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FROM : CHIEF, COVER & COMMERCIAL STAFF
TO : ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL
TITLE : MR. E. HOWARD HUNT - ALIAS BIRTH CERTIFICATE
DATE : 11/02/1973
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS : TOURIST CARD
JFK ASSASSINATION

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10105-10290

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2 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting General Counsel

SUBJECT: Mr. E. Howard Hunt - Alias Birth Certificate

1. On 30 October 1973 I saw Mr. John S. Warner, Acting General Counsel, to discuss two outstanding requests from the Special Prosecutor's office in regard to U.S. passports which had been issued to E. Howard Hunt and a MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD on Mr. Robert Bennett's session with the U.S. Prosecutor Silbert in July 1972. I handed Mr. Warner a memorandum listing the type, number and dates of the 2 passports which Mr. Hunt was issued between 1950 and 1970. In reviewing the information in this memorandum, I mentioned Mr. Hunt's tour in Spain in the middle 1960's and the fact that I had been instructed not to include Mr. Hunt and his activities in my inspection of the Madrid Station in 1965. I also mentioned to Mr. Warner that I remembered two discussions with Mr. Skip Dunn late in 1972 during which he inquired of me whether CIA had ever issued an alias passport to Mr. Hunt. I said that as I recalled, CIA did not initiate the issuance of a U.S. alias passport, but that Mr. Hunt did have in his possession an alias travel document. This came as a surprise to Mr. Warner. He had not been previously aware that Mr. Hunt possessed a U.S. international travel document in alias. As a result he called Mr. John Richards, Office of the IG, and asked whether Mr. Richards was aware of this and whether Mr. Dunn's reports provided this information. After an interval, Mr. Richards called back and told Mr. Warner that I had provided information to Mr. Dunn that Mr. Hunt had a tourist card in alias. According to Mr. Richards, Mr. Dunn's memorandum quoted me as saying that my information came from an "A-1 source." At that moment, I could not recall having made such a statement.

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2. Upon my return from Mr. Warner's office, I consulted with Mr. James W. Franklin, Chief, Official Cover Branch, CCS, with whom I had discussed Mr. Dunn's inquiry in late 1972. I asked Mr. Franklin whether he could refresh my memory. This he did immediately. He reminded me that a newspaper article (Tab A) had appeared claiming that one of the Watergate 5 had carried a U.S. passport in the name of Edward Hamilton. This newspaper article had been seen by Mr. Robert Johnson, Deputy Director of the U.S. Passport Office, who had had the U.S. Passport Office files examined with negative results. Mr. Johnson then determined from the FBI that the document involved was not a U.S. passport in the name of Edward Hamilton but a tourist card in that name. I then remembered that because the information came from the FBI via Mr. Johnson, I had not identified the source of my information. I immediately called Mr. Warner and advised him of the foregoing.


3. Later in the afternoon of 30 October 1973 Mr. Franklin came to my office with a number of documents. They consisted of a form memorandum signed by me which was addressed to Mr. Hunt dated 29 June 1970 (Tab B), a list of names numbering from 1 through 154, representing true names (Tab C), and a second listing similarly numbered, representing aliases (Tab D). Number 63 on the true name list reads E. Howard Hunt and on the alias list, Edward Joseph Hamilton. Mr. Franklin explained -- which I had forgotten -- that we had obtained from TSD this list of outstanding alias birth certificates issued by TSD in an attempt to recall -- if possible -- as many of these documents, or to determine what had happened to them. (Most of these alias birth certificates were issued in connection with the Bay of Pigs Operation.) The memorandum was never forwarded to Mr. Hunt because by June 1970, he had been retired for 3 months. This memorandum had not been included in Mr. Hunt's cover file but had been kept with the working papers pertaining to the action trying to recall as many of the outstanding alias birth certificates as possible. As a result, the repeated reviews of Mr. Hunt's cover file had not yielded the information that an alias birth certificate had been issued to him. 97 of the 154 aliases were not previously recorded in the CCS central index and the indexing after the acquisition of the list had been overlooked. The surfacing of these documents at this time occurred because in re-discussing Mr. Hunt's possession of an international travel document in alias reminded Mr. Franklin of the 1970 CCS exercise of recouping outstanding alias birth certificates. Discussions on the same subject in December 1972 simply did not result in the same memory association.

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4. In the late afternoon of 30 October 1973 Mr. Franklin and I saw Mr. Warner, reported the foregoing facts to him, showed him the documents, and agreed that we would ask Mr. Johnson to check the Passport Office files once more to confirm that no U.S. passport in the name of Edward Joseph Hamilton had ever been issued to Mr. Hunt. The result of Mr. Johnson's check is still outstanding at the time of this writing.



ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, Cover & Commercial Staff

4 Atts:

- A: News Article
- B: 29 June 70 Form Memo to Hunt
- C: True Name Listing
- D: Alias Name Listing

cc: IG via DDO

-3-

SECRET

NAME

1. ASAKIS, Gendaris *11007*
2. AASAL, Glen *6175*
3. SHERWOOD, John *11007*
4. ADKINS, Matt *42-336*
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay *11007*
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia *NR*
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algio *NR*
8. BROWN, James W. *47435*
9. SPEND, Horace III *8435*
10. Anthrill-I. (Crypt) *NR Julio Kauri Barreto*
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. *13915*
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. *NR*
13. BEALE, W. H. *42-336*
14. BENAS, Alis *NR*
15. BECERT, Jerome F. *NR - 12571*
16. ERICKSON, Paul *14317*
17. KINAMMER, James F. *NR*
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro *7797*
19. BECKER, Alexander *NR*
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe *NR - 3097*
21. BURKE, Paul J. *7997*
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward *42-336*
23. SHERWOOD, John *11007*
24. MELBERG, Robert L. *2219*
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore *6777*
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert *NR*
27. BURKE, Paul J. *8497*
28. BLAIR, William *9121*
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr. *5311*
30. CHAS, Peter *NR*
31. ~~NAME~~
32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton *42-336*
33. CAREY, William David *4294*
34. CARTER, William R. *1451*
35. CROCE, Andrew *4547*
36. FLORES, Thomas J. *2031*
37. DAIGA, Janis *NR T-421*
38. DALEY, V. J. *NR*
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. *7168*
40. DILLON, John E. *9540*
41. DE GARDER, Constantine *NR*
42. DENSONS, William H. *1545*
43. DALY, Vincent S. *11307*
44. DUBOIS, Rene E. *9544*
45. EGAN, Frank J. *1545*
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A. *10015*
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr. *1545*
48. None *✓*
49. HEATH, Donald R. *1545*
50. FUCHS, Robert H. *1545*
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr. *1545*
52. FLICK, Charles E. *1545*

NAME

53. JONES, John Herman *1545*
54. JONES, Frank *7422*
55. F. LINDORF, Robert Peter *48-336*
56. GROSS, Charles E. *3857*
57. GREEN *Greene, Aubrey*
58. BRICOLAT, Pedro Gonzalez *NR*
59. GONDIK, Cecil Mario *14162*
60. TISLER, Frantisek *14183*
61. GREENE, Bill *NR 5-1567*
62. GRAHAM, Barbara *9808*
63. HUNT, Howard *9 1088*
64. None *✓*
65. HAWKINS, Jack *NR*
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. *11749*
67. HILDALGO, Barney
68. HEWITT, Thomas Y. *9922*
69. ~~NAME~~
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward *NR - 2156*
71. IWASKIN, Andrij *NR*
72. JENCOSK, Stephen *NR*
73. JACHUK, Nicholas *NR*
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. *NR*
75. JAWZEMIS, Ulois *NR*
76. JOANSON, Ivar *NR 7428*
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai *NR*
78. KYKER, Benjamin Franklin *3111*
79. KAFUSTA, Peter *10178*
80. KARKLINS, Zigards *NR*
81. KRYZANIMSKI, Myron *NR*
82. KOCELA, Paul *NR*
83. KAPPES, G. *10170 George M.*
84. KURTZ, Walter *NR*
85. KIDA, Jack *10170*
86. KENNEDY, John W. *10170*
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter *NR*
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph *NR 25-103*
89. ~~NAME~~
90. LAMBERS, John *NR*
91. ~~NAME~~
92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen *10580*
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest *5824*
94. KLEIN, Theodore *1570*
95. LOPUSZANSKY, Myrosław *47-50*
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae *NR*
97. Unknown *✓*
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. *48-336*
99. CHIPMAN, Harold E. *7168*
100. MASLOVSKY, Serge *T-835*
101. MARTINEZ, Ruben *1545*
102. SMITH, Raviland Jr. *4593*
103. MOORE, Andrew F. *NR 25-5*
104. MARSAN, Frank *NR - 2994*
105. KRIESEL, George *NR*
106. MULANE, Corrald J. *NR 25*

Serial from Joe Latorre TSO. 68

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7771
108. MORALES David S. 3643
- ~~109. [REDACTED]~~
110. NEWMASER, Harry Richard WK
111. NASARENKO, Michael WK
112. PIEPER, Harry C. 3-13-633
113. PHILLIPS, William D. 2610
114. GREENE, Harris
115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas WK
116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw WK
117. FRANK, Maryado 40-1
118. MOORE, Robert Butler 4271
119. PRIBANYEC, Janos 14
120. None ✓
121. RASTENIS, Jonas WK
122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene 1077
123. RAUS, Juri 25-104
124. RIKAND, Enno WK
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt) N.R.
126. RATCLIFF, Richard 3518
127. REEVES, John M. Jr. 10691
- ~~128. [REDACTED]~~
129. REYNOLDS, Robert E. WK
- ~~130. [REDACTED]~~
131. RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr. 10764
- ~~132. [REDACTED]~~
133. SULLIVAN, Dennis B. 25-3591
- ~~134. [REDACTED]~~
- ~~135. [REDACTED]~~
136. STAROSTENKO, Henry WK
137. IMLER, Norman C. 8052
138. SLEEPER, Gordon 11255
139. None ✓
140. None ✓
141. GONZALO, QUESADA Jr. WK
142. SAGER, John 4192 - N-122
143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill - 48-338
144. SLENYS, Lindas K. WK
145. SOLNZEFF, Henry 1202
146. SOLER, Eva Diana WK
147. SATINSKAS, Henry WK
148. STEVENS, George A. 12-336
149. WALLIN, Jack 12
150. TASHEFF, Mary 11184

TRUE

151. AIMA, James Henry WK 48-
152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P. 11224
153. TALLEY, Ulo WK
154. TURK, Leo L. 47 228
- ~~155. [REDACTED]~~
156. THOMAS, Edward 47-116
157. None ✓
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry 347
159. VINING, James L. 25-557 - R
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald WK
161. HARVEY, William K. R.C. 2375
162. BULIK, Joseph 3704
163. WILL, Kenneth John 48-331
164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr. 14854
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-3011
166. MERTZ, Richard 2601
167. None ✓
168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw WK
169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)

LOD YGEVSKIRI - WK
PR-1

ALIAS

ALIAS

R.C. 74271. ACKER, Gerald
48-338 2. ADLARD, Glennon Edward
116673. ANGER, Paul Rodger
48-338 4. AIVNEY, Matt
K-763/48-338 5. ASHBORNE, Howard Clay
NR 6. AUDISTO, Mario
NR 7. BARKER, Algis
48-338 8. BARNAUD, James Winston
8435-NR 9. BARNER, Andrew Frank
NR 10. BARRITO, John Raymond
13915-NR 11. BAWER, William John
NR 12. BAUGH, William James
48-338 13. BELT, William Henry
NR 14. BENTON, Alan
NR 15. BEMUCK, Karl Donald
14317 NR 16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
P-168 17. BERGSON, William Kinander
K-1715 18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
NR 19. BEST, Alexander
(RC) K-31720 (T) BINSWANGER, Stanley Joe
C-1732/11-87 21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
48-338 22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
11007 23. BRBITHEIM, John Albert
2219 24. BRICK, Robert Leo
5871K 25. BRICKHAM, Tad S.
NR 26. BRIGGS, Herb
C-1734/8-128 27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
8447 NR 28. BRUTON, William Emmott
9181 NR 29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
5385 NR 30. CARNEY, Peter
NR 31. [REDACTED]
48-338 32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton
2544 NR 33. CLINE, William David
14337 NR 34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
5-165035. CROWE, Andrew Paul
3257 NR 36. CURELO, Eduardo
T-421 37. DAILEY, James
NR 38. DERANSKI, Vincent Joseph
7168 39. DELAINE, William Alan
9540 NR 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
NR 41. DE LONG, Constantine
48-338 42. DONAINE, William Henry
11362 43. DRAXOS, Victor Samuel
9564 44. DUBOIS, Rene E. ARMY
KC-11655-NR 45. EKELSON, Frank Joseph
10014 NR 46. ELMONT, Rudolf Albert
K-1135 NR 47. ELIEGOR, William Monroe
NR 48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
9549 NR 49. FARON, Charles Andrew
RC-2535 NR 50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
5561 48-338 51. FITSAMES, Lucian Charles
15765/2-52 T FLICK, Charles E.

NR 53. FORDASON, John Norman
742651. FROST, Frank
48-338 55. FRYLING, Robert Peter
48-338 56. GENGARO, Charles Henry
48-338 57. GENISHAN, Aubrey Lyle
NR 58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
25-23159. GUDING-MARGAIN, Carlos
K-9640. HABER, Frantisek
5-15161. HALE, William Mark
NR 62. HALL, Roberta Shirley
NR 63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph
NR 64. HARRISON, Louise
NR 65. HASKINS, John Martin
11747 66. HEBERDEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
992767. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
NR 68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark
NR 69. [REDACTED]
48-338 70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer
NR 71. IRVING, Andrew
NR 72. JACOBS, Stephan
NR 73. JAMES, Nicholas
NR 74. JARECKI, Stanley
NR 75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
742876 (T) JENKINS, Ivar
NR 77. JUDD, Nicholas
(C-271) (310) 78. HACKMAN, Benjamin Franklin
NR 79. KARLOVIST, Paul
NR 80. KASABIAN, Zigurds
NR 81. KELLY, Myron
NR 82. KENDALL, Paul
NR 83. KENCNER, George Michael
NR 84. KERKSICK, Walter
NR 85. KIRNEY, Jack Anthony
8017 86. KINSLOW, John William
NR 87. KOLA, Walter
NR 88. KOSTIK, Joseph
NR 89. [REDACTED]
NR 90. LANSING, John
NR 91. [REDACTED]
10550 92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen ARMY
NR 93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest
NR 94. LEMART, Charles Edward
6570 NR 95. LOWE, Myron
NR 96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
10333 97. LYONS, George H. ARMY
NR 98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph
NR 99. MALABRE, Howland Edward
NR 100. MALOGEFF, Serge
NR 101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben
459 102. MARSAL, Karl
25-557 103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
C-2994 104. MASON, Frank
NR 105. MCADAM, George Thomas
NR 106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald, Joseph

ALIAS		ALIAS		
NR107.	MENICUCCI, Andrew Robert	48-335	151.	STEVENSON, James Henry
NR108.	MIRANDA, Diego S.	NW152.		None
NR110.	NACHBRUNN, Harry Richard	NW153.		None
NR111.	NASH, Mike	NR154.		TANIER, Lester Lewis
NR112.	PANOCK, Harry Charles	NR156.		TOGGITT, Edward J.
NR113.	PAPPS, William David	NR157.		TORREY, Erasmus
NR114.	PARKER, Carl Frank	NR158.		TRABAN, Gregorio R.
NR115.	PASTOR, Nick	N-113	159.	VALCHIN, James Louis
NR116.	PAULSON, Marty	NR160.		VAN CHADDE, Donald
NR117.	PEVER, Laura Jean	NR161.		WALKER, William
NR118.	POLACEK, Henry Franklin	N-122	162.	WELK, Joseph Reinhold
NR119.	POLING, Janos	48-338	163.	WIDEGREN, Keith J.
NR120.	RAHILL, Richard Kent	14856	NR164.	WILLEMS, Brenton Wall
NR121.	RANALLO, Jonas	NR165.		WISHFORD, Roy Furniss
NR122.	RATCLIFF, Matthew Edward	NR166.		WOLF, Frederick Morri
NR123.	REED, Juri	NR167.		WONG, Lam
NR124.	REESE, Eno	NR168.		ZEAMAN, Myron
NR125.	REese, Joseph Anthony	NR169.		ZIMMER, Paul R.
NR126.	RESELLER, Richard Lawrence			
NR127.	ROBERTS, John Martin Jr.			
NR129.	ROGERS, Robert E.			
NR130.				
NR131.				
NR132.				
NR133.	SAKIN, Edmond Abel			
NR134.				
NR135.				
NR136.	SEALE, Henry			
NR137.	SEALY, Robert Ruben			
NR138.	SELF, Gordon Dale			
NR139.	SHALER, Floyd A.			
NR140.	SHIPLEY, Charles Joseph			
NR141.	SHOWCROFT, Richard E.			
NR142.	SIMPSON, John			
NR143.	SIROTA, Edward G.			
NR144.	SLATER, Lawrence			
NR145.	SNYDER, Gene			
NR146.	None			
NR147.	SORENSEN, Henry			
NR148.	STANDARD, George Adam			
NR149.	STATEN, Samuel Addison			
NR150.	TASHEK, STEPHENS, Marina T.			

1. ASANTS, Gendaris
 2. AASAL, Glen
 3. SHERRWOOD, John
 4. ADKINS, Matt
 5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay
 6. RAGONA, Ferruggia
 7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algis
 8. BROWN, James W.
 9. SPEND, Horace
 10. Anthrill-L. (Crypt)
 11. ROSENBAUM, William A.
 12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr.
 13. DEALE, W. H.
 14. ELIAS, Alis
 15. BECHT, Jerome F.
 16. ERICSON, Paul
 17. KIMMER, James F.
 18. BARQUIN, Casimiro
 19. BECKER, Alexander
 20. BYZER, Stephen Joe
 21. BURKE, Paul J.
 22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward
 23. SHERWOOD, John
 24. MELBERG, Robert L.
 25. SHACKLEY, Theodore
 26. BRANTLEY, Herbert
 27. BURKE, Paul J.
 28. BLAIR, William
 29. CUMMINGHAM, James Allen Jr.
 30. CHAS, Peter
 31. [Redacted]
 32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton
 33. CAREY, William David
 34. CARTER, William R.
 35. CROCE, Andrew
 36. FLORES, Thomas J.
 37. DAIGA, Janis
 38. DALEY, V. J.
 39. CHIPMAN, Harold E.
 40. DILLON, John E.
 41. DE GARDER, Constantine
 42. DEMONS, William E.
 43. DALY, Vincent S.
 44. DUBOIS, Rene E.
 45. EGAN, Frank J.
 46. ENDERS, Rudolf A.
 47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr.
 48. None
 49. HEATH, Donald R.
 50. FUCHS, Robert H.
 51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr.
 52. FLICK, Charles E.

53. [Redacted]
 54. [Redacted]
 55. [Redacted]
 56. [Redacted]
 57. [Redacted]
 58. [Redacted]
 59. [Redacted]
 60. [Redacted]
 61. [Redacted]
 62. [Redacted]
 63. [Redacted]
 64. [Redacted]
 65. [Redacted]
 66. [Redacted]
 67. [Redacted]
 68. [Redacted]
 69. [Redacted]
 70. [Redacted]
 71. [Redacted]
 72. [Redacted]
 73. [Redacted]
 74. [Redacted]
 75. [Redacted]
 76. [Redacted]
 77. [Redacted]
 78. [Redacted]
 79. [Redacted]
 80. [Redacted]
 81. [Redacted]
 82. [Redacted]
 83. [Redacted]
 84. [Redacted]
 85. [Redacted]
 86. [Redacted]
 87. [Redacted]
 88. [Redacted]
 89. [Redacted]
 90. [Redacted]
 91. [Redacted]
 92. [Redacted]
 93. [Redacted]
 94. [Redacted]
 95. [Redacted]
 96. [Redacted]
 97. [Redacted]
 98. [Redacted]
 99. [Redacted]
 100. [Redacted]
 101. [Redacted]
 102. [Redacted]
 103. [Redacted]
 104. [Redacted]
 105. [Redacted]
 106. [Redacted]

Deirdre (Joe Latorre) TSO. 6

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro 1171
 108. MORALES David S. 3643
 110. (NEWMASER, Harry Richard) 111
 111. (NASARENKO, Michael) 111
 112. PIEPER, Harry C. 3-13-63
 113. PHILLIPS, William D. 2610
 114. GREENE, Harris
 115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas 111
 116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw 111
 117. FRANK, Maryado 40-1
 118. MOORE, Robert Butler 4271
 119. PRIBANYEC, Janos 111
 120. None 03
 121. (RASTENIS, Jonas) 111
 122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene 1077
 123. RAUS, Juri 154
 124. RIKAND, Enno 111
 125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt) 111
 126. (RATCLIFF, Richard) 111
 127. REEVES, John M. Jr. 10691
 129. (REYNOLDS, Robert E.) 111
 131. (RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr.) 10764
 133. (SULLIVAN, Dennis B.) 15-3591
 136. (STAROSTENKO, Henry) 111
 137. (IMLER, Norman C.) 1052
 138. SLEEPER, Gordon 111
 139. None
 140. None
 141. (GONZALO, QUESADA Jr.) 111
 142. SAGER, John 4122 - N-122
 143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrell - 48-338
 144. SLENYS, Lindas K. 111
 145. (SOLNZEFF, Henry) 111
 146. SOLER, Eva Diana 111
 147. SATINSKAS, Henry 111
 148. STEVENS, George A. 18-331
 149. WALLIN, Jack
 150. (TASHEFF, Mary) 11184

TRUE

151. (AIMAN, James Henry) 111 48
 152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P. 111
 153. TALLEY, Ulo 111
 154. TURK, Leo L. 111
 156. (THOMAS, Edward) 111
 157. None
 158. TRIANOSKY, Harry 349
 159. VINING, James L. 15-557
 160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald 111
 161. HARVEY, William K. 111
 162. BULIK, Joseph 3714
 163. WILL, Kenneth John 48-331
 164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr. 148
 165. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-301
 166. MERTZ, Richard 111
 167. None
 168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw 111
 169. (ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)) 111

(LODYSEVSKY, 111) 06
 111

R.C. 74271. ACKER, Gerald
 48-338 2. ADLARD, Glennon Edward
 116613. ANGER, Paul Rodger
 48-338 4. AIVNEY, Matt
 48-338 5. ASHBORNE, Howard Clark
 NR 6. AUDISTO, Mario
 NR 7. BARKER, Algis
 48-338 8. BARNARD, James Winston
 8435-NR 9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
 NR 10. BARRETO, John Raymond
 13915-NR 11. BAUER, William John
 NR 12. BAUGH, William James
 48-338 13. BELT, William Henry
 NR 14. BENTON, Alan
 NR 15. BEHUCK, Karl Donald
 14317 NR 16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
 P-168 17. BERGSON, William Kinander
 48-338 18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
 7217 NR 19. BEST, Alexander
 (RC) K-317 20. BINSWANGER, Stanley Joe
 C-1737 NR 21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
 48-338 22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
 11667 23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
 2219 NR 24. BRICK, Robert Lee
 5871K 25. BRICKHAM, Tad S.
 NR 26. BRIGGS, Herb
 C-1734/P-120 27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
 8447 NR 28. BRUTON, William Emmott
 9181 NR 29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
 5385 NR 30. CARNEY, Peter
 48-338 32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton
 2544 NR 33. CLINE, William David
 14337 NR 34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
 5-1656 35. CROWE, Andrew Paul
 3037 NR 36. CURBELO, Eduardo
 T-421 37. DAILEY, James
 NR 38. DERANSKI, Vincent Joseph
 7168 39. DELAINE, William Alan
 9540 NR 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
 NR 41. DE LONG, Constantino
 48-338 42. DONAINE, William Henry
 1130 43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
 9564 44. DUBOIS, Rene E. ARMY
 RC-1655-NR 45. EIGELSON, Frank Joseph
 10016 NR 46. ELMONT, Rudolf Albert
 1433 NR 47. ELLEGOR, William Monroe
 NR 48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
 11549. FARON, Charles Andrew
 RC-2535 NR 50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
 5561 48-338 51. FITSMES, Lucian Charles
 15765/6 52. FLICK, Charles E.

NR 53. FORDACCH, John Norman
 7426 54. FROST, Frank
 48-338 55. FRYLICK, Robert Peter
 48-338 56. GENGARO, Charles Henry
 48-338 57. GENISMAN, Aubrey Lyle
 NR 58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
 25-211 59. GUDING-MARGAIN, Carlos
 K-969 60. HABER, Frantisek
 5-154 61. HAILE, William Mark
 NR 62. HALL, Roberta Shirley
 NR 63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph
 NR 64. HARRISON, Louise
 NR 65. HASKINS, John Martin
 11747 66. HEBERTEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
 9927 67. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
 NR 68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark
 48-338 70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer
 NR 71. IRVING, Andrew
 NR 72. JACOBS, Stephan
 NR 73. JAMES, Nicholas
 NR 74. JARECKI, Stanley
 NR 75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
 7428 76. JENKINS, Ivar
 NR 77. JUDD, Nicholas
 (C-211) 78. KACKMAN, Benjamin Franklin
 79. KARLOQUIST, Paul
 NR 80. KASARIAN, Zigurds
 NR 81. KELLY, Myron
 NR 82. KEMBALL, Paul
 NR 83. KERNER, George Michael
 NR 84. KERESICK, Walter
 NR 85. KIMNEY, Jack Anthony
 8017 86. KINSLOW, John William
 NR 87. KOLA, Walter
 NR 88. KOSTIK, Joseph
 NR 89. LANSING, John
 10550 92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen ARMY
 NR 93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest
 6570 NR 94. LEMART, Charles Edward
 NR 95. LOWE, Myron
 NR 96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
 10333 97. LYONS, George H. ARMY
 NR 98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph
 NR 99. MALAERE, Howland Edward
 NR 100. MALOHOFF, Serge
 NR 101. MARSCHATT, Ruben
 459 102. MARSAL, Earl
 25-557 103. MASCHIGAN, Andrew Frank
 C-2994 104. MASON, Frank
 NR 105. MCADAM, George Thomas
 NR 106. MCCAVIN, Gerald, Joseph

ALIAS

NR107. (MENICUCCI, Andrew Robert) 07 7797
 3643108. (MIRANDA, Diego S.)
 NR110. NACHBRUNN, Harry Richard
 NR111. NASH, Mike
 NR112. (PANOCK, Harry Charles) 07 3-134-633 48-358156
 NR113. PAPPS, William David 3610
 NR114. PARKER, Carl Frank
 NR115. PASTOR, Nick
 NR116. PAULSON, Marty
 NR117. PEVER, Laura Jean 4021 (R) K-2395
 NR118. POLACEK, Henry Franklin 4271 N-122162
 NR119. POLING, Janos 48-358163
 NR120. RAHILL, Richard Kent 14856
 NR121. RANALLO, Jonas
 NR122. RATCLIFF, Matthew Edward 10739
 25-15123. REED, Juri
 NR124. REESE, Eno
 NR125. REESE, Joseph Anthony
 NR126. RESTELLER, Richard Lawrence 13315
 127. (ROBERTS, John Martin Jr.)
 NR129. ROGERS, Robert E. 07
 NR130. [REDACTED]
 NR131. [REDACTED] (NR) 731. ROTTUM, Lowell Owen Jr.
 NR133. SAKIN, Edmond Abel 25-3541
 NR134. [REDACTED]
 NR135. [REDACTED]
 NR136. SEALE, Henry
 NR137. SEALY, Robert Ruben 8652
 1163138. SELFE, Gordon Dale ARMY
 NR139. SHALER, Floyd A.
 NR140. SHIPLEY, Charles Joseph
 NR141. SHOWCROFT, Richard E.
 112142. (SIMPSON, John) 07 DEF 4192
 NR143. SIROTA, Edward G. 2-PC K-S371
 NR144. SLATER, Lawrence
 NR145. SNYDER, Gene 13713
 NR146. None
 NR147. SORENSON, Henry
 115148. STANDARD, George Adam
 NR149. (STATEN, Samuel Addison) 07
 150. XASHEX, STEPHENS, Marina T. 11184

ALIAS

48-358151. STEVENS, James Henry
 NR152. None
 NR153. None
 NR154. TANIER, Lester Lewis
 NR155. [REDACTED]
 NR156. TOGGITT, Edward J.
 NR157. TORREY, Erasmus
 349158. TRABAN, Gregorio R.
 N-113159. VALCHIN, James Louis
 NR160. VAN CHADDE, Donald
 NR161. (WALKER, William) 07
 N-122162. WELK, Joseph Reinhold
 48-358163. WIDEGREN, Keith J.
 14856 NR164. WILLEMS, Brenton Wall
 NR165. WISHFORD, Roy Furniss
 NR166. WOLF, Frederick Morris
 NR167. WONG, Lam
 NR168. ZEAMAN, Myron
 NR169. (ZIMMER, Paul R.) 07

R.C. 74271. ACKER, Gerald
 48-558 2. ADLARD, Glenmon Edward
 1160 73. ANGER, Paul Rodger
 48-338 4. AIVNEY, Matt
 K-763/48-338 5. ASHEPPE, Howard Clay
 NR 6. AUDISTO, Mario
 NR 7. BARKER, Algis
 48-338 8. BARNAUD, James Winston
 8435-NR 9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
 NR 10. BARRITO, John Raymond
 13915-NR 11. BAWER, William John
 NR 12. BAUGH, William James
 48-338 13. BELT, William Henry
 NR 14. BENTON, Alan
 NR 15. BENUCK, Karl Donald
 14317 NR 16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
 P-168 17. BERGSON, William Kinander
 7-77 18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
 NR 19. BEST, Alexander
 (RC) K-21720 (T) BINSWANGER, Stanley Joe
 C-173 21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
 48-338 22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
 1160 23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
 22 19 24. BRICK, Robert Leo
 6871K 25. BRICKHAM, Tad S.
 NR 26. BRIGGS, Herb
 C-1734/P-128 27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
 8447 NR 28. BRUTON, William Emmott
 9181 NR 29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
 5385 NR 30. CARNEY, Peter
 NR 31. [REDACTED]
 48-338 32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton
 2544 NR 33. CLINE, William David
 14337 NR 34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
 5-1648 35. CROWE, Andrew Paul
 2037 36. CURBELO, Eduardo
 T-421 37. DAILEY, James
 NR 38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
 7168 39. DELAINE, William Alan
 9540 NR 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
 NR 41. DE LONG, Constantine
 48-338 42. DONAINE, William Henry
 1130 43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
 9564 44. [DUBOIS, Rene E.] ARMY
 KC-11655 NR 45. EXELSON, Frank Joseph
 10016 NR 46. ELMONT, Rudolf Albert
 1543 NR 47. ELIEGOR, William Monroe
 NR 48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
 1549 NR 49. FARON, Charles Andrew
 RC-2535 NR 50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
 5561 48-338 51. FITSAMES, Lucian Charles
 15765/C-299 52. FLICK, Charles E.

NR 53. FORNACOFF, John Norman
 7426 54. FROST, Frank
 48-338 55. FRYLICK, Robert Peter
 48-338 56. GELGARD, Charles Henry
 57. GENISHAN, Aubrey Lyle
 NR 58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
 25-21159. GUDING-MARGAIN, Carlos
 K-46760. HABER, Frantisek
 5-154761. HAIR, William Mark
 NR 62. HAIY, Roberta Shirley
 NR 63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph
 NR 64. HARRISON, Louise
 NR 65. HASKINS, John Martin
 11747 66. HEBERTEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
 992767. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
 NR 68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark
 NR 69. [REDACTED]
 48-338 70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer
 NR 71. IRVING, Andrew
 NR 72. JACOBS, Stephan
 NR 73. JAMES, Nicholas
 NR 74. JARECKI, Stanley
 NR 75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
 742876 (T) JENKINS, Ivar
 NR 77. JUDD, Nicholas
 (C-277) (310) 78. KACKAK, Benjamin Franklin
 79. KARLOQUIST, Paul
 NR 80. KASABIAN, Zigurds
 NR 81. KELLY, Myron
 NR 82. KENDALL, Paul
 NR 83. KERNER, George Michael
 NR 84. KERKSICK, Walter
 NR 85. KINNEY, Jack Anthony
 801 86. KINSLOW, John William
 NR 87. KOLA, Walter
 NR 88. KOSTER, Joseph
 NR 89. [REDACTED]
 NR 90. LANSING, John
 NR 91. [REDACTED]
 10550 92. [LEE, Watson Hwa Shen] ARMY
 NR 93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest
 6570 94. LEMART, Charles Edward
 NR 95. LOWE, Myron
 NR 96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
 10333 97. LYONS, George H. ARMY
 NR 98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph
 NR 99. MALABRE, Howland Edward
 NR 100. MALOKOFF, Serge
 NR 101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben
 454 102. MARSAL, Karl
 25-557 103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
 C-2994 104. MASON, Frank
 NR 105. MCADAM, George Thomas
 NR 106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald, Joseph

1. ASARIS, Gendaris *PK*
2. AASAL, Glen *6175*
3. SHERWOOD, John *11007*
4. ADKINS, Matt *48-336*
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay *PK 11057-6-7-8*
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia *PK*
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algis *PK*
8. BROWN, James W. *47430 11212*
9. SPEND, Horace *MI 8435*
10. Anthrill-L (Crypt) *PK Julio Kauri Barreto*
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. *13915*
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. *PK*
13. DEALE, W. H. *48-336*
14. BENAS, Alis *PK*
15. BECKET, Jerome F. *PK - 12871*
16. ERICKSON, Paul *14317*
17. KINANDER, James F. *PK*
18. BANQUIN, Casimiro *7777*
19. BECKER, Alexander *PK*
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe *PK 11007*
21. BURKE, Paul J. *7497*
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward *48-336*
23. SHERWOOD, John *11007*
24. MELBERG, Robert L. *2219*
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore *6777*
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert *PK*
27. BURKE, Paul J. *8497*
28. BLAIR, William *9181*
29. CUMMINGHAM, James Allen Jr. *5211*
30. CHAS, Peter *PK*
31. ~~_____~~
32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton *48-336*
33. CAREY, William David *4874*
34. CARTER, William R. *14317*
35. CROCE, Andrew *4874*
36. FLORES, Thomas J. *2031*
37. DAIGA, Janis *PK T-421*
38. DALEY, V. J. *PK*
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. *7168*
40. DILLON, John E. *9540*
41. DE GARDER, Constantine *PK*
42. DENTONS, William E. *12465*
43. DALY, Vincent S. *11307*
44. DUBOIS, Rene E. *9544*
45. EGAN, Frank J. *PK*
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A. *10015*
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr. *PK 11057-6-7-8*
48. None *✓*
49. HEATH, Donald R. *PK*
50. FUCHS, Robert H. *PK*
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr. *5741*
52. FLICK, Charles E. *17765*

53. ~~_____~~
54. ~~_____~~
55. ~~_____~~
56. ~~_____~~
57. ~~_____~~
58. ~~_____~~
59. ~~_____~~
60. ~~_____~~
61. ~~_____~~
62. ~~_____~~
63. HUNT, Howard *PK 9 1088*
64. None *✓*
65. HARKINS, Jack *PK*
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. *11749*
67. HILDALGO, Barney
68. HEWITT, Thomas M. *9922*
69. ~~_____~~
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward *PK 11057-6-7-8*
71. IWASKIN, Andrij *PK*
72. JENCOSK, Stephen *PK*
73. JANCIUK, Nicholas *PK*
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. *PK*
75. JAMZEMIS, Ulois *PK*
76. JOANSON, Ivar *PK 7428*
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai *PK*
78. KYKER, Benjamin Franklin *3111*
79. KAPUSTA, Peter *10078*
80. KARKLINS, Zigurds *PK*
81. KRYZANINSKY, Myron *PK*
82. KOCELA, Paul *PK*
83. KAPPES, G. *10078 George M*
84. KURTZ, Walter *PK*
85. KIDA, Jack *10078*
86. KENNEDY, John W. *PK*
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter *PK*
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph *PK 25-102*
89. ~~_____~~
90. LAMBERGS, John *PK*
91. ~~_____~~
92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen *10580*
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest *5824*
94. KLEIN, Theodore *570*
95. LOPUSZANSKY, Myrosław *47-5*
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae *PK*
97. Unknown *✓*
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. *48-336*
99. CHIPMAN, Harold E. *7168*
100. MASLOVSKY, Sergy *T-835*
101. MARTINEZ, Ruben *10078*
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr. *4593*
103. MOORE, Andrew F. *PK 25-*
104. MARSACK, Frank *PK 2994*
105. KRIESFELD, George *PK*
106. MULANE, Corrald J *PK 2*

Donal L. Latorre TSD. 60

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7777
 108. MORALES David S. 3643
 110. NEWMASER, Harry Richard PR
 111. NASARENKO, Michael PR
 112. PIEPER, Harry C. 3-12-633
 113. PHILLIPS, William D. 2610
 114. GREENE, Harris
 115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas PR
 116. PAWLYSZYN, Myrosław PR
 117. FRANK, Maryado 42-1
 118. MOORE, Robert Butler 4271
 119. PRIBANYEC, Janos PR
 120. None ✓
 121. RASTENIS, Jonas PR
 122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene 1027
 123. RAUS, Juri 27154
 124. RIKAND, Enno PR
 125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt) NR
 126. RATCLIFF, Richard 2718
 127. REEVES, John M. Jr. 10691
 129. REYNOLDS, Robert E. PR
 131. RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr. 10764
 133. SULLIVAN, Dennis B. 25-3591
 136. STAROSTENKO, Henry PR
 137. IMLER, Norman C. 2052
 138. SLEEPER, Gordon 11055
 139. None ✓
 140. None ✓
 141. GONZALO, QUESADA Jr. PR
 142. SAGER, John 4192 - N-122
 143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrell - 48-338
 144. SLENYS, Linds K. PR
 145. SOLNZEFF, Henry 12723
 146. SOLER, Eva Diana PR
 147. SATINSKAS, Henry PR
 148. STEVENS, George A. 12-338
 149. WALLIN, Jack PR
 150. TASHEFF, Mary 11184

TRUE

151. AIMA, James Henry PR 48
 152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P. 1125
 153. TALLEY, Ulo PR
 154. TURK, Leo L. 48-338
 156. THOMAS, Edward 48-338
 157. None ✓
 158. TRIANOSKY, Harry 349
 159. VINING, James L. 25-557
 160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald PR
 161. HARVEY, William K. R.C. 237
 162. BULIK, Joseph 3714
 163. WILL, Kenneth John 48-338
 164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr. 48-338
 165. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-3011
 166. MERTZ, Richard 2601
 167. None ✓
 168. ZANKIN, Myrosław PR
 169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)

LOD 46505812-0000
 PR-1

OGC 74-1755

SECRET

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"**

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff, and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt, his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know. We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974. These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation, the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the use of electronic surveillance.

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3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.

4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassified items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his advertising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.


5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

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manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.


JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS

OGC:JDM:sin
Original - OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 - Chrono

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20 October 1976

RETURN TO CIA
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06
Mr. (Emmett M. Steele) President
(International Art Associates, Ltd.)

06
Dear Mr. (Steele,)

08
This document is intended to confirm discussions held between yourself, representing (International Art Associates, Ltd.), hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Mr. John J. Murray, Jr., representing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). If it conforms to your understanding of the agreement reached, kindly so acknowledge by signing below.

1. You have agreed on behalf of the Company to assist CIA by placing on retainer Mr. Richard T. Gibson at an annual fee of \$9,000 per annum. This fee will be paid to Mr. Gibson by the Company in monthly increments of \$750 each. The Company will overtly negotiate a retainer contract with Mr. Gibson, which will make eminently clear that both are negotiating and concluding the contract as independent parties; that the Company will have no obligation to withhold Federal, state or Social Security income taxes.

2. In consideration of the support rendered, CIA will pay the Company a fee of \$10,000 per annum. Provision is made in this amount to offset any nominal expenses the firm incurs in its overt associations or support of Mr. Gibson.

3. CIA will reimburse the Company in quarterly increments via a contrived contractual arrangement between the Company and a notional facility of CIA. Cancelled checks will serve as adequate accounting for monies paid the Company.

4. Because of CIA's interest in Mr. Gibson, it is requested that the Company neither offer Mr. Gibson bona fide employment nor accept any proposal of employment from him without prior consent of CIA for a period of two (2) years following termination of this agreement.

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4/12/76

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5. All information relating to this Agreement is classified secret. Both CIA and the Company agree that the most stringent safeguards will be taken to protect this information, including the existence of the agreement. Any information in any form that must be given to a third party by either CIA or the Company will be done in strict conformance with the laws safeguarding national security information, and only with full consultation between CIA and the Company.

6. This agreement is effective 1 October 1976 and shall remain in full effect for an indefinite period, subject to cancellation at any time upon sixty (60) days' notice by either party thereto.

The CIA wishes to express its appreciation for the manner in which you have received this request to perform a service related to the national security of the United States and for your personal attention thereto.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY

Special Contracting Officer

International Art Associates, Ltd.)

Emmett M. Steele, President

Date

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HSCA Request Ltr 8 May 1978 OLC 78-1573

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INCLUSIVE DATES: Directorate of S & T Memo 22 June 1978

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1	Scott Breckenridge, OLC		
2	6D15, Hqs.		
3			
4			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE
AFO/DDS&T, 6E60, Hqs., x6561			

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Top Secret

(Security Classification)
E2 IMPDET

SC-01836-78

Copy 1

22 JUN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel
ATTENTION : Scott Breckenridge
SUBJECT : HSCA Request
REFERENCE : HSCA Letter Dated 8 May 78, OLC 78-1573

1. (U) Reference requests access to information in six areas pertaining to the U-2 Project. As you know the U-2 Project files include about 150 boxes and over 650 reels of microfilm, all located at the Records Center. We have reviewed the shelf listing titles to identify pertinent files that might be responsive to the areas of request. The information requested covers an era and an organization which was not a part of this Directorate. As a result much of the corporate memory is no longer available and research of the files by current personnel is time consuming and requires almost a learning process. We have depended a great deal on the written History of the U-2 Project for leads to files and for information contained in this memorandum.

2. (U) The primary interest of reference refers to the U-2 Project, Detachment C, while stationed in Atsugi, Japan. Attached are replies keyed to the six areas in the HSCA letter.

3. (U) We realize that the information supplied by this memorandum does not fully respond to all the areas requested. Because of the broad and encompassing nature of some of the requests in the HSCA letter and the fact that our files are not organized to readily respond to such broad requests we request that the HSCA staff review the material and determine if their requests could be limited or narrowed in some way.

Thomas G. Ward, Jr.

Thomas G. Ward
Acting Executive Officer
Directorate of
Science and Technology

Attachments:
As stated

May be downgraded to
Unclassified when
removed from attachment.
CL BY: 469804

Attachment To:
SC-01836-78SUBJECT: DDS&T Interim Reply to HSCA Request, 8 May 78,
OLC 78-1573

General Background: Detachment C advance party of security and communication personnel departed the U.S. for Atsugi, Japan, on 20 February 1957, the second echelon of administrative personnel departed 4 March, and the main body of the detachment with two U-2 aircraft and equipment began deployment on 15 March. On 29 March Headquarters was notified that all personnel and equipment were on base. Operational readiness was forecast for the week of 8 April. Operating procedures and liaison had been accomplished with the following major U.S. components:

Far East Air Force 13-3
Far East Command and Theater Commander
Agency's (Tokyo Station) and local support unit
54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron
Atsugi Naval Air Station

Details or specific operating agreements or procedures with the above components have not been located.

By mid-May 1957 the Detachment had flown 30 sorties. All of these operations were preparations for the primary mission of the Detachment. The first primary mission of the Detachment, a flight over part of the USSR, occurred on 20 June 1957, however, this mission did not originate or recover at Atsugi.

The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi occurred on 1 March 1958 and this flight was the only and last flight. This flight, as other previous flights by other Detachments, was tracked by Russian radar, even though the U-2 aircraft had anti-radar applications, and a Soviet protest was made on 5 March 1958 by the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Mikhail Menshikov. Attached are copies of the Soviet Aide Memoires of 5 March and 21 April 1958 (Tab A).

The Detachment continued to perform non-USSR missions in the Far East area until the Powers flight of 1 May 1960. Redeployment of the Detachment began in early July, the last U-2 aircraft departed Japan on 9 July and all personnel and other equipment cleared the base and turned the facilities back to the Navy on 19 August 1960.

During the deployment of Detachment C it performed approximately 86 operational missions, of these only 43 originated and recovered at Atsugi.

1. Any and all information pertaining to the take-offs and landings of the U-2 at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

We have been unable to locate files which would contain logs of all take-offs and landings of the U-2 aircraft assigned to Detachment C. In addition to the mission flights stated above we must assume that there were a large number of take-offs and landings which would include flights for pilot familiarization, training, equipment testing, transitional and flights (purely for cover purposes.) 32

2. Any and all information concerning the radar procedures, facilities, and staff involved with the U-2 flights at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

As stated in the General Background above we have not located details or specific operating procedures or agreements with the local Navy base at Atsugi.

3. Any and all information pertaining to contact between Marine Air Control Squadron #1, Air Group II, 1st Marine Wing, and U-2 personnel at Atsugi, Japan, including but not limited to housing, recreational, and eating facilities - limited to the years 1959 through 1962.

We have not identified any relationship between Detachment C and Marine Air Control Squadron #1. On the subject of housing, we have noted that late in 1957 families were permitted at Detachment C and as a result housing was provided in the compound assigned to the Agency Support Unit and ten houses were rented on the local market.

4. Any and all information pertaining to defectors with knowledge of the U-2 program.

The DDS&T has not located any information pertaining to defectors. We defer this request to the DDO.

4/12

5. Any and all information within the U-2 program file pertaining to defectors with knowledge of the U-2 program.

See above.

6. Any and all information concerning Soviet knowledge of the U-2 program previous to May 1, 1960.

Attached is an extract from a report dated 3 March 1958 concerning Soviet Air Defense which gives a summary of Soviet knowledge of the U-2 overflights between 20 June and 10 July 1956 (Tab B).

Also attached is a copy of the Soviet protest note of 10 July 1956 concerning Mission 2013 on 4 July 1956 which was the first penetration of the Soviet borders (Tab C).

5 March 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

AIDE MEMOIRE

According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter, the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan in the area south of the Olga Bay.

The information on this violation has been carefully checked and there is no doubt as to its authenticity. The military representatives of the United States, who in this case acted possibly without the knowledge of the Government of the United States, will perhaps deny the said violation, as has happened in the past. However, such a denial cannot eliminate the fact of violation itself. In any case, the Soviet side would have no interest in commenting on this incident if it had not actually taken place.

At the present time, when negotiations are being conducted on the holding of a summit meeting which could contribute to an improvement of relations and to strengthening trust between states, the violation of the Soviet border by an American military aircraft may be evaluated as an attempt to undermine the efforts aimed at convening such a meeting and to aggravate the international situation.

From the messages of the President of the USA and his conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, as well as from statements by other government officials of the USA, it is known to the Soviet Government that the Government of the USA desires a rapprochement between our governments and improvement in the relations between them. There can hardly be any doubt that such facts of violation of the borders of the USSR can have only one result--that of hindering this cause and upsetting Soviet-American relations.

14-00000

The attention of the Government of the USA is invited to the fact that in the present situation the violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft takes on a particularly dangerous character since, as has been repeatedly reported, American military planes make flights around the clock over many countries of the world carrying thermonuclear bombs. The Government of the USA cannot fail to be aware of what genuinely catastrophic consequences for the cause of peace will ensue when an American plane with such a load will find itself shot down.

The attention of the Government of the USA has already been previously directed to cases of violation of the state boundaries of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft. However, as proven by the case cited, the authorities of the USA have not taken the necessary measures to prevent such violations.

It is absolutely obvious that it is the duty of the governments of the USSR and the USA to do everything possible to prevent any acts capable of complicating the situation and the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA.

The Soviet Government cannot but protest against the violations of Soviet frontiers by an American military aircraft and it expects that the Government of the United States will punish severely those guilty of the violation of the airspace of the USSR which has taken place and that it will take steps to prevent such violations in the future.

Taking into account the present situation, where a summit conference is being prepared, and also the spirit and purpose of the negotiations being conducted between our governments, the Soviet Government would not like to make this matter public or subject it to discussion in the UN.

The hope is expressed that this matter will be settled satisfactorily between the governments of the USSR and the USA and that there will be no need for the Soviet Government to resort to other means for its settlement.

(Initialed by M. Menshikov)

Washington, March 5, 1958

21 April 1958

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Note No. 9

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, referring to the Aide-Memoire of the Department of State dated March 31, 1958 and containing a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the Aide-Memoire of the Soviet Government dated March 5 concerning a violation of the Soviet state border in the Far East by an American military jet aircraft, has the honor to communicate the following:

In the reply Aide-Memoire of the Department of State an attempt is made to deny the fact of an American military aircraft having violated the Soviet border.

As has already been communicated, the Soviet Government has at its disposal carefully verified data on this violation, the reliability of which leaves no room for doubt. According to these data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 a.m. Moscow time, an American military reconnaissance aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement Velikaya Kema, 32 kilometers south of that settlement. Then the violating aircraft deeply penetrated the airspace of the USSR and, after remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time, passed beyond the limits of the Soviet territory 45 kilometers south of the Olga Bay at 8:11 a.m.

In the light of the established facts the reply of the Government of the United States of America can in no way be recognized as satisfactory. Naturally, the question arises as to how to explain such a reply of the American Government: whether it was misled deliberately by its military representatives in the Far East or whether it considered it possible to protect such persons subordinate to it, who, without regard to the possible consequences, sanction violation of Soviet borders, thus creating a threat of international complications.

14-00000

Such a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the communication of the Soviet Government cannot fail to cause serious concern, the more so since the new case of violation of Soviet airspace took place after warnings on the part of the Government of the USSR to the effect that American authorities should take the necessary steps to prevent such violations.

In connection with the foregoing the Soviet Government expects that the Government of the United States of America will undertake further investigation of this act of violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft and will punish severely those guilty of this violation.

The Soviet Government also expects that the Government of the United States of America will take the necessary steps to prevent violations of Soviet airspace by American aircraft in the future and states that in the event of new violations full responsibility for their consequences will rest with the Government of the United States.

Washington, D. C. . April 1958



SC-02164-58

Summary of Initial Missions

In the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense system was subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven occurring within a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that ²⁴ (COMINT) provides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet system. This is important because it is clear from REGAL material that ²⁴ considerable air defense business is conducted over landlines and thus not observed by COMINT. However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:

1. In spite of the fact that these missions come as a surprise, none of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their radar coverage extends above (72,000) feet.

24

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SC-02164-58

2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action. One positive action was the standdown of civil flights while the mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which is believed related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft into East Germany and Poland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved into Hungary at about this time.

3. The performance of the Soviet system on the 5 July mission, 2014, was indeed curious. While the action evident from COMINT²⁴ is not clear an explanation which appears to fit the known facts is offered as follows: As a result of the previous missions, the Soviets had concluded the essential facts concerning the missions, i.e., that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew above 65,000²⁴ feet, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow was possible. They probably surmised that the 5 July mission was headed for Moscow when the track appeared on a northeasterly heading. The loss of the target when it entered Soviet territory was probably deliberate and the "red herring" track returning to the west was either a dodge or a convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for all the system to see that a "hostile or intruder" was coming over Moscow with no means available to stop it. This idea is supported by the use of a raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point where the track had been "lost". In addition, the track was not labeled "hostile or intruder" when it was broadcast after it had passed beyond Moscow. The reporting of the track when it did appear was only by Moscow and it has been suggested that other stations had been instructed not to broadcast the track. Further, it may or may not be a coincidence that the height broadcast was almost exactly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but on the next missions, four days later, the altitude reporting was consistently above 50,000 feet. 99

4. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recognition of the great height of the mission flights, tracking was better and in general the performance of the warning system was much improved.

5. The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning system closed a 3000 mile track with only two short periods of confusion or track loss. Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feet with one plot passed 68,800 which was only 100 feet off target. 99

6. The first eight missions proved that the air defense warning system is deployed in depth. This was evident from both the continuity of track and most forcefully from the ELINT data collected. Some 1461 intercepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 mc/s band were obtained by project ELINT as follows: TOKEN-1331, WHIFF-37, GAGE-26, PATTY CAKE-37, Other 30. These numbers cannot be equated to individual radar sets since the same radar may be intercepted more than once. 618 TOKEN sites were located, including 213 new sites. Some 343 additional TOKEN signals were identified but available information does not permit determination of location so that it must be concluded that these signals include both known and new sites. Because of the limitation of ELINT to the 3000 mc/s band and the Soviet practice of collocating radars on different frequencies the total number of radars may be expected to be at least double the number of sites. 49

SC-02164-58

7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point has not been determined because of insufficient data.

8. The question of radars for height finding, the capabilities of TOKEN in this role, the introduction of ROCK CAKES and later developments are discussed in another section. It is believed, however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction of ROCK CAKES.



(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

10 July 1956

Note No. 23

The Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, acting on instructions from the Soviet Government, has the honor to state the following:

According to precisely verified data, on July 4 of this year, at 8:18 a.m. Moscow Time, a twin-engined medium bomber of the United States Air Force appeared from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany and flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, entering the air space of the Soviet Union from the direction of the Polish People's Republic at 9:35 in the area of Grodno. The aircraft which violated the air space of the Soviet Union flew on the route Minsk, Vilnyus, Kaunas and Kaliningrad, penetrating territory of the Soviet Union to the depth of 320 kilometers and remaining over such territory for one hour and 32 minutes.

On July 5 of this year, at 7:41 Moscow Time, a twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force, coming from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany, flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and at 8:54 penetrated the air space of the Soviet Union in the area of Brest, coming from the direction of the Polish People's Republic. The aircraft violating the air frontier of the Soviet Union flew along the route Brest, Pinsk Baranovich, Kaunas, and Kaliningrad, having penetrated Soviet territory to a depth of 150 kilometers and having remained one hour and 20 minutes over such territory. The same day another twin-engine bomber of the United States Air Force

Department of State of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.

invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and penetrated to a significant depth over Soviet territory.

On July 9 there took place new flights of United States aircraft into the Soviet air space.

The above-mentioned violation of the air frontiers of the Soviet Union by American aircraft cannot be interpreted as other than intentional and conducted for purposes of reconnaissance.

It must be underscored that these gross violations of the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of international tensions has been achieved, when relations between governments are improving, and when mutual confidence between them is growing. Such a development of international relations is fully supported by the peoples of all countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.

One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of countries are worried by the relaxation of international tension which has taken place. These circles do everything possible to interfere with further improvement of relations between countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union, which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government energetically protests to the Government of the United States against such gross violation of the air space of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft and considers this violation as an intentional act of certain circles in the United States, planned to aggravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

14-00000

Calling the attention of the Government of the United States to the inadmissibility of such violations of the air space of the Soviet Union by American aircraft, the Soviet Government states that all responsibility for possible consequences of such violations rests with the Government of the United States.

The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken by the Government of the United States to punish those guilty for the said violations and to prevent such violations in the future.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Robert D. Clark
Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT: PDLADLE: Outside Lawyer to Draw Up
Deed of Trust

1. PDLADLE is a high-level defector residing in New York who has had advanced to him a number of large "loans" over the years, in addition to his "salary." Some of these monies have gone into the purchase of some real estate in the State of New York. The Agency now wants a Deed of Trust executed in favor of one of its nominees on the New York real property.

2. Possible lawyers to handle drafting the Deed of Trust are:

- a. ⁰⁶(Natalie Koether), a cleared N.Y. lawyer, on whom FR Division has an operational approval. They have an active interest in using her and her husband. If ⁰⁸(Ms. Koether) is used on the Deed of Trust, FR would lose an asset. Were it not for our rule of no operational use of cleared attorneys, FR apparently (accordingly to Eric Sowers) has no objection to ⁰⁶(Ms. Koether) drawing up the Deed of Trust;
- b. another cleared lawyer. The clearance on any such lawyer would have to be updated by Security. The best candidate Bill Ashbaugh and I were able to locate off the Cleared Attorneys Panel was ^{06, 08}(Richard C. Kullen, Jr., OS #651 162), last cleared 21 March 1975;
- c. the case officer for PDLADLE, MONCURE, who is apparently a practicing N.Y. lawyer who at one time worked for the Agency. This idea was suggested by Vasia Gmirkin of CI Staff, the client component on the Deed of Trust. The idea would be that since MONCURE already knows that PDLADLE and MONCURE would be used only on this PDLADLE job, the security and cover problems normally associated with allowing cleared attorneys to become involved in operations would not be as pronounced as

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usual. On the other hand, his prior association with the Agency could jeopardize PDLADLE if drafting the Deed of Trust exposes MONCURE to more scrutiny than his present association with PDLADLE already does; and

- d. an attorney from OGC. N.Y. mortgage law would have to be researched to try to make the Deed of Trust freely assignable from one CIA nominee to another. N.Y. form books should be easily locatable in the D.C. law libraries. If the Deed of Trust follows N.Y. form, would the fact that the OGC lawyer is not licensed in N.Y. in any way throw doubt on the document? When might the name of the lawyer who drafted the document come to light?



Robert D. Clark

RDC: kas

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1 - RDC Signer

1 - Chrono

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SUBJECT: Sam Jaffe

1. Sam Jaffe's relationship with the Agency predates his assignment to Moscow as an ABC correspondent. During the period 1958-60 while in New York Jaffe was a confidential informant of the FBI on his Soviet contacts in New York. In addition, he had several meetings with the New York office of CIA's Domestic Contact Division. While in Moscow with ABC Jaffe felt he was the subject of a recruitment attempt by the KGB in 1962. He recounted his story to the Regional Security Officer at the American Embassy in Moscow, copies of which went to both CIA and FBI. Jaffe covered the Gary Powers' trial for ABC and flew on the same plane from New York to Moscow with the Barbara Powers' party. Prior to that trip he was briefed by a CIA psychologist on ways to observe Powers's behavior and demeanor. Jaffe was never "ordered" to cover the Powers' trial, but simply acted as an enterprising newspaperman befriending Barbara Powers while her party was enroute and in the Soviet Union.

2. During the latter part of his time in Moscow Jaffe was in contact with a KGB officer, Kuvkov, and this relationship is a matter of record with the FBI. There is some evidence that Jaffe was given preferential treatment by the Soviet authorities. Some western pressmen felt that Jaffe, as an aggressive newspaperman, was giving a little to get a story. Jaffe has given his version of his dealings with the KGB in a lengthy 1969 interview with the FBI.

3. The defector Nosenko provided information on Jaffe's relationship to the KGB in 1964. However as time went on, further debriefings of Nosenko indicated that Nosenko was not as sure about Jaffe's relationship as he had been originally. By 1968 Nosenko was positive only that Kuvkov had been in touch with Jaffe, but Nosenko was not certain that Jaffe was a paid and witting agent of the KGB.

4. During Jaffe's tour in Hong Kong, and subsequently in Washington, he was in touch with CIA officers. He provided good information on a [Chinese] news official and he was helpful to the Agency in reporting on a [Canadian] organization, [The Committee of New China Policy]. All [official] contact with Jaffe ended in 1971. 08 28 24

5. Central to Jaffe's charges about CIA, which he has made public many times, is Jaffe's belief that the CIA passed derogatory information about him to his employers. Attached is a 24 November 1975 letter from Mr. Colby to Jaffe which states categorically that no information in the CIA files had ever been passed outside of official channels. In addition to this letter Jaffe has been reassured on this point verbally on at least four other occasions. The CIA is positive that Jaffe's recall from Hong Kong in 1968

14-00000
and subsequent dismissal by ABC, are not related to any action taken by the CIA..

6. In discussions with Jaffe he frequently recounts a conversation he had with Mr. [Ted Cowen, a British intelligence official] in Hong Kong. 06/08 According to Jaffe, [Cowen] told him that he had a "security problem" but 06 this problem would clear up in due course. A close check of our files can not elucidate what [Cowen] was talking about. It is possible, of course, 06 that [Cowen] was alluding to the Nosenko allegations as [the British] were 06, 11 given much of the Nosenko debriefings. The record is unclear on this point. However, based on information available to this Agency, we feel we have tried to pacify Jaffe with the statement contained in the Colby letter that we have no evidence he has ever been an agent of any foreign intelligence service.

7. Jaffe has submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to CIA which has resulted in the release of a large number of documents to him. Jaffe can, of course, appeal our withholding of certain documents through appropriate administrative and judicial procedures under the FOIA.

SECRET

10 March 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Robert D. Clark
Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT: Meeting in New York: PDLADLE

On 2 March 1978, the undersigned and Vasia Gmerkin of CI Staff met in New York City with the defector [REDACTED] and his wife [REDACTED] at the apartment of Bernard MONCURE. There [REDACTED] put a first mortgage on a New York City property of theirs located at 163 East 71st Street, New York, New York, in favor of a devised facility nominee of the Agency, ²⁴ (Roush-Walker Company, 48 Alabama Street, S.W.), Atlanta, Georgia, for a recited indebtedness of \$167,429.88. They signed a classified document acknowledging that the devised facility is an instrumentality of the United States Government. This document was witnessed in alias by Mr. Gmerkin and the undersigned. [REDACTED] registered strenuous objections to the "mortgage."



Robert D. Clark

RDC: kas

Distribution:

- Original - DEFECTORS
- 1 - RDC Signer
- 1 - Chrono

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STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF NEW YORK

SS:

On the 2nd day of MARCH 1978, before me personally came [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] husband and wife,

to me known to be the individual s described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that they executed the same.

STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF

SS:

On the day of 19 , before me personally came to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and say that he resides at No.

that he is the of

, the corporation described in and which executed the foregoing instrument; that he knows the seal of said corporation; that the seal affixed to said instrument is such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of the board of directors of said corporation, and that he signed his name thereto by like order.

STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF

SS:

On the day of 19 , before me personally came

to me known to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that executed the same.

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STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF

SS:

On the day of 19 , before me personally came the subscribing witness to the foregoing instrument, with whom I am personally acquainted, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and say that he resides at No.

that he knows

to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument; that he, said subscribing witness, was present and saw execute the same; and that he, said witness, at the same time subscribed his name as witness thereto.

Mortgage Note

TITLE NO.

SECTION 5

BLOCK 1406

LOT 26 - Tax Map

COUNTY XXXXXX NEW YORK

Recorded at Request of
CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY

Return by Mail to

MORTG. BROD. ENG.
116 Sullivan Street
NY NY 10012
Zip No.

STANDARD FORM OF NEW YORK BOARD OF TITLE UNDERWRITERS

Distributed by

CHICAGO TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY

4/11

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STATE OF NEW YORK.

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

On this 2nd
seventy-eight

day of MARCH, in the year nineteen hundred and
before me personally came
and
to me known to be the individuals described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument, and they acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

STATE OF NEW YORK,

COUNTY OF

On this day of
before me personally came in the year nineteen hundred and

to me known, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and say that he resides at

that he is the of

the corporation described in, and which executed the above instrument; that he knows the seal
of said corporation; that the seal affixed to said instrument is such corporate seal; that it was so
affixed by order of the Board of Directors of said corporation, and that he signed name
thereto by like order.

Title No.

(Husband and Wife)

TO
ROUSH-WALKER COMPANY
48 Alabama Street, S.W.,
Atlanta, Georgia.
(30303)

MORTGAGE

Dated March 2, 1978
\$167,429.88

The land affected by the within instrument
lies in Section 5 in Block 1406 on
the Map of the County of New York
Lot 26. RECORDED AT REQUEST OF

AND RETURN BY MAIL TO:

Mario E. APED, Esq.
116 Sullivan Street
NY NY 10012

1/2

STATE OF NEW YORK,

COUNTY OF

On this day of
before me personally came in the year nineteen hundred and

to me known to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

THIS MORTGAGE, made the 2nd day of MARCH

nineteen hundred and seventy-eight, between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] husband and wife, both residents of the State of New York

RETURN TO
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24
[ROUSH-WALKER COMPANY, 48 Alabama Street, S.W.,] the mortgagor, and Atlanta, Georgia

, the mortgagee

WITNESSETH, that to secure the payment of an indebtedness in the sum of (\$167,429.88) ONE HUNDRED SIXTYSEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTYNINE ⁸⁸/₁₀₀ Dollars, lawful money of the United States, to be paid on demand,

according to a certain bond or obligation bearing even date herewith, the mortgagor hereby mortgages to the mortgagee ALL that certain plot, piece or parcel of land, with the buildings and improvements thereon erected, situate lying and being in the Borough of Manhattan, City, County and State of New York, bounded and described as follows:

BEGINNING at a point on the northerly side of 71st Street, distant 285 feet westerly from the corner formed by the intersection of the sa northerly side of 71st Street and the westerly side of Third Avenue; RUNNING THENCE northerly, parallel with Third Avenue and part of the w through a party wall, 102 feet 2 inches to the center line of the bloc THENCE westerly, along said center line of the block, 15 feet; THENCE southerly, parallel with Third Avenue and part of the way through anot party wall, 102 feet 2 inches to the northerly side of 71st Street; ar THENCE easterly, along the northerly side of 71st Street, 15 feet to the point or place of beginning.

Said premises now being known as and by Street Number 163 East 71st Street, New York, New York.

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ORIGINAL

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION:

NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND :

NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at [Camp Peary] Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is \$23,500 per year.

APPROVAL :

(1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

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RESULTS :

By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION :

NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington, periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS :

(1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

14-00000
FILES

:

Office of Security files on NOSENKO
are maintained in the following
locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.
2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would soon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.
3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.
4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: : Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

para 1 declassified
by AAL on
19 Sept 78

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

~~SECRET~~

14-00000
(C) January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.
2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

~~SECRET~~

9 OCT 1969

ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security and essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET~~

There are enclosed Forms I-135 and background data,
in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn

8 October 1969

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Date

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee

- 1 - Signer's copy
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - KR
- 1 - SB Div.
- 1 - CI Staff
- 1 - DDP
- 1 - OGC
- 2 - CS Files

~~SECRET~~

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927

Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

Male

Divorced

Brown

Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches

Soviet

Caucasian

--

~~SECRET~~

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich ROSENKO

AKA: Yuri ROSENKO

BPOB: 30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

MARITAL STATUS: 1946 - Married and divorced Elvira ROSENKO (neé SHIRKOV).
1948 - Married Angelina A. ROSENKO (neé TELEGIN), 1949 - separated and 1951 - divorced.
23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Yulianovna ROSENKO (neé KOZRETYUKOVA), January 1954 - separated and 1969 - divorced.

CHILDREN: Daughters - Oksana ROSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara ROSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)

EDUCATION: 1942-1943 - Attended various USSR Naval Schools.
1943-1955 - Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.

EMPLOYMENT: March 1951-March 1953 - Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence).
March 1953-February 1954 - Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).

MILITARY: Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.

NATIONALITY: Soviet

PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS: 1943-1954 - Member Komsomol, USSR
1954 - Candidate Communist Party
1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence
in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of operational interest~~
to this Agency. Therefore, it is requested subject's
parole to this Agency be extended for an additional
period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of
his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much ap-
preciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED
TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

FROM

Chief, SR Division

EXTENSION

5777

NO.

DATE

13 February 1964

TO (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

DD/OS

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

BY HAND

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY



SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL



INTERNAL USE ONLY



UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.
2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.
3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.
4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoom which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desires to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessinos
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64

Distribution:

Orig - Adse
2 cc - SR/CI/K-Dowsey
1 cc - C/CI
1 cc - CSR
1 cc - DD/OS

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY



TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members
SUBJECT: Yuzi Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.
2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.
3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.
4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barzhoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

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6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 11

Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 5.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization

Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressures.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

196

U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

file

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for asylum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillips said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-
See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

*WASH Post
2/15/64*

See Defector

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him. The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present and said Nosenko also was "agreeable." A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko

called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with "impermissible acts in the case." He stopped short of a kidnapping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say. I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said

there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

folie

*WASH Post
2/15/1*

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch *mf*
FROM: Chief, Operational Support Division
SUBJECT: AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich (~~7-2~~), McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:

- (1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)
- (2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)
- (3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

	DDC/IOS
	ADDC/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/OD
	C/MD
	C/IB
	C/ID
	C/IB
1	C/IB <i>mf</i>
2	<i>C/IB</i>
	ALTS
	FILES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.


(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE-- These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.



Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

(

(

SECRETYurily Ivanovich NOSENKO**IDENTIFICATION:**

NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND :

NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is \$23,500 per year.

APPROVAL :

(1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

SECRET

00738

SECRET

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

SECRET

00739

SECRET

FILES :

Office of Security files on NOSENKO
are maintained in the following
locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

SECRET

☒ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ INTERNAL
ONLY

☐ CONFIDENTIAL

☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Lit Crim - US v. Leon

FROM:

(William H. Godson)
CI/R&A/O 03

EXTENSION

1592

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. AC/CI/R&A/O

02 NOV 1977

MF

2.

3.

AC/CI/R&A

2 NOV 1977

2 hrs US

4.

5.

C/CI Staff

2 NOV 1977

3 NOV 1977

4

6.

OGE - Mr. John Henry

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

5-6: This note is pursuant to our discussion of the black notebook several weeks ago. You may wish to talk directly with (Bill Godson) who has reviewed the file.

FORM 3-62

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SECRET 77-6714
11-4-77

1 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff
FROM : (William H. Godson)⁰³
CI/R&A/O
SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin File

1. I have reviewed the material in the Herbert Itkin file which is divided into two main divisions. The first concerns the details of Itkin's use as an unpaid witting informant on matters concerning an attempt by Haitian exiles in 1963 to unseat then President Duvalier. This involved a large number of contacts with Haitian exiles in New York, Washington, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Itkin became a legal advisor for a Haitian Government-In-Exile and put up \$15,000 of his "own funds" for this Haitian enterprise. Bernard E. MONCURE (P) a CI Staff staff agent in New York, rode piggy-back on Itkin's contacts with the Haitians to make his own operational contacts within the group. He also provided a small amount of money to them (\$4,300) from CIA funds. It would seem from information in the file that there was high-level governmental interest in removing Duvalier from office in 1963. This information is contained in handwritten notes which are paraphrased and indicate high-level interest in the activities of the Haitian exile group. (I suggest that this material be kept in case there are Freedom of Information Act requests on CIA activities involving Haiti in 1962-1963.)

2. The second and bulkier section of material concerns Itkin's efforts to involve MONCURE and CIA in his attempts to secure custody of his wife's children from her second marriage. Itkin had been heavily involved as a lawyer and confidant with Mafia syndicates and labor unions, particularly the teamsters. While doing this he had gained a large amount of information on the Mafia. In March 1963, MONCURE had recruited Itkin for the FBI for domestic issues while maintaining for CIA the use of Itkin for foreign intelligence matters. The FBI and the federal prosecutors in New York starting in 1968 found Itkin to be a very important witness in a series of criminal indictments starting with New York City Water Commissioner Marcus.

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Itkin and his wife had for a long time been struggling to maintain custody over her children from her second marriage. Claiming that she had violated the custody stipulations of a New York court by moving them more than 50 miles from New York without his permission, Frederick Hersh, Mrs. Itkin's former husband, gained custody of the children by means of a ruling from the British court in 1966. Mrs. Itkin began legal procedures in New York to regain the children. As part of their effort they swore affidavits that Mrs. Itkin had taken the children to England at the request of the CIA. Itkin embellished on his CIA record by stating that he had worked for CIA for many years prior to 1963, and insisted that his original contact had been set up between Harold Stassen and Allen Dulles in Philadelphia in the summer of 1954. Most of these assertions were fabrications. MONCURE's CIA relationship was exposed in various legal circles in New York. The Agency wanted to avoid MONCURE's having to contradict Mr. and Mrs. Itkin's affidavits in court. The FBI seemed to have been more interested in protecting Itkin's reputation as a witness than in protecting MONCURE's reputation for honesty.

3. MONCURE did not appear in court. The Federal authorities eventually placed protection around Itkin and his wife, keeping them on a military reservation, while he appeared as a star witness in numerous Mafia cases which led to convictions.

03 4. One small side issue is worth noting: (Thomas L. Roberts) who was a (law partner of Itkin) until mid-1961, became a CIA staff agent under cover in Africa. 24 The many fraudulent activities of Itkin spread a scintilla of suspicion around 03 (Roberts.) The latter was given a polygraph examination in Frankfurt. He answered questions on his relationship with Itkin including financial and his few contacts with Marcus to the satisfaction of his interrogators.

5. Comments: The thrust of the file is mainly defensive. CIA was reacting to Itkin's tactics to help his wife gain custody over her children. Itkin's numerous trips to England and Europe were made on behalf of the FBI, and they were part of an FBI attempt to gain information on the Mafia. Before the recruitment of Itkin and his utilization by the FBI, CIA did pass to the Attorney General in 1963 information on a Department of Labor official's alleged criminal involvement with the Mafia, which MONCURE had elicited from Itkin. The file also refers to MONCURE's continued contact with one Mafia figure Lenzieri, who was a legal client, as a means of self-protection as Lenzieri represented a channel back to the Mafia

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for MONCURE, who was apprehensive of Mafia retaliation because of his involvement with Itkin.

6. I have talked to Will Kerbe who is presently the case officer in contact for MONCURE. He says that MONCURE is in limited law practice and is drawing a pension from the Agency as well as a contract for services connected with Golitsyn. There is probably nothing in the file which could damage MONCURE's security as much of the information regarding his association with Itkin has already been exposed. The most recent information in the file is a January 1975 memorandum for the record from Acting Chief, CI, which states that John K. Greaney, Assistant General Counsel had learned that Seymour Herish had learned details of the Itkin-MONCURE relationship. It would appear that Mr. Greaney is the most knowledgeable person in the agency on the legal aspects of the Itkin case and probably maintains his own files.

03
(William H. Godson)
William H. Godson

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

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DISPATCH NUMBER

OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

TELEPOUCH

FAMW-4125

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TO: (MELBOURNE) (CANBERRA)

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DISP NO: (FAMW)-4125

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1973

TO: CHIEF OF BASE, (MELBOURNE)
 CHIEF OF STATION, (CANBERRA)

FROM: CHIEF, EAST ASIA DIVISION

SUBJECT: MR. HERBERT ITKIN

FYI ONLY:

1. ON 6 NOVEMBER 1973 MR. (LESLIE V. JARVIS) (ASIO REP) IN WASHINGTON, HAND CARRIED TO HQS A LETTER FROM AUSTRALIAN JUSTICE A. R. MOFFITT REQUESTING INFORMATION ON THE RELIABILITY OF MR. HERBERT ITKIN WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A FORMER CIA AND FBI EMPLOYEE. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE THE GIST OF MR. MOFFITT'S LETTER, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO "MR. WILLIAM CROSBY", (SIC) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. MOFFITT HOLDS A COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO THE INFILTRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME INTO NEW SOUTH WALES. IT IS OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE TO HIS INQUIRY THAT HE CONSIDER EVIDENCE GIVEN DURING A

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OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

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COURT CASE IN ENGLAND IN JULY 1971 BY ITKIN.

B. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND MR. ITKIN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED BY CIA IN AN "UNDERCOVER CAPACITY" IN ABOUT 1954. HE CLAIMED HE WAS WITH THE C.I.A. UNTIL MARCH 1963 AT WHICH TIME BY SOME ARRANGEMENT HE WORKED FOR BOTH THE FBI AND CIA, UNTIL JANUARY 1968.

C. MOFFITT ASKS FOR INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF MR. ITKIN DURING THE YEARS 1964 TO 1969 AND FOR COPIES OF "ANY RELEVANT AFFIDAVITS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY IN THE FBI OR CIA USED IN PROCEEDINGS IN USA."

D. MOFFITT NOTED THAT IN THE INTERESTS OF PRIVACY HE ROUTED HIS LETTER VIA THE AUSTRALIAN-DIPLOMATIC POUCH, AND ASKED THAT THE REPLY BE RETURNED TO HIM BY THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

2. MR. MOFFITT'S REQUEST WAS HANDLED BY THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNCIL (OGC) WHO MADE AVAILABLE FOR MR. MOFFITT COPIES OF THREE AFFIDAVITS (ALL OF WHICH IN PUBLIC DOMAIN) RELEVANT TO HERBERT ITKIN AND HIS AFFILIATION WITH THE CIA. OGC CONCLUDED THEIR REPLY BY SAYING THAT HERBERT ITKIN FURNISHED INFORMATION TO THE CIA OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT SENT TO ENGLAND TO COLLECT ANY

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OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

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INFORMATION FOR CIA AND HE DID NOT FURNISH THE CIA WITH ANY INFORMATION WHILE HE WAS IN ENGLAND.

3. OGC'S REPLY WAS SENT TO MR. MOFFITT IN THE SAME CHANNELS HIS REQUEST CAME IN. HQS POUCHING COPIES AFFADAVITS, BOTH LETTERS.

U/S/CZ VIA POUCH

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DATE: 21 NOVEMBER 1972 ORIG: (LAWRENCE) BAK UNIT: EA/PMI/ANH EXT: 5641/9033		COORDINATING OFFICERS OGC MR. GREANY {IN DRAFT} CI MR. ROCCA {IN DRAFT}		IP USE ONLY
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA RELEASING OFFICER				
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CONFIDENTIAL

32814

10 April 1963

Security Division
Federal Aviation Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Charles F. Niles

Subject: HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

Dear Sir:

In accordance with existing arrangements made with the Federal Aviation Agency and to confirm our oral notification, it is requested that your files reflect the above-named individual, an employee of this Agency, as having been issued Federal Aviation Agency Credential Number 4883, on 2 January 1963.

In the event of an inquiry, this information may be released to verify the authenticity of this credential.

Nicholas R. Zubon
Chief, Building Security Branch
Office of Security

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12 December 1967

SUBJECT: SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION
(See Houma Munitions Bunker - Lensed by Subject firm)

ALLEGATION:

GARRISON has charged that the burglary of the Houma munitions bunker was "CIA-inspired." He issued arrest warrants for Gordon NOVEL and Sergio ARCACHA SMITE charging them with the Houma burglary.

SOURCE:

Enclosure 24 of
CI/RZA memorandum of
7 August 1967.


CIA CONNECTION:

CIA had no connection with the alleged burglary of the Houma Munitions Bunker or any connection with the bunker itself.

However, Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, president of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION, was of contact interest in 1950 for routine exploitation as a foreign intelligence source. The FBI advised they had no objection to the Agency's interrogating Pierre SCHLUMBERGER who was an alien. In 1962 DAYSTROM, INC. was acquired by SCHLUMBERGER, INC. The Agency had a contract with DAYSTROM for an unclassified item (\$49,000 24 contract for the production of Mark II limpet mines); Agency interest was classified Secret. SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. is a Dutch firm controlled by French nationals. After the merger, it was determined that future relationship with DAYSTROM must be governed by Agency policy not to place classified contracts with a foreign firm. In 1963 the same decision was reached concerning Agency contracts with Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. EMR dealt in all phases of telemetry. Contact clearances for other personnel of SCHLUMBERGER are set out below.

OS INDICES RESULTS:

The SCHLUMBERGER COMPANY was the subject of a name check in 1947 because of a contract request, and it was determined that there are a number of SCHLUMBERGER corporations in Latin America which are dominated by French nationals. SCHLUMBERGER has a patented operation for an oil well "shooting" service which is subscribed to by various oil companies. The SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION in Houston was controlled by Henri Georges DOLL, a French national. He was of contact interest in 1956 and 1957. His wife is the daughter of Conrad SCHLUMBERGER.

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In August 1951 the Agency was interested in contacting Professor Edouard POLDINI, a geophysicist and professor at the University of Geneva and formerly an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION in Paris, for operational use. He was to be used as a channel to a Janus KANTAS who could give information about the fate of the previous employees of the Jersey Company in Hungary, the production figures and extent of exploitation of existing oil fields and exploration of new oil fields together with the names of the officials of the Russian Hungarian Company who took over the Jersey Company.

In March 1953 the SCHLUMBERGER file reflects that an FBI source furnished information that one Maurice Henri MARTIN, employed as an engineer by the SCHLUMBERGER Company, Paris, France, received a letter dated 27 July 1951 at Moscow from one Siegfried Stefanovitch MOROSOFF, asking MARTIN for specialized information concerning geophysics. The letter requested that MARTIN's reply be forwarded to Moscow through an intermediary. From January 1932 until April 1937 MARTIN represented the SCHLUMBERGER Company in Russia as an engineer, and it was thought that the correspondence from MOROSOFF may represent a Soviet attempt to resume contact with MARTIN and develop clandestine relations with him. The FBI conducted an investigation dated June 1953 and determined that Maurice Henri MARTIN resided at Nod Hill, Wilton, Connecticut and was employed by the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Co., Ridgefield, Connecticut. Informants advised that although MARTIN was strongly nationalistic toward France, he gave every indication of being anti-Russian and there was no evidence of CP activities.

When DAYSTROM, INC. merged with SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., research was done on the directors and officers of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. The results are as follows:

OS indices reflect a record on Dillon ANDERSON, a trustee of Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc. (a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD.) who was also a proposed trustee of "NEW DAYSTROM" when it merged with SCHLUMBERGER. ANDERSON is an attorney from Houston, Texas who was appointed by President EISENHOWER as an advisor to the National Security Council from 1953 until 1956. He was considered for a special clearance in August 1955 but the briefing was not given. He was granted a covert clearance in December 1953 and April 1954 for use as a covert associate on Project LPFUNNEL. 8g

Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, President and Chief Executive Officer, SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., Houston, Texas, French citizen, was of contact interest in 1950.

Charles C. PARLIN, Director of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., and a member of the law firm of SHEARMEN, STERLING and WRIGHT, Englewood, New Jersey, U. S. citizen, was of contact interest in 1962 but was security disapproved. PARLIN was allegedly the boy friend of Johanna BEKER who was in contact with known Soviet Agents, ROBERT and JACK SOBLE. BEKER advised the FBI in 1957 that she received, paid for and transmitted to Robert SOBLE, OSS information which was given her by two former OSS employees. She also advised the FBI in 1957 that she

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had given a very general outline of her activities to PARLIN and it is reliably reported that PARLIN and BEMER shared a hotel room in Holland in 1957. PARLIN recommended a William Woart LANCASTER for OSS employment. LANCASTER was a member of the same law firm as PARLIN and had a long record of Communist front affiliations. PARLIN in 1956 traveled to Russia as a member of a delegation under the sponsorship of the National Council of Churches. He was also the lawyer for a Swiss armament industrialist who sold arms to the Nazis and the Communist countries since that time.

Clark Drouillard GOODMAN, Vice-President of SCHLUMBERGER, Ltd., Houston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security disapproved for use by TED in 1952 and for contact use in 1955 based on his support of Professor Dirk STRUHK, a colleague at MIT, who was indicted on a charge of having been a Communist conspirator and identified as a Communist Party member. In March 1959 the same derogatory information was furnished the Contact Office to be considered in determining any use of GOODMAN. Also, a book written by GOODMAN's wife, May Ellen GOODMAN, was favorably reviewed by the "DAILY WORKER" in 1956.

Jean C. LEBRAND, Vice-President of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION, Pidgefield, Connecticut (U. S. citizen, naturalized Houston, Texas 1941) was approved for contact use in May 1957. His file is clear. There is a notation that one Mrs. J. C. LEBRAND, 5319 Danzell Street, Houston, Texas, in November 1944 was President of the Houston Chapter, France Forever, The Fighting French Committee in America.

Everett STRAITON, Sales Manager, Houston Area, SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING Corporation, Houston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security approved (CAUTION) for contact use in October 1950. His file is clear.

10
Daniel SCHLUMBERGER, French citizen, archeologist and teacher at the University of Strasbourg, France in 1955, was granted an operational approval (for use as a contract agent in Kabul) in April 1956 but the clearance was cancelled 20 September 1956. His file is clear. However, in a file on Nicholas KASAN, French financier, and suspected Soviet agent, which contains a detailed study of the inter-relationships and family connections existing in French firms, information on Daniel SCHLUMBERGER is contained therein. Daniel SCHLUMBERGER, a member of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING Corporation, was head of the French Archeological Delegation in Afghanistan (1948-1954). An associate of Daniel SCHLUMBERGER was Raoul CURIEL of a wealthy Jewish banking family in Cairo, Egypt. Raoul and his brother, Henri CURIEL, had Communist backgrounds and their mother was aunt to George BLANE English Soviet spy who defected to Russia. BLANE had lived with the CURIEL's in Cairo. Also Gilbert PONTECORVO, known Communist, was in contact with Duenio CURIEL, a relative of the CURIEL family involved in the George BLANE case. Bruno PONTECORVO, Gilbert's brother, an atomic scientist who defected to Russia in 1950, worked for the Well Surveying Corporation, Tulsa, Oklahoma, from 1940 to 1942 but it was not known if the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation is in any way connected with the Well Surveying Corporation in Tulsa.

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SCHLUMBERGER and Company and another SCHLUMBERGER subsidiary firm, Machine Bull (Competitor of IBM), are connected with Schneider and Company, 42 rue d'Anjou, Paris. Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL, manager of Compagnie Internationale de Commerce, represents SCHNEIDER for the USSR and is a Soviet agent. In September 1961, an investigation conducted in France disclosed that "everything that takes place in the Elysee is known in Moscow within 48 hours and the originator of such intelligence is Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL." Machine Bull is controlled by General Electric Company of the U. S. and SCHNEIDER and Company is affiliated with U. S. Westinghouse Corporation under the name SCHNEIDER-Westinghouse.

The Study in KAGAN's file contains the following additional information concerning SCHLUMBERGER and Company:

Maurice and Rami SCHLUMBERGER are affiliated with Lazard Freres and the Worms Bank. Lazard Freres controls SCHNEIDER-Westinghouse and has a New Orleans Branch Office. Closely associated with the SCHLUMBERGER's is Charles DOH. DOH was born at Odessa in 1911 and arrived in the United States in 1937 to join the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation at Houston, Texas. He became a U. S. citizen on 6 September 1950. Charles has a brother, Jean, who was closely associated with Leonard BOUNAU, a suspected Soviet agent. BOUNAU was closely associated with Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL, previously mentioned Soviet agent connected with SCHLUMBERGER and Company. Charles DOH was approved for Agency contact use in September 1955 as a member of the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation. His file is clear.

Roger Robert Henri BENQUET, Executive Vice-President, SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation, Houston, Texas, was approved for contact use on a limited basis in October 1950. He had been an employee of OSS from 1943 to 1945; was given American citizenship and the Congressional Medal of Honor for his deeds during World War II.

Arthur Henry FRENTROP, an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION, Ridgefield, Connecticut, was of contact interest in June 1956. Information concerning his spouse's critical attitude towards American customs and institutions and the dominant position she exercised over her husband was furnished the contact office.

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29 August 1968

SUBJECT: SEITZ, Charles

Charles SEITZ is identified as a pilot who was employed by the FLOURNOY Flying Service at the same time as Leslie Norman BRADLEY. It is reported that SEITZ stated that when BRADLEY learned of the assassination (President KENNEDY), he decided he had to go to Miami immediately.


A check of OS records revealed the following information on one Charles J. SEITZ who is currently being considered for a Proprietary Approval by DOD for Project WUBETON. He is to be used as a flight instructor on an unwitting basis for an Agency proprietary entity in Newton, Kansas. The results of investigation are not complete and clearance has not yet been granted.] 24

Charles J. SEITZ was born 31 January 1943 at Steele City, Nebraska and resides at 844 San Pablo, Wichita, Kansas. He is currently a test pilot with Cessna Aircraft Company, Wichita, Kansas. From 1963 to June 1966 Subject was in the U. S. Army. He was a flight mechanic and had tours in Vietnam and Thailand.

Charles's father, Charles William SEITZ, was born 21 December 1917 at Hollenberg, Kansas and currently resides at 2111 South Terrace, Wichita, Kansas 67218.

Inquiry was made of DOD if either Charles J. or his father Charles William SEITZ, had ever been employed by the Jack R. FLOURNOY Flying Service and it was determined that both Charles J. SEITZ and his father were employed by FLOURNOY in 1962-1963. The Jack R. FLOURNOY Flying Service went out of business in 1964 and the owner, Jack R. FLOURNOY, is currently employed as a salesman.

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06-77-0256
1-11-77

11 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SE Division

ATTENTION : Division Security Officer

FROM : ⁰³(Thomas L. Briggs)
SE/X/LA

SUBJECT : Appearance As Witness In Behalf of the
United States Government

REFERENCE : USA V. Gerald P. Hemming, Et Al. (76-371-CR-CA)

1. During the period of my employment as a Special Agent at the Drug Enforcement Administration (May 1971 - Jan 1977), I conducted an interview of Gerald Patrick Hemming (DPOB 1 March 1937, at Los Angeles, California) on 23 May 1975 at DEA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. My report concerning that interview has become part of the case file in USA v. Gerald P. Hemming, Et Al., Case Number 76-371-CR-CA, Southern District of Florida, Miami, Florida.

2. Upon my entrance on duty in SE Division on 5 January 1977, I orally informed the Division Security Officer, Billy Hix, about the information in paragraph 1 above. Mr. Hix asked me to submit the information in writing as soon as I was settled in the Division. On 7 January 1977, however, Special Agent Robert Fredericks telephonically contacted ⁰³(Hope Mason) DC/SE/X/LA, and told her that the United States Attorney, Southern District of Florida, had requested that I appear at the U.S. Courthouse, Miami, Florida on 10 January 1977 to confer with the Assistant United States Attorney, Karen L. Atkinson, regarding my appearance as a witness in behalf of the U.S. Government in the trial of Gerald P. Hemming.

3. During the afternoon of 7 January 1977 I conferred with Mr. Hix who advised me to contact the Office of the General Counsel. I talked to Mr. Edmund Cohen who advised me to get in touch with the Office of Security, External Activities Branch (OS/EAB). I completed an Outside Activity Approval Request (Form 879), obtained the concurrence of DC/SE, Mr. John Stein, and submitted the Form 879 to OS/EAB. OS/EAB sent me to Central Cover Staff (Mr. Blandford) and then to the Office of the General Counsel. After discussions with Mr. Cohen, I called

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S/A Fredericks in Miami at Mr. Cohen's suggestion. S/A Fredericks was not available. Mr. Cohen then advised me to return to my office and he would contact me with further instructions. Mr. Cohen retained the Form 879. Subsequently, Mr. Cohen advised me that I should travel to Miami as requested and that CIA would reimburse me for expenses connected with my activities in behalf of the U.S. Government. He further advised me that being in an overt cover status I should state, if asked under oath, that I am currently a CIA employee.

4. On 10 January 1977 I traveled to Miami where I met and conferred with AUSA Karen Atkinson and DEA S/A Robert Fredericks. They informed me that Gerald P. Hemming's case had been severed and his trial would not begin on 11 January. AUSA Atkinson told me she wanted me as a rebuttal witness if Gerald P. Hemming presented the defense that he had been working at the direction of DEA. She said they would not call me until and unless that defense was presented. She also said that she felt that any attempt to question me concerning my current place of employment was irrelevant and she would object to any such line of questioning. She said she would only ask me where I was employed at the time I interviewed Hemming. I returned to Washington D.C. the same day.

03
(Thomas L. Briggs)

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- 1 - OS
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16 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Edmund Cohen
Assistant General Counsel

SUBJECT: U.S. v. Hemming

1. On 22 November 1977 the undersigned accompanied by Messrs. ⁰³(Thomas Briggs) Gary Mattocks and Robert Barteaux, travelled to Miami to confer with Judge Hoeveler, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas M. Sherouse, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, about subject case. Messrs. ⁰³(Briggs) and Mattocks had dealt with Mr. Hemming while they were employed by the Drug Enforcement Administration and Mr. Sherouse wanted them available as rebuttal witnesses. Mr. Barteaux also was sought as a possible rebuttal witness to describe the Agency's relationship with Mr. Hemming in the event that Hemming raised a CIA defense.

2. On 23 November Mr. ⁰³(Briggs) Mr. Barteaux and the undersigned met in chambers with Judge Hoeveler, Mr. Sherouse, Mr. Roger Howard, law clerk to Judge Hoeveler, and Mr. Ted Sakowitz, Public Defender for the Southern District of Florida. Mr. Sherouse decided that Mr. Mattocks would not be required to testify and he did not attend the meeting. The Judge initially expressed some reluctance to have an ex parte conference because Mr. Hemming had assumed primary responsibility for his own defense with only limited assistance from the Public Defender. The Judge insisted that a transcript of the meeting be made but he promised that the transcript would be sealed and, in fact, would not be transcribed.

3. The undersigned indicated that the Agency had no interest in the outcome of the case and interposed no objection to the introduction of any relevant information. Our sole concern was to protect Mr. ⁰³(Briggs) and his relationship with CIA both before and after his DEA employment. The Judge was informed that Mr. ⁰³(Briggs) sole connection with Hemming was on 23 May 1975 and that he had no contact with Hemming during any period of Agency employment. The national security consequences of exposure of Mr. ⁰³(Briggs) as well as the career consequences were outlined. In addition, the Judge was informed that Mr. Barteaux was prepared to testify as an overt Agency employee about any relationship between Hemming and CIA.

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4. Judge Hoeveler asked Mr. Sakowitz to cross-examine Mr. (Briggs)⁰³ to determine whether he had any information which might be relevant to Hemming's defense. Mr. Sakowitz stated that although he was aware that Mr. Hemming wished to call Mr. (Briggs)⁰³ as a witness, he was not fully informed of all aspects of the case and, therefore, reluctant to question Mr. (Briggs)⁰³. Thereupon, Judge Hoeveler, swore in Mr. (Briggs)⁰³ and proceeded to ask him a series of questions to determine whether Mr. (Briggs)⁰³ interaction with Mr. Hemming had been in any way connected with his CIA employment⁰³. At the conclusion of this examination the Judge gave Mr. Sakowitz a second opportunity to question Mr. (Briggs)⁰³ and when Mr. Sakowitz again declined, he stated that in light of the national security consequences which had been brought to his attention he was not inclined to permit questions relating to Mr. (Briggs)⁰³ CIA employment.

5. At the conclusion of the conference in chambers, but before the jury was admitted into the courtroom, Mr. Sherouse informed Mr. Hemming that Mr. (Briggs)⁰³ was available as a witness. When the trial proceeded Mr. Hemming concluded his defense without calling Mr. (Briggs)⁰³. Mr. Sherouse, however, did call Mr. (Briggs)⁰³ as a rebuttal witness. On cross-examination Mr. Hemming asked Mr. (Briggs)⁰³ whether he was with CIA. Mr. Sherouse promptly objected to the question, the Judge sustained the objection and Mr. Hemming went on to the next question. The trial concluded soon afterwards without Mr. Barteaux being called as a witness. It was subsequently learned that Mr. Hemming was found guilty as charged.



Edmund Cohen

EC:jz

Distribution:

Original / LITIGATION-CRIMINAL, Hemming Gerald P.

1 - EC Signer

1 - Chrono

117J
SECRET

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

OUTSIDE ACTIVITY APPROVAL REQUEST

COMPLETE AND FORWARD ORIGINAL AND 2 COPIES TO EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH

TO :	DIRECTOR OF SECURITY; ATTN: EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH	DATE 7 Jan 77
THRU:	(Staff, division or office head and security officer, where assigned) SE Division Security Officer	
FROM:	NAME AND GRADE OF EMPLOYEE (Print or type) 03 (CROGER, Thomas), 12/3	COMPONENT 12/3
	ROOM NO. AND BLDG. 100 5229	PHONE 1-03

1. FULL DESCRIPTION OF OUTSIDE ACTIVITY FOR WHICH APPROVAL IS REQUESTED INCLUDING NAMES OF ORGANIZATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED, DATES, LOCALE, ETC. (Refer to HR 10-7 before completing)

On 7 January 1977 at approx. 1430 hrs. I was contacted by my supervisor, (Hoy) and that she had been telephonically contacted by a Mr. Fredericks of FBI in Miami, Florida (Off 305-551-1002, Ext 305-551-1170) and told that FBI wants me to travel to Miami to attend a pre-trial conference on January 10 January in order to prepare for possible appearance as a witness for the FBI against Harold Patrick Miller.

I consulted with the SE Division Security Officer and he advised me to contact the CSO. At approx. 1430 hrs. I was advised by the CSO to contact the Office of Security, External Activities Branch.

2. REMARKS BY REQUESTOR

IN ENGAGING IN THE REQUESTED ACTIVITY, I WILL MAKE NO REFERENCE TO OR DISCUSS MY CIA ASSIGNMENTS OR DUTIES. I (WILL, WILL NOT) BE IDENTIFIED AS EMPLOYED BY CIA FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

I was a CIA employee from Jan 69 to May 71 prior to transferring to DIA. I was under cover at that time. I have not put even my under cover since my new assignment (Jan 77).

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING EMPLOYEE

3. COMMENTS AND CONCURRENCE OF STAFF, DIVISION OR OFFICE HEAD

CONCUR: _____

DATE

SIGNATURE OF OPERATING OFFICIAL

FOR COMPLETION BY EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH AND RETURN OF ORIGINAL TO EMPLOYEE

DATE:

SECURITY APPROVAL HAS BEEN (GRANTED, DENIED)
FOR THE ACTIVITY CONTEMPLATED BY THIS REQUEST.

2/12 (FOR) CHIEF, SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION

9/7 Mo Sovereign - discuss Sherouse call re Q Doc
& re DCD contacts of on Drugs - let to ck
Bob Bortaux to be ready to testify.

Info Brocary section.

MFR on Q Doc

9/16 Spoke w/ Tom Sherouse 305 350 5449
Tues 25 Oct.

10/3 Used w/ Sherouse still is scheduled for
25 Oct - but calendar call set for
20 Oct Thurs Cal^{ready} Call All call bk on 21 Oct
to see where stand

10/25 Spoke w/ Sherouse Henry case is
#8 on Judge's calendar
on on case #1

earliest is late next wk at earliest
Henry - will be own lawyer

11/5 spoke w/ Sherouse sch for 16 Nov & needs us
Bartaux, (Brigg)⁰³, Maddox & I for rebuttal case thinks Fri 10 AM
but to call on 16th to check.

11/15 Meet w/ Mo S. (Brigg)⁰³ Maddox, Bartaux review Sherouse
statements, ck on why left agency & why returned, what doing.
Later meet w/ Mo & Bartaux - get WDO (offical) view
re impact of public exposure on (Brigg)⁰³ Maddox & brief
review of Bartaux all records on Henry.
reserve for Fri EA 195 not later 9⁰⁰ - & am 11²⁰

11/17 - Called M - for now

9318

(119 Evans St)

Rockville Md 20850

(340 8186) 08

~~Tom Briggs~~ r ~~1919~~

1. ~~encl~~ & cover

a Jan 69 - May 74

CIA - Army & Air Admin - Army
"major ops" clandestine
Eaves

b. 4 May 74 - 1 Jan 77 DEA

c. 2 Jan 77 - no cover, State cover

2. only contact w/ Henry -
23 May 75

3. Henry - to DC to see Green - up &
Green told see Tom -

4. ~~now~~ For - target ~~resentments~~
Why at 2 say KGM met in his name

from 50 - resigned - law enforcement
& CIA can't - no encl, ~~resentments~~

US vs Hemming (Gerald P. Hemming) S.D of Fla.
Case No 76-71-Cr-CA Judge Hoeverler

P.O. Bldg & Ct House 300 NE. First Ave Miami Florida

Mezzanine Floor 350-4136

1st Ave 3rd St

Thomas M. Sherouse Asst US Attorney (305) 350 5449 or 4471

Sec Mary Jones

300 Ainsley Bldg.

hm 856 22PS

1879

521 Florida Ave apt 104
Herndon Va 22070
- 437 8958

Bary Maddox

1. encl - 2 over

✓ CIA - 69-73 - Any cover Vietnam

- DEA ^{or (Sgt)} Aug 73 - 26 Feb 77 (comm cover)

✓ CIA 27 Feb 77 - open 5-6 weeks then

State cover now Cuban govt - Castro people operations


2. no later than Dec 76 contact w/ Maddox
none since bk w/ CIA -
no contact before DEA
never personal contact only friend DEA until

3. rel w/ Hemmy met under cover re purchase of narcotics
in Miami and, heavy agent re cover
a) without exchange of old guns b) present re Cuban envelope
of interest info

4. now - = Cuba govt -

Henry

Oct 25 2 wk trial

ok file -  on
LCS office on 10/17/77

Jan 62 submitted app for encl -

1) on 21 June 62 informed NO provisional for him in Aug

2) Records do not reflect he ever employed in any capacity or
used as agent.

but records do show Henry has falsely claimed assoc
w/ agency on several occasions since 1960

3. In Oct 60 3 encls in encl 1161, 1 Jan 1967, 3 in 1970

nothing after 23 Aug 70

on these occasions Henry can furnish volunteer info
which he hopes might be of value & info to

by our Don East people who openly need w/ any US
and who has info to volunteers.

OK

Drugs → ?

3. re that Doc not be able help - people that
could - even & tell why not would enable
people to -

7-9



Henry was found guilty