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SANITARIO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 SECRET

ROUTING	
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3	6

DIRECTOR
A. EL SALVADOR
ON, WH 8

DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CILGPS, CILMS, VC

PCB	INT	SS	SB

SECRET 282140Z

DIR CITE SALV 5229
WH DIV CUBA CUBANDEF

REF DIR 44137

28 AUG 62 062851
* Provide details of approach made to
Target by Liaison asset

1. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PARA 3 REF, Liaison asset Target Liaison asset

Liaison asset told Target that Target HAD REFUSED TO SERVE AS INFORMANT FOR GOES ON SECURITY GROUNDS; CITED CASE OF STUDENT WHOSE REPUTATION RUINED IN UNIV A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO AFTER BEING COMPROMISED AS POLICE AGENT. Target THEN RAISED POSSIBILITY OF WORKING FOR US, PROBABLY BECAUSE IT WELL KNOWN AROUND UNIVERSITY THAT Liaison asset ENJOYS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH USIA CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND ONCE GIVEN US SCHOLARSHIP.

2. AT MEETING WITH Station and CIA officer ON 27 AUG, Liaison asset TOLD HIM THAT WE HAVE DECIDED TO LET THE DUST SETTLE ON THE RUSSIAN PROFESSORS FLAP BEFORE FOLLOWING UP PITCH TO Target, AND TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION THIS CASE UNTIL ADVISED. Station asset DID NOT QUESTION THIS RATIONALE AND PROMISED TO COMPLY.

3. PLS IDENTIFY WH REP DW REP MENTIONED PARA 2. REF.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FBI

29 Dec. 67

Re: MOC

Thames

Confidential

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, WH Division	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; transform: rotate(-15deg); display: inline-block;"> MICROFILMED JUL 1 1967 ODC MICROSER </div>	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO			X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK (CAN JUDGE INDEXING)
SUBJECT	AKULE/MIHSPAWN/AMNOP Plans for ODCA Mid-April Congress		MICROFILM 150
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
REF: JMWAVE 0180			
<p>1. The purpose of this dispatch is to report the comments of AMNOP-1 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organization Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA) Congress. AMNOP-1 said that the precise date of the Congress is yet to be set though it is still scheduled for mid-April. He now feels that he will have a copy of the formal agenda by the end of December which is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. While AMNOP-1 is not a member of the committee preparing the agenda, he said that he is being kept generally informed of developments and that once the agenda is prepared he should be in a position to influence a revision of the agenda in the event that there are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not satisfactory. He said that the principal person with whom he is in contact on this matter is Rafael CALDERA and that it will be through CALDERA that he would hope to make his influence felt. AMNOP-1 also said that he has been assured by CALDERA that the Cuban case will be prominent in the agenda.</p> <p>2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed of developments on this end.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Roger E. Marchbank</i> Roger E. MARCHBANK</p> <p>Distribution: 3 - WH/COG</p> <p style="text-align: right;">14-300-10</p> <p style="text-align: center;">COPY</p> <p style="text-align: right;">DEC 1 1967</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; width: fit-content;"> GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification </div>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
B- 201-767219	UFGA-29068	1 December 1967	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER	
	S E C R E T	19-300-10	

FBI

20 Oct. 67 Miami
Re: RDC
Confidential

FBI :

30 Aug. 67
Miami
Re: MOC no class.

5 June 67 Miami
Re: MOC
Confidential

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chiefs, All WH Stations and Bases		X		WISHED FOR INDEXING	
INFO.				NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM Chief, WH Division				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT Christian Democracy in Latin America				MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
<p>ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI.</p> <p>The following analysis has been prepared in WH Division and is transmitted to all WH Division Stations and Bases as a review of the current status of Christian Democracy in Latin America and an updating of Headquarters' view on the movement. We believe the subject matter merits close and careful study by all Station operations and reports officers whose comments are solicited. FYI, this material, in a shorter and sanitized form was published in the 3 March issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and will thus be widely disseminated throughout the intelligence community. However, the WOGEAR study could not include much of the "Conclusions" section since it was interpretative and had operational overtones. Thus we've decided to send the full text herein in book dispatch form.</p> <p>1. The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy might develop significantly throughout Latin America competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress. Christian Democracy's advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus frequent manifestations of anti-Yankee syndrome caused some observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these concepts had an emotional appeal. This political charisma, coupled with a commitment to basic social reform and opposition to Communism, and presented within an ideological framework stressing the dignity of the human person, comprised a package of considerable attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the student and middle class elements. This dispatch will review the current status of the CD parties and the role of organizations -- ODCA, CLASC, Party youth and student wings and European CD groups -- which</p>					
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		DATE	
		BOOK DISPATCH 5961			
		CLASSIFICATION SECRET		GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	
		OFFICE WH/CA		COORDINATING Joseph DiStefano gb (8 March 1967)	
		OFFICE SYMBOL		EXT. 5006	
		DATE		OFFICER'S NAME	
		WH/1		(in draft)	
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		WH/4		(in draft)	
		WH/5		(in draft)	
		WH/6		(in draft)	
		WH/7		(in draft)	
		RELEASING		OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
		C/WHD		William V. Broe	

DISPATCH

represent key factors in the development of the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. Our major purpose is to determine, some two years after the Frei victory, whether the generally enthusiastic assessment of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this highly significant election was justified.

I - CURRENT BALANCE SHEET OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

2. Parties of Current Significance. Christian Democratic parties are generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador and Peru.

a. The Chilean PDC is the only party with the responsibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the Party's reform program is being implemented with less than deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly challenged by the left wing of the PDC.

b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent of the electorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica Party (32 percent). COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency.

c. In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1972, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular Action (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet positions. Some would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only 4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in competition with the dominant AP and the long-established APRA, both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to this argument by the very recent split off of a dissident faction of the PDC into a separate party. However, the inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition government and thus contributes an element of stability to the political scene in Peru.

3. Parties of Moderate Potential. Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgement of potential, there are not more than four CD parties -- in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil and Guatemala -- that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

a. The Dominican PRSC stands as a prime example of CD irresponsibility from the time Caonabo Javier took over Party leadership in the wake of the Dominican Revolution in April 1965. It has collaborated with the entire spectrum of Marxist-leaning parties, and moderation of its extreme militancy in the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has developed a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily from the university ranks, and is buttressed by the strongest CLASC affiliate (CASC) in the Hemisphere.

b. The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a miniscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. If the Panama CD succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and attracts militants from the predominantly negro and mestizo population, it could become a force of some importance.

c. While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of the vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three key states of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other pre-Castello Branco political parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner in the presidential and parliamentary elections of late 1966. Expanded political activity will probably be permitted after the seating of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it is expected that the number of legally recognized political parties will be limited. It appears likely that the PDC will have to merge with another party if it is to compete in the legislative life of the country. If the PDC joins with a party that has strength outside the present PDC strongholds, and the PDC message and mystique sets the tone for such a new political entity, the net result could be expanded importance for Christian Democracy in Brazil.

d. The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This nascent group has good strength in the youth and student movement and growth potential in the important campesino sector. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene de Leon appears honest and intelligent but he has little organizational flair or charisma. His leadership is being challenged by a group of militant "Young Turks" on the left. With more vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon cadres the party could develop significantly.

4. Parties of Insignificance. The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties -- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay -- show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia

(Remo di Natale). These parties appear doomed to the role of bridesmaids to the handful of parties that really count.

II - PARTY YOUTH WINGS

5. CD Strength in Universities Ahead of Party Strength. As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants are drawn from the ranks of student appendages active in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much more significant than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the Party polled 3.1 percent of the vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), while its University youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 election. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of the Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966. These comparative figures suggest some conclusions which are presented in Paras. 19 and 20 below.

6. Radicalization of Youth Wings. Several CD leaders, most notably Frei and Caldera, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. That youth groups of every political stripe assume positions to the left of their parties is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line divides the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) from the stance assumed by Marxist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far-out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University is allied with the Communist students.

7. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great concern of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Some observers believe that the CD youth problem has been exaggerated and that the "hot heads" will mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. While this is partially true, we would take issue with this relaxed view. The raw material to be molded is far different than it was ten years ago; since that time the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed -- and among the youth the cry has assumed din proportions. The natural mellowing process will no longer produce the same magic.

8. Need for Training. Some believe that the only way of arresting the CD youth drift to the left in the foreseeable future lies in massive and intensive youth and political cadre training. Efforts in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national political training institutes, ORNEU and various student training

courses) have been discouraging. In most instances the teachers share identical biases with the students with the result that misconceptions are reinforced and no new horizons are opened up. Frei and Caldera have asked the German Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field, but the Germans, while recognizing the serious need, have thus far declined to increase their commitment. To accomplish anything significant, the Germans believe a massive program must be launched (which would tax their current resources), and they wonder whether the CD youth situation has been permitted to drift too long to salvage.

III - THE IMPACT OF CLASC ON THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

9. CLASC Poses Serious Danger for CD Movement. A KIMONK study points out that "Organized labor could contribute substantially to the development of well-organized CD political parties in the hemisphere, but it also offers the best chance for CD extremists to cause harm to the movement." Few would argue that how the CD movement fares and the image it projects depend in not insignificant measure on the posture assumed and progress achieved by CLASC. More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on the worst element comprising it -- and in this regard CLASC is challenged only by the party youth and student wings. As an organized labor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the exception of its campesino arm); its only impact and sole raison d'etre up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. It is unlikely that CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow as do parties when they achieve the responsibility of government.

10. CLASC Has Maintained Posture of Independence. Despite its "Christian" label, CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic movement or any member party. The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty of most of the same aberrations as the least responsible of the CD parties, it invariably commits its follies independently, (often, in fact, setting an example that is emulated by the parties). But while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it is also true that CLASC does not discourage the belief that it is the chosen labor instrument of the Christian Democratic movement, although this label has never been formally bestowed.

11. Closer Ties Between CLASC and CD Movement Appear Likely. It appears likely that a more organic participation of CLASC in CD affairs is in the offing. A Seminar was held in Montevideo from 11 - 23 April (sponsored by the Christian Democratic Formation Institute -- IFEDEC) for officials of CLASC who are also officers of Christian Democratic parties. The Seminar, called for the specific purpose of arranging closer coordination between the CD political movement and the Christian labor movement, resulted in the signing of the "Carta de Montevideo" on 20 April. The Act calls for formal representation of ODCA in both the Christian labor organization and CD party labor departments. To this end, a Coordinating Committee was formed -- the Comite Relacional Y Coordinador De Organizaciones Laborales Y Funcionales De Los Partidos Democrita Cristianos. The Act appeals to the CD parties

to request ODCA approval of the creation of this Coordinating Committee and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen hemispheric labor instrument. The eventual approval of the ODCA leadership appears likely; indeed, it is doubtful that the Act would have emerged from the Montevideo Seminar if informal agreement of the ODCA leadership had not been obtained in advance.

12. Negative CLASC Influence on Party Youth Wings. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement will likely rub off negatively on the CD youth wings which invariably are further left than their parent parties and identify much more closely with the revolutionary image and mystique CLASC has sown and propagated. It is perhaps significant that CLASC has intensified its efforts since January to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor movement. This initiative appears to have made greatest progress in Central America.

IV - THE ROLE OF ODCA

13. ODCA Contributes Little Positive Direction. The Latin American CD parties formed their regional organization in Montevideo in 1949 -- the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). The current officers of ODCA are:

President : Rafael Caldera, Venezuela
Vice President : Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru
Vice President : Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala
Secretary General: Tomas REYES Vicuna, Chile

ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broad range of key issues (most forcefully on the American intervention in the Dominican Republic) but on balance has been less strident in its criticism than several of its member parties (notably the Chilean, Bolivian and Dominican CD's), probably because of Caldera's restraining hand. The Organization would merit much closer attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply sanctions against national groups. But ODCA amounts to little more than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological homogeneity and the cement of their union appears to be based more on revolutionary mysticism (which most parties are careful to qualify with adjectives like peaceful, democratic and Christian) and on negative factors (hostility to the U.S., capitalism and the oligarchies), than on a foundation of CD doctrine or basic agreement on just what they want.

14. Efforts to Firm Up the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts in European CD circles to prod ODCA to set criteria for membership and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support from the Latin American parties and organizations against these criteria. EYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans cannot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in Latin America to hold to the same rigid standards of political morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should the Europeans

continue to tolerate and thus abet the irresponsibility of the Latin CD parties because there are no standards at all. ODCA leader Caldera appears to recognize the need for at least some basic ideological common ground among ODCA-member parties. But no signal success has been achieved in this direction to date and we are not at all sanguine that even modest progress will be made in this regard in the foreseeable future. Reporting on the Congress of the World Christian Democratic Union (WCDU) held in Lima in April 1966 indicates clearly that the Latin American parties will not submit without combat to any effort (whether initiated by the European financial backers of the CD movement or by ODCA) that aims at imposing standards and controls that will impinge on their complete freedom of action.

15. Formation of Central American Regional Grouping. The Central American CD parties met in El Salvador in July 1966 to establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Democrata Cristiana de Centroamerica (UDCCA). This action does not appear to reflect any element of pique with ODCA (the relations of COPEI and Rafael Caldera with the Central American parties appear close and cordial) but rather a desire to establish a smaller and more cohesive unit that can better address itself to the problems common to the area and, to a lesser extent, to the individual CD parties. UDCCA is comprised of five parties (in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), with the possibility that a sixth party will be formed in Honduras.

V - EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INFLUENCE

16. The European Christian Democratic Union (ECCU). The European CD parties were first to establish a regional organization, the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (NEI) in 1947. The NEI never played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From the outset the Latin American parties maintained their closest ties with individual leaders of the CD movement in Europe, particularly those involved in financial operations with the sister parties and CLASC in Latin America. The NEI became progressively less significant and in recent years was virtually moribund. But in mid-1965 the organization was revamped and re-christened as the European Christian Democratic Union (ECCU). Its newly elected President, Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC, appears intent on making the ECCU a strong organization which will at least match the Socialist International in stature.

17. European Financial Support to the CD Parties. The two CD organizations which have contributed most heavily to the support of the Latin American CD parties and related organizations are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (ISF). Between them they will contribute an estimated \$800,000 to \$1,000,000 to the CD parties and CLASC in Calendar Year 1967. It was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive \$480,000 for the 1968 election from ISF at the rate of \$160,000 per year commencing in 1966.

a. The IIS. The Institute for International Solidarity, headed until recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the new Director is Adolf Herkenrath), is an arm of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Like its

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<p>Social Democratic counterpart (the Friedrich Ebert Foundation), the bulk of IIS's operating budget comes from the German Government. IIS maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports several CD activities directly. But it also contributes more than fifty percent of the FIS budget.</p>		
<p>5. The FIS The International Solidarity Fund was formally created on 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of financial support efforts on the part of the European CD parties and other CD-oriented groups in Latin America. The name was later changed to the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund of CISC and other organizations. The FIS operates as an arm of the ECDU, with headquarters in Rome. Its most important leaders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS, a German national and close personal friend of Konrad Adenauer), Mariano Rumor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vanistendael (Secretary General of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions -- CISC).</p>		
<p>18. <u>Difference in Function of IIS and FIS.</u> From the start of its activities, the Germans and Italians have contributed almost the entire FIS budget (in 1964, for example, Vanistendael contributed only \$15,000 from the CISC International Solidarity Fund). FIS appears to be the exclusive European CD channel for organizational support to the Latin American CD parties. While the IIS is the rich partner in the IIS-FIS tandem and could easily fund the Latin American parties directly, the FIS channel is preferred by the Germans and has two major advantages: First, since FIS is a regional solidarity instrument with representation (but not contributions) from all the European parties, the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CD's collectively. Thus a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CD's cannot easily make a formal demarche to the IIS or the German government. Second, it is easier to obfuscate the magnitude of European organizational support to the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America if it is channeled through a multi-party organization. The Germans have limited IIS funding to less controversial areas -- support to youth and student formation, political training institutes and CLASC training institutes. (See Attachment A for a detailed flow chart.)</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>CONCLUSIONS</u></p>		
<p>19. <u>CD's Challenge Communist Domination of the University.</u> It was noted in Para. 5 above that almost without exception CD strength in the university greatly exceeds the voting strength of the parent party. The same is true of the Communists, and it is a fact that Communist/Christian Democratic strength on the campus is overwhelmingly dominant throughout the hemisphere. Few would take issue with the conclusion that the vast majority of university youth are attracted to movements projecting an inspirational message (the word "inspirational" more accurately characterizes the CD movement than does "ideological") or an aura of revolutionary mystique. During the past few years Communist voting losses in the university have been picked up mainly by the Christian Democrats -- the vote has shifted from one movement with a message to another. It would appear that the Christian Democrats are the only political group capable of challenging the Communists' hemispheric domination of the campus.</p>		
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20. CD Strength in University No Indicator of CD Party Strength or Potential. From the foregoing, however, it does not follow that the growth of CD strength in the university presages a corresponding increase in CD party strength. While voting patterns in the university provide valuable insights on population (particularly youth) attitudes and aspirations, these patterns are not a reliable barometer of either organized party strength or future potential. In no country of Latin America is the voting strength of the CD's or the Communists nearly as strong among the population at large as it is on the campus. One reason is that the university population of Latin America is less than 2 percent of the total population. The CD campus leader almost invariably graduates from student politics to more direct party involvement when he leaves the university -- even if the party has no discernable future. It would appear, however, that the non-university youth (lacking the pseudo-intellectual pretensions and the self-bestowed elite label of the university-trained) are much less inclined to vote and militate for Christian Democracy simply because it has emotional or inspirational appeal.

21. CD Failure to Transform Affinity of Lower Classes Into Votes. The inadequately educated and the lower social classes in Latin America are inevitably motivated by the pragmatism of the possible; to vote for a party that has limited potential to achieve national power, simply because it espouses views that hit responsive chords, is a luxury he believes he cannot afford. Better, he thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of the traditional parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a middle-class movement. With few exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and to a lesser extent Venezuela) it has scant worker or campesino appeal. By and large, Christian Democracy has failed to reach those on the lower rungs of the social ladder.

22. Individual Party Fortunes Appear Unaffected by CD Progress Elsewhere. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of the CD movement throughout the hemisphere. This has not happened. There is no evidence that individual CD parties were either assisted or hindered in their development by the Chilean success story. And yet the view persists that the Chilean victory was a boon to the movement's potential and progress. During the past year COPEI leader Rafael Caldera has broadcast a variation on this theme that several European CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEI must emerge victorious in the 1968 election if the CD movement is to maintain its momentum, for an ideologically based movement cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually down, if it has only one significant victory to cite over a period of several years. We would reject the view -- based on election results in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay -- that individual party fortunes will be affected in any significant measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere. What appears to emerge from these elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their own devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development of middle echelon cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the "socially disinherited," and the pragmatism of local issues and considerations. International events (with rare exception) count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties even less.

23. Growth Potential Exists, But Much Less Than Originally Anticipated. The CD movement has made only modest progress the past two years. Indications are that the development of the movement will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory, for it has many problems to resolve. Chief among these, perhaps, is CD failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. The chances of CLASC contributing positively to correct this failure appear remote. Another major problem is the absence of an ideological commonground, despite the lip service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunciate minimum behavioral standards that these philosophical roots would impose. This deficiency is the root cause of two manifestations: First, a propensity to consort with Communist and assorted Marxist groups (e.g., in Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Panama). Second, the progressive radicalization of party youth wings which threatens to push the parent parties further left. The fact, remains, nevertheless, that Christian Democracy is the most unified non-Communist movement in Latin America. It cannot be labeled democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations of several national parties.

24. Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The ranks of those who viewed Christian Democratic prospects with great enthusiasm two years ago -- including the European financial backers of the movement -- have dwindled considerably. But those who have been critics of Christian Democracy from the outset (many of whom might be described as the "visceral denigrators") have displayed no more perception in evaluating CD prospects. The head-in-the-sand generalization that Christian Democracy has no future does not stand the challenge of investigation. Neither does the assertion that Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would submit that the only valid approach to the CD phenomenon is to assess the movement and make operational judgements on a country-by-country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of the party would be no loss. The key question is: Can the party develop as a positive element in national political stability? If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within the party and to examine the need for operational involvement. Station posture toward the CD movement must be based on the raw realities of the local situation, case by case.

RUTHERFORD J. LYNER

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
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File:

*CD file
DW*



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Christian Democracy in Latin America

Secret

Nº 1100

3 March 1967

No. 0279/67A

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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy would develop significantly throughout Latin America, competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress.

No such trend has yet developed. The Christian Democratic movement's appeal is to students and middle class, a relatively small percentage of the population in most Latin American countries. Its concepts of basic social reform and the dignity of the human person may appeal to the workers, but they still cast their vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable of the established parties that have an immediate chance of governing.

The movement's progress is likely to be hampered by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor organizations to compete against the entrenched positions of other political movements.

Current Balance Sheet

The Christian Democratic movement is generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries--Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and El Salvador.


In only one of these--Chile--is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) the governing party. Frei's solid victory in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the party's reform program has run into difficulty in the upper house of Congress, which is still controlled by the opposition; no progress has been made in weaken-

ing Marxist domination of the urban labor force; and Frei's moderation has been increasingly challenged by the left wing of his own party, which may capture control in the next two or three years.

The only other Christian Democratic party with a claim to a role in government is the one in Peru. It was brought into a pre-election coalition by the dominant Popular Action Party in 1963 and, although it gained only four percent of the votes, it holds two cabinet posts. Its voting strength has been weakened recently by the defection of a dissident faction which formed a separate Popular Christian Party.

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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA



EDUARDO FREI

*President of Chile,
Latin America's Christian Democratic leader.*



RAFAEL CALDERA

*Venezuelan presidential aspirant and
number-two Latin American Christian Democrat*

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Venezuela's Christian Democrats (COPEI) have strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean party in 1968 and appear to have narrowed the gap between their 22 percent of the electorate in 1963 and the governing Democratic Action's 32 percent. COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency. He has recently come out in favor of a politically expedient move to the right, thus filling the vacuum of the center-right of the Venezuelan political spectrum and opening new sources of support.

In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 31.2 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame - educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgment of potential, there are not more than four other CD parties--in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, and Guatemala--that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

The Dominican Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC),

led by Coanabo Javier, has abandoned, at least for the time being, the irresponsible policies it adopted after the April 1965 revolt and has moved toward the political center. The party has made its opposition to the Balaguer government clear, but has also indicated that it intends to operate within bounds acceptable to the President. The PRSC hopes that this moderate line will increase its following and enable it to improve on the poor showing it made in the 1966 elections. The party has developed a small but talented cadre, primarily from the university ranks.

The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a minuscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacked by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. The PDC is currently negotiating with the mass-based Panamenista Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's largest--in hopes of forming a coalition for the May 1968 elections. The CDs have offered to provide the Panamenistas with much-needed administrative skills in return for a share of the assembly seats in the next election. A long-range goal would be to acquire support within Arias' party and inherit his mass following when he passes from the scene.

The Brazilian PDC polled only four percent of the vote in

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1962, but the party had significant strength in three important south-central states (Parana, São Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other Brazilian parties, it was abolished during a political reorganization under the Castello Branco administration. Most of its members then affiliated with the progovernment ARENA party and campaigned under its banner in the November 1966 congressional elections. It is unlikely that there will be any significant expansion in the number of political parties--the new Brazilian constitution sets down stringent standards that virtually eliminate the possibility of a repetition of the former proliferation of parties. The former PDC has made no attempt to reconstitute itself, but its former members will probably join with like-minded congressmen to pursue policies consistent with Christian Democratic ideology.

The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This group, which is being financed by Catholic sources in Germany and Belgium, has some strength in the youth and student movement and some growth potential among the campesinos who make up more than half the population. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; its leader, Rene de Leon, appears honest, but he has little organizational flair or popular appeal. With more vigorous leadership and the development of a middle-echelon cadre, the party might develop significantly--particularly if the incumbent Revolutionary Party (PR) administration fails to resolve basic problems confronting it.

The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties--in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay--show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Alende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia (Remo di Natale).

Party Youth Wings

As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants come from student organizations in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much greater than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the party polled 3.1 percent of the national vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), but its university youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 campus election and 24.4 percent in January 1967. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966.

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Several CD leaders, most notably Frei in Chile and Caldera in Venezuela, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. In several countries the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) are almost indistinguishable from those of pro-Communist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is moving dangerously far to the left. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University, while differentiating itself from the Communist students on certain issues, has frequently taken a parallel line.

The great concern of responsible party leaders is that these students, as they progress from campus to parent party, will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Other observers, however, expect the "hotheads" to mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. Both views can be defended. Some mellowing is inevitable, but in the past ten years the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed--and among the youth the cry has assumed much greater proportions.

Both German and American observers have commented that massive and intensive political training of youth and political cadres might arrest this drift to the left. Frei and Caldera have specifically asked the West German CD party's Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field. However, the Germans, who have long been proponents of organizational programs in Latin America, appear inclined to the position in the youth and student field that party leaders have permitted the situation to deteriorate too long for even a massive training program to produce a moderating trend.

The Labor Arm

A major influence in the development of the Christian Democratic movement will be the actions and attitudes of its labor organization, the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC). So far, as an organized force, it has been a dismal failure except among the campesinos. Its only impact and sole purpose up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. In this role, it has earned a reputation for independent action and irresponsibility that has reflected negatively on the whole movement despite CLASC's vigorous claims that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic political leaders.

In spite of the apparent differences between CLASC and

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the CD movement, a closer and more formal relationship appears to be in the offing. Last April, officials of CLASC who are also officers of the Christian Democratic parties met in Montevideo to arrange closer coordination between the two groups. To accomplish this goal, they proposed that both the CD party labor departments and CLASC be granted formal representation in the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA), the regional grouping formed in 1949.

The plan has not yet been implemented, but eventual ODCA approval appears likely. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement may have an adverse effect on CD youth wings, which--being further left than their parent parties--have identified more closely with CLASC's revolutionary image. Since the first of the year, CLASC has intensified its efforts to create its own youth groups and appears to have made some progress, especially in Central America.

The Role of ODCA

In its 17 years of existence, ODCA has not evolved beyond a sort of fraternity held together more by negative factors such as hostility to the US, to capitalism, and to the oligarchies, than by any basic agreement among its members on doctrine or principles. Moreover, the individual parties have made very clear that they will fight any effort--whether initiated by ODCA or by the European financial backers of the CD movement--to impose standards

and controls that will impinge on their freedom of action.

In general, ODCA takes a slightly less hostile line on US policies than that of its member parties. This probably results from the influence of its president, Rafael Caldera of Venezuela. The organization's two vice presidents are Hector Cornejo Chavez of Peru and Rene De Leon of Guatemala. Tomas Reyes Vicuna of Chile is its secretary general.

Only in Central America has there been any move toward a more cohesive unit geared to area problems. A smaller regional group, the Christian Democratic Union of Central America, was organized last July. It now has five member parties, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, and a sixth may be formed in Honduras.

European Role and Influence

Although Latin American Christian Democracy like the European variety, has its roots in the profoundly humanistic and democratic ideas of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, it does not contain the European fascist concept of the corporate state. The European reaction to the growth of Communism in the 1930s had little effect on the Latin American CDs; consequently the Americans were moving to the political left as the Europeans were moving to the right.

Not until 1947 did the newly important and affluent European

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EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS

GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)

KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION

Eichholz
Academy

Political
Leadership
Academy

Student
Institute

Institute
for
International Solidarity
(IIS)

DIRECTOR
Adolf Herkenrath

European
Christian
Democratic
Union
(ECDU)

International Solidarity
Foundation
(ISF)

PRESIDENT
Johannes Schauff

Christian Democratic
Organization
of
Latin America
(ODCA)

Christian Democratic
Union
of
Central Europe
(UCDEC)

International Union
of
Young Christian
Democrats
(UIJDC)

SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT

Support To:

Political Training Institutes

Training Institutes of CLASC

(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)

Youth and Student Training

Organizational Support To:

Political Parties

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CDs attempt to coordinate international CD activity through an organization they called the New International Team (NEI). This organization never achieved any significance because European influence in Latin America had already been undermined by a basic difference in political philosophy and because the Latin American parties had been maintaining individual relations with the various European groups. These ties were strictly on vague ideological grounds and for financial reasons.

The two heaviest European contributors to the Latin American parties are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated \$800,000 to \$1,000,000 to the American CD parties and CLASC in calendar year 1967. In addition, it was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive \$480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS.

The IIS, under the direction of Adolf Herkenrath, is an arm of the West German Christian Democratic Union with the bulk of its budget coming directly from the German government. It maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports youth and student groups, political training institutes, and CLASC organizations.

The FIS, under the leadership of Dr. Johannes Schauff, operates as an arm of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU), successor to the NEI. Since its

creation in 1964, Germans and Italians have contributed almost its entire budget. FIS appears to be the exclusive European channel for organizational support to the Latin American parties. It has assumed this responsibility because it is composed of representatives of all the European parties. Thus the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CDs collectively. Furthermore, a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CDs cannot formally protest its funding activities to the German government.

Outlook

The modest progress made by the Christian Democratic movement in the past two and a half years suggests that its development will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory.

One major problem is its failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. Its strength in the universities and its ability to compete with Communist groups on the campus create unfounded optimism. The "inspirational" approach that attracts the college student has no comparable appeal among the inadequately educated lower classes.

Neither does a victory for one party seem likely to have

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any major effect on the fortunes of another. What appears to emerge from CD gains or losses in recent elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on the basis of their own leadership

abilities, organizational talents, and approach to local issues. International events count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties for even less. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SECRET

7 FEB 1967 Miami

RE: MDC

SECRET

25 Nov. 1966 New Jersey
RE: IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ

CONFIDENTIAL

31 Oct. 1966 Miami, Fla.
RE: MDC CONFIDENTIAL

30 SEPT. 1966 NEW JERSEY
IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ
CONFIDENTIAL

29 Aug. 1966 Miami, Fla.
RE: MDC SECRET

REPORT COVER SHEET		PROCESSING ACTION	
FROM: JMWAVE		REPORT NO. UFG-8473	
REPORTING OFFICER: Henry J. SLOMAN		DATE OF REPORT: 8 August 1966	
REPORTS OFFICER: John C. TARBELL/vkl		PROJECT: AMOT-245	
APPROVING OFFICER: Philip G. ELMARD		SOURCE CRYPT: XXX	
FIELD DISTRIBUTION		COVER SHEET	
INTRA-AGENCY		INDEXED FOR INDEXING	
4 - Hqs		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
1 - DCS		IF DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY	
2 - Santo Domingo		DISSEMINATION	
2 - Santiago de los Caballeros		DISSEMINATION	
2 - Caracas		DISSEMINATION	
2 - Guatemala City		DISSEMINATION	
EXTRA-AGENCY		DISSEMINATION	
State		DISSEMINATION	
FBI		DISSEMINATION	
I&NS		DISSEMINATION	
Customs		DISSEMINATION	
Border Patrol		DISSEMINATION	
USCG		DISSEMINATION	
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA			
<p>TYPIC</p> <p>SOURCE: AMOT-245 in AMOT reports as follows: Para. 2: DD-1874 from Palacio BARBEITE, 10 June 1966, and DD-1888, 6 July, from BARBEITE and Angel HERNANDEZ; paras. 3 to 7 and source comment 2, DD-1888; para 8 and source comment 5, DD-1883, 23 June, which included a copy of the document; para. 9: DD-1892, 15 July, from HERNANDEZ, DD-1895, 21 July, from a conversation between HERNANDEZ and Jorge MAS, and DD-1902, 3 August; para. 10, DD-1892; para. 11, DD-1874 from Ignacio VALLADARES; source comment 1: DD-1874 and DD-1890, 14 July, from Laureano BATISTA.</p> <p>AMCRUMP-1's true name appears in this report. Information available in his 201 indicates that he was "suspended" on 25 February 1966, and there is no record of contact since that time.</p> <p>RID: Index <u>701-265277</u></p> <p>Name: BATISTA Falla, Laureano</p> <p>Sex: M</p> <p>DPOB: 1 May 1935, Havana, Cuba</p> <p>Cit: Cuban</p> <p>Occ or Status: <Elected organization secty of Natl Executive Committee of MDC at congress 25-27 Feb 66. Trip to DR on behalf of MDC, June 66.></p> <p>Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification</p>			

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SECRET

Page two of Cover Sheet

UFG-8473

Name: BAZAN, Arnaldo
Sex : M
DPOB: ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in DR. Connection with MDC base.
Formerly with La Salle College of Camaguey, Cuba.

Name: HERNANDEZ Rojo, Angel (1922-1942)
Nickname: Baby, El Baby
Sex : M
DPOB: 4 Sept 33, Havana Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Second in command of military
dept of MDC.

Name: BARBEITE Freyre, Placido A.
Sex : M
DPOB: 19 Nov 38, Batabano, Havana Prov, Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Chf of military dept of MDC.

Name: PALACIOS San Juan, Armando
Sex : M
DPOB: ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre. President of MDC in Puerto Rico.

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A Completely reliable B Usually reliable C Fairly reliable D Not usually reliable E Not reliable (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence) F Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2 Probably true 3 Possibly true 4 Doubtful 5 Probably false 6 Cannot be judged

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COUNTRY Cuba/Dominican Republic REPORT NO.
SUBJECT **Activities of the MDC Possibility of Reactivating a Base in the Dominican Republic, Condition of Boats, Possible Alliances With Other Emigre Organizations** DATE OF REPORT 8 August 1966 NO PAGES 4 REFERENCES
DATE OF INFO 29 May to late July 1966
PLACE & DATE ACQ United States, Miami (10 June to 3 August 1966) UFG-8473

SOURCE:

A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. This group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. Summary: Laureano Batista Falla, leader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC, Christian Democratic Movement), returned to Miami in late June 1966 from the Dominican Republic, where he allegedly obtained pledges of support for his anti-Castro undertakings from the Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, pending the approval of President Balaguer. However, the military department of the MDC recently issued a document in which it voiced its discouragement, primarily due to lack of funds. Although representatives of the MDC have discussed the signing of agreements with representatives of the Students' Revolutionary Directorate (DRE) and the Cuban Representation in Exile (RECE), no alliances have yet been formed.

with representatives (DRE) and the Cuban Representation. Alliances have been made.

2. Laureano Batista Falla, organization secretary of the National Executive Committee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned to Miami on 26 June. On 29 June he met with other leaders of the MDC to inform them of the results of his trip.

3. Batista said that during the discussions held with General Juan N. Folch Perez, Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, he had requested that Folch cooperate with the MDC by allowing the MDC to maintain Base Luna, located at Estero Salcedo near the town of Pepillo Salcedo (N 19-43, W 71-45). According to Batista, Folch indicated his willingness to cooperate and offered the following assistance, subject to the approval of President Balaguer, whom Folch said he will consult:

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E/ DIA ARMY NAVY AIR NSA OCR FBI /2

SO # USIA () I&NS ()

FI	1	WHC/SI	1	E/IB/R	1
RR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	E/MADR	1
RE	3	WHC/CA	1		
CICS	1				
MO	1	CI/OPS/WH	2	WH/PACY(CINCSO)	1

LS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO/H 1,

Liaison *

COORD. RELEASE

- a. The use of five islets facing Santiago de los Caballeros City for a military base. (SIC).
- b. Authorization for MDC personnel to move into and out of the Dominican Republic in a clandestine manner.
- c. Transportation of MDC war materiel from Miami aboard Dominican Air Force planes.

5. Batista expressed enthusiasm regarding Folch's proposals, and stressed the necessity of acting immediately, including sending MDC personnel to the Dominican Republic. He directed Angel Hernandez Rojo, second in command of the military department, to prepare a plan to operate from the Dominican Republic, and Placido Barbeite Freyre, chief of the military department, to prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans in order that the necessary money can be obtained.

Division of the Foreign Office

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Fañcinos said that Perez does not report to the president on military plans and activities. However, Barbeite defended Perez' action with the argument that ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ military matters do not really fall ~~xxxxxxx~~ within the scope of responsibilities of the president.

c. The condition of the boats is such that the MDC has no sea transportation. The boats are described as follows:

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UFG-8473

- (1) The CADELLO I is docked across from Brito's Boat Yard at Stock Island, Florida.⁶ The boat is in need of repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the installation of electronic navigational equipment would be required to put it in operational condition. Current docking and routine maintenance costs are not being paid. Efforts to make commercial use of this boat have not been successful. This boat is considered ideal for activities which might be undertaken if there were a base from which to operate, but under the present circumstances the expense which this boat represents is not justifiable. It is recommended that consideration be given to selling the CADELLO I if an operational base is not established within four months.
 - (2) The KYA-ORA⁷, which was donated to the MDC by a member of the military department, is in drydock at Nuta's Boat Yard in Miami. There are leaks in the hull.
 - (3) The LANCHAZUL⁸ is in need of repairs, as well as trailer. Repairs on this boat are being given priority, and will proceed as money becomes available.
- d. Informal discussions have been held with representatives of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students' Revolutionary Directorate), and there is an "agreement in principle" to coordinate future actions. There is no political commitment.
9. In July Jorge Mas Canosa, chief of press and propaganda of Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile), proposed that the MDC enter into a pact with RECE, and indicated that some members of MDC will be offered full-time employment preparing military plans for the RECE. As of late July no formal agreement had been reached.
 10. Hernandez, who feels that Ramon Font Saunell⁹ is incapable of formulating military strategy, favors the formation of a pact between the MDC and RECE ~~xxxx~~ which would exclude Font from participating in the preparation of plans for military operations. Hernandez also said that he plans to attempt the reorganization of the military department of the MDC in order to replace Barbeite in a less important position than that which he currently occupies. ~~Barbeite~~ department of the MDC in order to move Barbeite from his present position to an unimportant position in the department.
 11. In early June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez¹⁰ expressed a desire to participate in action against Cuba with the MDC. Barbeite agreed to inform Valladares when an operation is to be carried out. Before Valladares left Miami on 6 June for Dover, New Jersey, he said that within a month he would send a 57mm recoilless rifle, a 50-caliber machine gun, and an unstated number of M-1 and Garand rifles. His address in Dover is Dover Cliff Apartments, apartment 21.

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UFG-8473

1. Source Comment. At the time of his departure, Batista told the executive committee that he was going directly to Caracas, Venezuela. It was not until after his return that it was learned that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as he had planned. He later explained that while he was in Puerto Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was informed that the latter had "failed in his efforts."

Field Comment. Presumably he was referring to an interview with President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista had earlier said had been arranged by his cousin. (Cf. ~~UFG-8327~~ TDCS 314/01722-66)

3. Headquarters Comment: In early August 1964, Folch was reported to have been in charge of Dominican ~~armies~~ Armed Forces aid in a ~~xe~~ caching operation for Cuban exiles in the Monte Cristi area. See TDCS-314/01722-66. In ~~TDCSDE 314/00700-66~~ another source reported ~~that~~ in September 1964 approximately 30 Cuban exiles were taking training at a camp near Punta Presidente (N 19-47, W 71-46). ~~See TDCSDE 314/00794-66 for further information.~~

4. The location of the house was not given.

5. Source Comment. The document, as originally drafted, was modified because Barbeite felt that the tone was too strong. Also, the amount of money requested was reduced to \$10,000.

Field Comment. An earlier report from the same source reported that the document was being prepared, and that \$75,000 would be requested. (Cf. UFG-8327) ~~UFG-8327~~ ~~UFG-8327~~ ~~UFG-8327~~

Field Comments.

6. The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat, is a former U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat. The boat yard referred to is the Syncrolift Boat Yard on Stock Island which is owned by Mike Brito. Stock Island is on U.S. Highway 1, between Key West and Boca Chica.
7. The KYA-ORA, or KIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E.
8. The LANCHAZUL has been described as a high-speed launch. (Cf. ~~UFG-8327~~). Besides the CADELLO I, the MDC has been reported to own the VICKY I, a blue V-23; the PUNCHIN CHIA (FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO II.
9. Font is chief of military operations of Comandos L, which has an alliance with RECE. (Cf. UFG 8423) ~~UFG-8423~~ ~~UFG-8423~~ ~~UFG-8423~~
10. Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which he gave to the MDC. He offered to supply weapons to the MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs (Brigade 2506).

FBI

29 June 66 New York
Re: MOC Secret

7 June 66 Florida
Re: MOC Secret

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

XX

Chief, WHD
ADMIN/TYPIC

Station Files on Cuban Counterrevolutionary and Exile Organizations

REFERENCE: UFGT-16343, 31 May 1986

1. We are returning Volume VII of the MDC file which you sent with the reference for Headquarters to review as a sample of a group of 80 files which are no longer useful to the Station. Headquarters appreciates your interest in this aspect of records improvement, considering the need for retrieval, but would like to defer a decision until IDENTITY, a KUBARK employee who is retiring soon but is now engaged in writing historical studies, can visit the Station to survey these files with others.

2. IDENTITY plans to visit JMWAVE for several days about the end of July to size up and review certain records for writing a history of the Station. Therefore, we would like the 80 background files to be left intact for his visit. Afterwards a decision will be made on their retirement or other disposition.

3. If space for storing the files is critical we will authorize forwarding them to Headquarters, but will prefer your holding them temporarily to assist with the historical research cited above.

Claude F. GOTTFRIED

Attachment:

1. Identity, u/s/c
2. MDC File, h/w

Distribution:

3-COS/JMWAVE, w/att. 1 & 2

UFGS-8398

SECRET

1-WH/RMO, w/att.1
1-WH/C/ESEC, w/att.1
1-WH/C/CA/PP, w/att.1
1-Historical Staff

WH/RMO

NOEL C. WILSON/pap

C/WH/C/CA/PP

STEPHEN G. CHACONAS

C/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/MO

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO WGS-8398

IDENTITY - Paul Loeb

SECRET

FBI

Miami, Fla.

3 June 66

Re: MDC

Confidential

14-00000

IS ☐ NO TO FILE NO. C. TED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

TO FILE NO.

LE PID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

JMURVE

ACTION

ADVANCE COPY ☒ RID COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO

FILE VR, GLOB, CAC, CALPROP, CALO, CILICZ, FL, FILINT, WHB

26 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED File M.D.C

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	3	FL
2		6	CA
3	MO	7	
4		8	2

UNIT TIME

SECRET 210017Z

LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0321

TYPIC AMMOP

REF A. WAVE 0031 (789790)*

B. DIR 75395

AMMOP-1, IDEN, DEPARTING MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 APRIL ON
PERUVIAN AIRLINE FLIGHT 55 TO ATTEND REF CONFERENCE.

SECRET

CFN 0321 0031 75395 AMMOP-1 MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 PERUVIAN 65

BT

SECRET

ACTION

RET LIMA CONF 23-26 APRIL,
71 APR 65 100058

(5)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____
X-REF TO FILE NO. _____
FILE RID ☐ REV. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. _____

26 **SECRET**

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____

FROM JH WAVE

ACTION ☒ RID COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

ADVANCE COPY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	2	FI
3	MO	4	3
5		6	2

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VA, CIAA, CAZ, CALPROP, CA/04, CILICZ, FI, FILINT, WAB,

SECRET 210317Z

LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0322

TYPIC AMMOP

REF WAVE 0321 (N00958)

IDEN: ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, MDC SECRETARY
FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

SECRET

CFN 0322 0321 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ MDC

BT

SECRET

ACTION 21 APR 68 = 00953

(Handwritten signature)

INDEXED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES
CLASSIFIED TO FILE NO.	15 SECRET	STATION OF 1
NUMBER TO FILE NO.	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/>		1 PP-
DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG.		2 CA
FROM		3 MD
JMWAVE		4
ACTION	ADVANCE COPY	UNIT TIME BY
1048 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RID COPY	<input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED <input type="checkbox"/> TUBES	
INFO	FILE, MR. WALKER, SOCB, CLOPS, CIAA	

SECRET 151831Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0194

15 APR 66 07580

DYVOUR ANNOP

1. ANCRIB-1 (IDEN) CONTACTED BY DULCE DE LA MAZA RODRIGUEZ, NIECE OF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, WHO TRAVELED THROUGH JMWAVE AREA. DE LA MAZA HAND CARRIED LETTER TO ANCRIB-1 DATED 4 APRIL FROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA, PRSC SECY OF INTL AFFAIRS, WHICH REQUESTED AMCRIB-1 ARRANGE FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT OF TWO OR THREE USED CARS TO BE USED FOR PRSC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN DOMREP. LETTER WAS ACCOMPANIED WITH \$1402 FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT COSTS OF CARS.

2. ANCRIB-1 TELEPHONED ROSARIO EVENING 11 APRIL TO CONFIRM LETTER AND AGREED TO PROVIDE AID IN PROCURING CARS. ROSARIO INFORMED ANCRIB-1 THAT HE EXPECTED RECEIVE NOMINATION AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF PRSC AT PARTY ASSEMBLY ON 17 APRIL AND STATED HE WOULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS RUNNING MATE. ROSARIO ALSO INDICATED HE EXPECTED SOME ELECTORAL SUPPORT FROM UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF APJ MEMBERS.

SECRET

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

IN 97580 PAGE 2

CFN: 0194 AMCRIB-1 DULCE DE LA PAZA RODRIGUEZ PRSC ANTONIO ROSARIO
JMWAVE AMCRIP-1 4 FRANCISCO CORDOVA PRSC -1 PRSC DOMINGO SIADON
-1 11 -1 PRSC 17 CESAR ESTRELLA APJ

PT

NNNN

SECRET

14-00000

27

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE */* TOTAL COPIES

15 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	AP-	1	1
2		2	2
3	RO	3	3
4		4	4

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: *IMWAVE*

ACTION: *W.H. 2* ☒ RID COPY ☐ ADVANCE COPY ☐ TUBED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO: *FILE, VR, W.H. 8, SON 6, CILOPS, CILOA*

SECRET 151742Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 3195

DYVOUR AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0194 (*97.500*)

IDEN: JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE, SECRETARY OF MOVIMIENTO
DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO ^{OF} CUBA.

SECRET

CFN: 0195 0194 JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA
CRISTIANO CUBA

BT

SECRET

[Signature]

NNNN

INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES 2
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.	SECRET	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
H-REF TO FILE NO.	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
FILE DIR <input type="checkbox"/> REF. TO ORIGIN <input type="checkbox"/>		
DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG.		
FROM JN WAVE		
ACTION 11/11/62	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RID COPY	ADVANCE COPY
INFO	<input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED <input type="checkbox"/> TUBED	UNIT TIME DY
FILE, 11/11/62, C1/102, C1/104, F1, F1/INT2, CH2, CA/PROP		

SECRET 141654Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167

141654Z 0167

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0132 (0941248)*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND
WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED
MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

SECRET

CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

SECRET

NNNN

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO _____

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____

A-REF TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ S.O. _____

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/c 8 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WHB, 2/1/52, CI/ON, FI, FI/INTZ, CIA2, CI/RRUP, CI/04

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 18 TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		3	
2		4	
3		5	
4		6	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

UNIT _____ TIME _____ BY _____

SECRET 141024Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 IN 96675

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14 APR 1952 06026

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ☐ TOTAL COPIES ☐

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ☐ SECRET ☐

REF TO FILE NO. ☐

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. ☐

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JM WAVE File MDC

ACTION 12/11/82 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WAVE, C1/C2, C1/H, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/PROP

12/11/82

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	5	1212
2		6	C1
3	CA	7	FI-TK
4	FI	8	

SECRET 141654Z

14 APR 82 0625

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0132 (094245)*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND
WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED
MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

SECRET

*RE PRETRIP BRIEFING FOR
ATTENDANCE WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMO

CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

SECRET

NNNN

40

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____

S. REF TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. _____

FROM JM WAVE

ACTION WAVE 8 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WHB, C/102, C/104, FI, FI/INT2, CH2, CH/PPUP, CH/04

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 18 TOTAL COPIES _____

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	5	RR
2		6	Y
3	CA	7	ELTC
4	FD	8	D

SECRET 141054Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 in 96675

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14 APR 68 090626

(Handwritten signature)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, WH	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO	Chief of Station, Santiago		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	AMMOP/Operational AMMOP Circular Letter to Identity A Leaders and Organizations		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR : FYI

REF: WAVE 9754

1. As indicated in reference, the AMMOP organization on 15 March 1966 sent a circular letter based on Fidel Castro's 13 March speech to Identity A individuals and organizations. The letter, which was signed and composed by AMMOP/1 and which was accompanied by transcripts of the speech, condemned Castro's attack on Chilean President Eduardo Frei; requested support for Frei's position; and asked the recipients to join the struggle maintained by the Cuban people to overthrow Fidel Castro and prepare for the freedom of Cuba from Communism.

2. The youth wing of the AMMOP group, headed by AMCRIB/1, mailed a letter to its Identity A youth contacts based on the 13 and 20 March speeches by Fidel Castro along the lines cited above. Included in this letter were the strong anti-Castro statements made by Identity B. Copies of both letters are forwarded under separate cover.

3. According to AMMOP/1, his letter was replayed by FUSEE and was the basis for an article in a Santiago newspaper by Identity C.

Philip G. Elward
Philip G. ELWARD


Attachments:

- A. Identities - u/sc
- B. Cys of Ltrs - u/sc

Distribution:

- 3 - WH/C w/atts
- 2 - COS, Santiago w/atts - *Ticket Pouch*
- 2 - C/WH - w/atts

*Please furnish HQS File Number



CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-24893	DATE APR 1 1966 31 March 66
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

To WH/c
U/sc att #A to
UFGA-24893

IDENTITIES: A. Christian Democratic Party
B. Alfredo Lorca
C. Jorge Roman

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

CS COPY

S 220-100-4-24893

1-2 300-10

Marzo 15 de 1966

SECRET

RECEIVED
UNIVERSITY STATION, CHICAGO, ILL. 60607

Estimado demócratacristiano:

Después de leer una copia literal del discurso pronunciado por Castro, en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana, el pasado 13 de marzo, me considero obligado con el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno, que fueron innoblemente atacados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocución, a expresar mi opinión con relación a dicha ofensa.

Digo obligado, porque el hecho de ser demócratacristiano cubano, integrante de esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un día se dieron a la tarea de realizar una revolución en libertad y que lamentablemente vieron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al comprobar que las mismas eran ahogadas por la sangre vertida en los paredones de fusilamientos por héroes como Porfirio Ramirez, Presidente de la FEU de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr. Humberto Sorí Marín, Comandante del Ejército Rebelde y autor de la primera Ley de Reforma Agraria; debe servirme de experiencia para expresar lo que pienso decir a través de estas líneas. Digo obligado, porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en múltiples oportunidades, colaboración y solidaridad con nuestra lucha, solicitud que lamentablemente no ha sido respondida por algunos, alegando unas veces desconocimiento y otras imputándonos incompreensión con el "proceso revolucionario" que se está llevando a cabo en Cuba, no queremos que en esta oportunidad en que son los compañeros chilenos los que necesitan de nuestra solidaridad, vayamos a encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se decida a respaldar públicamente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo de Chile en la actitud cívica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas expresadas por Castro durante su discurso, entre las cuales transcribimos las siguientes: "A decir verdad, siempre he creído que Frei es un representante de la burguesía chilena, que su gobierno es un gobierno de la burguesía. Jamás he creído que Frei vaya a hacer ninguna revolución".... posteriormente, al referirse a los sucesos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del Salvador donde murieron varias personas dijo: "Frei es un reaccionario. Frei ha demostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de mano firme, sino un individuo cobarde, que abusa del poder,....."

SECRET
14. 3. 66

SECRET 14. 3. 66

Frei ha demostrado ser un mentiroso. Frei ha demostrado ser un politiquero vulgar que para justificar su sanguinario gesto, trata de culpar a la Tri-Continental. Frei se desenmascara. Frei demuestra al pueblo de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolución es la que va a hacer, qué tipo de gobierno es el que va a llevar adelante. Es decir, no una revolución sin sangre, sino una política de sangre sin revolución; sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de Frei, sangre sin revolución, ese es el gobierno de Frei, sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de la Alianza para el Progreso".

Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que salirle al paso a Castro y a la camarilla que des gobierna hoy a Cuba, e instar y pedir mayor colaboración con los patriotas que hoy ofrecen sus vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fin de evitar no solo la continuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva a cabo en la Isla, sino también ponerle fin a todos estos incidentes bochornosos para la historia, en los que aparece un cubano, ofendiéndolo públicamente ante el mundo a un Presidente, a un Partido y a un pueblo que a contrario sensus de lo que él esta haciendo en Cuba, si está realizando una revolución en libertad, si ha defendido en todo momento el sano nacionalismo, si se ha puesto de frente cuantas veces las circunstancias lo han requerido a los oligarcas y explotadores.

Para terminar, sólo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de la solidaridad que une a todos los demócratacristianos, exprese públicamente su deseo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en Cuba, una verdadera revolución en libertad, así como su respaldo a la actitud asumida por el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno en los actuales momentos.

Pendiente de su atención y respuesta y dejando constancia de mi mayor consideración, quedo suyo

Cordialmente,



Ernesto Rodríguez

Sec. de Relaciones Internacionales del
MDC de Cuba

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

JUVENTUD DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANA DE CUBA.

1732 N.W. 7th St.

MIAMI, FLA. U.S.A.

Miami, Marzo 17 de 1966

Estimado compañero:

La JDC de Cuba, fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apostol José Martí que dice: "ver en silencio un crimen es cometerlo", no ha querido marginarse del daño que Castro quiere hacerle a la Revolución en Libertad, que está realizando el Presidente Eduardo Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile.

Consciente de que es posible que no te hayan llegado muchas de las informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ataques públicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, calificándolo al Presidente de "representante de la burguesía chilena", "reaccionario", "mimado del imperialismo yanqui y guardián de sus intereses en Chile"....etc. Hemos querido comunicarte, no sólo los ataques de Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le han dado a Castro. Nos referimos a la que en días pasados hiciera el Diputado Demócrata-Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorca y que a continuación transcribimos "Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso digno de análisis. Hace pocos días atrás, según expresaron diputados que estuvieron en Cuba, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Presidente. Agregó que si él hubiera estado en Chile, habría hecho lo mismo que Frei.

Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocado la epidermis de la Tri-Continental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera.

Yo estuve en Cuba -añadió Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro subió al poder. En esa ocasión le pregunté al ver a tantos hombres armados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y él me contestó, con ese modo tan tropical: "chico, armas para qué cuando se tiene al pueblo".

Sin embargo, -añadió Lorca- en los siete años que Fidel tiene al pueblo detrás de él, anda más armado que un militar en plena guerra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los

Cuba del mañana. . . 1/2 Democrata-Cristiana


radicales, el Sr. Ibáñez, el Sr. Alessandri, el propio Sr. Frei, han recorrido todo el país sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a sueldo como los que utiliza Castro.

No se puede decir que Frei sea un cobarde, un mentiroso y un déspota como Fidel Castro afirma - añadió Lorca-. En cambio él está resguardado por metralletas y no puede dormir, ni se le conoce domicilio fijo porque los hijos de los muertos en el paredón lo buscan. Además -puntualizó Lorca- vale la pena destacar que nadie se ha ido de Chile. En cambio, es público y notorio que más de 300 000 personas han huido del paraíso fidelista. Y me atrevo a pensar que si Fidel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren irse de Cuba, se quedaría solo con sus barbas y su hermano Raúl, porque Camilo Cienfuegos ya no está. Dicen que se cayó de un avión.

Finalmente, Lorca recordó el caso del que fuera Presidente de los tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorí Marín. "Es un hombre íntegro, puro y extremadamente justo", decía Castro de él. "Estoy seguro que nunca condenaría a quien no mereciera la pena de muerte". No obstante una mañana amaneció de mal genio y el Sr. Sorí Marín se convirtió en un agente de la Central de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro, íntegro y justo."

Estas palabras, expuestas por el Diputado D.C. Alfredo Lorca, señalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro, ratifican una vez más lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus dirigentes, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demócratacristiana de América y que hoy, con más fuerza y moral que nunca nos permite pedirte en nombre de la solidaridad que nos une, que expongas públicamente tu respaldo a la Revolución en Libertad que viene realizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile así como tu colaboración a la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo existente en nuestra Patria.

Consciente de que nuestra solicitud será escuchada por tí, y seguros de que nos darás a conocer la atención que has de prestarle, quedo a tu entera disposición



Jesús Angulo
Presidente de la JDC de Cuba

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO _____

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **B** TOTAL COPIES **31**

X-REF TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ DET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. _____

FROM **JHWAVE**

ACTION **WHIS** ☒ RID COPY ☐ ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO **FILE, VR, WHB, CAZ, CA/PROP, CA/04, FI, FILINT, CIL0A, CILICZ**

PERSON-UNIT NOTIFIED **151**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	5	MO
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	D
4	CA	8	

SECRET 042230Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUITO CITE WAVE 0031 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC AMMOP

REF A DIR 75895 *

4 APR 65 189790

B WAVE 9034 (IN 51776)

1. AMCRIB-1 ADVISED BY IDEN A THAT REF A LIMA CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 23-26 APRIL, PRECEDED BY YOUTH SEMINAR 15-22 APRIL.
2. AMCRIB-1 HOPES OBTAIN TICKET THRU EFFORTS OF IDEN B. IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, STATION PLANS FINANCE AMCRIB-1 TRIP TO ATTEND BOTH MEETINGS UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY.
3. AMMOP INVITED IDEN C, 201-749991, FORMER WAVE ASSET WORKING IN QUITO, ATTEND REF CONFERENCE AS MEMBER AMMOP DELEGATION. IF IDEN C ATTENDS, WILL PAY OWN WAY.
4. PLS NOTE AMCRIB-10 OF REF B SHOULD BE AMCRIB-1.

SECRET * WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS SCHEDULED LIMA 14-16 MARCH.

CFN 0031 75895 9034 AMCRIB-1 A A 23-26 APRIL 15-22 APRIL AMCRIB-1

B NOT SUCCESSFUL AMCRIB-1 AMMOP C 201-749991 AMMOP C AMCRIB-10

B AMCRIB-1

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO _____

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **6** TOTAL COPIES **31**

X-REF TO FILE NO. _____

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO DRAUGH ☐ **26** **SECRET** GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

DESTROY ☐ SIG. _____ PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED _____

FROM **JMWAVE**

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP-	3	100
2		6	FI
3	CA	7	5
4	RR	8	2

ACTION **WH/CB** ☒ RID COPY ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT _____ TIME _____ BY _____

INFO **FILE VR, WHB, CAZ, CA/PROP, CA/04, FI, FILINT, CI/OA, CI/C2**

SECRET 042230Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0032 INGHURST ACTING

4 APR 68 089798

TYPIC AMMOP

REF WAVE 0031 (IN 87790)

IDEN A. UIJDC

IDEN B. JULIO MONEAGATTA, JUDCA SECY. GEN.

IDEN C. JOSE M. ILLAN

SECRET

CFN 0032 0031 A UIJDC B JULIO MONEAGATTA JUDCA SECY GEN C

JOSE M ILLAN

SECRET

BT

REPORT COVER SHEET		S E C R E T		PROCESSING ACTION	
JMWAVE		REPORT NO.	UFG-7960	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING	
Henry J. SLOMAN		DATE OF REPORT	15 February 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY	
Sylvia B. MONESTIER		PROJECT		CS DISSEMINATION	
John C. TARBELL/vk1		SOURCE CRYPT	AMOT-245	TDCS DISSEMINATION	
Philip G. ELMARD		FIELD DISTRIBUTION			
INTRA-AGENCY			EXTRA-AGENCY		
4 - Hqs 1 - DCS 2 - Caracas 2 - Lima 2 - Santiago 2 - Bogota			1 - JMBAR State FBI I&NS Customs USCG		
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA					
<p>TYPIC</p> <p>SOURCE: AMOT-245 in DD-1768, 11 February 1966. Field Comment 2 was received from AMCRIB-10, orally, on 14 February.</p> <p>RID: No Index</p>					
<p>Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification</p>					
<p>19-300-10</p>					

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

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COUNTRY **Cuba**

REPORT NO. **100-100000-1000**

SUBJECT **Christian Democratic Movement to Hold Congress in Miami, 24 to 27 February 1966**

DATE OF REPORT **15 February 1966**

NO. PAGES **1**

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. **Early February 1966**

PLACE & DATE ACQ. **United States, Miami (7 to 14 February 1966)**

UFG-7960

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: **A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.**

1. **The Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC, Christian Democratic Movement) in Miami will hold a congress from 24 to 27 February 1966.¹ Delegations of Christian Democrats from Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Germany will attend the congress.²**
2. **The MDC is preparing to hold elections for positions on the executive committee.**

Field Comments:

1. **The Eighth National Congress of the MDC was held in Miami from 19 to 21 February 1965. Delegations from Puerto Rico and Mexico attended. (Cf. CSDB-312/00790-65)**
2. **Another source, who is a member of the MDC, reported that invitations had been extended to delegations from these countries, but that no replies have been received, except from Peru, which only acknowledged receipt of the invitation.**

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ACTION: in by 28

FILE: WH/8

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FILE: WLB, CS/EE, DCL, U/DCL, DCL (COMMUN), DRP ADAP, C&I, CO/SPCP
CL, C/SPCP, C/SPCP, FL, SOCB, COSA, EUR, S/PA, DCL, DQ/H3

5 OCT 67 170054Z CITE JMWAVE 3413

70115E11550

DIRECTOR
TYPIC

1. EVENING 5 OCTOBER ORLANDO BOSCH GIVEN THREE YEAR SUSPENDED SENTENCE BY NAPLES COURT WHEN FOUND GUILTY OF TRANSPORTING EXPLOSIVES WITHOUT LICENSE IN APRIL 66. TWO COMPANIONS TO BE TRIED SEPARATELY.
2. EVENING 5 OCTOBER AMOT REPORTED THAT ANTAUR-2 HAD BEEN TELEPHONED BY JORGE CUITERREZ ULLA, CHIEF OF PROPAGANDA OF HIRP, TO ATTEND PRESS CONFERENCE 6 OCTOBER. AMOT² ALSO REPORTED THAT AT TRIAL^{1A} JORGE VEGA, BOSCH DEFENSE ATTORNEY, HAD MADE STATEMENT TO COURT TO EFFECT THAT BOSCH SHOULD NOT BE CONVICTED BECAUSE HE WAS TRYING TO FREE HIMSELF FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION AND IN DOING SO WAS NOT ACTING ANY MORE ILLEGALLY THAN WAS MOPACT, WHICH WAS CONDUCTING "SAME TYPE OF ACTIVITY" FROM A BASE LOCATED AT THE "CAYO GORDO" SECTION OF NAPLES.
3. "CAYO GORDO" UNDOUBTEDLY IS GARBLE FOR GORDON PASS AREA OF NAPLES AT WHICH BERTHING SITE FOR JMWAVE MARK I SWIFT

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS IS LOCATED. HOWEVER, RIGGER WAS
NOT SEEN AT THE SITE SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER WHEN REMOVED FOR OPS
BOAT AND STRAITS. WAS SCHEDULED RETURN TO BERTH CIRCA 1
OCTOBER BUT THIS POSTPONED BECAUSE OF HURRICANE INEZ.
RIGHT NOW AT TARPON PROPERTIES BERTH, KEY LARGO, WILL NOT
BE RETURNED TO NAPLES SITE. AS HAS AWARE LATTER SITE
ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR TERMINATION OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 66.

4. UPON RECEIPT AMOT INFO JMWAVE CONTACTED AND BRIEFED
AGENTS SERVING AS CUSTODIANS AT NAPLES SITE. TO DATE THEY
HAVE NOT REPORTED ANY QUERIES. OFFICIALS OF COVER CORPORATION,
²⁹
(GULFLANT) WHICH OWNS RIGGER AND RENTS BERTHING SITE WERE
ALERTED AND BRIEFED 6 OCTOBER. 2

5. MORNING 6 OCTOBER ANTAUP-2 REPORTED PRESS CONFERENCE
NOT HELD BY VEGA BUT THAT GUTIERREZ STATED HE HAD PHONED UPI,
AP, AND WOULD TO GIVE THEM PRESS RELEASE INCLUDING VEGA
CLAIM RE: VEGA'S ACTIVITIES NAPLES AREA.

6. AS OF 1100 HRS 6 OCTOBER STATION HAD NOT SEEN ANY
MENTION OF VEGA'S ALLEGED VEGA STATEMENTS. MIAMI HERALD
AND MIAMI NEWS COVERAGE OF BERTH TRAIL DID NOT MENTION
CLAIMING OF VEGA'S NAPLES PRESS COVERAGE OF TRIAL.

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4/11

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7. AT GUTIERREZ REQUEST AMTAUP-2 TAPED STATEMENT FOR RADIO PROGRAM. REVIEW OF STATEMENT BY AMOT SHOWS THAT WOFAC NOT MENTIONED.

8. ALTHO NO FIRM EVIDENCE TO DATE ANTICIPATE THAT MIRR MAY SEEK PUBLICIZE FURTHER "REVELATIONS" RE JMWAVE ACTIVITY, NOTABLY RE COMBINED OPS FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL. INFO FROM AMOT AND OTHER CONTACTS IN EXILE COMMUNITY INDICATES FELIPE RIVERO AND HIS ANC GROUP ALSO TALKING OF "EXPOSING" WOFAC ACTIVITIES. STATED AIM OF BOTH GROUPS IS TO SHOW "TWO-FACED" ATTITUDE OF U.S. GOVT WHICH STOPS ANTI-COMMUNIST EXILE FIGHTERS FROM USING U.S. AS BASE FOR ACTION AGAINST CASTRO CUBA BUT ALLOWS WOFAC TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTIVITY. FURTHER AIMS ARE TO SHOW EXILE COMMUNITY THAT MIRR AND ANC ARE "ACTIVIST" GROUPS AS COMPARED WITH OTHER EXILE ORGS AND TO RIDICULE AND TRY INTIMIDATE THOSE CUBANS WHO WORK FOR JMWAVE.

9. STATION EVALUATES INCIDENT AS HAVING NO SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPS OR GENERAL STATION SECURITY. STATION HAS DIRECTED INCREASED STATE OF VIGILANCE AT ALL COMBINED OPS SITES BUT DOES NOT ENVISAGE ANY BASIC CHANGES IN COVER

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TO THE SECURITY PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED REQUIRED
LEVEL OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL PLUS EFFECTIVE MASKING OF
SENSITIVE DATA RE COMBINED OPS.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		ROUTING	
SECRET		1	4
		2	5
		3	6
DATE : 27 MAY 62		PA/PROP	
TO : DIRECTOR		MAY 27 2216Z 62	
FROM : JMWAVE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	
ACTION: TFW 10(MR CHARLES MATT, TFW, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1830 27 MAY)		IN 41885	
INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, S/C 2			

OPIN DIP CITE WAVE 4277

GYFOSE

1. MIAMI HERALD 27 MAY CARRIES FRONT PAGE ITEM BY JAMES BUCHANAN ENTITLED "MIRO FADES AS EXILE CHIEF: THREE LATIN LEADERS BEHIND RAY". ARTICLE FLATLY STATES MIRO AND COUNCIL HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY MANUEL RAY WITH JACKING GOV MONTEZ MARIN, PRES ROMULO BETANCOURT AND FORMER PRES JOSE FIGUERAS. THAT RAY HAS TAKEN OVER POST "WITH THE BLESSING OF THE UNITED STATES". FURTHER, ARTICLE STATES "FROM VARIETY SOURCES HERALD LEARNED THAT MIRO WAS NOTIFIED OF CHANGE ONLY THIS WEEK" AND THAT RAYS REAPPOINTMENT AS "CHIEF IN EXILE" CAME FROM "UNDERGROUND IN CUBA" ACCORDING TO JOAQUIN GODOY, PROVISIONAL MRP HEAD IN MIAMI. AFTER FURNISHING RESUME CUBAN ACTIVITIES SINCE ORIGIN OF AMBUD, ARTICLE CREDITS CUBANS IN MIAMI WITH SAYING "NEW MAN IN FIELD" IS ADOLF A. BERLE JR. WHO HAS BEEN SPECIAL ASST TO STATE DEPT AND IS ALSO MEMBER OF PRES KENNEDY'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA". IMPLICATION BEING THAT BERLE IS RUNNING NEW UNITED STATES SPONSORED CUBAN EFFORT.

2. THIS RELEASE CAUSING SOME FUROP IN LOCAL CUBAN COLONY TO EXTENT AT LEAST ONE OPS AGENT DESTINED FOR (ISOLATION) TRAINING WAS ASKED TO BE BELIEVED IF THERE ANY TRUTH THIS STORY. MEANWHILE WAVE

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ROUTING

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

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2	5
3	6

PAGE 2

WAVE 4077 IN 41885

CHECKS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACTS HAS PRODUCED LITTLE OTHER THAN WILLIAM S. WIRALDA'S STATEMENT THAT BUCHANAN JOURNALISTIC REPUTATION INDICATES HE INACCURATE AND SENSATIONALIST. AMCLATTER-1 AND PASSOV⁴OV³ ATTEMPTING DISCREETLY TRACE BUCHANAN SOURCE FOR "U.S. BLESSING."

3. BUCHANAN HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED MIRO IE DURING RETURN PLAYA GIRON PRISONERS MIAMI. HAVE NO REAL INSIGHT INFO SIGNIFICANCE THESE ATTACKS BUT BELIEVE THEY COULD REFLECT BUCHANAN OR MIAMI HERALD ATTEMPTS FORCE CHANGES IN UNITES STATES POSTURE RE CUBA.

4. EXPECT ARTICLE WILL HAVE FURTHER REPROCUSSIONS AS IT SPREADS. WISH ALERT HQS THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY INITIATE ACTION DISCREDIT BUCHANAN STORY AS WELL AS REASSURE MIRO. WILL FORWARD SUGGESTIONS THIS REGARD AFTER WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER ASSESS STORY'S IMPACT.

5. POUCHING CLIPPING 28 MAY

END OF MESSAGE

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3/17/17

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/490,978
SUBJECT	STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT	DATE DIST.	24 OCTOBER 1961
DATE OF INFO.	OCTOBER 1961	PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	ENGLAND, LONDON (24 OCTOBER 1961)	REFERENCES	BN11257
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	OEL-30,995

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE (OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE) FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS". 24

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA, INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.
2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO, HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACD	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	OSR	OG	EXD	FBI
					T&S		TREASURY		REC INCLANS						

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

TDCS -3/490,978

IN 11257

PAGE 2

HAD AGAINST BATISTA.

3. THE MRP WAS PRESENTLY SHORT OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES BUT THE POSITION WAS IMPROVING (A MILITIA CAPTAIN WAS RECENTLY SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS IN PRISON FOR PASSING ARMS TO THE MRP). NO HELP WHATSOEVER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE FROM THE "SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES, WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION". THESE SOURCES WERE STILL THINKING INEFFECTUALLY IN TERMS OF A FURTHER INVASION.

4. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE RESISTANCE IN CUBA TOWARDS THE EXILES WAS ONE OF INDIFFERENCE MOUNTING TO CONTEMPT FOR SPECIFIC MOVES SUCH AS THE PROPOSED PROMOTION OF A CUBAN GOV'T IN EXILE. WHAT THE RESISTANCE WANTED WAS FUNDS AND THE RETURN, BY INFILTRATION, OF TRAINED EXILES, PARTICULARLY COMMUNICATION EXPERTS.

5. ON THE TIMING OF CASTRO'S OVERTHROW, RAY SAID CASTRO WOULD NOT LAST ANOTHER YEAR. HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION IN CUBA IMMEDIATELY AFTER CASTRO'S DOWNFALL WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND COULD DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL WAR.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE. CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING													
			FORM FILLED	ACTION ACTION												
TO	Chief, Special Affairs Staff		XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING												
INFO				NO INDEXING REQUIRED												
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING												
SUBJECT	TYPIC/Operational Debriefing Report - Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre			ABSTRACT												
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES																
ACTION REQUIRED: None																
REFERENCES: (A) WAVE 2733, dated 15 August 1963 (B) MEXI 5507, dated 26 July 1963																
<p>Transmitted herewith, FYI, is a debriefing report on Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre. Subject arrived in the U. S., via Mexico in late August, 1963. The debriefing contains information re the MRR roll up in May, 1962. Attachment "A" contains a list of subject's friends that are currently employed in power plants in Cuba. Attachment "B" is a debriefing report on Angel BENCOMO who Sanchez believes was responsible for the MRR roll up.</p>																
END OF DISPATCH																
ATTACHMENTS: Debriefing Reports, 1 cy ea. herewith																
INDEX - X		<table border="1"> <tr><td colspan="2">RECLASSIFIED</td></tr> <tr><td>RI/AN</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>RI/MIS</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>WIP/IS</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>SA-10013</td><td></td></tr> <tr><td>RI/E-100</td><td></td></tr> </table>			RECLASSIFIED		RI/AN		RI/MIS		WIP/IS		SA-10013		RI/E-100	
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<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;"> <small>CLASSIFICATION</small> SECRET </div>		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;"> <small>DATE TYPED</small> 4 Oct. 63 </div>														
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;"> <small>DATE DISPATCHED</small> 11 1963 </div>		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;"> <small>DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER</small> UFGA-11653 </div>														
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;"> <small>HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER</small> 19-132-5-96/3 </div>																

3 September 1963

DEBRIEFING REPORT : Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre - aka "Jose Antonio"
DATE & PLACE : Safehouse #182, 29-30 August (0900 - 1300 hrs)
CASE OFFICER : Clarence E. SMERYAGE

1. Subject began to work against the CASTRO regime with the MRP in 1960. At that time he was employed in the Santa Clara power plant as a technician. His job was controlling the amount of electric current that was distributed. (Attachment "A" contains a list of Subject's friends currently employed in power plants in Cuba). On 17 April 1961 Subject made contact with a KUBARK infiltration team and began to assist the team. Team consisted of Segundo BORGES, Pepe GONZALES and AMARGO/1. Case Officer Comment: AMARGO/1 has confirmed the fact that Subject worked with his team in Cuba. Subject permitted the team to install their RS-1 set in his house located at #219 Carretera de Camajuani in the City of Santa Clara. He also safehoused the team on occasion and permitted them to hold meetings at his house. After the failure of Playa Giron the team reorganized the MRR in Las Villas Province, selecting Subject to be the Civil Coordinator of the movement in that province. Enrique ORTEGA was selected as the Military Coordinator. On 21 July 1961, while ORTEGA and Subject were in Havana for discussions with MRR leaders AMH/1 and Juan FALCON, the KUBARK infiltration team and many other members of the MRR in Las Villas, including Subject's wife, were arrested. (Discussions were about actions to take place 26 July 1961).

2. Maria RODRIGUEZ Posa, from Santa Clara, age 50/55 yrs, called ORTEGA in Havana and told him not to return to Santa Clara as many people had been arrested. ORTEGA passed the information to Subject but as subject thought it applied only to ORTEGA he returned to Santa Clara late at night on 22 July. He went to his home and on 23 July proceeded to work at the power plant. Maria RODRIGUEZ Posa intercepted him on his way home for lunch and told him that the G-2 was at his home and that they also were going to the power plant to arrest him. Subject also learned that there was surveillance on his home on the night of 22 July 1961, but the person watching the house had gotten drunk and did not see subject when he returned from Havana. From that moment until entering an Embassy on 6 September 1962, subject lived "black".

3. Subject proceeded to the outskirts of Santa Clara where a friend, Efrain WARREN, resided. His friend told him to go to Havana. While driving to Havana Subject met another person who informed him that the G-2 had a roadblock on the highway at Colon, Matanzas, and that all cars were being searched. On 24 July 1961, Subject went to a beach called "GANUZA" located on the north coast of Las Villas near Corralillo. Subject's sister has a home at "Ganuza" so he left his car there and proceeded to Havana with some friends of his sister. Later the G-2 confiscated his auto. (It is interesting to note that the G-2, after confiscating subject's auto at the beach, believed that Subject had departed from Cuba. Subject thereafter communicated with his wife by sending her letters in jail via Miami where they were postmarked).

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10/82

4. On 25 July 1961 Subject went to the house of an MRR leader, FNU JIMENEZ in Havana. When Subject approached JIMENEZ's house he noticed a "blind move as if someone was watching" so he did not go in. He walked two blocks to a bus stop. From the bus stop he could observe the house and he noticed that a car departed at a "high rate of speed". Later that day Subject made contact with ORTEGA at the house of Mario MIRIVE in Fontanar, Havana. MIRIVE still lives in Havana. ORTEGA told Subject of the MRR plans for the following day (26 July). ORTEGA said that the movement was "going ahead with their plans" even though they were aware of JIMENEZ's arrest. Subject resided for approximately one week at the home of Jose MALGAREJO in Veradero. MALGAREJO continues to work for the GOC at this time. He is the Deputy Chief of "Asphalt Consolidated" for the entire country. (In April 1962 Subject's wife escaped from the Womens' Prison at Guanajay, Pinar del Rio. She also was safehoused at MALGAREJO's house). Subject claims that MALGAREJO is a "good man" who also has a home located at Avenida de los OCUJES #221 in Santa Catalina (outskirts of Havana). MALGAREJO's wife and sons reside with him. Subject spent approximately one month in the above house (Aug.-Sept. 61).

5. From October 1961 Subject resided with Ester CRUZ, a person he had known for 10 years. While living with CRUZ he changed his appearance - lost much weight, dyed and curled his hair, obtained contact lenses. (C/O Comment: Ester CRUZ was arrested approximately 9 May 1962 during the "roll up" of the MRR. She is in jail at this time). In November 1961, Subject met Jose Luis ARANGO from Camaguey. ARANGO was at that time military coordinator for the MRR and used the name "Angelito". FNU REYES aka LUCAS, who was the MRR Coordinator of Las Villas introduced Subject to ARANGO. REYES is from Yaguajay, Las Villas. Subject met REYES through Oscar MADRUGA aka "Anibel" whom he had known since 1959. ARANGO encouraged Subject to begin working for the MRR again. An ID card in alias from a medical laboratory was obtained for Subject. He then obtained a briefcase and began selling medical supplies. MADRUGA's cousin Jose FERNANDEZ owned the laboratory FROMBERG LABORATORY. FERNANDEZ worked for AMBRONC/5. After AMBRONC/5 was captured two actual MRR members met FERNANDEZ and requested that he continue to work. FERNANDEZ did not know the men and denied that he worked for the movement).

6. In late November, 1961 Subject moved into a "guest house" where several other MRR members resided. House is called "House of Maria de la GALLEGA" and is located on "J" Street between 21st and 23rd Streets, Vedado. Subject met "Fernando", the Security Chief of the MRR at the guest house. Fernando continues to work in the underground. He also met Oscar MADRUGA there. He met Roberto SANCHEZ who also continues to work in the underground. MADRUGA had gone to the hills of Las Villas but returned to Havana. Another MRR man residing there was Roberto FERNANDEZ. Arturo MUGARRA and AMSALON/1 visited the house on occasion. Subject was once picked up at the house by AMSALON/1. During this period FNU REYES, aka Lucas, was arrested and Subject began to work with MUGARRA. In December 1961 ARANGO took asylum. There was much conflict in the MRR during this period between AMHOOK/1 and AMBRONC/5. (Subject has many letters pertaining to this conflict but they were left in Mexico. AMBIDY/1 is having someone pick up the letters. Case Officer will attempt to obtain these letters and review them. Subject claims he did not hand carry them to the U.S., as he thought our officials would seize them).

7. In January 1962, [Arturo MUGARRA] and [Roberto SANCHEZ] were preparing to depart from Cuba. When AMJAVA/4 and AMBRONC/5 arrived in Havana they changed their minds. (C/O Comment: A woman named [Emilia del MAS] was living with MUGARRA. This girl later came to the USA via the Brazilian Embassy) [MUGARRA]'s group consisted of [Roberto SANCHEZ], [Angel CANETE], [Eddy GALENO] who "is bad, likes money, women, etc", and subject. [GALENO] called Subject here in Miami on 28 August and wants to talk with him).

8. [MUGARRA] informed AMBRONC/5 that he had doubts about Juan BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly", as he had asked too many questions re what AMBRONC/5 had brought to Cuba. AMBRONC/5 decided to call a "false meeting" of the chiefs of the movement to test BUSTAMENTE but "someone objected to this". In February 1962, a meeting of the leaders of the MRR took place and AMBRONC/5 reorganized the movement. Subject met AMBRONC/5 only twice - once in February 1962 at the house of [Angel CANETE] and another time in March, 1962 when the assassination of Juan MARINELLO failed. The Operation failed as the automobile to be used in the assassination attempt was stolen on the day of the proposed Operation. The driver of the car was to be Orlando CRUZ, brother of Ester CRUZ. The MRR suspected Orlando CRUZ after this incident as he is a person who "likes money" and the theft was "quite a coincidence". (Orlando CRUZ is presently in Miami. He called Subject on 28 August and wants to see him). AMBRONC/5 informed the group in March to suspend all operations until he returned from a trip he was taking to the USA with [MUGARRA] and [Jose RODRIGUEZ Pecheco]. AMBRONC/5 placed [Angel CANETE] in charge of the radio sets. [CANETE] was selected to be the only person in direct contact with the RADOP in place of Juan BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly". [MUGARRA] gave subject two radio sets; one was placed in the apartment of a sister-in-law of subject located at 23rd and I Sts., Vedado, Apt. #11. The other set was located at *A Street between 3rd and 5th Sts., Vedado, the home of [Carlos CADENAS]. The only persons who knew the locations of the sets were the Radop, [Juan FALCON], the MRR Chief and [Angel CANETE]. During AMBRONC/5's trip to the USA in April, 1962, Juan BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly" discovered where the radios were hidden. Subject had contact with [FALCON] and [CANETE] during April.

9. On 2 May 1962 AMBRONC/5 and [MUGARRA] returned from the USA. [Enrique CEPERO] and [MUGARRA]'s common-law wife waited for them in the Blue Studebaker Lark. AMBRONC/5 and [MUGARRA] were late in arriving, however, and the group had departed from the area.

10. Subject later discovered that the G-2 had captured a "large radio" in the apartment of a radio technician named TROVADIUS. TROVADIUS, when captured, fired at the G-2 and was himself wounded in the shoulder. Later TROVADIUS reported that he had seen Juan FALCON in prison and that FALCON had said "people in the G-2 had told me that no one would be wounded or killed".

11. The Radop *(ALBUMP/1) informed subject on Wednesday (9 May 1962) to take the radio set out of the house. Rumors were already circulating that the Radop and [FALCON] were captured. Owners of the house where the radio was cached had moved to Santa Clara for Mothers' Day. As Subject was in contact with [Congo PECHOCO] during this time he did not attempt to pick-up the radio until Thursday (10 May) at 0700 hrs. Subject entered the apartment building (12 stories high) by the rear. Upon arrival he discovered that the glass doors on the terrace were opened (apartment was located on the eleventh floor). These windows are seldom opened.

Page 4 -

Subject entered the building with his briefcase containing a pistol. He noticed two men "loitering in the lobby". He took the elevator to the 9th floor, departed, and walked to the eleventh floor. Subject was wearing soft shoes. He walked quietly to the apartment and heard a voice say "don't talk so loud as no one will come in". Subject then proceeded to the next apartment occupied by a friend of the movement. The friend said she had heard noises since the preceding night in the apartment. Subject then took the stairs to the 9th floor and entered the elevator. He got off on the ground floor and proceeded to the house on Carlos O. Tercero Ave. where the other radio was cached (Owner's name is CABANES). Upon arrival at the house he discovered that the woman who owned the house was outside in her housecoat talking to a stranger. Subject then departed from the area, called a friend of CABANES who went to the house. The friend was arrested, held a week and released. Subject then tried to pass this information to Arturo MUGARRA but MUGARRA had disappeared. He later discovered that MUGARRA knew that the radios were discovered and that TROVADIUS had been shot.

12. On 9 May Juan FALCON, the radio operator (A/CUMP/1), Pepe GUTIERREZ, Al Peluza, Estar CRUZ and Jose SEOANE were arrested. When Subject heard of these developments he hid in the Guanabo area. During this period 9th to 28th of May, he saw MUGARRA approximately eight times. He later heard that the G-2 had taken over a house in Guanabo, located 3 blocks from where he was hiding. Subject heard that the G-2 had taken a "blond thin man there" (Possibly AMBRONC/5). G-2 remained at the house for four days.


13. Subject then departed from Guanabo for a few days. When he returned in June 1962 he met Sylvia LNU, the person who resided at the house where the "blond thin man named CARLOS" was taken. Sylvia and subject met in the water in front of their houses. Sylvia is the wife of a BATISTA Naval Captain who lives in Miami. She has two "little girls". Sylvia said that "CARLOS" used to live at her house and after being captured he was returned there with the G-2. The G-2 was searching for a "plastic case and envelopes" (pads and crystals). Sylvia told subject that she had seen the envelope and that when Enrique CEPERO's family informed her that he was captured she hid everything in the house that could incriminate "Carlos" under the dog house in the back yard. "Carlos" talked as if he had been drugged when he returned to the house with the G-2. They searched the entire house bringing "Carlos" back and forth several times for four days. Sylvia was forced to open the door whenever anyone arrived and the caller was arrested. Sylvia was interrogated and the house was under surveillance for approximately a month. A friend of Sylvia's from outside Cuba visited her during this period and was arrested and held for a week. Sylvia said the items she buried looked like "pads and maps wrapped in plastic". Although she claimed the material was turned over to the MRR, subject has doubts that this was done.

13/82

Page 5 -

14. During September 1962 Subject and his wife entered the Uruguayan Embassy to remain in asylum until 19 June 1963 when they arrived in Mexico City via Safe Conduct.

15. Attachment "B" is a report on Angel BENCOMO who subject believes was responsible for the MRR "roll-up".


Clarence E. SMERYAGE

SECRET

ATTACHMENT "A"

*TALLAPIEDRA - (Power Plant)

1. Ing. Manolito *FERNANDEZ - Superintendente
2. Ing. Luis F. de *LEON - Superintendente Auxiliar
(Bomb Thrower)
- 3.

REGLA - (Power Plant)

1. Delfin *RODRIGUEZ - Operator Control Room
2. Ing. *ROSS - Superintendent

DESPACHO NARANJITO - (Sub-Station)

1. Jaime *GUIU


OFICINA PRINCIPAL DE DESPACHO

1. Carlos *MANUEL Pena - Auxiliar of Superintendent
(May be throw a bomb)- He can give good information.

DESPACHO SANTA CLARA (Santa Clara Dispatching Office)

1. Pedro *LUCAS Galvez (Jefe Despacho) - Dispatch Chief
2. Agustin *GARCIA Cabalet - Despachador - (Dispatcher)

Vladimir S. *KLITTING.



SECRET

ALL "A" to UFC-A-11653

19-300-11

ATTACHMENT "B"



Debriefing of Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre

SUBJECT: Angel ~~X~~ BENCOMO (BENCOMO reportedly was responsible for the MRR roll-up per SANCHEZ - See MEXI-5507)

1. Angel BENCOMO is approximately 19 years old, has brown skin, short, stocky, approximately 150 lbs. BENCOMO was formerly a miliciano in Camaguey and a friend of Arturo MUGARRA. BENCOMO entered the MRR via Eddy GALENO during March 1962 when he was employed by the Abras Publicas in Camaguey. BENCOMO had trouble with his superiors; quit the militia, etc. GALENO brought BENCOMO to Havana where BENCOMO began working in resistance with Jose RODRIGUEZ Pecheco and Santiago SANCHEZ. (BENCOMO did not meet Arturo MUGARRA in Havana). SANCHEZ "tested BENCOMO" and he appeared to be OK i.e., disciplined, quiet, etc. SANCHEZ then began using BENCOMO to pick-up radios, minox cameras, etc. This activity took place between March and May 1962.

2. Arturo MUGARRA was arrested in May 1962 in a cafeteria in Havana where he went to dispose of an automobile. GALENO was to meet MUGARRA at the cafeteria. MUGARRA and his brother arrived at the cafeteria, turned the car (Cadillac) over to the prospective buyer and sat down. A mechanic drove the car to test it and returned with two G-2 cars. Although GALENO was present and was questioned he was not arrested.

3. From May to September 1962, SANCHEZ saw BENCOMO often. In September SANCHEZ went into an Embassy but "heard that BENCOMO was arrested and held until November". In January 1963 SANCHEZ heard from BENCOMO via SANCHEZ's sister. BENCOMO wrote a letter (which SANCHEZ still has) saying that he was working for the MRR in the streets. BENCOMO said he did not want to seek asylum but was considering going to the house of Luis PERALES in Oriente. PERALES formerly was operating in the hills of Yayuajay but went to Havana to hide out in Jan.-Feb. 1962). In February 1963, SANCHEZ received another letter from his sister saying that BENCOMO was a G-2 man. BENCOMO identified himself as a G-2 man to PERALES in December 1962, and asked PERALES to cooperate with him. PERALES told SANCHEZ sister of BENCOMO's proposition in January 1963. Since that time PERALES has disappeared.



AN "B" 1. UFGA-11153

9-300-11

BIBR

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Burke, William P. Jr
01775

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1947 - 1962

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CS files

ROOM: 5E 13


DELETIONS, IF ANY: NONE

[illegible]

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

BOCKE WILLIAM P

TERMINATED

STANDARD FORM 56 Revised November 1959 U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CHAPTER I - F.P.M. 56-103		AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954	
1. FULL NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">Burke William P., Jr.</div>		2. DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">October 22, 1900</div>	
3. CHECK THE REASON FOR TERMINATING INSURANCE <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="width: 30%;"> (a) <input type="checkbox"/> SEPARATED (b) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RETIRED </div> <div style="width: 30%;"> (c) <input type="checkbox"/> DIED <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-top: 5px;"> WAS EMPLOYEE AT TIME OF DEATH AN APPLICANT FOR CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO </div> </div> <div style="width: 30%;"> (d) <input type="checkbox"/> 12 MONTHS NON-PAY STATUS (e) <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) </div> </div>			
4. CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX CONCERNING S. F. 54, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="width: 30%;"> (a) <input type="checkbox"/> CURRENT S. F. 54 ATTACHED </div> <div style="width: 30%;"> (b) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS NOT ON FILE WITH THIS AGENCY </div> <div style="width: 30%;"> (c) <input type="checkbox"/> A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (OR EQUIVALENT) </div> </div>			
<small>NOTE: IF EMPLOYEE (A) DIED OR (B) IS RETIRING OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION UNDER CONDITIONS ENTITLING HIM TO RETAIN FREE LIFE INSURANCE, ATTACH CURRENT S. F. 54, IF ANY, TO ORIGINAL S. F. 56 AND CHECK BOX 4 (a) ON ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF S. F. 56. IF NO CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE, CHECK BOX 4 (b). IN ALL OTHER CASES, SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE BY CHECKING BOX 4 (b) OR (c). A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELED BY EMPLOYEE OR AUTOMATICALLY BY TRANSFER OR PRIOR TERMINATION OF INSURANCE.</small>			
5. DATE OF EVENT CHECKED IN ITEM 3 (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">October 27, 1962</div>		6. ANNUAL COMPENSATION RATE (CONVERT DAILY, HOURLY, PIECEWORK, ETC. RATE TO ANNUAL RATE) ON DATE IN ITEM 5. <div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">\$7,925.00 PER ANNUM</div>	
7. DATE OF NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE (SF 55) TO EMPLOYEE (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)		8. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM, AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS OFFICIAL RECORDS, AND THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED WAS COVERED BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 5. (SIGN ORIGINAL ONLY)	
<div style="text-align: center;">  (Personal signature of authorized agency official) </div>		<div style="text-align: center;"> 17 DEC 1962 (Date) </div>	
<div style="text-align: center;"> B. DeFelice (Type name of authorized agency official) </div>		<div style="text-align: center;"> Insurance Officer - Alternate (Title) </div>	
<div style="text-align: center;"> Central Intelligence Agency (Name of agency) </div>		<div style="text-align: center;"> 2430 E St., N.W., Washington 25, D.C. (Mailing address of agency) </div>	

SEE OTHER SIDE
FOR
INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

31 OCT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 001775		2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BURKE WILLIAM P JR	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT (OPTIONAL)		4. EFFECTIVE DATE NO DA YR 10 27 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
A. FUNDS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> V TO V	<input type="checkbox"/> V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3242 222 4000
	<input type="checkbox"/> CF TO V	<input type="checkbox"/> CF TO CF	
8. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION U.S. FIELD NEW ORLEANS OFFICE		9. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION NEW ORLEANS, LA.	
11. POSITION TITLE IO CONTACT		12. POSITION NUMBER 0195	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION OC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 17925
18. REMARKS			
SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL			
19. ACTION CODE N5	20. EMPLOY CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE		24. MGRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH NO DA YR 10 22 60
26. DATE OF GRADE NO DA YR		27. DATE OF LEI NO DA YR	
28. NTE EXPIRES NO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - PICA 3 - NONE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 03H0000
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE NO DA YR		33. SECURITY REQ NO.	
34. SEX		35. VET. PREFERENCE ODE 0 - NONE 1 - 6 PT 2 - 10 PT	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR		37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR DESV PROV TEMP		39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA 1 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE		43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS 1 - YES 2 - NO	
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO		45. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION	
46. POSTED 11-2-62 Lws			

1150

Use Previous
Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

PSC: 31 OCT 22

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION					
1. SERIAL NUMBER		2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)			
001775		BURKE WILLIAM P JR			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION			4. EFFECTIVE DATE		5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT (OPTIONAL)			NO OR YES 3/2/22		REGULAR
6. FUNDS		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE		8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> V TO V <input type="checkbox"/> CF TO V <input type="checkbox"/> V TO CF <input type="checkbox"/> CF TO CF		3243 222 4000			
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11. POSITION TITLE			12. POSITION NUMBER		13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
10 CONTACT			0155		CC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LO, etc.)		15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES		17. SALARY OR RATE	
GS		0132.21		17525	
16. REMARKS					
SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION					

Executive Registry

62-7634

22 OCT 1962

Mr. William P. Burke
 6300 Saint Charles Avenue
 New Orleans 18, Louisiana

Dear Mr. Burke:

As you bring to a close eighteen years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed much to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend warmest wishes in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

(Signed) JOHN A. McCONE

John A. McCone
 Director

Distribution:

3 - Addressee
 1 - DCI
 1 - DDCI
 1 - ER
 1 - DC/EAB/SD

1 - Di/Pers
 1 - C/BSD
 1 - OPS
 1 - BCB Retirement
 1 - BCB Reader

Originator:

/s/ Harry W. Little, Jr.

Director of Personnel

22 OCT 1962

SIGNED

Concur:

DC/EAB/SD

19 OCT 1962

OP/BSD/RSage:smt (18 October 1962)

100

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LA 57 - 793 AND
 DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1954, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS:
 EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GRST	OLD SALARY	NEW GRST	NEW SALARY
BURKE WILLIAM P JR	001775	R2500	V	13 0	\$15810	13 8	\$17925

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

FILE

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD		DATE 2 October 1962
The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:		
NAME: (Last) (First) (Middle) BURKE, William Patrick, Jr.	POSITION TITLE Chief, New Orleans Field Office	
PRESENT GRADE GS-15	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDI/OO	STATION New Orleans
BE AWARDED: Intelligence Medal of Merit		
<input type="checkbox"/> FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON:		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION <input type="checkbox"/> DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION		
<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF:		
CITATION <p>Mr. William P. Burke, Jr., is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his outstanding service to the Central Intelligence Agency. As Chief of the New Orleans Field Office since its inception in 1947, Mr. Burke labored unceasingly in developing programs which have produced important information on a continuing basis. In his role as Agency representative, he has been successful in establishing relationships which have furthered the mission of the Agency and enhanced its reputation in the area. In his role as office chief, he has provided leadership of the highest order to his associates, and leaves behind him a legacy of achievement in keeping with the best traditions of service to the United States.</p> <p>(Recommendation approved by DD/I on 14 September 1962)</p>		
REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD		
APPROVED (Signed) Marshall S. Carter <i>Deputy</i> DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 3 OCT 1962 DATE		SIGNATURE /s/ Harry W. Little, Jr. TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD HARRY W. LITTLE, JR. SIGNATURE /s/ Robert M. Gaynor TYPED NAME OF RECORDER ROBERT M. GAYNOR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION						DATE PREPARED 14 September 1962	
1. SERIAL NUMBER 1775 ✓		2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) BURKE, William P., Jr.					
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Voluntary Retirement (Retinal)				4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH DAY YEAR 10 15 62		5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6. FUNDS X V TO V CF TO V		V TO CF CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGE ABLE 3242-2221-4000		8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/00 Contact Division U.S. Field New Orleans Office				10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION New Orleans, La.			
11. POSITION TITLE <i>IC Contact</i> Intelligence Officer, Chief				12. POSITION NUMBER K 0195		13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION OC	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LP, etc.) GS		15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21		16. GRADE AND STEP 15-8		17. SALARY OR RATE 115,810 <i>17,225</i>	
18. REMARKS as Payroll; Security Subject is re-employable.							
19. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL E. M. ASHCRAFT Chief, Contact Division, 00				DATE SIGNED 30 Oct 62		19. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER J. LAROCQUE, JR. Acting Assistant Director, 00	
DATE SIGNED 30 Oct 1962							
SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL							
20. ACTION CODE US 18		21. OFFICE CODE NUMERIC ALPHABETIC		22. STATE CODE		23. INTEREST CODE	
24. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 12 13 1900		25. DATE OF GRAD MO. DA. YR.		26. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.		27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	
28. DATE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.		29. SPECIAL REFERENCE		30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE		31. SEPARATION DATA CODE TYPE FH, CO, O, O	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA MO. DA. YR.		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.		34. SEX		35. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
36. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 1 - NONE 2 - 5 yrs 3 - 10 yrs		37. SERA. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.		38. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.		39. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP	
40. FEDERAL TAX DATA CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO		41. STATE TAX DATA CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO		42. HEALTH INS. CODE CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO		43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	
44. U.P. APPROVAL H. F. HEGGEN By E. M. ASHCRAFT, 31 Oct 62		DATE APPROVED 31 Oct 62					

FORM 1152 PREVIOUS EDITIONS
4-62 AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE _____ FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

(Date)

Oct 31 2 03 PM '62

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE

DATE SIGNED

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary - Part Time		

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE
 Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
 Office, Major Staff, etc..
 Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
 Branch
 Section
 Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-200-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.


SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

1. FIRST SERIAL NO. 01275		BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 15 Jul 1944			
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Bull, William Patrick, Jr.		3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Oct 1900	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 18 Sep 1947	
6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT (Indicate no. of dependents) 1	8. YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1907		9. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE NA	
10. CAREER STATUS Staff	MEMBERSHIP Reject-1	OTHER STATUS Reject-1	11. LAST MED. RPT. Oct 1957	QUAL. FOR US Field	EVAL. FOR Annual
12. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS X	NONE SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3
13. ASSESSMENT DATE 9 Jul 1947		14. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None		15. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None	
16. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT 1925-42 Self-Employed, New Orleans, La - Lawyer 1942-45 Military Service, US Marine Corps, Major - Division Legal Officer 1945-47 Administered Financial Matters Concerning Family Estate					
17. NON-CIA EDUCATION 1915-19 Loyola Univ, New Orleans, La - AB Arts & Sciences 1920-23 Harvard Law School - LLB 1923-24 Trinity College, Cambridge, England - English Literature Research 1924-25 Tulane Univ., New Orleans, La - LLB					
18. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested) None					
19. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING 1954 CIA Orientation 1959 Mgmt for Contact Div					
20. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 15 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)					
EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1947	I.O.	0132.21	P-7	OO/Contact/Contr/Actg R Mgr	LAC New Orleans
Sep 1948	"	0132.21	P-8	CO/Contact Br/Reg Mgr N. O.	"
Mar 1952	"	0132.21	15	OO/ContactDiv/Ch, N.O. Off	"
Jul 1960	LWOP				"
Sep 1960	I.O.-Contact	0132.21	15	OO/ContactDiv/Ch, New Orleans	Off
21. DATE REVIEWED 25 Sep 1962 OP/POD/QAB/hms		22. PROFILE REVIEWED BY 25 Sep 1962 OP/POD/QAB/hms		23. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 2 Dec 1957	

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 01775		BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)	
NAME (Last-First-Middle) BURKE, William Patrick, Jr.		DATE OF BIRTH Oct 1900	
			
24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE			
25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL			
26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION <p>Letter of Appreciation 1948 from AD/Operations prior to leaving Agency for having created an effective field office in less than a year, excellent relations with clients and local Armed Forces Representatives and high morale of office.</p> <p>Commendation 1954 from DD/P for thorough and expeditious contribution made by DDI Personnel to urgent need for intelligence about Guatemala.</p>			
27. DATE REVIEWED 25 Sep 1962		28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY OP/POD/CAB/hms	
FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) 1 FEB 67		REPLACES FORM 1000 (PART 2) SECRET WHICH IS OBSOLETE.	
		PROFILE (4)	

SECRET

02 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief, New Orleans Field Office continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. He is extremely conservative by nature and finds it difficult to act without the most careful consideration of all factors involved. While this approach might be a handicap in some areas it tends to be an asset in New Orleans. In spite of this tendency he willingly and efficiently devotes all his time and energy to the solution of a problem in an emergency. He represents the Agency well and maintains the highest respect in his community.

E. M. Ashcraft
E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

SECRET

SECRET

02 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief, New Orleans Field Office continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. He is extremely conservative by nature and finds it difficult to act without the most careful consideration of all factors involved. While this approach might be a handicap in some areas it tends to be an asset in New Orleans. In spite of this tendency he willingly and efficiently devotes all his time and energy to the solution of a problem in an emergency. He represents the Agency well and maintains the highest respect in his community.

E. M. Ashcraft
E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

SECRET


21 June 61

Memo for File - William P. Burke

Subject: Longevity Step Increase

In reviewing this file under the Security reinvestigation program, it was noted that the 3rd LSI (as GS-15) was proposed to be made effective on 18 Sept 60, but that the effective date had been changed by Payroll to show 16 Oct 60. Reason for the change is presumed to be due to LWOP. Form 560 shows 225 hours of LWOP during the waiting period. If those figures are correct, then there was no "excess" LWOP, since the law provides that a maximum of 240 hours of LWOP is creditable toward completion of the waiting period in the case of LSI's.

I called this case to the attention of Joe Tracy, C/Payroll, who will review LWOP records and, if required, issue a memorandum to correct the effective date of the last LSI.


Gene C. Stevens

14-00000

SECRET

2 JUL 1961
not
for

30 JUN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. Mr. Burke is a conservative who sometimes finds it difficult without most careful and protracted consideration of all factors involved to adjust to changes in methods and objectives particularly those peculiar to clandestine support. While his conservatism added to his meticulous legalistic approach might be something less than desirable in certain areas it is a definite asset in New Orleans. When called upon in emergency he willingly and efficiently devotes his entire time and energy to the solution of the problem regardless of personal inconvenience. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area and readily maintains respect in the community.

E. M. Ashcraft

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

3 JUL 1961

1000 0000

1000 0000

1000 0000

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

100
not
for

30 JUL 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. Mr. Burke is a conservative who sometimes finds it difficult without most careful and protracted consideration of all factors involved to adjust to changes in methods and objectives particularly those peculiar to clandestine support. While his conservatism added to his meticulous legalistic approach might be something less than desirable in certain areas it is a definite asset in New Orleans. When called upon in emergency he willingly and efficiently devotes his entire time and energy to the solution of the problem regardless of personal inconvenience. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area and readily maintains respect in the community.

E. M. Ashcraft

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:


George G. Carey
George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

3 JUL 1961

SECRET

1960

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.		2. NAME				3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.		4. FUNDS		5. ALLOTMENT	
101775		BURKE WILLIAM P JR				DDI/CONT 7		V-40			
6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
GS 15	9	\$15,550.00	MO	DA	YR	GS 15	7	\$15,810	MO	DA	YR
			09	21	58				10	06	60
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER											
8. CHECK ONE <input type="checkbox"/> NO EXCESS LWOP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCESS LWOP						9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP					
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:											
<input type="checkbox"/> IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD						10. INITIALS OF CLERK					
<input type="checkbox"/> IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD						11. AUDITED BY					
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL											
12. TYPE OF ACTION						13. REMARKS					
<input type="checkbox"/> P.B.I. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L.B.I. <input type="checkbox"/> PAY ADJUSTMENT						Employee has served an aggregate of 10 years in present, equivalent, or higher grade and at the top of present grade since 9-19-48. This is the third longevity step increase.					
14. AUTHENTICATION											
09. MAR 2 2008 7 00 AM '60 HONOLULU BRANCH						<div style="text-align: center;">  </div>					
PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION											

FORM 5-59

560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b.

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

V to V		V to V		SECRET (When Filled In)		REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION				DATE PREPARED		
UV to V		UV to UV								Mo	Da	Yr
9		14		60								
1. Serial No.		2. Name (Last-First-Middle)				3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet. Prob.		5. Sex	
101775		BARKER WILLIAM P JR				Mo Da Yr			None 0 5 Pr 1 10 Pr 2		Code	
Mo Da Yr		Mo Da Yr				Mo Da Yr			Mo Da Yr		Mo Da Yr	
01 15 44		01 15 44				01 15 44			01 15 44		01 15 44	
7. SCD		8. CSC Rating		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority		10. Appr. Affidav			11. FEGLI		12. LCO	
Mo Da Yr		Mo Da Yr		Mo Da Yr		Mo Da Yr			Mo Da Yr		Mo Da Yr	
01 15 44		01 15 44		01 15 44		01 15 44			01 15 44		01 15 44	

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations				Code		15. Location Of Official Station				Station Code	
DDI - CO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE				2531		NEW ORLEANS, LA.				75033	
16. Dept. Field		17. Position Title		18. Position No.		19. Serr.		20. Occup. Series			
Dept. Code USMA Frqn		INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)		0135		65		0132.21			
21. Grade & Step		22. Salary Or Rate		23. SD		24. Date Of Grade		25. PSI Due		26. Appropriation Number	
15 9		\$15550		OC		Mo Da Yr		Mo Da Yr		1242 2221	
09 19 48		09 19 48		09 19 48		09 19 48		09 19 48		09 19 48	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action		Code		28. Eff. Date		29. Type Of Employee		30. Separation Data	
RETURN TO DUTY FROM LWOP		570		Mo Da Yr		Regular			
				9 1 60					

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations				Code		32. Location Of Official Station				Station Code	
				2531						75033	
33. Dept. Field		34. Position Title		35. Position No.		36. Serr.		37. Occup. Series			
Dept. Code USMA Frqn											
38. Grade & Step		39. Salary Or Rate		40. SD		41. Date Of Grade		42. PSI Due		43. Appropriation Number	
		\$				Mo Da Yr		Mo Da Yr			
						09 19 48		09 15 60			

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)		C. Person Approved By (Signature And Title)		Date Approved	
E. M. ASHCRAFT, Chief, Contact Division, CO		George G. Carey		15 SEP 1960	
For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)		Assistant Director for Operations			
Ann L. Budresky					

CLEARANCES

Clearance		Signature		Date		Clearance		Signature		Date	
A. Career Board						D. Placement					
B. Pos. Control		18		9-16-60		E					
C. Classification						F. Approved By		DU Mulcahy MRS		9/16/60	
Remarks											

CK for M. Budresky

Continued On Reverse Side

FORM NO 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION 4-16-60

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BLT: 7 SEPT 1960												NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION																	
1. Serial No.			2. Name (Last-First-Middle)						3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet. Pref.			5. Sex			6. CS - ECD											
101775			BURKE WILLIAM P JR						Mo. 10 Da. 22 Yr. 00			Non-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2			Code 1			M 1			Mo. 09 Da. 15 Yr. 47								
7. SCB			8. CSC Reent. - CSC Or Other Legal Authority						10. Appt. Affidav.			11. FEQU			12. LCD			13. Int. Serv. Ltr.											
Mo. 07 Da. 15 Yr. 44			Yes-1 No-2						Code 1						50 USCA 403 J						Mo. 09 Da. 10 Yr. 47			Yes-1 No-2			Code 2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations				Code		15. Location Of Official Station				Station Code			
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE				2531		NEW ORLEANS, LA.				75033			
16. Dept. - Field		Code		17. Position Title				18. Position No.		19. Serv.		20. Occup. Series	
Dept. - 2 USStd - 4 Frqn - 6		4		INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)				0195		GS		0132.21	
21. Grade & Step		22. Salary Or Rate		23. SD		24. Date Of Grade		25. PSI Due		26. Appropriation Number			
15 9		\$ 15550		OC		Mo. 09 Da. 19 Yr. 48		XX XX XX		1242 2221			

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action		Code		28. Eff. Date		29. Type Of Employee		Code		30. Separation Data	
RETURN TO DUTY FROM LEAVE WITHOUT PAY		50		Mo. 09 Da. 07 Yr. 60		REGULAR		01			

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations				Code		32. Location Of Official Station				Station Code			
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE				2531		NEW ORLEANS, LA.				75033			
33. Dept. - Field		Code		34. Position Title				35. Position No.		36. Serv.		37. Occup. Series	
Dept. - 2 USStd - 4 Frqn - 6		4		INTELL OFF (CON) (CH)				0195		GS		0132.21	
38. Grade & Step		39. Salary Or Rate		40. SD		41. Date Of Grade		42. PSI Due		43. Appropriation Number			
15 9		\$ 15550		OC		Mo. 09 Da. 19 Yr. 48		Mo. 09 Da. 18 Yr. 60		1242 2221			

44. Remarks

POSTED

9-22-60-18

HOL

DT

SECRET

(When Filled In)

V to V		V to UV		REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION				DATE PREPARED					
UV to V		UV to UV						Mo	Da	Yr			
1. Serial No.		2. Name (Last-First-Middle)				3. Date Of Birth		4. Vet. Pref.		5. Sex		6. CS - EOD	
1775		BURKE, William P., Jr.				10 22 00		None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2		M		Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD		8. CSC Retire		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority		10. Asmt. Affidav		11. FEGLI		12. LCD		13. Yes - 1 No - 2	
Mo Da Yr		Yes - 1 No - 2		Code		Mo Da Yr		Yes - 1 No - 2		Mo Da Yr		Yes - 1 No - 2	

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations				Code		15. Location Of Official Station				Station Code		
DDI/00 Contact Division New Orleans Office						New Orleans, La.						
16. Dept. Field		17. Position Title		18. Position No.		19. Serv.		20. Occup. Series				
Dept. - Usld. - Frgn -		Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CH)		195		GS		0132.21				
21. Grade & Step		22. Salary Or Rate		23. SD		24. Date Of Grade		25. PSI Due		26. Appropriation Number		
15-9		\$14,450		00		09 19 65		Mo Da Yr		242-2221		

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action		Code		28. Eff. Date		29. Type Of Employee		Code		30. Separation Date	
LEAVE WITHOUT PAY*				Mo Da Yr		Regular		76			

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations				Code		32. Location Of Official Station				Station Code	
										75033	
33. Dept. Field		34. Position Title		35. Position No.		36. Serv.		37. Occup. Series			
Dept. - Usld. - Frgn -											
38. Grade & Step		39. Salary Or Rate		40. SD		41. Date Of Grade		42. PSI Due		43. Appropriation Number	
						Mo Da Yr		Mo Da Yr			

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)		C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)		Date Approved	
M. Aschcraft, Chief, Contact Division		GEORGE G. CAREY		1 JUN 66	
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)		Assistant Director for Operations			
Ann L. Budresky		2271			

CLEARANCES

Clearance		Signature		Date		Clearance		Signature		Date	
A. Career Board						D. Placement					
B. Pos. Control						E. Release					
C. Classification						F. Approved By					

Remarks *Personal reasons. It is requested that Mr. Burke be granted 25 days of leave without pay commencing 18 July and ending 10 August 1966.

To 10/16/66
10 Sept 66 per
mainey initiation

Continued on reverse side

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PAS: 26 AUGUST 1960														
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION														
1. Serial No.		2. Name (Last-First-Middle)				3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet. Pref.		5. Ser.		6. CS - EOD	
101775		BURKE WILLIAM P JR				Mo. Da. Yr.			Non-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2		Code		Mo. Da. Yr.	
07 15 44						10 22 00			1		M 1		09 18 47	
7. SCD		8. CSC Reint.		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority		10. Appt. Allidat			11. FEGR		12. ECD		13. Grant Rec.	
Mo. Da. Yr.		Yes-1 No-2		Code		Mo. Da. Yr.			Yes-1 No-2		Code		Mo. Da. Yr.	
		1		50 USCA 403 J							09 18 47		No-2 2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations				Code		15. Location Of Official Station				Station Code	
DDI 00 CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE						NEW ORLEANS, LA.					
16. Dept. - Field		Code		17. Position Title				18. Position No.		19. Ser.	
Dept - 2 USMld - 4 Frgh - 6		4		INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)				0195		GS	
										0132.21	
21. Grade & Step		22. Salary Or Rate		23. SD		24. Date Of Grade		25. PSI Due		26. Appropriation Number	
15 9		\$ 15550		OC		Mo. Da. Yr.		Mo. Da. Yr.		0242 2221	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action		Code		28. Eff. Date		29. Type Of Employee		Code		30. Separation Data	
LEAVE WITHOUT PAY (THRU COB 10 SEPT 1960)		61		Mo. Da. Yr. BOB 07 29 60		REGULAR		70			

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations				Code		32. Location Of Official Station				Station Code	
DDI 00 CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE				2531		NEW ORLEANS, LA.				75033	
33. Dept. - Field		Code		34. Position Title				35. Position No.		36. Ser.	
Dept - 2 USMld - 4 Frgh - 6		4		INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)				0195		GS	
										0132.21	
38. Grade & Step		39. Salary Or Rate		40. SD		41. Date Of Grade		42. PSI Due		43. Appropriation Number	
15 9		\$ 15550		OC		Mo. Da. Yr. 09 19 48		Mo. Da. Yr. XX XX XX		1242 2221	
44. Remarks											
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; display: inline-block; transform: rotate(-10deg);"> POSTED P-30-60 WR 10/1/60 </div> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;">ST</div>											

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED
1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OC	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	101775	25 31	GS-15 9	\$14,450	\$15,550

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

18 MAY 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

1. William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office most efficiently and to demonstrate thorough knowledge of his area. His inherent conservatism and somewhat legalistic approach tend to make it difficult for him to accept change and methods peculiar to clandestine support without most careful consideration of all the factors involved.
2. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area. His conservatism is to a degree an asset in New Orleans; it could conceivably be a handicap elsewhere.

E. M. Ashcraft
E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey 20 MAY 1960
George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations