials. He probably knows of the existence of the LIMITED base since this base dispatched the radio cars on surveillance of Soviet officials.	
Samuel RODRIGUEZ Rodriguez - individual who desired to purchase the LIMITED base.	

c. LIPSTICK-30:

(1) He was recruited by Raymond S. GENDRE. He knows that GENDRE works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity.

(2) He knows the true names of Thomas G. LIPSTICK, Edward P. SECHEN, Matthew S. DIBBLEY, Wilfred O. CLOVER, Oliver U. SCANTLEB, and Harvey P. DEGENHOLTZ.

(3) He participated in the raid on the apartment of Alfredo Guerra Borges.

(4) He knows of the LIPSTICK #4 vehicle (photo truck).

53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACE PAGES 51, 52, 53 AND 54 WHICH ARE OUTLET	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN	GROUP - SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL	2
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CONFERENCE

SECRET

6 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE

REFERENCE: HPM-A-11368

1. This dispatch represents the type of operational reporting we need. I think any answer to the Station should lead off with an expression of appreciation for a good job. Maybe it will encourage them to write more of this type.

2. GERENDE is very exposed and should be taken off some of his jobs at once. Specifically, my ideas are as follows:

3. Re para. 3 a, agent is very capable and should be retained if secure means can be found. Getting rid of him would not solve the problem. As long as he is in Mexico he is vulnerable. Some thought should be given to how he would be supported in the event of arrest. Personally, I believe the Station would do better to sacrifice a case officer than permit things to drag on to the point where GERENDE might tell all to the police.

Recommendations:

a. GERENDE be briefed so as to be ever ready with an innocuous story to tell the police in the event of arrest.

b. GERENDE be told to contact one of already blown Station officers like HAZLETT in the event of arrest and that the Station officer be ready to appear personally at police station to free GERENDE. If the case officer named for this duty and GERENDE both know the innocuous cover story, there should be little problem. I have done it myself. A good cover story is "looking for draft dodgers" or some such tale which does not have implications of working against Mexican citizens.

c. That if not allowed to communicate directly GERENDE should tell the senior officer present at police station that he works on (cover story) for HAZLETT and insists HAZLETT be sent for.

d. That a second blown case officer's name be given as an alternate for HAZLETT, who is often out of town and unavailable.

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e. That GERENDE be taken off LIFEAT at once and all suspicious audio equipment be removed from his home or offices. At present, LIFEAT is the only illegal activity being engaged in by GERENDE; if he is made merely in connection with his physical surveillance activities he is not likely to be hurt by the Mexicans.

f. Concur preparations should be made to hide out GERENDE if it is known he is to be arrested.

4. Re para. 4 a, GERENDE's participation in LIMITED is O. K. I believe no law is being broken. However, LIMITED is probably blown to the Soviets. Here is the more real danger. Station should find out who is the registered owner of the phone at LIMITED. Prior to leaving Mexico I noted to MAHONEY it was still held in the name of LIMESTONE-3 (now fired and hence a possible threat).

5. Re para. 4 b: This is the same situation as LIMITED but not so likely blown to the Soviets. There is no reason why GERENDE should not continue this work.

6. Re para. 4 c, LICALLA is a very special problem and should be taken up at once with Headquarters elements working on LIMESA/LIMUST. I thought LICALLA had been cancelled out when LIMESA began to shape up. I consider it a danger to LIMESA. Has LICALLA produced anything of value? I think we could vacate this in such a way that the agents in LICALLA would have no cause to be suspicious. (Put an obvious tail on the agent, scare him off, etc. This would throw off the Mexican police, too, in the event they are already wise to LICALLA through LIPSTICK 47. We could pretend to believe the Soviets ran the tail and the game is up.)

Recommendation: Get rid of LICALLA unless very productive. Better do this before the remodeling begins.

7. Re para 4 d, photo truck. LIPSTICK-2 does know of the locations of some of the basehouses on LIFEAT since he was a line inspector.

Recommendations:

a. New compartmented truck should be set up. Don't use false names and addresses. It could result in great harm.

b. LIPSTICK-2 be sent off to some small town as "resident agent" for general work and to get him out of the area.

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8. Re para. 4 e. I have no particular thoughts on LIVERSEY but think it consistent for GERENDE to handle it.

9. Re para. 4 f: GERENDE should be taken off LIFEAT at once, even if it means losing lines. As of March this year the Station had enough agent personnel to handle bases for 24 lines. They should be able to fill the gap even though LIMESTONE-3 and his tribe were fired. Only 12 lines are now being handled (latest report). The way GERENDE is handling his LIFEAT work seems to be breaking all the rules we set up in seven years of experience.


10. Re para. 4 g, LICCOL-7. I see no harm in GERENDE's handling the operational aspect of this case. But through LIMITATION-5 the police could get back to LIMITATION and the main LICKERICK tap, that is, if they were able to make GERENDE talk before we could save him. The danger to LIMITATION was not brought out in the Station's survey.

11. In re para. 5, recommendations -

- a. Approve.
- b. Get him off LIFEAT right now.
- c. Concur, but liquidate LICALLA.
- d. This needs some discussion. What do we do with GERENDE in the U. S.?
- e. Concur.
- f. Concur with reservation noted above.
- g. O. K.
- h. I don't see why he can't handle all these jobs since they are physical surveillances.
- i. Not a bad idea.

12. Final observations:

- a. What is GERENDE's cover?
- b. We must be sure he is not overworked. Sloppy work has resulted from people being overworked.


CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/YI

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Route)DISPATCH NO. 4-804-5760SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

701-119523

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

24 Dec 57 19 01

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond W. GLAUFIDE

ACTION REQUESTED: Sign and Return Contract Extension

Attached are original and two copies of an extension of Subject's contract to be signed and witnessed and returned to Headquarters.

J. C. King
J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

19 December 1967

Attachment
3, as stated above

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/atts.
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓ 1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/1Subc:jck

J. C. King
(Relating officer)

(Coordinating officer)

R. N. Dahlgren
(Authenticating officer)

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONFORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☐ CIA INTERNAL
USE ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Contract Personnel Division
Room 801 1016 16th St.

D/K

NO

DATE

10 December 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

1. FI/OPS/Projects
1709 L Bldg.

10 DEC 1957

15 DEC 1957

✓

2. WH Division
1405 Barton Hall

P

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

The original of this contract was prepared in headquarters and forwarded to the field for their execution and retention. This amendment should follow the same procedure. Please let CPD know when subject has signed his extension so a copy of this document can be forwarded to Finance Division for their records.

Saw H. Lucke

Contract to field, HANW-5760

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

☒ SECRET☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ CIA INTERNAL
USE ONLY☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
Security Air or Sea RouteDISPATCH NO. 201-5626

201-11523

DEC 3 1957

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE _____

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond M. GALTRE

1. Effective 1 October 1957, the contract (as amended) for subject, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.
2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

26 November 1957

Distributions:

3- Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chm
1 - Subject
1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico City

Charles E. Apple
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

B. DANLON, C/WH/III

(Relating officer)

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

LIPSTICK Quarterly Report

*ma 8713
27 Nov 57*

C. Raymond H. GIBBON, a contract agent, was cover provided by LIPSTICK and is responsible for LIPSTICK office number 2. GIBBON supervises the work of LIPSTICK-12 who processes the film from LIPSTICK, LIPSTICK, and LIPSTICK branches. GIBBON directs the activities of the LIPSTICK surveillance team (a separate project discussed in LIPSTICK-0151). GIBBON is also responsible for the activities of the fixed surveillance basehouse, LIPSTICK.

(1) LIPSTICK is a second story apartment which affords a view into the right angle of the main gate of the LIPSTICK installation at an angle which photographs from the top of the house downward. The equipment is the same as that used in LIPSTICK and LIPSTICK and the film is processed in the same way. LIPSTICK-12 lives in this apartment and is responsible for the photographic and physical surveillance. His reports supplement but do not duplicate those submitted by the LIPSTICK branchhouse. The photographs from LIPSTICK are superior in quality to those obtained from either LIPSTICK or LIPSTICK. LIPSTICK-12 is an efficient stenographer and good photographer. Also, this base offers a better position from which to take photographs.

(2) GIBBON's contacts in private investigative agencies are used to check leads from other operations. During June and July 1957 GIBBON received training at Headquarters and both he and the Case Officer feel this training has been most beneficial.

RECEIVED

Sumner

SECRET

Air Force

134-A-8700

Chief, W. Division

19 November 1971

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Operational

William Norman BRANCH (201-2008)

Reference: 134-5062

ACTION REQUESTED: None

1. There is attached for Headquarters retention a translation of a report concerning the Subject. The original report was obtained through a private detective agency in Mexico City which had been contacted by Raymond H. GARLAND. GARLAND posed as a businessman seeking credit and character reports on the commercial firm of Gibbon, Alonson y Cia., S.A. de Mexico. This was a special assignment for the detective agency in order that Station Mexico could assess the investigative assets of the agency for possible future operational exploitation.

2. The sub-source of 134-0021, the former SOTM chief in Mexico, knows the Subject personally. The Case Officer will contact him direct for additional information on the Subject and his activities.

Willard C. Curtis

Encl.

MSD/bet
15 Nov 71Distribution
3 - HQS V/attach
2 - Files

COPY

SECRET

LIPSTON/20

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for Raymond H. Gerende

1. Effective 1 October 1957, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY _____
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA 112
*Specify Air or Sea Route*DISPATCH NO. 201-119523SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-119523

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 1 Oct 57 11 52

FROM : Chief, WND

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond M. GEREDE

The following is the evaluation of Raymond M. GEREDE written by the instructor of foreign trainees on 12 September 1957.

1. Instruction commenced 10 June and was concluded 12 July 1957. It covered tradecraft, observation, description, casing and reporting, principles of CE and CI, elicitation and interviewing, investigative techniques, and briefings in photo and use of recording machinery.

2. Trainee was known as "Ray". He was easy to work with. He was always pleasant, courteous, cheerful and seemed genuinely interested in every phase of the training. He can speak, read and write English without any difficulty.

3. Ray seemed well motivated, more Pro-American than Mexican. He possesses a strong interest in clandestine work. He is an avid reader. He demonstrated ability to apply principles he had learned from reading and study. He seemed possessed of initiative although there was a limited opportunity of observing this quality in action.

4. While Ray's duties to date apparently have not given him a wide and varied experience in clandestine activity, he seemed to grasp the material quite readily, and although in the field of CI and CE he stated he had never thought of many of their aspects as applying to him, he seemed glad of the opportunity to learn and absorbed them quite readily. He now possesses a good working knowledge of fundamental principles involved. However, it is felt that if he is to work primarily in this field, it should be under the supervision of a case officer with considerable experience and background in this type of activity.

5. As previously indicated, Ray was an avid reader. In addition to certain case studies, he read the following books:

(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATIONFORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

SECRET

100-4-521
Page Two

"Man Hunt for Spies"
 "The Spy Web"
 "Out of Menace"
 "London Calling North Pole"
 "A Spy Has No Friends"

The following films were exhibited and critiqued:

"Radio Search"
 "Surveillance"
 "Body Search"
 "Under Cover"

6. It is felt that Ray benefitted considerably from this course of instruction. We feel that his concept and understanding of principles of clandestine activity have been broadened and strengthened. His interest, enthusiasm and production should reflect this in his future work.

J. C. King
 J. C. KING
 Chief, WHD

25 September 1957

Distributions:

3 - Mexico City
 1 - WH/Mailroom
 1 - WH/III/Chrono
 1 - RI
 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulo:mjm

Based on: CT/OS/TR memo, 12 September 1957

IN COPY

Charles E. Apple
 J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET

R. Dahlgren
 R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET

23 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERSHKE (ps)

1. It is requested that the two-year contract of Raymond H. GERSHKE, (LIPSTICK-20), which was executed on 1 October 1955, be extended for a two year period, effective 1 October 1957.

2. Raymond H. GERSHKE's principal duties are administration and operational direction of the LIPSTICK team, processing film, contacting agents and acting as out-out for the Case Officer, conducting individual investigations, and handling cash advances, accountings and property.

J. C. KING
Chief, CID

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- 1 - WH/III/Mexico
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mja

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH/3
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc

DATE: 12 September 1957

FROM : Instructor, Foreign Trainees

SUBJECT: Evaluation of trainee in Special Project LIPSTICK

1. Instruction in this project commenced 10 June and was concluded 12 July 1957. It covered tradecraft, observation, description, casing and reporting, principles of CE&I, elicitation and interviewing, investigative techniques, and TSS briefings in photo and the use of recording machines.

2. Trainee was known as "Ray". He was easy to work with. He was always pleasant, courteous, cheerful and seemed genuinely interested in every phase of the training. He can speak, read and write English without any difficulty.

3. Ray seemed well motivated; more Pro-American than Mexican. He possesses a strong interest in clandestine work. He is an avid reader. He demonstrated ability to apply principles he had learned from reading and study. He seemed possessed of initiative although there was a limited opportunity of observing this quality in action.

4. While Ray's duties to date apparently have not given him a wide and varied experience in clandestine activity, he seemed to grasp the material quite readily; and although in the field of CI&CE he stated he had never thought of many of their aspects as applying to him, he seemed glad of the opportunity to learn and absorbed them quite readily. He now possesses a good working knowledge of fundamental principles involved. However, it is felt that if he is to work primarily in this field, it should be under the supervision of a case officer with considerable experience and background in this type of activity.

5. As previously indicated, Ray was an avid reader. In addition to certain case studies, he read the following books:

- "Handbook for Spies"
- "The Spy Web"
- "Out of Bondage"
- "London Calling North Pole"
- "A Spy Has No Friends"

SECRET

SECRET

The following films were exhibited and critiqued:

"House Search"
"Surveillance"
"Body Search"
"Under Cover"

6. It is felt that Ray benefitted considerably from this course of instruction. We feel that his concept and understanding of principles of clandestine activity have been broadened and strengthened. His interest, enthusiasm and production should reflect this in his future work.

Oscar H. Sells
OSCAR H. SELLS

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division
Attention : Mr. Lawrence B. Sulc, WH/III/Mexico
Room 2114 Earton Hall
FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

DATE 8 AUG 1957

SUBJECT: COVERT SITE
Apartment D-22
The President Madison
Presidential Gardens
Alexandria, Virginia
#122877

1. Reference is made to your request (Requisition No:57-51) for safehouse facilities. Further reference is made to your subsequent request that a survey be scheduled of the Subject covert site and that you be advised of the results thereof.

2. It is the understanding of this office that the Subject covert site was utilized for the training and housing of an agent of interest to your office in connection with Project LIPSTICK. It is further understood that motion pictures would be used as part of the training program at the site. The Subject apartment was leased in the name of Rufus KING, cleared attorney.

3. This confirms previous verbal advice that a security survey was conducted at the Subject premises with favorable results. You were previously advised of security approval for the use of the Subject premises for the above purposes.

4. In view of the fact that you have completed your use of the Subject covert site, copies of the report of the survey of the site are being retained in this office. Safehouse Branch and the Central Cover Branch are being advised of the confirmation of the security approval for the use of the site by copies of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham
Robert H. Cunningham

cc: Chief, Safehouse Branch
Central Cover Branch

Lipstick (20)

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA SECRET
(Specify Air or Sea Route)

DISPATCH NO. FM-4930

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-119523

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE AUG 57 13 21

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational/LIP/TICK
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GERMIDE

Reference: WH-4554, 21 May 1957.

1. Subject departed from Washington, D.C. on 13 July 1957 to visit his relatives in South Carolina prior to returning to Mexico. He completed five weeks training on 12 July - an evaluation of the Subject by his instructors will be forwarded in the near future.
2. Subject was advanced two weeks per diem at the rate of \$12 by Mexico Station. Since his lodgings were provided by Headquarters it was decided to pay him per diem at the rate of \$8. This Station's payment was extended to cover four weeks and subject was advanced \$42 on 3 July to cover the fifth week (7 July through 13 July).
3. The net amount of Subject's telephone bill was not known at time of Subject's departure. Headquarters has Subject's receipt in the amount of \$14.29 to cover the money order made out by him to the telephone company. Some of this amount will probably be returned to Subject whereupon he should be reimbursed for the net amount of the telephone bill.

J. C. King
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

25 July 1957

Distribution:

- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/ Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- 1 - Subject
- 1 - RI

WH/B&P *[Signature]*
(Coordinating officer)

WH/III/Mexico *[Signature]* LSulc:rms
(Authenticating officer)

Charles E. Apple
for
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

R. Dahlgren
R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

VIA: Air Pouch

DISPATCH NO. HM24-A-7427

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 12 July 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Remon ALVAREZ Durant

Reference: HM4-W-4554

ACTION REQUESTED: None

Attached for Headquarters retention are two copies of the subject's visa application obtained from the Visa Section of the United States Embassy in Mexico City on 6 May 1957.

Willard C. Curtis

Encl.

MSD/bet
11 July 1957

Distribution
3 - Hqs w/attach
2 - Files

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

201-117523

1.- Nombre como este en el Presente.

Ramon Alvarez, Durant

2.- Telefono en Mexico

15-65-02

3.- Fecha en que piensa salir para los E. U.

15 MAYO

4.- Como va a viajar? (tren, avion, coche, camion):

AVION

5.- Frontera por donde entrara o primer punto que tocara de los E. U.

MIAMI


6.- Direccion exacta y completa en donde se le pueda localizar en los E. U.

3135 Yale Ave. (Mr. Mrs R.F. Kell)

Columbia S.C

15-31

shall be required to depart from the United States at the expiration of my stay as authorized by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. I hereby agree that I permitted to proceed to or to enter the United States and assume all responsibility for losses or damages which may result in the event I am not permitted to enter the United States, or in the event my departure should be delayed I do not intend to apply for admission to the United States. My application are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.



James A. Young
(Signature of Alien)

Subscribed and sworn to, or affirmed, before me
APR 1954
at *San Francisco*
of the United States of America

Immigrant classification *E-2*
CFR 41.5 and Sect. 101 (a) (15), Immigration and Nationality Act.

File Numbers *11923*

22
5.00
62.50 in. in.

Application for Nonimmigrant Visa and Alien Registration

FAMILY NAME		GIVEN NAME		INITIAL	2 PLACE AND DATE OF BIRTH		3	
ALFONSO		MURIEL		ALFON	Dec. 7, 1933		V-2322298	
4 HOME ADDRESS					5 ACCOMPANIED BY			
Cuartel # 9, Mexico, D.F.					NO			
6 ADDRESS IN U.S.					7 NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON TO WHOM DESTINATION			
South Carolina					J. A. ...			
8 Name and address of nearest relative in home country					9 TRAVEL DOCUMENTS PRESENTED			
Mr. ... de Alvarez					FC 4/5/5 ... 4/5/5			
10 Hair	11 Eyes	12 Height	13 Weight	14 Nationality	15 Eyes	16 Sex	17 MARITAL STATUS	
br.	br.	5' 7"	140	Mexican	white	M	MAR <input type="checkbox"/> SGLT <input type="checkbox"/>	
				15 Complexion	17 Ethnic Classification	WID. <input type="checkbox"/> DIV <input type="checkbox"/>		
				15 ...	Mexican			
20 OCCUPATION				21 DISTINGUISHING MARKS		22 Have you ever been arrested in, or deported or excluded from any country?		
Belarran				none				
23 DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION TO U.S. (TO BE INSERTED BY IMMIGRATION OFFICER)					24 DATE AND INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY IN U.S.			
					Pleasure trip 2 months			
ITEMS BELOW HEAVY BLACK LINE TO BE FILLED IN BY IMMIGRATION OFFICER								
25 ARRIVED BY					26 DATE TO WHICH ADMITTED			
					27			
<p align="center">MEM</p> <p align="center">U. S. IMMIGRATION OFFICER</p> <p>Except as hereinafter stated, I have never been refused a visa, or deported, removed, or excluded from the United States. I understand that I</p>								

FORM FS-257; 9-1-52

S

SECRET

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Raymond H. GERENDE DIVISION WA/71
SUBJECT Audio Briefing
DATES TRAINED 3 July 1957 (1330 hours)

On 3 July 1957 an Audio Briefing was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. The major portion of the briefing was on the Revere T-700 tape recorder. When asked if he knew anything about recorders, GERENDE stated that he was quite familiar with the Revere T-700 as he had had some experience with this recorder when he was a disc jockey in a radio station. A step by step operation of the recorder was explained to him, the tape recorder head was explained also how the sound was recorded on the tape. The following were also explained to him: tape speeds, frequency response, footage indicator, dual tracks—how they can be used in the Revere T-700—, the mechanical section of the recorder and the amplifier.

The recorder was removed from the case by the Subject and the possible breakdown points were shown to him, the recorder and amplifier units were taken out of the case by him and the operation of the sections explained. The recorder was then put together by GERENDE.

GERENDE asked many questions relative to microphones and microphone installations. There were explained to him—carbon microphones, crystal microphones, dynamic and controlled reluctance.

He appeared to be intelligent and was interested in the subjects discussed.

EDWARD A. SIVIK
TSS/IRD/Instructor

Please return ~~two~~ copies of this form to TSS/ID for overt distribution.
Please return ~~two~~ copies of this form to TSS/ID for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
- 1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
- 1 - CTR/Registrar
- 1 - Office of Personnel
- 1 - TSS/ID File

COVERT DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Operations Officer
- 1 - TSS/ID
- 1 - Senior Staff

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Raymond H. GERENDE DIVISION WH
 SUBJECT Photography Briefing
 DATES TRAINED 3 July - 0930-1230

On 3 July 1957 a Photography briefing was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. Mr. GERENDE was briefed on film processing, printing, telephoto lens, fixed and mobile surveillance. He was shown the following equipment: Leica, Exakta, Mikrons, Vinox and Robot cameras, the hidden device for Robot Camera, Horse 100 ft. tank and Nikor Multiple tank. The briefing lasted three hours.

GEORGE O. KELLNER
 Tss/TMD Instructor

Please return ~~four~~ copies of this form to TSS/TD for overt distribution.
 Please return two copies of this form to TSS/TD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
- 1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
- 1 - OTR/Registrar
- 1 - Office of Personnel
- 1 - TSS/TD F.R.

COVERT DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Operations Officer
- 1 - TSS/TD
- 1 - Senior Staff

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

11 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GEREZE (ps) Training

1. At 1000 - 1030 hours, 7 June 1957, I met with Mr. Robert Melberg, Chief Instructor, C/C/Covert Training and Mr. George Orton in the office of Mr. Oscar Sells, C/Covert Training (x2778, x8175).

2. Subject's training was discussed. Mr. Sells will take us to Subject's apartment (safehouse) at 0930 on 10 June to be introduced to Subject. He will be known as Mr. Stoker. At 1000 Mr. Melberg (to be known as Bob Brice) and Mr. Orton (George) will arrive to take over training.

3. At 1100 hours, 7 June 1957, I talked by telephone to Mr. Mexell (safehouse procurement officer). He informed me that a check for four weeks rent had been sent to the apartment firm by Mr. Rufus King's office to cover the cost of the apartment (safehouse).

L. SULC
WS/III/Mexico/I

Distribution:
WS/III/Chrono
✓ Subject

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

4 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LIPSTICK
Raymond H. GRENDE

(Phone - OL 2-9514)

1. On 28 May 1957, Harry Mexell (Safehouse Procurement Officer, X8185), William Lidenheimer (S.C.) and the undersigned met to obtain a safehouse for Raymond H. GRENDE (ps). The safehouse obtained was the following:

Apartment D-22, Madison
Presidential Gardens Apartment Hotel
Mount Vernon Avenue and Russell Road
Alexandria, Virginia
Telephone: TEmple 6-4400

2. This apartment was tentatively approved orally by Mr. Lidenheimer from a security standpoint. Registration was made by me in the name of Rufus KING, attorney, Southern Building, Washington, D. C. National 8-3115. GRENDE will be ostensibly a legal client of Mr. King and will be registered in true name upon his arrival. His name was not given upon obtaining the apartment nor was mine. Only Mr. King's name was used.

3. My cover story, if necessary to use one, was to be that of law clerk, Larry HERMAN, in Mr. King's office. Mr. Mexell has cleared this cover with Mr. King's office. Mr. King's office, according to Mr. Mexell, will pay for the apartment by check.

4. The apartment was rented at the rate of \$155 a month from 8 June 1957 onward (to be through 13 July 1957).

5. Mr. Frazee of S.C. (SE/2, X547 and X3071) informed me telephonically on 31 May that the safehouse site had been approved.


Lawrence B. Sulc



SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH-3
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc
FROM : Instructor, Foreign Trainees

DATE: 23 May 1957

SUBJECT: Special Project LIPSTICK

A. The following outlines the Special Project Training Plan for Special Project LIPSTICK:

1. Originator: WH-3 Mexico
2. Approvals: C/WH; C/WH-3, FI/TRO; CI Staff
3. Case Officers: Mr. Larry Sulc, ext. 2555
4. Chief Instructor, CI: Mr. Robert Melberg, ext. 2778
5. Purpose: To provide instruction and training which will assist trainee in carrying out field objectives of obtaining CE and operational information thru surveillance and other means, working against designated targets.
6. Clearances: Project was approved 2 November 1956. OA amended approval, dated 19 March 1956. Trainee is a contract agent.
7. Number of Trainees: One
8. Nationality: Mexican (formerly U.S. citizen)
9. Biographical Data: Trainee was born 7 Dec. 1933, New York City. He received his education at the American High School, Mexico, D.F., Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June, 1955. He speaks English and Spanish. He has received no formalized intelligence training, but some on the job training has been given.
10. Cover: Tourist

SECRET

11. Time Table: Instruction will commence 10 June and be completed on or about 13 July 1957.
12. Training Area: Training will take place in the Washington area in a safehouse secured by the Division.
13. Language of Instruction: English
14. Course of Instruction: See Appendix I
15. Finances: Financial expenses will be handled by the Division.

B. Copies of this memorandum are being distributed as follows:

Original and 1 - Chief, WH-3
Attn: Mr. Larry Sulc
1 - CI Staff
1 - AC/OS/TR; C/OS/TR
1 - Covert Files

Oscar H. Sells
OSCAR H. SELLS

SECRET

APPENDIX IPROJECT LIPSTICKSCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION

- 10 June Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology.
- 11-21 June Tradecraft
- (1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity
Clandestine Activity of the Individual and the Group
Clandestine Activity of the Sovereign State
Relationship of Overt to Clandestine Activity
Elements of Clandestine Activity
 - (2) The Nature of Clandestine Action (By Political Entities)
 - (3) Principles of Organization for Clandestine Activity
Concepts of Compartmentation
 - (4) Concepts of Cover and Concealment
Requirements of Cover
The Cover Problem as Applied to Individuals, Groups
 - (5) Basic Obstacles to Clandestine Activity
Active Opposition
Administrative and National Boundaries as a means of
Compartmentation
 - (6) Clandestine Communications
Introduction and Concepts of Clandestine Communications
Criteria for Clandestine Communications
Methods of Clandestine Communications
Principles in the Use of Codes, Secret Writing,
Microphotography and Ciphers
Cutout Devices: Accommodation Address, Drops, The Courier,
The Intermediary or Cutout
The Personal Meeting
Signals
The Safehouse
 - (7) Agent Personnel
Introduction
Agents and Their Functions

SECRET

-2-

- (8) Spotting
Check and Investigations
Selection of Agents
Recruiting Methods
Training, Briefing, and Debriefing
Handling of Agents
Termination of Agents

Special emphasis will be devoted to agent spotting, acquisition and management.

- 24-28 June Observation, description, casing, reporting. The latter will include operational reporting, surveillance reporting, CE type reports and principles of positive intelligence reporting.
- 1-2 July Missions, functions, & principles of CE & CI.
- 3 July TSS briefings, audio & photo
- 5-9 July Continuation of CE & CI.
- 10-11 July Principles, procedures, techniques of elicitation, interviewing.
- 12 July Seminar on covert investigative techniques.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE 495 ES/DM/BO
29 MAY 1957

495

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 1-2

INFO : COP 3, C/FI/OPS 4-5, DD/S 6, SSA 7, D/OP 8, S/C 9-10

ROUTING	
1	4
2	8
3	4
MAY 30 12 34.53	
REC'D CABLE SECY	
ROUTINE	
IN 49174	

TO : DIR
RYBAT ADMIN
REF HMMW 4554

INFO

CITE MEXI 463

SUBJECT REF DEPARTS MEXI 9 JUNE 1100 HOURS PAA FLIGHT
502. DEPART HOUSTON EAL FLIGHT 502 ARRIVE WASH 2140 HOURS
9 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

For James H. [unclear] (m)

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

Copy No.

SECRET

Chief, WH-3
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc
Instructor, Foreign Trainees

25 May 1957

Special Project LIAISON

A. The following outlines the Special Project Training Plan for Special Project JINSTRICK:

1. Originator: WH-3 Mexico
2. Approvals: C/WH; C/WH-3, VI/TRO; CI Staff
3. Case Officer: Mr. Larry Sulc, ext. 2555
4. Chief Instructor, CI: Mr. Robert Melberg, ext. 2775
5. Purpose: To provide instruction and training which will assist trainee in carrying out field objectives of obtaining CI and operational information thru surveillance and other means, working against designated targets.
6. Clearances: Project was approved 2 November 1956. OA asended approval, dated 19 March 1956. Trainee is a contract agent.
7. Number of Trainees: One
8. Nationality: Mexican (formerly U.S. citizen)
9. Biographical Data: Trainee was born 7 Dec. 1933, New York City. He received his education at the American High School, Mexico, D.F., Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June, 1955. He speaks English and Spanish. He has received no formalized intelligence training, but some on the job training has been given.
10. Cover: Tourist

SECRET

File:
GERE NOE
(Liaison 20)

-2-

11. Time Table: Instruction will commence 10 June and be completed on or about 13 July 1957.
12. Training Area: Training will take place in the Washington area in a safehouse secured by the Division.
13. Language of Instructions: English
14. Course of Instructions: See Appendix I
15. Finances: Financial expenses will be handled by the Division.

B. Copies of this memorandum are being distributed as follows:

Original and 1 - Chief, WH-3

Attn: Mr. Larry Sulc

1 - CI Staff

1 - AC/OS/TR; C/OS/TR

1 - Covert Files

OSCAR H. SELLS

SECRET

APPENDIX 1PROJECT LIPSTICKSCHEDULE OF INSPECTION

- 10 June Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology.
- 11-21 June Tradecraft
- (1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity
 - Clandestine Activity of the Individual and the Group
 - Clandestine Activity of the Sovereign State
 - Relationship of Overt to Clandestine Activity
 - Elements of Clandestine Activity
 - (2) The Nature of Clandestine Action (By Political Entities)
 - (3) Principles of Organization for Clandestine Activity
 - Concepts of Compartmentation
 - (4) Concepts of Cover and Concealment
 - Requirements of Cover
 - The Cover Problem as Applied to Individuals, Groups
 - (5) Basic Obstacles to Clandestine Activity
 - Active Opposition
 - Administrative and National Boundaries as a means of Compartmentation
 - (6) Clandestine Communications
 - Introduction and Concepts of Clandestine Communications
 - Criteria for Clandestine Communications
 - Methods of Clandestine Communications
 - Principles in the Use of Codes, Secret Writing, Microphotography and Ciphers
 - Cutout Devices: Accommodation Address, Drops, The Courier, The Intermediary or Cutout
 - The Personal Meeting
 - Signals
 - The Safehouse
 - (7) Agent Personnel
 - Introduction
 - Agents and Their Functions

SECRET

- (8) Spotting
 - Check and Investigations
 - Selection of Agents
 - Recruiting Methods
 - Training, Briefing, and Debriefing
 - Handling of Agents
 - Termination of Agents

Special emphasis will be devoted to agent spotting, acquisition and management.

- 24-28 June Observation, description, casing, reporting. The latter will include operational reporting, surveillance reporting, CE type reports and principles of positive intelligence reporting.
- 1-2 July Missions, functions, & principles of CE & CI.
- 3 July TSS briefings, audio & photo
- 5-9 July Continuation of CE & CI.
- 10-11 July Principles, procedures, techniques of elicitation, interviewing.
- 12 July Seminar on covert investigative techniques.

SECRET

Basic Transcript 2 weeks.

Observation, Description, Casings 3 days
Reporting - 1 week

Investigation 7 CT + CC 1 week

Execution, Subjunctive } 2 days
Investigation Techniques }
Photo & Audio Brief 1 day.

Mr. Lillo

201 T-30

CTR

Henry Mirell

X 8185

2054

Quincy

Jefferson Pimentel Jr

leg. 245-1006

leg. 45-1025

GERONIC works for LIPSTICK-19 as purch. agent.

LIPSTICK/LIMITED - (Photo) GERONIC ← LIPSTICK-19

" / LYRIC - (Photo) "

" / LIXION - (Photo) " ← LIMITATION-5, -6

LINSTOCK (Lies maintenance of tech) LINSTOCK

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
By Air or Sea Pouch

KAPOK

DISPATCH NO. BM V 4554

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

201-119523

21 MAY 1957 KAPOK #500

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE _____

FROM : Chief, WHD

PRIORITY

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational Matters/LIPSTICK
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GLENDE/Training

Reference: BM-M-4410, 26 April 1957 (201-119523)

ACTION REQUESTED: See Paragraph 5.

1. Subject is scheduled for covert training to begin Monday, 10 June 1957, and to last five weeks. Subject should arrive in Washington, if possible, on 8 or 9 June.
2. It is planned that Subject stay in a furnished apartment where he will also be trained on weekdays. For food, laundry and incidentals he will be given per diem of \$4. Entertainment of Subject will be conservative.
3. It is suggested that Mexico City Station provide Subject with a round-trip ticket by air. From a cover standpoint it might be wise to have Subject visit his mother's relatives in South Carolina on the way to Washington. If feasible he should create the impression that he is visiting New York City or both New York and Washington on this trip.
4. Subject's cover while in the U. S. will be that of tourist.
5. Please cable Subject's time of arrival and flight number. He will be met at the airport by the desk operations officer, "Larry." In the event the meeting is not made he should call the telephone number forwarded under separate cover and ask for "Larry." In the event he is still unable to make contact he should go to the National Hotel,

(Releasing officer)

KAPOK (Officer)

(Authenticating officer)

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

KAPOK
SECRET

REF-V-6556
E-POL # 500
Page Two

1803 Eye Street, N. W., take a room and wait for a call. If unable to get a room he should leave a forwarding address for further contact.

John T. Dwyer
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachments:

- 1 - As described above, u/s/c

17 May 1957

Distribution:

- 3 - Mexico City, w/att. u/s/c
- 1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
- ✓ 1 - Subject, w/o/att.

WH/III/Mexico/LSule:mjm

John T. Dwyer
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/AF/III

KAPOK
SECRET

SECRET

17 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/WH/Support

Attn: JH/B & F

SUBJECT: Contract Agent Covert Training
Raymond H. GORDON (ps)

1. Subject, Project LIPSTICK contract agent, will arrive in Washington on approximately 2-4 June 1957 for five weeks of covert training. Covert training has been arranged and a safe house obtained.

2. The matter of entertainment of Subject was discussed with Mr. Mattles, C/WH/Support, who said that entertainment of contract agents is authorized under certain conditions and that it would be permissible to entertain Subject conservatively while in Washington. He spoke to Mr. Price of the General Counsel's Office who supported this view.

3. To favorably impress Subject and to maintain his morale while in Washington, it is contemplated that the desk operations office will entertain him with dinner and drinks approximately twice a week during the first and final weeks and once a week during the intervening weeks.

J. GALBRAITH
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee

1 - WH/III/Chrono

1 - Subject - *Lipstick 20*

WH/III/Mexico/LSalesers

SECRET

SECRET

15 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics
THROUGH : Chief, Central Cover Branch, DS/P
REQUESTING OFFICE : WH/III/Mexico
CASE OFFICER : Lawrence B. Sulo - Extension 2555
PROJECT : LIPSTICE Allotment: 7-3570-83-130

Reference: R 45-1025, 25 June 1956.

Type of safehouse requested: Furnished apartment (efficiency apartment or larger). The apartment should be large enough to show motion pictures to trainees.

Location and Environment: Washington, D. C. Middle class or above type of environment.

Maximum Price Range: \$10 per day.

Occupancy from: 8 June 1957 To: 14 July 1957

Intended Use: Safehouse will be occupied by one (1) agent for residence and training. The agent is a Mexican (completely bilingual in Spanish and English, was born in the U. S.), aged 23, a college graduate and purchasing agent for a Mexico City firm. He will occupy the safehouse most of the time, both day and night, for five weeks. Three or four other persons (from CTR and possibly the case officer) will spend time in the safehouse during the day. Sensitive material will be in the house during the day.

Cover Arrangement: Subject will be in the U. S. as a tourist from Mexico. He has American relatives in North Carolina. WH Division's memorandum requesting training for Subject, and which included this cover plan, was approved by the FI and CI Staffs on 14 May 1957.

Funds are available:

BUDGET OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET**-2-****WH/III/Mexico/LBSalc mja****Distribution:**

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CCB/DD/P
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓2 - Subject

SECRET

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO.

EMM-A-6873
(201-119523)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
SPECIFIC— Raymond E. Gerende

DATE: 15 May 1957

Reference: EMM-W-4410

ACTION REQUESTED: Contact with Gerende

1. The Subject has made reservations at the Hotel Emery, 1812 G Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C., Telephone Republic 7-1812, for 9 June 1957. He will wait at this hotel for a telephone call from Malcolm Q. EDWARDS sometime before 1200 hours on 10 May 1957. The Subject will meet EDWARDS in the lobby of the Statler Hotel at the time stated in the conversation. Should this contact fail the Subject will remain at his hotel from 1300 hours until 1800 hours on 10 May 1957 and the same times on successive days until contact is made.

2. Station Mexico appreciates the efforts of the Headquarters desk in arranging this training.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

MSD/bct
15 May 1957
Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

201-119523

KAPOK
SECRET

AIR

HM4-W-4554

201-119523

KAPOK #500

: Chief of Station, Mexico City

: Chief, WHD

PRIORITY

- Operational Matters/LIPSTICK
- Raymond H. GERENDE/Training

Reference: HM4-W-4410, 26 April 1957 (201-119523)

ACTION REQUESTED: See paragraph 5.

1. Subject is scheduled for covert training to begin Monday, 10 June 1957, and to last five weeks. Subject should arrive in Washington, if possible, on 8 or 9 June.
2. It is planned that Subject stay in a furnished apartment where he will also be trained on weekdays. For food, laundry and incidentals he will be given per diem of \$6. Entertainment of Subject will be conservative.
3. It is suggested that Mexico City Station provide Subject with a round-trip ticket by air. From a cover standpoint it might be wise to have Subject visit his mother's relatives in South Carolina on the way to Washington. If feasible he should create the impression that he is visiting New York City or both New York and Washington on this trip.
4. Subject's cover while in the U. S. will be that of tourist.
5. Please cable Subject's time of arrival and flight number. He will be met at the airport by the desk operations officer, "Larry." In the event the meeting is not made he should call the telephone number forwarded under separate cover and ask for "Larry." In the event he is still unable to make contact he should go to the National Hotel,

KAPOK
SECRET

KAPOK

SECRET

HBM-W-4554

KAPOK #500

Page Two

1808 Eye Street, N. W., take a room and wait for a call. If unable to get a room he should leave a forwarding address for further contact.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachments:

- 1 - As described above, u/s/c

17 May 1957

Distributions:

- 3 - Mexico City, w/att. u/s/c
- 1 - WH/III, KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
- 1 - Subject, w/o/att.

WH/III/Mexico/LSulomajm

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

KAPOK

SECRET

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Special Air or Sea Route)

DISPATCH NO. 504-11-110

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-119523

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 26 APR 57 14 44 Z

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT

GENERAL	- Operational Matters
SPECIFIC	- Raymond E. Gerardo

Reference: BR-1-5661, 19 December 1956 (50-6-4-1316)

1. Plans are underway to bring subject to Headquarters for training as requested in reference. Gerardo is tentatively scheduled to begin his training on 10 June 1957.
2. It is anticipated that subject will be trained in Basic Tradeecraft, CI/CE matters, Photography and some audio surveillance. He should be able to complete his studies in about five weeks time.
3. It is believed that tourist cover for subject's visit to this country will be satisfactory, inasmuch as he has relatives living in South Carolina.
4. As further and more definite arrangements are made regarding the matters discussed in this dispatch, you will be so advised. Headquarters regrets the delay in answering reference dispatch.

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

19 April 1957

Distribution:

- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- ✓ 1 - RI

1 - Subject
WH/III/Mexico/MFC Condor: alu

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

SECRET

22 April 1957

Gerande
(Lip - 20)

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/TR

ATTENTION : Assistant Chief For Covert Training, CS/TR

FROM : WH/3/Mexico

SUBJECT : Request For Covert Training

Project: LIPSTICK

Pseudo : Raymond H. Gerande

1. Initiated by: WH, Branch 3, Mexico - FI
2. Date of Project Approval: 2 November 1956
Type and Date of Clearance: Amended Operational Approval C-32743 effective 19 March 1956. Supersedes OA granted 28 February 1955.
3. Agent's Status: Contract Agent
4. Agent Nationality: Born in U.S., but renounced citizenship to become Mexican citizen on 31 July 1952.
5. Operations Officer: Lawrence B. Sule Known to student as: Larry Room 2114, Barton Hall, x-2555
Alternate Operations Officer: John B. Brady Known to student as: Jack Room 2111, Barton Hall, x-3162
6. Training dates: Beginning about 10 June 1957 for approximately 5 weeks.
7. Complete biographic background of trainee:
See memorandum attached.
8. Previous intelligence training: Trained in surveillance and related techniques by his field case officer. No formalized training.
9. Project Objective: Physical surveillance in Mexico City area to obtain CE and operational information on Soviet/Satellite and Communist Party personnel, plans and activities. This project supports a technical surveillance project in Mexico. Some of the basehouses under Project LIPSTICK support the physical surveillance aspect of Station operations whereas some of the basehouses support technical surveillances.

SECRET

SECRET

10. Description of agents duties in the field: Under the direct supervision and guidance of the Case Officer, full operational and administrative responsibility and control of the following:

- a. LIPSTICK Team
- b. LIPSTICK Car #4
- c. LIPSTICK/LIMITED basehouse
- d. LIPSTICK/ALYONIC basehouse
- e. LIPSTICK/ALAN basehouse
- f. LIPSTICK
- g. LIPSTICK office #2
- h. Pretext investigations
- i. Spot assignments

addition + task

In summary it can be said that the subject's principal duties are administration and operational direction of the LIPSTICK team, processing 35 to 40 rolls of 35 mm film each week, contacting agents and acting as cut-out for the Case Officer, conducting individual investigations, handling cash advances, accountings, and property.

Description of agent's cover in the field: Gerende is perfectly covered working for LIPSTICK 19 as purchasing agent. He spends approximately three to four hours per day working on his cover duties. This cover is believed by all his friends, is durable and allows sufficient freedom for operational activity.

- 11. Proposed cover to be used during training: It is anticipated that subject will come to the U.S. as a tourist. Inasmuch as Gerende's mother has six sisters and three brothers living in either Columbia or Sumter, South Carolina, (as of June 1955) tourist cover for him would appear to be appropriate.
- 12. Student availability for training: full time.
- 13. Specific problems to be considered in handling trainees: None envisioned at this time. Subject speaks English.
- 14. Specific training subjects to be covered: Basic Tradeecraft, CI/CF course, Photography, and some audio surveillance techniques.
- 15. Technical training requirements: Photography and audio surveillance techniques.

16. Has student in the past, or does he at present, visit overt installations of the organization? None in the Washington area. Presumably he has never been in the Station in Mexico City.

17. Special attributes to be evaluated:

J. C. KING
Chief, WND

APPROVALS:

Senior Staff Training Officer

CI Staff

Attachment: Biographic Data

WH/III/Mexico/Mendoncelw

Distribution:

Orig & 1 Addressee - w/attach
1 WH/III/Chreno - w/attach
1 Subject- w/attach

SECRET

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO TRAINING MEMO

Name : Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ Du Rant
Born : 7 December 1933 in New York City
Citizenship : Mexican
Father : Fernando ALVAREZ (deceased), Mexican citizen
Mother : Janie Du Rant, wd. de ALVAREZ, U.S. citizen,
born 13 December 1906 at Sumter, So. Carolina
Sisters : Marcia and Adria
Official
Identity Papers : Mexican passport #41776 issued in Mexico City 19
December 1953; renewed 16 November 1954 #7774,
good until 16 November 1956, Mexican draft card
#1963865.
Religion : Protestant - non-denominational
Education : American High School, Mexico, D.F., diploma July 1952
Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies,
June 1955
Languages : English and Spanish
Military
Service : January-December 1953—Mexico City—XV'a Division de
Infanteria, 15/o Compania de Transmisiones Corporal
Physical
Description : Age 23
Height 5' 9 1/2"
Eyes hazel
Face shape oval
Complexion fair
Posture erect
Weight 145 lbs.
Teeth normal, straight
Hair dark brown
Scars 1/2" horizontal on tip of chin
Build medium

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR COVERT TSS TRAINING

- IMPORTANT:
- a) Approval of Staff Training Officer must be indicated on this form.
 - b) Approval of CI Staff must be indicated on this form.
 - c) If student is a member of a foreign intelligence or security service, the name of the service must be indicated in the space provided.
 - d) If student is a contract agent, he must have full operational clearance, must have signed his contract, and project must be an approved project.
 - e) TSS will provide training site facilities provided that the sites are available on the dates training is requested.
 - f) Should it be necessary for the student to enter agency buildings (other than safehouses), the requestor will undertake to procure CI staff approval, also building passes or badges when necessary.

1. Name of student: Raymond H. Gerende ☐ True ☒ Pseudo ☐ Crypto
2. Training alias to be employed: "Ray"
3. Name of Operations Officer: Lawrence B. Sulc Division: WH
 Senior Staff: _____ Room No. and Bldg.: 2114 B.H. Extension: 2555
4. Name of Approved Project: LIPSTICK Date and Type of Clearance: DA, 19 March 1956
5. Operations Officer known to student as: (Name) "Larry"
6. Nationality of student: Mexican
7. Status of student:
 - a. Staff agent: ☐ b. Contract agent: ☒
 - c. Foreign Intell. or Security Service Official (specify name of service): Not applicable
8. Language in which training will be conducted: English
 (Note: Requestor agrees to provide interpreter should such be required.)
9. Country or area in which student will operate: Mexico
10. Will agent train others? Yes ☐ No ☒
11. Dates during which student will be available for training: From 10 June 1957 To 12 July 1957
12. Will training take place in:
 - a. TSS training site: ☐ b. Site provided by Area Division: ☒ (OTR will provide safehouse)

DISTRIBUTION:

- Orig. & 1 - For one subject
 - 1 - For each additional subject
 - 1 - CI Staff
- } TSS/TD

Page One

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST									
TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION					DATE 25 July 1956				
FROM WH/III/Mexico					ROOM NO. 1026 Barton Hall			TELEPHONE 2555	
<p>INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.</p> <p>SECTION I: List 201 number, name, and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.</p> <p>SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym if assigned. If true name is sensitive, fill in the 201 number and Section II only. If true name is non-sensitive, both Sections I and II must be completed.</p> <p>SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.</p>									
SECTION I									
201 NO. 119523		1. NAME (Last) ALVAREZ DuRant,		(First) Ramon		(Middle) Joseph		(Title)	
NAME VARIANT									
2. TYPE NAME (Last)		(First)		(Middle)		(Title)			
3. PHOTO YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>		4. BIRTH DATE 071233		5. COUNTRY OF BIRTH USA		6. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH New York City		7. OTHER IDENTIFICATION	
OCCUPATION/POSITION								8. OCC/POS. CODE	
SECTION II									
CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM Raymond H. GERENDE								SENSITIVE <input type="checkbox"/> NON-SENSITIVE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
SECTION III									
9. COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE MEX		10. ACTION DESK WH/3M		11. 2ND CITY INTEREST		12. 3RD CITY INTEREST		12A.	
COMMENTS:									
<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">Permanently charged to WH/III/Mexico</p>									
OPEN FILE YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		RESTRICTED FILE YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		SIGNATURE Kenneth S. Sefton					

FORM NO. 831 TEST
1 NOV 55

SECRET

(30)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
 (When Filled In)

card

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST									
TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION					DATE		ACTION		
FROM <i>RILAN</i>					ROOM NO. <i>1504K</i>		TELEPHONE <i>2919</i>		
<p>INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.</p> <p>SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.</p> <p>SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.</p> <p>SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.</p>									
SECTION I									
SENSITIVE		201 NO. <i>119523</i>		1. SOURCE DOCUMENT					
NON-SENSITIVE									
NAME (Last)		(Middle)		(First)		(Title)			
NAME VARIANT									
TYPE NAME 2.		(Last)		(Middle)		(First)		(Title)	
PHOTO 4.		BIRTH DATE 5.		COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.		CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.		OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.	
YES NO		D M Y						1. 2. 3.	
OCCUPATION/POSITION								OCC/POS. CODE 9.	
SECTION II									
CRYPTONYM					PSEUDONYM <i>GERENDE, RAYMOND H.</i>				
SECTION III									
COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. <i>MEX</i>			ACTION DESK 11. <i>WH/2A</i>		2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.		3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.		
COMMENTS:									
PUNCHED									
PERMANENT CHARGE					RESTRICTED FILE			SIGNATURE	
YES NO					YES NO				
201- <i>119523</i>									

FORM NO. 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
 1 JUL 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20)

SECRET

12 DEC 1975

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 1975	
FBI - NEW YORK	

SE/CE/I

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
National Security Agency

ATTENTION : Mr. Benson Buffham

SUBJECT : William Hamilton Martin and Lorne Ferguson
Mitchell ²⁰¹⁻²⁸²³³⁸
₂₀₁₋₂₈₂₃₃₇

1. Attached is a copy of a report recently received through Canadian liaison channels concerning a conversation between Canadian professor Dr. Hans Kunov and Martin in Moscow. The attachment outlines the conversation Kunov had with Martin and indicates that both Martin and Mitchell are attempting to leave the USSR.

2. Also attached is a report on Yuriy Igoryevich Torgov, ²⁰¹⁻⁰⁸⁶²⁰⁹
Kunov's host at the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center.

3. The Canadians have advised us that the FBI has received the information contained in the attachments.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

George T. Kalaris
George T. Kalaris

Attachments:
As stated

CIOL-00164-75

DDO/CI/RQA/E:W.kerbe:dmj (12/12/75)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att
1 - C/CI w/att
2 - CI/RQA/E 1 w/att
2 - C/DIVD w/att

COORDINATION:

Paul L. Rinaldo
C/DIVD/TCB in draft

1 - DIVD/TCB

12 Dec 1975
201-282338

B-201-0862574
B-201-0282337

SECRET

2 - [unclear] 6/98

SECRET

Dr. H. KUNOV professor, University of Toronto, visited Moscow from September 1-14, 1975 to undertake research at the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the USSR/Canada General Exchange Agreement. The research was carried out at the Academy of Sciences Computer Centre, 40 Vavcova Street. KUNOV's host was Yuriy I. TORGOV, 2nd in charge of the Computer Centre and on whom a separate personality sketch is attached.

On September 3 while having a coffee break in the Computer Centre KUNOV was approached by a man who identified himself as William MARTIN, an American who defected to the USSR in 1960. MARTIN openly spoke about his past and stated that he now lives in Moscow and that he is a consultant to TURGOV's group at the Computer Centre. He said much of his work is done at home but he does drop into the Centre weekly.

It was at this time that MARTIN told KUNOV that he would like to get out of the USSR even if he has to run certain risks. He also said that (Bernon) MITCHELL feels the same and has voiced his desire to the Soviet authorities.

MARTIN asked KUNOV if he might enquire with the Canadian authorities on his behalf to see what his status would be in this country or if there was any chance of his being allowed in here as a political refugee. KUNOV agreed to contact the Canadian Embassy in Moscow to see what the official view would be and notify MARTIN at a later date. MARTIN seemed most pleased at this and left KUNOV his home telephone number, cautioning him not to say anything over phone that would tip off the Soviet authorities as to his intentions. This first meeting lasted a little over one half hour and took place in the coffee lounge area of the Centre. There were other Soviets present in the lounge, however, TORGOV was not among them. KUNOV does not believe the others were aware of their conversation.

On the 5 September 75 KUNOV called at the Canadian Embassy, Moscow and spoke to a doorman asking him who he might speak to regarding some Americans living in the USSR who would like to immigrate to Canada. The doorman referred KUNOV to the office of a Mrs. Louise O'CONNOR. KUNOV then spoke to a U/M who stated that he was the under secretary to Mrs. O'CONNOR. KUNOV enquired about the Americans living in the USSR and asked could they be allowed to immigrate to Canada. The Embassy official would not commit himself and stated that KUNOV should enquire officially with the nearest office of Manpower and Immigration when he returned to Canada. KUNOV did not give this official MARTIN or MITCHELL's names. KUNOV telephoned MARTIN after the Embassy visit and stated that the reply from the Embassy was negative. MARTIN seemed upset that KUNOV should phone him, then he later stated that it would probably be all right.

MARTIN met KUNOV on at least two occasions after the 5 September, all at the Centre, usually in the coffee lounge and in the general presence of others. They spoke English at all times. MARTIN thanked KUNOV for his trouble in enquiring at the Embassy and cautioned KUNOV not to get personally involved with him in this venture as it would be bad news. KUNOV promised MARTIN that he would check with Canadian Manpower and Immigration authorities on the matter when he returned to Canada.

SECRET

... /2

SECRET

The following observations were made by KUNOV regarding MARTIN:

(a) Physical Description

- 5'7" or 3" tall, fair hair, crewcut, balding at the temples, not belied.
- may suffer from a nervous condition, and bears the mark of a man who has experienced rough times.
- always dressed with a shirt, tie and jacket.
- spoke perfect English with a slight Russian accent on certain words.

(b) MARTIN provided KUNOV with the following home address and telephone number, cautioning him that his telephone was bugged.

- telephone number - 433-03-81
- 117421 Obrucheva Street
- Building 4-1
- Apt. 126
- Moscow, USSR

(c) MARTIN stated that his friend MITCHELL lives in Leningrad and is married to the Dean of the Music Conservatory in Leningrad. MITCHELL is very unhappy and he has openly asked Soviet authorities for permission to leave Russia and return to the USA. Apparently he has never been able to adjust to the Soviet way of life and is now very desperate. MITCHELL is willing to divorce his wife and take any risk to get out of the USSR. To date however he has been met with a wall of silence by the Soviets.

(d) MARTIN is unmarried. He claims to have a comfortable apartment and feels that he has adjusted to the Soviet life and is accepted in the USSR. He does not want to return to the USA but would like to get out of the USSR. He said he would have quite a story to tell about his life in Russia as well as his past and that he would have no compunctions about telling all about the Russians. MARTIN at one point stated that he would not consider attempting to escape from the USSR.

(e) MARTIN claims that he is constantly harrassed by Soviet officials. His apartment has been broken into on several occasions and he refused to use the Soviet mail system. He has also refused to show up for work in the past as a form of protest. MARTIN also indicated that he has had several contacts with Americans in Moscow and that they have not shown any animosity towards him. He actually dated an American woman for some time but did not mention her name.

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KUNOV said his motives for trying to assist MARTIN and MITCHELL are based on humanitarian grounds, only, as he feels they are suffering under the Soviet system. He does not intend to take any further action to assist them in leaving the Soviet Union. KUNOV hopes to return to the Soviet Union next year for a more extended period of study.

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201-282.338

The RCMP Liaison Office
2450 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

US/75/539

75WLO-118-38

2 December 1975

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Mr. George Kalaris
C.I.A.

Dear

Re: William Hamilton MARTIN, and
Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL

Further to your letter of 6 October 1975, we have identified and spoken to the Canadian professor, Dr. Hans KUNOV, referred to in your letter as Harry KERNOV. The attachment outlines the contact between KUNOV and MARTIN and MITCHELL. KUNOV has proven co-operative as a source on previous occasions and we believe he will continue to assist us within limits.

Also attached is a report on Yuriy Igoryevich TORGOV, KUNOV's host at the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center. In addition to any comments you may wish to make concerning MARTIN's approaches to KUNOV, we would welcome an assessment of TORGOV, if available.

The F.B.I. has received the information contained in the attachments.

Yours truly,

E.R.J. Miller,
Assistant Liaison Officer.

att. (2)

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020111

Re: W.H. MARTIN and B.P. MITCHELL

Dr. Hans KUNOV professor, University of Toronto, visited Moscow from September 1-14, 1975 to undertake research at the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the USSR/Canada General Exchange Agreement. The research was carried out at the Academy of Sciences Computer Centre, 40 Vavcoha Street. KUNOV's host was Yuriy I. TORGOV, 2nd in charge of the Computer Centre and on whom a separate personality sketch is attached.

On September 3 while having a coffee break in the Computer Centre KUNOV was approached by a man who identified himself as William MARTIN, an American who defected to the USSR in 1960. MARTIN openly spoke about his past and stated that he now lives in Moscow and that he is a consultant to TURGOV's group at the Computer Centre. He said much of his work is done at home but he does drop into the Centre weekly.

It was at this time that MARTIN told KUNOV that he would like to get out of the USSR even if he has to run certain risks. He also said that (Bernon) MITCHELL feels the same and has voiced his desire to the Soviet authorities.

MARTIN asked KUNOV if he might enquire with the Canadian authorities on his behalf to see what his status would be in this country or if there was any chance of his being allowed in here as a political refugee. KUNOV agreed to contact the Canadian Embassy in Moscow to see what the official view would be and notify MARTIN at a later date. MARTIN seemed most pleased at this and left KUNOV his home telephone number, cautioning him not to say anything over phone that would tip off the Soviet authorities as to his intentions. This first meeting lasted a little over one half hour and took place in the coffee lounge area of the Centre. There were other Soviets present in the lounge, however, TORGOV was not among them. KUNOV does not believe the others were aware of their conversation.

On the 5 September 75 KUNOV called at the Canadian Embassy, Moscow and spoke to a doorman asking him who he might speak to regarding some Americans living in the USSR who would like to immigrate to Canada. The doorman referred KUNOV to the office of a Mrs. Louise O'CONNOR. KUNOV then spoke to a U/M who stated that he was the under secretary to Mrs. O'CONNOR. KUNOV enquired about the Americans living in the USSR and asked could they be allowed to immigrate to Canada. The Embassy official would not commit himself and stated that KUNOV should enquire officially with the nearest office of Manpower and Immigration when he returned to Canada. KUNOV did not give this official MARTIN or MITCHELL's names. KUNOV telephoned MARTIN after the Embassy visit and stated that the reply from the Embassy was negative. MARTIN seemed upset that KUNOV should phone him, then he later stated that it would probably be all right.

MARTIN met KUNOV on at least two occasions after the 5 September, all at the Centre, usually in the coffee lounge and in the general presence of others. They spoke English at all times. MARTIN thanked KUNOV for his trouble in enquiring at the Embassy and cautioned KUNOV not to get personally involved with him in this venture as it would be bad news. KUNOV promised MARTIN that he would check with Canadian Manpower and Immigration authorities on the matter when he returned to Canada.

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- 2 -

The following observations were made by KUNOV regarding MARTIN:

(a) Physical Description

- 5'7" or 3" tall, fair hair, crewcut, balding at the temples, not bellied.
- may suffer from a nervous condition, and bears the mark of a man who has experienced rough times.
 - always dressed with a shirt, tie and jacket.
 - spoke perfect English with a slight Russian accent on certain words.

(b) MARTIN provided KUNOV with the following home address and telephone number, cautioning him that his telephone was bugged.

- telephone number - 433-03-81
- 117421 Obrucheva Street
- Building 4-1
- Apt. 126
- Moscow, USSR

(c) MARTIN stated that his friend MITCHELL lives in Leningrad and is married to the Dean of the Music Conservatory in Leningrad. MITCHELL is very unhappy and he has openly asked Soviet authorities for permission to leave Russia and return to the USA. Apparently he has never been able to adjust to the Soviet way of life and is now very desperate. MITCHELL is willing to divorce his wife and take any risk to get out of the USSR. To date however he has been met with a wall of silence by the Soviets.

(d) MARTIN is unmarried. He claims to have a comfortable apartment and feels that he has adjusted to the Soviet life and is accepted in the USSR. He does not want to return to the USA but would like to get out of the USSR. He said he would have quite a story to tell about his life in Russia as well as his past and that he would have no compunctions about telling all about the Russians. MARTIN at one point stated that he would not consider attempting to escape from the USSR.

(e) MARTIN claims that he is constantly harrassed by Soviet officials. His apartment has been broken into on several occasions and he refused to use the Soviet mail system. He has also refused to show up for work in the past as a form of protest. MARTIN also indicated that he has had several contacts with Americans in Moscow and that they have not shown any animosity towards him. He actually dated an American woman for some time but did not mention her name.

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(d)

MARTIN is unmarried. He claims to have an apartment and leads a life of normal life and is expected to return to the U.S. in about 1955. He said he would like to live in the U.S. but he has no connections there. He said he is the only person in the group attempting to leave the U.S.

(e)

MARTIN claims that he is constantly being followed by the KGB. He said he is not sure if this is true or not. He said he is not sure if this is true or not.

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Re: Yuriy Igoryevich TORGOV

TORGOV, DOB 6 June, 1932 Vitebsk, USSR, Head of Laboratory, Computer Centre, Academy of Sciences, Moscow, was a visiting professor in Toronto and Ottawa, Canada, for four months - November 1974 to February 1975.

A number of sources were impressed by TORGOV's frankness and his willingness to speak out, at social gatherings, on current problem areas in the Soviet system. For example he discussed dissidents in Soviet society and commented on one occasion that present day Soviet society allowed for far greater freedom of expression than had been allowed previously. He said that things were being said in Moscow that one would never have heard in Stalin's era. Nevertheless, TORGOV argued that a return to "terror tactics" under Soviet rule was always possible. He considered that such tactics were unlikely at this time because of the personal philosophy of Premier Leonid BRESHNEV.

TORGOV is reported to be the son of a scientist and party member and he himself is an admitted party member. He is married with three children. He is considered to be one of the top experts on his field (computers) in the Soviet Union. He mentioned having travelled to other Western countries two or three times. His English is good. He was very friendly towards Canadians during his visit but it was observed that he did not associate with three other Soviet research students at the same institution. On one occasion in Ottawa he was berated quite severely by a Soviet Embassy official for his failure to report periodically, as required, to the Embassy. TORGOV later told a source that this Embassy official "could be a dangerous man to your country".

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6 OCT
1975

US/75/539

Dear Harry,

We have learned that on the evening of 8 September 1975, James WILKINSON of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had a conversation of interest with a Canadian Embassy Officer. Wilkinson stated that while attending a social function at the Australian Embassy, he engaged Canadian Consular Officer Geoffrey FARROW in conversation. Farrow advised that he had been recently approached by Dr. Harry KERNOV, an Associate Professor of English at the University of Toronto in Canada, regarding American defectors Bernon F. MITCHELL and William H. MARTIN. Kernov implied that he had had recent personal contact with one or both of the defectors and recommended that the Canadian government give Martin and Mitchell permission to emigrate to Canada. Farrow furnished no further details regarding Kernov's contact.

During the same conversation Farrow asked Wilkinson if he could supply any basic background material on Mitchell and Martin. Wilkinson replied that he would pass Farrow's request on to the Consular Section of the Embassy. Subsequently, Farrow was given an unclassified article concerning the defectors which appeared in the June 1961 issue of True magazine.

We would, of course, be interested in any indications that Martin and Mitchell are attempting to leave the USSR and would be grateful for any information you may be able to provide us in regard to the above.

I am using the CAZAB channel in this instance as this information has been passed to us informally.

Yours,

George T. Kalaris

George T. Kalaris

Mr. Harry Brandes

DDO/CI/R&A/T:LHWigren(20Oct75)

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1 - 165-2720 ✓
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201-282338

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1 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT:

Benson Ferguson MITCHELL,
William Harrison MARTIN,
Espionage - R

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 17 July 1961, captioned as above, and also to Bureau letter dated 22 June 1961, addressed to the Director, National Security Agency, with copy to this Agency. Subject: Benson Ferguson MITCHELL, William Harrison MARTIN, MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

2. The following information supplements the material on: Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASKOS aka DAMASCUS, reported in paragraph 4 of our 17 July 1961 memorandum, referenced above.

a. Our representatives in Melbourne advised that Australian Security Service indices reflect that Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCOS, Greek national born 10 March 1911 at Alexandria, Egypt, arrived in Sydney, Australia, for permanent residence on 24 October 1946, aboard the S. S. SYRATIENAYER, traveling on Greek Passport No. 2063/1946, issued 6 March 1949 at Alexandria, Egypt. At the time of his arrival in Sydney, DAMASCOU was in possession of Australian Visa No. 433A, issued in Cairo on 12 July 1946. He was described as follows: single, 5 feet 10 inches tall, normal build, brown eyes, black hair, occupation "writer". He departed Australia on 25 May 1949 aboard the S. S. ORONSAY, destination not indicated, and as of 18 July 1961 had not re-entered Australia.

b. Our representatives in Mexico City meanwhile had learned that Anastasio Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, sister of the above, on 6 July 1949 applied at the Mexican Consulate in San Antonio, Texas, for a Mexican Tourist Card to enter Mexico to visit her brother Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS, then residing at the Hotel

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New York in Mexico City. At the time of her application for an entry permit, she made no mention of any wedding plans. The Mexican Government approved her trip on condition that she deposit with the Consulate a 10,000 Peso bond, as a guarantee of her intention to depart Mexico upon expiration of her tourist card. Mexican Immigration files contain no record of her actual arrival in Mexico following approval of her 8 July 1960 application. The most recent correspondence case on this case contained in Mexican files is dated 15 February 1961, reflecting that Anastasia DAMASCOSU again requested a Tourist Card on or about the date of the letter, at which time her address in the United States was given as c/o Mexican Consul, San Antonio, Texas. In reply to her second application for an entry permit, Mexican authorities again replied with a request that she post a bond in the amount of 10,000 Pesos, to guarantee departure from Mexico upon expiration of her tourist visa. There is no further information currently available on her further travel plans.

c. With reference to Nicolas Georges DAMASCOSU, on basis of the information reported in preceding paragraph, a recheck by our representatives with officials of the United States Embassy in Mexico City revealed that Nicolas Georges DAMASCOSU, born 10 March 1931 at Alexandria, Egypt, holder of Greek Passport 1981 issued in Alexandria, Egypt, on 5 March 1960 and valid to 29 April 1961, with address of 2 Elizabeth Bay Road, Elizabeth Bay, Sydney, Australia, was the recipient of a United States Visa on 12 October 1960. On his application, DAMASCOSU indicated that he desired to visit the United States for a period of four months, described as a pleasure trip to visit his sister. His visa application did not include any destination address in the United States. It was also noted that the visa card maintained on Nicolas DAMASCOSU in the Embassy in Mexico City contains a notation "1-688 to Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, May 29 1961."

d. Through a reliable confidential source our representatives in Egypt had learned in the interim that Nicolas DAMASCOSU, who is identical with the individual described in preceding paragraphs, currently resides in Los Angeles, California, at 1600 North Gardner, Apartment 12, and that he advised his mother and younger brother, still residing in Alexandria, that he plans to marry the daughter of an American official, who is not further identified. The same source also advised that Georges DAMASCOSU aka DAMASCOSU, father of Nicolas and Anastasia DAMASCOSU aka DAMASCUS, died during the summer of 1960. Following the demise of the father, Angelika DAMASCOSU nee SAVOURAS, widowed mother of Nicolas and Anastasia

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DAMASCOU, in company of a younger son not identified by name, had planned to emigrate from Egypt to join her son Nicolas in the United States. However, prior to the realization of these plans, Angelika DAMASCOU suffered a stroke, exact details concerning which are not known, but she is reported as of this writing still to be paralyzed and obviously is unable to travel. No further information was available on the possible future emigration plans of Angelika DAMASCOU or HAVONRAS and/or of the unidentified younger brother of Nicolas DAMASCOU and of Anastasia DAMASCOU.

c. On basis of the reported filing of an application for a United States Visa in July 1956 at the U.S. Embassy in London by Anastasia DAMASCOU, our representatives in London were requested to initiate a check of British Liaison indices in the names of Nicolas DAMASCOU and of Anastasia DAMASCOU. MI-5 advised that as of late July 1961, they held no traces on Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS aka DAMASCUS, but that although they had no traces on Anastasia DAMASCOU, they were continuing to check her possible residence in London during 1956, based on the reported visa application data. MI-6 advised that they held no traces on either Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS or on his sister Anastasia Georges DAMASCOU.

3. It is suggested that the indices of the Department of State, Visa Section as well as the indices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, may contain further detailed information on the current immigration status, whereabouts in the United States, and also the contacts in the United States of Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, of Anastasia Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCOU, and any other members of the family who may have applied for entry visas from abroad.

4. With regard to Justo SIERRA Casares, mentioned in above referenced memorandum of 17 July 1961 as a contact of Nicolas DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, it is suggested that the indices of the Department of State may require additional information on his activities during his service at the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C.

5. The information reported above is for the internal use of

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addressees only and may not be further disseminated without the prior permission of the originator.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

IS/
WILLIAM K. HARVEY

**Recd: National Security Agency
Attn: Mr. S. Wesley Reynolds**

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HX-17

17 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL,
William Hamilton MARTIN,
Espionage - R.

1. Reference is made to the following communications, which contain information pertinent to the new information reported in succeeding paragraphs:

a. Memorandum of 14 June 1961 from this Agency addressed to the National Security Agency, a copy of which was forwarded to your Bureau, captioned as above.

b. Bureau letter of 22 June 1961, addressed to the Director, National Security Agency, with copy to this Agency, captioned: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL, William Hamilton MARTIN; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING .

c. Department of Immigration Name Check Request Form, File A-2, dated 28 June 1961 addressed to your Bureau with copy to this Agency, in the name of Justo SIERRA, born 12 July 1914, Mexico, D. F., who entered the United States at New Orleans, Louisiana, on 13 June 1961 with destination address of Mexican Embassy, Washington, D. C. (Not sent information addressed)

d. Various earlier Department of Immigration Name Check Requests on Justo SIERRA covering his previous trips to this country. (Not to NSA)

e. Our memorandum of 29 December 1960, addressed to your Bureau, our reference CSCI-2/769, 270 with enclosures, Subject: SIERRA, Justo; Visa - Mexican, and earlier communications forwarding name trace results on this individual. (Not to NSA)

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c. Further inquiries in Mexico by our officials there revealed that Nicolas DAMASCUS had been ordered to leave Mexico in October 1960 solely because of the expiration of his tourist card, which had been once extended. Mexican Records fail to show that he returned to Mexico, following his entry into the United States at Brownsville, Texas, from Matamoros, Tamaulipas on 24 October 1960. Upon arrival in Mexico on 22 June 1961, he indicated that the purpose of his visit was to attend the wedding of his sister, Anastasia, identified in preceding paragraph, however, as of 21 June 1961, there was no record of Anastasia DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU in official Mexican Files, and there was as yet no identification of the individual she was alleged to have been scheduled to marry. From the same source it was learned that for the period 22 June through 6 September 1960, the only address listed in official indices for Nicolas DAMASCUS is c/o Justo SIERRA, Reforma 95-407, Mexico City, which is the law office maintained by Justo SIERRA Casasua, former Counselor of the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C., and who is further identified in the documents cited in paragraph 1. c. through h. above. DAMASCUS reportedly used SIERRA to attempt to obtain an extension of his tourist permit, although the details of his contacts with and knowledge of SIERRA himself are not known at this time. Neither has it been possible as of this date to verify the reported contact between Nicolas DAMASCUS and subjects at the Hotel New Yorker, as reported by Mr. Thomas DONLON. Investigation efforts abroad by this Agency are continuing, however, and any further information developed will be forwarded as soon as available.

3. In light of the escape route used by the two NSA defectors, transitting Mexico and presumably Cuba enroute to the USSR, your particular attention is invited to the information concerning the contacts and views of Justo SIERRA Casasua furnished in the reports cited in paragraph 1. e., f., and g. above. It is noted Justo SIERRA Casasua is identical with the senior Don Justo SIERRA, First Secretary at the Embassy of Mexico, mentioned in Bureau Reports cited in paragraph h. above as a contact of Boris A. KAZANTSEV, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1952-54. It is further noted that Boris KAZANTSEV, after returning to Moscow in 1954 and assuming the post of First Secretary in the Latin American Division of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was next assigned from 1955 to 1957 as First Secretary and subsequently Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and that as of 1960 he was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Havana, Cuba, in the position of Counselor, departing Havana for Mexico, in company of his wife and daughter, on 30 June 1961, and then proceeding to Canada on 2 July 1961.

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1. Teletyped Information Report from this Agency, dated 9 April 1959, Report No. YDCS-3/639, 947, Subject: Contacts Between Fidel CASTRO Ruz and Lazaro CARDENAS .

g. Intelligence Report of this Agency dated 7 September 1956, Report No. CS-102629, Subject: Marxist Indoctrination of the Partido Popular .

h. Bureau Report dated 17 June 1954, prepared at Washington, D.C. by Special Agent Boyd D. Aditt, captioned: Soviet Cultivation of Latin American Diplomats - Internal Security - R and Bureau letter of 21 August 1954, addressed to this Agency, forwarding as Enclosure Washington Field Office Report of 10 August 1954, prepared by Special Agent William C. Cregar on the same subject, Bureau File Reference: 105-22386. (Not to NSA)

2. Since the writing of our memorandum of 14 June 1961, (cf. para 1.a. above), the following supplementary information has been developed concerning Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASKOS, who is a contact and client of Justo ALFARRA Casasas, mentioned in the communications referenced in paragraphs 1. c. through h. above.

a. Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS reportedly is officially listed in Egypt under the name of Nicolas George DAMASCOU, born 10 March 1931 at Alexandria, the son of George DAMASCOU and Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS. He is a Greek national and holds Greek citizenship. From 1947 through 1957, he resided at 57 Melitopolis Street in Alexandria. Representatives of this Agency in Alexandria advise that local available records indicate that as of May 1959, Nicolas DAMASCOU resided at 6 Dirlley Place, Elizabeth Bay, Sydney, Australia, and that he listed his occupation as that of Clerk. Our field records indicate that as of May 1959, the United States Consulate in Sydney had some interest in him, and it is suggested that the indices of the Department of State may contain further information concerning this individual.

b. Anastasia (or Anastasia) George DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU, sister of Nicolas DAMASCUS, above, was born March 1931, place of birth not indicated but presumably Egypt, was identified by our representatives in Alexandria as having filed application for a United States Visa at London, England in July 1956, listing her occupation as that of entertainer. It is suggested that the Visa Files of the Department of State may contain additional information on this individual.

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4. The records of this Agency indicate that Boris A. KAZANTSEV is a known Soviet Intelligence Officer, most probably representing Soviet State Security (KGB). It is requested that any further information which may be reflected in the indices of your Bureau, or those of information addressees, reflecting upon the relationship of Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU and his sister Anastasia Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU with Justo SIERRA Casasus, on the latter's contacts with representatives or agents of the CASTRO government in Cuba, or on SIERRA's continued contacts with KAZANTSEV or other suspect Soviet officials or agents in this country or elsewhere be forwarded to this Agency as quickly as possible. A request along the same lines has already been forwarded to our representatives in Mexico City, and you will be kept advised of any further information which may be developed in this regard.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

2 cci: National Security Agency

DD/P/PI/D/APotocki:mem

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - addressee

1 - CS Copy - 100-6-124/3

2 - OS/SRS

1 - CI/OPS

1 - 201-282337

1 - 201-282338

Based on:

201-24592, SIERRA

ALEX 2793 (IN 37468), 12 Jul 61

MEXI 8266 (IN 28014), 21 Jun 61

DIR 49505 (OUT 79310), 7 Jul 61

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

560
DATE : 8 AUG 61**SECRET**

ROUTING

1		4	
2	<i>me</i>	5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/BELL 5 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR BELL AT 2140, 8 AUG)

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, C/WH 2, S/C 2

AUG 9 0048Z 61

- PRIORITY

IN 10213

PRITY DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8621

JNZIP RYBAT

REFS: A. MEXI 8565 (IN 47539)

B. MEXI 8522 (IN 44276)

C. HMMW 9598

1. ON 6 AUG 61, LITAMIL-6 (IDEN A) WENT HAVA VIA MEXICANA

ATTEMPT MAKE CONTACT HIS FRIEND LIOOZE-1 AND CARRY OUT

INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN HIM BY LITAMIL-5 IN PRESENCE CO RE CONTACT

SABOTAGE TEAM STILL INTACT INSIDE CUBA. LITAMIL-6 ALSO CARRIED
(IDEN C) WHICH WILL BE USED AS "CODE BOOK" WHEN CUBA/MEXI RADIOCOMMO ESTABLISHED.. LITAMIL-1 WHO RECRUITED LITAMIL-6 ONLY ONE
AWARE HIS ATTEMPT CONTACT LIOOZE-1.

2. L-5 TOLD L-6 GO HAVA MAKE CONTACT WITH ENRIQUE COLLAZO
(NOT KNOWN WHETHER SUBJ MEXI 7723) WHO LIVES CALLE "A" 509 VEDADO,
HAVA. L-6 CARRIED OTHER HALF MEDICAL FLYSHEET AS "BONA FIDES"
WHICH PREVIOUSLY TAKEN TO COLLAZO BY DIETER LAEGENFELDER
(NO TRACES) GERMAN DRUGGIST WHO WENT HAVA 32 JULY PER L-5
INSTRUCTIONS. COLLAZO WILL TAKE L-6 TO "JESUS BADAL" (PSEUDO) WHO

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201-267295

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DATE

TO

FROM

ACTION

INFO

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3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 10213 MEXI 8621

ACTION MAN SABOTAGE UNIT. L-5 REPORTS THIS GROUP HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH KUBARK PBPRIME BY RADIO. ALSO IN RADIO CONTACT TAMAYO FNU ("INDIO AZUL") IN CARA. L-6 WILL GIVE "BADAL" CODE BOOK AND TELL HIM CLANDESTINE RADIO MEXI USING NAME "RADIO CUBA LIBRE" WILL BE OPERATION SOON. WILL ASK "BADAL" ATTEMPT MAKE RADIO CONTACT MEXI.

3. RADIO TRANSMITTER MEXI RECEIVED THROUGH (IDEN B) AS "GIFT" TO LITAMIL-1. STATION THROUGH LITAMIL-1 PAID TRAVEL EXPENSES LITAMIL-6 AND FAMILY (2) PRESENTLY CUBA WHICH WILL RETURN WITH HIM.

EXPECT RADIO BE IN OPERATION WITHIN TWO WEEKS. PLAN USE L-6

"VOICE" "RADIO CUBA LIBRE". STATION REQUESTS UTMOST SECURITY RE CP CITED ABOVE AS "LEAK" BACK TO MEXI WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE RELATIONS LITAMIL COMPLEX HERE.

END U. MESSAGE

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MACHADO Llosas, Manuel

201-267298 (Machado)

(Carrillo)

JUN 1960

1. Biographical Data: Born 12 December 1913, Auras, Oriente, Cuba. He now lives in Mexico and is owner and manager of a printing establishment, "Manuel MACHADO, S.A.", Tlalpan 710, in Mexico City. He is single and well-off financially.

2. Political Activities: Machado was a member of the 26th of July group of Cuban revolutionaries in Mexico. Now he is in exile in Mexico. He was Treasurer of the Mexican movement and handled operational funds. He was a good friend of Fidel Castro, but became disillusioned with the Castro government some months ago and is ready to fight against it.

3. Security Aspects: Machado is a CIA Agent (LITAMIL-1, POA/OA requested 9 Dec 1959; POA granted 8 January 1960; OA granted 6 June 1960). The Mexico City Station planned to use him to report on the activities of Cuban revolutionaries and possibly, due to his friendship with Fidel Castro and members of the Cuban Government, as a "political action" asset. (Note - the Mexican Desk is interested in any action taken on Machado, since he is their agent. They hold his 201-267298).

4. Contacts: Machado is a friend of Ambassador Arcos y Bergnes. He also has a certain amount of prestige in revolutionary circles.

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BERLIN.

4. SUBJ CLAIMED HE NOW LIVING HOTEL STADT DRESDEN, BERLIN-CHARLOTTENBURG, STUITERTER PLATZ 17.

5. BONN FRANKFURT BERLIN: SUBJ IS FABRICATOR AND MENTAL CASE WHO PERIODICALLY CAUSES TROUBLE FOR SWISS AND LNPURE CONSULATES IN SUISSE.

6. HQS: REQUEST PERMISSION PASS INBREED INFO CONTAINED PARA 3 DIRECTOR 80955, 6 MARCH 1969. OTHER ADDEES: PLEASE ADVISE APPROPRIATE US ARMY AUTHORITIES ON OFF CHANCE THEY ARE MISSING COPY OF "FISCAL YEAR 70 (USAREUR)."

7. FILE 201-746537. GP-1

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TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION/ATTN: R.K. MCHESQUE/GENERAL
INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.4

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CIR-316/03605-77 Y

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF ORLANDO LETELIER; INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CORU Y

REFERENCE: FIRCIN-312/03290-774 7 OCTOBER 1977 4

3. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PERTAINS TO INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED
IN REFERENCE. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSISTANT
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY EUGENE M. PROPPER.

2. THIS AGENCY HAS NO INFORMATION ON ROBERTO CARRERAS, AN ARGENTINE NATIONAL WHO WAS IDENTIFIED AS A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE GULF AND WESTERN CORPORATION AT THE FALCONERIDGE PROJECT, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (SIC) AND WHO IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY "EL ROSARIO" MINE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN DECEMBER 1976 THE SAME SOURCE WHO PROVIDED PARAGRAPHS 2 - 6 OF REFERENCE REPORTED THAT EULALIO FRANCISCO "FRANK" CASTRO PAZ AND ROLANDO OTERO (HERNANDEZ) TRAVELLED AT LEAST

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TWICE TO LA ROMANA TO SEE ALVARO CARTA, CUBAN BORN PRESIDENT OF
GULF AND WESTERN AMERICAS, TO SEEK ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.} (SANTO
DOMINGO STATION COMMENT: CARTA NOW HAS A TOP JOB WITH GULF AND
WESTERN IN CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.}4

3. RUBEN SOTO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE SOTO PREVIOUSLY
IDENTIFIED TO YOU AS ONE OF THE BEST FRIENDS OF U.S. ARMY MAJOR
JUAN ARMAND MONTES. SOTO, THE OWNER OF "LA FRANCESA" BAKERY (PASTRY
SHOP) AND A CUBAN EXILE, IS KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO ORLANDO BOSCH
AVILA AND FRANK CASTRO.4

A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED IN LATE 1976
THAT HE WAS TOLD BY A CUBAN EXILE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC THAT A
DELEGATION OF LOCAL CUBANS, AMONG THEM RUBEN SOTO, WAS SOLICITING
MONEY FOR CUBAN RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES.4

ONE RUBEN SOTO HAYET, WHO WAS BORN IN ISLA DE PINOS, CUBA,
ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1937, WAS A MEMBER OF BRIGADE 2506 AND WAS A CAN-
DIDATE TO RECEIVE PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN EARLY
1962. THERE HAS BEEN NO AGENCY CONTACT WITH SOTO HAYET SINCE THEN.4

IN 1963 ONE RUBEN SOTO AULET, POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH RUBEN

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SOTO HAYET, WAS DESCRIBED AS A FORMER 2506 BRIGADE MEMBER WHO WAS AN EXECUTIVE MEMBER OF THE MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY (MRR). 4

4. IN DECEMBER 1976 THE SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 2 - 6 OF REFERENCE REPORTED THAT IN JULY OR AUGUST 1976, DURING A MEETING OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES AT THE PIZZA RESTAURANT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ARMANDO CABALLEROS, OWNER OF THE RESTAURANT, SPOKE OPENLY ABOUT PLANS TO ASSASSINATE "UN GRAN FUNCIONARIO AMERICANO" IN COSTA RICA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: PLEASE SEE CIOL-0445-76, 23 DECEMBER 1976, WHICH PROVIDED YOU WITH INFORMATION ON TERRORIST PLOTTING OF CUBAN EXILES AND INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. ARMY MAJOR MONTES. IN RELATION TO THE PARAGRAPH TWO MEETING, SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER MET IN EITHER MEXICO OR COSTA RICA WITH "AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT NAMED HART" (PROBABLY ARMANDO HART DAVALOS). KISSINGER WAS LABELED A TRAITOR AND PLANS WERE DISCUSSED TO ASSASSINATE HIM IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH COORDINATING THIS ACTION WAS PETER (OR PEDRO).

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MARTINEZ. SOURCE BELIEVED THAT MARTINEZ RESIDED IN MIAMI. THE

PLAN WAS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE THE "CIA FOUND OUT" AND "AN

- IMPORTANT EXILE," IDENTIFIED AS MANOLO REYES, WHO ALSO LIVED IN
A PROMINENT U.S.
MIAMI, OBJECTED AND THREATENED TO ADVISE [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 34 101-284805

ONE ARMANDO CABALLERO PARODI, WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 10 JULY 1941, WAS A FORMER MEMBER OF THE 2506 BRIGADE. HE WAS TERMINATED BY THIS AGENCY IN MAY 1963. IN LATE 1963 THERE WAS INTEREST IN USING CABALLERO IN TEACHING INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS CONTACTED IN THIS REGARD.

5. THIS AGENCY HAS NO INFORMATION ON DANILO GONZALEZ, IDENTIFIED AS PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN CLUB IN SANTO DOMINGO, OR ON LOCAL EMPLOYEES OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN SANTO DOMINGO, JOSE RENE ROMAN, JOSE JEREZ OR FRANKLIN POLANCO.

6. JORGE ALONSO PUJOLS IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JORGE ALONSO-PUJOL BERNUDEZ WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 20 JULY 1923. HE IS THE SON OF FORMER CUBAN VICE PRESIDENT GUILLERMO ALONSO-PUJOL, WHO SERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF CARLOS PRIO. ALONSO-PUJOL RECEIVED

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TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY DURING 1961 AND WAS CAPTURED AT THE BAY OF PIGS. HIS FATHER PURPORTEDLY PAID \$100,000 FOR HIS SON'S RELEASE. HOWEVER, AT THE TIME THE RANSOM WAS EFFECTED, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION AMONG EXILES IN THE MIAMI AREA THAT HIS FATHER DID NOT PAY THE RANSOM BUT HAD MADE A DEAL WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT FOR ALONSO-PUJOL TO UNDERTAKE PRO-CASTRO PROPAGANDA IN LATIN AMERICA IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS FREEDOM. ALONSO-PUJOL WAS ARRESTED IN MIAMI IN JUNE 1970 ON NARCOTICS-RELATED CHARGES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION ON JORGE ALONSO-PUJOL BERMUDEZ.

7. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY
ERNESTO HERNANDEZ BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.
834598

8. PABLO MARTIN IS THE PEN NAME USED BY AVENOL FRANCO, WHO IS ALSO KNOWN AS FRANCISCO AVENOLL. ^{✓ 711-834591N} FRANCO, WHO MAY NOT BE IDENTICAL WITH THE MARTIN MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 26 JUNE 1936. FRANCO HAS SERVED AS PROPAGANDA SECRETARY FOR THE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION "JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA" AND WAS EDITOR OF THE ANTI-CASTRO

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MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR

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ARTILES WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 5 OCTOBER 1910. MARRERO HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF THE PEOPLE (PRP) SINCE ITS FORMATION IN COSTA RICA IN NOVEMBER 1972.4

14. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY JOSE
✓103-721
LUIS PRADO BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.

15. ANDRES SARGEN IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ANDRES NAZARIO SARGEN WHO WAS BORN IN LAS VILAS, CUBA, ON 11 MARCH 1926. NAZARIO IS A LONG TIME ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVIST AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION "ALPHA-66."

✓ 2b. JORGE MAS CANOSA IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JORGE LINCOLN
201-297817 *documental*
MAS CANOSA WHO WAS BORN IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1939.

MAS WAS RECRUITED BY THIS AGENCY IN MARCH 1961 TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. HE HAS NOT BEEN USED BY THIS AGENCY IN ANY OPERATIONAL CAPACITY SINCE THE BAY OF PIGS. MAS HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE) GROUP. IN JANUARY 1966 HE WAS THE SUBJECT OF A DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INQUIRY REGARDING CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN A HIT-AND-RUN RAID CONDUCTED IN THE HAVANA HARBOR AREA IN NOVEMBER 1965.4

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✓ 201-785794
 17. JUAN PEREZ FRANCO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JUAN EDUARDO PEREZ FRANCO WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 28 JANUARY 1928. PEREZ RECEIVED PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN LATE 1960 AND WAS ACTIVE IN THE 82506 BRIGADE. AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH PEREZ WAS TERMINATED IN JANUARY 1962. ✓

✓ 110-701
 18. FREDDY LUGO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE FREDDY LUGO WHO WAS ARRESTED IN 1976 IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBANA AIRLINER CRASH. ✓

✓ 110-701
 19. GERMAN LOZANO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH GERMAN RICARDO LOZANO WHO WAS ARRESTED ALONG WITH FREDDY LUGO IN 1976. ✓

✓ 110-701
 20. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY FERNANDO BUENO BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION. ✓

✓ 201-355001
 21. GENERAL JUAN NEPOMUCENO FOLCH PEREZ, AIR ADVISOR TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WAS BORN IN PUERTO PLATA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON 3 AUGUST 1926. FOLCH HAS SERVED AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND MORE RECENTLY AS AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF. IN LATE MAY 1972 USDAO, SANTO DOMINGO, REPORTED THAT FORMER CHIEF OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL POLICE, GENERAL MANUEL BENITEZ VALDEZ, HAD ✓ 201-106192

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VISITED THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN AN EFFORT TO SELL, TO THE DOMINICANS, ARMAMENT AND SPARE PARTS FROM A U.S.-BASED FIRM WHICH BENITEZ WAS REPRESENTING. BENITEZ HAD CONTACTED TWO DOMINICAN GENERALS, ONE OF THEM BEING FOLCH. USDAO COMMENTED THAT FOLCH'S ASSOCIATION WITH CUBAN EXILES AND ARMS SALESMEN HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE DURING 1972 AND THAT FOLCH WAS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED WITH MILITANT CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, SUCH AS "ALPHA 66," DURING 1962-1963.Y

22. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, IN LATE DECEMBER 1965 ONE VIRGILIO ^{H-400201}POU WAS IDENTIFIED AS A MEMBER OF A RIGHTIST GROUP WHICH WAS ORGANIZED TO COUNTER THE SPREADING OF INFLUENCE BY FORMER "CONSTITUTIONALISTS" IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE GROUP WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLACING PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE AT THE GRAVESITE OF LT. COLONEL RAFAEL TOMAS ^{H- No 201}FERNANDEZ DOMINGUEZ IN SANTIAGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, IN MID-DECEMBER 1965 IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO MURDER COLONEL FRANCISCO ²⁰¹⁻⁷⁷⁵⁻¹³⁹CAAMANO MDENO, WHO WAS ATTENDING A CEREMONY IN HONOR OF FERNANDEZ. THE GROUP WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ITS ATTEMPT TO DETONATE THE EXPLOSIVE.4

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23. FRANK CABRAL IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH DR. FRANK CABRAL

CALCAGNO WHO WAS BORN IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON 6 FEBRUARY 1942. CABRAL SERVED AS CIVILIAN ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER FROM 1970 UNTIL HIS ARREST IN LATE JUNE 1974 AS A RESULT OF THE DISCOVERY OF NUMEROUS WEAPONS AND TELTAP EQUIPMENT IN HIS HOME. CABRAL HAD USED HIS RESIDENCE AS A CENTER OF OPERATIONS WHILE RUNNING HIS OWN INTELLIGENCE NETWORK. CABRAL WAS SENT INTO EXILE AND RETURNED TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM SPAIN IN JULY 1975. HE HAS SERVED AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE DISSIDENT FACTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUISQUEYAN PARTY (PQD).Y

24. MAJOR JUAN POU CASTRO, MORE COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS JUAN POU, JUNIOR, IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE BROTHER OF MAJOR JOAQUIN ANTONIO POU CASTRO. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON JUAN POU. HOWEVER, HIS BROTHER JOAQUIN, WHO WAS BORN IN SANTO DOMINGO ON 1 MARCH 1935, GAINED NOTORIETY BY "NEUTRALIZING" TERRORISTS WHEN HE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION (J-2) OF THE DOMINICAN ARMED FORCES.

25. IN APRIL 1966 ONE COLONEL PAULINO REYES DE LEON, WHO IS

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PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE REYES MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, WAS ONE OF THREE DOMINICAN MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WAS CALLED TO SANTO DOMINGO TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED PLOT TO ASSASSINATE GENERAL JOSE MORILLO. PREVIOUS INFORMATION FROM 1965 INDICATES THAT JOSE PAULINO REYES DE LEON, WHO WAS BORN ON 5 MAY 1932 IN LA VEGA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, WAS COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL POLICE IN SAN FRANCISCO DE MACORIS.4

26. AN FBIS ITEM FROM JULY 1966 IDENTIFIES ONE CAPTAIN FELIPE E. ROJAS LOPEZ AS AN AIDE WITH THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ROJAS LOPEZ. (SANTO DOMINGO STATION COMMENT: SOURCE WAS NOT POSITIVE THAT ROJAS ATTENDED THE MEETING.34

27. ONE MAJOR DARIO L. DIAZ GIL, WHO WAS BORN IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ON 19 DECEMBER 1936, IS A MEMBER OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE PARACHUTE BRIGADE.4

28. ANA MARGARITA (DE) WINDT IS THE WIFE OF EULALIO FRANCISCO (FRANK) CASTRO PAZ.4

29. IN MAY 1977 OUR MEXICO CITY FIELD STATION IDENTIFIED

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