14-00000

OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

#069

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(When Filled In)

OPR. LOIS BARNAAL/kmb
UNIT E/G/R
EXT. 7118
DATE 1 DECEMBER 1971
CONF.

ROUTING
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TDCS -314/12543-71

DATE DISTRIBUTED 1 DECEMBER 1971

PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

E/R	2	E/G/R/WP 2.4-1					
E/G/R	2	E/G/W	1				
E/G/R/BD-1		E/F/R	2				
E/G/R/DE-1							
E/G/R/LB-1				NO LIAISON			

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
EGG-1781
HAMBURG 20722
IN 479259
CAEROTIC/3
LIAISON *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE | ARMY | NAVY | AIR

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WP 2.4

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FORM 3-69 1K-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-10-44-47)

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 479259

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONR CRS XXXXXXXXXX

TREAS XXXXXXXXX

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDCS -314/12543-71

DIST 1 DECEMBER 1971

COUNTRY WEST GERMANY

DOI NOVEMBER 1971

SUBJECT SUMMARY OF ADOLF VON THADDEN'S 3 DECEMBER SPEECH TO THE NORTH-WEST MINING ASSOCIATION

ACQ GERMANY, HAMBURG (23 NOVEMBER 1971) FIELD NO. EGG-1721

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL WEST GERMAN SECURITY SERVICE AT THE LAND LEVEL. ANALOGOUS INFORMATION FROM OTHER WEST GERMAN SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS CONFIRMATION. THE SUB-SOURCE IS AN NPD OFFICIAL WHO HAD ACCESS TO A COPY OF THE DRAFT SPEECH.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: ADOLF VON T H A D D E N, FORMER NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE WEST GERMAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NPD), HAS BEEN INVITED TO SPEAK TO THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE NORTHWEST MINING ASSOCIATION, SPOKANE, WASHINGTON, ON 3 DECEMBER ON THE TOPIC: A EUROPEAN'S VIEW OF THE AMERICAN CURRENCY PROBLEM. SEE AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL HAMBURG TELEGRAM 767, 10 NOVEMBER 1971. DESPITE VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION FROM HIS NPD POST HE STILL PLANS TO ATTEND THE MEETING AND

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

TO PRESENT THE SPEECH WHICH IS SUMMARIZED BELOW.)

2. VON THADDEN BEGINS BY TRACING THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES' RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE PRESENT, DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THE 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH. HE GIVES CREDIT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR HELPING EUROPE BACK ON ITS FEET AFTER WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN. BUT POINTS OUT THAT THE NATIONS WHICH WERE HELPED USED THE AID TO BUILD AN EXPORT BASE WHICH NOW IS CONTRIBUTING TO AMERICA'S FINANCIAL TROUBLES. HE SAYS THAT GERMANY AND OTHER COUNTRIES BECAME INFECTED WITH AN "EXPORT HYSTERIA" AFTER THE WAR WHICH HAD SHORT TERM BENEFITS FOR WORLD TRADE, BUT WHICH IN THE LONG RUN DAMAGED THE DOMESTIC ECONOMIES OF THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES.

3. THE 15 AUGUST 1971 SPEECH BY PRESIDENT NIXON IS COMPARED WITH THE 24 OCTOBER 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH, AND VON THADDEN SAYS THAT THE SPEECH WILL HAVE JUST AS PROFOUND AN EFFECT ON THE WORLD'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM AS DID THE CRASH. HE DEPICTS THE SPEECH AND THE RESULTING CONTROLS AS SPELLING THE END OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ESTABLISHED AT BRETTON-WOODS.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

4. IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE TYPE OF WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH SHOULD FOLLOW THE CURRENT AMERICAN CONTROLS AND FLOATING OF THE DOLLAR, VON THADDEN DRAWS HEAVILY FROM THE 23 SEPTEMBER PRESS CONFERENCE OF FRENCH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU. HE SAYS THAT THE DOLLAR CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED THE SINGLE WORLD CURRENCY. THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF EUROPE MAKES IT NECESSARY THAT A EUROPEAN RESERVE CURRENCY BE AVAILABLE AS A SECOND WORLD CURRENCY. THIS CANNOT BE THE BRITISH POUND AS MANY PEOPLE AT ONE TIME WOULD HAVE BELIEVED, BUT MUST BE A CURRENCY ACCEPTED BY BOTH FRANCE AND GERMANY AND ADMINISTERED BY A COMMON GERMAN-FRENCH BANK SUPPORTED BY GOLD. ALL EUROPEAN STATES WOULD USE THIS BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS. VON THADDEN VIEWS POMPIDOU'S SPEECH AS A SIGNAL TO THE UNITED STATES THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT WILLING TO STAY PERMANENTLY UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON, AND AS PROVIDING AN OUTLINE OF THE TYPE OF ECONOMIC ORDER EUROPE SHOULD HAVE IN THE FUTURE. HE CRITICIZES THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT FOR NOT TAKING A SIMILAR STAND, SAYING THAT WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE STATE TO PUT ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON OTHER STATES, THE SITUATION CAN LEAD TO

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE PROFITABLE ONLY TO THE COMMUNISTS.

5. VON THADDEN SEES TWO ALTERNATIVES IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, I.E., EITHER A RETURN TO FIRM PARITY WITH A DEVALUED DOLLAR, OR A CHANGE TO FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AGREED TO BY THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND GUARANTEED BY INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES. HE BELIEVES THE DOLLAR MUST BE DEVALUED BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT EXPECT EUROPEANS TO CONTINUE TO BUY THE DOLLAR AT A RATE WHICH IS NOT LEGALLY FIXED. HE VIEWS FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AS DESIRABLE FOR EUROPE, BUT NOT REALIZABLE AT PRESENT BECAUSE THIS SYSTEM WOULD EXCLUDE THE "THIRD WORLD" AND THUS WOULD BE OPPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES.

6. SUMMARIZING, VON THADDEN STRESSES THE NECESSITY FOR THE FREE WORLD TO REMAIN STRONG AND FOR EACH EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO RETAIN ITS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DIGNITY TO PREVENT DOMINATION BY COMMUNIST AND FAR-LEFT FORCES. HE CRITICIZES THOSE WHO SAY THAT AMERICA IS NO LONGER NEEDED AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE USSR, DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO OTHER COUNTRY WHICH CAN SERVE IN THIS CAPACITY, ESPECIALLY NOT PRESENT DAY WEST GERMANY. HE SAYS THAT THE WEST

GERMAN PEOPLE, THROUGH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND LEADERS WHO ARE FRIENDLY TO COMMUNISM, HAVE LOST THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER AND ARE TOO WEAK TO OPPOSE THE USSR. HE ENDS BY CALLING FOR A CHARACTER RENAISSANCE IN THE FREE WORLD TO MAKE IT STRONG ENOUGH TO COUNTER COMMUNISM. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE STATEMENT OF VON THADDEN IN SPOKANE MAY ATTRACT PRESS INTEREST DUE TO THE NOTORIETY HE GAINED IN RECENT YEARS AS LEADER OF A GERMAN NATIONALIST PARTY WIDELY DESCRIBED AS NEO-NAZI. IN FACT, THE PARTY HAS DECLINED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO THE POINT WHERE IT IS THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION, AND VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY DEPRIVES HIM OF ANY POLITICAL PLATFORM IN WEST GERMANY.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: NONE (SENT BONN).

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

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DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

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S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS-311/01861-71

DATE DISTR. 10 March 1971

2WP24

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI March 1971

SUBJECT Intention of Adolf Von Thadden to Resign As Chairman of the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany, Hamburg (8 March 1971) FIELD NO. EGG-1682

SOURCE An official West German Security Service concerned with right and left radical organizations, from sources described as NPD officials, who have access to the information. Similar information received through other West German intelligence channels should not be construed as confirmation.

1. In early March 1971 Adolf Von T h a d d e n indicated to close associates including members of the Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands - NPD) that he plans to resign as Chairman of the NPD in the near future. Von Thadden has not announced the date when he plans to resign but close associates believe it will be sometime during the period 1 April to 1 June 1971.

2. Von Thadden's decision has been prompted by his discouragement over prospects for the NPD, serious financial difficulties of the party and by severe internal bickering within the NPD Executive Committee during the past several weeks. Von Thadden is basically more moderate than many members of the Executive Committee. Among other disagreements, Von Thadden has opposed certain aspects of the "Resistance Action" - (Aktion Widerstand) in which NPD members have recently staged demonstrations which erupted into violence. Von Thadden was also personally humiliated when his sister and other relatives asked him not to attend the funeral of Von Thadden's brother-in-law, the well-known historian Percy S c h r a m m who died in Goettingen in January 1971.

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S E C R E T (classification) NO FOREIGN DISSEM (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

E/R	1	CA/INT	2						EGG-1682 HAMBURG 19934 IN 282656 CAEROTIC
E/G/R	2	CA/PEG	1						
E/G/R/JE	1								
E/G/R/BM	1								
E/G/R (WP 2.4)	1								
TOTALS							LIAISON	COORDINATING	RELEASING
IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6, CA 3							32		HM:JM: Csam

S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

3. (Source Comment: Von Thadden's resignation will in all probability mean the end of the NPD as an effective political organization. With the possible exception of the Bavarian District Chairman of the NPD, Dr. Siegfried P o e h l m a n n, the NPD lacks effective and dynamic leaders. Poehlmann, however, has health problems and also does not have the stature of Von Thadden. The disintegration of the NPD will probably result in a number of smaller right-wing groups coming into existence, some of which, like the recent "Aktion Widerstand" may have a propensity for violence. After the NPD disintegrates, most of its former supporters will probably cast their votes for one of the three major political parties in West Germany. The CDU and CSU stand to gain most of these votes.)

4. Field Dissem: None.

FORM NO. 1A-3 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

COMMUNICATION SUPPLY

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS-311/02895-70

DATE DISTR. 3 April 1970

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI Mid-February 1970

SUBJECT Analysis of the West German National Democratic Party's Election Chances and Cohesiveness

ACQ Germany (27 February 1970) FIELD NO. ~~OGA-953~~

SOURCE A medium-level West German government official who follows the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD), from an NPD official who attended the party congress. The report is the NPD official's analysis of the party's situation in the wake of the congress. The information is also passed to an official West German service, from which similar information should not be construed as confirmation.

1. Adolf von T h a d d e n, NPD chairman, remains firmly in control of the party following the 14-15 February 1970 NPD congress in Wertheim.

2. Skepticism about the future of the NPD is increasing among party leaders. The NPD is definitely planning to wage vigorous campaigns in all 1970 Land elections, but there appears to be little chance that the party will do even as well in these elections as it did in the 1969 Bundestag elections, when it failed to obtain five percent of the total vote.

3. At the congress, several prominent NPD leaders emphasized the need for party unity; these appeals were well received by the delegates. There are many unresolved questions and problems, however, which will continue to plague the party. For instance, the "national-conservative" concept, which was adopted in the manifesto issued by the congress, came under strong attack. One group, which includes both older and younger members, rejects the concept of the NPD as a conservative party, because they consider that this term conveys the idea that the party is an out-of-date and reactionary political group. On the other hand, the proponents of the national-conservative concept consider themselves as upholding "positive values" in the face of manifestations of disintegration. Von Thadden is the party's unifying force, and one delegate accurately summarized the situation by saying: "Von Thadden, by virtue of the charisma of his speeches, succeeded in bridging the many cracks in the party."

4. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	[redacted]	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

E/G/W	1							OGA-953 CATERROR
E/G/R	2							
C/E/G/W	1							
E/R	1							
E/G/R/NP	2	1				NO LIAISON		COORDINATING / RELEASING: HM:CHW lah
TOTALS						LIAISON		

IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6

(30)

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

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DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS-311/08556-69

DATE DISTR. 26 September 1969

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI June 1968, 1 September 1969

SUBJECT West German Ministry of Interior Evaluation of the Prospects of Banning the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany (1 September 1969)

FIELD NO. OGA-913

SOURCE A medium-level West German government official who follows the activities of the National Democratic Party and who had access to the study during his official duties. The information was extracted from the original document and is believed to be an accurate summary of its highlights.

Summary: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior prepared a basic study of the prospects of banning the West German National Democratic Party (NPD). The summary of this study given below describes the major charges which the government could bring against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make against these charges, and the probable political results which would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the NPD. According to the source, this study is still considered the basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and is being studied by senior federal government and state (Land) officials. End of Summary.

1. (Field Comment: For several years, West German political and government leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court ban on the NPD. On 13 November 1968, Ernst B e n d a, West German Interior Minister, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg K i c s i n g e r that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against the NPD. Kiesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, and the subject became embroiled in West German politics. On 23 April 1969, the Federal Cabinet decided not to seek a court ban of the NPD, at least until after the September elections. This decision was prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains and apparently was losing popular support.)

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S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

C/E/R	1	E/G/R/C	1								OGA-913 CATERROR
E/G/R	2	E/G/R(WF	2	4)		1					
E/G/W	1	E/BERLIN	2								
C/E/G/W	1										
E/G/R/P	1							NO LIAISON		COORDINATING	RELEASING
TOTALS IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 8(2)								LIAISON 32			HM:CH: sro

FORM 11-48 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(38)

2. In June 1968, the West German Interior Ministry prepared a 50-page study of the prospects for banning the NPD entitled "Considerations Regarding a Ban of the National Democratic Party." The study was well prepared and carefully written. It is still considered the basic Interior Ministry paper on the NPD and is being studied by senior officials of both the federal and state governments. It avoids giving an opinion on the prospects of obtaining a court decision against the NPD, but from the content of the study, it is clear that the authors believed that the courts would probably reject a government proposal to ban the NPD. (Field Comment: If the study is still considered current, it is unclear how it fits with Benda's November 1968 statement that there was sufficient evidence to obtain a ban against the NPD.)

3. The study summarized the case which could be brought against the NPD as follows:

a. It could be shown that there was a similarity between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) which has been outlawed.

b. It could be argued that the goals, and parts of the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the principles of a free democratic state.

The study concludes that a sufficiently strong case could be presented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without a hearing.

4. The study lists the following points which the NPD could be expected to use in its defense:

a. The party could prove that it has given firm instructions to its members not to engage in rowdyism or violence.

b. It could show that a sizeable number of former NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part of the Selbstreinigung (self-cleaning) process.

c. It could point out many features of its program which are in accord with democratic principles.

d. It could show that its elected representatives have worked with other parties and have not disrupted the Landtage (state diets) and other elected bodies in which they participate.

e. It could point out that other political parties have many ex-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.

f. It would charge that the government's charges were one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date.

g. It would claim that not all of Professor Ernst A n r i c h ' s points were included in the party platform. (Field Comment: Anrich is a former university professor from Darmstadt whose proposals were apparently more extreme than those incorporated in the party platform.)

h. It could claim that the increased violence (Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.

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5. The study states that it would be very difficult to refute these NPD defenses in court. The government would have to admit that since early 1968 there have been very few statements made by NPD leaders, or incidents caused by the NPD, which could be used to support the government's case. Objectively, it would have to be admitted that many incidents of violence in which the NPD has been involved were initiated by opponents of the party.

6. The study predicts the following probable results should the government win its case against the NPD:

a. The NPD would probably respect the prohibition. It is very unlikely that the NPD would attempt to go underground as the illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did.

b. NPD members and sympathizers would not change their opinions because of a ban. Many would join other groups or parties and continue to work for their political beliefs.

c. NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a campaign for the banning of the new German Communist Party (DKP) and other leftist groups.

d. A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreign countries.

7. The study concludes that if the government should lose a case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid evidence (Beweisschwierigkeiten). In such an event, the following adverse effects would occur:

a. The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable publicity.

b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some success in keeping former Nazis out of key positions would be halted.

c. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of the stigma of being associated with a party which could be declared illegal, would join the party or become active supporters.

d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members. (Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried because the party's membership has not increased significantly during the past 18 months.)

8. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Base, Berlin

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany

INFO: Chief, European Division

SUBJ: CALL/INTEL
NPD Activities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFER NOTE

REF: EGBT-14589, dated 9 September 1969

WP 2.4

1. We are very pleased with the quality of the information on the NPD which has been made available through CATERROR. It is particularly useful during this pre-election period, but we also appreciate not having to wait 6 to 8 weeks for CAWHISPER to digest the material and pass it on.

2. After looking over the Reference, we are inclined to stick with the requirements mentioned in DIRECTOR 39284 for items worthy of intel dissemination. In this context Bonn State Department Telegram 12253 dated 17 September quotes Foreign Minister Brandt as saying that there has been evidence that the East Germans, undoubtedly with Soviet approval, had given financial support to von Thadden. While we are inclined to think that Brandt's comment may be wishful thinking, evidence of East German financing for the NPD would be of great interest and utility. Material not bearing on the requirements in DIRECTOR 39284 should be forwarded now to Headquarters for review. The NPD, as you know, is a subject of interest beyond its proportions as a political force, and we are grateful for the timely opportunity to keep up with the ins and outs of it.

Harriet G. Cocollato
Harriet G. COCOLLATO

2 - COB/Berlin
2 - COS/Germany

Group I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	EGBS-6522	30 SEP 1969 25 September 1969
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

2 - E/G/R
1 - E/G/IS
1 - E/REG/Chrono
1 - C/EUR/R
1 - C/E/G/R

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER'S NAME	TYPIST	EXT.
E/G/R	Cassandra Horton	sro	6196

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/E/G/R	26 Sept '69	John R Knapp

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/E/R		

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DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS-311/05430-69

DATE DISTR. 22 September 1969

WP 2.4

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI Early August 1969

SUBJECT Miscellaneous Information on the National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany, Hamburg (15 August 1969)

FIELD NO. EGG-1444

SOURCE Member of the National Democratic Party in Schleswig-Holstein whose reliability has not yet been established. He obtained the information from two district officials of the Party.

1. According to a ranking official of the Kiel district of the National Democratic Party (NPD), Karl-Heinz K n i p p h a l s, the chairman of the Kiel district of the NPD, and Adolf v o n T h a d d e n, the national chairman of the NPD, are personal enemies. (Source Comment: In January 1969 Knipphals was elected to be his party district's candidate for the West German Parliament. Knipphals, a Kiel lawyer, is in his early 50's. He was severely wounded during World War II and has only one arm.)

2. Von Thadden is aware of, and unhappy about, the fact that Knipphals, prior to joining the NPD, participated in Easter Marches and received unfavorable publicity. Furthermore, von Thadden is concerned about Knipphals' strong and ruthless political ambitions. He has referred to Knipphals as a "second Hitler", and he welcomes and encourages the fact that there is strong opposition to Knipphals even within the Kiel district of the party. Von Thadden, for the above reasons, would very much like to see Knipphals remain on the district level and is anxious to keep him out of the West German Parliament.

3. The same official who made the remarks about von Thadden and Knipphals also stated that many wealthy industrialists contribute funds to the NPD anonymously, because they do not wish their association or sympathy with the party to become known.

4. The chairman of another NPD district in Schleswig-Holstein stated that, in view of the fact that each new

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
		DC					

C/E/R	1						EGG-1444 CAINFER
E/G/R	2						
E/G/R/P	1						
E/G/R/C	1						
E/G/W	1					NO LIAISON	COORDINATING / RELEASING
TOTALS	IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6					LIAISON *	HM:CH: Brown

S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Session of the West German Parliament is opened by its oldest member, the NPD will insure that the oldest member of the next Parliament will be an NPD man. (Headquarters Comment: The possibility that an NPD Deputy might open the Bundestag has already been considered by the CDU. See CS-311/08164-69.)

5. Field Dissem: None (sent Bonn, Berlin)

14-00000

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CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO. CS LT-313/01123-69

DATE DISTR. 9 July 1969

COUNTRY West Germany

DOI 1 January 1969

SUBJECT German Government Evidence against the National Democratic Party (NPD)

WP2.4

ACQ Germany, Bonn (26 March 1969)

FIELD NO. EGN-4107

SOURCE An official West German security service.

1. A 77-page German-language report, describing the National Democratic Party (NPD) and presenting documentary and testimonial evidence of possibly unconstitutional aspects of the NPD, has been deposited in the files of the CIA Document and Pictorial Services Division, from which copies may be obtained upon request. The report is the shorter of two versions prepared by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz). This shorter version is said to be complete in substance and is the version which was made available to West German Cabinet members in preparation for Cabinet discussion of whether the NPD should be banned. The longer, two-volume version has not been obtained.

2. Appraisal of the legal validity of the evidence against the NPD was omitted from the report at the order of the Minister of the Interior, who reserved to himself an assessment of the NPD's legality. Also, pages 9 to 13--a section entitled Chief Features of the Ideology (Grundzuege der Ideologie)--was omitted from the report at the request of the Minister of the Interior. (Headquarters Comment: The evidence in the report appears to be overt and less than conclusive. The West German Cabinet decided in the spring of 1969 not to request a ban of the NPD; substantial doubt existed as to whether there were sufficient grounds to obtain a legal ban of the NPD. The omissions from the text, referred to in this paragraph, may reflect realization by the Interior Ministry of the weakness of the case against the NPD.)

4. Field Dissemination: U. S. Embassy Bonn (limited).

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S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CS -311/06103 -69

DATE DISTR. 7 July 1969

COUNTRY West Berlin/West Germany

DOI March to Mid-May 1969

SUBJECT Status Report on Problems, Activities and Plans of the West Berlin National Democratic Party

WP 2.4

ACQ. Germany, Berlin (March - Mid-May 1969)

FIELD NO. EGB-24,611

SOURCE Intercepted communications, supplemented by information from a member of the West Berlin National Democratic Party (NPD) with close contacts among members of the Berlin NPD Executive Council and a record of accurate reporting.

Summary: The Berlin NPD has been plagued by a split between the Berlin City leadership, which is loyal to the Party's national leaders, and the "Loyalists" headed by the Berlin district leaders, who opposed the dissolution of the Berlin NPD ordered by National Party Chairman Adolf von Thadden in October 1968. Court action led to the thwarting of the plan for dissolution. In an effort to keep the Berlin Party alive, in mid-March von Thadden ordered a cessation of open Party activities until after the September parliamentary elections. Subsequently, von Thadden arranged a postponement of a scheduled Berlin Party convention until October, because of the possibility of a ban on the Berlin NPD by the Allies and the threat of trouble from the militant left. At the end of March, Berlin City NPD Chief Rudolf Kendzia resigned in an effort to promote party unity in Berlin, but he remains active behind the scenes. Since early April, the Berlin NPD leadership has followed von Thadden's guidelines. The influence of the Loyalists has been greatly reduced, and in accordance with von Thadden's instructions party activities have been circumspect. Both the Berlin and the National leadership are hoping that the NPD will obtain 25 to 35 Bundestag seats in September, which, they feel, will make the party more acceptable to right-wing voters in Berlin and enhance NPD chances during the 1971 Berlin communal elections. Berlin is planning to send volunteer workers to campaign for the NPD in West Germany, especially in North Rhine-Westphalia, the NPD stronghold. End of Summary.

1. (Field Comment: In October 1968, the West Berlin NPD had approximately 480 dues-paying members. According to a senior party official, more than 100 members have officially dropped their

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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

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membership and others are dropping out quietly. In March the paid-up membership was about 300.)

2. Following the abortive attempt by the National Democratic Party (NPD) leadership to force the Berlin NPD to dissolve itself for tactical reasons in October 1968, routine party activity resumed almost immediately. It was characterized by a split between the leadership of the Berlin City (Landesverband) party unit and that of district (Kreisverband) party units. The former are generally loyal to National Party Chairman Adolf von Thadden and the national leadership in Hanover and their broader tactical concepts, while the latter, referred to as the "Loyalists" (Satzungstreue), defend the letter of the Berlin NPD statutes. The Loyalists initially objected primarily to the method of the attempted dissolution, but the friction with the city Executive Committee (Landesvorstand) headed by Rudolf Kendzia led to total mutual mistrust, disloyal statements to the press, and efforts to get each other expelled from the party by a party court (Schiedsgericht).

3. At a general membership meeting in Berlin on 15 March 1969, von Thadden attempted to achieve a truce within the party and ordered that there be no "political organizational activity" until after the September 1969 parliamentary elections. At this meeting von Thadden approved the scheduling of a Berlin party convention (Landesparteitag) for 26 April 1969, at which a new and hopefully more stable city Executive Committee was to be elected.

4. The 15 March meeting provided an indication that the Berlin NPD may well stick together under von Thadden's guidance until 1971, in spite of the friction between city and district leadership. Although the eight spokesmen for the local leadership, who took the floor after Kendzia's situation report and von Thadden's keynote speech, approved the action of the Berlin NPD districts in opposing the self-dissolution of the local party, and no one contradicted them, all but 31 of the 140 members present then voted for a resolution condemning District Chiefs Johann Ratzek (Schoeneberg) and Philipp Goelles (Wilmersdorf), leaders of the Loyalists, for anti-party activity. This vote amounted to a vote of confidence in the tactics of the Berlin City leadership, and according to members present was due solely to von Thadden's presence and influence. In the view of these members, a meeting without the attendance of representatives of the Hanover headquarters would have led to a no-confidence vote in the Kendzia leadership. During the meeting, von Thadden also rejected Kendzia's "Berlin Program," which called for a softer line on East Germany and on German reunification.

5. At the 15 March session, left-wing, anti-NPD protestors assaulted a number of NPD members and forced the NPD twice to change its meeting site. This leftist action and the obvious fact that the militant left has a penetration of the Berlin NPD have had a seriously dampening effect on the NPD's willingness to meet in the open. The party is now tentatively planning to hold future meetings on a rented excursion boat whose location would not be announced until the time of the meeting.

6. The Berlin NPD has made strenuous efforts to determine which left-wing organizations made up the task force which tried to disrupt the 15 March meeting. The Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) claimed the honor, but the NPD investigation showed definitely that all but a handful of the protestors were an organized group dispatched by the Spandau branch of the West Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SEW) whose actions are part of a long-range program of harassment by the East Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED).

7. Because of the subsequent possible threats of prohibition by the Allies (signalled by a letter from Governing Mayor Klaus Schuetz to the Allies asking that the NPD in Berlin be banned) and of further counter-demonstrations by the militant left, on 27 March von Thadden wrote a letter to the Berlin City leadership asking that

the Berlin party convention be postponed until October 1969, the normal expiration date of the term of the present city Executive Committee and well after the national elections. The letter, which was read at several district meetings, also stipulated that the city and district organizations were to restrict themselves to routine monthly meetings with no speeches and no invited guests until next October.

8. In a tactical move to promote party unity, Party Chief Kendzia resigned on 28 March. In response to von Thadden's letter, the Berlin district party unit leadership, which otherwise remained intact, called a session of the Berlin Party Council (Landesausschuss) on 10 April to approve the postponement of the party convention. (Field Comment: The Party Council consists of the Executive Committee plus the 12 district leaders.) Walter Seezen, a member of the national leadership, was present. The situation was ticklish because the Berlin NPD statutes provide that if full membership meetings in four of the 12 districts had voted for holding of the party convention in April, the postponement motion would fail; there was a distinct danger that this could occur. At the 10 April meeting, the district leaders grumbled but approved the postponement until 11 October.

9. On Kendzia's resignation, Guenther Mensel, a member of the Executive Committee, was selected as Acting Party Chief and Speaker of the Party Council until a new Executive Committee is elected in October. Mensel, an attorney, was hesitant about accepting the job because of its possible effect on his practice, and did not commit himself until the 10 April executive meeting. Mensel's age (62) and stability were the main reasons for his selection. The only other replacement considered was Guenter Kleinert, also on the Executive Committee, whom Kendzia did not trust. Mensel's duties are to consist of calling and chairing pro-forma monthly Executive Committee meetings and of presiding at the party congress next October.

10. Kendzia considers his resignation a temporary tactical retreat caused by disagreements with the NPD national and Berlin district leaders, by von Thadden's public rejection of his "Berlin Program," loss of business because of unfavorable publicity, and a hit-and-run car accident involving a bicyclist on 27 March. Kendzia promised Mensel to remain active behind the scenes and set up a vacant office in his place of business as party headquarters, with desks for himself and Executive Committee members Frank Schwerdt, Joachim Rebuschat and Hans Werner Andreas, the de facto heads of the Berlin NPD.

11. Kendzia and a majority of the NPD leaders hope that the fall elections will bring some 25 to 35 NPD members into the Bundestag. This, they feel, will make the party more acceptable to potential right-wing voters in Berlin and thus enable the NPD to make a showing in the 1971 Berlin communal elections. (Source Comment: The Berlin NPD's major problem in Berlin is to keep its membership intact and its machinery functioning until 1971. Whether Kendzia will hold to his promise to direct the Berlin NPD from behind the scenes indefinitely, and whether he will emerge as leader in 1971, are open questions, because Kendzia has shown an interest in the current program and policies of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and particularly in its "General-Contract" concept, which fits in with his "Berlin Program." A close friend of Kendzia's, (fnu) Nerchert, resigned from the NPD to protest its participation in the presidential election in Berlin on 5 March and has already made overtures to the FDP.)

12. Since Kendzia's resignation and the 10 April executive meeting, the Berlin City Executive Committee (under Kendzia's behind-the-scenes tutelage) has kept the Berlin NPD functioning and loyal to the Hanover leadership. Executive Committee members (especially Schwerdt, Rebuschat and Andreas) have attended annual election meetings in all 12 party districts. Through their influence, pro-von Thadden or neutral District Executive Committees have been elected in each case. The district officers who led the opposition to the self-dissolution

of the Berlin NPD last fall have been effectively expelled or neutralized. As of early May, Loyalist influence had been greatly reduced. Although there is now no significant internal opposition group, there was a call pending for formation of an informal group representing both the city organization and the districts to propose organizational changes. Routine monthly district meetings with "guests" from West Germany, whenever possible, are to be continued, under the watchful eye of the pro-tem Executive Committee, until next October when the party convention of the Berlin NPD will elect a new leadership.

13. Schuetz' attempts to have the NPD banned in Berlin have not been taken seriously. Local party activists are preparing to support the NPD election campaign in West Germany by sending volunteer workers. A letter appealing for such help states that the decisive electoral campaign which will determine whether or not the NPD gets into the Bundestag will be waged in North Rhine-Westphalia. Air fare and living expense subsidies are being offered to volunteers who are to distribute leaflets, put up posters and ring doorbells. (Field Comment: The NPD made inroads in North Rhine-Westphalia during the economic recession of 1965-66, and the NPD national leadership is counting heavily on salvaging their foothold in the Bielefeld-Ruhr area.)

14. The main NPD weapons in the national election campaign are to be pamphlets describing the party's election platform. One is to be distributed between 1 and 15 June; a follow-up pamphlet, between 15 and 30 August; and a third pamphlet on the eve of the election. Each will be printed in 15,000,000 copies. Distribution will be handled by two firms--Velbringer Company and Erdmann Company.

15. Ruediger Krauss, head of the NPD's student organization, the National University League (Nationaler Hochschulbund - NHB), has moved from Berlin to Bonn to assume the post of chairman of the Bonn City NPD Executive Committee. Von Thadden plans to use the tactic of moving reliable leaders into critical areas after the elections. For example, he plans to move a Bavarian NPD officer to Berlin and assume the chairmanship of the Berlin NPD. In an attempt to obtain legal recognition for the NHB in Berlin, (fnu) von Hindy, a Hungarian law student and good friend of Krauss, is to be appointed Krauss' successor.

16. Field Dissem: USBER, DCSI/USCOB (Also sent Bonn).

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S E C R E T

Germany 1969

West Germany

June 1968

West German Ministry of Interior Evaluation of the Prospects of Banning the National Democratic Party

Germany (1 September 1969) OGA-813

A medium-level West German government official who follows the activities of the National Democratic Party and who had access to the study during his official duties. The information was extracted from the original document and is believed to be an accurate summary of its highlights.

Summary: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior prepared a basic study of the prospects of banning the West German National Democratic Party (NPD). The summary of this study given below describes the major charges which the government could bring against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make against these charges, and the probable political results which would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the NPD. According to the source, this study is still considered the basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and is being studied by senior federal government and state (Land) officials. End of Summary.

1. (Field Comment: For several years, West German political and government leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court ban on the NPD. On 13 November 1968, Ernst B e n d a, West German Interior Minister, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg K i e s i n g e r that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against the NPD. Kiesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, and the subject became embroiled in West German politics. On 23 April 1969, the Federal Cabinet decided not to seek a court ban of the NPD, at least until after the September elections. This decision was prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains and apparently was losing popular support.)

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2. In June 1968, the West German Interior Ministry prepared a 50-page study of the prospects for banning the NPD entitled "Considerations Regarding a Ban of the National Democratic Party." The study was well prepared and carefully written. It is still considered the basic Interior Ministry paper on the NPD and is being studied by senior officials of both the federal and state governments. It avoids giving an opinion on the prospects of obtaining a court decision against the NPD, but from the content of the study, it is clear that the authors believed that the courts would probably reject a government proposal to ban the NPD. (Field Comment: If the study is still considered current, it is unclear how it fits with Benda's November 1968 statement that there was sufficient evidence to obtain a ban against the NPD. There have been other reports, however, that the evidence was not as clear-cut as Benda would have had the Chancellor believe. See, for example, ZGN-3894.)

3. The study summarized the case which could be brought against the NPD as follows:

a. It could be shown that there was a similarity between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) which has been outlawed.

b. It could be argued that the goals, and parts of the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the principles of a free democratic state.

The study concludes that a sufficiently strong case could be presented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without a hearing.

4. The study lists the following points which the NPD could be expected to use in its defense:

a. The party could prove that it has given firm instructions to its members not to engage in provocation or violence.

b. It could show that a sizeable number of former NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part of the Selbstreinigung (self-cleaning) process.

c. It could point out many features of its program which are in accord with democratic principles.

d. It could show that its elected representatives have worked with other parties and have not disrupted the Landtage (state diets) and other elected bodies in which they participate.

e. It could point out that other political parties have many ex-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.

f. It would charge that the government's charges were one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date.

g. It would claim that not all of Professor (fnu) A n r i c h 's points were included in the party platform. (Field Comment: Anrich is apparently a rightist whose proposals were more extreme than those incorporated in the party platform.)

i. It could claim that the increased violence (Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.

5. The study states that it would be very difficult to refute these NPD defenses in court. The government would have to admit that since early 1968 there have been very few statements made by NPD leaders, or incidents caused by the NPD, which could be used to support the government's case. Objectively, it would have to be admitted that many incidents of violence in which the NPD has been involved were initiated by opponents of the party.

6. The study predicts the following probable results should the government win its case against the NPD:

a. The NPD would probably respect the prohibition. It is very unlikely that the NPD would attempt to go underground as the Illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did.

b. NPD members and sympathizers would not change their opinions because of a ban. Many would join other groups or parties and continue to work for their political beliefs.

c. NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a campaign for the banning of the new German Communist Party (DKP) and other leftist groups.

d. A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreign countries.

7. The study concludes that if the government should lose a case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid evidence (Beweisschwierigkeiten). In such an event, the following adverse affects would occur:

a. The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable publicity.

b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some success in keeping former Nazis out of key positions would be halted.

c. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of the stigma of being associated with a party which could be declared illegal, would join the party or become active supporters.

d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members. (Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried because the party's membership has not increased significantly during the past 18 months.)

8. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

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

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

West Germany's National Democrats and the Grand Coalition

Secret

№ 919

31 May 1968
No. 0022/68A

WEST GERMANY'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATS AND THE GRAND COALITION

Germany's far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) showed another increase in strength in recent elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, while the Social Democrats (SPD) lost heavily. This outcome in a traditionally liberal and prosperous state appears to stem in part from the dissatisfaction of many Socialists and trade unionists in the SPD with their party's cabinet cooperation with the Christian Democrats (CDU). Another factor was the discontent of farmers and refugees with the policies of the Grand Coalition in Bonn. Concern over student disorders contributed to the NPD gains, but this was not as decisive as some have supposed. Despite these gains, the NPD is unlikely to achieve a growth comparable to that of the Nazi Party in the early 1930s.

The outcome in Baden-Wuerttemberg confirmed the belief of many Socialists that their cooperation with the CDU at both the national and state level is proving to be unprofitable for the party. As a result, they have already decided at the state level not to renew cabinet cooperation with the CDU in Baden-Wuerttemberg, thus making prospects for the Bonn coalition appear less favorable. Nevertheless, SPD leaders in Bonn remain committed to the Grand Coalition and serious instability at the federal level seems unlikely. Over the long run the outcome of this latest election may have certain implications nationally, including the possibility that Bonn leaders may be encouraged to take a more nationalist line.

The NPD's Success

The West German state elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg on 28 April brought the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) 9.8 percent of the vote, the most impressive total it has yet attained in any state. About 71 percent of the voters turned out, approximately three percent more than in the last Baden-Wuerttemberg state election in 1964, but 15 percent less than in the 1965 federal election.

Christian Democratic Union (CDU) strength fell slightly to 44.1 percent (1964: 46.2 percent), while the Social Democratic Party (SPD) achieved a vote of only 29.1 percent (1964:



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37.3 percent). The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), made a slight gain, winning 14.4 percent of the vote (1964: 13.1 percent). Against the background of last October's Bremen elections, in which the National Democratic Party won what was then a record percentage of 8.9, the Baden-Wuerttemberg results brought renewed cries of alarm over the dangers of neo-Nazism in the Federal Republic. More important, the results also raised doubts as to the future of a coalition government by the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, not only in Baden-Wuerttemberg but at the federal government level as well.

Baden-Wuerttemberg: A Test Case

Baden and Wuerttemberg traditionally have been strongholds of liberal, nonsocialist democracy in Germany. In the early 1930s, the Nazi vote in this area was almost always appreciably lower than elsewhere in Germany. The hotbeds of Nazism lay in other regions, for example in Franconia, East Prussia, and Schleswig-Holstein.

The economic and social picture in Baden-Wuerttemberg would lead to expectations of stability there. The proportion of the population now employed in industry is higher than in any other state. The economy of the state was virtually untouched by the recent West German recession, during which unemployment never exceeded one percent. Per capita income is above average. Protestants and Catholics are almost evenly balanced in population, while the proportion of protestants in the Federal Republic is slightly higher.

A few observers correctly forecast the outcome, but the general expectation was that the vote for the National Democratic Party would be lower than in Bremen. The two major West German polling organizations had predicted in March that the NPD would receive five percent of the vote.

Federal-level politicians had campaigned actively in the state. Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, a popular native son, made a three-day speaking tour, in which he sharply attacked "arrogant, thoughtless, and dangerous nationalism." He stressed this theme in the Hohenlohe area, where the NPD later received its highest vote in the state. Willy Brandt also appeared to speak for the Social Democrats.

NPD Representation in West German States



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The participation by national figures reflected a feeling in Bonn that this state election, the last before the 1969 federal election, might influence national politics. The analogy to the federal scene was pointed up by the existence in Baden-Wuerttemberg of a coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, similar to that in Bonn.

Reaction to Student Riots

In looking for explanations of the NPD gains, German observers have emphasized the public reaction against the Easter student rioting, and dissatisfaction with the federal grand coalition. Conservatives lean to the former explanation, while students and trade unionists stress the latter. The NPD did not receive less than 6 percent in any electoral district. This suggests that the sentiment expressed by the vote is widespread, and may extend throughout the FRG.

Reaction to student rioting probably contributed something, but this aspect seems to have been exaggerated as a factor in NPD gains. In Heidelberg, the NPD vote rose to 11.9 percent, but in three other university towns, the party's vote fell below the state average of 9.8 percent. In industrial Esslingen, where there had been two student riots, the NPD only attained 9 percent. Some voters may have been influenced by student demonstrations to transfer their votes from the SPD to the CDU, whose spokesmen have generally advocated a stern treatment of rioters.

At the same time, the "new left" certainly failed to win popular support. The Democratic Left, supported by radical students, won only 2.3 percent in the state as a whole, while making better showings in certain university and industrial localities. While the Democratic Left's state-wide average was better than the far left had attained in recent elections under other names, it fell below the last, low figure gained by the Communists before they became illegal: 3.2 percent.

Hostility to the Grand Coalition?

There is dissatisfaction with the coalition within the CDU, and it can be assumed that some of the party's right wing voted for the National Democrats. The Socialists, however, suffered the greater loss. Left-of-center Socialists often complain that the party has compromised its principles and lost public favor. There is an undercurrent of feeling in these quarters that the party has endangered German democracy by abandoning its long-time position of opposition and entering into collaboration with the CDU.

Although the SPD has provided much of the impetus to the grand coalition's economic and foreign policies, and although the coalition in Baden-Wuerttemberg has generally functioned well, dissatisfaction undoubtedly exists among idealistic members of the left and among traditionally class-conscious union members. Middle class voters of this persuasion probably turned

to the Free Democratic Party, which has assumed the role of respectable opposition. The connection between this left-liberal criticism and the NPD gains on 28 April is not immediately apparent.

Some commentators including some Socialists, conclude that many SPD voters defected to the NPD. The respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung fudged some of the election data to support its argument that workers had gone over to the NPD, but a more careful analysis has shown that the NPD did indeed win above-average support in some working-class neighborhoods.

Many old Socialists and trade unionists, such as Willi Bleicher, the powerful boss of the metalworkers in this state, are cool to the coalition and hostile to intellectuals, and some of them are repelled by anarchic student leftism. Even so, most workers are unlikely under conditions of full employment to cast what they would consider a neo-Nazi vote; certainly Bleicher would never favor such action. SPD electoral losses would seem to be due less to defection to the NPD than to the failure of lower-level SPD functionaries, apathetic, or even hostile toward the coalition, to get out the vote, and to the failure of many trade union and normally SPD voters to go to the polls.

In traditionally socialist Mannheim, only 58 percent of those entitled to vote turned out. SPD percentages dropped 14 percent in one district and 13 percent in another. The percentage of NPD strength rose to 12.1, 10.9, and 11.2 in the three city districts, but working class votes would not be needed to provide these percentages, especially in the face of a low SPD turnout. These votes probably came mainly from the CDU, the FDP, or from those who had not voted before.

NPD Activity Pays Off

The NPD organization worked hard during the campaign, conducting more meetings than all the other parties put together. The party has overcome its former inexperience and disunity, and is developing into a well-oiled political machine. The organization fields speakers and provides canned speeches and propaganda materials to local groups. The NPD's heritage is not purely Nazi. It encompasses more respectable antecedents, such as the Deutschnationaler (German Nationalists) and other conservative elements. In the interests of avoiding a government ban, the National Democratic Party shuns blatantly Nazi appeals and tactics.

Adolf von Thadden, the national leader of the NPD, is a smooth personality from a Junker family who denies charges that he was an active Nazi. He seems to model himself more on De Gaulle than on Hitler. The Baden-Wuerttemberg leader of the party, Wilhelm Gutmann, is a former Nazi. During "the good old days," he was Buergermeister of Tiengen on the Swiss border, where he sponsored anti-Semitic

activities in 1938. He refused to permit the raising of white flags when the Allied forces arrived in 1945. Despite his past, he won 15,000 votes in Karlsruhe. In one commune in the northern end of the state, the NPD gained an absolute majority with 55 percent of the vote; this was the home of an NPD candidate named Valentin Goetz, who had been voted out as Buergermeister two years before.

The NPD won its greatest relative successes in three northern districts: Oehringen (14.8 percent), Crailsheim (14.5 percent), and Tauberbischofsheim (14.3 percent). The first two of these districts are largely protestant; the latter is predominantly Catholic. This northern area, and especially its Hohenlohe section, is filled with dissatisfied small farmers, who now face Common Market competition and who have recently suffered the loss of a state subsidy on milk. Rural dissatisfaction provides opportunities for the NPD, but this is not a promising base for a mass movement, particularly since the farm population in the Federal Republic has dropped in the last ten years from 20 percent to 11 percent. Another important voting factor in this northern area is the relatively high proportion of refugees, who were probably aroused by recent statements by Willy Brandt about the Oder-Neisse line and by the failure of the CDU to react more forcefully against Brandt.

As was the case in the early 1930s, overwhelmingly Catholic areas, where the Church influences its members politically, had the lowest right extremist vote. One overwhelmingly Protestant district, Freudenstadt, also produced a

ADOLF VON THADDEN

WILHELM GUTMANN

low NPD vote. A postelection poll of 1967 voters in Bremen showed that, unlike the Hitler movement, the National Democrats do not yet attract many women and youth. More than two thirds of the voters for the party, were males, and the strongest participation was in the 45 to 60 age bracket.

FDP Gains and Losses

The FDP profited from its position in the opposition. Ralf Dahrendorf, a sociologist from the University of Konstanz with an international reputation, has recently entered the party and has assumed a leading role, influencing the FDP in a leftward direction and attracting left-liberal support. In the Stuttgart district where he was a candidate, the party vote rose by 6 percent. On the other hand, the new pattern is not acceptable to many old members of this traditionally business-oriented party, who looking askance at Dahrendorf's readiness to debate and discuss with Rudi Dutschke and other radical students. Two of the three districts with heaviest NPD gains also showed heavy FDP losses, as did some other former FDP areas of strength.

Perspectives on the Vote

The over-all picture appears to be that while both the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats lost to the NPD, they gained at the expense of the Socialists. The Socialists suffered from apathy and incurred some loss to both the NPD and Democratic Left. The NPD probably garnered some new and uncommitted votes. It is fortunate for the SPD leaders in Bonn that the annual party congress came before the Baden-Wuerttemberg election. It is hardly likely that the congress would now defeat a motion withholding endorsement of the coalition, as it did by a four-vote margin in March. Assuming the SPD remains faithful to the Bonn coalition now, the prospects are for further erosion of its strength and for greater difficulties within its ranks.

Meanwhile, the NPD probably will continue to grow in influence. It now is probably stronger in some other areas than in Baden-Wuerttemberg. A change from proportional representation to single-member constituencies, which might have

served to block NPD growth, has now become even less acceptable than before to the SPD, which would have lost three-fifths of its Baden-Wuerttemberg seats under this system.

A ban of the NPD appears unlikely unless the party commits some flagrant violation of accepted rules. A Bonn press office spokesman has stated that the government will seek a political debate with the NPD, and not a ban. On present form, the NPD may get 40 seats in the 1969 Bundestag elections. An attempt to set a higher minimum percentage of votes (present minimum: five percent) for Bundestag representation would arouse violent FPD opposition, and does not seem to be under serious consideration at the moment. It would violate German tradition, and might produce a reaction in favor of the NPD, enabling it to overstep even the new margin.

Although the growth of the NPD is disturbing, alarm does not seem to be warranted. In the early 1930s, Germany suffered from depression and high unemployment, and had bitter memories of a recent inflation which wiped out savings. Powerful elements in the government and society, including President von Hindenberg, the army, the courts, and heavy industry, were highly reactionary and either cool or hostile to republican democracy--as were the professors and students. Racism was rampant and more or less respectable, and unwillingness to accept defeat in World War I provided endless opportunities for demagoguery. All these conditions are now virtually absent. The defeat in 1945, and subsequent disclosures, work to discredit any real Nazi manifestations. Moreover, the fact that no other state will elect a new assembly before the 1969 federal elections may help to prevent a real bandwagon development. It must be emphasized that the NPD is still a small party, if no longer a mere splinter group.

The Coalition Problem

German observers tend to be more worried about the effect of the NPD showing on foreign opinion than about the increase in NPD strength itself, and their greatest concern is over the prospects for the grand coalition, resulting from the SPD losses. A Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD convention voted on 18 May against continuing the coalition in Stuttgart, and the old state SPD leaders resigned. This would seem to make the prospects for the Bonn coalition less favorable.

At the same time, the FDP appears not to be in a mood to return to a coalition in either Bonn or Stuttgart. Dahrendorf has suggested that there might be a CDU minority government in the state. State CDU leaders may, however, prefer to call new elections if a coalition cannot be formed. In this event, they would appeal for an absolute majority from the voters. If they got it and if the NPD vote declined, this would be encouraging, but new elections might also have a less favorable outcome.

If the 1969 federal election follows the pattern of the 28 April election, the same problems will arise in Bonn. With this kind of a breakdown of the vote, the FDP and the SPD together cannot form a majority, and a refusal on the part of both of them to join the CDU means that the latter cannot organize a majority government either--unless the CDU invites NPD collaboration, which it is far from ready to do.

A collapse of the grand coalition in Bonn either before or after 1969 and a return by the SPD to opposition positions would signify more than a passing cabinet crisis. In the past, parties tended to harden into intransigence, committed to particular ideological and material interests, and unable to reach pragmatic compromises with each other. In recent years, West German politicians have tried to break with this tradition and to work on the consensus principle. A failure of these efforts would have serious implications. If--as does not seem likely at present--the three major parties were unable to form a majority government, this might lead to severe instability and the discrediting of parliamentary government.

Bonn and Weimar

Many misleading analogies have been drawn between the Bonn and Weimar republics. One Weimar precedent may help, however, to explain why some observers view the coalition problem seriously. In March 1930, another grand coalition with SPD participation collapsed over the question of cuts in unemployment insurance, leading to the formation of a conservative majority government under Heinrich Bruening. Bruening was later replaced by the reactionary Franz von Papen, who in turn was followed first by a wire-pulling general, Kurt von Schleicher, and then by Adolf Hitler. The worst aspect of the SPD withdrawal was that it made the parliament ineffective and powerless.

Once minority government was embarked on, supported by presidential prerogatives, there was no effective test for legitimacy except the will of Hindenburg by then susceptible and old. The Nazis ultimately came to power, not by a majority vote, but through the paralysis and impotence of the constitutional system and through intrigues in the presidential palace on the part of those, especially Papen and Schleicher, who thought they could "use" Nazi mass support.

In contrast to the 30s, the presidential powers now are far weaker,* and aside from all the other factors inhibiting a recurrence, the Weimar precedent itself must influence SPD leaders in Bonn. They are completely committed personally to the present coalition. A decision to go into opposition is unlikely under Brandt and Wehner.

The absence of executive emergency powers is not of course without dangers. In a bitter parliamentary deadlock, an illegal assumption of power, perhaps by extragovernmental elements, might be the only way out.

Another possibility might be a left-wing withdrawal from the SPD, although the leadership for a dissident faction has yet to emerge. This might provide a healthy outlet for criticism of the system without a turn to minority rule. Unlike the early 1930s, virtually all West German politicians now would do their best to maintain a functioning constitutional system. Real dangers will probably not arise unless, as in the late Weimar period, the government finds itself confronted with economic or political problems which seem to defy compromise settlement or rational solution.

Immediate Prospects

Assuming that the Bonn coalition lasts until the 1969 elections, its leading members may still modify their policies somewhat in the light of the Baden-Wuerttemberg experience. The adverse vote of the refugees in the recent election could act as a brake on the policy of detente with Czechoslovakia and Poland, although there is no sign of this as yet. Chancellor Kiesinger has attributed NPD gains partly to "years of agitation against our own history and against healthy self-confidence," which suggests that he may try to sound a more nationalistic note. To the extent to which the results continue to be attributed to student activities, this will strengthen the demand for firmness. Even before the election, Brandt sent a telegram to SPD state headquarters, advising that speakers should react "completely hard" against student demonstrations.

Although the antistudent reaction does not seem to have been as important a factor as some have believed it to be, constant violence and provocation on the part of the students, accompanied by constant press attention, could lead to severe official or unofficial counteraction. This, in turn, could bring more serious student violence, perhaps with the support of other elements.

Some matters of student concern have appeal for others. Thus students and many trade unionists oppose emergency laws, and this question is again being agitated. Because of the Nazi experience, there is widespread aversion among left-of-center elements to the use of force in the name of "order," however great the provocation. But also because of the Nazi experience, a really large increase in NPD votes does not seem likely in the 1969 election, or in an earlier new election in Baden-Wuerttemberg, should that come to pass. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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1.	Bundestag Elections 1965 -.- NPD's first Effort	664,137 votes = 2%
2.	13 March 1966, communal Elections, Schleswig-Holstein. (NPD Kiel directive not to participate. A few did)	In 11 communities where NPD run candidates, averaged 10.5% of vote compared with 6% in same towns in 1965.
3.	13 March 1966, Bavarian Communal Elections NPD major effort concentrated only in Franconia.	1.6 % of total Bavarian vote but: Middle Franconia = 5.. Ansbach - 5.1% Erlangen - 8.2% Nurnberg- 7.7% Schwabach-5.6% Upper Franconia Bayreuth - 8.4% Coburg - 5.3% Kulmbach - 5.8% 3 + 2 village mayors
4.	27 March 1966 Hamburg Burgerschaft Election	3.9 % (1.6% in 1965) no candidates elected
5.	10 July 1966 Northrhein-Westphalia Landtag Election No NPD candidates elected none entered.	
6.	16 October 1966 Hanlin Byelection(Communal Concil)	8.2% (1965=) 2 seats
7.	6 November 1966 Hesse Landtag Elections	221,500 votes = 7.9%+ 8 Seats in Landtag Marburg, Wiesbaden, Darmst and Giessen =on 10% FF/M = 8.4%
7.	20 November 1966 Bavarian Landtag Elections	votes= 7.4% 15 Seats in Landtag
8.	23 April 1967 Rheinland-Palatine	4 Seats, 6.9 % of vote
9.	23 April 1967 Schleswig-Holstein	4 Seats, 5.7 % of vote
10.	4 June 1967 Lower Saxony	10 Seats, 7 % of vote
11.	11 October 1967 Bremen Burgerschaft	8 Seats, 8.8 % of vote
12.	28 April 1968 Baden-Wurttemberg	12 Seats, 9.8 % of vote

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

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

The National Democratic Party in West Germany

Special Report

WEEKLY REVIEW

Secret

№ 310

9 June 1967

SC No. 00773/67B

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN WEST GERMANY

The poor showing of the ultranationalistic National Democratic Party (NPD) in recent elections in several West German states clearly disproves the party's claim of providing an acceptable alternative to the policies and programs of the country's major parties. The NPD's failure to maintain the momentum suggested by the successes scored in two state elections last fall is directly attributable both to its own well-publicized internal dissension and to voter preference for the Christian Democrats and Socialists deriving from the image of vigor and decisiveness imparted by their "grand coalition" under Chancellor Kiesinger. Barring some serious reversal in the fortunes of the Kiesinger government--which is unlikely--it is doubtful that the NPD will be any more successful than other fringe groups have been in seeking to rally latent right-radical sentiment in Germany and revive it as a dynamic political force.

Election Setbacks

The NPD has claimed wide attention both in Germany and abroad and led many observers to conclude that it was a force to be reckoned with. Within two and a half years of its founding in November 1964, the party elected representatives to the legislatures in five of West Germany's ten states (11 counting West Berlin). In elections this April the party was expected to obtain close to 10 percent of the vote in Rhineland-Palatinate and 12 to 15 percent in Schleswig-Holstein but actually won only four seats in each parliament with 6.9 and 5.8 percent of the vote respectively. In the 4 June election in the party's "home base bastion" of Lower Saxony, the NPD's performance was similarly unimpressive--7 percent of the vote and 10 Landtag seats.

Emphasis by party leaders on their success in gaining representation in all the states where the party has competed during the past year has not masked their disappointment that the NPD's momentum of growth has leveled off. The party's failure to make a good showing in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony--areas considered particularly susceptible to nationalist appeals--is especially damaging, and raises fundamental doubt about the party's future prospects.

NPD Representation in West German States



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Origins and Early Successes

Formed from the remnants of the defunct German Reich Party (DRP)--one of a number of ultranationalistic splinter groups which have dotted the political landscape of postwar Germany--the NPD quickly established a political apparatus capable of functioning throughout the country. The new party soon distinguished itself by its relative success in attracting the support of other ultranationalistic elements and a variety of political malcontents. Earlier attempts by other groups to unite disparate nationalists invariably had foundered on personal rivalries and tactical disagreements. Some were no more than platforms for self-expression by leaders advocating a particular set of extremist notions. Even the most successful, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), which at its high water mark obtained 11 percent of the vote in the Lower Saxony Landtag elections in 1951, was unable to establish effective working relations with rival rightist groups before it was outlawed by the West German supreme court in 1952.

During its first year, the NPD encountered many of the problems experienced by its predecessors. The party was unable to put on an effective campaign for the September 1965 national elections and obtained only 2 percent of the votes--short of the 5-percent minimum required for representation in the Bundestag. In local elections in Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein in March 1966, however, the NPD showed that it could command pockets of strength. In the Bavarian cities of Nuremberg and Bayreuth, it received between 7 and 10 percent of the vote and elected representatives to the local governing councils. These gains were facilitated by concentrating the party's efforts in selected areas such as the Protestant centers of Middle and Upper Franconia in heavily Catholic Bavaria.

The first clear demonstration that the NPD could attract more than the ultranationalist vote came two weeks later in Hamburg, where the party nearly doubled its vote as compared with the Bundestag election the year before. Although the NPD failed to elect any deputies, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists were concerned about its ability to secure even 3.9 percent of the vote. The threat to the traditional third party, the conservative Free Democrats (FDP) became apparent. The FDP fell a third below its 1965 vote and lost 4 of its 12 seats in the Hamburg city council. Profiting from a decline in the economy which was already under way and the increasing public disenchantment with the leadership of then Chancellor Erhard in Bonn, the NPD accelerated both its organizational effort and its public relations campaign.

The stage was then set for the party's breakthrough in the Hesse and Bavaria state elections

last fall in which it won 7.9 and 7.4 percent of the vote and elected 8 and 15 deputies respectively. In Bavaria the NPD emerged as the only small party in the Landtag, causing the FDP to lose its representation in the legislature for the first time in its history. By underlining the weakness of the FDP, the election outcome contributed to the formation of the grand coalition government in Bonn by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists.

For the major parties, the NPD's successes had disturbing implications. In contrast to its various predecessors, the NPD appeared capable of mobilizing urban as well as rural support and of altering the general trend long evident in most West German elections toward a two-party system. In Hesse, the combined vote of the Christian Democrats and Socialists was a lower percentage of the total vote than in the previous election four years earlier. Still more significantly, however, Hesse and Bavaria provided further evidence of the NPD's ability to attract "protest" votes from various disaffected lower-middle-class elements including small businessmen and farmers unhappy with their lot in present-day Germany.

Basic Characteristics and Sources of Support

In spite of its direct lineage from the old German Reich Party, the NPD has tried to dispel the impression among the general public that it is the spiritual heir of Hitler's National Socialists. The party has sought acceptance as a legitimate political party and insists that it intends to function within the established democratic order. Party spokesmen maintain that it differs from the established parties primarily in its allegedly superior devotion to the national interest, which they accuse the governing parties in Bonn of having failed to protect. The NPD says it offers the voter a genuine choice between bankrupt policies of the major parties and a return to national morality.

As much as some NPD supporters might wish to play down the party's Nazi associations, however, it has been clearly established that the leadership consists of a nucleus of former Nazis who have been active in neo-Nazi parties throughout the postwar years. According to police reports, some 2,000 of the estimated 25,000 members of the NPD belonged to the Nazi party before 1933. This ratio is roughly eight times that for the public as a whole. The party has lost libel suits in which it has challenged charges of neo-Nazism. The German Interior Ministry notes the parallels in political outlook and philosophy between the NPD and the Nazis, and maintains that the party's activities "approach" unconstitutionality. In the words of one former party member, the NPD is made up of people "who have forgotten nothing and learned nothing" from Germany's past.

The Bonn government is generally reluctant, however, to ban the NPD, believing that it would be imprudent to drive the ultra-rightists underground. If the NPD were to score impressive new successes in future elections, however, the resulting concern in the major parties might prompt a reconsideration of this policy. Interior Minister Luecke favors banning the party as soon as enough evidence can be obtained to assure successful court action. It is also possible that new NPD gains would motivate the established parties to make proposed changes in the electoral law that would make it more difficult for the NPD to obtain Bundestag representation.

Although the NPD program is strongly reminiscent of Hitlerian National Socialism, the party's electoral supporters in Hesse and Bavaria also include persons who have no prior Nazi affiliations or any particular susceptibility to Nazism per se. It has managed to attract impulsive youngsters, as well as political malcontents of all ages. Its membership includes individuals from a broad range of occupations. The NPD's special appeal among the lower-middle-class, and particularly among the small businessmen and farmers is reinforced by the economic squeeze these groups are experiencing as a result of government economy measures. In Hesse and Bavaria, the party did especially well in areas noted for traditional German nationalism and in areas which are predominantly Protestant. Many NPD adherents are expellees from the territories lost at the end of World War II.

The makeup of the formal NPD membership is not radically different in age or occupation group from a cross section of the general public. However, there are certain characteristics of NPD supporters which set them apart from supporters of the three major parties. The NPD tends to attract a somewhat larger number of older persons as well as young adults, and the number of lower middle class members, including pensioners, is disproportionately large. Formal membership among students, however, is very small and only 350 of a total of 244,000 university students are on the party rolls.

There is no evidence that the NPD receives significant financial support from German industrialists. It is, however, able to operate in the black. The sound state of its finances is in part a result of its practice of charging admission to its rallies. This serves the double function of making the rank and file feel that they have a stake in the party and of making it necessary for its opponents to pay for the right to heckle. The party also derives considerable sums from membership dues, subscriptions to party publications, and donations from members and sympathizers.

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Party leader Von Thadden at Second NPD Congress at Karlsruhe, June 1966

NPD audience: a characteristic cross section

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Rumors of clandestine financial support from the Communists or from sympathizers among Nazi emigrants to Latin America have not been confirmed.

Despite NPD claims of widespread sympathy in the West German armed forces, there is no evidence of this. German security officials estimate that no more than 2 percent of armed forces members are card-carrying NPD members. Since the NPD is a legal political organization, military leaders are constrained from openly influencing members of the armed forces to oppose it.

Many Germans are probably reluctant openly to admit their support for an organization like the NPD. It is significant, however, that only 6 percent of respondents to a national opinion poll in January 1967 indicated a preference for the NPD.

Leadership Problems

The most notable single handicap confronting the NPD is the weakness of its leadership. None of its leaders possesses any great talent or stature. Certainly no individual with Hitler's demagogic genius has yet appeared. The absence of strong leadership in what has been called a "fuehrer-oriented party" has left it divided and weakened by factionalism. This was clearly demonstrated in March 1967 when then party chairman Fritz Thielen and Deputy Chairman Adolf von Thadden engaged in a public feud which further damaged the party's reputation. An outgrowth of long-standing personal antagonism, the dispute was triggered by Thielen's resistance to Von Thadden's attempted take-over as party chairman in Lower Saxony. Thielen claimed that Von Thadden's election to the state chairmanship had been illegal and would hurt the party's reputation. The party's federal executive, however, turned the tables on Thielen and not only voted to reinstate Von Thadden but also to drop Thielen from the national chairmanship and expel him from the party. Thielen clung to the helm under a temporary court order until finally throwing in the sponge in early May with an announcement of his formation of a new, rival party, the National Peoples Party (NVP).

More of an archconservative than a neo-Nazi, Thielen was never more than a figurehead. Real authority and leadership--as well as ideological guidance--was provided by Von Thadden. Von Thadden is a 45-year-old native of Pomerania, a member of a prominent and aristocratic Prussian family, a number of whose members were prominent in the anti-Nazi resistance. Although Von Thadden applied for Nazi party membership he apparently was never formally admitted. An ardent nationalist, Von Thadden aspires to become a German De Gaulle rather than a re-creator of the German Reich.

Other leaders of some prominence include Otto Hess, party propaganda chief, and Waldemar Schuetz, editor of the NPD's

official weekly, Deutsche Nachrichten. Both were active Nazis.

Thielen's departure clears the way for Von Thadden formally to take over leadership of the NPD. It is doubtful that Thielen has the personal force or following to organize a party with significant strength. The impact of the new party on the NPD will probably be small since the bulk of the NPD membership appears to prefer the leadership and ideology of the Von Thadden group. On the other hand, the strengthening of extremist tendencies within the NPD signaled by the triumph of Von Thadden may hurt the party's interests in the long run. The result is also likely to assist those actively seeking a formal government crackdown on the party.

Program

In addition to its leadership difficulties, another failing of the NPD is its inability as yet to offer a clear, positive program relevant to existing problems. Xenophobic and opportunistic, the NPD feeds upon nostalgia for an older German nationalism, discontent with the existing social order, and Germany's international standing and frustration over the fact that reunification remains as distant a prospect as ever. Its stated objectives are ill defined, when not deliberately ambiguous, and are sometimes inconsistent. Its electoral approach is generally negative and destructively critical rather than affirmative. Its principal targets include foreign interests and culture which undermine old values and "de-Germanize the fatherland." It attacks the renunciation by those in power of what the NPD regards as justified German objectives. It deplores what it considers the miseducation and corruption of youth, "crime in the streets," foreign aid, and the competition of foreign workers.

The NPD demands an end to German dependence on the US and calls for the revival of German national consciousness. It attempts to draw a parallel between West German - US relations and those between the East German regime and the USSR. In order to free Germany from foreign domination, NPD spokesmen maintain, American "occupation" forces must go, although not before the withdrawal of Russian troops, which the NPD would have occur simultaneously with that of US troops. Germany must again become master of its own fate, party leaders insist, and the "lie" of war guilt and war crimes trials must be ended and a new German general staff created. A key demand is that the reunification of Germany cannot be limited to uniting West and East Germany but must include the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse border now held by Poland. Although it does not advocate the use of force to achieve this objective, the party holds out hope that recovery will be possible by a Machiavellian deal of some sort. NPD spokesmen at present renounce a national nuclear capability for Germany.

The party puts forth slogans proclaiming "Germany for the Germans" and "Europe for the Europeans." Indeed, the NPD favors a united Europe somewhat along the lines advocated by De Gaulle. Europe, it holds, should be completely independent of the US, and possess its own nuclear deterrent. It should be built on a Franco-German alliance that smaller European countries sooner or later would have to join. The NPD would welcome the decay of NATO as signaling the end of sterile policies which do not serve Germany's real interests.

In seeking to gain the broadest popular acceptance, the party avoids affirming the more extreme aspects of Nazi ideology. There is, for example, no obvious anti-Semitism in the party program and Jews technically could become party members. The private attitudes of the leadership, however, are said to resemble traditional Nazi anti-Semitism closely. The NPD makes vague references, moreover, to the importance of "blood ties," rejects evidence relating to the Nazi extermination policy, makes derogatory references to the Jews in the party press, and denounces aid to Israel.

In recent campaigning in Lower Saxony, NPD spokesmen shifted tactics somewhat by no longer stressing issues obviously associated with the Nazi period such as war guilt and reparations. Instead, they sought to exploit current grievances including the economic recession, unemployment, lack of progress on reunification, and what they called the unreliability of NATO.

Future Prospects

The NPD's failure to maintain the momentum of last fall's successes in this year's state elections in Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower Saxony is a serious blow to the party's hopes. The squabble among the leadership apparently reinforced the feeling among uncommitted elements that casting a protest vote for the NPD was not worthwhile under present circumstances. The widespread discontent among farmers over government economy measures did not result in a significant shift of votes to the NPD. Moreover, there has been a strong resurgence of general confidence in the Bonn government. Although the NPD benefited last fall from the popular dissatisfaction with the Erhard government, the grand coalition headed by CDU Chancellor Kiesinger has displayed vigor and decisiveness which has been rewarded at the polls.

Even if the NPD were to follow its forerunners into oblivion it would not mark the end of rightist extremism. A portion of the German electorate will remain receptive to this kind of appeal. In the absence of a party such as the NPD, right-wing voters tend to give their support to one of the insignificant splinter parties, or to one of the more conservative established parties, such as the FDP, when they vote at all.

It is possible--although increasingly unlikely--that the NPD could turn out to resemble other parties of a national-conservative stamp. Despite the radical views of some of their members, such groups have managed to operate without subversive manifestations. The German Party (DP), for example, which had been represented in several North German state legislatures and in the Bundestag conducted itself in a responsible fashion.

The NPD at present draws a good deal of this traditional right-wing vote from the old Refugee Party, the DP, and small conservative regional parties such as the Bavarian Party. The total extremist vote, however, has increased very little since the establishment of the NPD. Estimates of the extent of hard-core ultranationalist sentiment in Germany vary between 5 and 15 percent of the electorate. Under present conditions this does not constitute a threat to German democratic institutions and is not greater than the degree of extremist sentiment in other Western European countries.

Outlook

Assuming the NPD survives the current period of internal strife, its potential for further growth beyond its present 6- to 8-percent range appears to be limited under conditions now prevailing in West Germany. The NPD is still capable of capitalizing on circumstances which might present themselves as a result of a protracted economic recession or major political blunders which would discredit the present government leadership. The outcome of recent state elections, however, tends to confirm that the overwhelming majority of German voters continues to prefer the moderate, albeit increasingly independent and nationalist, policies of the major parties and the government, and rejects the radical alternatives advocated by the NPD. (SECRET)

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S E C R E T
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COUNTRY: West Germany

REPORT NO.: CS DB-312/00003-67

SUBJECT: BfV Program to Monitor and Counter the Activities of the National Democratic Party

DATE DISTR.: 5 JAN 1967

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PLACE & DATE ACQ.: Germany, Bonn (25 November 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO.:

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A qualified American official from a senior official of the West German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). This official is responsible for monitoring the activities of right radical organizations throughout West Germany. The information is probably true.

1. (Summary: The West German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and its regional affiliates (LfV) have undertaken a program to monitor and counter the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD). Included in this program are efforts to penetrate the NPD at all its levels, to monitor its membership and finances, and to counter its influence.)

2. Report: For a number of years the BfV has been engaged in penetrating and monitoring the activities of right radical organizations. Since the establishment of the NPD in [illegible] 1964, the BfV has made a concerted effort to penetrate it at both the national and regional levels. This effort has resulted in the recruitment of about 60 sources with access to the NPD organizations at all levels. In several cases the BfV or LfV have been able to recruit local NPD county chairmen and in six Laender have access to the minutes and files of the Land organizations. The BfV has also penetrated the national headquarters of the NPD in Hannover.

3. Through its penetration of the national organization, the BfV has been able to obtain and photograph the entire membership rolls, which currently contain about 20,000 names. The national list has been augmented by additional membership applications obtained via penetrations of the [illegible] Land organizations. The BfV is currently in the process of tracing all of these membership applications against the master Nazi Party membership files at the American

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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TOTALS: IE 2, CI 2, FI 4, EUR 9, DO/H 1.

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controlled Berlin Document Center. Although this tracing activity has not been completed and is handicapped by lack of personnel at the Berlin Document Center, the BfV estimates its current file on the NPD is far more accurate than the files at the NPD headquarters. Because of its access to the Berlin Document Center, the BfV will eventually have a better estimate of the number of NPD members who are former Nazi Party members than does the NPD itself.

4. The BfV is also making a concerted effort to obtain documentary evidence on the NPD's sources of income. The recruitment efforts to do this are directed at spotting and recruiting clerical help who work in NPD offices and have access to files. Information in the BfV's possession to date, which includes considerable documentary evidence regarding finances, indicates that the party is not receiving any substantial financial assistance from abroad. The principal sources of funds are as follows:

   a. The monthly DM 3.- membership dues. For the 20,000 members, this amounts to DM 60,000 per month or DM 720,000 a year.

   b. Subscription fees for publications.

   c. Single donations from financially well-to-do members and supporters.

   d. Admission fees for political rallies. The BfV has registered, since May 1966 when the NPD began its campaign in Bavaria, a total of more than 2000 political rallies in Bavaria. Although at times more than one third of those attending such rallies were estimated to be opposed to the NPD, everyone attending the rally paid an admission fee. The BfV estimates that the NPD has been able through the above sources of income to collect from DM 3,000,000 to DM 4,000,000. The LfV are watching this funding quite closely, particularly for evidence of financing from Communist countries. Thus far they have been unable to substantiate the existence of any such support. Although there is no firm evidence of actual financial support of the NPD from Communist sources, the BfV is aware of an interest on the part of the Eastern intelligence services to penetrate the NPD and monitor its activities.

5. At the instigation of Federal Minister of Interior Luecke, the BfV has undertaken to establish a confidential all-party committee consisting of members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Trade Union Movement (DGB) to counter the NPD in Rheinland-Pfalz prior to the upcoming elections in spring 1967. All of the parties have agreed to participate and this activity is moving ahead. Recently at a two-day conference chaired by the BfV in a village on the Mosel River, it was decided not only to counteract NPD propaganda during the election campaign, but also to undertake orientation lectures for all officials in the Rheinland-Pfalz and other local governments who have shown NPD leanings. These courses will be launched as soon as the campaign gets underway. A similar propaganda and orientation activity is also being planned for the elections in Schleswig-Holstein in 1967.

6. The BfV has persuaded the DGB to set up an action group aimed at organizing the Labor movement into countering the

influence of the NPD. The BfV is assisting the DGB in working out methods for the infiltration of workers into NPD organizations to report and counteract their influence within factories and workers councils. The BfV has also established contact with the German Industrial Institute in Cologne, which is sponsored by the German equivalent of the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers. The BfV used as an argument with the industrialists the fact that increasing influence of the NPD in German industry would have a negative effect upon foreign trade.

7. The BfV undertook a survey of the election results at the village and county level in Land Hesse. This survey showed that the NPD had substantial success in areas containing German military installations. It was further determined that the NPD had considerable appeal among non-commissioned professional soldiers who feel they have failed to find acceptance in the postwar German society. This negative attitude has been less among Bundeswehr officers and draftees than among non-commissioned officers, who feel themselves underpaid and lacking in social acceptance. The BfV has contacted the security organizations of the Bundeswehr to undertake a program of orientation to counter the influence of the NPD within the Bundeswehr.

Headquarters Comment: CS-311/16288-66 from a different source reported that the President of the West German Association of Military Reservists had stated that a large percentage of older reserve officers and non-commissioned officers had voted for the NPD in the Land Hesse election.

Anlage 1

Stellenbesetzung des Bundesparteivorstandes der NPD

(Stand: 1.10.1966)

• Parteivorsitzender:

THIELEN, Friedrich (Fritz) geb. 25.9.16 in Bremen,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Schönebeck, Brauteichen 19
Beruf: Betonfabrikant

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründungsmitglied der CDU,
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften,
1957 Mitglied und später Landesvorsitzender der "Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

1. Stellvertreter:

GUTMANN, Wilhelm, geb. 9.6.1900 in Basel,
wohnhaft: Karlsruhe, Kaiserallee 30
Beruf: Angestellter

1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Baden-Württemberg der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit/
"Gesamtdeutsche Partei" (GDP/BHE),
ehem. Funktionär des "Bundesverbandes ehem. Internierter- und Entnazifizierungsgeschädigter" (BIE).

NSDAP: 1.3.1932
1933 Bürgermeister in Tiengen

von THADDEN, Adolf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff,
wohnhaft: Benthe, Lärchenweg 6
Beruf: Chefredakteur

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1949 Mitglied der "Deutschen Rechts-Partei" (DRP),
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion "Nationale Rechte",
1950 Mitgl. u. Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei"(DRP),
1955-1959 Mitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages.

NSDAP: 1.9.1939

WINTER, Franz Florian, geb. 23.3.1923 in Amberg,
wohnhaft: Tegernsee, Bahnhofstr. 11
Beruf: Metzgermeister u. Fachredakteur

1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bayern der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
CSU-Mitglied u. Mitglied der Landesleitung
GDP-Mitglied u. Mitglied des Vorstandes des Landesausschusses und des Kreisverbandes

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

III. Präsidium:

BROWER, Otto Theodor, geb. 31.5.1906 in Paris,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Vegesack, Gerhard-Rohlfs-Str. 61,
Beruf: Kaufmann
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bremen der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
"Deutsche Partei" (DP),
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaft

NSDAP: 1.8.1931

HESS, Otto, geb. 19.12.1908 in Rossdorf,
wohnhaft: Bissendorf, Weidendamm,
Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann,

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied u. Funktionar der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP),

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,
1938 Referent im Berichts- und Rechtsamt der
obersten SA-Führung, SA-Obersturmbannführer.

LANKER, Dr. Karl, geb. 22.9.1913 in Theesen,
wohnhaft: Bielefeld, Paderborner Weg 24 a
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Notar

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Nordrhein-Westf.d.NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NADAP: 1.5.1933

SCHÜTZ, Waldemar, geb. 9.10.1913 in Dausenau,
wohnhaft: Göttingen, Felix-Klein-Str. 4
Beruf: Schriftleiter u. Verlagsinhaber

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionar

NSDAP: 1.11.1936,
1929 Eintritt in die HJ,
1934 Adjutant des Gau-Pressechefs,
1937 Kreiswart u. Gaureferent "Kraft durch
Freude" (KdF),
1938-1939 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang,
anschließend Beauftragter der NSDAP im Gau Hessen,
SS-Hauptsturmführer der Waffen-SS

SCHWEIMER, Horst-Günther, geb. 11.2.1913 in Essen,
wohnhaft: Hamburg-Groß-Flottbek, Hochrad 7,
Beruf: Reedereibesitzer

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Hamburg der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: 1.4.1932
SS-Hauptsturmführer und Adjutant
Legationsrat im Auswärtigen Amt

VA[illegible], [illegible], geb. 21.1.19[illegible] in Berlin,
wohnhaft: Vlotho/Weser, Hochstr. 6,
Beruf: Dipl. Politologe

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied der CDU, des BHE, der GDP und der NE-Freunde.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

WINKELMANN, Fritz, geb. 21.5.1909 in Wittingen/Krs.Gifhorn
wohnhaft: Wittingen, Stackmannstr. 4
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Notar

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied der "Deutschen Partei" (DP) und
Mitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

IV. Parteivorstand:

a) gewählte Mitglieder:

BRANDES, Anneliese, geb. 7.10.07 in Hargarten/Lothringen
wohnhaft: Herzberg, Enzianstr. 7

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

LAUNE, Peter, geb. 30.11.1940 in Löhnhorst,
wohnhaft: Hannover, Auf dem Lärchenberge 15,
Beruf: Student

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

MA[illegible]DORN, E[illegible]l, geb. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren,
wohnhaft: Großaitingen, Bahnhofstr. 45
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)
1936 Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau Schwaben
1937 Reichsschulungsleiter im Amt für Technik, München.

PRINZ zu SALM, Karl, geb. 8.11.1911 in Coesfeld,
wohnhaft: Breitscheid ü.Düsseld., Kahlenbergweg 7
Beruf: Kaufmann/Oberst a.D.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

WINKELMANN, Gertraud, geb. 18.2.1917 in Prettin,
wohnhaft: Lüneburg, In der Techt 1
Beruf: Hausfrau

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründerin und Leiterin des "Deutschen Kinderschutzbundes" Oldenburg
DKP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.9.1938

b) Sonstige Angehörige des Parteivorstandes:

JÄNG, Adolf, geb. 21.3.1906 in Saarbrücken,
wohnhaft: Saarbrücken, Enkircher Weg 23
Beruf: Versicherungskaufmann
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Saarland der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: 1.6.1933

M A I, Fritz, geb. 26.10.1914 in Osthofen,
wohnhaft: Osthofen, Mainzer Str. 20
Beruf: Winzer/Weinhändler

Vorsitzender des LV Rheinland-Pfalz der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DKP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.3.1933
SS-Sturmbannführer

FAUSENDER, Heinrich, geb. 24.5.1899 in Solingen,
wohnhaft: Rothenburg/Fulda, Oberer Hausberg 4
Beruf: Kaufmann

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Hessen der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1918 Mitglied der "Deutsch-Nationalen-Volkspartei" (DNVP)
1946 FDP-Mitglied und Mitglied des hessischen Landtages,
1949 Mitglied des Bundestages,
1955 Übertritt zur "Deutschen Partei" (DP) u. Mitglied der Fraktion der DP im Deutschen Bundestag.

NSDAP: 1.10.1931
Austritt erfolgte im November 1932

KÜHNE, Dr. jur. Lothar, geb. 2.1.1908 in Steinbach/Thür.,
wohnhaft: Hannover, Im Moore 12,
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt,
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Niedersachsen der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
FDP-Mitglied u. stellv. Landesvorsitzender

NSDAP: 1.12.1931
1934 Reichssicherheitshauptamt,
1936 Referent in der "Parteiamtlichen Prüfungskommission" im Stab des Stellvertreters des Führers,
1937 Büro des Botschafters von Ribbentrop,
SS-Untersturmführer

LOBER, Karl-Ernst, geb. 6.8.1927 in Namslau/Schl.,
wohnhaft: Schleswig, Kolonnenweg 31,
Beruf: Bäcker und Jugendpfleger

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Schleswig-Holstein der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
SRP-Mitglied und Funktionär,
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär auf Kreisebene.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

V. Ämter im Präsidium:

Organisationsabteilung: Adolf v. THADDEN (s.Stellvertreter)

Finanzabteilung: Otto Theodor BROUWER (s.Präsidium)

Rechtsabteilung: Fritz WINKELMANN (s.Präsidium)

Propaganda- u.Schulungsabteilung: Otto HESS (s.Präsidium)

Pressenabteilung: Waldemar SCHÜTZ (s. Präsidium)

Referat z.b.V.: Fritz WINKELMANN (s.Präsidium)

VI. Referenten im Parteivorstand:

Außenpolitik:

von THADDEN, Adolf (s. Stellvertreter)

Innenpolitik:

HERRMANNDÖRFER, Benno, geb. 20.3.1916 in Altötting,
wohnhaft: München, Heckenstaller Str. 178,
Beruf: Senatsrat

Mitglied des geschäftsführenden Vorstandes des Landesverbandes Bayern der NPD,
Vorsitzender des Bezirksverbandes Oberbayern der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: 1.1.1938
HJ-Mitglied seit 1933

Agrarpolitik:

RUDOLPH, Heinz, geb. 7.6.1922 in Elberberg,
wohnhaft: Klein-Ilde 5,
Beruf: Bürgermeister, Dipl.Landwirt, Hauptmann d.R.

Referent für Agrarfragen im LV Niedersachsen der NPD,
Redner auf Landesebene im LV Niedersachsen der NPD,
1. Vorsitzender im Kreisverband Hildesheim der NPD.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
CDU-Mitglied

NSDAP: 1.9.1940

Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Steuerpolitik:

FABBENDER, Heinrich (s. Parteivorstand)

Verkehrspolitik:

SCHWEIMER, Horst-Günther (S. Präsidium)

Jugendfragen:

LOBER, Karl-Ernst (s. Parteivorstand)

Sozialpolitik:

KNUPFER, Kurt, geb. 7.6.1915 in Rippien,
wohnhaft: Neuenhaus, Jahnstr. 2,
Beruf: Elektromonteur

Geschäftsführer und Kassenleiter im Kreisverband Grafschaft Bentheim der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.5.1930

Frauen- und Familienfragen:

WINKELVOSS, Gertraud (s. Parteivorstand)

Kulturpolitik:

DEHNEN, Dr. Dietrich, geb. 19.4.1924 in Duisburg,
wohnhaft: Duisburg-Meiderich, Haferacker 13
Beruf: Oberstudienrat

2. stellv. Vorsitzender im LV Nordrhein-Westf. d.NPD
Landesredner des LV Nordrhein-Westfalen der NPD

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

Vertriebenenfragen:

GUTMANN, Wilhelm (s. Stellvertreter)

Arbeitskreis Bundeswehr:

NITSCHE, Dieter, geb. 4.7.1934 in Zittau,
wohnhaft: Oldenburg, (z.Z. Putlos)
Beruf: Hauptmann der Bundeswehr

NPD-Stadtrat im Stadtparlament Oldenburg

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
AKON- Mitglied

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

VII. Sonstige Funktionen im Parteivorstand

Leiter der Abteilung Kasse:

SCHÜTZ, Waldemar (s. Präsidium)

Leiter der Revisionsabteilung in der Finanzabteilung:

SCHIMMEROHN, Dr. Heinz, geb. 22.1.1911 in Chemnitz,
Wohnhaft: Hannover, Raimundstr. 1
Beruf: Versicherungs-Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAP-Mitglied und Funktionär
DNP-Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.6.1930
SS-Obersturmbannführer

Bundesgeschäftsführer:

SCHWARZ, Martin, geb. 16.9.192 in Oels/Schles.
Wohnhaft: Porz-Ensen, Charlottenstr. 14
Beruf: Hauptmann d.Bw. a.D.

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine

NSDAP: 1.5.1932

Anlage 2

Gesellschafter des Verlages
"Deutsche Nachrichten" (DN) GmbH.

SCHUTZ, Waldemar, geb. 9.10.1913 in Dausenau,
wohnhaft: Göttingen, Felix-Klein-Str. 4
Beruf: Schriftleiter und Verlagsinhaber

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.11.1936,
1929 Eintritt in die HJ,
1934 Adjutant des Gau-Pressechefs,
1937 Kreiswart und Gaureferent "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF),
1938 - 1939 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang,
anschließend Beauftragter der NSDAP im Gau Hessen,
SS-Hauptsturmführer der Waffen-SS.

von THADDEN, Adolf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff,
wohnhaft: Benthe, Lärchenweg 6
Beruf: Chefredakteur

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1949 Mitglied der "Deutschen Rechts-Partei" (DRP),
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion "Nationale Rechte",
1950 Mitglied und Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP),
1955 - 1959 Mitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages.

NSDAP: 1.9.1939

HESS, Otto, geb. 19.12.1908 in Rossdorf,
wohnhaft: Bissendorf, Weidendamm,
Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann,

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitgl. u. Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP)

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,
1938 Referent im Berichts- und Rechtsamt der obersten SA-Führung,
SA-Obersturmbannführer.

RUTER - DORN, Emil, geb. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren,
wohnhaft: Großaitingen, Bahnhofstr. 45
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.8.1930
1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)
1936 Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau Schwaben
1937 Reichsschulungsleiter im Amt für Technik, München

[illegible], Dr. G[illegible], geb. 24.5.1910 in Berlin,
wohnhaft: Wiesbaden-[illegible]enberg, Tennelsa[illegible]str. 23
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.5.1928
Referatsleiter der Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, Berlin

[illegible], Dr. Heinz, geb. 22.1.1911 in Chemnitz,
wohnhaft: Hannover, Raimundstr. 1
Beruf: Versicherungskaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär
DNV - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.6.1930
SS-Obersturmbannführer

von [illegible], Prof. Dr. Hans-Bernhard, geb. 30.5.1903
in Protzig/Pommern
wohnhaft: Wuppertal-Vohwinkel, Am Osterholz 55
Beruf: Universitäts-Professor a.Wv.
zur Zeit Lehrer an einer Privatschule

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.2.1931
Gauamtsleiter der NSDAP (Gau Ostpreußen)
Gauheimstätten-Amtsleiter,
Gaudozentenbundführer.
Ordentlicher Professor der Staatswissenschaften
Rektor der Albertus-Universität in Königsberg.

[illegible], Walter, geb. 6.10.1908 in Breslau,
wohnhaft: Hamburg-Altona, Arnoldstr. 24
Beruf: Angestellter

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.4.1932

[illegible], Peter, geb. 22.10.1930 in Greifswald,
wohnhaft: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, SPreuergasse 45
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DAF - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

SEETZEN, Walter, geb. 25.11.1916 in Hamburg,
wohnhaft: Bremen, Kulenkampffallee 162
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
SRP - Mitglied und Funktionär
DRP - Mitglied und Funktionär

NSDAP: 1.4.1936

THIELEN, Friedrich (Fritz), geb. 25.9.1916 in Bremen,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Schönebeck, Brauteichen 19
Beruf: Beton-Fabrikant

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründungsmitglied der CDU,
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften,
1957 Mitglied und später Landesvorsitzender der "Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

BROEWER, Otto Theodor, geb. 31.5.1906 in Paris,
wohnhaft: Bremen-Vegesack, Gerhard-Rohlfs-Str. 61
Beruf: Kaufmann

Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
"Deutsche Partei" (DP)
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften.

NSDAP: 1.8.1931

18 July 1963

GERMANY AFTER THE WAR, A BACKGROUND READING LIST

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DORNBERG, JOHN. Schizophrenic Germany. New York, Macmillan, 1961. 302p. DD259.2.D6 DLC; DD259.2.D6 CIA.

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(FRONT NATIONALE FRANCE)

THIRD AGENCY

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LONDON

9 August 1944

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-21

COUNTRY France
SUBJECT Resistance and Labor organization in Normandy; Civilian Attitudes.

ORIGINAL REPORT NO (V-130)
DATE OF REPORT 24 July 1944
EVALUATION B-2

CONFIRMATION
SUPPLEMENT
CORRECTION

SOURCE OSS - 3rd Army
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1. The Conseil de la Resistance in Cherbourg is composed of three main groups: the O.C.M., Liberation and the Front National:

The Chief of the Conseil de la Resistance, M. Greslin, is an O.C.M. leader and his organization holds the majority of seats in the Conseil. The O.C.M. is generally composed of merchants, landowners and notables who, prior to the armistice, were Rightists or extreme-Rightists.

Liberation, which claims to have been the most active and efficient movement in the Department, is led by and generally composed of Socialists and C.G.T. men. In fact all the Resistance Socialists and Union men are members of Liberation.

As in the rest of France, the Front National is here the Communist Party's resistance organization. It is not as influential here as it is reported to be in other regions.

2. The right hand man to M. Greslin is M. Bocher (Beauchet), who seems to be as well the most prominent labor leader of the department. Bocher is at the same time secretary of the Regional Socialist Federation, secretary of the Merchant Sailor's Union, secretary of the Union des Syndicats, representative of the I.T.F. and head of the local Liberation movement. He is a very efficient man and seems to be respected and esteemed even by his political adversaries.

3. The enthusiasm in favor of the Allies described in the newspapers should not be overestimated. The Norman did not like the Germans and is glad that they have been thrown out. But a very

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great number of people here are suspicious of Resistance because of the presence of Communists and Socialists. Moreover, they are very reserved towards foreigners as a rule, and they are not sure of what the Allies intend to do. They are also puzzled about the currency which has been introduced. On the part of Labor, there is a sincere enthusiasm for the victories of the democracies somewhat tempered by the way local problems are handled by military authorities. For example, the ~~Army or the Navy~~ have hired dozens of workers to repair the Cherbourg harbor, but ~~they have done it~~ without consulting the unions. They have thus given work to ~~a lot of~~ former Todt workers, more or less reliable, while skilled workers who were in Resistance movement are left unemployed. Instances of this kind are frequent.

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Report No [illegible]
Report Date [illegible]

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Information Date : [illegible]
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Minutes of Session

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

that the CC [illegible] not maintaining a sufficiently independent and opportunist attitude.

12. Regarding relations of the Socialist Party with resistance groups, [illegible] Soldani, member of the Central Committee of the party for the Turin region of the CLN, expressed his deep regret over the fact that fusion between the Socialist Party and the PSI has seemed impossible. He said he had hoped this fusion of the socialists of the [illegible] left elements of the Socialist Party would constitute a great representative Socialist Party of the future. During the talks on the subject, he said, it was clear, despite an explosive exception to an instruction by Pet. Nenni, member of the Direzione of the party, that the leaders of the PSI were simply a group of opportunists who were trying to take advantage of the attraction of some political power.

13. As for foreign policy, the Congress expressed itself as opposed to the hegemony of any one great power, whether it be Britain, the United States or Russia, and in favor of a system of collective security, with all the democratic nations of the world equally represented in an international association of nations. This association should [illegible] the economy, credit, transport, etc. in order to be able to prevent the crisis. Regarding the treatment of Germany, the Congress voiced the opposition to any dismemberment of the country, but approved a long occupation, which would allow control of all German industry and sources and a long-range program for the reeducation of German youth.

14. Communist Party. According to [illegible], secretary of the Venice section of the Socialist Party, the Communists claim to have 4,000 registered members in the city. Communist leaders interviewed declined to quote any figures.

15. [illegible], president of the Venetian region of CLN, stated that the Communists have gained many new followers in the [illegible] since the war, at the expense of the Socialists. He claims [illegible] to obtain results [illegible] largely outmoded from the Communist nationalist policy. He also [illegible] young, vigorous leaders as opposed with the Socialists [illegible] the war, leaders representing the old regime. He stated that the policy of the Communist Party would remain nationalist in the future; that it would be difficult to return to a revolutionary program.

16. [illegible] asserted that the Socialists get along better with the Christian Democrats than with the Socialists, since the latter - as he put it - placed party interests above the national interest.

17. The Communists [illegible] opposed to the holding of elections next February, which reason [illegible] as follows: [illegible] elections were called before the reconstruction of the national economy by the Allies and [illegible] following [illegible] the Allies that resulted in the country being [illegible] the Allies [illegible] recognized the Badoglio government, the principal area for [illegible] of Italy's major exports. Besides, it would be well [illegible] for the return of two million prisoners and deportees from Germany to the polls. According to Mr. [illegible], however, the real reason the Communists are opposed to the elections is their fear of losing [illegible] strength which they have built up on the vertical department-

[illegible] liberation committee [illegible], [illegible] indicated his personal opinion on the holding of elections at the present time since the Toronto vote constituted an experiment and he was in favor of conducting such experiments while France was still at war. (Algiers may well feel that to hold elections now would mean a loss of strength for the [illegible] all as for the candidates.) Etienne Allegra, Communist municipal delegate, stated flatly that he believed the elections could be postponed, although his party is making its plans so as to have everything in readiness in case the elections are held in January.

18. Both [illegible] and others [illegible] the leaders of the Var, M. Servin, for not being [illegible] enough in his [illegible] of the democracies, particularly the government of Algiers and [illegible], [illegible] for his personal courage and for his active participation in resistance activities but pointed out that he was formerly secretary of the pro-fascist [illegible] and that he did not break [illegible] the old habits of the pre-war period fonctionnaire.

19. Pothier described political leaders, [illegible] of Toulon, as a [illegible] of the old tradition along with the great majority of high [illegible] officers at the Toulon naval base.

20. According to Allegra, the Toulon edition of Frugoulida, the [illegible] paper published in Marseille, has a daily circulation of 1[illegible],000 and a Sunday circulation of [illegible],000.

21. [illegible] ambitious to [illegible] the Toulon section of the [illegible] has formed about [illegible] months ago. The officers are [illegible], president, M. Journeau, [illegible], secretary; M. Poulier, author of the [illegible] treasurer. A representative committee of the [illegible] in the process of organization; Labrousse hopes to have it organized before the end of the year. [illegible] a membership [illegible] the Toulon section of [illegible] but this appears to be an exaggeration. Labrousse stated that the Toulon edition of the Christian [illegible] paper, [illegible], published [illegible] a local circulation of [illegible]. This Toulon edition was started [illegible].

22. The [illegible] (FTP) in the [illegible] of the [illegible] at Toulon, [illegible] making serious efforts to capture the [illegible] of [illegible] free weekly political lectures, starting in October 194[illegible] by the [illegible] of the CFLN.

23. Radical-Socialist Party: It is universally stated that the Radical-Socialists are [illegible] as a political force in the Var. No party headquarters have been established in Toulon, and the Var has no [illegible] newspaper announced that, no [illegible] of any political-socialist activity was discovered.

24. [illegible], of the [illegible], is pessimistic over the possibility of fusion between the [illegible] and the [illegible] in the Var [illegible] after the agreement just reached between the two parties in the Isère and of the Gard. On the other hand, Arigo, of the [illegible], points out that many members of his organization are resistant about uniting with the [illegible], because they see in this an attempt

[illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible]. However, the [illegible] [redacted] [illegible] and still continuing between the two groups. [illegible] report, [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] not [illegible] all the positions [illegible] responsibility in [illegible] [illegible] or held by [illegible].

[illegible] according to [illegible], representative of the [illegible] on the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] members of the [illegible] [illegible] October 1947, [illegible] [illegible] in 1937. [illegible] of the most urgent [illegible] before the [illegible] in the [illegible] of the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] workers are too highly paid [illegible] comparison with the salaries of [illegible] skilled workers in other trades. This [illegible] [illegible] created by [illegible] was paid [illegible] in order to [illegible] labor in certain high-[illegible] [illegible]. For example, workers in the building trades are getting up to [illegible] per hour, while skilled [illegible] on [illegible] are only [illegible] francs [illegible]. [illegible] points out that it is not possible to raise all salaries to the [illegible] level [illegible] by the Germans, since this would cause an inflationary trend. Therefore, the [illegible] is faced with the dilemma of working [illegible] for the [illegible] to a certain extent [illegible] some salaries and the [illegible] of others.

[illegible] and Military Traffic

[illegible] Military Traffic [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

29. [illegible] stated that [illegible] elements of [illegible] but [illegible] elements [illegible] circulating in [illegible] clothes in order to [illegible] Thus [illegible] the [illegible] in [illegible] for all [illegible]

30. [illegible], who was formerly [illegible] of the [illegible] and [illegible] still a member of [illegible] [illegible] (candidate [illegible]), claims [illegible] for the [illegible] in the [illegible] 1950, [illegible] stated that many of the [illegible] were [illegible] on [illegible] of the [illegible] that the former were [illegible] their spare time to [illegible] work.

31. [illegible] According to Lt. Colonel [illegible], [illegible] of the [illegible] in [illegible] consisted of [illegible] (1) [illegible] Bigrim consisted of [illegible] and [illegible] preparing [illegible] shortly for the front to join the [illegible] in Korea, [illegible] formed on [illegible] [illegible] one of the [illegible]

[illegible] Inter-Korean Relations

32. [illegible] stations [illegible] and [illegible] would [illegible] possible.

33. [illegible] the [illegible], [illegible] of [illegible] beautiful [illegible] barbarism of [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] food [illegible] civilian population [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

35. [illegible] people [illegible] to [illegible] the decision of the Government to [illegible] the [illegible] divorce [illegible]. [illegible] stated that [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] region.

Housing Situation.

36. Damage to Construction. Modern [illegible] mainly from [illegible] the [illegible] hit, but [illegible] destruction as [illegible] in the center of town as well. According to the [illegible] Bureau of Reconstruction, of a total of 36,[illegible] houses in [illegible], 9[illegible] were entirely destroyed, 1,3[illegible] were [illegible] damaged and [illegible] suffered damage. Since it is [illegible] difficult to obtain building [illegible] to repair houses which have [illegible] partially destroyed and [illegible] from the [illegible] of the [illegible]. Many people who [illegible] are temporarily living with [illegible] relatives [illegible] of [illegible] have [illegible] yet [illegible] from the [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] during the [illegible] months [illegible] normal [illegible] of life, we [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible]; if [illegible] from [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible].

37. [illegible] modification [illegible] housing [illegible] of building materials [illegible] within [illegible]

0,[illegible] tons of [illegible] for roofing
3,[illegible] tons of bricks
5,[illegible] tons of plaster
1,[illegible] tons of cement
1,[illegible] tons of lime
200,[illegible] square meters of window panes.

[illegible] requirements [illegible] with [illegible].

38. [illegible] food conditions in [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] before [illegible] children, [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] different [illegible] [illegible] 2 months [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] for the [illegible] of children of [illegible] 6 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 1,5[illegible] children [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] (Commission Jacques)
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
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[illegible]

Notes on Poulon

1. [illegible] is in full activity [illegible] with [illegible] elections and [illegible] for more [illegible]. The candidates and [illegible] are the [illegible] of the [illegible] political parties, and their strength [illegible] is [illegible] divided. The Christian Democrats (Christian Democratic Party) are lacking [illegible] place with the Radical-Conservatives [illegible]. As for the [illegible] organizations, both the [illegible] (Communist International) and [illegible] (Moscow Internationale) are very strong [illegible] in the party [illegible]. It is difficult to estimate the extent of [illegible] leaders [illegible] are willing to [illegible] figures [illegible] but both appear to be about equal in strength to the [illegible] communists.

2. [illegible] stated to Mr. [illegible], President of the Poulon [illegible] that [illegible] many [illegible] parties in Poulon (as compared with [illegible] before the war). He pointed out that the [illegible] traditionally a [illegible] stronghold in 1939, of 25 senatorial generals [illegible] were socialists and 3 [illegible]; he stated that if elections were held [illegible], the Socialists might [illegible] even [illegible].

3. [illegible] stated that the political situation is confused by the existence of the [illegible] and the [illegible], and that since the work of the committee [illegible], these groups [illegible] have gone over to the political parties. He maintains that the leaders of the [illegible] are motivated by a sense of personal interest, their aim being to replace the old politicians and the old leaders. He states that [illegible] of the Socialist Party with the [illegible] will not be accomplished, and that individual communists joined the [illegible] simply to [illegible] the resistance movements to that organization and to [illegible] the influence of the [illegible].

4. [illegible], in private conversation, and [illegible] Socialist [illegible] of Versailles, in his speech before the Congress of the Socialist Federation of the Seine-et-Oise, [illegible] 1946, warned the [illegible] against [illegible] to democracy. They pointed out that present [illegible] and [illegible] in Liberation were not representative of the will of the people [illegible] reflect public opinion. Referring [illegible] as a [illegible], said [illegible] as normal proof of popular support before [illegible] decisions [illegible] considered [illegible]. [illegible] stated that the [illegible] liberation [illegible] conducted very [illegible] in terms of the majority, but of all [illegible] the [illegible] speak for the people. [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible], [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible].

5. [illegible] feels it possible that the [illegible] may be [illegible] to exert [illegible] pressure on the government [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible] of the elections [illegible] [illegible] order in France although [illegible] does

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hold [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] would again [illegible] [illegible] that [illegible] affiliate to [illegible] [illegible] of the provincially [illegible] popular support of General De Gaulle.

6. The Socialists fight a certain [illegible] of the Senate vote, they feel that the members are likely to be strongly influenced by the clergy when they go to the polls. Despite this fact, however, the Socialists would [illegible] to be held next February.

7. The Socialist party [illegible] [illegible] despite the rain throughout the [illegible], with a colorful display of posters and [illegible] material, and huge gatherings of [illegible] and [illegible]. The Socialist [illegible] of a [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] daily [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] small [illegible] of [illegible] prominent meetings of the Socialist [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] are held.

8. Composition of the Socialist [illegible] of the Vaucluse: The Socialist [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

that the CGT was not maintaining a sufficiently independent and apolitical attitude.

12. In discussing relations of the Socialist Party with resistance groups, M. Soldani, member of the Bureau Federal of the party for the Var and member of the CN, expressed his deep regret over the fact that fusion between the Socialist Party and the CNR had become impossible. He said he had hoped this fusion of the Socialists of the CNR with the best elements of the Socialist Party would constitute a great representative Socialist Party of the future. During the debate on the subject, he took vigorous, almost explosive exception to an insinuation by Gen. Mistral, member of the Bureau Directeur of the party, that the leaders of the CNR were simply a group of civilians who were trying to take advantage of the situation of state political power.

13. As for foreign policy, the Congress expressed itself as opposed to the hegemony of any one great power, whether it be Britain, the United States or Russia, and in favor of a system of collective security, with all the democratic nations of the world equally represented in an international association of nations. This association should have its own army, credit, transport, etc. in order to be able to guarantee the peace. Regarding the treatment of Germany, the Congress voiced its opposition to any dismemberment of the country, but approved a long occupation with a severe Allied control of all German industry and commerce and a long-range program for the reeducation of German youth.

14. Communist Party: According to M. Mistral, secretary of the Nouloa section of the Socialist Party, the Communists claim to have 4,000 registered members in the Var. Communist leaders interviewed declined to quote any figures.

15. M. Rothier, president Communist member of CN, maintains that the Communists have gained many new followers in the Var since the war, at the expense of the Socialists. He claims that this results to a large extent from the Communists' nationalist policy and also from their young, vigorous leaders as compared with the Socialists who still have the same leaders representing the old regime. He stated that the policy of the Communist Party would remain nationalist in the future; that it would be difficult to return to a revolutionary program.

16. Rothier asserted that the Communists get along better with the Christian Democrats than with the Socialists, since the latter - as he put it - placed party interests above the national interest.

17. The Communists are opposed to the holding of elections next February. Their reasoning, ostensible here, follows: the elections were scheduled before the recognition of the provisional government by the Allies as a means of holding a popular referendum and thus showing the Allies that De Gaulle and the country solid with him. Now that the Allies have recognized the De Gaulle government, the pressing need for immediate elections no longer exists. Besides, it would be evil, fair to wait for the return of the three million prisoners and deportees before proceeding to the polls. According to M. [illegible] of CN, however, the real reason the Communists are opposed to the elections is their fear of losing some of the strength which they now hold on the various depart-

mental and local liberation committees. Incidentally, M. Aubry himself indicated his personal opposition to the holding of elections at the present time, since the women's vote constituted an experiment and he was not in favor of conducting such experiments while France was still at war. (Aubry may well feel that to hold elections now would mean a loss of strength for the MRP as well as for the Communists.) Pétinne Allegre, the multi-municipal deputy, stated flatly that he believed the elections would be postponed, although the party in making its plans so as to have everything in readiness in case the elections are held in February.

18. Both Allegre and Pothier criticized the prefect of the Var, M. Savie, for not being vigorous enough in his handling of the activities of the Communists, particularly the procurement of adequate food supplies. Pothier praised Savie for his personal courage and for his active participation in resistance activities but pointed out that he was formerly secretary of the Cous-prefecture at Toulon and that he had not broken away from the old habits of the pledding government fonctionnaire.

19. Pothier described Admiral Lecdert, Préfet Maritime of Toulon, as a reactionary of the old tradition - along with the great majority of higher naval officers at the Toulon naval base.

20. According to Allegre, the Toulon edition of Rouge-Midi, the Communist paper published in Marseille, has a daily circulation of 17,000 and a Sunday circulation of 15,000.

21. Mouvement Républicain Populaire: The Toulon section of the MRP was formed about one month ago. The officers are: M. Labrosse, president; M. Jouzian, attorney, secretary; M. Cornier, worker at the Naval Arsenal, treasurer. A departmental federation of the MRP is in the process of organization; Labrosse hopes to have it organized before the end of the year. Labrosse claims a membership in the Toulon section of 1,000 - but this appears to be an exaggeration. Labrosse stated that the Toulon edition of the Christian Democrat newspaper, Le Provençal, published at Marseille, has a local circulation of 2,000. This Toulon edition was started two weeks ago.

22. The Union Féminine Civique et Sociale (UFCS) is the women's adjunct of the MRP at Toulon. As in Paris, the MRP in Toulon is making serious efforts to capture the women's vote. A series of three free weekly political lectures, starting 13 October 1944 has been organized by the UFCS.

23. Radical-Socialist Party: It is universally stated that the Radical-Socialists are practically absent as a political force in the Var. No party headquarters has been established in Toulon, and aside from the brief newspaper announcement, no sign of any Radical-Socialist activity was discovered.

24. PPF and PS. Pothier, of the PS, is optimistic over the possibility of fusion between the PPF and the PS in the Var region after the agreement just reached between the two groups in the department of the Gard. On the other hand, Arig e, of the PPF, points out that many members of his organization are hesitant about uniting with the PS, because they see in this an attempt

on the part of the PCF to march the CGT. General, he states that discussions are still continuing between the two groups. Griffis asserts that although many members of the PCF are not communists all the positions of responsibility in that organization are held by communists.

25. [illegible] according to M. Bergeon, representative of the CGT on the CFLN there were [illegible] registered members of the CGT in the Var at December 1944, and numbers with 24,907 members in 1937. Bergeon considers one of the most urgent problems before the CGT in the Var to be that of the stabilization of salaries. Dock workers are reportedly paid twice as much as the salaries of equally skilled workers in other trades. This anomaly of salaries has created by the dockers who paid very well in order to attract labor to certain high-priority jobs. For example, workers in the building trades earn up to 31 francs per hour, while skilled artisans and foremen earn only 12 francs per hour. Bergeon points out that it is not possible to raise all salaries to the high set levels established by the dockers, since this would cause an inflationary trend. Therefore, the CGT was faced with the delicate task of working at the same time for the reduction -- to a certain extent -- of some salaries and the raising of others.

Police and Military Bodies

26. [illegible] Republican Security and Border Patrol Corps. The Forces Républicaines de Sécurité have a total strength of [illegible] officers and men in the Var, under the command of [illegible], Colonel [illegible] Barrat. Their headquarters are at Draguignan, about 7 km. west of Toulon, at the Château Sainte-Roseline, a requisitioned private estate formerly occupied by the Vichyite [illegible] (Groupes Mobiles de Réserve).

27. The two companies under Barrat form part of the RS of the 15th Military Region (Provence, Haute Alpes, Basses Alpes, Alpes Maritimes, Basses-Alpes, Var) and are used by regional commissioner Aubert and placed under the command of General Pellet. The RS are an official, paid militia, working under the prefect in each department of the 15th Military Region, with the principal task of combatting traitors, collaborationists and black marketeers and of maintaining order. In the Var, the RS has the additional task of guarding the [illegible] political prisoners at the camp of Fréjus. Members of the RS in the Var are all former FFI. The men are paid 2,856 francs monthly; officers and noncommissioned officers receive regular army pay.

28. Barrat states that he is short in most of arms and equipment for his men. There are uniforms for only 40 percent of his 300 men, and their total arms consist of 30 Garand rifles and two light machine guns. Barrat pointed out that it would mean a great deal for the discipline of his men if they could all be properly armed and equipped. He hastened to add that in spite of circumstances, discipline was good. An inspection tour of the quarters, however, revealed a rather sad state of discipline; the men lacked the military appearance and bearing of trained soldiers. German prisoners working on the premises were more prompt than the members of the RS to come to attention and salute at the approach of Lt. Colonel Barrat.

29. Barrat stated that he had sent detachments out on expeditions against the

29. [illegible] stated that he had made determined efforts to take action against the "black market" -- elements of which have reported in various localities in [illegible] but so far without success. The [illegible] has not made contact with these elements mentioned in the [illegible] circulating in civilian clothes in Toulon to help stamp out the black market. Thus far, the [illegible] made 250 arrests in Toulon, for all offenses.

30. [illegible], who was formerly departmental chief of the [illegible] intelligence, and who is still a member of the departmental committee of the Union [illegible] Republicaines (Gaullist patriotisme), claims responsibility for the [illegible] in the [illegible] 30. Bourrat stated that some of the [illegible] were the same as those of the [illegible], but that the former were usually civilians detailed only their spare time to this task.

31. [illegible] According to Lt. Colonel Warren, all the remaining FFI of the Var are grouped in the [illegible] at Draguignan, under the command of Colonel [illegible] Salvatori. This unit numbers about [illegible] men, and is preparing to leave shortly for the front to join the 1st French Army. In Toulon, [illegible] members have formed an amicale des FFI. According to one of the [illegible], the amicale has a total membership of [illegible].

Franco-American Relations

32. American sailors stationed in Toulon report a number of cafe fights and arguments between themselves and French men, principally over women. The feeling is widely spread among American sailors at Toulon that the French would overcharge an American at every opportunity possible.

33. On their side, the French are, to a greater or lesser degree, resentful over the American bombing of Toulon, which destroyed a large part of the city; over American treatment of German P/W's; and over the fact that American food supplies to the civilian population have not arrived in greater quantities. Cal Nelson (a Cowlesan, recut 5), veteran of the last war and acquainted for over two years during this one) remarked bitterly that American soldiers had sold cigarettes, rations and soap at high black market prices and had not even maintained decency, courtesy to what was expected of them. Cigarettes were sold at 50 to 100 francs a pack; soap at 50 francs a cake.

34. [illegible], Communist member of the [illegible] and director of [illegible], stated that he noticed a general feeling that General Leclerc, [illegible] to Tiboy, had continued relations with the Vichy Government even after his recall; that Washington was not pleased with the De Gaulle government and would have preferred a General or a Commissaire to be Gaulle; that a report was circulating in Marseilles newspaper circles to the effect that there exist before the liberation of Paris, American diplomatic representatives had penetrated into the city and had discussed with Vichy officials the possibility of setting up a new French government replacing the De Gaulle Government.

35. [illegible] stated that many people were no longer [illegible] the Allies had [illegible] to [illegible] the decision of the Government to disarm the [illegible] civilian militias. In this connection, he stated that the FFI and the FTP were greatly [illegible], since the people had no confidence in the police [illegible] of the pre-war and who had served the Vichy regime.

Economic Situation.

36. Damage and destruction. Toulon has suffered heavily from Allied bombing. The port area was particularly hard hit, but a good deal of destruction has occurred in the center of town as well. According to the municipal bureau of Reconstruction, of a total of 16,[illegible] houses in Toulon, 993 were entirely destroyed, 1,3[illegible] more than 50 percent destroyed and 5,9[illegible] more suffered damage. Since it is extremely difficult to obtain building materials, to make repairs, houses which were only partially damaged are deteriorating rapidly from the effects of the weather. Many people made homeless are temporarily living with friends and relatives, in makeshift quarters; a large number have not yet returned to Toulon from the interior, where they had sought refuge during the bombings. Toulon's normal population is of 160,000 and [illegible] was the end of August; it had risen to 1[illegible] the end of October, and to [illegible] 110,000.

37. The municipal Service Fields reconstruction estimates needs of building materials for repairs as follows:

0,[illegible] tons of tile shingles for roofing
3,000 tons of bricks
5,000 tons of plaster
1,000 tons of cement
1,000 tons of lime
200,000 square meters of window panes.

Temporary roofing repairs are being made with wood planks.

38. Food. Food conditions in Toulon are bad, the most serious shortages being milk for children, and fats and oils. There is only enough milk to permit distribution to infants up to 9 months. According to Dr. Bidermann, it would be proper to provide milk for the 1,077 children of 9-18 months, 600 cans of condensed milk would be required daily. Another 900 cans daily would be needed for the 1,500 children 18 months - 3 years of age. [illegible] emphasized the urgency of this problem. Dr. Bidermann recommends that if American milk is shipped to Toulon, it be given directly to the municipality for distribution. (Informed of this the Red Cross [illegible] claims that on previous occasions the American milk was distributed through the French Red Cross, much of it found its way into the black market and never reached the children for whom it was intended.)

39. Despite the fact that the Var is an important producer of olive oil, there was a serious shortage of this product on the market. According to Allegro, municipal [illegible] in charge of ravitaillement, whenever stocks of olive oil do exist in the region they are blocked by the Direction de Ravitaillement for distribution throughout France. This is a source of dissatisfaction among the people

However, distribution of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] with the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] improve by the end of the [illegible] [illegible], where [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on the black market, but [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

Page [illegible]

Reporting [illegible]

[illegible]

	Responsibility	Party or Interest Movement
Pierre [illegible]	Relations et Relations (Nord)	
	Police	FIN
Lecropp	Finances	FIN (Charation Dérogers)
Magin [illegible]	Reconstruction, Urbanisme	FIN
Cavelier	Instruction publique, Beaux Arts, Sports, Théâtre	FIN
Lourmand, Dr.	Ministère de guerre et pavillon	FIN
Turinaz	Radio-service	FN
Pothier	Travaux d'exploitation des services communaux, voirie, [illegible] publics, contrôle des travaux neufs	CF (Communist)
Villegro	Ravitaillement	Communist Party
Ducasse	Séparation propriétés, affaires militaires, défense passive, quais, ports et [illegible]	CS
Villiard	Réquisitions, ministère et Réfugiés	Socialist
Soulas	Etat-civil, contributions, [illegible]	Socialists
Guiné	Personnel, régie des [illegible]	CGT
Pouillon	Cimetières, propos funéraires, abattoirs	CGT
Sauli	Services publics [illegible]	CGT
Mme. Antoine	Secours mobilisés	Mouvement unitaire de la Libération Nationale
Mme. Aurière	Orphelinats, [illegible], Maison, Secours	Union des Femmes Françaises
Arnaudin	Jeunesse, sports	Fédération de la Jeunesse Patriotique
Incelli	Hygiène, Laboratoire	Loge Maçonnique (Indépendante)
Mme. Blanchet	Contentieux	
Mme. Guerin	Service des Eaux, Nettoiement, Assainissement, Voies Plantations et Cadeaux	(Indépendant)

[illegible]

14-00000

K 6

Toulouse 12 Septiembre 1945.

INFLUENCIA DE LOS COMUNISTAS EN TOULOUSE

Los comunistas influyen totalmente en el "FRONT NATIONAL" y su diario "LE PATRIOTE", de Toulouse.

Asimismo en el COMITE FRANCE-ESPAGNE, cuyo Presidente Jean CASSOU, a pesar de no pertenecer al Partido Comunista, se deja maniobrar por el.

Igualmente en el Comite FRANCE-U.R.S.S.

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SECRET

Report No. : F-6937
Date of Report : 28 April 1946
Information : Current

FRANCE: POLITICAL

Reported Replacement of "Front National" by a New Paper

The following report is from a member of the staff of "Front National" and is a close friend of Thorez. This information was disclosed directly to a well-tried source, who has extensive contacts in French press circles:

1. It appears improbable that "Front National" will continue to be published after the elections, because of the breaking down of this political formation, which is of no further interest - except perhaps a marginal one - to the Communist Party. However, until now, Thorez has been opposed to its disappearance.

2. At present the leaders of the CP are planning to replace it by a more effective organ, and are studying three possible solutions:

(a) A newspaper which might be called "Ce Matin", and which would be supplementary to "Ce Soir" which would be responsible for its publication. The directors of "Ce Soir", which is a successful paper, are opposed to this idea, because they do not see the necessity for placing an additional load on the budget.

(b) A paper exclusively for women and which would treat all questions interesting to women: the home, the factory, food, the child, clothing, education, etc. But it is wondered if women have not adopted the habit of reading their husbands' paper, and would not be reluctant to indulge in the expense of an extra paper.

(c) An evening paper which would sell for 3 fr., and which would be similar to "Le Monde" in form, and would be the leftist opposite number of that paper. This paper would be destined particularly for the elite, and would stress cultural matters, accurate documentation, etc. The difficulty lies in assembling a first rate editorial staff to handle the political, economic, financial and artistic departments of such a paper.

3. It appears likely that a decision will be reached before the end of May.

SECRET

Distribution: 3 May 1946

Embassy/Paris	Washington	SSU/JD PARIS
LO	Amzon	
MA	Bern	Hampshire/Bramley II

14-00000

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Code Name ..... Other Code Names .....

REF. MAPS

CARD NO. F65

Name FRONT NATIONAL (FAIA)

Pre-D-Day ..... D-Day .....

Address (i) ..... (ii) .....

Hides (i) ..... (ii) ..... (iii) .....

Proof of Identity .....

Description: Height ..... Weight ..... Build ..... Colour of Eyes .....

Distinguishing Peculiarities .....

Zones of Operations Z N

~~Sub~~-Organisers COLBERT represents the MOVEMENT CONSEIL DE LA RESISTANCE

W/T Operator .....

Experience .....

Remarks Resistance movement supposed to be run by the Communists strongest in the North but has some following in Z S.

1219

From: Marseille Report No: WM-633 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 8 No. of Enclosures:

Report Made By: H. R. SHERIDAN HRS Approved By:

Distribution:
By copy to: 0 Orally to: 0

C.F.D.I

Source Cryptonym: HOMOHEDRAL References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Although this report is based principally on information received from HOMOHEDRAL, the chief facts have been confirmed by HOMESTRETCH and HOMOCHRE. Much of the information, especially the excerpts from CADI reports, was taken from the original CADI documents which HOMOHEDRAL lifted from the CADI files. (One of HOMOHEDRAL's sub-agents got the char-woman who cleans the CADI offices to lift a few reports each night for a period of a week.) The Italian immigrant sent by this station to the CADI office is Ettore GUIDETTI.

Copies to:
Paris-2
Wash-2
Mars-1

Classification SECRET

REGISTRY COPY 29-4-11-2

14-00000

Subject: Comite D'Action et de Defense des Immigres		Report #:	WPM-333
		Date of Information:	See below
Place Acquired:	Marseille	Date Acquired:	22 April 1949
Evaluation:	C-2	Date of Report:	29 April 1949
Source:	HOMOHEDRAL		

1. The Comite d'Action et de Defense des Immigres (CADI) was organized at Paris in November 1944 and operated overtly until ordered dissolved as a subversive group by a decree of the Ministry of the Interior in December 1948.

2. The principal organisations which joined to form CADI are as follows:

Parti Communiste Francais
Confederation Generale du Travail
Conseil National de la Resistance
Front National
Union des Femmes Francaises
Union des Patriotes Sovietiques
Comite Italien de la Liberation
Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive
Union National de la Colonie Tcheco-Slovaque en France
Union Democratique des Hongrois en France
Aide a la Patrie Polonais
Front National Armenien
Italia Libera
Front National Roumain
Union de la Jeunesse Republicaine de France
Union Nationale Espagnole en France
Federation des Espagnols Residant en France

3. As the name CADI implies, the organisation was formed to aid foreign immigrants in France. It was not ostensibly founded as a political organisation, nor was it ostensibly designed to support any particular political party. Its apparent purpose was rather to give social and legal aid to any and all immigrants in France. Its social program was quite simple and was largely devoted to the distribution of food, clothing, shelter, and money to needy immigrants. Its legal program was two-fold: first, it offered legal assistance to the individual immigrants through its lawyers; and secondly, it sponsored a series of measures in the Chamber of Deputies which were designed to benefit the status of all immigrants.

Classification

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-00
FEB 1948

REGISTRY COPY 29-4-11-2

4. The measures which CADE sponsored were officially known as the "resolutions pour la promulgation d'un Statut Juridique des Immigres", and demanded the following benefits for the immigrants:

a. That "Cartes de residents privileges" be granted to all immigrants, without exception, after three years residence in France.

b. That immigrants be allowed to choose their place and type of employment.

c. That immigrants be granted all the social benefits to which a French citizen is entitled.

d. That expulsion from France be made dependent on a court order, rather than on a decree of the Ministry of the Interior.

5. CADI sponsored the above measures for all immigrants. For those certain immigrants who had volunteered for service in an Allied army, or had taken part in the Resistance, or had been deported to Germany, CADI made the following demands:

a. That naturalization be granted by judges of the peace upon simple proof of the immigrant's claim to be in one of the above categories, and that all other naturalization requirements be waived.

b. That all invalids, deportees, and widows of men of this category be entitled to the same social benefits as French citizens of similar classification.

c. That the term "Mort pour la France" be added to the titles of the deceased of all immigrants of this category.

6. For those immigrants of the above category (para 6) who preferred to maintain their original citizenship, CADI demanded:

a. That they be allowed to choose their place and kind of work and that they be permitted to change their profession whenever they so desired.

b. That they receive all social benefits granted to French citizens.

c. That all "administrative measures resulting from their antifascist activity before and during the War be annulled." (Field comment: This is a direct translation from the French and refers to any legal actions taken against immigrants who, as Communists, refused to obey the orders of the French government between September 1939 and the German attack on Russia.)

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14-00000

WFM 533

7. CADI was largely successful in realising its demands, for the Statute of Immigrants which was passed by the Consultative Assembly (the Statute was composed of the ordonnance of 24 March 1945, the ordonnance of 2 November 1945, the ordonnance of 19 October 1945, the ordonnance of 25 October 1946, and the decree of 25 December 1946) gave to immigrants an equality of rights approximate to those enjoyed by a French citizen. The most active supporter of the CADI measures in the Consultative Assembly in 1945 was Madeleine BRAUN, prominent Communist and one of the leaders of the Front National. The Communist Party and the CGT also heavily backed these measures.

8. Paragraphs 4 through 6 represent CADI's original program; it was overt, it was designed to benefit all immigrants, and it was supposedly non-political. To implement its program, CADI established branch offices throughout France in the cities which had large numbers of immigrants. These branch offices were known as Centres d'Action de Defense des Immigres. CADI also took the lead in organising the annual National Congress of Immigrants (Congres National des Immigres), the first one of which was held in Paris on 25 January 1946. M. AMRACHA, representative of the Ministry of Industrial Production presided. In 1947, CADI again sponsored the congress, now called the International Congress of Immigrants in France (Congres International des Immigres en France), which took place in Paris 16 February to 17 February. Some 15,000 delegates, representing 3 million immigrants of all nationalities, attended. Justin GODARD, president of CADI, made the principal speech. Louis SAILLANT, secretary-general of the CGT and president of the CMI, was a member of the sponsoring committee and sat on the speakers' platform. The sponsors' committee for the 1947 Congress which was also held at Paris in February, consisted of Justin GODARD, Louis SAILLANT, Jacques DUCLOS, Albert BAYET (delegate of the Ligue des Droits de L'Homme), PINEAU (director of the Union de Jeunesse Republicaine de France), Madeleine BRAUN, and Joseph HOFFMANN (lawyer for the Lettres Francaises in the FRANCHEMO TRIAL).

9. Although the ostensible and apparent purpose and activities of CADI were those outlined in paragraphs 3 to 6, its true purpose and its clandestine activities were quite different. CADI was not the non-political organization that it professed to be, but was in fact a tightly controlled Communist organization. To be sure, the legislative measures it supported benefited all immigrants, but they were designed primarily to help Communist immigrants. Similarly, CADI's program of aid to immigrants was restricted solely to Communist or pro-Communist immigrants. The true purpose of CADI was to aid Communist and

29-4-11-2

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS