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DOES NOT PLAN TO IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER MONIES INTO CHILE. HE RETURNING CHILE VIA NEW YORK AND CHICAGO AND PLANS TO MEET WITH FREI 15 OCTOBER IN NEW YORK. FUERMINE-1 EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE JUNTA WILL NEITHER RAISE THE MATTER WITH EMBASSY NOR PURSUE FURTHER SINCE IT IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO.

2. FUBRIG-2 RECEIVED NEWS CALMLY BUT WAS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT IMPLICATIONS OF EFFECTS OF THE REVELATIONS AND EXPRESSED OPINION THAT SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE CHANGED
PREV
TO QENT SUCH LEAKS. HE WAS RELIEVED THAT EL MURCURIO WAS NOT MENTIONED BY NAME (BUT WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT IT WILL NOT BE EASILY IDENTIFIED IN ANY SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARY). FUBRIG-1 THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE JUNTA MAY WONDER IF USG STILL NOT IN SOME WAY SUPPORTING PDC, WHICH OF COURSE JUNTA WOULD FIND MOST UNACCEPTABLE.

4. FUERMINE-5 ALSO TOOK THE NEWS CALMLY ABOUT REVELATION OF \$9,000 ITEM FOR TRAVEL OF PDC LEADERS. WHILE SHAKING HIS HEAD ABOUT THE LEAKING OF SUCH MATTERS, HE BELIEVES THAT THE REVELATION, UNLESS IT IS MADE MUCH MORE SPECIFIC BY SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLICITY, WILL NOT CAUSE HIM A PROBLEM.

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CONSIDERS THE FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE DELEGATION AS BEING PDC AND (INCORRECTLY) AS MAKING A TOUR OF LATIN AMERICAN RATHER THAN EUROPEAN CAPITALS WILL LEAD AWAY FROM PROPER IDENTIFICATION, SINCE THE FUNDS THAT PASSED THROUGH HIS HANDS WERE APPROXIMATELY \$4,000 AT THE THEN LOCAL FREE MARKET RATE (AS OPPOSED TO STATION SPENDING RATE), HE FEELS THAT THIS WILL ALSO HELP HIDE PROPER IDENTIFICATION EVEN WITHIN THE PDC OF THIS FUNDING.

5. FUPOCKET-1 WAS INFORMED OF DISCLOSURE OF \$25,000 FOR PURCHASE OF RADIO STATION ON 8 SEPTEMBER. WAS VISIBLY DISTURBED UPON HEARING NEWS AND COMMENTED "YOU PEOPLE NEED TO CHANGE YOUR SYSTEM SO THAT SUCH NEWS DOES NOT GET OUT." STATED THAT NO ONE WITHIN HIS GROUP KNEW THAT HE GAVE MONEY ON THE SIDE TO PURCHASE THIS RADIO STATION AND THAT NO RECORDS WERE MADE OF HIS PART IN THE DEAL. HE REMARKED THAT THE FORMER OWNER OF THE STATION IS A SOCIALIST AND UNLIKELY TO DISCUSS THE TERMS OF THE SALE SINCE ILLEGAL MONEY TRANSACTION INVOLVED. FUPOCKET-1 PROMISED TO KEEP US ADVISED OF ANY BLOW-BACK.

6. ON 10 SEPTEMBER? FUBARGAIN-1 SAID THAT GENERAL PINOCHET

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DID NOT SEEM VERY UPSET BUT COMMENTED IN FUBARGAIN-1'S PRESENCE THAT THE DISCLOSURE "SEEMED TO BE A DUB^{ME} THING TO DO." FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH FUBAEGAIN-2, HE SHOWED HIS UNHAPPINESS AT WHAT HE FEELS IS GROWING EVIDENCE OF USG INCOMPREHENSION OF GOC. SAID HE AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE TRAVELED TO STATES AND ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE WAY USG FINCTIONS COULD PARTIALLY UNDERSTAND CURRENT U.S.G. ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS. SAID MOST JUNIOR OFFICERS, HOWEVER, ARE INCREASINGLY UPSET AND CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY FEEL IS U.S. FAILURE TO BE A "GOOD FRIEND" OF CHILE DESPITE THE IMPORTANT SACRIFICES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE HERE IN THE WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE.

7. ACCORDING TO FUBARGAIN-1, MOST CHILEAN OFFICERS VIEW THE REVELATIONS AND THEIR TIMING AS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY A SECTOR OF U.S.G. (ALBEIT THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH) TO DELIBERATELY DAMAGE JUNTA AND FALSELY CAST DOUBT ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND ROLE IN BRINGING DOWN ALLENDE. OFFICERS HAVE ADDED THIS LATEST BLOW TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE U.S. FOOT-DRAGGING ON SUPPLYING CHILE ARMS URGENTLY NEEDED FOR DEFENSE

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AGAINST PERU AND U.S. FAILURE NOT ONLY TO ASSIST, BUT ACTUALLY
TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS, PROBLEMS OF CHILEAN IMAGE
ABROAD. SUM IS THAT CHILEAN OFFICER CORPS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY BAFFLED AND RESENTFUL ABOUT U.S. ACCORDING TO THIS
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PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS
MEDIA IN ALLENDE'S CHILE

*For
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HIGHLIGHTS

- Since President Allende's electoral victory in 1970, the Government propaganda apparatus has mounted a coordinated campaign against the opposition communications media focusing on the prestigious El Mercurio newspaper chain and key opposition radios. The long-range goal is to create conditions that will insure Government control over the media so that an emasculated opposition will operate intuitively and through self-censorship within an approved framework.
- The opposition radio stations bear the brunt of an array of legal and illegal devices designed to intimidate them. These devices include the threat of violence, favoritism in the distribution of essential Government advertising revenue, temporary closures, and Government-fomented strikes.
- Chile's national television -- the only country-wide channel -- has become an important propaganda instrument for the Government. But it is being challenged by a Catholic University channel which is attempting to expand its service beyond the Santiago area.
- A major confrontation between the Government and the opposition, lasting more than a year, has taken place at the Papelera, Chile's only important private newsprint producer, with the company supported by the opposition media stymying repeated Government efforts to take over the firm. The paper company claims that Government price policies have brought it close to bankruptcy.
- Despite officially-sanctioned harassment, the opposition media have continued to function, taking advantage of the fluid political situation currently prevailing in Chile, and have become increasingly effective in exploiting the Government's economic failures and the growing dissension within the ruling Marxist coalition.
- Nevertheless, the opposition's economic base that sustains its media is being slowly undermined as the Government expands its control over the Chilean economy. Many opposition media are reportedly already in difficult financial straits. The Chilean Communist Party, seeking to strengthen its voice in the March 1973 Congressional elections, has already purchased five beleaguered radio stations (one a former opposition station) in southern Chile.

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III. THE ALLENDE PROCESS - HOW THE MEDIA ARE TREATED

Allende's treatment of the opposition media and his utilization of the pro-Government media offer revealing insights into the unique claim that Chile will carry out a Socialist revolution within the framework of traditional bourgeois and democratic institutions without social cost.

Any Chilean government possesses wide powers that can be employed to control and intimidate media opponents given sufficient will power and cynicism to do so, despite the fact that media freedoms in Chile are twice-guaranteed, both in the 1925 constitution and in a statute of constitutional guarantees agreed to by Allende's Popular Unity coalition and the Christian Democrats (PDC) as a condition for PDC support for Allende in the congressional run-off held subsequent to the Presidential election in September 1970.

What are some of these powers? Any Chilean executive under provisions of the State Internal Security Law may establish emergency zones by decree headed by military commanders empowering the State to enforce news censorship and to restrict access to newsprint supplies. A law on publicity abuses empowers the government to petition the courts to suspend access to news and information. (Laws on the books that pose potential threats to freedom of radio information are more severe and more frequently utilized. See Section III. B. Radio.) Furthermore, through the judicious parceling out of advertising from State and autonomous State firms any government can discriminate against opposition media by denying or restricting this key source of revenue.

Unlike predecessor governments which utilized existing laws and accepted practices to reward political associates and benefit business partners, the Allende Government has consistently and frequently applied these measures to harass, to intimidate, and to undermine the morale of political and class opponents in the media. These tactics are applied throughout the country.

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A basic organizational technique for the UP coalition has been the establishment of UP committees (CUP -- Comité de Unidad Popular) -- composed of newsmen who are militant members of parties belonging to the Government coalition or independent supporters of UP policies -- in newspapers, radios, magazines, and in journalistic bodies. The CUP's have been most active at the union level: demanding exorbitant wage increases, insisting that UP employees be given the right to express their opinion on editorial pages, disrupting legitimate union meetings, forming rump unions, and leaking internal company data to the leftist press and to the Government.

The goal of certain Unidad Popular militants regarding freedom of the press was most explicitly and revealingly stated by the organizing committee for a conference of leftist journalists which was held in Santiago in April 1971. The committee issued the following statement prior to the conference:

... we believe that we must fight for true freedom of the press, which will only be possible when there is true economic independence. We maintain that Chile will have true freedom of the press only when the means of mass communication are part of the area of social property, that is, (when they) belong to all Chileans. The press, radio, television, and the theater must be tools at the service of liberation and culture of our people and not a private business, an ideological battering ram of the national and foreign minority (the capitalists) as is presently the case. ⁷ (underlining added)

Another statement said "the mission of journalists is to support and defend the People's Government (the UP) together with all the workers." The declaration also underlined the support of UP newsmen for "Viet-Nam, Cuba, and all the people that are building Socialism," and threw a bouquet at Cuba's Prensa Latina agency for its "objective" reporting of the Chilean phenomenon. Allende himself lent legitimacy to the mission of UP journalists in a speech kicking off the conference when he stated that "committed" newsmen must act as the "vanguard" of the revolution by "elevating the political level of the people." Reiterating a theme expressed on many other occasions, Allende asserted that his Government would respect freedom of information while at the same time he lamented his Government's "excessive tolerance" for the opposition media.

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A. Press

In the key Santiago metropolitan area, there are five major opposition daily newspapers and one important neutral daily, La Tercera de la Hora.

TABLE 2. MAJOR OPPOSITION AND NEUTRAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS

<u>Title</u>	<u>Estimated Circulation</u>	<u>Political Orientation</u>
El Mercurio	160,000	Independent, conservative
Las Noticias Ultimas	120,000	Part of the <u>Mercurio</u> chain
La Prensa	25,000	Christian Democratic (PDC)
La Segunda	60,000	Part of the <u>Mercurio</u> chain
La Tribuna	25,000	National Party (PP) interests
La Tercera de la Hora	190,000	Independent

A favorite target of the Government and its propaganda apparatus has been the conservative, independent daily El Mercurio, dean of the Chilean press and chief representative of the largest and most influential newspaper chain in the country. Tarred regularly as "pro-U. S." and as a "gringo newspaper written in Spanish" -- potent accusations in Chile -- El Mercurio has borne the brunt of every conceivable kind of pressure short of outright seizure.

On numerous occasions the paper has been implicated along with other opposition media in alleged seditious plots carried out in concert with foreign (i. e., U. S.) interests to overthrow the Government. Advertisers have been "requested" not to do business with the Mercurio chain,⁸ which has been accused of foreign exchange irregularities by tax authorities, by Government supporters on the paper's own staff, and by Allende himself at public rallies. Allende, too, periodically reacts to critical Mercurio editorials with charges that Chile and the Presidential office have been "insulted," that the Mercurio chain indulges in "libertinism unprecedented in Chilean journalistic history."

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and that the chain is "faithful to its tradition of infamy." The Government propaganda apparatus follows suit.

The PDC organ La Prensa and the National Party tabloid La Tribuna are secondary targets for the UP propaganda apparatus because their circulation is limited. Pressures employed against these dailies are aimed generally at the political parties behind them in contrast to the Mercurio chain where pressures are intended as a warning signal to the "free" media as an institution.

Independent La Tercera receives distinct treatment. The Government exerts minimal pressures on the paper in return for favorable editorial treatment of Allende policies (see Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). This tactic has paid dividends for Allende and for Tercera's owner, Germán Pico Cármas. Allende obtains favorable publicity in a mass-circulation paper that maintains comparative objectivity in its news columns, thus lending credence to Allende's claims that he will respect traditional Chilean freedoms while making the transition to Socialism. Freed from the need for the strident partisanship so characteristic of the rest of the press, Tercera steadily builds its circulation with a public seeking some relief from the verbal civil war. As a result Pico, who has been head of the Chilean newspaper association, has defended the Allende Government's press policies in international forums. The understanding with the Government, however, is an uneasy one; Tercera is not sufficiently malleable for the Socialist Party, the principal party in the Government coalition.⁹

B. Radio

Radio continues to be the most important medium of communication in Chile. The latest available figures compiled by the World Radio-TV Handbook give Chile a total of 137 stations, including 29 in the capital city, Santiago (See Table 3). The number of receivers is estimated at 3 million, or one for every third person. In a country 2,600 miles long radio's strategic importance is understood by both Government and opposition. The Government has resorted to a variety of devices designed to intimidate opposition radio stations: requests by Allende advisers that opposition stations hire designated leftist commentators; threats of violence; favoritism in the distribution of needed government advertising revenues; temporary closures; and strikes fomented by CUP committees.

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TABLE 3. IMPORTANT RADIO STATIONS

<u>Station</u>	<u>Political Orientation</u>
Radio Agricultura	National Party (PN)
Radio Balmaceda	Christian Democratic (PDC)
Radio Cooperativa	PDC with PN elements
Radio Corporación	Socialist Party
Radio IEM	University of Chile station controlled by Marxists
Radio Luis Recabarren	Chilean labor federation (CUT) station; Communist-controlled (See Note No. 10)
Radio Magallanes	Communist Party
Radio Minería	Independent with PDC and PN elements.
Radio Pacifico	Radical Party (UP)
Radio Portales	Socialist Party
Radio Santiago	Catholic Church interests
Radio UTE	State Technical University station controlled by Communists

Partial blame for leftist infiltration of Chilean stations must rest with "bourgeois" radio owners. Long before Allende became president the Chilean businessmen and politicians who owned radio stations made it a practice to hire leftist commentators because they believed that leftists were superior professionals and helped to increase listenership. When the UP came to power it tapped an existing source of manpower.

In addition, the Government frequently utilized existing regulations to gain its ends. Radio concessions are granted by a Government entity (Servicios Electricos) attached to the Interior Ministry. The same entity can cancel or transfer such concessions.¹⁰ Regulations promulgated during World War II state that "In case of internal disturbance, catastrophe or war radio stations are subject to the rules, control, and censorship that the Government may adopt." Under this type of emergency regulation, all radio stations were placed under an obligatory Government network -- not an unusual practice for the Allende Government -- when a modified martial law was decreed in 21 of Chile's 25 provinces during the October-

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November 1972 truck drivers strike (See Note No. 18). Another regulation decrees that stations must interrupt their transmissions whenever the Interior Minister judges it to be necessary in the interest of the internal security of the State. Still another regulation authorizes the Central Bank to control the importation of equipment and spare parts for radio, television, and the press.

The Government moved quickly after the 1970 presidential election to obtain control of key stations. The Socialist Party gained control of Radio Portales, Chile's most popular station, and purchased Radio Corporación from El Mercurio (Portales has subsequently slipped in popularity). The Communist Party purchased Magallanes, an important Santiago station. The Communist Party recently also purchased Radio Simón Bolívar (formerly pro-opposition) in Concepción (as well as four other stations in southern Chile in preparation for the Congressional elections in March 1973). The rightist National Party daily La Tribuna quoted the former owner as saying that "the age of privately-owned mass media (in Chile) is over" with only the Government, strong economic consortiums, and the most powerful political parties capable of sustaining media operations. La Tribuna says the Communist Party is now the most powerful (single) broadcaster in southern Chile.

PDC-oriented Radios Balmaceda and Cooperativa, however, have to date successfully resisted Government enticements and pressures (see Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). Balmaceda -- a radio station which over the years had earned a reputation for objective newscasts -- has been the number one target of the UP in the radio field. It has suffered more temporary closures than any radio facility. The station was shut down, for example, 17 hours in June 1971 for broadcasting an alleged "alarmist" report during the State of Emergency decreed after the assassination of Perez Zujovic, a former interior minister in the Frei Government. At the same time a UP station, Portales, received nothing more than an admonition for transmitting "alarmist" news more acceptable to UP propagandists. During the August-September 1971 period Radio Balmaceda was shut down on three separate occasions under similar pretexts (see Note No. 10).

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In radio as in the press the Government has used CUP committees to formulate exaggerated wage demands, to foment strikes, and to form rump unions. CUP unions at Radio Pacifico, for example, forced the owner to sell out to a cooperative formed by employees when wage demands could not be met. The radio station subsequently was purchased by the Radical Party -- a member of the UP coalition.

The principal Government weapon, however, is its control over public service advertising, which traditionally has provided the bulk of revenues for Chilean radio stations. The Government has dangled the prospect of advertisements in return for favorable news treatment, but the bait has not been picked up by the major opposition radios which recognize that their independence is at stake. The economic squeeze makes the future of Chilean independent radios appear bleak.

C. Television

Since its inception in Chile in 1962, television has made great strides, but the medium still lags behind radio, especially in the provinces where technical conditions for viewing are poor. According to the best estimates available, there are 350,000 sets in Santiago and a total of 500,000 sets in the country. Chile is served by the following television channels: 1) A national network with some 21 outlets throughout the country; 2) the Catholic University channel in Santiago; 3) a separate Catholic University channel in Valparaíso; and 4) the University of Chile channel in Santiago.

The Government clearly recognizes television's importance as a propaganda vehicle, and under the direction of an Allende confidante, newsman Augusto Olivares (Socialist and a suspected member of the ultra-left MIR -- Movement of the Revolutionary Left), it has transformed Chile's only nationwide television channel into an outright political instrument of the Government coalition. Slanted commentaries favoring UP policies, character assassinations intended to smear political and class opponents, and a steady drum-fire of Socialist propaganda in news and cultural programming became standard fare.

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At the same time network authorities made it difficult under a variety of pretexts for opposition spokesmen to air their views in contravention of the State television statute. For example, the authorities frequently obliged all television channels and radios to carry official statements and denied opposition spokesmen equal time, resorting to the legal fiction that the official statements were transmitted voluntarily.

A popular political chat show "A Tres Bandas," in which opposition representatives freely debated UP representatives (the only such show carried nationally), was cancelled in August 1972 after two years of UP agitation against it. The Government defended the step by alleging that the program had poor listenership and by pointing to a ruling granting all political parties equal time to express their views on twice-weekly 20-minute slots. The original chat show format provided several hours of open-ended and frequent face-to-face confrontation, usually embarrassing to the Government.

The University of Chile station has consistently asserted the Marxist line since its inception, but the two remaining university channels have successfully fought Government control to date (See Section VI. C. University Confrontation and Television Freedoms). None of the university channels, however, is national in scope.

D. Magazines and Book Publishing

Early in 1971 the Government purchased the plant and equipment of the PDC-controlled Zig-Zag publishing empire -- one of the most modern in Latin America. The GOC announced the purchase after prolonged negotiations, provoked originally by the excessive demands of a Communist-led union. Under the terms of the accord the Government purchased Zig-Zag's plant and equipment, the company's national line of comics, and several magazines while Zig-Zag retained several mass-circulation magazines (Ercilla and Vea being the most important) under a two-year contract with the Chilean Treasury. The Zig-Zag infrastructure formed the basis for the newly-established Government-owned Quimantu National Publishing Enterprise. The accord with Zig-Zag has been scrupulously observed to date.

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Quimantu quickly began turning out magazines, comic books, and textbooks pushing UP policies. Comic books like Firme were designed for mass consumption and aimed at adults with low cultural levels, while others like Ramona were aimed at the teen-age market. Cabrochico, another comic book, was geared to pre-teens. The format of some Quimantu products closely resembled competing Zig-Zag products. The weekly Ahora, for example, was designed to compete with Ercilla. After eight months Ahora collapsed, rejected in the market place by Chileans who were turned off by heavy-handed political propaganda.

E. Films

The Government's film production company, Chile Films, became the UP's principal propaganda arm in the film field. Rival Chilean private producers went out of business, squeezed by rising production costs and discriminatory tax and exchange rate treatment that denied them needed equipment and spare parts from abroad. Chile Films signed a comprehensive exchange accord in March 1971 with the Cuban Cinematographic Institute (ICAIC) (See Section V. C. Exchange of Persons, Visitors, and Exchange Agreements).

Chile Films also initiated agreements with the experimental film institute (leftist) at the University of Chile, the film institute at the Communist-dominated State Technical University (UTE), the Government information office, the film department of the Communist-dominated CUT (Central Unica de Trabajadores -- the major labor organization), the national television network, and the University of Chile television station. The stated purpose of the accords was to "develop the new Chilean film industry."

Its products are intended to glorify the roles of workers, peasants, and students in the march to Chilean-style Socialism, romanticize the proletarian role of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, and attack the "bourgeoisie" and their "imperialist" allies. Despite an intense publicity buildup, however, few films actually appeared in the 1970-72 period. Most of the films that were produced appeared to be pieced together from newsreel film taken during the Allende presidential campaign or from post-election political rallies.

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The Government's delay in making public the results of June 1972 elections for top posts in the Communist-dominated CUT labor federation also damaged Government credibility. The opposition media scored heavily in a barrage of charges of irregularities and vote fraud with a public that takes justified pride in clean elections.

B. The Papelera Confrontation

The Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles Y Cartones (known as the Papelera), Chile's major private producer of newsprint, became another propaganda battleground cast by the opposition in terms of "freedom versus Marxist totalitarianism."

In October 1971, the Government, carrying out a long-standing pledge, announced that CORFO (the Government Development Corporation) had opened negotiations to buy out the Papelera through the purchase of its stock. The opposition media immediately launched a campaign to warn the public that the free press would be crippled if newsprint distribution were placed at the mercy of Government suppliers. At the same time, the opposition media pleaded with private shareholders to refuse to sell to the Government. In addition, a "freedom fund" was created enabling private persons to buy up Papelera shares to prevent the company from falling into Government hands.

For several months pro- and anti-Government media carried out daily an intensive propaganda battle in advertisements, news stories, and editorials. Both sides resorted to the familiar numbers game: the pro-Allende media claimed that the Government was besieged by willing shareholders eager to sell out; the opposition asserted that shareholders were resisting temptation. Government propagandists argued that newsprint production was essential to the State and must be controlled by the State; the opposition said Papelera must remain in private hands as a patriotic duty.

Thwarted to date in its attempt to buy out Papelera shareholders, the Government has not hesitated to use other measures -- price controls, labor-induced production shortages, and strong-arm tactics -- to prevent the delivery of raw material to the plant. The Government press also circulated rumors that Jorge Alessandri (former President

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of Chile and a leading shareholder and board chairman of the Papelera had made a deal with Allende to give the Government control over the Papelera to weaken the will of private shareholders and their supporters. That the Papelera still withstands these combined pressures a year later is a tribute to a determined defense of the firm by an opposition Congress, to the loyalty of the bulk of the Papelera employees, and to an aroused and alerted opposition media.

The battle for control of the Papelera will continue and the odds are not good for the company. Repeated requests for price increases sufficient to absorb cost increases -- forced on the firm in part by Government economic policies -- were not met, and the firm declared in September 1972 that it could not meet loan payments due to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Finally, in December 1972 the Government authorized new price increases averaging 45 per cent, which were, however, inapplicable to the price of newsprint. The Papelera gains some breathing space but Government pressures on the company are certain to continue. The price increase itself may be viewed as a form of pressure.

The battle has spilled over into the halls of the Chilean Congress. Partly to protect the Papelera's independent status, the PDC sponsored a "three areas" constitutional amendment designed to give Congress some control over which businesses can be incorporated as social property by the Government. (The Papelera is one of the firms appearing on the Government's original list of 91 firms to be absorbed by the Government as social property.) The amendment -- still a bitter bone of contention between the Government and the opposition -- would, among other points, declare null and void CORFO's attempted purchase of Papelera stock in the absence of Congressional approval.¹³

C. University Confrontation and Television Freedoms

Growing opposition confidence fed by an election victory at the University of Chile in April 1972 and by stiffening opposition attitudes at Santiago's Catholic University had important spill-over effects in television programming at two channels run by Catholic University. Increasing opposition effectiveness even raised the possibility that the Marxist-controlled University of Chile channel for the first time in its existence might be obliged to inject some objectivity into its output.

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Incumbent University of Chile Rector Edgardo Boeninger, an independent with Christian Democratic sympathies, gained 51.9 per cent of the vote for rector in April against three other contenders representing the UP coalition and leftist splinter groups, including the MIR. An independent-PDC state also gained control of the previously Marxist-controlled Superior Normative Council. The victory was billed by the opposition media as another victory for democracy and pluralism over Marxist totalitarianism.¹⁴ In the process Rector Boeninger became a hero of the opposition media and a symbol of "democratic" defiance of Government efforts to impose its will on an independent university. The opposition's rallying cry became "Defend a democratic and pluralist university." Translated into media terms it became "We want a democratic and pluralistic university TV channel."

Rallying behind that slogan, opposition supporters at the two Catholic Universities (Santiago and Valparaíso) began to ease out leftist influence in the news departments of the two university channels. UP supporters, however, remain at the technician level at the Santiago channel and can be expected to create problems for their opponents. Opposition authorities who now control the channel are proceeding cautiously against them.

A more significant indication of UP long-range attitudes toward television freedoms has been the Government's persistent refusal to permit university television stations to extend their networks throughout Chile. In September 1972, President Allende blocked the opposition's most recent attempt to obtain legislative sanction for such an extension by vetoing selected items in a PDC-introduced bill. The Government claimed that its own bill -- pending before Congress and allowing universities to establish stations only within the territory in which the seat of each university is located -- would create a national network for all recognized universities on an "equal and non-discriminatory" basis. What the Government did not say was that the bill if passed would preserve the State Network's position as the only single channel that can be viewed by a national television audience. Presumably the Government bill also would permit the Communist-dominated State Technical University to operate a television station in Santiago in competition with Santiago's Catholic University channel which, according to available public opinion surveys, is viewed by approximately 69 per cent of the capital's audience.¹⁵

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Ercilla
October 5, 1972

Demonstrators Protest President Allende's Veto of Bill Permitting
University (Santiago) to Extend Its Television (Channel 13) Throughout Chile.

In subsequent developments the Catholic University at Santiago as nevertheless extended its television service to the Concepción metropolitan area, third most important in Chile, via a television repeater in Talcahuano. The Government has ordered that the repeater cease operation as the University lacks a concession under 1959 law to function in that area. The University has refused to comply, claiming that the 1970 National Television Act, which authorizes the universities to operate television channels, is the governing statute and that it needs no additional concession to operate in any part of Chile. Meanwhile the repeater is still functioning (as of February 15, 1973) while the legal (and political) debate continues.

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Allende in Retrospect

By Paul E. Sigmund

World attention has moved away from Santiago since the bloody overthrow of Salvador Allende last September, but the questions that were raised at that time still need answering. Where should the primary responsibility be placed for the tragic events on and after September 11, 1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a fascist counterrevolution aided and abetted by the forces of imperialism? Was it, as the Right asserts, the only available response to Allende's attempt to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by a mixture of guile and force? Did it mark the "death of a dream" of the establishment of socialism by democratic means, and was it thereby one more demonstration that Marxism must use force to accomplish its goals? Were there internal and external political and economic factors which made it impossible for Allende's experiment to succeed, or was the downfall of the *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity) coalition government the consequence of a series of ideologically-influenced analyses and mistaken policy choices which, if they had been different, might have produced another result? A review of the course of the Allende government with the aid of the considerable new material that has become available in recent months may help to answer these questions.

Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote in a three-way race.¹ What they do not mention is that in the congressional run-off between the two

front-running candidates he was elected president by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. He received the support of the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the run-off in return for his agreement to the adoption of a Constitutional Statute of Democratic Guarantees protecting freedoms of expression, education and religion, and guaranteeing the independence of the military from political control. The text of the statute, which was added to the Chilean Constitution shortly after Allende's election, reflected the fears of non-Marxist groups that the new Marxist President would use the considerable power of the Chilean executive to undercut and eventually destroy all opposition to a Marxist takeover.

Political and Economic Strategy

When he took office, Allende promised that he would follow a "second model" of Marxism—the *via Chilena* to socialism, "with meat pies and red wine." To prove that this model was "anticipated by the classics of Marxism," he quoted from Friedrich Engels on the possibility of

... a peaceful evolution from the old society to the new in countries where the representatives of the

¹ Allende's supporters in the Popular Unity coalition consisted of his own Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*—PS), the Communist Party (*Partido Comunista*—PC), the main body of the Radical Party (*Partido Radical*—PR), the leftist Catholic "Movement of Popular United Action" (*Movimiento de Acción Popular Unida*—MAPU), and two other smaller groups. The largest opposition groups were the centrist Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*—PDC) and the rightist National Party (*Partido Nacional*—PN).

In retrospect, it is ironic that the Chilean Senate never acted on a constitutional amendment proposed early in 1970 to establish a second-round popular election, which would have provided the President thus elected (probably the right-wing candidate, Jorge Alessandri) with a clear popular mandate.


Mr. Sigmund is Professor of Politics at Princeton University. Among his published works are *Models of Political Change in Latin America*, 1970, and *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (2nd rev. ed., 1972). He has visited Chile nine times since 1963, most recently in January 1974 to do research on a forthcoming book dealing with Chilean politics.

Allende in Retrospect

"people have all power and in accord with the constitution can do what they desire when they have the majority of the nation behind them."

Yet it was precisely the question of majority support that was Allende's central problem in his design to carry out a peaceful transition to "socialism with democracy, pluralism and liberty." The parties in his coalition were in a distinct minority in the Congress, and although there was no doubt about the legitimacy of his election by that body, his victory had only been possible because of the conditional support of the Christian Democrats. The PDC, it should be noted, included both Radomiro Tomic, the party's 1970 presidential candidate, who had gone to Allende's house to congratulate him the day after the popular election, clearly inferring his future support, and conservatives like Senator Juan de Dios Carmona, who had fought within the party to prevent it from voting for Allende in the run-off. In the immediate aftermath of the election the PDC was controlled by the Tomic forces, who claimed to be in favor of "communitarian" socialism, nationalization of copper, acceleration of agrarian reform, and reduction of Chile's *dependencia* on the United States. One way, then, for Allende to achieve his acknowledged goal of majority support for the transition to socialism would have been to try to arrive at an understanding with the Christian Democrats on the points in his program with which they were in agreement. This might have provoked the secession of some of the rightist members of the PDC, but if an accord had been reached with the party's leaders, it would likely have given Allende a majority in the Congress for at least part of his program.

Flushed with victory and unwilling to come to terms with the party which he had termed "the new face of reaction" during the campaign, Allende chose an alternative strategy. The next congressional elections were not scheduled to take place until March 1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in the event of a conflict with the Congress over the text of a constitutional amendment, the President could call a national plebiscite. The strategic course adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popular support for his coalition and then propose a constitutional amendment which, in accordance with the Popular Unity electoral program, would replace the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral



Salvador Allende speaks of his plans for Chile at the 23rd Congress of the Socialist Party, held in January 1971, three months after his election as President of Chile.

—Photo by Senti Visalli for Photoreporters.

house, to be elected immediately following the approval of the amendment. The Congress would be certain to reject the amendment, but if Allende had the support of a majority in the country, he could win the plebiscite and secure control of the unicameral legislature that would then be established.

Allende's strategy for the expansion of electoral support was an economic one which drew as much from John Maynard Keynes as it did from Karl Marx. The Chilean economy, already operating below capacity, had gone into a profound recession as a result of Allende's election. The response of Pedro Vuskovic, Allende's Minister of Economics, was to "prime the pump" by adopting a deficit budget, increasing public expenditures, and redistributing income by skewing the annual wage readjustment for the preceding year's inflation (35 percent in 1970) in favor of the low-income sector of the population (the lowest income groups received a 40-percent increase). The utilization of unused industrial capacity, combined with strict enforcement of price controls, more stringent collection of taxes, and refusal to devalue the Chilean *escudo* in relation to the dollar, were expected to contain possible inflationary pressures which might result. (The Allende government also had a cushion of nearly \$400 million in foreign reserves left to it by the Frei government as a result of high international prices for copper, Chile's principal export.)

The strategy also contained a Marxist element—

• El Mercurio (Santiago), Nov. 6, 1970, p. 23.

accentuation of the class struggle. At the same time that appeals were made to the pocketbooks of the lower-class Chileans, there was also to be an effort to increase their class consciousness (*concientización*) through government publications and the use of the media to remove the elements of "false consciousness" instilled by "bourgeois" propaganda. Expressing the diametric opposite of a claim often voiced by his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, Allende said in a press conference just after his installation, "I am not president of all Chileans." And in his first "State of the Nation" message to the Congress he asserted:

... the People's Government (Gobierno Popular) is inspired in its policy by a premise that is artificially denied by some—the existence of classes and social sectors with antagonistic and opposing interests.¹

Allende's economic advisers anticipated an additional source of revenue for the government from the "exploitative" profits of the industries that were to be nationalized by the new government. The partially American-owned copper mines were to be taken over by a constitutional amendment—both to lay to rest any legal doubts about the reversal of the Frei-Chileanization agreements of 1967 and 1969, and because a general consensus in Chile favored nationalization.² Other companies were to be nationalized after a controlling interest was gained through the purchase of shares on the open market by the government development agency. The latter course seemed facilitated by the fact that the price of shares had been depressed since the elections, and further economic pressures could be created by allowing wage increases but forbidding any rise in prices. The legal adviser to the government, Eduardo Novoa, also outlined other "legal loopholes" in existing Chilean law which could be used for "temporary" takeovers of companies, including "intervention" because of labor disputes and "requisition" because of a "breakdown in supply of an article of prime necessity."

¹ Salvador Allende, "The Chilean Way to Socialism," in Paul E. Sigmund, Ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, 2nd rev. ed., New York, Praeger, 1972, p. 450.

² Frei's Chileanization program had involved the purchase by the Chilean state of a controlling interest in the large copper mines owned by the Kennecott and Anaconda companies. The agreements had also provided that Chile's payments to the American companies were to be invested in the expansion of copper production and refining in Chile, earning the country additional revenue in the 1970's to pay back the loans contracted to finance the purchases.

The takeover of large sectors of Chile's basic industry and trade, as promised in the Popular Unity program, was thus seen as an essential part of an economic and political strategy aimed at achieving and maintaining power. Combined with a rapid acceleration of agrarian reform (again using existing legislation—the 1967 agrarian reform law—but exploiting provisions such as one authorizing the expropriation of "abandoned or badly-farmed land," with one percent payment in cash and the rest in bonds), the planned takeover meant that even if the effort to create a unicameral left-dominated legislature failed, the Allende government could destroy the economic base of the "capitalist" opposition through a series of "irreversible" faits accomplis (*hechos consumados*) which would give the



A Chilean peasant guards the gate of a farm south of Santiago which was seized from its owners on the pretext that it was "operated unproductively" (*mal explotada*).

—Photo by Miguel Costales.

Allende in Retrospect

government control of the economy and of the excess profits that the private sector had used for luxury consumption or had sent out of the country as profit remittances to foreign companies. At the same time, the fact that the policy remained within the letter, if not the spirit, of the law meant that intervention by the military was unlikely.

Allende's constitutionalist and legalist strategy was not universally accepted within his coalition. Most of his own Socialist Party—beginning with its newly elected General Secretary, Senator Carlos Altamirano—and several other groups further to the left, such as the MIR (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the VOP (*Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo*—Organized Vanguard of the People), were openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying on elections and "bourgeois legality" to achieve power and advised preparation for an armed confrontation with the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as inevitable. Allende's effort to portray the transition to socialism as peaceful in character was not assisted by the publication of his conversations with French revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in early 1971.

In these, Debray declared that "in the last analysis and until further notice, political power comes out of the end of a gun," and Allende repeatedly stated that his differences with apostles of violence like Ché Guevara were only "tactical," because the Chilean situation required that he observe legality "for the time being." Allende himself organized an armed personal bodyguard, the so-called GAP (*Grupo de Amigos Personales*), and—we now know—as early as December 1971 received reports on the illegal importation and distribution of arms to the MIR and to his bodyguards.⁵

While there were thus intermittent hints of revolutionary alternatives, Allende's basic economic strategy was "socialist consumerism,"⁶ combined with a rapid expansion of state control in industry, trade and agriculture, and his basic political strategy

⁵ See Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende* (New York, Random, 1971, pp. 52, 77, 91, and 97. *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Feb. 18-24, 1974, p. 3, reproduces the report, found in the presidential palace.

⁶ On "socialist consumerism" see Paul E. Sigmund, "Two Years of Popular Unity," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1972, pp. 38-51.



A Santiago rally in November 1970 celebrates the first anniversary of the Allende presidency—in the foreground, a picture of Latin revolutionary Ché Guevara.

—Photo by Claus Meyer for Black Rep.

was an expansion of the electoral base of the Allende coalition by an appeal to the material interests and the class consciousness of the lower classes. It was the interaction of the various elements of this political and economic strategy that finally produced the breakdown of Chilean constitutionalism and the intervention of the armed forces that the extreme left of the Allende coalition had been predicting all along.

Initial Success

At the outset, the new economic policy was astoundingly successful, although it had within it the seeds of future disaster. Income redistribution stimulated demand, while price controls and an artificially low exchange rate kept prices down. As a consequence, a mini-boom ensued. By March 1971 the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril* (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), representing Chilean business and industry, admitted that production had increased by 6.3 percent over the figure of 12 months before, and by May that figure had reached 13.5 percent. The Institute of Economics of the University of Chile later reported that unemployment in the Santiago area dropped from 8.3 percent in December 1970 to 5.2 percent in June 1971 and declined further to an unusually low 3.8 percent by the end of the year. The Consumer Price Index stopped climbing entirely in December 1970 and had only increased by 6 percent by the time of the municipal elections of April 1971—its lowest rise in many years. At the same time, salaries and wages increased by 27 percent in real terms.

This wave of economic prosperity—combined with the absence of the political repression that some rightists had predicted would result from a victory by the Marxists—led many, particularly in low income groups, to vote for the candidates of the Popular Unity coalition in the April municipal elections. Allende's own Socialist Party bettered its electoral showing in the 1969 congressional elections by nearly 100 percent (a jump from 12 percent to 22 percent of the total), and the candidates of all the parties supporting Allende received about 50 percent of the vote, as compared with the 36 percent which the President himself had received only seven months before. Yet, gratifying as the results were, the coalition was still a few votes short of the absolute majority that Allende required to win a plebiscite on a constitutional amendment. He was later criticized for not calling the plebiscite at the time

when the regime's popularity was at its highest point,¹ but in retrospect it does not appear at all certain that he would have won—particularly since by the time that the constitutional prerequisites for such a vote had been fulfilled, the economic and political situation would have been much less favorable.

The period after the municipal elections now appears to have been crucial for the long-term survival of the regime. The Right was still in disarray, the Christian Democrats had elected a compromise leadership which was not committed to either of the party's wings, and the short-run economic and political indicators were favorable. Yet, instead of taking action on the economic front to stem the loss of foreign reserves and to dampen inflationary pressures—and on the political front to prevent the movement of the Christian Democrats into an alliance with the right-wing opposition parties—the regime continued its previous policies, confidently assuming that in the long run "the people" would support it and ignoring the warnings of "bourgeois" economists that the loss of foreign reserves, the expansion of demand, and the sharp decline in investment would produce disastrous consequences in the following year.

Political Polarization

The hardening of the Christian Democratic position began in mid-1971. It was accelerated in June by the assassination of the former Christian Democratic Interior Minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by extremists, at least one of whom had been released from prison by Allende upon his accession to power. A month later in a by-election in Valparaiso, the victorious Christian Democratic candidate received the support of the Right. The tacit alliance with the Right led to the secession from the PDC of eight deputies and a number of other party leaders to form the pro-Allende *Izquierda Cristiana* (Christian Left). This was counterbalanced however, by a split in the other direction within the Allende coalition. Five of the seven Radical senators (including two former presidential candidates) and 7 of the 19 deputies left the Radical Party (PR), and formed the *Partido de la Izquierda Radical* (Party of the Radical Left—PIR) in protest against the Marxist orientation of a

¹ See, e.g., Paul M. Sweezy, "Chile: The Question of Power," *Monthly Review* (New York, London) December 1973, pp. 1-11.

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PR policy resolution which the dissidents described as "completely removed from the characteristic and distinctive ideology of our party" and opposed to "the interest of the middle social strata" whom the party had always represented.^{*} For a time, the PIR continued to support the Allende government, but within a year it had entered the ranks of the opposition.

In July 1971, the Christian Democrats had voted in favor of the constitutional amendment nationalizing the copper mines, but from that point forward, the pattern was one of polarization of Chilean politics and society into two opposing blocks. The Allende forces controlled the executive and pursued an increasingly vigorous ideological purge of those who were not entirely sympathetic to the government. The opposition controlled the legislature, and in October 1971 the Christian Democrats and the rightist parties attempted to assert legislative control over the expansion of the public sector by voting in favor of a constitutional amendment limiting the use of the intervention and requisition procedures and requiring that all transfers of private enterprises to the "social" or mixed sectors be carried out in accordance with specific legislation adopted by the Congress. This legislative act, referred to as an amendment on the "Three Areas of Property," became the focus of a continuing deadlock between the President and Congress that lasted until Allende's overthrow in September 1973.

Allende's refusal to accept the amendment or to call a plebiscite to resolve his differences with the Congress appeared to the congressional opposition to be a decisive indication of his determination to bypass the legislature in carrying out the Popular Unity program, and from the time of the adoption of the amendment onward, the Christian Democrats began to cooperate with the rightist parties in opposing the executive. One method was to impeach ministers for violation or (more often) nonenforcement of the law. The first of many such impeachments took place in January 1972. Another method was to present a united electoral front against the government. Informal cooperation between the rightist parties and the Christian Democrats led to striking victories in two by-elections in January 1972, and a month later these groups formed the Democratic Confederation (*Confederación Democrática—CODE*) to prepare joint lists for the 1973 congressional elections. A third area of cooperation was in


marches and demonstrations against the government, the most famous of which was the March of Empty Pots in December 1971, in which thousands of housewives, mostly of middle-class background, marched, banging pots to protest food shortages.

Those shortages had developed because the predicted economic difficulties resulting from the Vuskovic policy began to emerge in late 1971. The balance-of-payments surplus had been depleted at such an alarming rate (in 1971 there was a deficit of \$315 million, while in 1970 there had been a surplus of \$91 million) that in November 1971 the Allende government called a moratorium on payment of its foreign debts. Chile had already experienced difficulties in securing loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank as a result of its failure to compensate the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies for the nationalization of their major mines. The debt moratorium was bound to make it considerably more difficult for Chile to secure foreign credits, particularly for the short term.^{*} In December 1971, the Chilean government finally permitted a partial devaluation of the Chilean escudo so as to decrease the distortions created by its overvaluation, but this created pressure on prices of goods manufactured with imported components. Shortages of certain food items—especially cooking oil, detergents, sugar, toothpaste, and cigarettes—were ascribed by the government to upper-class hoarding and to increased consumption by low-income groups; however, the dislocations in the countryside associated with the very rapid expansion of the agrarian reform (Allende took over almost as much land in his first year in office as Frei had in six years) clearly had something to do with the problem as well, and the situation could be expected to get worse with the harvest in early 1972. A 100-percent increase in the money supply as a result of the government's deficit spending was also beginning to produce inflationary pressures now that the unused capacity of Chilean industry had been taken up by the 1971 expansion. Most important, a sharp drop in investment (Allende said it had declined by 7.7 percent, but opposition economists claimed it had fallen by 24.2 percent) meant that the spectacular growth rate achieved in 1971 would be sharply reduced in 1972.

Yet the degree of the incipient crisis was not

^{*} On the inaccuracy of the term "invisible blockade" to describe the Allende government's credit problems, see Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1974, pp. 322-40.

^{*} *El Mercurio*, Aug. 8, 1971, p. 37.



Workers occupying a plant outside of Santiago proclaim their intention to hold it to the death. The initials of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) are painted on the wall by the gate.

—Photo by Maggi Costello.

Immediately evident from the figures for 1971. Industrial growth had reached 8.3 percent, agrarian production (based on plantings before Allende's accession to power) had increased by 5.3 percent, and unemployment had dropped to record lows. The Communist Party in a report to a Popular Unity "conclave" in early 1972 warned that "very strong inflationary pressures could make our situation acute," but the government took no action to deal with the problem. The continuing optimism of government policymakers at this time was expressed at a Round Table in Santiago sponsored by the University of Sussex and the Chilean Planning Office in March 1972. In the course of discussion Radomiro Tomic, the defeated Christian Democratic presidential candidate, asserted that the Allende government had committed a "fatal political error" in failing to establish an "institutional majority" in the Congress through a "far-reaching agreement between socialists inspired by Christianity and those inspired by Marxism—that is, between the Christian Democrats and Popular Unity—in the period following the 1970 presidential election." Allende's representatives con-

fidently replied that "with a gradual heightening of the political consciousness of the proletariat, there seemed to be no obstacles in the internal logic of the Chilean bourgeois state to prevent the workers' winning sufficient strength to gain control of the legislature as well as the executive."

On the political front, there were individuals and groups on both sides who attempted to stem the movement toward polarization, which they correctly foresaw would lead to the breakdown of Chilean institutions. Two important efforts to arrive at a compromise on the issue of the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" were made in the first part of 1972. In April the Left Radicals, who had entered the Allende government in January, carried on lengthy negotiations with the Christian Democrats to hammer out a satisfactory agreement on this issue, only to have it rejected by the top command of the Popular Unity coalition parties. The Left Radicals responded by leaving the government and joining the opposition, a move Allende described as "a stab in the back." A second set of negotiations in June between the head of the Christian Democratic Party and Allende's Minister of Justice broke down when the time limit set by the Christian Democrats expired and the PDC leadership refused to extend it.

The two sets of negotiations seem to have collapsed for related reasons. In April the left wing of the Popular Unity coalition was unwilling to accept a compromise which would slow down or stop the forward movement of the government nationalization program, while in June the right wing of the Christian Democrats could point to an impending by-election in mid-July as a reason for discontinuing discussions. Both cases illustrated a general problem posed by the Chilean multiparty system. Once political conflict became polarized, the extremes held the rest of the opposing coalitions hostage and prevented what could have been a convergence of views in the center.

The negotiations were interspersed with a series of demonstrations and counterdemonstrations by the government and the opposition which always stopped just short of open violence. Several observers, including the American Ambassador to

¹⁰ J. Ann Zammit and Gabriel Palma, Eds., *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1973, pp. 38, 247. The Communist Party report appears in *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1972, p. 4.

¹¹ Partido Izquierda Radical, *Trayectoria Política del PIR* (Political Path of the PIR), Santiago, 1972, p. 79.

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Chile, Nathaniel Davis, remarked on the pattern of "brinkmanship" that the Chileans exhibited. Social and political tensions increased—but as long as economic deterioration was not reflected in runaway inflation, the Chilean political system seemed able to contain them.

The Turning Point

The strains in the system only became unmanageable in mid-1972, when the lid blew off the fragile Chilean economy and let loose the pressures that had been building up for at least a year. As the deficit in government spending rose, particularly because of its subsidies to the "social area," its foreign reserves dropped nearly to zero, and the growth of industrial output slowed down. Allende replaced Economics Minister Vuskovic with Carlos Matus and appointed Orlando Millas as Finance Minister. The Matus-Millas team sought to "find stability at another level," ordering a drastic currency devaluation, raising prices in the nationalized sector, and permitting limited agricultural price increases. The result was a sharp jump in the cost-of-living index, which climbed from 27.5 percent at the end of June to 99.8 percent at the end of September. A wage readjustment to compensate for the increase in the cost of living only accelerated the inflation, so that by the end of the year the official consumer price index had reached 163 percent (see Table 1). In September, industrial output began to drop in absolute terms (i.e., not merely in terms of the rate of increase)—a drop that continued every month thereafter until the September 1973 coup.¹¹ Agricultural production (excluding livestock) also commenced to decline, and mineral production registered precipitous drops, although copper production rose by 1.3 percent for 1972 owing to the fact that a number of new mines came into operation. (On other elements of the worsening economic situation, see Table 2.)

Chile's economic problems were paralleled in the

political arena. Several additional ministers were impeached, including the Minister of Interior, who was charged with abetting the illegal importation of arms from Cuba in March. (The Allende government claimed that suspect shipments from Cuba—"bultos Cubanos"—were "works of art," but after the September 1973 coup, the government White Book published an inventory of over 2,000 pounds of arms sent from Cuba in 13 crates which customs

Table 1: Monthly Fluctuations in Consumer Prices and Industrial Output under Allende

	Month	Consumer Price Index	Industrial Output *
1970	Oct.	35.6	-8.0
	Nov.	35.3	4.3
	Dec.	34.9	-0.3
1971	Jan.	28.1	-4.5
	Feb.	22.8	-7.3
	March	20.1	6.3
	April	20.2	1.6
	May	21.0	13.5
	June	21.1	10.7
	July	19.1	6.7
	Aug.	17.4	10.7
	Sept.	15.6	25.5
	Oct.	16.5	22.6
	Nov.	18.8	22.1
	Dec.	22.1	19.5
1972	Jan.	24.8	18.5
	Feb.	32.0	11.9
	March	34.0	10.2
	April	38.1	12.6
	May	40.0	11.4
	June	40.1	2.5
	July	45.9	5.0
	Aug.	77.2	3.6
	Sept.	114.3	-7.8
	Oct.	142.9	-7.7
	Nov.	149.9	-8.1
	Dec.	163.4	-11.1
1973	Jan.	180.3	-6.8
	Feb.	174.1	-4.7
	March	183.3	-2.8
	April	195.5	-11.3
	May	233.5	-11.0
	June	283.4	-14.8
	July	323.2	-10.7
	Aug.	303.6	-11.9
	Sept.	286.0	-22.9
	Oct.	528.4	18.0
	Nov.	528.9	5.1

* Percentage of change from the same month of the previous year.

SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistics), Santiago; Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), Santiago.

¹¹ A secret cable from US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis to the State Department, published in Jack Anderson's column in *The Washington Post* (Washington, DC) on March 28, 1972, commented that "the Chileans have a great ability to rush to the brink, embrace each other, and back off." On the same point see Mauricio Solari and Fernando Cepeda, *Allende's Chile: On the Politics of Brinkmanship*, Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes, 1972.

¹² The Allende government blamed the drop in production on the October 1972 strike, but this ignored the fact that production declines began before October.

Table 2: Some Indices of the Chilean Economy, 1970-72

	1970	1971	1972
Gross domestic product (% change)	3.7	8.3	1.4
Investment (% change)	8.6	-24.2	-8.5
Real wages and salaries (% change)	13.0	30.0	-9.0
Exports (\$ million)	1129	1045	853
Imports (\$ million)	1020	1124	1287

SOURCE: Department of Economics, University of Chile.

had been forbidden to inspect.¹¹) The judiciary joined in the conflict, protesting the failure of the Ministry of Justice to carry out court orders, while progovernment demonstrators denounced the *viejos de mierda*—"filthy old men"—in the Supreme Court. As it became apparent that there was no real possibility of resolving their differences, the two sides turned to the armed forces as impartial arbiters, and the national holidays in mid-September 1972 were marked by rival efforts of the Congress and the President to ingratiate themselves with the military.

The political involvement of the military was accelerated by the next step in the Chilean tragedy—the October 1972 strike. Respectively termed the "employers' lockout" and "the national strike" by pro- and anti-Allende forces, it began far from Santiago, in the remote southern province of Aysen, with a strike by small truckers. (Referred to by the government press as the "truck-owners," the membership of the truckers' *gremio*—guild—was almost entirely composed of owners of one or two trucks who feared an announced plan to establish a state trucking agency which would have had priority access to new trucks and spare parts). The strike quickly spread across the nation, as the truckers were joined by bus and taxi drivers, shopkeepers, doctors, nurses, dentists, airline pilots, engineers and part of the peasantry. The Christian Democrats and the rightist parties supported the strikers, and the work stoppage dragged on for over a month resulting in an estimated loss of \$150-200 million in production. Agriculture was particularly hard hit because the strike took place in the midst of the planting season; indeed, there is no doubt that part, though not all, of the 25-percent drop in the 1973 harvest was the consequence of the strike. Industry

was not as adversely affected, since workers attempted to keep factories going despite management's efforts to cease production—and the October strike saw the emergency of "Industrial Belts" (*Cordones*) and "Communal Commands," which seemed to embody the type of spontaneous "popular power" that leftist theorists had spoken of as the basis of a genuine revolutionary class consciousness to replace the materialistic "economism" that had characterized Chilean workers until this time.¹² When the workers seized closed factories, the plants were usually "intervened" by the government, so that an important result of the October strike was a considerable expansion of the government-controlled sector of industry and trade.


The most important outcome of the strike, however, was the direct involvement of the military in the Allende cabinet. A condition of the settlement of the strike was that the military take over key cabinet posts. This resulted most notably in the assignment of the Ministry of the Interior to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Carlos Prats, so as to assure that the congressional elections scheduled for March 1973 would be carried on freely and impartially.

The involvement of the military and the preparations for the March elections brought about a lull in the escalation of political conflict in Chile. Inevi-

¹¹ The *Cordones* were more or less spontaneously organized committees of workers from seized factories which coordinated production and distribution in a given industrial area. The Communal Commands (*Comandos Comunes*) were organized by the *Cordones* to mobilize the local population in the surrounding area. They included representatives of neighborhood committees (*juntas de vecinos*), mothers' groups (*centros de madres*), price control and distribution committees (*juntas de abastecimiento y precios*), and other groups. On the persistence of worker "economism," see James Petras, "Chile: Nationalization, Socioeconomic Change and Popular Participation," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), Spring 1973, pp. 24-51, also available in James Petras, Ed., *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution*, New York, Wiley, 1973, Chap. 2.

¹² *Secretaría General del Gobierno, Libro Blanco* (White Book), Santiago, 1973, pp. 103-08.

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Symptomatic of leftist attacks on Chilean institutions, a Santiago wall poster denounces the country's Supreme Court as "Protectors of Fascist Sedition."

—Photo by Juan de Onís for The New York Times.

tably, however, it also produced political divisions within the military itself, which had hitherto been relatively aloof from the process of polarization. It was soon apparent, for instance, that General Prats was willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt in nearly every instance that its decisions or actions were challenged. Conversely, the Navy was noticeably less enthusiastic, and in January Admiral Ismael Huerta resigned from the cabinet over plans for the initiation of what he took to be a food-rationing system. It is now also known that the first plans for a possible coup were made by intermediate-level officers at the end of 1972."

Food distribution became a critical issue as the black market continued to expand, with much of Chile's agricultural production going into illegal channels because of the government's refusal to increase the official prices paid for agricultural produce. The result was, in effect, two separate price systems—a subsidized, state-owned distribution system oriented primarily toward the low-income groups and a flourishing black market aimed at middle- and upper-income groups. The expansion

of the powers of government-appointed Supply and Distribution Committees (JAPs) to deal with the black-market problem led the opposition to charge political manipulation of food distribution; nonetheless, the government seemed powerless to combat black-market operations.

The March 1973 Elections

The congressional elections in March did not resolve anything. Chile's right-wing parties had hoped that food shortages and economic difficulties would produce a two-thirds majority against the government, which might in turn permit the impeachment of the President, but the results, while showing an anti-government majority of 56 percent, gave the Allende regime 44 percent—a larger vote than most observers had predicted. The opposition pointed out that the vote of the pro-government forces had declined from the 50 percent they had registered in the 1971 municipal elections, while the government compared its 44 percent with the 35 percent that Allende had received in 1970. In fact, the only proper basis for comparison was the

* The New York Times (New York), Sept. 27, 1973.



Apprehensive middle-class homeowners man a watchtower along a security wall built around their Sant'ago neighborhood; a Socialist slogan on the outside of the wall counters with "We Will Win."

—Photo by Sant' Visalli for Photoreporters.

1969 congressional elections. On that basis, the leftist parties had suffered a slight loss in votes but had achieved a slight gain in seats. Certain oppositionists later argued that the Left would have suffered much greater losses had it not been for a government-assisted electoral fraud involving some 200,000-300,000 votes, but the statistics presented in support of the argument are unconvincing."

While the government's interpretation of the elections as proof that it was expanding its popular support was not accurate, the election results indicated that at least it had not lost popularity as rapidly as previous governments faced with similar economic reverses. Despite a wage readjustment in October, real wages had declined 7 percent in 1972, and raging inflation continued to consume the wage increase in early 1973. However, the combination of discriminatory distribution of government-produced goods and appeals to class consciousness seemed to

have stemmed the erosion of support, at least among the masses of the poor.

Unfortunately for the government's longer-range interests, the deliberate accentuation of class consciousness had an opposite effect on the middle class, driving middle-class areas to organize themselves into "Neighborhood Committees" to defend themselves. It also, for the first time, led many to arm themselves for a possible confrontation, which seemed more likely now that the safety valve of an impending election was no longer present. A government proposal to limit full wage readjustments to those making less than three times the minimum wage did nothing to reassure the hostile middle-income groups.

Before the elections, it had been rumored that there might be another attempt in March at an accommodation between the regime and the opposition forces, possibly under the auspices of the military. Any possible accord of this type was quickly prevented by the publication, two days after the elections, of a government decree calling for the initiation in June of a single national unified school system, which would follow a common curriculum including compulsory courses in socialism and work

¹ The report of the Investigating Committee of the Catholic University of Chile, reproduced in the Libro Blanco, pp. 220-30. The report on new voters in 1973 omits the 21-to-24 year-old group and also lists too young to vote in 1970. They comprised almost exactly the number of "fraudulent" voters estimated in the report.

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periods in factories. The ensuing uproar involved the Catholic Church for the first time in formal opposition to the government and mobilized thousands of secondary school students in violent demonstrations in downtown Santiago. Stories of fierce arguments over the school proposals among the top military officers (the military had left the cabinet after the elections) filtered into the national press, and a military delegation held a formal meeting with the Education Ministry to express their opposition. The controversy subsided only when the government announced that the proposal had been postponed, pending further discussion.

Within the government, the debate continued on whether to "consolidate in order to advance" (the Communist position) or to "advance without compromise" (the Socialist stance). One indication of how the debate was resolved was the decision by the government to use a constitutionally-authorized "decree of insistence" allowing the cabinet to override the rulings of the Controller General of Chile, Hector Humares, who had disallowed the requisitioning of some of the factories taken over during the October 1972 strike. Conflicts also continued with the judiciary over the executive's refusal to obey court orders to return seized properties. On May 26, the Supreme Court sent a public letter to the President denouncing

... the illegal attitude of the administration ... [its] open and continual rebellion against judicial orders ... which signifies a crisis of the rule of law [and] the imminent breakdown of the juridical structure of the country.¹⁰

The stalemate between the executive and the Congress over the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" was compounded when the Constitutional Tribunal refused to take jurisdiction over the disputed question of whether, in the absence of a plebiscite, the Congress could override the President's item vetoes by a majority or by a two-thirds vote.¹¹ A second constitutional conflict along the same lines developed when the opposition majority in Congress voted in favor of an amendment to give farms under 40 hectares (about 100 acres) in size an absolute guarantee against expropriation

and to compel the distribution of land in the "reformed" sector to the peasantry after a transitional period of two years. (The government had once again used a loophole in the 1967 law to postpone indefinitely the distribution of expropriated land by individual title.)

In May the official price index jumped 20 percent, indicating that the inflation was moving into a new hyperinflationary stage. The one effort that the government had made to hold the line—its refusal to grant a full cost-of-living wage increase to the El Teniente copper miners on the grounds that under their contract they had already received partial cost-of-living increases—led to a bruising two-and-a-half month strike, which included a miners' march on Santiago, mass rallies, and simultaneous one-day general strikes for and against the government in mid-June. By that time, Allende was once more ready to resort to military involvement in the cabinet to restore social peace.

Last Stage—Decline and Fall

On June 29, the last act of the Chilean tragedy began with an abortive revolt by the Second Armored Regiment in Santiago. Apparently, several army units had been in contact with *Patria y Libertad*, a right-wing political organization, and had planned to seize President Allende at his residence and to occupy the presidential palace. The revolt was canceled one day before it was to occur, but when one of the officers of the Second Armored Regiment was arrested and held in the Defense Ministry, the Regiment decided to free him and in the process to seize the presidential palace as originally planned. General Prats, the Army Commander, used the other military units in Santiago to put down the revolt in a few hours—most of which were spent in negotiation rather than shooting—but not before President Allende had gone on the air to urge "the people" to take over all industries and enterprises as a response to the uprising of "a small group of rebellious military men." The Central Labor Federation also urged the workers to occupy the factories, and in one day the number of companies taken over by the government rose from 282 to 526. The "Industrial Belts" that had sprung up at the time of the October strike now achieved new importance. The spread of "people's power" (*poder popular*) had been seen by Allende as a deterrent to a possible future coup, but it created many additional problems for the

¹⁰ Libro Blanco, p. 215.

¹¹ The term "item veto" reflects the fact that the Chilean president, unlike his US counterpart, can veto or even rewrite individual sections of proposed laws.



Workers in hardhats and bearing pitchforks march in Santiago in support of the Allende administration during brief nationwide strikes by pro- and anti-Marxist elements in mid-June 1973.

—Wide World Photos

government. Production declined sharply after the takeovers, the opposition got fresh fuel for its claim that the expansion of state control of industry was being carried out through extralegal channels, and "poder popular"—as expressed in the worker occupations—appeared to some extent to pose a possible threat of an alternative to the power of the central government.

After the June 29 revolt, Allende made new efforts to secure military involvement in the government, but his negotiations with the armed forces were unsuccessful.¹ Instead, they embarked on a policy of vigorous enforcement of the Arms Control Law, a measure which had been adopted in October 1972 but only sporadically enforced thereafter. This law authorized any military or police commanders to carry out arms searches if there was "a presumption of the clandestine existence of illegal firearms."² The right wing *Patria y Libertad* organization had just announced publicly that it was going under-

ground in an attempt to overthrow the government by force, and military intelligence was also aware of the initiation of arms training by all the government parties, even the centrist Radicals.³ In the course of their crackdown, the military found arms caches in factories in Santiago and Concepción, and the killing of a worker in one such arms raid provoked protests from the leftist parties.

At this point, the Chilean Communist Party and the Catholic Church both concluded independently that the only solution to the impasse in Chile was one more attempt at an agreement between the Allende government parties and the Christian Democrats. The Communists initiated a campaign against civil war almost simultaneously with a statement by the Chilean hierarchy calling for a renewal of dialogue. Probably in response to these pressures on both sides, two lengthy discussions took place on July 31 between UP and PDC representatives. Both Allende and the Christian Democrats agreed on the necessity of enforcement of the Arms Control Law, but disagreement continued on the constitutional reforms. Allende offered to sign the amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" in return for a constitutional amendment specifying that the Congress could only override presidential vetoes of constitutional amendments by a two-thirds vote. He also proposed the establishment of joint committees to work out further agreements. However, the Christian Democrats denounced these proposals as "dilatatory" and broke off the negotiations.


A few days before the dialogue was initiated, the truckers began another strike, which was to last from July 25 until the coup on September 11. As in October, the truckers were joined by the other *gremios*. Coming at a time when the 12-month inflation rate, fueled by massive government budget deficits and subsidies to the nationalized industries and agriculture, had reached 323 percent—and in a situation where inventories had not yet been built up from the October strike—the truckers' action created much more serious problems for the government than the earlier strike. This new crisis once again raised the question of military participation in the cabinet, and General Prats persuaded his fellow commanders that it was their patriotic duty to re-enter the cabinet in order to settle the strike.

¹ See circulating accounts of those negotiations appear in *Excelsior* (Santiago), July 11-12, 1973, pp. 7-10.

² See No. 17,758, *Diario Oficial* (Santiago), Oct. 21, 1972. By a decree of the law had come to Allende's desk in the midst of the October strike, and since it had the strong support of the armed forces he was compelled to sign it despite the opposition of the right wing party and the MIR.

³ Allende's personal bodyguard had organized courses in arms training at his vacation house outside of Santiago. The MAPU began arms training in December 1972, and the Radicals did so in July 1973. The armed forces were aware of this at least by the end of July. See documents in *Libro Blanco*, pp. 43-45, 192-93, 196-200.

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Trucks stand idle outside Valparaiso, Chile on September 8, 1973, the 44th day of a paralyzing transportation strike.

—UPI.

On August 9 Allende swore in what he called a "national security cabinet," with General Prats as Defense Minister, Air Force Commander César Ruiz as Minister of Transport (the ministry which would deal with the striking truckers), and the heads of the Navy and of the National Police in other cabinet posts.

Almost coincident with the entrance of the military into the cabinet, the naval establishment became involved in a serious conflict with the left wing of the Allende coalition. On August 7, the naval intelligence arm announced the discovery of a plot to carry out an enlisted men's revolt on August 11 in Valparaiso and Concepción. The announcement accused PS Secretary General Carlos Altamirano, MAPU leader Oscar Garretón, and Miguel Enríquez, head of the MIR, of being the "intellectual authors" of the revolt and demanded the lifting of the congressional immunity of the first two, who sat respectively in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Two days before the September coup, Altamirano admitted that he had encouraged navy men to resist their coup-minded (*golpista*) officers."

This attempt to subvert the hierarchy of a service command from below was combined with maneuvers

by Allende to replace officers unsympathetic to him. When General Ruiz resigned his cabinet post on August 17 in protest against his lack of sufficient power to settle the strike, Allende compelled him to add that his departure from the cabinet "implicitly" carried with it his retirement as Air Force Commander. This was correctly seen as an Allende tactic to remove an officer opposed to him, and it met serious resistance from within the Air Force, provoking a series of actions which ultimately led directly to the September 11 coup.

On August 20, top Air Force officers met to decide whether to resist Allende's action. By evening, Ruiz had persuaded them to accept it on the condition that Allende appoint the second-ranking officer, General Gustavo Leigh, as Air Force Commander and name another Air Force general to the cabinet (so that Allende could not repeat the same maneuver with Leigh). The next night the wives of high-ranking military officers, including those of six generals, gathered in front of General Prats' house to present a letter asking for his resignation. When the demonstration was broken up by police tear gas, it provoked such dissension in the armed forces that on the following day General Prats decided to resign both as Defense Minister and Army Commander. He was joined by two other generals who, with Prats, had led the military forces that had quelled the tank-regiment revolt in June.

The resignation of what appeared to be the last defenders of Allende in the army now meant that all three services were opposed to the President. It coincided with the adoption on the same day of a "sense of the house" (*acuerdo*) resolution by the Chamber of Deputies directed at the President and the military ministers, drawing their attention to "the serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order." "The resolution criticized the Allende government for repeatedly bypassing the legislature through the use of legal loopholes and for refusing to promulgate the constitutional reforms voted by the Congress. It accused Allende of ignoring judicial orders, encouraging illegal seizure of property, persecuting opposition labor groups, and supporting illegal paramilitary organizations. In conclusion, it stated that the listed actions constituted a "serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order of the Republic" and urged the military ministers to "put an end to the *de facto* situations listed above which violate the Constitution and the law" or be

* It was an indication of the continuing press freedom in Chile that newsstands in downtown Chile at this time contained a left-wing publication headlined, "Soldiers, Disobey Your Officers," and a magazine of the extreme Right with the headlines, "The Right of Rebellion," "Rebellion and its Goals," and "Resistance to the Tyrant."

¹⁴ Libro Blanco, pp. 239-42.

guilty of "compromising the national and professional character of the armed forces."

In its original form, the resolution had declared the Allende government to be illegitimate, but the *acuerdo* had later been softened in order to secure the support of the Christian Democrats. Yet its effect was still to give a congressional green light to the military, and Allende immediately so interpreted it. He replied to the motion by accusing the Congress of "promoting a *coup d'etat* by asking the military forces to make governmental judgments independently of the authority and direction of the President"; he also pointed out that according to the Constitution the only way that the Congress could decide on the legality of the President's conduct of his office was through impeachment by a two-thirds vote.¹¹

The congressional vote was echoed by several professional associations. The Medical Association called on their "colleague" Allende to resign—a request that was echoed by the Federation of Professionals (CUPROCH)—and resignation petitions were circulated in Santiago. The Lawyers' Association issued a declaration which—"without attributing a malevolent intention" to the President—asserted an "incompatibility between the institutional framework within which he is supposed to exercise his office and the actions which he feels obliged to carry out in his program." Arguing that Allende "would appear to be incapacitated (*impedido*) in the exercise of his functions as he understands them," the statement suggested that he could be removed from office under Article 43 of the Constitution, which authorizes the Congress to declare presidential incapacity.¹²

The Coup

Exactly when the decision to carry out the coup was made is not yet certain, but it evidently was reached in the days following Prats' resignation. The armed forces had contingency plans for the control of vital points throughout the country in case of any emergency, and it only required a signal to

put them into operation, hence the actual seizure of control required little preparation.

After the resignations of the third week of August, Allende restructured his cabinet without the top military commanders but still retained representatives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over the opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as Minister of the Interior his Socialist colleague Carlos Briones, who was known to be interested in another attempt at accommodation with the Christian Democrats. The president also canceled a projected trip to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers. The government and the opposition again staged rival demonstrations in connection with the third anniversary of the 1970 presidential elections.

On the weekend before the coup, the Christian Democrats called all provincial party leaders to a meeting at which a proposal was adopted for the simultaneous resignation of the Congress and the President and for new elections to resolve the con-




Gen. Carlos Prats, then Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army and Minister of Defense, leaves the President Palace on August 15, 1973, after a conference on the transport crisis.

¹¹ *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Aug. 20-26, 1973, p. 5. The chairman of the Christian Democratic Party told the *New York Times* that "neither we nor the armed forces favor anything but a moderate solution to Chile's political crisis" but emphasized that the only way to avoid a breakdown of the Constitution was the appointment of military men in at least six cabinet posts, as well as in undersecretary positions and as heads of the chief government agencies. *The New York Times*, Aug. 27, 1973, p. 12.

¹² *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1973, p. 7.

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Salvador Allende hurries through the corridors of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on the morning of September 11, 1973, shortly before taking his own life during the military coup d'état.

—Photo by The New York Times.

flirt between the executive and legislative branches. During the same weekend, Allende met with the leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and called for the holding of a plebiscite on his conduct of office. Although this step was reportedly opposed by the Socialists, Briones subsequently asserted that Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a radio address at noon on the day of the coup.⁸⁷

Meantime, after a stormy session with Allende on September 7, the military commanders proceeded on Sunday, September 9, to draft the text of the *pronunciamiento* issued on September 11. They did not secure the agreement of the National Police until early on the morning of the coup itself, and only after the fourth-ranking officer in seniority had taken over the position of police commander.⁸⁸

On September 10, Navy units set sail from Valparaíso for previously scheduled maneuvers, but that evening they returned to port and by early morning of the 11th had seized control of that city. Concepción, the third-ranking city in Chile and a

known center of leftist activism, was taken over without a hitch. Santiago required a few hours longer.

To justify their action, the military commanders broadcast a communiqué to the nation. While admitting that the Allende government had initially come to power by legal means, they announced that it had "fallen into flagrant illegitimacy" by violating fundamental rights, by "artificially fomenting the class struggle," by refusing to implement the decisions of the Congress, the judiciary and the Controller-General, by causing a critical decline in agricultural, commercial and industrial activity in the country, and by bringing about a state of inflation and anarchy which "threaten the internal and external security of the country." The coup leaders concluded:

These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical doctrine . . . to justify our intervention to depose a government which is illegitimate, immoral, and unrepresentative of the overwhelming sentiment of the nation."

At 9:30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one but the GAP, his personal bodyguard, was ready to defend him, Allende broadcast his last message to

⁸⁷ Information from the author's personal interviews with Patricio Aylwin, Jan. 11, 1974, and Carlos Briones, Jan. 14, 1974.

⁸⁸ Accounts of pre-coup military activities appear in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Sept. 17, 1973; *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Sept. 25, 1973; *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 19, 1973; and Robert Moss, "Chile's Coup and After," *Encounter* (London), March 1974, pp. 72-80.

⁸⁹ *Libro Blanco*, pp. 248-49.

the Chilean people over the single p... Allende radio station that had not yet been shut down by the military. He began:

This is surely the last time that I will be able to speak to you. . . . My words are not spoken in bitterness but disappointment. In the face of these events I can only say to the workers, "I am not going to resign." At this historic juncture I will pay with my life for the loyalty of the people.

Blaming "foreign capital, imperialism, and reaction" for persuading the armed forces to break with their tradition, he said:

History will judge them. . . . My voice will no longer come to you, but it does not matter. You will continue to hear it; it will always be among you. At the least, you will remember me as an honorable man who was loyal to the revolution."

At 11:00 a.m., the coup leaders permitted those who wished to do so to leave the building, and—except for his personal secretary—all the women, including Allende's pregnant daughter, left. The military also offered the President and his family safe conduct out of the country if he would surrender. Allende rejected the offer. The Air Force then sent in Hawker Hunter bombers, which repeatedly hit the palace with rockets and set fire to large portions of it. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p.m., Allende decided to discontinue the resistance, and the members who had been with him left the building in single file, led by the secretary carrying a white flag. Allende stayed behind and, sitting on a sofa in a reception room on the second floor, put two bullets into his head. The automatic rifle that he used was a gift from Fidel Castro."

Conclusions

Since the coup, comments in the world press representing widely divergent political postures have cited the Chilean case as proof that the hope of achieving Marxist socialism through democratic means is a vain one. Yet most people have failed to note two fundamental errors of the Allende policy, neither of which was essentially related to the attempt to establish democratic socialism:

(1) As noted at the outset, the very quotation from Engels that Allende cited at the beginning of his

administration to justify . . . course states as a prerequisite "the support of the majority of the people." Allende acted as if he had that support; but even at the highest point of his popularity in the April 1971 elections, he never achieved it. Moreover, his policy of deliberate class polarization, aimed at expanding his electoral base, was more successful in pitting professional and middle-class groups against him than in widening his support among workers, peasants and low-income groups.

2) Marxist economists and policymakers have always placed primary emphasis on investment and the expansion of the productive capacity of the economy. By contrast, the Allende policymakers emphasized increases in consumption and combined this with a headlong rush to take over industry and agriculture—a course far removed from the "two steps forward, one step back" of Lenin. The consequences of these policies after their deceptive initial success were massive government deficits, runaway inflation, and a near-breakdown of the economy. (The argument that Allende's economic problems were the result of a shortage of foreign credit does not really hold water, since they were caused by policies initiated before the foreign squeeze and since, in any event, Allende's regime managed to secure enough foreign credits from Latin American, European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase the Chilean foreign debt from \$2.6 billion to \$3.4 billion in less than three years. Much of the new indebtedness was to Western Europe and other Latin American countries. Surprisingly, Chile's debt to the USSR, China and Eastern Europe increased only from \$9 million to \$40 million between 1970 and 1973.)

¹⁰ Translated from the transcript of the tape recording of the speech published in Ricardo Boizard, *El Último Día de Allende* (The Last Day of Allende), Santiago, Editorial de Pacífico, 1973, pp. 53-55.

¹¹ On Allende's suicide, see the medical report in *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 1973, pp. 1 and 7. The eyewitness testimony of one of the President's personal physicians, who entered the room immediately thereafter, is published in *Ércilla*, Jan. 28, 1974 pp. 10-13. Allende's widow has asserted that witnesses told her they had seen bullet wounds in his chest and stomach. A supposed account by a personal bodyguard circulated in Mexico and elsewhere describing his murder contains numerous factual errors and describes events which could not have taken place because of the physical design of the building. On this and many other myths of Left and Right concerning the overthrow of Allende, see Paul E. Sigmund, "Allende through the Myths," *Worldview* (New York) April 1974 pp. 16-21.

¹² Secretaría, Comité Interamericano de la Alianza para el Progreso (CIAP), *El Esfuerzo Interno y las Necesidades de Financiamiento Externo para el Desarrollo de Chile* (Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Chile), Washington, DC, 1974, p. v-9.

Allende in Retrospect

Specific aspects of the Chilean system also made the Allende experiment a particularly difficult one. He was able to come to power in the first place because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the democratic system and because the Marxist parties were able to mobilize a part of the proletariat and the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many instruments for state control of the economy which had been developed by previous administrations since the 1930's. However, he was required to operate within an institutional system which included frequent and staggered elections, proportional representation, and a multiparty system which made majority rule very difficult and often gave veto powers to the extremes of Right and Left. The economy had been characterized for nearly a century by a chronic tendency to inflation, and successive governments had consistently ignored agriculture in the interest of securing urban electoral support. The most important systemic constraint of all, of course, was the existence of a professionalized and institutionally-loyal military which was unresponsive to the ideological blandishments of the Left."

The immediate causes of the military intervention are apparent from the preceding account. In the last part of 1972, the military were drawn into Chilean politics by both sides and became as polarized as the rest of Chilean society—with the overwhelming majority joining the opposition to Allende. The conflict over education in March-April 1973 heightened that polarization just at the time the military were attempting to extricate themselves from political involvement. Then the expansion of arms searches in mid-1973 revealed the extent to which Chile was becoming an armed camp on the verge of civil war. Finally, the efforts to subvert the existing military hierarchy by a combination of leftist activity among enlisted men and presidential maneuvering with promotions and retirements provided the classic scenario for a *coup d'état*.

¹¹ The Socialists always believed that they could convert the military to their outlook. This is strikingly revealed in Socialist Party documents published in the *Libro Blanco*, pp. 124-30.

One can also relate Allende's difficulties to the inherent contradictions in the Marxist theory to which he appealed. At the same time that he proclaimed his faith in a democratic, pluralist and libertarian transition to socialism, many of his Marxist supporters spoke and acted on the basis of a belief in the inevitability of armed confrontation. With his knowledge, they armed themselves and—what was worse—talked incessantly about revolution. The repeated statements of Régis Debray and others that the observance of the rules of "bourgeois" legality was only a tactic until the balance of forces had improved was hardly likely to persuade doubters of the sincerity of Allende's commitment to democracy. When the importation and distribution of arms was combined with efforts to reorganize education along ideological lines, to subvert military discipline, and to rearrange the hierarchy of command, it is not altogether surprising that the military finally took action.

A positive evaluation of the Allende years would certainly credit him with a sincere effort to raise the living standards of low-income groups and to involve them actively in the determination of their own future. It would likewise stress the continued existence of freedom of expression for all points of view in Chile right up to the coup. A more negative assessment would ask whether the low-income groups in Chile genuinely benefited from an economic policy which after the first half of 1972 produced hyperinflation, a continuous drop in agricultural and industrial production, and a reduction in the real value of wages and salaries. Even more critically, one could inquire who has suffered the most in economic and in human terms as a result of the breakdown of the Chilean system—the Marxist politicians, many of whom were able to escape or go into exile, or the workers, peasants and slum-dwellers they claimed to represent, who are now paying the price of the Allende regime's mistakes in the form of the hardships imposed by sharply reduced consumption and the strictures of draconian military rule.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SOVIET AGAINST, London
15 August 1974

Kremlin's Hand in Allende's Chile

by JAMES THEBERGE

Why did Salvador Allende's revolutionary government end in a bloodbath despite Soviet support and the plaudits of the world's left-wing extremists, who saw in Chile a new path for Socialism's march to power?

James Theberge, who is Director of the Latin American Department of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, shows how Moscow, the "big brother", though eager to exploit this opening in Latin America to the full, disagreed with Allende's headlong methods, and while warning him of the growing economic chaos denied him enough financial aid.

In 1935, Moscow dispatched Eudocio Ravines, a brilliant Peruvian Communist organizer, to Chile to implement the "united front" and "anti-fascist popular front" strategy that had replaced the ultra-left strategy of the Comintern. Since that time the Chilean Communist party generally has followed a strategy of broad alliance and limited aims, although the Cuban revolution led to a radicalisation of party strategy.

The Chilean Communist party, one of the most loyal pro-Soviet parties in Latin America, gave unqualified support to the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. While its fortunes have shifted through the years as a result of domestic and international developments, it unstintingly supported the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy and repeated Moscow's themes of anti-imperialism and class warfare.

The party, at least prior to the military intervention of September, 1973, was the best organized and strongest in Latin America. Between 1956 and 1969 it formed an uneasy alliance for electoral purposes with the Socialist Party, its more militant Marxist rival on the Left. But in 1969 the Communists decided that a much more broadly based alliance of left-wing forces was necessary for the transformation of the country into a socialist state and they played a key role in the founding of the Popular Unity Front (a coalition of six leftist parties) at the end of that year. After the 1970 electoral victory of the Popular Unity Front under Salvador Allende the Communists became the single most influential force within the coalition. It was a far better organized and disciplined participant than its closest rival, the more ideologically unstable and militant Socialist Party.

The ultimate aim of the party did not waver throughout the Allende period. The Communists hoped to be able to take advantage of the weakness of the democratic institutions to install a "dictatorship of the proletariat" under their direction. Their Secretary-General, Eduardo Labarca, made this clear in his *Corralón 27 Horas* (Santiago, Editorial Galaxia, 1972), in which he declared: "For us the path from capital-

ism to Socialism necessarily requires that the proletariat be converted into the leading class, into the determining social force".

The Communist strategy, shared by Salvador Allende and the "moderate" wing of the Socialist Party, was to "overthrow" the bourgeois state and constitution, using the legal device of the plebiscite. In an interview with Régis Debray in 1971 Allende said: "As for the bourgeois state at the present moment, we are seeking to overcome it. To overthrow it!" (Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution, Conversations with Allende*, New York, Random House, 1971 p.82).

Mass mobilisation, infiltration of Chilean institutions and tactical alliances with the opposition were to be employed to generate sufficient popular support. Congress was to be replaced by a "popular assembly" and the existing legal system by "popular tribunals." President Allende's pledge to uphold the "Statute of Guarantees" (designed to commit his government to preserve Chile's democratic freedoms and institutions in exchange for Congressional support) was simply a "tactical necessity" to gain power, as he explained later.

The Chilean Communists and their allies in Moscow were uneasy about the ideological implications of the *via Chilena* as advocated by Salvador Allende (Debray, p.119). The Communist party refused to endorse the *via Chilena* as a uniquely Chilean path to socialism, which implied that it might not necessarily assume the leading role after complete power was gained by the Popular Unity coalition. The Chilean party supported Moscow's doctrine of the *via pacífica*, which accepted free elections and popular pluralism as a short-term tactical device under Chilean conditions but aimed in the long run at installing a Soviet-style Communist dictatorship. The *via pacífica* was not as "pacifist" as the slogan implied: it embraced all forms of class conflict and violence short of armed insurrection and civil war in the process of establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Misleading Image

The *via Chilena* proclaimed by Allende soon after his election was widely misunderstood in the West. The image that was officially propagated was that of a uniquely Chilean path to a new type of Marxist-humanist socialism, where basic liberties, economic pluralism and free elections were respected by all. Western liberals were led to believe that the Allende government was constructing a new Western-European type of democratic socialism in Chile. This image clashed with the reality of Salvador Allende's revolutionary ambition to use Chile's pluralist democracy to destroy it. He seemed to have abandoned the *via Chilena* formula during the last year of his government. Not only did he rarely

employ it in his speeches but the importance of preserving "democracy, pluralism and liberty" was conspicuously absent.

The government's policy was very much to Moscow's liking: seizure of US investments, the espousal of the doctrine of "ideological pluralism" (relations with all states regardless of ideology and internal political character), closer relations with the socialist camp, and the fostering of an "anti-imperialist (anti-US) front in Latin America.

Under the Allende regime, foreign policy was reoriented, and the previously close ties with the United States were replaced by strong political, economic and scientific ties with the "socialist countries," above all with Cuba and the USSR. The first trip of the Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, outside of Latin America was to the USSR and Eastern Europe, in May-June, 1971. President Allende visited Moscow in December, 1972. Strong ideological and personal ties linked the Chilean Communist party leaders with the Soviet party leadership and Salvador Allende with Fidel Castro.

President Allende's description of the USSR as Chile's "big brother" (*hermano mayor*) was no mere figure of speech but reflected the expectation of his government that the USSR would become the most important socialist ally of the revolution and the main economic bulwark of the regime. Moscow did, in fact, become the most important source of socialist camp economic aid and credits to the Popular Unity government, totalling \$620.0 million (\$156.5 million in short-term bank credit and \$463.5 million in project aid and supplier credits) in the 1971-73 period*. The USSR authorised \$260.5 million in credits (\$98.5 million in short-term credit and \$162.0 million in economic aid) to the Allende regime, most of which was never utilised. This was far from the massive help Allende needed. But Moscow was under no illusion that its economic co-operation would decisively influence the immediate prospects for radical social and economic transformation, although it no doubt helped reduce Chile's dependence on the United States.

Soviet influence expanded rapidly as a result of the Chilean Communist party's loyalty to the USSR and the expansion of Soviet-Chilean economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and fisheries cooperation made possible by the victory of the Communist-Socialist regime. But Moscow became increasingly alarmed at the deterioration of the economic situation, the violent clashes of the ultra-left and the ultra-right, and the growing organisation of opposition forces, particularly after the Popular Unity government failed in the March, 1973, elections to obtain the majority electoral support required to transform

the political and economic structure by peaceful, constitutional means.

Nevertheless, Moscow was not willing to provide the massive short-term commodity assistance (such as foodstuffs) or untied convertible currency credits which the regime needed to finance the import of food, spare parts, and machinery to alleviate local shortages. Moscow's \$98.5 million in short-term bank credits was no doubt helpful but paled into insignificance before the need to finance Chile's import requirements, which, for food alone, were running at the rate of about \$700 million a year when the Allende regime collapsed. The Soviet leadership told Chilean Communist and Popular Unity officials that the main effort to improve the economic situation would have to be made by the Allende government. Moscow repeatedly stressed that the Popular Unity government must reverse the calamitous decline in production and productivity to have a chance of winning over a majority of the Chileans to the cause of socialism.

Refusing to give Allende the hard currency credits he needed to improve his worsening chances for survival, Moscow contented itself with organising solidarity meetings at home and abroad in the hope that these demonstrations would "reach the ears of the Chilean people" (Moscow Radio 13 August 1973). Allende's loyal ally and "big brother" was willing to sell Soviet machinery and equipment to him—that is, expand Soviet exports financed by long-term credits—but denied him the short-term hard currency credits he desperately needed.

A combination of circumstances — Moscow's costly entanglement in Cuba, economic difficulties at home, shortages of grain and foreign exchange — led the USSR to eschew massive short-term aid to Chile and to counsel a policy of self-help to the Allende regime — a theme repeated frequently by the Chilean Communist party leadership when referring to Soviet assistance. In the final analysis Moscow watched idly while the *via pacifica* was destroyed by the disastrous economic policies, the circumvention of the laws, and the tacit encouragement of the ultra-left by President Allende and the Popular Unity government.

Moscow pursued a dual strategy in Chile. At the level of state-to-state relations it acted cautiously, adopted a non-interventionist posture, and encouraged anti-Americanism and independence from the United States. Since it realised that the internal balance of forces did not favour the armed struggle, the Popular Unity leadership was urged to maintain internal unity, reject the "provocative and adventurous" overtures of the ultra-left, avoid actions that might provoke a civil war or military intervention, adopt a more rational economic policy, and consolidate the initial gains of the revolution.

At the same time, Moscow did nothing to restrain direct Cuban involvement in the Chilean revolution. Protected by a friendly, Marxist-dominated government and its Marxist President, Cuba transported large quantities of Soviet and Czechoslovak-supplied weapons to the radical left in Chile on the Cuban airline and merchant ships.

*See *Deuda Externa de Chile*, Tomo V, Departamento de Créditos Externos, CORFO, Santiago, 1973, for full details.

It also established a guerrilla training base and coordinating centre in Chile. The large intelligence team in the Cuban Embassy in Santiago maintained liaison with the liberation movement in Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Cuba's Soviet-controlled intelligence service, Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), also had close ties with the Chilean ultra-leftist and other revolutionary exile groups, providing them with training, arms and funds for the armed struggle in Chile and other Latin American countries.

Revolutionaries Trained

Soviet army personnel were directly involved in the training of worker-revolutionaries for urban guerrilla warfare. This occurred during 1972-73 at El Belloto, near Valparaíso, where the USSR had installed a factory for the manufacture of prefabricated housing. The firm (KPD) employed sixteen Russians, four of whom were engineers and technicians; the remaining twelve were Soviet army officers. After working hours, these twelve officers instructed a hard-core of specially-selected worker-revolutionaries in the use of arms, street fighting and urban guerrilla tactics. The Russian-built factory was kept under constant surveillance by Chile's naval intelligence. On the morning of 11 September 1973, naval intelligence arrested the Russians and three days later expelled them from the country*.

This clandestine involvement in training guerrillas in Chile was an exception to Moscow's official line of giving full support to the legal and peaceful path to socialism. But the Soviet leadership operates on the principle that since every eventuality cannot be foreseen it is better to take advance measures which might "contradict" the official line than to be sorry later. In Chile there clearly were some advantages in having some armed revolutionaries under direct Soviet control: Moscow would be able to retain some measure of influence over the ultra-left, particularly important in the event that this faction was able to seize power. As it turned out, Russia's "united front" tactics failed, and the armed struggle was aborted by the Chilean military.

Soviet Industrial Espionage

The Soviet Union made every effort to extract the maximum advantage from its technical assistance programme. It assigned 46 technicians to the nationalised copper industry to help raise productivity, all of whom were engaged in industrial espionage. They were far more interested in gaining first-hand knowledge of the advanced US mining equipment and methods of operation than in assisting Chilean development. Andrey Zauschkevich, executive vice-president of the copper corporation, told me in December 1973 that the specialists during their two-year stay contributed nothing to the improvement of mining operations and were mainly occupied in gathering specifications of American equipment, obtaining information on mining techniques and organization, and collecting data on costs and productivity.

Moscow was also especially interested in fisheries and fishery-related (oceanographic, hydrographic and marine biological research) assistance to Chile. Fisheries aid gave the Russian's access to Chilean ports for its fishing, oceanographic and other vessels.

the Chileans with a Soviet maritime presence. The growing presence in Chilean waters, around the Cape and in sub-Antarctic waters provided a cover for gathering intelligence and oceanographic data of use to the Soviet navy.

The Soviet Union offered to supply \$300 million in military equipment to Allende in 1971, but the military refused the offer and decided to continue to obtain arms from the United States and other Western suppliers. The anti-Communist military were disturbed by the deepening economic and political violence under the Popular Unity government, and were anxious not to weaken their military ties with the United States and Western Europe by turning to the Soviet Union for arms. Moscow had hoped to establish an important precedent for supplying arms to non-Communist countries in Latin America and further weaken Washington's already strained relations with the Latin American military. Despite the coolness of official US-Chilean relations, the United States continued to maintain friendly relations with the Chilean military.

The Kremlin was very much aware of the weakness of the Allende regime. Not only was it a minority government (in 1970, 36% and, in 1973, 43% of the electorate supported the Popular Unity coalition) but the armed forces and powerful national police were strongly anti-Communist. Since the "democratic forces" lacked full political and economic power, Moscow favoured a gradual take-over by the Communists and avoidance of civil war or military confrontation at all costs. Both the ultra-left and ultra-right opponents of Allende were attacked regularly in the Soviet press. But the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MLR), an ultra-left group that pursued the armed path and hoped to defeat the opposition forces in a violent confrontation, was singled out for particularly scathing criticism. It was charged with "revolutionary adventurism", contributing to political instability and harming the prospects of survival of the Popular Unity government.

From mid-1972 onwards, Moscow realised that the opposition to the Allende government was growing and widespread. It was only the shrewd and dilatory personality of Allende—skilled in maintaining a balance between the disruptive forces within his own government—that held together the disintegrating fabric of society. There was Soviet criticism of the irrational economic management, declining agricultural and industrial production, accelerating inflation, and the worsening balance of payments.

Soviet observers advised a slower take-over of the economy, nationalising the large firms first but leaving the smaller and medium-sized firms alone for the time being. In the last months before the military coup they saw the handwriting on the wall and urged a consolidation of the economic gains already achieved, collaboration with the opposition political parties (especially the Christian Democrats), and avoidance of armed conflict.

**Exclita* (Santiago), 10-16 October 1973, and author's interviews with the Chilean military high command, Dec.

Collapse of Socialist 'Model'

The Soviet policy vis-à-vis Chile emphasized cooperation in the political field, the forging of an anti-US front with Chile, Peru and Cuba, and expansion of trade and aid relations while refraining from polemics and interfering in Chile's internal affairs (mainly through its influence over the Chilean Communist Party). The Chilean Communists were given moral and material support for widening the base of support of the regime, but it made no difference to the final outcome. The weakness of the Allende regime, its fateful internal contradictions, official connivance in the arming and violence of the ultra-left, the Weimar-type inflation and food shortages, the growing political polarisation and violence, and the fateful alienation of the armed forces were the decisive conditions that triggered the *coup d'état* that led to Allende's downfall and replacement by a military junta on 11 September, 1973.

Moscow was deeply disturbed but not especially surprised. TASS admitted on 20 September 1973 that the "Chilean experience was bitter and dramatic," and Fidel Castro declared that he was "very upset by events in Chile" (the new military junta had immediately broken off relations with Havana). Moscow severed diplomatic relations with Santiago and withdrew its ambassador and embassy staff because of alleged persecution of Soviet officials by the junta. After less than a week in power, Chile's new military government began to feel the full blast of Soviet displeasure and frustration, expressed in a well-orchestrated and sustained propaganda campaign aimed at isolating and discrediting the regime.

The Soviet media accused the junta of "persecuting left-wingers with unparalleled cruelty" (Moscow Radio, 13 September 1973). There were reports in *Pravda* on 26 September that "the streets of Santiago were flowing with blood" and the radio spoke of "tens of thousands of Chilean democrats" killed. Salvador Allende was alternatively reported to have been "murdered in cold

blood" or to have died a hero's death, resisting the rebels to the very end. Allende's residence was alleged to have been "wiped off the face of the earth." The junta was shooting at women and children in an attempt to intimidate the people. On 29 October TASS indignantly blamed the CIA, Chilean "reaction" and "American monopolies" for organising the military coup. And according to a Moscow broadcast even Leonid Brezhnev, not known for his devotion to Western democracy, expressed horror at the "monstrous, completely open violation of a country's constitution, the uncereceremonious flouting of the democratic traditions of an entire nation."

The overthrow of the Allende government was a bitter but not entirely unexpected setback for Moscow's united front tactics in Latin America, and had adverse repercussions for Marxist parties elsewhere in the West. Communists and Socialists in France and Italy who had earlier pointed to Chile as a model of the peaceful transition to socialism moved to disengage themselves from the Allende disaster. Instead of leading to socialism, united front tactics in Chile ushered in a period of unparalleled political violence, enormous suffering for Chile's workers and middle class, and the worst economic crisis in its history.

Soviet designs for Chile to serve as the vanguard of the anti-US front in Latin America ended in a complete fiasco and left a deep impression on the non-Communist political parties and the armed forces in the region. It reminded them of the grave risks of entering into an alliance with totalitarian parties. Despite protestations to the contrary, Marxist governments are driven inexorably to violate pledges to uphold the constitution, to destroy the private sector of the economy, and ultimately to install a totalitarian dictatorship.

Authoritative statements of the Chilean Communist Party's position under the Allende regime can be found in Labarca's *Corvallen* 27 *Heras* and Luis Corvalán's *Camino de Victoria*, (Santiago, 1971).

WASHINGTON POST
28 August 1974

Argentine Manager Murdered

BUENOS AIRES—Gunmen killed the labor relations manager of a French-owned auto plant in Córdoba yesterday, and President Maria Estela Peron spoke out against the recent "cowardly and mercenary assassinations" in Argentina.

The extreme leftist Peronist Armed Forces claimed responsibility for the death of IKA Renault official Ricardo Goya, 35, saying it

was "the Peronist workers' answer to the enemies of our class."

A two-month slowdown at the Renault plant climaxed Monday with ouster of leftist leaders of the auto union. Workers battled police last night on the streets of Córdoba.

Mrs. Peron, in her first speech from the palace balcony that her late husband, President Juan D. Peron often used as a rostrum, declared:

"Many people think that because I am a woman I cannot rule... but with this fragile appearance I have committed myself. For the foundation of the political killing came in a talk earlier with provincial govern-

NEW YORK TIMES
28 August 1974

SPARSE AUDIENCE HEARS MRS. PERON

Only a Few Thousand Attend
Her First Public Rally

By JONATHAN KANDELL

Special to The New York Times

BUENOS AIRES, Aug. 27—A few thousand people gathered today to hear Mrs. Peron's first public rally. The killing of the Argentine Renault executive, Ricardo Goya, 35, since she took office, spoke in years old, followed a clash last night between a left wing auto workers' and policemen that

Juan Domingo Peron, had drawn scores of thousands of supporters on numerous occasions.

The event was marred by the Government's mounting problems with left-wing industrial workers in Córdoba, 430 miles northwest of the capital.

Early this morning, unidentified terrorists panned down the labor relations manager of IKA-Renault, a leading car manufacturer in Córdoba, as he

drove to the main plant that has been in the center of a hit-

ionists gathered today to hear her workers' strike. The killing of the Argentine Renault executive, Ricardo Goya, 35, since she took office, spoke in years old, followed a clash last night between a left wing auto workers' and policemen that

left two trade unionists seriously wounded. The rally was ostensibly called to publicize the Government's decision last week to nationalize the distribution and sale of petroleum products. Until now, Shell and Esso companies had shared the local sale of oil products with the State Petroleum Company.

Assertion of Leadership

But Mrs. Perón devoted most of her speech to defend her claim to leadership of the Peronist movement, which has been in growing disarray since General Perón's death on July 1.

"Do not doubt for a moment that Isabel Perón, his widow, and his second wife, the last three weeks that con-

sply with his doctrine, no matter what the cost," said Mrs. Perón. During the two months she has been in power, she has sought to transform her image from that of a bereaved widow to a forceful chief executive able to guide a nation divided into numerous rightist, leftist and moderate factions.

She has held well-publicized Cabinet meetings and reunions with opposition politicians, Congressmen and military

gathered an enormous personal following before her death in a major public rally to strengthen her image in the face of rising terrorist activity, labor unrest and economic problems. "I know that many think I cannot take over the helm," said Mrs. Perón, still dressed in one of the lengthy black dresses she has donned since her husband's death. "But I have two arms, and in one hand I have Perón and in the other Eva Perón."

At times her voice cracked with emotion and she shook her extended arms, recalling General Perón's death on July 1, heavily laced with references to her husband's death and slogans used by General Perón. There have been rumors in the last three weeks that conservative Peronist leaders

were urging Mrs. Perón to hold a major public rally to strengthen her image in the face of rising terrorist activity, labor unrest and economic problems.

Despite the poor turnout, at today's rally, television announcers remarked that the crowds were "multitudinous," and at least one commentator spoke of "hundreds of thousands" of people on hand. But a walk through the plaza confirmed that only the street in front of the big Government house was filled. The cameras of the television stations— which have recently been brought under state control—focused on trade

BALTIMORE SUN
28 August 1974

Forecast is cloudy for

By RICHARD OLMARK

Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun

Rio de Janeiro—Opposition is growing against the continuation in office of President Hugo Banzer of Bolivia. But observers are divided over whether General Banzer will end his tenure legally, through elections promised for next year, or by the usual mechanism for transferring power in Bolivia—the coup d'état.

Last week, General Banzer celebrated the beginning of his fourth year in the presidency by dancing in the streets during a massive celebration of the coup d'état that deposed Gen. Juan José Torres August 21, 1971.

Even as he was celebrating, making speeches about the durability of the Nationalist Popular Front—the civilian-military coalition through which he has governed—the powerful Bolivian Miners' Union declared itself virtually at war with the regime. And the Front apparently was disintegrating.

This week one party in the coalition, the Nationalist Boliv-

ian Falcón demanded immediate elections. The Falcóns' declaration repudiated immediately by another member party of the Front, a smaller group named after the late president, René Barrientos.

Even as the civilian elements that have supported President Banzer's continually rightwing and intensely anti-Communist regime were falling out, there were reports of dissension within the military.

Although President Banzer received the perfunctory support of the commanders of the armed services during last week's fête, it is evident to those here, and from reports from Bolivia, that the military is divided over the president and his policies.

It is believed that the younger officers are being alienated increasingly by the president. Specifically, they oppose his refusal to grant amnesty to

those officers who plotted and executed the unsuccessful coup against his government June 5. A pamphlet was circulated recently to all military units in La Paz, allegedly produced by a group of young officers who have taken inspiration from their counterparts in Portugal who last April led a successful coup against the authoritarian regime there.

The pamphlet read, in part, "Banzer's repression against his own institution [the Army] has persuaded those democratic officers to fight beside campesinos, miners, workers and students."

After the attempted coup of June 5, many of the officers involved were either jailed or sent into exile to Paraguay and Argentina. According to reports from Argentina, many of these officers have been returning to Bolivia clandestinely.

unionists and avoided photographing the empty stretches.

One of the organizers of the rally asserted that it was successful considering that only two unions—the light and power union and the state petroleum workers—were supposed to attend. But he acknowledged that "Perón would never have addressed so small a crowd."

The chief focus of political unrest in the country has been Córdoba, the second largest city. Last February, a right-wing police coup, apparently backed by General Perón, removed the elected left-wing Peronist governor from power. During the upheaval, right-wing trade unionists also wrested control of the local labor federation from leftists.

Since then, Córdoba has been the scene of repeated incidents of political violence. A few days ago, the Labor Ministry decided to remove legal recognition from the leftist-controlled union at Ika-Renault—a concern with mixed Argentine and French capital—after labor leaders called a strike in support of higher wages.

The clashes with the police last night resulted when officers moved to dislodge labor leaders from the union headquarters.

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Aug. 23, 1974

Argentine Left Clings to Hold On University

By Joseph Novitski

Special to The Washington Post

BUENOS AIRES—The entrance and hallways of the University of Buenos Aires

by a Cultural Revolution. Wall newspapers fall

meetings" hang from the high ceilings to the floors. Corners and columns are plastered with posters that urge the defense of the revolution or quote Gen. Juan D. Perón, the Argentine populist leader who died in office as president on July 1.

Outside, people walk past without seeming to notice. But inside, behind the posters, the young people who believed Perón's return to power in Argentina last year meant a giant step toward socialism are trying to hold on to their last stronghold: the university.

Slowly, but inexorably, the government let behind

university administration and student body. Peronist professors say that President María Estela Perón, the leader's widow and successor, is following a line laid down by Perón: To ease the Marxist left out of the Peronist movement. This means winning back control of the University of Buenos Aires—whose student body of almost 200,000 makes it be far the largest in the country—from the Peronist leftwing.

The university has been a sectarian political battleground for more than a year. Entrance policies, the curriculum and administrative

The university, an urban campus with old and semi-modern buildings scattered throughout the city, is organized along European lines. Eleven separate faculties, like separate colleges, educate lawyers, doctors, agronomists and liberal professionals. Each gives two years of basic college education. Seven years ago, after a violent university purge by Argentina's military government, many parts of the separate curricula were shaped to American models.

When the Peronists returned to power last May, young leftist leaders loyal to Peron were given the university as their share of the new government. It changed almost overnight.

Entrance examinations were abolished and all high school graduates were offered admission. One year later, 85,000 new students had entered and the enrollment had doubled.

"There are so many people now, it seems that even the rats from the basement take exams," said a fourth-year philosophy student.

Professors with connections to the military government or foreign companies were dismissed. Fourteen were fired from the faculty of economics alone. The university broke off assistance and exchange agreements with the Ford Foundation, the University of California and Rutgers, and opened new programs with universities in Peru, Algeria and Mexico.

Courses of study were changed. Traditional philosophy courses were replaced, in part, by studies of South American politicians and Peron's doctrine. In an introductory architecture

course, a slide show alternates views of a new Sheraton hotel here with pictures of the capital's shantytowns and is followed by a discussion of American imperialism in Argentina.

"Last year we had Samuelson, this year we had Lenin," said a second-year student of economics. "It's really interesting. We learned how Samuelson's book (An Introduction to Economics by Paul A. Samuelson, an introductory text widely used in the United States and some foreign countries) used all these graphs and curves to prove that imperialism was necessary. Oh, not directly, but subtly, you know."

"We took out Samuelson but we did not replace him with Lenin or Marx," Oscar Sbarra Mitre, the 33-year-old dean of the economics faculty, said during an interview. He explained that there is now no single textbook for the two-year introductory course, but rather a reading list with a majority of Latin American authors. Marx—as well as John Maynard Keynes—shows up as an individual theorist, but not at the last word.

The shift from studies designed to produce executives for giant companies to a more populist and national outlook, Sbarra Mitre said, is better exemplified by the course called "History of the Union Movement and Labor Relations," which replaced a course on personnel management.

It was not educational policy, however, but pure politics that turned the university into a left-wing redoubt defying the Peronist government. A basic university law, laying down the rules

for Buenos Aires and the eight other campuses of the national university system, passed Congress by a large majority late last year with the support from non-Peronist parties. The law embodied the basic changes that had begun at Buenos Aires.

Meanwhile, a majority faction in the Peronist youth movement backed by two urban guerrilla groups that had fought the military government under Peron's banner, had made the university here their power base. They proclaimed a government program that smacked heartily of Marxism-Leninism and, in effect, challenged Peron for leadership of his movement.

"Look, these people are anything but Peronists," Gen. Peron said last February, when he first began trying to separate his movement's youth wing from the leaders born of the guerrilla movement who call themselves Montoneros.

"Before thinking about getting organized, we've got to think how it can be a true organization and not a sack full of cats who will start showing their claws pretty soon," Peron told leaders of the youth wing. He asked them to reorganize themselves and expel the Marxists. "That's why this purification is necessary," he said.

The purification Peron wanted has been thwarted, in part by government reluctance to drive the whole youth wing into open revolt and in part by students from the University of Buenos Aires. Twice, since April, they have marched into the streets to protest the appointment of new deans and have forced the government to back down.

A week ago they took over 10 of the 11 faculties in a move to hold onto the temporary university rector, Raul Laguzzi, 32, a professor of pharmacy who is loyal to the Montoneros. And, inside the faculties, it often seems as if one is inside Peron's "sack of cats."

At the medical faculty recently, students who still proclaim loyalty to Peron started playing the Peronist marching song on a loud-speaker system. A faction that stands further to the left put on the Internationale, the Communist hymn, and turned up the volume on their own sound system. The Peronists turned up their volume, and so it went, to ear-shattering levels.

"It isn't bad once you get above the second floor," a professor of neurobiology said.

Slowly the university crisis seems to be heading for some kind of resolution. A week ago, President Maria Estela Peron named a new minister of education. He is expected to name a new rector. Student street demonstrations have been quickly and sharply put down by police. The same demonstrations were tolerated by her late husband.

There have been some hints that the government will try to defuse the crisis by unraveling Peronist politics and the quarrel with the Montoneros from university policies.

"We're waiting to see who the new rector will be," said a young professor. "That should clear up something. In the meantime, if you're thinking of building a house in Argentina, get an old architect."

Western Hemisphere

ENCOUNTER, London
January 1974

Allende & the Myth Makers

David Holden

Political Realism & Revolutionary Romance

UNFEELING AS IT MAY SEEM to say so when the bloodshed of the Chilean *coup d'état* is still so keenly remembered and the generals who made it are riding unpleasantly high, the fact remains that Salvador Allende died a lucky man. In life he was a failure. Both his policies and his country were shattered long before the end. But in death he achieved success beyond his dreams. Instantly canonised as the Western world's newest left-wing martyr, he became overnight the most potent political cult-figure since his old friend, Che Guevara.

To some extent, of course, the congregation had already been prepared for this posthumous elevation. In the three years of Allende's administration the "Chilean experiment" and the "Chilean road to socialism" had become favourite topics of discussion among left-wing groups in Europe, where Chile's supposed resemblance to Italy or France had encouraged the belief that Europe might, for once, follow in Latin America's footsteps instead of the other way about. Many aspiring revolutionaries from Europe and the United States had actually joined their Latin American counterparts in Chile in much the same spirit as their dropped-out contemporaries had hitch-hiked to Nepal hoping for a glimpse of Paradise in action. By the time of the September *coup* the military junta claimed there were as many as 15,000 foreigners of all kinds in Chile, actively supporting—sometimes with violence—the "socialist revolution."

DAVID HOLDEN has travelled in Chile on several recent assignments as Chief Foreign Correspondent for the "Sunday Times." Among his regular contributions to ENCOUNTER are "South African Notebook" (August 1970), "Day Trip to Zanzibar" (September 1972) and "Ethiopia—Forty Years On" (February 1973).

These specially interested groups or individuals obviously provided a ready network for international propaganda in the aftermath of Allende's death. But the shocked and, at times, almost hysterical reaction to the *coup* went far beyond such committed parties to embrace many of the West's ordinary liberals and social democrats. For them, as much as for the self-styled revolutionaries, it seemed, a bright light of world-wide hope had been extinguished in Santiago; and from Washington to Rome, via Paris, Bonn and London, anguished cries of "Foul!" rent the air.

Revolt Against the Ballot Box" for which the Chilean armed forces could offer no excuse (*The Guardian*, 12/9/73); as a "Disaster in Chile" that would "set back the cause of socialism and democracy everywhere" (*New Statesman*, 14/9/73); and as "The Death of a Hope" comparable, even, to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia that ended Alexander Dubcek's régime in 1968 (*The Observer*, 16/9/73).

Within 24 hours of the first, bare news of the *coup* the General-Secretary of the British Labour Party, Mr Ron Hayward, was writing officially to one of Allende's former colleagues to say that it was difficult to express the sense of horror and anger felt by the British Labour movement "as the aspirations of the working people of Chile—shared by so many others around the world—are destroyed at the hands of a few arrogant and ignorant officers acting at the behest of those who believe their right to rule is unchallengeable" (*The Times*, 13/9/73). Mr Len Murray, General-Secretary of the Trades Union Council, expressed his shock and abhorrence with equal speed and vigour. And Mrs Judith Hart, speaking as a member of the Labour Party's National Executive, unleashed a torrent of assertions so passionate as to suggest that her mind had come close to being overthrown with Allende's government. They ranged from the declaration that "the democratic will of the people of Chile" had been defeated by capitalist "collusion" (*The Guardian*, 17/9/73) to "for Socialists of this generation Chile is our Spain" and "This is the most vicious fascism we have seen in generations" (*The Guardian*, 19/9/73).

When the Labour Party Conference met at Blackpool three weeks later these instant reactions had hardened into established orthodoxy. The former Chilean Ambassador in London was given a standing ovation when he became the first non-delegate to address a Party Conference since two Spanish Republicans were allowed to do so in the 1930s. Resolutions were then carried utterly condemning the military *coup* and the precipitate action of the British Government in recognising the military junta; demanding the recall of the British Ambassador from Santiago and the withholding from the military régime of all aid, loans, and credits; and calling on the Labour Movement to campaign for the restoration of democracy in Chile and to offer financial and other assistance to the Popular Unity (Allende's) movement (*The Times*, 5/10/73). My italics.

the reasons for this fierce reaction would repay study. Probably they included a happy chance of timing. Several of the most fashionable matters of Western political protest had passed into history or been shadowed by disillusionment in the year or two before Allende's downfall: from Viet Nam and Greece to Black Power and the Student Movement. Allende's dramatic end supplied a new cause just when it was wanted. Familiar double standards were certainly involved. Nobody at the Labour Party Conference, for example, thought it necessary to ask why such a royal welcome should be offered to the representative of a government which had included one of the very few Communist parties outside Eastern Europe to approve the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. A Pavlovian response to the very idea of "revolution" was also clearly in evidence—and made all the more eager, it seemed, by the fact that this particular revolution had been taking place at such a safe distance in such sublimely foreign parts. There was, perhaps, a characteristic love of worldly failure, too—for it was difficult to read some of the more extravagant expressions of grief at Allende's death without sensing a touch of gratification at the idea that Good had once more succumbed to Evil and so delivered another martyr unto Heaven before he could be corrupted by the practical demands of life on Earth. But most of all, perhaps, the response seemed to stem from ignorance and wishful thinking—always the two most powerful sources of political romanticism—which left the facts of life in Allende's Chile either unknown or ignored and the field wide open, therefore, to the creation of instant myth. Hence the composite picture, now accepted throughout a wide spectrum of Western liberal and left-wing opinion, of Allende as a genuine social democrat of impeccable constitutional propriety who met his end at the hands of a fascist conspiracy on behalf of a minority "ruling class" aided and abetted by the United States of America.

To replace this romantic vision with something approaching reality may already be impossible, for myths undoubtedly possess a life of their own immune to rational challenge. To attempt to do so also may entail some risk of abuse, for it seems to be a common assumption nowadays that anyone who seeks a rational explanation of a military *coup d'état* (unless it happens to represent a left-wing interest) is necessarily a fascist beast.

I SHOULD MAKE IT PLAIN, therefore, that I am concerned here with Allende's Chile and not with what has taken its place. I hold no brief for military juntas, nor for the summary executions, mass imprisonments, censorship or whatever that the Chilean junta may have inspired or tolerated during its early months of power. Indeed, because I happen to know and like Chile as a country and count a number of Chileans among my friends I feel some personal sadness at the country's present plight. But I feel no surprise nor, I am afraid, much moral shock. Military men will be military men, the world over; and in any case Chile was left in such a mess by Allende that some vindictiveness, alas, was only to be expected when he fell.

Nor am I concerned with Chilean might-have-beens. I accept that the country needed genuine social reform and I believe that it could

have been achieved without violence by a democratic government that was ready to work pragmatically within the constitution and with a proper respect for what the economic and political fabric of Chile would stand.

But that is not the point any more. What I am concerned about is how the country came to its present pass. And without wishing to speak ill of the dead, it seems to me necessary to say outright for the sake of the living that the Chilean *coup* was largely Allende's own fault and that the myths with which it has been surrounded on the Left are not merely a falsification of Chilean history but a potential danger to the future of liberal and social democratic politics in the Western world as well. Indeed, what is most disturbing to me about the fashionable Western reactions to events in Chile is their revelation of the degree to which revolutionary romanticism has combined with left-wing cynicism in recent years to corrupt our own politics. It is certainly "no accident" that, for example, the British Labour Party which so uncritically adopts Allende's cause is also the party which has permitted its self-avowed Marxists and utopian socialists to gain factional positions of unprecedented power.

I will leave others to pursue that theme, however. All I want to do is to try to set some of the Chilean record straight—or at any rate, straighter—by looking in some detail at three of the main myths that now surround the end of Allende and his famous experiment.

1. The American Intervention Myth

THIS FOUND its most virulent expression in the equation of Allende's downfall with that of Dubcek. Yet in the absence of any American armed assault to compare with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—let alone the fact that whereas Dubcek's Parliament supported him against the Russians, a majority of Allende's Congress invited him to resign—there were only stereotype suppositions to sustain it.

In general, the American intervention myth seemed to derive from that characteristic Latin American and left-wing scapegoat complex which insists that the *Yanquis* are responsible for everything (except, of course, anything good). Garnished with historical fact (Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, etc.) this is frequently transmuted in Latin American affairs into a plausible anti-American smear; and the state of Washington politics in 1973 was, of course, guaranteed to give such a smear extra credence this time. The *New Statesman* offered a fine example. "The likelihood is that the trail will lead back to the Pentagon", it assured its readers, "if a proper investigation can ever be mounted. But in default of this it does seem possible to say that Nixonism and its allies were already too heavily implicated in the

* Addicts of the ITT conspiracy theory might like to work out, incidentally, why ITT in Chile was never taken over by Allende, even after the notorious memorandum became public property. Was it, perhaps, because its operations there were mostly losing money and Allende did not want to share its financial embarrassment? Or was it that he knew the company had given him an effective political stick to beat his opponents with and he did not want to throw it away by kicking the company out? Either way, ITT's apparent immunity from reprisal did not suggest that he took its challenge very seriously.

subversion of Allende for Chile to be considered "now" (14, 19, 71). The charge is almost ecologically vague yet simultaneously all-embracing. But what does it actually rest on?

First, presumably, the celebrated memorandum of 111, which suggested ways of preventing Allende from assuming the Presidency in 1970 and of toppling his regime if he did so. There is, of course, no doubt of this memorandum's authenticity, not of its appalling folly; and with such organizations admittedly pushing their conspiratorial notions at the heart of American politics it is not surprising that suspicions of major fraud for anyone who sees the memorandum as evidence of actual dirty work; simply, that all inquiries so far indicate that its recommendations were never adopted. They were studied by the CIA, where one department produced a conspiracy plan based upon them; but neither the memorandum nor the plan seems to have received ascent at any higher level; and given the kind of public exposure to which the workings of the White House, the CIA and most other things in Washington have been treated during the Watergate crisis (including the allegations of Nixon's personal involvement with 111), I am hard-pressed to believe that if such ascent had been given it could have been kept quiet until now.

Secondly, in support of the American intervention theory, it is pointed out that the U.S. maintained its contacts with the Chilean armed forces and continued to supply them with arms when other American aid to Chile was suspended. Therefore, so the implication goes, the Pentagon was deliberately keeping open the credit line at Washington's door as a major weapon in a cold war against Allende from the start. At first glance this has more substance to it. The U.S. certainly suspended further commercial credit to Chile after Allende had nationalized the American-owned copper mines on terms amounting to confiscation. As the major power in the World Bank and the IMF the U.S. also argued there against further aid for Chile; and to the extent that it was successful it must have added to Allende's financial difficulties. But it was not able to prevent other Western countries (e.g. Holland and Sweden) from continuing to offer credit; it never persuaded Britain to close down its small aid programme; it did not exclude the re-scheduling of most of Chile's foreign debt repayments in 1972, and it had not prevented the discussion (incomplete at the time of the coup) of a similar re-scheduling for 1973. In short, the U.S. influence may have limited Western aid and credit but it was far from being able to condemn Chile to economic perdition. In any case, Allende's Chile is not one of the underdeveloped world's hard cases, totally dependent on external aid and credit for its survival. The wealth of its copper mines alone ensured that in normal times it was hardly for its survival. The wealth of its copper mines alone ensured that in normal times it was

not more than marginally "aid-worthy", and with sensible economic management it ought to have been able to withstand a good deal of external pressure. Unfortunately, nobody with even a modicum acquaintance with economics could have classified the management of the Allende government as anything but disastrous. To a great extent it placed itself beyond the pale for any but the most trivial—or dedicated—of creditors, but even if that had not been so, and if the blame for Chile's economic difficulties could have been laid fairly and squarely at Washington's door, Allende would surely have had small cause for complaint. It was, after all, his administration which announced its immediate determination to "expedite imperialist capital... realize a policy of self-financing... and review, demerit and repudiate, as the case may be, treaties or agreements limiting our sovereignty, especially the reciprocal assistance treaties, the mutual aid pacts, and others, between Chile and the United States" (*The People's Unity—Basic Program of Government, 1970*).

It was also his administration which promised to "repudiate the agreements between us and the International Monetary Fund" (*The People's Unity—First 40 Steps, 1970*). These bold intentions were never fully realized, it is true; but they were expressed as official policy before the United States or any other "imperialist" power had actually done anything to embarrass Allende's government. In other words it was naive, to say the least, to complain that his chosen opponents took defensive measures. What else were they expected to do?

THOSE WHO DO COMPLAIN OF AMERICAN action, nevertheless, might be better employed in asking why Allende got so little support from most of the governments which professed to be his friends. Except for Cuba, which offered co-ordination (but not always practical) advice to Allende, as well as supplying arms and training for his militant Left, the world's established Marxist governments were consistently cool to the "Chilean experiment". The farthest the Soviet Union would go to show its approval was to open a 12-year credit in roubles for Chilean imports of Russian industrial goods and to agree to take a limited amount of Chilean copper for a year or two in repayment. But the hard currency loans that Chile really needed to plug the gaps that quickly opened between Allende's economic promises and performance were never forthcoming. In the nature of things, Marxist countries rarely have hard currency to spare and they were unlikely to devote what little they might have to building out a regime which seemed intent upon over-reaching itself in every direction. Conversely, Allende would have done better for himself and his country if he had simply abandoned the "free" world market altogether and taken Chile at once into the controlled case bloc of the Communist world in the hope of getting total Soviet support. But that would have meant imposing a completely centralized economy and strict political control inside Chile—in short, reproducing by decree. To the credit of the "free" world, it is not one of the underdeveloped world's hard cases, totally dependent on external aid and credit for its survival. The wealth of its copper mines alone ensured that in normal times it was

but even if he had, it might not have worked. To support Castro's Cuba is believed to have cost Moscow the equivalent of about \$1 million a day for many years. To support a similar regime in Chile would probably have cost even more. There was never the slightest sign that Mr. Brezhnev, or anyone else in the Kremlin, was ready to accept such a burden.

To sum up, then, it seems to me that the idea of an American conspiracy to overthrow Allende is both unproven and unnecessary to explain his downfall. I am not saying, of course, that Washington was not relieved to see him go; although I think some American officials would have preferred to see him stumble on for sometime longer in the hope that growing disillusionment would infect even his stoutest supporters and accordingly diminish the chances of his being made a martyr when nemesis finally overtook him. But in general the American attitude seems to have been a predictably cautious one:

*Thou shalt not kill, but needst not strive
Officiously to keep alive....*

A realistic Chilean government embarked on its "road to socialism" would surely have bargained for that much, and (on a truly Marxist analysis such as Allende professed) it should have expected much more—that America would move in for the kill as soon as possible. Yet while adopting a deliberately provocative stance, Allende took no steps to protect himself against possible American reprisals, declined to compromise for the sake of other Western help, and failed to provide grounds even for his supposed Marxist friends to help him.

It was magnificent, perhaps, but it was not politics. At the very least, Allende must be convicted here of a lack of realism that would probably have been fatal to any statesman anywhere.

2. The Ruling Class Conspiracy Myth

THE PICTURE of Allende being overthrown by what has been variously described as a "revolt of the privileged," a series of "bosses' strikes" or a "conspiracy of the traditional ruling class" contains to many misconceptions that it is hard to know where to begin to sort them out. One idea, however, seems basic to them all: that Allende and his Popular Unity coalition were somehow the uniquely legitimate representatives of "the People's Will." That such an odd belief should have gained any currency whatever outside purely propagandist circles is a mark of the confusion that surrounds the Chilean experience in the minds of many non-Chileans. To judge from published comments, such as those referring to the "defeat of the democratic will", some of Allende's sympathisers abroad seem even to believe that he not merely enjoyed a massive popular majority of the vote but was also the first President of his country to do so.

Yet the facts are beyond dispute. Chile was and had been for many years a functioning democracy with a constitution which vested executive power in the President and legislative power in Congress. Both in theory and in practice, no doubt, there were serious weaknesses—as revealed, for instance, in the inability of previous

governments to press through social reforms as swiftly as many Chileans would have wished. But by common consent the system was the best and most stable in Latin America and it had enabled Allende himself to contest the Presidency successfully three times before he finally won it at his fourth attempt in 1970. There was no doubt of the legitimacy of that victory. But, unfortunately for those who saw it as a unique expression of "the people's will", it was gained only through a narrow plurality in which Allende obtained just over 36% of the poll. His nearest rival, only a couple of percentage points behind, was the candidate of the conservative National Party, whose members in Congress opposed Allende from the start. Another 28% went to the third candidate, a radical reformist from the Christian Democrat party, many of whose members in Congress at first gave Allende the benefit of the doubt, hoping he would modify his avowed Marxism in practice to a kind of reformism compatible with their own ideas and the existing constitution.

In the mid-term Congressional elections of March 1973, the Popular Unity coalition raised its share of the vote to 44% (although this time the "legitimacy" was suspect owing to opposition allegations of substantial electoral fraud). But the opposition parties retained a large majority in Congress where, by that time, most of the Christian Democrats had joined the Nationalists in outright antagonism to the President. On these facts it seems plain that, so far from representing "the People's Will", Allende never actually represented more than a substantial minority interest. Only if "the People" are identified as being those who voted for Allende, while the rest—the majority—are relegated to the status of "non-people" can any other interpretation be sustained. But that, of course, is just what is implied by the myth of the "ruling class conspiracy."

If there was a "ruling class" in Chile it was that of the politicians and the surrounding establishment drawn mostly from the narrow upper end of Chile's prosperous middle class. Allende himself and many of his ministers and leading supporters were as much part of that group as were their political opponents. But, ironically, it was a group that often suffered less than others from Allende's socialism because its members on both sides generally possessed enough cash or property to exploit the black market at home or slip into agreeable exile if things got too rough—in any case, to survive (like Allende himself until his death) in very reasonable comfort. But the people who did most to overthrow Allende were rarely of this group at all. With the possible exception of some naval officers, the armed forces were very much apart from the establishment of any political colour; and even after Allende brought the service commanders into his government they remained aloof from, and remarkably little known by, those relatively small circles in Santiago which were accustomed to set the country's political tone.

Indeed, as events since the coup d'état have shown, Chile's military men—like their counterparts elsewhere—were probably as contemptuous of the politicians (and as ignorant of politics) as the politicians were of them. They had stayed outside politics for nearly 40 years, and if Allende

Although even that was not unbreakable towards the end, such was the chaos the economy had fallen into, I drove over the Andes to Argentina and at the found Chilean taking a large American car to piece and laying upon the snow-covered ground around it one ton of copper ingots that had been hidden in various nooks and crannies of the car. It would have been worth around U.S. \$2,000 in cash in Argentina—a fortune by then, in Chilean terms, of about four months' wages on the black market.

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blinded had not dragged them into the whirlpool they might have been content to remain that way. But their position was made impossible by the President's own decisions. On the one hand they were encouraged to turn a blind eye to the steady growth of illegal, para-military forces under the command of the President's friends or others who were more cunning in their revolutionary commitment. On the other hand they were required to serve in his cabinet to maintain "law and order" and reassure the country of the President's constitutional property. On top of that they were threatened by attempts to strip within the President's own circle to subvert their authority within their own forces, as in the naval conspiracy uncovered in July 1973, and the public call for a naval intervention by Allende's friend and fellow-leader of the Socialist Party, Senator Carlos Altamirano, made only three days before the coup.

A sure way can hardly be imagined of proving military among responsible officers, and it is only surprising in retrospect that it did not happen sooner—as in most Latin American countries it surely would have done. To describe the military's reaction to the manifestations of "the ruling class" is to understand nothing, either of military men in general or of Chile's military in particular.

Non should it be forgotten that some of the most damaging strikes of all were those of Chile's most influential blue-collar workers—the copper-miners. The last forty-men's strike was immediately preceded by a two months' strike for higher wages by miners at El Teniente, the country's biggest mine. Because copper accounts for three-quarters of Chile's foreign earnings, that strike probably cost the country far more in real terms than the transport strike, whose costs to a great extent could be absorbed internally. Indeed, as one West European diplomat remarked to me in Santiago, the money lost in those two months at El Teniente would have more than repaid Chile's entire debt to his government—a debt which Allende at that moment was trying to reschedule for the second consecutive year.

It is true that the copper-miners were the elite of Chile's blue-collar class and, no doubt, wanted to keep it that way. To that extent, perhaps, they may be deemed "privileged"—like, say, coal miners or motor car workers in Britain; although I doubt if that is what members of the British Labour Party, or the New Democrats, can have had in mind in embracing the "privileges" which they suffered far more than most of the workers the most vital of all Chile's manual miners' representatives, I believe, is that although they were the most vital of all Chile's manual workers they suffered far more than most of their erstwhile comrades from the country's shattering economic decline under Allende. Unlike farm and factory workers, they could not supplement their official wages by selling the fruits of their labour on the black market. The farm worker could take home a sack of

or from no party at all.

The members of the various professional associations, like doctors, dentists, lawyers and airline pilots, which joined the second transport strike, were likewise not "boomers" although they were certainly, in Chilean terms, rather more "privileged." Their protest was probably more ideological than that of the forty-men and the shopkeepers—it was usually their wives, for example, who objected most forcibly to the Government's politically-inspired changes in the school curriculum—but it was also provoked by sheer exasperation and fear at the growing threat to their professional status posed by the Government's combination of administrative inefficiency and dubious social priorities. For example, Chile's economic collapse and inflation not only threatened many doctors financially but seriously frustrated their work. Some early reports from Santiago after the coup made the point that hospitals were appealing urgently for bandages and drugs to treat the wounded, as if that indicated that the number of casualties must be overwhelmingly high. But bandages, drugs, and other medical supplies had been only sporadically obtainable in Chile for many months beforehand. The daily round of the pharmacies in search of the simplest medicines had become a regular feature of Santiago life; and foreign embassies had been driven to stock-pile their own supplies, imported through the diplomatic bag, for the treatment of the most normal ailments among their staffs. It was partly in the hope of ending that situation that many otherwise conscientious doctors finally joined the movement to get Allende out.

potatoes, a few chickens, or even a side of beef, could make a good living on the black market even if his official wages remained stationary while inflation roared ahead. The factory worker who was entitled to buy a proportion of his factory's output at official fixed prices could (and did) sell that at six or ten times what he had paid as soon as he left the factory gates. But miners could hardly find ready buyers for a stolen truck-load of copper ore.⁸

Thus the copper-miners were thrust, in effect, into the same position as the lorry-men, the shopkeepers, and virtually all of Chile's salaried professional men and women: they were left more or less defenceless against the most vicious inflation the country had ever experienced.

SOME APOLOGISTS for Allende have maintained that the degree of inflation was exaggerated or, at any rate, little worse than was customary in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America. The truth is that it was far beyond anything normally endured in that continent. As little as nine months after Allende came to power, when I first visited Chile, the escudo had already fallen from 20 to 40 against the U.S. dollar on the free, or black, market. Eighteen months later, on my second visit, the Government's own figures put the rate of inflation at 130% in a year, the money issue was going up by 10% a month and the escudo had fallen to about 350 to the black U.S. dollar. By August 1973, the official inflation rate was 323% and rising fast, and the escudo was worth only 2,000 to the dollar—an effective devaluation in less than three years of 10,000%!

Nor is it enough to attribute these catastrophic rates to such adventitious or malicious factors as—and again I refer to published arguments—falling world copper prices, the normal difficulties of maintaining industrial and farm output in a time of radical political change, or deliberate American intervention.

On the last of these three I have already said enough, I hope, to show that it was far from decisive and that it was, anyway, largely self-invited. As to falling copper prices, the fact is that after a fall in the first year of Allende's Government, prices recovered until by the time of his overthrow they were 80% above the level at the time of his election. Had they not risen so steeply he would almost certainly have fallen sooner and probably would not have secured his relative, short-lived success in the mid-term elections of March 1973. The difficulties of maintaining output in a time of change, however, were real—unfortunately, far more so than Allende ever seemed to realise.

To take just two examples: copper and milk. Expropriation of the copper mines from their American owners would, no doubt, have led in itself to the withdrawal of American technicians as well as of American management with some consequent risk of losing production temporarily, at least. But this might have been overcome by the promotion of trained Chilean managers and technicians, of whom there was no shortage.

Alas, for Chile's national income, Allende not merely nationalised but deliberately politicised the mines as well. Jobs for the party boys were handed out in thousands while trained Chileans emigrated so that, after three years of Popular Unity Government, mining manpower and costs had risen by more than a third while mining

output was down by about the same amount.

I take milk as the second example because it was specifically mentioned in Popular Unity election manifestos, which guaranteed "every Chilean child half a quart of milk daily." Here again, the government's programme of land reform, intended to break the power of Chile's remaining landlords and open the way to co-operative or state farming, might have been expected to result in some shortfall in dairy production for a year or two while the teething problems were sorted out. In fact, however, milk production dropped as if someone had simply punched a hole in the bottom of every churn in the land. At one large co-operative dairy in Temuco, one of the main milk-producing areas of Chile, the average daily winter intake of milk was about 20 (000) gallons in 1970. By 1973 it was down to 7,000. Nor was this surprising. Apart from the fact that legal land reform had been accompanied by widespread and unchecked illegal land seizures so that too many farms were in the hands of people utterly without experience, the prices established for milk—as for most other farm products—were simply economic nonsense. Presumably in the hope of getting half a quart of milk for every child on the cheap, the government decreed that a gallon of milk would fetch less than half the price of one egg. Inevitably, nobody was interested in producing milk and cows were slaughtered wholesale for beef—legally or illegally—or driven over the mountains to Argentina while Allende was forced to scour the world for dried milk imports that, thanks to his policy in the copper mines, he no longer had foreign currency to pay for.

SUCH POLLS were repeated everywhere as the romantic pictures of self-styled revolution were preferred to facing the facts of life. While overall production in both agriculture and industry fell disastrously, Allende simultaneously attempted to redistribute the national wealth by giving Chile's poorer classes more money to spend. They were his constituency and they were properly grateful, for many of them certainly had never had much before. But you can't redistribute what you have already thrown away; and as output vanished, so domestic queues grew longer, foreign debts piled up, and the budget deficit expanded like a hydrogen balloon. A year before the final collapse I asked one of Allende's chief economic advisers what they were going to do to control a situation that was already looking critical. He replied, with commendable candour, that he really didn't know. "I know," he said, "what we ought to do—we should impose an austerity régime tomorrow, freeze wages, and ration essential supplies. But how can we? We would destroy our own political base...."

Precisely. In the end, rather than do that they plunged on down the primrose path of promises and illusions and practically destroyed the country. The "ruling class conspiracy" was the gloss that they and their supporters put upon the reality of their own miscalculations.

3. The Myth of the Constitutional Revolutionary

HERE WE COME to the crux of Allende's policies and character about which, finally,

all the other arguments revolve. Was he a genuine constitutionalist? Was he a true revolutionary? Was he—could he ever have been—both?

Allende himself, of course, admitted no doubts. Repeatedly, he insisted that he was a revolutionary and a Marxist, and that he intended to establish at least the preconditions for what he told Régis Debray would be "total, scientific Marxist socialism." Equally repeatedly, he proclaimed his faith that he could achieve this end by constitutional means, through the ballot box and all it implied. That was, after all, to be the distinctive "Chilean road to socialism" of which so many people outside Chile cherished such high hopes.

But no hindsight is required to see that both theory and practice were riddled with contradictions. Revolutions are born of, or generate, sectional conflict—a fact of political life that Allende acknowledged every time he spoke of "overthrowing" what he called the "bourgeois" state. But a democratic constitution rests upon consensus—a basic acceptance of the fact that the State represents more than a merely sectional interest. The second permits reform, but the first denies it; and there is no way of reconciling the two.

All Allende's practical difficulties followed from this simple distinction. Taken seriously, his constitutionalism meant that his programme could only succeed if a majority would actually vote for it. But, elected as he was with only just over a third of the popular vote and with a large majority of Congress against him, Allende had neither a democratic nor an administratively effective mandate for his revolution. Indeed, in a parliamentary rather than a presidential democracy, he would probably never have been able to begin.

If he was to succeed within his six-year term of office even in opening the door to revolution, let alone establishing it as accomplished fact, he had to transform his minority into a majority. But how to do it? For, if words meant anything, Allende's had to mean that he intended to replace the existing, reformable constitution of Chile with another that would be, of its Marxist nature, irreversible. In other words, a system that was admittedly democratic was to be used to build another that would be effectively dictatorial. This was asking the majority to hang itself from its own gallows; and, not surprisingly, it declined.

AlLENDE'S ATTEMPTS to overcome this basic illogicality in his position were precisely what ensured his ultimate downfall. Refusing to abandon either his revolutionary rhetoric or his professed constitutionalism he was forced to rely more and more upon political illusionism. His sleight-of-hand was often remarkable, as he sought to outwit the opposition majority in Congress by exploiting the letter of the constitution, using every legal loophole to force upon them measures they did not want. But in the process, inevitably, he destroyed the constitution's spirit, so that his opponents became as ruthless as he

was. At the start he won considerable opposition support in Congress for needed changes like the nationalisation of the copper mines, land reform, and the state's takeover of banks and major industries—evidence that the democratic consensus could and would work within the existing constitution. But, at the end, not a single member of the opposition majority would cast a vote in his support. They voted unanimously to condemn his "habitual illegalities" and were even joined by the Supreme Court in accusing him of disregarding the rule of law. He had cut away the middle ground of Chilean politics, wrecked the democratic consensus, and beotten the reality of counter-revolution through his own addiction to revolutionary slogans.

Equally inevitable was the economic breakdown, which came from Allende's attempts to enlarge his popular base outside the political institutions. Here his plan was two-fold: to buy political support among "the People" through massive wage increases and other benefits and at the same time to squeeze the middle class into submission, or even flight from the country, through wholesale nationalisation of their interests and the appointment of his own men to all significant civil-service jobs. The two simply cancelled each other out; for while the first part of the plan raised vast new expectations and demands, the second diminished the country's capacity to meet them. The whirling spiral of inflation followed as a necessary result of Allende's political confusions.

THESE BASIC CONTRADICTIONS were compounded by the fragmented nature of Allende's support. His Popular Unity coalition was far from united. Its majority element was Allende's own Socialist Party—a body that bore little resemblance beyond its name to most of the democratic socialist parties of Europe which so enthusiastically espoused its cause. It was, in fact, a revolutionary Marxist party that began as a splinter of the more bureaucratic and Stalinist Chilean Communist party in the 1930s, and in recent years had acquired a fiery "New Left" wing as well. Several of its leaders, like Senator Altamirano, and many of its rank and file, constantly urged Allende to "speed up the revolution" without much regard for constitutional niceties. The smallest element of the coalition was the Christian radicals of various persuasions, some of whom hoped to offer a bridge to the centre of Chilean politics by cooperating with the left wing of the Christian Democrats; but none of whom ever attained positions of real influence. The coalition's sheet anchor was the Communist Party which, as business and administration slipped into chaos, became increasingly important as a source of discipline and strategic thinking.

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN hard enough to drive this *troika* anyway without either overstepping the constitutional limits of government or antagonising one or other of its elements and thereby jeopardising the only "democratic" base the revolution had. But Allende had also to contend with the still more militant left outside the coalition, led by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which insisted on revolution now, and by violence if necessary—as, in MIR's view, it was.

Here Allende's professed constitutionalism was

* Indeed, as I discovered for myself on a visit to southern Chile nine months after Allende's elections, local police forces there were under specific instructions not to attempt to restore the farms to their legal owners. See also Robert Moss's report in *ENCOUNTER*, "Allende's Chile", August 1973, and Alistair Horne's "Commandante Pepe", July 1973.

revealed as, at best, equivocal. He officially rejected MIR's violence, yet he never permitted the Army to root out their para-military groups. When they stigmatised his land-reform programme as "inadequate" and seized hundreds of farms at gun-point he rebuked them in occasional speeches but did nothing to reverse their actions.⁸

When they hijacked lorry-loads of valuable manufactures, to raise funds by selling them on the black market, he rarely tried to redress the crime. The Left said this was because the MIR truly represented "the People" against whom Allende dared not act. But the truth, I fear, was more squalid. For one thing, the MIR had close friends in the Socialist Party and in Allende's own entourage whom the President did not want to offend. For another, as long as their activities did not actually split the Popular Unity coalition, it was often convenient to see them pushing along the revolution by unconstitutional means while Allende denounced them in his role as a constitutionalist.

It was not as if Allende was unable to deal with the MIR when he had to. For example, when a *Militia* force blockaded the Philips television factory in Santiago in 1973 after an unsuccessful attempt to hijack a lorry-load of TV sets, they were allowed by the Government to remain unmolested for ten days, although a police post was just across the road. Yet when diplomatic representations were made by the Dutch *chargé d'affaires* with the hint that his country's financial aid might have to be reconsidered if this harassment of a Dutch enterprise continued, the *Militias* were hustled away without a shot in 24 hours.

A SIMILAR EQUIVOCATION was evident in Allende's adoption of a personal armed bodyguard—the first in memory to accompany a Chilean President. It is true that the extreme Right in Chile was quick to threaten violence as a response to Allende's proclaimed revolution, and Allende himself always maintained that he needed protection. But right-wing para-military groups were never as big or as highly organised as those on the Left; and, in any case, the proper reaction of a constitutionally-minded President would surely have been to call upon his state security forces to protect him.

Instead, Allende formed a personal unit, known as "the Group of Friends of the President." Trained, armed, and partly manned by Cubans, it was led by known revolutionaries, sympathetic to the MIR, including Allende's son-in-law. The existence of such a group at the very centre of the State was not merely a provocation to the established security forces and an affront to Chilean tradition, it was also an implied rejection of the principle of constitutional rule.

DOUBTS ABOUT the real depth of Allende's constitutionalism were raised also by his personal history and his language, both of which suggested

a romantic attachment to violence. He was, after all, a founder and first president of the Latin American Solidarity Organisation, created in Havana in the 1950s and dedicated to the encouragement of armed insurrection throughout the continent. He promised to "paint Santiago with blood" in 1970 if Congress declined to ratify his election as President, and he repeatedly tried to intimidate the opposition, inside and outside Congress, with the threat of civil war. These were not the actions or the sentiments of a man dedicated to constitutional change, except as a matter of expediency.

On the other hand, it was hard to see Allende as a genuine revolutionary. He never looked anything but the complete bourgeois gentleman. A *bon viveur*, florid but well-groomed, a snappy dresser, with a twinkling eye for the ladies and a good deal of personal charm, his strongest political card was his skill in tactical manoeuvre. But as a strategist, a thinker, a man with a real message, he was unconvincing. Towards the end, as he appeared with increasing frequency on the presidential balcony in Santiago to address chanting crowds of his supporters with revolutionary platitudes, he seemed to me to lose all contact with reality, to have become an actor in love with his revolutionary part rather than a serious leader who knew where he was going.

IN RETROSPECT, I am inclined to think this was always the truth of the matter with Allende. Basically, he was a political romantic, dealing in sensations rather than sense. He enjoyed his hour upon the stage but he never properly assessed the forces he was dealing with, either for or against him. He raised expectations on his own side without commanding the means to satisfy them, and he encouraged opposition on the other side by his use of a revolutionary rhetoric whose threats he also could not fulfil.

At best he was muddle-headed; and time may show that he was deliberately deceitful. Certainly he managed to deceive a lot of people, including himself. But in the end reality taught its own, hard lessons. That you can't be a democrat and a revolutionary—at least, not in a society that is already admittedly democratic. That you can't be anti-American and expect the Americans to help you. That you can't pose as the people's leader and kick most people in the teeth. That you can't conscript soldiers into politics and expect them to remain apolitical. That you can't have inflation roaring out of sight and maintain a base for social welfare. That, in short, the real world is not Cloud-cuckoo-land. Down here, you just can't have your cake and eat it.

It is sad that such elementary lessons should have to be taught yet again at such tragic cost in Chile. But it is alarming that so many people elsewhere should evidently fail to grasp that they are the lessons.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

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10. (Station/Base)		FROM: (Division)	
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INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS			
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INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE			
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
MHCUNCH FUOMEN REDLEG

REF: EGGA-6103, 12 AUG 74

1. ARTICLE BY PROF. JAMES T H E B E R G E, PUBLISHED IN
SOVIET ANALYST, VOL. 3, NO. 17, 15 AUG, ENTITLED: "KREMLIN'S
HAND IN ALLENDE'S CHILE" IS IDEAL FOR PURPOSES OUTLINED IN REF.
WE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE, WILL ADVISE. SUGGEST NO INCLUDE ARTICLE
IN PRESS COMMENTS.

2. FILE DEFER, E2 IMPDET.

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DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

Newspaper article

FUOMEN/PSYCH Ref: HELSINKI

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Allendes misstag

— Den svenska debatten är ensidig. Man har på ett lysande sätt dokumenterat juntans grymheter men man drar ingen lärdom av utvecklingen i Allendes Chile. Det är viktigt att kunna kritisera det som var fel i utvecklingen, annars kan man inte lära sig någonting. Om man tystar ner varje form av debatt om det som var före kuppen, använder man sig av ett censurliktänkande som är på samma linje som juntans, säger **Andres Küng**, journalist och författare som besökt Chile före, under och efter Allendes tid. Han har nu också givit ut en debattbok, *Att så socialism och skörda fascism*.

— Salvador Allende och "folkregeringen" Unidad Popular (folklig enhet) emottogs med stort intresse även utomlands. Man skulle intligen få svar på flera grundläggande frågor. Kan socialismen genomföras på fredlig väg i Latinamerika? Är marxismen i praktiken förenlig med politisk demokrati? Kan en social revolution genomföras med bevarad politisk demokrati?

— Folkfrontens program hade fyra naturtillgångar, framst köpparn, 2) obal i jordreformsarbetet, 3) förstärkande av de största bank- och industriföretagen och 4) snabb ekonomisk tillväxt och omfördelning av inkomster och förmögenheter samt kamp mot inflationen.



Andres Küng, journalist och författare, säger att Chile-debatten är ensidig. "Det är viktigt att även kunna kritisera det som var fel på Allendes tid annars kan man inte lära sig någonting".

Köppar viktig

— Köpparna svarar för upp till fyra femtedelar av landets export och mellan en femtedel och en tredjedel av statsinkomterna. Under åren före första världskriget gick gruvorna över i nordamerikansk ägo. I slutet av 1960-talet nationaliserades de till hälften av den kristdemokratiska Frei-regimen. Staten övertog 51 procent av aktierna. Men Freis "chilenisering" av köpparna visade sig slutligen ändå mest lönsam för de amerikanska företagen. Köpparna förstärktes genom ett tillägg till grundlagen 1971. Frågan om ersättning till de forna amerikanska ägarna hänskjöts till högste statsrevisorn — men Allende och hans regering ansåg att de inte hade råd att betala konstant ersättning i dollar.

— Jordbruket svarar för mindre än en fjärdedel av sysselsättningen, vilket är mindre än i de flesta latinamerikanska och andra u-lander. Flera jordreformslagar antogs före Allende en av dem 1967 då man bestämde att alla jordegendomar över 80 "bashektar" kunde tvångsinlösa, ten bashektar = en hektar förskädd komstbevattad jord.

— Taktiken i jordreformsarbetet ökade under Allendes presidenttid. Under hans första år tvångsinlöstes nästan lika mycket jord som under hela den föregående sexåriga presidentperioden. Alla stora jordegendomar uppgavs ha förstärkats 1973.

En följd av jordreformen var att lantarbetarna organiserades fackligt. En annan var jordokkupationerna. De ökade nio gånger redan under Allendes första år jämfört med under Freis tid. Jordägarna började gå till motangrepp.

— Produktionen sjönk — de exportierade gårdarna hade inte tillräckligt med maskiner, redskap, kreatur och utsäde. Den sjunkande tillgången på livsmedel och den stigande efterfrågan ledde till försörjningsproblem och prisstegringar.

— I början genomförde Allende en rad åtgärder för att skapa en jämnare fördelning av förmögenhe-

svarta börsaffärer och hamstring. Penningvärdet sjönk med 163 procent.

— Under min vistelse i Santiago i början av 1973 var enbart cigarrettköerna i centrum ett par kvartier långa, berättar Andres Küng.

Förlorade stödet

— De ekonomiska problemen medförde politiska problem. Allende förlorade medelklassens stöd och arbetarklassens stöd minskade. I kongressvalen behövde han majoritet — det var en nödvändig förutsättning för att han skulle kunna fortsätta att genomföra sitt program och stifta sina lagar. Han fick bara 44 procent. Maktkampen kongress — parlament — president fortsatte. Ingen ville ge vika för den andre. Allende drevs till åtgärder som inte var förenliga med demokratiska principer och gällande lagar.

— Denna utveckling tyder på att varje försök att mot flertalets vilja tvina fram en extrem politik medför risker för polarisering av samhället som bara skulle gynna odemokratiska riktningar. En aggressiv klasspolitik, vare sig den är reaktionär eller revolutionär, kan framkalla en utveckling mot en socialistisk eller fascistisk diktatur, konstaterar Andres Küng.

— Men inga missförhållanden och misstag under Allendes tid kan användas som ursäkt för kuppen och det blodbad som sedan följde. Man kan ha olika uppfattningar om Allendes politik, men varje sann demokrat måste kunna avsky för den nuvarande militärjuntan.

Flitig författare

Andres Küng är född i Gävle

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Journal of Management Inquiry, Vol. 19 No. 1, March 2010
DOI: 10.1177/1056492609358000
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TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKROOM, SANTIAGO, CHILE

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2. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDRESSEES, CALL ATTENTION TO RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/ AUTHOR ANDRES KUNG (CONTACT "C") ENTITLED "TO SOH SOCIALISM AND FEAR FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDEN. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP".

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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PAGE 02-02

IN 230973

FOR 10211032 MAY 74

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AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72)
EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBSS". NOW LIVES IN HALMO. HAS
PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC
STATES.

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TO: DIRECTOR INFO PARIS.

RYBAT HYSAGE

REFS: A. PARIS 48989 (J 273492)

B. DIRECTOR 559514

1. STATION CONCURS WITH PARIS ASSESSMENT. IF ALLENDE ACTUALLY DID WANT TO SURRENDER, JUNTA COULD ONLY SUFFER FROM PUBLICIZING FACT.

2. FILE: 56-6-42/3, 201-927906. E2 IMPDET

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RYBAT HYSAGE

REF: DIRECTOR 559514

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1. DEFER SANTIAGO RE PARA 5 BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO BE GAINED IN PSYCH TERMS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE TO ATTEMPT CLARIFY WHETHER ALLENDE KILLED WHILE FIGHTING OR ATTEMPTING SURRENDER. JUNTA'S PRESTIGE SO LOW IN EUROPEAN EYES THAT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE OR COULD ACTUALLY REBOUND AGAINST JUNTA SHOULD IT EMERGE HE DIED WHILE WANTING SURRENDER.

2. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT FANATICS AROUND ALLENDE REFUSED ALLOW HIM SURRENDER, THEN THIS MIGHT BE ANOTHER STORY BUT THIS NOT CLEAR FROM REF AND ALSO NOT KNOWN IF GARCES COULD MAKE SUCH VERSION STICK BECAUSE OF HIS EARLY DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL PALACE.

3. FILE: 55-6-42/31 201-987906. E2, IMPDET

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INFO. C/WH Division		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM Acting Chief of Station, Santiago			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT FUJHFN Psych			MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>Ref: HELSINKI 22455</p> <p>If available, we would appreciate receiving four copies of Andres Kung's book mentioned in reference. E2 IMPDET.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Leslie H. Berberian</i> Leslie H. BERBERIAN</p> <p>Distribution: 2 COS Helsinki - To out pouch 1 C/WHH</p> <p style="text-align: right;">HWA 10 10 11 11</p>			
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NETHERLANDS

CHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVES

Editorial by N. van Nieuwenhuysen; Reformatorisch Dagblad,
Dutch, 19 April 1974, p 57

The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be having adjustment problems. These rather prolonged symptoms seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of their Marxist president is definitely over and that their country is now being ruled by a small group of reactionaries who are trying to keep the people under control through terrorism, repression, and torture. Such problems will take you quite a ways in the Netherlands and those idealists were quick to take advantage of it.

Welfare

What is the situation? Most of the approximately 250 refugees with a high school or university education do not work. About half of them have been housed at the "Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on the terrace or play volleyball in the yard. Board and lodging are free and at the end of the week they pick up another 25 guilders pocket money. In addition they receive free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and compensation for each trip they have to take.

Do you get the idea that they are better off than many old people in the Netherlands? You are probably right, because the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare; they are being paid from the frozen funds which had been allocated for development aid to their fatherland, Chile. So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.

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Considering that this small group of pampered exiles is preaching revolution even here and with a full stomach, it may be useful to point out a few facts. These are facts which are well known in the Ministry in The Hague but for some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.

Facts

The great majority of the refugees are not even Chilean nationals. They are natives of Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. They came to Chile as a result of illegal and revolutionary activities in which they had been involved in these South and Middle American countries, the ultimate consequences of which they did not wish to suffer.

They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende showed sympathy for their situation. His first action as president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to declare amnesty for all those who "were members of terrorist underground organizations," those who during the last months of his predecessor's regime had been charged with bank robbery, the armed robbery of self-service stores, the theft of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and attempted murder.

The fact that some of those revolutionaries received Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries. These refugees with a high school or higher level education seemed to have no adjustment problems in Chile. As a result they soon found their way to important key positions in the government.

The fugitives didn't suffer any sleepless nights in Chile either, because they felt protected by a militant Marxist army, armed to the teeth. Some 10,000 revolutionaries, from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.


Definition

In the Berner Tageblatt, a Swiss newspaper which is known for not exaggerating, Dr. Mario Puelma, from the University of Freiburg, wrote the following: "The concept of political refugee is only of limited value when applied to Chile. Whatever one's attitude toward the military junta

may be, one thing is certain: the Chilean refugees were not pursued only because of their ideology, their status, or their origin. This is the traditional, humanitarian definition for a refugee. For the most part they are people who, in their own country, could be legally charged with crimes which are punishable under any judicial system.

These refugees carried out activities in Chile which were against the constitution. As a matter of fact, they are specialists in violence. This is why they sought asylum in the foreign embassies in Santiago and why there are so many foreigners among them."

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V.S.-economie loopt terug

WASHINGTON — De Amerikaanse regering heeft donderdag bekend gemaakt dat de nationale economie veel krachtiger is teruggelopen, in het eerste kwartaal van dit jaar, dan was verwacht. Prijzen stegen bovendien met meer dan tien procent.

Het bruto nationale product vermindert in het eerste kwartaal met een half-percentage van 5,8. Dit is de eerste keer sinds 1970 dat het bruto nationale product is vermindert en het is de scherpste daling in 16 jaar. De vermindering van het bruto nationale product met 5,8 procent moet vergeleken worden met een schatting van tussen de 3 en 4 procent, zoals die door de regering was gedaan. In het laatste kwartaal van het vorig jaar nam het bruto nationale product toe met 1,8 procent.

Opgemerkt Chili

De Chileense vluchtelingen in Nederland schijnen 'aanpassingsproblemen' te hebben. Dit nogal langdurige verschijnsel blijkt ondermeer veroorzaakt te worden doordat zij het nog steeds niet kunnen verkroppen dat de socialistische droom van de Marxistische president definitief voorbij is en dat hun land nu beheerst wordt door een kleine groep reactionairen die met terreur, onderdrukking en folteringen probeert het volk onder de duim te houden. Met zo'n lange volzin kom je een heel eind in Nederland en dit hadden deze idealisten al gauw in de gaten.

VERZORGING

Want wat is het geval? Werken doen de meeste van de ongeveer 250 vluchtelingen van middelbaar en universitair niveau niet. Ongeveer de helft van hen is ondergebracht in het 'Huis ter Schie' in Overvecht, waar zij op het terras genieten van de zon of volleybal spelen in de tuin. Kost en inwoning zijn gratis en aan het einde van de week van gen zij ook nog eens vijftientwintig gulden zakgeld. Daarbij krijgen zij nog gratis taalcursussen, een rijtenkaart voor de bus en een vergoeding voor elke reis die zij moeten maken.

Door

N. van Nieuwenhuysen

U vindt dat zij het beter hebben als menig Nederlands bejaarde? Waarschijnlijk hebt u gelijk, want de Chileense ballingen behoeven niet van de bijstand te leven; zij worden namelijk gefinancierd door de geblokkeerde gelden voor ontwikkelingshulp aan hun vaderland Chili. Zo ziet u maar hoe goed ons belastinggeld wordt besteed.

Daar dit in de watten gelegde groepje ballingen zelfs hier nog niet volle maag de revolutie predikt is het misschien nuttig enige feiten te noemen. Feiten die op het ministerie in Den Haag welbekend zijn, maar om de een of andere reden nooit de pers in Nederland halen.

FEITEN

De vluchtelingen hebben voor het overgrote deel niet eens de Chileense nationaliteit. Zij zijn afkom-

MINISTERS KRIJGEN HUISARREST

Ethiopische leger uit scherpe verwijten

ETHIOPISE LEGER

ADDIS ABEBA — Premier Endalkachew Makonnen van Ethiopië heeft donderdag bekendgemaakt dat de leden van de regering die eind februari door de stridkrachten gedwongen werd af te treden, huisarrest hebben gekregen.

Volgens de Ethiopische radio heeft Makonnen de gezegd op een bijeenkomst in Addis Abeba van rond 2.000 officieren en manschappen. De premier zou naar de bijeenkomst ontboden zijn door de stridkrachten die hem hadden laten weten dat het leger gedwongen was zijn in te grijpen als er niet onmiddellijk tegen de ministers werd opgetreden.

Het leger verwijt de ministers dat zij het land in een economische chaos hebben gestort, zich op onwettelijke wijze verrijkt hebben en na hun aftreden hebben samengezworen om verdeeldheid te zaaien.

PLANNEN

Makonnen zal op de bijeenkomst een uitvoerige uiteenzetting van de hervormingsplannen van zijn regering. Hij praat de stridkrachten voor hun voortbestaan gebed en deed een beroep op hen een voorbeeld te geven van de tucht die nodig is voor het land in de moeilijke dagen die nog zullen komen. De premier zou het huisarrest van de voormalige ministers bekend hebben gemaakt toen

hem de vraag werd gesteld waarom een arme Ethiopier die een brood heeft gestolen, onmiddellijk de gevangens ingaat, terwijl de ex-ministers die ernstige misdaden zouden hebben begaan, niet voor de rechtbank worden gedaagd en maar ongehinderd op straat rondlopen.

Makonnen zei dat er een commissie is benoemd die een onderzoek moet instellen naar het gedrag van de voormalige ministers.

POLITIE

In de stad Asmara heeft de politie bekendgemaakt dat zij geen routine-werk meer zal verrichten, omdat haar eis tot ontslag van het landelijke hoofd van de politie, luitenant-generaal Yilma Shibeshi, niet is ingewilligd. Voorts hebben de 1.200 spoorwegmannen die woensdag in staking zijn gegaan, de vrachtauto's tegengehouden die goederen van Asmara naar de havenstad Massawa zouden brengen.

Arbeidsonrust in Canada

OTTAWA — De postrijen, het commerciële luchtverkeer en het scheepvaartverkeer op de St.-Lawrence rivier in Canada zijn verlamd door een staking die het land dagelijks enkele miljoenen dollars kost. De arbeidsonrust duurt nu al meer dan een week en zal volgens de Canadese parlementaire oppositie de inflatie die momenteel jaarlijks 10 procent bedraagt, bevorderen.


Door welke stakingen is de helft van alle postkantoren in het land gesloten ten gevolge van solidariteitsstakingen. De noodtoestand be-

Liberaal Kennedy aan het woord

Frankrijk heeft ongekend tijde negeren zullen en gefouilleerd het spoor te korden op voetgangers vijf maanden, ten zonder parafet (trouw) neermontage is uitlegging van verklaringen.

te zijn beland, betere verhoudingen tussen, sen bericht het AP slechts dat in partij-leer". Brezjnev's ondere communisde kwalificaties ik en vriend. Roemenië veran mening over militaire bond-egermanoeuvres n het Russische Soeren.

Het Ameri- n buitenlandse lag exportver- urd krachten dochteronder- grote Ameri- orieken auto's Cuba. Deze waarrechtelijk saking van het de organisatie en tegen Cuba mbargo.





BELGRADE — De Amerikaanse senator Edward Kennedy heeft donsdagochtend op een persconferentie in de Zuidslavische hoofdstad Belgrado de vlootsteuningen van de NAVO veroordeeld die onlangs in het noorden van de Adriatische Zee zijn gehouden.

Deze oefeningen hebben het geschil tussen Italia en Zuidslavie naar de zogenaamde „zone B“ ten zuiden van Trieste verheerlijkt. Kennedy merkte het geen afdoende reden dat de oefening niet kon worden afgelast omdat er al verscheidene maanden tevoren in voorbereiding waren gezeten. De Amerikaanse senator is donsdag na een bezoek van drie dagen, tijdens hetwelk hij besprekingen voerde met onder meer president Tito, naar de Sovjet-Unie doorgereisd. Hij zal daar onder de indruk te zijn van zijn gesprekken met het Zuidslavische staatsbeleid.

20 werknemers schorste omdat zij T-shirts droegen, waarop het publiek werd verzocht de Canadese posten te boycotten. De werknemers wilden loonwinsten stellen, maar de overheid weigert te onderhandelen totdat iedereen weer aan het werk is.

138 loodsen op de St.-Lawrence rivier, die voor alle scheepvaartverkeer zorgen tussen Montreal en Quebec zijn al een week in staking omdat zij een onmiddellijke loonsverhoging eisen van 20.000 tot 30.000 dollar per jaar. De regering heeft hen 35.000 dollar geboden over een periode van drie jaar en zoekt momenteel naar mogelijkheden om de loonwinsten te dwingen het werk te hervatten.

Ook het luchthaven personeel eist loonsverhoging van rond de 3000 dollar. De acht grootste luchthavens van het land hebben de afgelopen week op halve kracht gewerkt. Verder dreigt een staking van de verkeersbedieners.

stich in deze Zuid- en Midden-Amerikaanse landen Zuiden bezig gehouden met onwettige en revolutionaire gedragingen. Daarom zij de uiteindelijke concessies niet wensten te dragen.

In het Chili van Allende vuchten zij zich thuis omdat Allende begrip toonde voor hun gedrag. Zijn eerste daad als president, toen hij in november 1970 geïnstalleerd was, bestond namelijk uit het afkondigen van amnestie voor al diegenen, die lid waren van een terroristische ondergrondse organisatie, voor hen die in de laatste maanden onder zijn voorganger waren aangeklaagd voor het beroven van banken, gewelddadige overvallen op zelfbedieningswinkels, diefstal van wapens uit militaire depots, ontvoeringen en moordaanlagen.

Dat sommigen van deze revolutionairen Chileens diplomatieke status kregen is ook verstaanbaar als men weet dat de regering van Allende een beleid voerde dat er op gericht was om juist verdragsvergunningen te geven aan dit type revolutionairen. Deze vreesdelingen van middelbaar en hoger niveau bleken namelijk in Chili geen aanpassingsmogelijkheden te hebben. Zij vonden dan ook weliswaar hun weg naar belangrijke sleutelposities in de regering.

Slapeloze nachten hadden de „vervolgden“ in Chili ook niet, omdat zij zich beschermd voelden door een tot de tanden gewapend militant-Marxistisch soldatenkorps. Zo'n 10.000 revolutionairen nu alle windstreken stonden hen ter beschikking.

DEFINITIEF

In het „Berliner Tagblatt“ een Zwitserse krant die zich niet aan overdriften schuldig maakt, schrijft dr. Mario Puelma van de Freiburger Universiteit: Het concept van de politieke vluchtelingen kan niet betrekking tot Chili slechts in zeer beperkte mate gelden. Hoe men ook mag staan tegenover de militaire junta, een ding is zeker: de Chileense vluchtelingen werden niet alleen vervolgd voor hun ideologie, status of afkomst. Dit laatste is de traditionele humanitaire defenitie van een vervolgde. Voor het grootste deel zijn het mensen die in hun eigen land wettelijk aangeklaagd kunnen worden voor misdaden die onder elk rechtsbestel strafbaar zijn.

Deze vluchtelingen vonden in Chili daden uit die in strijd waren met de grondwet. In Chili zijn het specialisten in geweld. Om deze redenen rochten zij asiel op de buitenlandse ambassades in Santiago en daarom bevinden zich zoveel buitenlanders onder hen.

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Irak krijgt parlement

BAGDAD — Irak krijgt voor het eerst sedert de revolutie van 1958 een volksvertegenwoordiging. Het presidium van het „progressieve nationale front“ heeft hier toe besloten, zo is donsdag bekendgemaakt. Wanneer de volksvertegenwoordiging er komt en of die tot stand zal komen voor algemene verkiezingen, is nog niet besloten. In Bagdad staat een groot gebouw voor een nationale vergadering maar het is nog nooit gebruikt. De socialistische Baas-partij en de communisten werken samen in het progressieve nationale front.

GOUDPRODUCTIE ACHTERUIT

Grote onrust onder mijnwerkers in Z.-Afrika

JOHANNESBURG — In de afgelopen weken is moord en doodslag in de Zuidafrikaanse goudmijnen onder de zwarte mijnwerkers tot een zorgbarende omvang uitgegroeid. De jongste balans van bloedige stamtwisten tussen gastarbeiders uit Lesotho en de Xhosa's in de goudmijn Carletonville, bij Johannesburg, luidt: tien doden en drie en zestig gewonden.

De meeste slachtoffers waren gruwelijk vernietigd. Slaapplaatsen werden vernietigd, met benzine overgoten en in brand gestoken. Vloeiende mijnwerkers zijn volgens ooggetuigen doodgeschoten.

Tien duizend Baascho's hebben sinds februari hun werkterrein in Zuid-Afrika in de steek gelaten en zijn naar hun veilige bergachtige vaderland Lesotho teruggekeerd. Vele andere zijn van plan ook naar Lesotho terug te gaan. Na de Basotho's vreezen thans de mijnwerkers uit Malawi aan de beurt te zijn.

INSPRAAK

Woordvoerders van de zwarte mijnwerkers verklaren, dat de mijnwerkers niets in te brengen hebben tegenover de blanke leiding van de mijnen en niets aan de arbeidsom-

zegt te weten waarom de mijnwerkers elkaar doodslaan. „Hun vertegenwoordigers weten het niet en ik betwijfel, of de arbeiders zelf het wel weten“, aldus de bedrijfsleider.

Velen menen, dat ingewortelde

stammen-vijandschap de oorzaak is van de onlusten. Daarbij komt dat bij de huidige woningnood een nietige aanleiding voldoende is om de haat tegen de gastarbeiders tot een explosie te brengen. De mijnmaatschappijen hebben zich tot dusver verzet tegen de eis, de zwarte mijnwerkers te groeperen naar de streken waar zij vandaan komen. Zij menen, dat dan nog grotere onlusten zouden ontstaan. Het zou zelfs tot „slachtpartijen“ kunnen komen. Intussen gaat de goudproductie achteruit. In Lesotho zit de regering met het probleem van de broedkroos geworden terugkeeren-

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T. J. Fournier

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2. AIRMAILING TO BROUTSAS BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON LEFTIST EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME, INCLUDING:Y

- A. LCBEPRE PRESS SUMMARIES OF FRONT ACTIVITIES.Y
- B. NEWS BULLETIN PUBLISHED BY BRITISH CHILE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE, WHICH CONTAINS "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION AND A SECTION GIVING CHILEAN REFUGEE QUOTAS BY COUNTRY.Y
- C. ARTICLES RE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON CHILE, HELD ROME, APRIL 74.Y

D. MAY 1974 WIENER TAGEBUCH ARTICLE ON CHILE BLACK BOOK.Y

E. APRIL 1974 FRANKFURT-STADT RUNDSCHAU ARTICLE RE CHILEAN

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SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL. 4

3. WE ARE UNABLE SUGGEST KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON OF STATURE FOR INTERVIEW ON LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDIT REGIME. AS ALTERNATIVE, SUGGEST CAGUARRY OR NETWORK REPORTER MIGHT SEEK INTERVIEW OF DR. MARIO PUELMA, PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY AT FREIBURG UNIVERSITY, WHO WROTE TWO-PART ARTICLE IN 1975-16 JANUARY ISSUES OF BERN DAILY BERNER TAGBLATT ON SUBJECT CHILEAN REFUGEES. IN ARTICLES PUELMA GIVES BACKGROUND OF TERRORIST MOVEMENT IN CHILE AS IT DEVELOPED AS RESULT OF ALLENDE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CITES EXAMPLES OF "REFUGEES" AND THEIR ACTIVITIES TO SHOW THAT "TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF POLITICAL REFUGEE, WITH RESPECT TO CHILE, CAN BE APPLIED ONLY IN VERY LIMITED SENSE..." (SEE ORPEG 0026, REF B, FOR ^{QUOTES FROM} ~~SUMMARY~~ OF ARTICLES. 4) *PS*

4. SUGGEST FEATURE INCLUDE POINT THAT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME IS ENCOURAGED, IF NOT ORCHESTRATED, BY SOVIET FRONTS AND THAT PUBLICITY GENERATED BY "SOLIDARITY" CAMPAIGN (E.G., "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION OF BRITISH COMMITTEE BULLETIN) HAS INTIMIDATING EFFECT PRECLUDING OBJECTIVITY. BENEATH SUPERFICIAL SHOW OF "SOLIDARITY," EUROPEAN LEFTISTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING CRIMINAL/

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TERRORIST "REFUGEES" IN EUROPE, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CRITICALLY ANALYZING EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE COUP AND REASSESSING THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEALING WITH NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES AND ASSUMING POWER BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS. MIGHT ALSO MAKE POINT THAT WITH VIETNAM NO LONGER AN ISSUE, CHILE REPRESENTS ONE FOCUS FOR ENGENDERING UNITY BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST LEFT IN WESTERN EUROPE.Y

5. FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON EXTREME LEFTIST VIEWS/ACTIVITY, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR ZDF REPORTER MIGHT CONTACT "SOCIALIST BUREAU," SPONSOR OF SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL. (SEE BONN 31174 AND BBONN 31869). FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON JUNTA VIEWS, SUGGEST CONTACT DEUTSCH-CHILENISCHER BUND ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ (SEE BERLIN 11306, OCT 73). (676994)

6. FILE: 200-126-107/11. E2 IMPDET.H

In AC/SS/CAG/PSB Ra. hana belduin

E/ROG

E/G

WH/6

 ω_H/c

DATE: 30 MAY 1974
ORIG: CONNIE MOORE:SRM
UNIT: E/CAG
EXT: 66408/1289

Enid

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

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E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 004244

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T 149793 214850		PAGE 01	
		IN 265992	
		TOR:301144Z MAY 74	
		BANG 59314	

SECRET 301122Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BANGKOK 59314

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

REDLEG AEFIS-

REFSI A. BANGKOK 59065 (in 260348) WH/6/RR
 B. DIRECTOR 554557 WH/6/Soc'y Fed. FUCHEN

1. MILTON C. REPOUSH AND RALPH K. TOLGIEN MET WITH EMILIO GALETZKI ON 25 MAY AND PASSED REF B INFO. TOLGIEN HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH GALETZKI ON 29 MAY TO DISCUSS HIS ENCOUNTER WITH ARTHUR CUNNING.

2. GALETZKI MET CUNNING AT HOME OF ROBERT B. HARTFORD, U.S. CITIZEN EMPLOYED IN POPULATION DIVISION OF ECAFE. HARTFORD IS PRO-ALLENDE AND ORGANIZED SMALL SOCIAL GATHERING OF INTERESTED PERSONS TO MEET CUNNING AND DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE. CUNNING IS DESCRIBED AS ABOUT FORTY YEARS OLD, BLACK HAIR, FULL BEARD AND AVERAGE BUILD. HE IS A DEMOGRAPHER EMPLOYED BY UNITED NATIONS AT CENTRO LATINO AMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (CELADE) IN SANTIAGO. HE ARRIVED CHILE IN OCTOBER 1970 WITH HIS WIFE. CUNNING DEPARTED BANGKOK 27 MAY FOR DELHI, KATHMANDU AND NEW YORK AND PLANNED RETURN SANTIAGO APPROX 22 JUNE.

3. CUNNING TALKED VERY LITTLE ABOUT ALLENDE REGIME AND

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T 142793		EIA650		PAGE 02	
				IN 265992	
				TOR:001144Z MAY 74	
				BANG 59314	

CONCENTRATED ON DISPARAGING PRESENT REGIME. CLAIMED THERE THOUSANDS OF REPRISAL KILLINGS BY ARMY, RUN AWAY INFLATION, SHORTAGE OF GOODS AND GENERAL REPRESSION BY REGIME. CUNNING VERY SUBJECTIVE IN STATEMENTS AND HAD FEW FACTS TO BACK UP STATEMENTS. WHEN GALETZKI ASKED CUNNING HOW HE KNEW THERE "THOUSANDS OF KILLINGS", CUNNING CLAIMED "THERE IS CIA REPORT WHICH STATES OVER TWENTY THOUSAND HAD BEEN KILLED." GALETZKI FOUND PORTIONS OF REF 6 INFO USEFUL IN REFUTING CUNNING STATEMENTS. HOWEVER GALETZKI'S TEMPER GOT THE BEST OF HIM HALF WAS THROUGH MEETING AND FRIEND SUGGESTED THAT HE REFRAIN FROM ARGUING WITH CUNNING LEST THE SITUATION BECOME VIOLENT.

4. GALETZKI TELEXED REPORT ON CUNNING TO HIS EMBASSY IN TOKYO. HE TOLD TOLGIEN WOULD PASS HIM ANY FEED BACK INFO ON CUNNING HE MIGHT RECEIVE.

5. REQUEST POA AND 201 ON GALETZKI TO DEVELOP AND RECRUIT AS MOLIMBER ASSET TARGETTED PRIMARILY ON AEFISH. TOLGIEN WILL UTILIZE COVER AS AIR FORCE CIVILIAN ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY AS ANALYST DURING DEVELOPMENT.

6. FIL: 22-795277, 201-GALETZKI. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

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MAILING OFFICE IS FORBIDDEN

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c/rlm, c/23, c/23/203

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T 148171

E14272

PAGE 01-01

TOR:2921507 MAY 74

SECRET 2921407 MAY 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29314

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PSYCH

REF: DIRECTOR 553537

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/SA

WH/6/Fl

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

File FUERNEN

1. FUERNEN-3 HAS CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACT WITH LOCAL OFFICES OF MAJOR WIRE SERVICES. WE TASKING HIM WITH COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF REPS HERE AS WELL AS SPOTTING AND ASSESSMENT INFO ON WHO MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO COLLABORATE WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT.

2. STATION ALSO EXPLORING REP WITH FUERNEN-1 AND FUERNEN-16.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

21 MFG. 11-73

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BY MSGT/UNIT NOTIFIED

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PLAN, WH'8, SS.5.

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T 242756

E1A997

PAGE 01-01

IN 263354

7091280955Z MAY 74

HELS 22538

CONFIDENTIAL 282351Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22538

TO: SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: HC SA 18924

1. LARGEST LOCAL BOOK STORE HAS BOOK ON ORDER, WHEN RECEIVED, STATION CAN BUY AND POUCH COPIES PER REF. HOWEVER, WISH POINT OUT, IF SANTIAGO NOT ALREADY AWARE, THAT BOOK IN SWEDISH. IF COPIES STILL DESIRED AND SANTIAGO WISHES OBTAIN EARLIER, SUGGEST STOCKHOLM STATION BE ASKED BUY SINCE BOOK SHOULD BE READILY AVAILABLE IN SWEDEN.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

[illegible]

RECORD COPY

C O N F I D E N T I A L

15-124-52
28 May 74

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T. 137626	EIA065	PAGE 01	IN 262014	
TOR: 241716Z MAY 74			BNNB 31991	

SECRET 241627Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BONN BASE 31991

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN, HAMBURG.

FUONYX CAQUARRY TOFOCUS

REF BONN BASE J1516 (U 241838)

C/WH/6 _____

DC/WH/6 *W* _____

WH/6/SA _____

WH/6/PI _____

WH/6/RR _____

WH/6/Sec'y _____

1. CAQUARRY ADVISED ZDF MAGAZIN PLANNING ANOTHER FEATURE ON CHILE FOCUSING ON CHILEAN POLITICAL REFUGEES IN WEST GERMANY. CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE EXPOSE REVOLUTIONARY/CRIMINAL BACKGROUND OF SOME OF REFUGEES AND IDENTIFY ANY LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE IDENTITY. ALSO INTERESTED FOCUSING ON WORLD-WIDE LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME. AS PART FEATURE CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ZDF INTERVIEW A PERSON KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOVE. IDEALLY SUBJECT SHOULD BE PERSON OF SOME STATURE. INTERVIEW CAN BE MADE LATIN AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA, OR IN EUROPE. SECURITY NOT A PROBLEM AS CAQUARRY WILL SIMPLY ASSIGN NETWORK REPORTER TO MAKE INTERVIEW ON NONWITTING BASIS USING QUESTIONS CAQUARRY WILL PROVIDE.

2. ALSO APPRECIATE ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO CAQUARRY. GERMAN LANGUAGE MATERIAL MOST USEFUL SINCE CAQUARRY HAS NO ENGLISH OR SPANISH CAPABILITY.

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T 137600		EIA065		PAGE 02-02		IN 262014		
				TOR:241716Z MAY 74		BNNB 31991		

3. RE PARA 2 REF, STILL ON "PER DU" BASIS MATTHOEFER
RECENTLY CONTACTED CAQUARRY TO ASK HIM MAKE PUBLIC RETRACTION
OF PARA 2 STATEMENT. CAQUARRY REFUSED AND SUGGESTED MATTHOEFER
INSTITUTE LIBEL SUIT, MATTHOEFER QUICKLY BACKED DOWN.
INCIDENTALLY, IN APPARENT BONE TO LEFT-WING SPD. HQS WILL
NOTE THAT MATTHOEFER HAS BEEN APPOINTED MINISTER OF RESEARCH
AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT.

4. FILE: 201-0230705; X-REF 201-0903816. E2-IMPDET.

SECRET

FORM 3-73
10-73

CABLE DEC DIBSEM BY 2 PER TOTAL COPIES 33-1 RUN BY

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ACTION #

T 102861

EIA160

PAGE 21-01

IN 251122

TOR:141020Z MAY 74

STOC 15691

S E C R E T 142938Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 15691

TO: DIRECTOR INFO HELSINKI.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549305

B. HELSINKI 22455 (239973)

1. NO STATION TRACES KYUNG.
2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

FILE FUOMEN

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/SA

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

S E C R E T

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T 103782		EIA146		PAGE 01		IN 250476	
		TOR:1318512 MAY 74		SAGO		29117	

SECRET 131621Z MAY 74 STAFF
 CITE SANTIAGO 29117 (JABAUT ACTING)
 TO: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR,
 TOFUCUS UNSOBER
 REF: A. DIRECTOR 549340

B. PARIS 48390 (IA 250170)

1. AGREE WITH REF B RECOMMENDATION TO AWAIT OUTCOME OF FRENCH ELECTION BEFORE DECIDING IF AND HOW TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1. IN MAKING THAT DECISION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED:

A. WHILE STATION HAS CAPABILITY VIA FUTRUNK-1 (IDEN FOR PARIS), RECENTLY RECRUITED SALARIED AGENT, TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1 IN OBTAINING INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT OUR INTERVENTION, NO MATTER HOW SUBTLE, WOULD VERY PROBABLY IDENTIFY UNSOBER-1 TO FUTRUNK-1 AS AGENCY COLLABORATOR.

B. THE CHILEAN GOVT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN PRESS CRITICISM AND WOULD LOOK UNHAPPILY ON ANY T.V. PROGRAM WHICH REFLECTS BADLY ON GOVT, REGARDLESS OF HOW SLIGHT THE CRITICISM MIGHT BE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO OBTAIN

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T 103782		EJA146		PAGE 02-02	
				IN 250476	
				TOR11318912 MAY 74	
				SAGU 29117	

FUTRUNK-1'S ASSISTANCE FOR ANY PROGRAM WHICH COULD PROVE
EMBARRASSING TO HIM.

2. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

CONF: *Surge*

INFO: FILE

DATE-TIME GROUP

102248Z

DIRECTOR

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

549348

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: *49*

0 TO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IF FILE #

TO: SANTIAGO INFO PARIS.Y

TOFOCUS UNSOBER Y

REF: OFAA-2356, 9 APRIL 74 (NOT NEEDED SANTIAGO)Y

1. TOFOCUS ACTIVITY SEEKS TO DEVELOP ASSETS TO INFLUENCE NEWS AND OTHER PROGRAMMING WITH POLITICAL CONTENT IN EUROPEAN TV SERVICES. IN FRANCE THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY TOUGH NUT TO CRACK, BUT PARIS STATION HAS MADE RECENT PROGRESS WITH UNSOBER/1. THIS FORMER STAFF JOURNALIST FOR PRE⁵STIGIOUS FRENCH NEWS WEEKLY L'EXPRESS RECENTLY COMPLETED A 30-MINUTE REPORTAGE ON CURRENT EVENTS IN WEST GERMANY. IT WAS WELL RECEIVED AND RESULTED IN HIS BEING TAPPED TO DO SECOND 30-MINUTE PROGRAM. AS UNSOBER/1 APPEARS TO BE ON WAY TO POSITION OF SUBSTANCE WITHIN FRENCH TELEVISION, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST HIS RISE AND INSURE THAT PARIS STATION'S MOST PROMISING TOFOCUS ASSET ACHIEVES MOST INFLUENTIAL STATUS POSSIBLE. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE OF VALUE IF UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE.Y

WV/ICA _____
WV/IFI _____
WV/IFB _____
WV/IFCody _____

FL
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DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

DELEADING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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DIRECTOR

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INFO: FILE

549348

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2. THE REPORTAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE DESIGNED FOR 30-MINUTE AIRING, AND WOULD HOPEFULLY CONTAIN FILMED INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND VISIT TO DAWSON ISLAND. WHILE WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED TO FRENCH JOURNALIST BY THE HEAD OF RULING JUNTA (THUS BIG BOOST FOR UNSOBER/1), WE UNDERSTAND PINOCHET HAS GRANTED OTHER INTERVIEWS AND ALLOWED FILMING ON DAWSON ISLAND. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DISCUSSED WITH UNSOBER/1, AND HE HAS SAID REPORTAGE WOULD BE FAVORABLE BUT NOT TOTALLY UNCRITICAL--BEST TREATMENT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COULD HOPE FOR IN FRANCE.Y

3. TO OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND OTHER JUNTA LEADERS AND/OR PERMISSION TO FILM CONDITIONS ON DAWSON ISLAND AND ELSEWHERE IN CHILE, UNSOBER/1 HAS ASKED FOR BKHERALD ASSISTANCE. UNSOBER/1 IS CONFIDENT THAT SUPERIORS WOULD APPROVE PROGRAM IF UNSOBER/1 COULD ASSURE THEM THAT HE WOULD BE GRANTED INTERVIEWS, ETC.Y

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ASSISTANCE SANTIAGO STATION CAN PROVIDE TO UNSOBER/1.Y

5. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 8 MAY 1974
 ORG: DAN WAGNER:LD
 UNIT: E/F/INT
 EXT: 9111

C/E/CA

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C/WH

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C/WH/6

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DATE TIME GROUP
102239Z

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DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
549305

CONF: EUR8 INFO: FILE 11/AN. SBE. (WMS) SSS

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TO: STOCKHOLM INFO HELSINKI, SANTIAGO. Y

FUOMEN PSYCH Y

REF: HELSINKI 22455 [IN 239973] Y

1. A FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER (AECLUSTER) REPORTED THAT THE NAME OF ONE ANDRES ALEKSANDROVICH K Y U N G, BORN 1945, NATURALIZED SWEDISH CITIZEN, APPEARED ON SOVIET VISA BLACKLIST AND HE TO BE DENIED VISA TO USSR. NO REASON GIVEN FOR THIS DENIAL BY MFA. (DOI: MID-1971). NO OTHER TRACE HQS FILES. Y

2. STOCKHOLM: PLS FURNISH TRACES SUBJECT REF. Y

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

DC/WH/SA _____
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WH/SA _____
WH/SA _____

WH/B (CHILE)- 2. K. [Signature]

SB/X/EU- [Signature]

File FUOMEN

DATE: 10 MAY 74 [Signature]
ORIG: MARIA C. WALSH/JD
UNIT: E/SC/S
EXT: 1588

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C/TEUR [Signature]
RELEASING OFFICER

[Signature]
AC/E/SC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CL BY: 008234

FORM 3-72
1 JUL 73

CAUSE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER 29-1 RUN BY
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IPAN WKS OS6/OC

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STAFF

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PAGE 01

IN 250170

TSR:131542Z MAY 74

PARI-48390

SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

C/VH/6

DC/VH/6

WH/6/3

WH/6/11

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

*FUG
FOC MEN*

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 221-872997. E-2 IMPDET

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FORM 3020b
23 AUG 73CABLE REC. DISSEM BY 4 PERTOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY

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IPAN, WH 8, OSG/OC

C/OPS SSS

ACTION #

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EIA670

PAGE 01

IN 253170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74

PARIS 48390

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

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3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

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FORM 30206
1 JUL 73LABEL REC DISSEM BY 4 PER TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

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PAGE 01

IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74

PARL 48390

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

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BY AT Z

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OPS/INT, WHS

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3		6

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EIAC20

PAGE 01

IN 240240

TOR:110024Z MAY 74

BNNB 31516

SECRET 231429Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BONN BASE 31516

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, PARIS.

CATHATCH CAQUARRY TOFOCUS FUQYNX

REF: BONN BASE 31234 (IN 230053)

C/WH/6 #132 DUPE & CORRECTED
FOR WASH SIC NOTE.

DC/WH/6

WH/6/31

WH/6/51

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

TEL
OMEN
FUG

1. 1 MAY ZDF MAGAZIN WITH CAQUARRY AS MODERATOR CARRIED
15 MINUTE FEATURE ON CHILE, A THEME LONG DISCUSSED WITH CAQUARRY.
MAIN PART FEATURE WAS INTERVIEW WITH SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN,
FRIEDRICH B E E R M A N N (SUBJECT REF) WHO RECENTLY RETURNED
FROM VISIT CHILE AND SPOKE WITH GENERAL PINOCHET. BEERMANN
STRESSED THAT ALLENDE GOVERNMENT HAD RULED ILLEGALLY, CONDITIONS
NOT AS BAD AS THEY SEEM AND THAT OVERALL CHILEAN POPULATION
FAVORED ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW. SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT INTERVIEW
WITH SPD POLITICIAN AND SPD, AS INFLUENCED BY ITS LEFT WING,
HAS BEEN STRONGLY ANTI-JUNTA.

2. HANS M A T T H O E F E R, LEFT WING SPD PARLIAMEN-
TARIAN AND STATE SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION, HAS BEEN
LEADING GERMAN OPPOSITION TO JUNTA AND ALSO TRYING BLOCK
ECONOMIC AID. DRAWING ON FUAXL/5 BACKGROUND INFO (SEE EGN-5363,
NOV 73) WE HAVE DISCUSSED MATTHOEFER IN DETAIL WITH CAQUARRY

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FORM 3076
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PAGE 22-32

IN 241838

IN 247048

TCR:110024Z MAY 74

BNNB 31516

QUESTIONING HIS MOTIVATION IN STRONG SUPPORT ALLENDE AND EVEN
STRONGER CONDEMNATION OF JUNTA. BY COINCIDENCE CAQUARRY ON
PER "DU" BASIS WITH MATTHOEFER (NOT FOR SAME POLITICAL IDEALS)
AND WELL AWARE MATTHOEFER BACKGROUND INVOLVMENT LEFT WING
ACTIVITIES. END OF CHILE FEATURE CARRIED STATEMENT BY CAQUARRY
THAT IT STRANGE MATTHOEFER CONDONED ALLENDE GOVT USE OF FORCE
AS NECESSARY WHILE HE IS PRESENTLY VOCIFEROUS IN CONDEMNING
JUNTA ACTIVITIES. STATEMENT SERVED EMPHASIZE SPD NON-OBJECTIVITY
IN DEALING WITH CHILE.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON MATTHOEFER. SUGGEST OPEN
221 SINCE HE ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL LEFT WING SPDRS AND WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY BE INVOLVED IN ANY FUTURE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN
RIGHT AND LEFT WINGS OF SPD.

4. FILE: 221-2230705 X-REF 221-

E2 IMPDET

WASH S/C NOTE: PARIS ADDED INFO ADDEE PER HQS REQUEST.

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T 077141		EIA230		PAGE 02-02	
				IN 239973	
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AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

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PAGE 01

IN 231132

TOR:231149Z APR 74

HAMB 24795

SECRET 232953Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24795 (SWARZCHILD ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

REF: DIRECTOR 540262

1. WELCOME RECEIVING SPECIAL BRIEF FOR PURPOSES INDICATED IN
REF.

2. RELUCTANT TO LEAVE MEDIA FIELD ON CHILE TO SOVIETS AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS. SUGGEST THEREFORE HQS KEEP OPEN MIND ON SELECTIVE
PLACEMENTS SHORT OF GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME.

3. SINCE WOMEN LIKELY TO CONTINUE PLAYING PIVOTAL ROLE IN
FURTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BELIEVE THEIR VIEWS AND REACTIONS
OUGHT BE GIVEN MORE PLAY. AS AN EXAMPLE, COULD POSSIBLY ENGINEER
ARTICLE IN GERMAN MAGAZINE "DER STERN" (CIRCULATION 1,500,000),
WHICH THUS FAR IN VANGUARD OF ANTI-JUNTA PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN,
THROUGH MRS. VERA VACEK.

4. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.

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		FOR 10410112 DEC 73		WAMB 23918	

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CITE HAMBURG 23918

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.

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PAGE 02-02

IN 104043

TO R1041011Z DEC 73

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BY LEFTIST-GENERATED COPY ON CHILEAN DEVELOPMENTS. IF AFFIRMATIVE,
SHALL TAKE SOUNDINGS ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
VEHICLE.

4. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

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TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE
HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPI, LONDON, BERN INFO
SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUONEN FUORACLE

REF: DIRECTOR 465768

DOC. MICRO. SER.

NOV 1 1973

MICROFILMED

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1. FOLLOWING OF INTEREST AS FOLLOW-UP TO REF.
2. ACCORDING WASHINGTON POST 12 OCTOBER, "THE BITTERNESS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND CHILE ERUPTED INTO A BATTLE OF OBSESSIVES AND THREATS LAST NIGHT, DISRUPTING A LATE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AT HEIGHT OF THE DISTURBANCE, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED THE CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE A 'SON OF A WHORE,' AND ANOTHER CUBAN DIPLOMAT REPORTEDLY DISPLAYED A PISTOL.
3. "DISPUTE BEGAN WHEN ROA DEVOTED MORE THAN HALF OF HIS SPEECH IN GENERAL DEBATE EARLIER IN THE DAY TO AN ATTACK ON THE NEW CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA. CHILEAN AMBASSADOR RAUL BAZAN DAVILA TOOK PODIUM DURING THE NIGHT-TIME SESSION TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF REPLY. BAZAN INSISTED THAT LATE PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE HAD COMMITTEED SUICIDE AND SAID 'CASTROISM' MUST TAKE A LARGE PART OF THE BLAME. HE AD-

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15-124-52
12 Oct 73

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MITTED AND REGRETted AN OFFICIAL FIGURE OF 581 DEATHS IN CONNECTION WITH CHILEAN COUP, BUT ADDED THAT CHILEANS RESPECTED HUMAN LIFE, WHILE IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF HAD, AS HIS DAILY PASTIME, THE WATCHING OF EXECUTIONS BEFORE THE FIRING SQUAD WALL, TO WHICH HE EVEN INVITED SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS...

4. "AT THAT POINT ROA ROSE FROM HIS SEAT AND DASHED DOWN THE AISLE TOWARD THE ROSTRUM, SHOUTING 'FAG', 'SONG OF A WHORE' AND OTHER INSULTS AT BAZAN, IN SPANISH. OTHER CUBANS FOLLOWED HIM. NICARAGUAN DELEGATION, SEATED IN FRONT NEAR ROSTRUM, ROSE TO BLOCK THE CUBANS. OTHER LATINS FLOCKED TO FRONT OF THE HALL. A DIPLOMAT WHO WAS THERE SAID A CUBAN SHOWED HE WAS CARRYING A PISTOL IN A CONFRONTATION WITH PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO BARREIRO....

5. "U.N. GUARDS SWARMED TO THE ROSTRUM AND THE CUBANS DISPERSED. ROA RESUMED HIS SEAT LATER. FIVE LATIN AMERICANS CAME TO THE ROSTRUM LATER TO CALL THE CUBANS 'GANGSTERS' AND CHALLENGED THE RIGHT OF A DICTATORSHIP TO CRITICIZE THEIR GOVERNMENTS. U.S. AMBASSADOR JOHN A. SCALI SAID ROA 'HAS ONCE AGAIN SUNK TO HIS USUAL LEVEL OF GUTTER VULGARITY...THE OUTMODED VITUPERATION OF AN EARLIER ERA.'"

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6. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. E2, IMPDET.H

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DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1973 *W. Kent*
 ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT: SMB
 UNIT: ADC/WH/L
 EXT: 6556/9155

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TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO,
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 SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

1. SINCE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UNGA HAS
 RECEIVED LIMITED PRESS PLAY, BELIEVE FOLLOWING MAY BE USEFUL TO
 ADDRESSEES FOR BRIEFING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MEDIA AND OTHER CONTACTS
 WHO MAY BE INTERESTED IN CHILEAN SITUATION. MATERIAL IS LARGELY
 OVERT, THEREFORE NO OBJECTION TO ITS USE BY PRESS ASSETS SO LONG
 AS STORY NOT PASSED OR USED VERBATIM.

2. ON 9 OCTOBER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VICE-ADMIRAL ISMAEL
 HUERTA APPEARED FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR PRESENTATION BEFORE UNGA
 TO EXPLAIN "FACTS WHICH OBLIGED ARMED FORCES AND POLICE TO TAKE
 CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF NATIONAL
 RESTORATION," AND TO CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME VICTIM
 OF A "MOST FALSE, MOST MALEVOLENT, MOST VICIOUS AND VERY WELL-
 ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN."

3. HUERTA'S SPEECH STRESSED THAT ALLENDE'S MINORITY REGIME HAD

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