

SECRET

- 4 -

5. After Mr. Oldfield had put a number of questions to Simmons the latter asked Oldfield whether Geddes is possibly a British agent which Oldfield emphatically answered in the negative.

6. Mr. Oldfield said that he would now send off a communication to his service indicating that Geddes might be a phony—a provocateur. However, he asked that he be provided with the following:

a. CIA appreciation of the United Revolutionaria;

b. Identities of C-1, C-4 and members of the net with whom C-1 was arrested on March 18 (Note: Simmons acknowledged that besides C-1 conceivably several other members of this net might have known of Geddes and his activities.)

c. Identities of the couriers who had contact with Geddes

d. The identity of the CIA case officer—the name or names used by him in contacts with Geddes;

e. Chronological summary of the visits of Geddes to Miami and returns to Havana; also a list of the nature of his communications to Miami (by telecoa, courier, etc.) and communications sent to him in Havana.

John G. Roberts
DC/WE/6

SECRET

DISPATCH

R-2-C-R-S-T

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

SUBJECT: DYCVR/TIPIC/Operational
Reactions from WH to UR Propaganda and Desire to Concentrate UR Efforts
of PERMANENT

AR: As Indicated

RSP: UFGA 9274, 27 May 1963





1. Paragraph 3 of ref: Concerned elements at headquarters studied the attachments with interest; however, the material was not considered of special operational import to merit specific guidance to witting contacts in the UR.
2. Any additional effort by the UR to reach and influence PERMANENT audiences will be highly valued.

END OF DISPATCH

Distributions:
3 - Addressees

POINTING	INITIAL
1 - SAS/ECR/PA-PROP	
1 - SAS/ECR	
1 - C/WH/CA	
RID/PI	
DESTROY	

CROSS REFERENCE TO		DATE FORWARDED 18 June 63	DATE DISPATCHED 21 JUN 1963
CLASSIFICATION 8-E-C-R-S-T		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER 17M-277	
		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-123-26	
ORIGINATING OFFICE SAS/ECR/PA-PROP			
OFFICE SYMBOL C/ECR/PA-PROP			
DATE 18 JUN 1963			
OFFICE NAME A. J. K. K. K.			
COORDINATING OFFICE C/ECR/PA-PROP			
DATE 18 JUN 1963			
OFFICE NAME A. J. K. K. K.			
RELEASING OFFICE C/ECR/PA-PROP			
DATE 18 JUN 1963			
OFFICE NAME A. J. K. K. K.			

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT				CLASSIFICATION 255 SECRET 255 (When Filled In)			
ORIG.	Jane S. Ingles: jg			ROUTING		Aug 28 13 44.62	
UNIT	TFW/Intel/Reports			1	4		
EXT.	5547			3	5		
DATE	27 August 1962			3	6		
CONFIRMATION COPIES TFW 12				TDCS -3/520,846-... 5L66.			
INFORMATION COPIES CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 5, IW 2, CA 2, CA/PRG, OS, WH 6, WE 4,							
DATE DISTRIBUTED 27 August 1962				PRECEDENCE			
DISSEMINATION				ROUTINE			
TFW/FI	2	TFW/PROP-PA	1	WH/R	1	BASED ON (Fld. Rpt., Proj.)	
TFW/Int	2	TFW/SI	1	WE/3	3	WAVE-7632 (IN-11670)	
TFW/R	2	TFW/WAVE	1	WE/R	1	WAVE-7114 (IN-46173)	
TFW/CI	2					UFG-1396	
TFW/PM	1	WH/PACY	2	OS/SSD/Drauman	1	UNION (UNION-11)	
EVALUATION REQUESTED	STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR		Linison: G	
HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS NO FOREIGN DISSEM							
<div style="text-align: center;">  DD/P INTERNAL USE ONLY</div>							
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER 				COORDINATING OFFICER(S) W. S. Compton WE/3/RE (in draft)			
CLASSIFICATION SECRET (When Filled In)				RELEASING OFFICER  for TFW/Intel COPY NO.			

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/520,846
SUBJECT	PLANNED UPRISING BY OPPOSITION GROUPS IN CUBA	DATE DISTR.	27 AUGUST 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	AUGUST 1962	REFERENCES	IN -46173
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	FRANCE, PARIS (25 AUGUST 1962)	RD-ACQ-01258	-11670
APPRAISAL	B	RD-W-2107	
		FIELD REPORT NO.	


THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL FRENCH SERVICE.

1. MEMBERS OF THE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) REPORTED TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN HABANA THAT ON 10 AUGUST THEY WERE INVITED TO ATTEND A MEETING ON 14 AUGUST ORGANIZED BY THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE) AND THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP). THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS FOR THE THREE GROUPS TO PLAN A STAGE OF ACTIVE WARFARE. THE UR WAS ADVISED BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY NOT TO PARTICIPATE, BUT THE UR COULD NOT CONVINCE THE DRE AND THE MRP TO REVERSE THEIR DECISION FOR AN UPRISING SCHEDULED FOR THE LAST DAYS OF AUGUST, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A GENERAL UPRISING OF ALL INTERNAL RESISTANCE GROUPS.

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIB

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM



STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO DIA	INS
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REPCINCLANT EXU

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS		11670	
S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM		IN 47173	
		PAGE	2
<p>3. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS, TELEGRAM NO. 984, DATED 26 AUGUST 1962, REPORTED INFORMATION FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN HABANA ON THIS AGREEMENT FOR A GENERAL UPRISING DURING THE LAST DAYS OF AUGUST.</p> <p>END OF MESSAGE</p>			
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS			
S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM			

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: TFW 10 (MR. KAPPEL, TFW ISSUED TEMPO COPY 2315, 30 AUG)

INFO : DCI, DD/P, ADOP, SCD-5, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4,
CI/O'S, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW 2, WH 7,
DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

AUG 31 0310Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 14497

OPIN DIR CITE WAVE 7916

IN 14497

GYROSE INTEL

REF A. WAVE 7903 (IN 14407)

B. WAVE 7886 (IN 14220)

1. REFS REFLECT MOST RECENT ACQUISITION INTEL RE TIMING GENERAL UPRISING. DISTURBING ASPECT RECEIPT THIS INFO IS FACT IT REACHING KUBARK VIA WIDE VARIETY SOURCES BUT ULTIMATE END SOURCE ALWAYS UR. ANALYSIS THIS INFO INDICATES IT HANGS TOGETHER RATHER WELL AND IN MANY INSTANCES VARIETY OF CHANNELS VIA WHICH IT RECEIVED WOULD NORMALLY TEND SERVE AS CROSS CHECK OR CONFIRMATION. WE CONFIDENT THIS INTEL COMING FROM UR CHANNELS WHICH EXILE UR REGARDS AS BONA FIDE. WAVE INITIALLY REGARDED INFO AS ACCURATE REFLECTION WHAT UR EXPERIENCING IN CUBA. HOWEVER INVESTIGATION AND REAPPRAISAL THIS INFO LEADS CONCLUSION INFO NOT ACCURATE AND MAY BE REFLECTION G-2 DECEPTION OR PROVOCATION OP.

2. COLLATION ALL INTEL WHICH OBTAINED FROM UR SOURCES RE UPRISING CUBA HAS IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING GROUPS AS SCHEDULED PARTICIPATE THIS REVOLT. OUR COMMENTS RE INQUIRIES WITH THESE GROUPS REVEALS FOLLOWING.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

- A. DRE REPEAT DRE. PEDRO YNTERIAN GARCIA STATES DRE HAS NO INFO RE SCHEDULED REVOLT.
- B. MRP REPEAT MRP. AMAZZ-1 CLAIMS HAS NO INFO RE INTERNAL REVOLT.
- C. 30 NOV REPEAT 30 NOV. AMICE-8 REPORTS HIS FACTION RECEIVED CODED CABLE 30 AUG FROM CUBA WHICH REQUESTED ARMG AS SITUATION DESPERATE AND THEY NEED HELP. AMICE-8 SENT CODED REPLY 30 AUG STATING HOLD OFF FROM ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTION. AMICE-8 HAS NO INFO RE TIMING ANY REVOLT.
- D. JUVENTUD ANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA REPEAT JUVENTUD ANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA. (CATHOLIC ANTI-COMMUNIST YOUTH) ANPAN-4 REPORTS THIS GROUP HAS NO INFO RE REVOLT.
- E. MRR REPEAT MRR. CESAR BARRO INDICATES HE HAS HAD COMM O FROM CUBA LAST FEW DAYS BUT NO MENTION MADE ANY REVOLT.
- F. ELN REPEAT ELN. (EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL). WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.
- G. FND REPEAT FND. WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.
- H. FAL REPEAT FAL. HAVE NO INFO OR READY ACCESS THIS GROUP.
- I. SECUNDO FRENTE ESCAMBRAY REPEAT SECUNDO FRENTE ESCAMBRAY. WE TRYING OBTAIN FROM THIS GROUP.
3. VIEW PARA 2 INFO PLUS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE INTERNAL CUBAN SCENE WHICH STEMS FROM DAILY CONTACT REFUGEES, RECEIPT AGENT TRAFFIC, ETC. MUST CONCLUDE THAT BALANCED JUDGEMENT CONTINUES INDICATE BONA FIDE POPULAR UPRISING NOT LIKELY AT THIS TIME.
4. HAVE NOT EXCLUDED PROVOCATION POSSIBILITY THEREFORE HAVE ARRANGED FOR ANCORE-2 BROADCAST FOLLOWING STATEMENT 2000

SECRET

HOURS OVER WML. WILL SUBSEQUENTLY REPLAY OVER ALL SPANISH PROGRAMS WME, WGBS, AND WNET. STATEMENT WILL READ AS FOLLOWS:

"RELIABLE REFUGEE SOURCES AND INFO COMING OUT OF CUBA AS WELL AS CUBAN RADIO REPORTS INDICATE CLEARLY THAT CASTRO FORCES HAVE BEEN ON A WAR FOOTING UNDER CONSTANT ALERT EVER SINCE THE DRE ATTACK OF 24 AUG. THEY ARE PREPARED TO CRUSH ANY SIGN OF UPRISING, RESISTANCE OR CUBAN INVASION FROM OUTSIDE. ALL TRUE CUBAN PATRIOTS ARE URGENTLY WARNED NOT TO UNDERTAKE AT THIS TIME AN UPRISING AS THIS IS DESIRED AND EXPECTED BY THE CASTRO COMMUNIST FORCES. LOYAL PATRIOTS MUST FEAR AND EXPECT PROVOCATIONS. LIBERATION WILL COME BUT NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO REVOLT."

END OF MESSAGE

CS Comment: *Reported a general uprising in all of the Provinces of Cuba is scheduled for 4:00 a.m. on 31 August.

SECRET

Pre-dates
HSCA request

(Call 3rd Agency)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

SVIR/111

FROM:

DC/OS/JPriebe

EXTENSION

3441

NO

DATE

30 July 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

1.

DO/SR

30/7

80

2.

DO/SAT
SR/CI/BBright

AUG 8
1963

1118

2- This information was sent to CI Staff recently and has probably been forwarded to you for reply. Though you might be able to use this extra copy.

3.

Joan

GP

4.

5.

6.

CSR/CI/K

CU

CHANGED FROM RID/CI

7.

Daloz

DR

8.

EE/G/CE-Wagner

14/8

TR

9.

SR/CI/K

AD

10.

11.

SR/CI/A

AUG 20
1963

GP

12.

Joan

13.

RID/AN

CRS

14.

RID/MIS

92

15.

RID/Files

6-5 note in memo...
Schneider apparent CMC
approach a subsequent
Sov. approach. Loss of
Felfe house 2 political for
1163?
e +
8 to 9: Looks like RIS was
on him first, but they may
have sent Felfe (or another)
at him for a false flag
recruitment attempt.
Felfe in 200;
To be open...

FORM 3-62

610

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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☐ UNCLASSIFIED

100-5-1

SECRET SENSITIVE

10571

5 July 1963

Chief, Contact Division, OO

Attempted RUS Penetration of Bell Telephone Laboratories - 44-10612

1. Attached are two memoranda, dated 26 June 1963, from our New York Field Office concerning apparent KKK interest in Manfred E. Schroeder and Donald E. Thomas, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey. We believe this information should be passed to the FBI immediately. We would appreciate being advised the date this information is forwarded to the Bureau.

2. For your information, permission to brief Dr. Schroeder prior to his trip to the USSR was requested by our New York Office but refused by FI Staff. In view of his employment, however, and previous CA/OS contacts with him, FI recommended he be provided with a strong defensive and realities briefing.

3. Further inquiry may be directed to Mrs. Shirley Stetson, CN/CG, Support Branch, Room 413, 1717 H Street, N. W., extension 8208.

7/32
George N. (C)
Cano. 123401
agents sent to Sweden
for information on
18 May 63

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Reals: As stated above

BBteton/EM
CC: 08

CC: 08

11 8+4y

100-5-1

Approved: ~~X~~ 150X

30 JULY 63

CS COPY

100-5-1

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114-10117

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-106

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Mc Connell/Czajkowski/Lincoln Staff
FROM : Chief, New York Office

DATE: 1 July 1963

SUBJECT: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs


Ref: NY Reports 2988-3 and 2989-3

1. We thought the attached reports would be of interest to Lincoln Staff from a Soviet realities standpoint. We also felt that they should be brought to the attention of Division management because the M.O. outlined therein is becoming a major factor in dealing with sources who have contact with Sovbloc nationals. It has been our experience that the type of activity outlined has been on a marked increase, particularly since the establishment of the KGB 10th Directorate. Although such activity by Sov legals is taking place throughout the continental U.S., undoubtedly its greatest impact is being felt in the New York and Washington, D.C. areas because of the large Soviet Government establishments in both of these cities. For this reason it would seem imperative that both WAFO and NYFO be extremely vigilant for such activity in companies and institutions with which they are dealing in order that it may be recognized in its earliest stages and appropriate CI/CE countermeasures instituted. In order to assist other offices in this respect, we plan to write in the near future an article for the Division Newsletter, outlining some of our experiences along these lines.

2. We were somewhat disappointed in CI Staff's reaction to our recent request for assistance in defensive briefing of the subject of one of the attached reports. It seems to be quite clear now that our original assumption concerning his being R.I.S. targeted was quite correct and that there is a strong likelihood that his current trip behind the Curtain will be utilized by the opposition for provocation and/or an actual recruitment attempt. We wonder in future cases of this nature exactly what support we may expect from Angleton's shop. Although we feel that we have a fair capability for handling such matters here in New York, we do admit that, at least on this one, we would have felt slightly more comfortable had a CI specialist been along, if for no other reason than to preclude any possible Monday morning quarterbacking by the "old pros."

10612

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-2-

Subject: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

3. Judging by the attached material, it would appear that, despite established Bell policy (see our 16 May memorandum re Case 39,790), the opposition has seen fit to deflower at least two of Bell's scientific virgins. We seriously wonder at this point just how many other Bell people might be in the same boat. Perhaps, as a result of all this, some representation by Bell management to the KGB will be forthcoming, spelling out to that organization, as was spelled out to our own, established company policy pertaining to such matters. In any event, it would appear that at least one or two Bell scientists, and there are probably more, have been giving the R.I.S. more cooperation and reporting than the Agency. Let's hope that in the near future Bell management takes some effective steps to rectify this rather ludicrous, and patently dangerous, situation.

J. L. Reeves
JAY B. L. REEVES

Attachments: NY Reports 2988-3
and 2989-3

GHagle/mg

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10612

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Support (Shirley Stetsen)
FROM : Chief, New York Office

DATE: 26 June 1959

SUBJECT: **Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder, (201-734194)**
Bell Telephone Lab

201-734194

1. 0930-1230 hours 14 June, Manfred R. Schroeder of Bell Labs received a strong defensive briefing in connection with his June-July trip to the USSR and Bulgaria (see our 7 May Coordination Outline for subject). During Schroeder's briefing, Nagle elicited from him that prior to a trip to the USSR in 1959 he had been contacted by an individual who represented himself as a West German Intelligence Officer. More important, we also learned that, at about the same time, RIS cultivation of Schroeder apparently began.

2. Concerning the West German approach, Schroeder indicated that his mother, who resides in Hamburg, was telephoned in 1959 by an individual who claimed to be an old acquaintance of her son's and who was interested in contacting him concerning employment in the US. The caller left a phone number and said that he would appreciate it if Schroeder could call him next time he was in Hamburg. Schroeder's mother relayed the message to her son, and, as requested, he telephoned the caller just prior to his 1959 USSR junket. The individual he called identified himself as a West German Intelligence Officer and said that he would like to meet Schroeder as soon as possible. Schroeder agreed. When they met, the individual in question (Schroeder does not recall his name) presented suitable credentials and expressed interest in Schroeder's trip to the USSR. According to Schroeder's account, the West German Intelligence Officer gave him the old "keep your eyes and ears open" pitch, and told him that he would contact him in the first West German city in which he touched down after his USSR trip. Schroeder was contacted in Stuttgart promptly after returning to Germany from the USSR on his way back to the US. Because of his US employment and the fact that Bell paid for his trip, Schroeder became very apprehensive about any further contact with the West German service and at the time of the call indicated that he had nothing to say and wanted no further contact. Other than the cursory examination of credentials (as reported above), Schroeder made no attempt to establish the bona fides of the German who made the approach. We pointed out to Schroeder the unlikely possibility that the approach might not have been bona fide and might, in fact, have been a provocation.

* copy attached.

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

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Subject: Apparent U.S. interest in Minors, in connection with
Telephone call.

3. Apparently R.I.S. cultivation of Schroeder began prior to the above incident. According to his account, he had received what appeared to be a routine invitation to visit Soviet acoustics facilities in Moscow and Leningrad in August 1955. In connection with the invitation, he wrote to the Soviet government that during his visit he would like to meet V. I. Volgin, a leading Sov acoustics engineer who was very interested in sound and had done several Russian translations of Sakis from German. As a result of this correspondence, Schroeder received a telephone call at his home a couple of days prior to his departure for his trip from an individual who claimed to be a Sov. He said his representative in New York. The caller told Schroeder that he had a special invitation from G. M. Givens, of the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific and Technical Information, whose name Schroeder did not recognize, and that he would like to deliver the invitation to him personally before he departed. Schroeder indicated that he was very busy, with last minute details which he had to get in order on his trip and asked if the invitation couldn't be sent to him. When the caller insisted that his instructions were to deliver the invitation personally, Schroeder finally agreed to have his wife send the letter to him and pick up the invitation. Incidentally, at one point in the conversation Schroeder invited the Sov to deliver the invitation to his home; the latter declined, however, saying that Schroeder's home was in an area closed to travel by Sov diplomatic personnel. In any event, the Sov arranged to meet Schroeder's wife in a secret corner in Chinatown, New Jersey, and at that time turned over to her the invitation for her husband.

4. Schroeder said that his 1955 visit to the USSR was quite routine and that he could recall nothing out of the ordinary happening during the trip. During the visit, his Sov counterpart, Furduy, who speaks fluent German, acted as his host and was at his side almost continually.

5. (Sometimes in 1951 Schroeder received a phone call at his home one evening from Vladimir Volgin, who identified himself as a representative of Amtorg (A.S.). Volgin said that Schroeder's old friend Furduy had just completed a visit to New York and before leaving the city had asked him to deliver a present to Schroeder for him, hence the phone call. Volgin insisted on delivering the present to Schroeder in person, and the two made arrangements to have lunch together the following week in Manhattan. This began a series of approximately six

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Subject: Apparent His Interest in Sanford A. Schroeder,
Bell Telephone Labs.

or more contacts with Volgin which lasted until late 1961 when Schroeder received a note from Volgin stating that he and his family were returning to the USSR in order that his wife could undergo medical treatment there. Incidentally, Schroeder's only other contact with Volgin was in 1962 when he met him in Copenhagen at a professional meeting.

6. Schroeder said that most, if not all, of Volgin's phone calls to him were to his home and usually appeared to have been made from pay phones. Schroeder said that his meetings with Volgin included lunches and dinners in Manhattan, socializing at a New York Club, meeting, theater, and entertainment of each other in their respective homes. Schroeder claims that his wife accompanied him during most of his contact with Volgin. Other than to his own family, Volgin never introduced Schroeder to any other individuals.

7. Schroeder claims that on a couple of occasions he turned over unclassified technical papers to Volgin, who claimed to be an electrical engineer. Schroeder can't recall whether Volgin specifically requested the information or whether he turned it over to him on his own initiative. At one point during their relationship, Volgin asked Schroeder to write an article on US acoustics work for publication in a Soviet technical journal. Schroeder declined.

8. In retrospect Schroeder admitted that he had been quite naive about his relationship with Volgin and expressed some concern that his security hadn't been more active in admonishing him against development of relationships with Sov Government representatives. His view of his experiences now completely coincides with ours as a result of our discussion.

9. Another factor which obviously enters into Schroeder's R.I.B. picture is his wife's Bulgarian extraction. Schroeder states that neither he nor, to the best of his knowledge, his wife have ever been approached by Soviets representatives in this country concerning his wife's family in Bulgaria. His wife's mother, Ivanalia Menschik, immigrated to the US in April 1960 and lived with Schroeder and his wife until November 1962 when she returned to Sofia, apparently because she was homesick and couldn't adjust to the new language and life in the US. Schroeder said that his mother-in-law's original exit visa request was rejected in 1958 by the Bulgarian Government, but after he and his wife wrote several letters to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry she was finally granted permission to leave in 1960.

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder,
Bell Telephone Labs

10. After Schroeder visits the USSR on his current trip, he plans to fly to Sofia to spend approximately a week with his wife's family there. Schroeder had not mentioned the Bulgarian visit in outlining his original itinerary to Bob Martin of this office, therefore, it was not mentioned in Schroeder's Coordination Outline.

11. All of the above would seem to indicate quite strongly that Schroeder, as we originally surmised, has been targeted by R.I.S. In briefing Schroeder, we ran through some of the typical entrapment situations fabricated by the opposition, e.g., women, homosexuals, purchase of drugs for Sov citizens, black market activity, acceptance of letters to mail outside the USSR, commitments to disaffected Sovs, etc. In addition, we stringently admonished Schroeder against any notetaking or photography which could in any way be construed as compromising. We also alerted Schroeder to the fact that some attempt might be made to use his wife's family as leverage in a recruitment attempt. In this connection, we pointed out to Schroeder that there was a strong likelihood that the R.I.S. and/or Bulgarian service would make an approach to him during his forthcoming visit to Sofia. An approach in Bulgaria would give the Sovs an opportunity for disavowal and also would provide the proper setting for maximum utilization of relatives. When Schroeder mentioned that his sister-in-law, FNU Menschik, had indicated several times in the past that she would like to leave Bulgaria, we strongly admonished him against making any commitments to her, pointing out that she may possibly be co-opted by the opposition. We told Schroeder that any representations to gain an exit visa for his sister-in-law should be channeled through the US Legation in Sofia. Schroeder was told that, if any pressure were applied concerning his wife's family, his best reaction would probably be a noncommittal, "I'll think it over when I get home." All in all, we alerted Schroeder as best we could to the opposition M.O. and prepared him on how best to avoid some of the not so obvious pitfalls which might be in store for him.

12. Prior to our briefing of Schroeder, Bob Martin alerted Bell management to all of the ramifications of Schroeder's travel behind the Curtain. The management was informed by Martin that we felt it our obligation to point out to them the strong possibility that Schroeder had been targeted in order that they would have all of the facts available before signing off on his trip.

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SENSITIVE

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SENSITIVE

-5-

Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder,
Bell Telephone Labs

13. Assessment of Schroeder: Subject, a very accomplished scientist, heads up all acoustics research at Bell. He reads Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch, and English. He impresses us as being a rather savvy, discreet, cooperative, mature, stable, well motivated individual. We attribute Schroeder's apparent lack of discretion in his dealings with the Sovs more to the subtlety of the Sov approach than to his own naivete. It has been our experience that most US businessmen and scientists are very susceptible and vulnerable to the opposition approach mainly due to somewhat of a lack of realistic public education concerning contacts with Sovbloc nationals. We feel that Schroeder's degree of cooperativeness with US services has been enhanced considerably by his feeling that he has really been taken for a ride by the opposition.

Incidentally, when we asked subject for permission to release this information with source disclosure to the FBI, he was at first somewhat apprehensive and expressed the desire to talk it over with one of his Bell superiors before he made any commitments. He finally agreed, however, when we convinced him that it would certainly be in his best interest to get on record with the FBI as soon as possible. Most of his apprehension about the FBI seemed to be attributable to the fact that he has just been granted US citizenship and, in addition, is now somewhat concerned that his activities with the Sovs in some way may effect his security status which in turn could be very detrimental to his career.

Based on our limited contact with Schroeder, we have every reason to believe that he would be suitable for operational use, should the Bureau choose to pursue such a course.

14. We would strongly recommend that all of the above be passed to the Bureau ASAP in order that that organization may effect contact with Schroeder and provide him with proper guidance concerning any further approaches by Sov or Bloc nationals in this country.

JAY B.  REEVES

CHaglc/ng

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10612

1. Birth Date and Birthplace:
2. DOB, POB, Citizenship: b. May 1926, Andern, Germany. German Citizenship - West German. US Citizenship pending application for same made 22 January 1963.
3. Home Address: 12 Gates Avenue
Quinton, New Jersey
4. Place of Employment and Position:
Inventive Staff
Bell Laboratories
Murray Hill, New Jersey
Head of Acoustics Research
5. Itinerary: Subject will tentatively depart US 18 May, arriving Moscow 19 May. He will spend two weeks visiting labs in Moscow and Leningrad at the invitation of D. Orishiani, Deputy Chairman, State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research. If the 19 May arrival date is not acceptable to the Soviets, subject will make the trip in June or July.
6. Reason for Trip: During November 1962, while in Europe, subject received an invitation from the USSR Academy of Sciences to visit various Soviet acoustic laboratories. Because of a tight schedule at the time subject declined the invitation. In early March of this year he received the invitation from Orishiani mentioned above.

During his trip, subject will discuss with Soviet counterparts various aspects of voice communications research, electroacoustics, and architectural acoustics. He will also visit Soviet laboratories involved in research in these fields.
7. Security Status: Subject was granted Secret clearance by Middletown Air Material Command 30 July 1956 in anticipation of his being used on classified project at Bell Laboratories. Alien name check on subject pending.
8. Previous Intelligence Activities: In 1959 subject was contacted twice by NY/OO New York Field Office for debriefing after a trip to the USSR. At the time he was generally cooperative,

but somewhat apprehensive. He was again contacted in 1962 for briefing subsequent to a US visit of a Soviet counterpart.

9. Relatives or Close Friends in Denied Areas: Subject's wife was born in Sofia, Bulgaria. She now reportedly holds US citizenship. In November 1962 subject managed to arrange for immigration to the US of his mother-in-law, Ivanka Wrenchik. After a short stay in this country, however, she returned to her home in Sofia in March 1963. In addition to his mother-in-law, presumably there are other relatives of his wife still living in Bulgaria.
10. Extent of Previous Trip to Denied Areas: 13-18 August 1959 subject visited scientific laboratories in Moscow and Leningrad.
11. Analysis of Subject's Capabilities: Subject is a very competent scientific scientist. He reads Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch and English.
12. Status of Personal Assessment: During our constant limited relationship with subject he has given every indication of being discreet, security conscious, mature, and cooperative.
13. Policy of Substantive Briefing Proposed and Requirements to be Met: None. Subject will not be briefed on operations of any kind. No photography or incriminating note taking will be requested of him.
14. Defensive and Political Briefing: Subject will receive routine defensive and Soviet realities briefing.
15. Briefing Officer and Participation: Briefing will be conducted by C2/CG New York Field Office personnel.
16. Funding of Trip: Subject's trip will be funded by his company.
17. Finalization Briefing: 13 May 1963.

11617

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Chief, Contact Division
 Attn : Support (Shirley Stetson)
 FROM : Chief, New York Office

DATE: 26 June 1963

00-A-3266992

(NY-29883)

SUBJECT: ^{OF} Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. Thomas,
 Bell Laboratories

DISCUSS
 OFF SCIENTIST
 BELL LABORATORIES

1. During routine debriefing of Donald E. Thomas of Bell Laboratories in connection with his recent USSR visit to attend the Popov Society Meeting, 5-14 May, Moscow (see NYOR 8878 for Coordination Outline)* subject mentioned having had recent contact with a Soviet Government representative in this country. The Soviet in question identified himself to Thomas as Gleb Aleks² Pavlov and gave his address as 1216 First Avenue, Manhattan.

2. According to Thomas, his initial contact with Pavlov took place in late March following the International Convention and Show of the I.E.E.E., 25-29 March, New York City (see Case 39843). At the convention Thomas became friendly with two Soviet counterparts in attendance, A. V. Tiel and Anatole Trutka, both of whom Thomas invited to his home for a social visit during their US stay. When the Sovs departed for home following the convention, Thomas saw them off at New York International Airport. It was at the airport that he first met Pavlov, who apparently was seeing off all of the Sov I.E.E.E. delegates. After the Sov delegation had departed, Thomas and Pavlov returned to Manhattan together and, on parting, exchanged addresses.

3. A couple of weeks after their initial meeting, Pavlov telephoned Thomas at his home and told him that Tiel and Trutka had asked him to send their warmest regards to Thomas and thank him for the hospitality which he showed them during their trip to this country. During the conversation, Pavlov expressed an interest in renewing his acquaintance with Thomas, and suggested that he would enjoy visiting him at his home in Madison, New Jersey. Thomas said that he would enjoy seeing Pavlov, but that he was currently preparing to leave on a trip to the USSR and Europe and was not scheduled to return to the US until late May. Thomas suggested that, in view of this, perhaps early June would be a good time for them to plan on getting together. Pavlov replied that he, himself would be in the USSR then, but would contact Thomas when he returned in early July. Incidentally, Pavlov's

* copy attached

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. Thomas,
Bell Laboratories

phone call to Thomas was made on a pay phone. In fact, when the operator cut in for overtime, Thomas called Pavlov back at the pay phone. Thomas mentioned that he possibly might have the phone number written down somewhere.

4. Soon after the phone call from Pavlov, Thomas called John McVicker of the State Department and inquired if any clearance of Pavlov's proposed trip to his home in Madison would be necessary. McVicker told Thomas that any such clearances were Pavlov's worry and that he need not be concerned about same.

5. During his recent trip to the USSR, it would appear that Thomas was exposed to two incidents which possibly could have been of opposition fabrication. One involved an approach by a Soviet interpreter by the name of FNU Petrov, who took Thomas aside and asked him if he could do him a personal favor by getting him a subscription to National Geographic Magazine for which he, Petrov, would reimburse Thomas in rubles. Thomas politely refused. *D Moscow USSR*

6. The other incident involved Thomas being photographed with an attractive young female interpreter, Ludmilla Oshkina. According to Thomas, when one of the Soviets in their party was about to take a picture of him standing next to Ludmilla, another individual standing nearby was pushed out of the way apparently so that he would not be included in the photograph. In addition, Ludmilla attempted to strike an affectionate pose with Thomas for the photograph by slipping her arm through his. Thomas claims to have pushed her arm away just as the photo was being snapped. *sent C.I. USSR*

7. Assessment of Thomas: Subject strikes us as being extremely naive and unrealistic. He appears to be more apprehensive about his dealings with CIA than his dealings with Soviets. In fact, when Thomas was asked if he would mind if a tape recorder were used for debriefing, he became very nervous and expressed a fear that, if such a tape were made, perhaps the Soviets might gain access to it and use it against him in some way at a future date.

Thomas had an outline in his own handwriting of the sessions of the Popov Society Meeting. When we asked for a photostat of same, he again expressed misgivings and indicated that he would prefer to have a typewritten copy prepared for us instead of a copy in his own handwriting because he was fearful that it might fall into Soviet hands.

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. Thomas,
Bell Laboratories

We inquired of Thomas why he had not mentioned Pavlov to us during our defensive briefing of him before his trip. He replied rather nebulously that it was his understanding that it was company policy that our only function in seeing him before his trip was to give him a defensive briefing, and that, since no debriefing was involved at the time, he felt no obligation to volunteer the information concerning Pavlov.

It is our opinion that Thomas's obvious naivete, apparent lack of sophistication, and extreme apprehension concerning dealings with our Agency would make him most unsuitable from the standpoint of operational utilization by the Bureau.

8. We would strongly recommend that all of the above be passed to the Bureau ASAP in order that that organization may effect contact with Thomas in time to provide him with proper guidance concerning any further approaches by Pavlov or other Sov legals in US.

P. J. Conner
JAY B. L. REEVES

Glagle/mg

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1 May 1963

SUBJECT: Coordination Outline - Donald E. Thomas, Bell Labs

FROM: New York Field Office

Following is coordination outline for D. E. Thomas. Dr. W. O. Baker requested that Thomas be given defensive briefing by us before going behind Curtain. As you are already aware, Baker is Vice President at Bell Labs and member of President's Scientific Advisory Council and President's Intelligence Board.

1. Name: Donald Edgar Thomas
2. Date and Place of Birth: 18 May 1907, Hanover Township, Penna.
3. Name and Address: 48 Fairview Avenue, Madison, New Jersey.
4. Place of employment and position: Bell Labs, Murray Hill, New Jersey; Electronics Engineer.
5. Itinerary: Subject departs on 3 May for Moscow to attend Popov Society meeting, 5-14 May. Following Moscow meeting he will visit labs in Western Europe for approximately one week.
6. Mission and reason for trip: Subject was invited to give paper at Popov meeting by USSR Academy of Sciences via I.E.E.E. (International Electronics and Electrical Engineers).
7. Security Status: We hold favorable SAS completion on subject dated 29 Jan 59.
8. Previous Intelligence Activities: Subject was contacted by OS/OS 1958-59 concerning info on Soviet work in his field which he acquired from contacts with Soviet scientific counterparts attending international meeting in USSR.
9. Relatives or close friends in denied areas: None.
10. Extent of previous trips to denied areas: None.
11. Analysis of Subject's Competence: B.S. State College, B.S., B.E., 1930; Columbia University, M.A., 1932; US Army Signal Corps, 1940-44; USAF, 1944-46, on radio countermeasures, 1944-45; Retired Lt. Col. USAF; Member (Civilian) panel on Electronics Countermeasures R&D Board, Dept of Defense, 1946-53.
12. Results of personal assessment: During our limited relationship with subject, he has given every indication of being discreet, security conscious, cooperative, well motivated, mature. He is well regarded in his particular field of competence.
13. Nature of substantive briefing proposed and requirements to be met: None. Subject will not be briefed on operations of any kind. No photography or incriminating note taking will be requested of him.
14. Defensive and realities briefing: Subject will receive routine defensive and realities briefing.
15. Funding for trip: Subject's trip will be funded by his company.
16. Briefing office and participants: Briefing will be conducted by OS/OS New York Office personnel.
17. Coordination Outline: 2 May 1963.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO.

000-11

SUBJECT Alleged House Arrest of Soviet Scientist, L Chistovich

DATE DISR

NO PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO.

July 63

PLACE &

DATE ACQ -- July 63

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, professor in a US university.

He is an authority on acoustics.

1. I attended the Third International Congress on Acoustics, 1-8 Sept 59, Stuttgart, West Germany.
2. While at this Congress I met a Soviet female scientist, L Chistovich, who is connected with the Pavlov Institute of Physiology, Leningrad. One day during the Congress I took a walk in the Black Forest with L Chistovich and another Soviet scientist. After a short time, the other Soviet scientist excused himself saying that he had to rejoin his colleagues.
3. In June 1963 Manfred Schroeder, an acoustician with Bell Telephone Laboratories, was in the USSR. On his return to the US he told me that he had heard while in the USSR that L Chistovich, on her return from the 1959 Stuttgart Congress, had been placed under house arrest. He also said that he had seen L Chistovich while he was in the USSR, and he had asked her whether it was true that she had been placed under house arrest on returning from the Stuttgart Congress. He said Chistovich's only reply was to blush.
4. I suspect that the individual who reported L Chistovich to the authorities was Yuri Pavlovich Lysanov. He is connected with the Acoustics Institute in Moscow. He publishes very little and his conduct has seemed strange to me. He was in the United States in 1946-1947. I suspect that the fact that L Chistovich took a walk with me alone may well have been the reason she was placed under house arrest.

- end -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

MC

AFC

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NO DISSEM ABROAD

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FBI report dated 22 Oct. 62 (Wash. D.C.)

Memorandum for Secretary, 4470 Special Committee

FBI report dated 25 Oct. 62 (Wash. D.C.)

Re: Exchange of Information Regarding
Soviet & Satellite Diplomats

FBI report dated 31 Oct. 62 (N.Y., N.Y.)

FBI Memo dated 24 Jan. 63 (Wash. D.C.)

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 26 Feb. 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 21 March 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 25 April 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 24 May 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 20 June 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 22 July 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 19 Aug 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Analysis dated 4 Sept 63 (Wash. D.C.)

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 4 Nov. 63 (Wash. D.C.)

Re: Unknown Subjects (two); Observed Taking
Photographs in Vicinity of U.S. Naval
Station, Wash. D.C.

FBI Report dated 25 Nov. 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed 4(S) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 27 Dec 63 (N.Y., N.Y.)

TOP SECRET CROSS REFERENCE SHEET (FBI Report 22 May 63)

Re: Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: _____ TS Material from Deryagin Safe

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET				
SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM:		EXTENSION	NO.	
Rodger S. Gabrielson OLC/C&R		1133	REF TO: Con. No. TS191722 Date 19 June 1978	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Mr. N. Shepanek	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. MR. DIXON SA/DO/O Tube: 4X6 Green				
2. Mr. Jack Sullivan AS Tube: FM				
3. Mr. Young AS Tube: 4X6 Green				
4. Mr. John Heringer AS				
5. Mr. H. H. H. H. H. AS Tube: 4X6				
6. Mr. Hubert H. H. AS Tube: 4X6				
7. Rodger Gabrielson OLC				
8.				
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Attached is a letter from the House Select Committee on Assassinations dated . Please respond as soon as possible.

Shep: Please have CI look at this. It's the T.S. material from Deryabin's safe - requested by Blakey. Thanks,

Rodge

(12 7: CI Staff says they may be shown to Blakey May)

FORM 3-62

610

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Source	SR/CI/K	CIA Control No.
Doc. No.	XAAZ-17241	TS# 191722
Doc. Date	20 APR 1964	Date Document Received
Cover No.	# Repro 2	15 JUN 1978
Number of Pages	38	Logged By
Number of Attachments		

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DCI/OLC <i>Scott Breckinridge</i>							
DDO/TSCO <i>B. Ligg</i>		19 JUN 1978	19 JUN 1978				
DDO/TSCO <i>B. Ligg</i>		19 JUN 1978	19 JUN 1978				
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TS# 191722A
TS# 191722B
TS# 191722C

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DCI/OLC <i>[Signature]</i>							
DDO/TSCO	<i>[Signature]</i>	19 JUN 1978					
DDO/TSCO	<i>[Signature]</i>	19 JUN 1978					
DDO/TSCO	<i>[Signature]</i>	20 JUN 1978					

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Doc. Date 19 MAY 1964				Logged By <i>AB</i>			
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DDI/OCC <i>Scott Breckinridge</i>							
DDO/TSCO <i>B. Swigg</i>		19 JUN 1978	19 JUN 1978				
<i>Thompson</i> DDI/OCC		19 JUN 78	19 JUN 78				
ACK (NCOY)							
DDO/TSCO <i>B. Swigg</i>		20 JUN 1978	23 JUN 1978				
DDI/OCC <i>Breckinridge or Gabrielson</i>							
DDO/TSCO							

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Doc. Date	19 May 1964	Date Document Received
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Number of Pages	2	Logged By
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DCI/OC	<i>Scott Bruckinridge</i>							
DDP(TSCO)	<i>B. Ligg</i>	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
DCI/OC	<i>Mr. Lippman</i>	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
ALC(MC)								
DDP(TSCO)	<i>B. Ligg</i>	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OC	<i>Bruckinridge or Harrison</i>							
DDO/TSCO								

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DEFECTORS - NOSENKO

<u>TAB</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1	Report on: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, Soviet	2 Apr 64
	Attachments:	
	1. Memo for Record from David E. Murphy, Subject: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case	2 Apr 64
	2. Memo for Director of Security from Lawrence R. Houston, Subject: Parole Status of Defectors	3 Apr 64
	3. Memo, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO	Jan 75
	Letter for Mr. Richard Helms from J. Walter Yeagley, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	20 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Richard Helms, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Forms 1-125 and background data attached)	9 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Louis Wienckowski from Frank E. Bartos, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	24 July 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Victor R. White, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO	18 Jul 69
	Routing Sheet from Chief, SR Division to DD/OS	13 Feb 64
	Memo for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Thomas H. Karamessines, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	11 Feb 64
	Memo for US Intelligence Board Members from Marshall S. Carter, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
	Newspaper clipping: Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet	
	Newspaper clipping: U.S. Lets Swiss and Red Envoys talk to Defector	15 Feb 64
	4. Memo for Acting Chief, Support Branch from Jack M. Bauman	12 May 64
	5. Memo for Special Agent in Charge District Field Office from Victor R. White, Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)	10 Jul 64

TABTITLEDATE

Memo for Headquarters from John D. Noble, Jr.,
 Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions
 Regarding Custody Of) with Attachment: Emergency
 Instructions (2)

1 Jul 64

6. Memo for the Record from John M. Maury,
 Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts
 on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case w/att

5 Aug 69

/ 2

Nosenko's Request for Political Asylum

4 Feb 64

2

Secrecy Agreements and Financial Arrangements
 Between the CIA and Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

21 Apr 69

3

Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge,
 Subject: Office of Security Reports on PARAGON,
 NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD

31 Dec 74

4

Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge,
 Subject: Nosenko

13 Jan 75

✓ Attachments:

1. Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subject: Yuriy
 Ivanovich Nosenko;

9 Jan 75

1A. Memo for USIB Members from M. Carter, 12 Feb 64,
 Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

12 Feb 64

5

Questions and Answers Concerning the Treatment of Soviet
 Defector Nosenko

5

Memo for the IG, Subject: The Nosenko Case

67

Attachment:

1. Summary of 1967 Document Which Outlines the
 Nosenko Case

ORIGINAL

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION:

NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND :

NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is \$23,500 per year.

APPROVAL :

(1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

14-00000

RESULTS :

By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION :

NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS :

(1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES :

Office of Security files on NOSENKO
are maintained in the following
locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

SECRET
EYES ONLY

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney
General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.
2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would soon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.
3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.
4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.
2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.
3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

SECRET

14-00000
January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.
2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials officials/and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

SECRET

Department of Justice

Washington 20530

October 20, 1963

Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms:

Re: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
(ER 69-5003/1)

Reference is made to your letter dated October 9, 1969, concerning the above case, in which you urge the concurrence of the Attorney General in your proposal to have the above-named alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, as amended.

The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has informed me that on the basis of the records of his Service and the information furnished by you, and in the absence of any other evidence adverse to the alien, he concurs in your proposal that the alien be permitted to enter the United States for permanent residence under the authority of the foregoing statute.

Upon the basis of all the evidence received for consideration and your statement of recommendation and approval which carries with it your determination that the entry of the individual concerned is in the interest of national security and in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, I concur in your recommendation that the admission for permanent residence of the subject alien be authorized under the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.

Respectfully,

For the Attorney General

J. Walter Grayley
Assistant Attorney General

SECRET

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET

9 OCT 1961

ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:


SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security ~~and essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission.~~ In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

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There are enclosed Forms I-123 and background data,
in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn

8 October 1969

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Date

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer's copy
1 - DDGI
1 - SI
1 - SB Div.
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP
1 - CGC
2 - OS Files

SECRET

14-00000

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927

Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

Male

Divorced

Brown

Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches

Soviet

Caucasian

--

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich KOSENKO

AKA: Yuri KOSENKO

DPOB: 30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

MARITAL STATUS: 1946 - Married and divorced Flavia KOSENKO (Ne: SHISHOV).
1946 - Married Augustine K. KOSENKO (Ne: YELIGIN), 1949 - separated and 1951 - divorced.
23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Yulianovna KOSENKO (Ne: KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 - separated and 1969 - divorced.

CHILDREN: Daughters - Oksana KOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara KOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)

EDUCATION: 1942-1943 - Attended various USSR Naval Schools.
1943-1953 - Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.


EMPLOYMENT: March 1951-March 1953 - Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence).
March 1953-February 1964 - Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).

MILITARY: Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.

NATIONALITY: Soviet

PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS: 1943-1954 - Member Komsomol, USSR
1956 - Candidate Communist Party
1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR

SECRET



SECRET

SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence
in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of operational interest~~
~~to this Agency. Therefore, it is requested subject's~~
~~parole to this Agency be extended for an additional~~
~~period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of~~
~~his stay of 16 August 1969.~~

Your cooperation in this matter is very much ap-
preciated.

Sincerely,


SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR SYMBOLIZED
TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SECRET



SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536

PLEASE ADDRESS REPLY TO

AND REFER TO THIS FILE NO.

July 24, 1969

A13 724 817

W

Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.


Attention: Mr. Louis Wienckowski

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko,
Your SP-1687.

Dear Sir:

As you requested in your letter dated July 18, 1969, the
~~subject has been given a further period of stay to expire on~~
February 16, 1970.

Sincerely,

*Frank E. Bartos*Frank E. Bartos
Chief Intelligence Officer
Field Inspection and Security Divisione.u. 16 Jan. 1970
J.F.
(2)

SECRET

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.
2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.
3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.
4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

- 2 -

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that Department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept his was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessinos
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:

Orig - Adse
2 cc - SR/CI/X-Downey
1 cc - C/CI
1 cc - CSR
1 cc - DD/OS

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY



TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members
SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.
2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.
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TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

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7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

By TAD SZULO

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 — Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 9.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization

Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressure.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

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U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for asylum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillips said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-
See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

*WASH Post
2/15/64*

Swiss, Soviets See Defector

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information "as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him." The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present, and said Nosenko also was "agreeable." A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday, in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko

called in American Ambassador For Kohler and charged the United States with "impermissible acts" in the case. He stopped short of a kidnapping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say, I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said

there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

Solic

*WASH Post
2/15/64*

SECRET

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch *JAT*

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich ~~(H-20)~~, McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:

- (1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)
- (2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)
- (3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

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(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.



Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

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ADMINISTRATIVE

Headquarters

10 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Special Agent in Charge
District Field Office

SUBJECT : LESNICK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
#262 622 C - SD/1

1. Reference is made to the outline of emergency instructions submitted by you on 1 July 1964 for Headquarters approval.

2. The plan as outlined is approved and should be implemented immediately.

[Signature]
Victor E. White

DDS/IOS	BIASSEN:dr
ADDS/IOS	JULY 1964
ASST/IOS	SUPPLEMENTAL
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C/OSD	
DC/OSD	
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
TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters

SUBJECT : LEONIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of)
#262 622 C SD/1

1. Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT's health, safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where SUBJECT is currently being held.
2. This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part, are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the District Field Office who are concerned with this case.
3. Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of the Special Security Detail will be made upon notification of Headquarters approval.


JOHN D. NOBLE, Jr.
Special Agent in Charge
2 July 64

Attachment:

Emergency Instructions (2)

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TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling of emergency situations such as fire, the escape or attempted escape of SUBJECT, and the sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT. Should such situations arise, it might be necessary to call on the Police, the Fire Department, or outside medical facilities for assistance. It is possible that in such an event representatives of the press or curiosity-seekers in the local community might be attracted to the site, thereby creating security problems with respect to the custody and protection of the SUBJECT from a publicity standpoint.

In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these instructions be thoroughly understood and memorized by all personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on this case.

FIRE (Main House)

1. In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the fire should apply the nearest fire extinguisher, unless, in his judgment, the fire has reached such proportions where available equipment would be useless. Simultaneously, he should dispatch another member of the Security Detail to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA) and the other occupants of the house. If no one is available in the immediate vicinity, the person discovering the fire should alert others in the house by shouting "FIRE".
2. Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for directing the fighting of the fire, protecting classified and sensitive documents and equipment on the premises, calling the local Fire Department if circumstances warrant, and evacuating personnel. Also, at the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.
3. In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire, it should be borne in mind that two guards must be maintained on the third floor at all times, so long as the SUBJECT remains confined to his quarters. If it should become necessary to remove the SUBJECT from his quarters during an emergency, a minimum of four guards should be present unless circumstances are such as to make this infeasible. In

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during the movement of SUBJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody and control over the SUBJECT and prevent his escape.

4. If, in the judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely to reach, proportions that it could not be controlled by firefighting equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to arrival of the Fire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone calls should be made to the safehouse. If no answer is received, the cognizant DEO official should be contacted for instructions as to whether to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternate site.

FIRE
(Tenant House)

1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereof should be instructed to immediately notify the Main House and to use any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises. It should be clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole responsibility of the SSA.

2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If, in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach, proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the observation of the SUBJECT by firemen or other unauthorized persons who might be attracted to the scene.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

3. At the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE

1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a 24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to discourage and prevent the SUBJECT's escape. If SUBJECT should make an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary under the circumstances in order to subdue the SUBJECT and maintain custody and control over him. However, unnecessary brutality and the indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.

2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt. Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of the SUBJECT by all means available.

3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circumstances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT's total escape, may direct a qualified firearms-trained agent to fire shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warning to halt. In no event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot directly at the SUBJECT.

4. At the first available opportunity, the SAC/DFO, or in his absence, one of the ASACs, should be telephonically advised of all the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt. In no case shall the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.

ILLNESS OR INJURY

1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT, Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event

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EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

of his absence, should be immediately notified and advice obtained as to any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival. Likewise, the SAC or ASAC/DEO should be notified immediately after talking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situation and any instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardless of any instructions given by the doctor, no action shall be taken to remove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospital or ambulance service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAC.

2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital or other location away from the premises, every possible precaution should be taken to maintain close custody and control over him, and to prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized persons.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION

1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under constant observation twenty-four hours a day.
2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while confined to third floor.
3. Six men in attendance whenever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for removal signal from visitors.
4. Coveralls taken from SUBJECT at 2200 hours and returned the following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and undershirt overnight.
5. Military appearance and prompt shift schedules maintained at all times when in presence of SUBJECT.
6. Careful room search, including clothes and bunk, to be conducted every time SUBJECT leaves cell.
7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing wall whenever anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

8. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms on 3rd floor to be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order to prevent his becoming oriented to surroundings.
9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with SUBJECT or among agents, nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT's hearing.
10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor permitted to hear radio or television, nor shall there be any discussion of news events within his hearing. He may be provided selected reading material upon authorization of Headquarters personnel concerned with the case.
11. Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up any comments by SUBJECT or conversation between him and the doctor or other operational personnel.
12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities of SUBJECT to be promptly brought to the attention of the SSA.
13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel, as well as photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained in a secure place for ready reference by the SSA.
14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police or Fire Department regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with specific reference to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled by the SSA with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the scene. The SSA should converse in private with such official, and identify himself by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased and that it is used occasionally for training purposes. All inquiries concerning the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if necessary, it may be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder which sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified under his alias or otherwise. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request that his own identity, plus his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence, especially with regard to the press. Inquiries by members of the press or members of the civilian population should be answered by stating that the site is rented by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

SPECIAL CONTACTS

1. George PASEGAULIS, Chief of Police, Prince Georges County.
(Personally known to SNODDY under GOLIATH)
2. Lieutenant MOON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf,
Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to FERRALL
under GOLIATH)
3. Emergency Ambulance - Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department.
(Can be obtained through SNODDY)

Above not to be contacted unless authorized by SAC or ASAC.

CLC 69-0676

5 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case

1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo of 17 June 1969 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case, I have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcommittees along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:

Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House
Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1969

William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Senate
Appropriations Committee -- 24 July 1969

Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed
Services Committee -- 24 July 1969

Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations
Committee -- 27 July 1969

2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers registered particular concern or curiosity about the case and I think it doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Nevertheless, I think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it further at this time.

Attachments:

Distribution:

Original - CLC Subject File

1 - DDP

1 - Chief, CI Staff

1 - Chief, SE Division

1 - D/Security

1 - CGC

1 - CLC Chrono

John M. Maury
JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

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1-9-1731/2

DRAFT:JMM - 19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case

The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.

1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.

2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debriefings by officers of the Agency and the FBI.

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3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence. For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.

4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer,

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he would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts. With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.

5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other officers responsible for his safety and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.

6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.

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SEC

NOSENKO

Question #1 - Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment? Prisoner? Treatment?

Answer:

During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:

- a. Confinement in single room except for periods of interrogation.
- b. Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour visual observation with regular room search.
- c. Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient quantity but limited in variety.
- d. No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio and television were not allowed, newspapers or any information concerning current events were forbidden and reading material was extremely limited.

Question #2 - Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.

Answer:

During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967, conditons cited above were basically maintained with the following additons or changes:

- a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was furnished no reading material.
- b. After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given a different volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica to read.
- c. From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko was not permitted cigarettes.
- d. Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small confined area outside the building when weather permitted.

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Question #3 - Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this:
What?

Answer:

Office of Security records contain only limited information in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be based on SE records.

Question #4 - Where is Nosenko working now?

Answer:

Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area for several days approximately every six weeks for direct interviews by the FBI and Office of Security personnel.

Question #5 - Is he working for CIA?

Answer:

Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration, primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late 1972, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition, on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency from any claims prior to that date.

Question #6 - What is his legal status?

Answer:

Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in April 1974.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

SUBJECT : The Nosenko Case

Attached please find a summary of a document written in 1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967 Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any location whatsoever, he was free to do so. In other words, from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man. That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to October 1967.

While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns of a dilemma in this regard. There were legitimate doubts about Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet plant. There was no country to which he could be deported save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to national security.

Recognizing that only legal experts can judge definitively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that the Agency had no choice but to hold Nosenko incommunicado pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko de facto from the date of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for his

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conduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to believe that full and total release of Nosenko would be an abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error. In sum, the act of defection places the defector at the mercy of the laws of the country to which he defects. It is the obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that its responsibility for the defector was met. While it was unfortunate that it took so long to resolve the matter, we can find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko himself.

Attachment: A/S

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposition of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967 in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime. He gradually created a new life for himself in the United States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.

Background

Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA representatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and

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debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt, Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political asylum from the U.S. Government.

Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was originally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February, unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had disappeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.

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Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his release. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of his own free will.

On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director, Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

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On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that they desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador KOHLER and protested "impermissible activities" on the part of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 September, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At these interviews, which were also attended by State Department and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition, he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship. On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain in this country.

From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko was housed in the Washington area. During this period, regular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was

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made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case officers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which he was being held. Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.

On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated deception.

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on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsibilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were suspended pending resolution of bona fides.

It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions on the basis of his information. The results of some of these actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For example, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately, involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.

Bona Fides

Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral

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investigations. We concluded that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB instructions, and that he came to the United States on a deception mission. The implications of this mission had a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissible in a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable means of communication with the KGB.

Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted, however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States.

Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies

USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an

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ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 February 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established. It was agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community.

The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director, Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.

Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.

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The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors.

The Director of Security, State Department, was informed of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department.

Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major

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aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI formally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent provocateur."

The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our reservations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this country.

Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of Nosenko's True Status

From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were

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to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people in the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intelligence community, even though this carried the inevitable risk of leakage.

Soviet Inspired Inquiries

In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets were making a serious effort to find out what happened to Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist, Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain compensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandonment of her and her children. In responding to this approach we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself,

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to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to represent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way.

Nosenko's Status

To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955, which states:

"After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status."

In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we ensured that he was under our direct observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United

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States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial.

Disposal

From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what

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this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country.

USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.

Third Country: Although we believed it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country,

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there is certainly no country in the free world on which we could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first informing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplicity on the basis of the political risks involved.

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1 July 74
File under
NOSENKO

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions for a period of approximately three years. Commencing in 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed total freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1974. He is presently under contract to the Agency, providing consultative services and information on subjects germane to his background.

NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing substantive questions were raised concerning his bona fides, and his general behavior raised further concern about his emotional health and general safety. NOSENKO's debriefing and confinement were ended when it was concluded that he was not a threat to national security. The advice of the Justice Department was obtained at the time of his confinement, and the FBI participated in his subsequent debriefing. NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated with the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement.

The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to make clear to him that his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his confinement and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers (ADD/O and D/OS) that such was the case, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors whose bona fides were in doubt.

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
12 JAN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel**SUBJECT : Nosenko**

Attached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the awareness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS). We have been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of immediate liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment: a/s

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~~EYES ONLY~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.
2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.
3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.
4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account

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HR 10-23
9 January 1975

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of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Sarghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
 Lieutenant General, USA
 Deputy Director

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EX-103

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31 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Office of Security reports on PARAGON,
NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II
and MOCKINGBIRD

1. Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum from the Acting Director of Security on subject activities. The material represents responses to questions posed by your office. Obviously, the next phase of the investigation will require more detailed reviews of each activity.

2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:

PARAGON

We should spell out what is meant by the statement that the FBI "deferred further coverage to the Office of Security," how it was expressed and what form it took.

The taping of two conversations does not seem to constitute "electronic surveillance" in the usual sense. It certainly is not trespassory surveillance. A little more detail on the equipment will be wanted.

NOSENKO

We will go to the DDO for any record of DCI knowledge, and report such information as we get.

AELADLE

We will want to verify DDCI's approval of entry.

EX-103

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EYES ONLY**

CELOTEX I

We will want more detail on the actual surveillance, including possible higher approval.

This is responsive to the DCI's request for newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.

CELOTEX II

Questions similar to CELOTEX I.

We may want actual copies of newspaper stories for display, in addition to memos, should DCI wish to use it.

MOCKINGBIRD

No recorded (in CIA) formal approval by Attorney General. It may be that Justice will have a copy.

Does this raise a question of surveillance of congressmen if one is contacted by someone under surveillance?

3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA, REDFAX I, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB Thursday.


S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments a/s

**SECRET
EYES ONLY**

SECRET**EYES ONLY**

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31 DEC 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : PARAGON
NOSENKO
AELADLE
CELOTEX I
CELOTEX II
MOCKINGBIRD

1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office. As you will note, the report is in a question and answer format with attachments.

2. This Office is still gathering material in regard to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist, on the above mentioned projects.


Sidney D. Stembidge
Acting Director of Security

Atts

Distribution:

Original - Adse
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CL BY 010249**EYES ONLY****SECRET**

REQUEST

I, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, request the Government of the United States of America to grant me political asylum in the United States of America. This decision has been taken by me as the result of considering this question over the course of several years without any pressure on the part of anyone whatsoever. I absolutely do not believe in the truth of the Socialist system. Working in the KGB and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about the internal situation, the mood of the people and the policies of the Soviet Government, I became convinced that in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist Party. Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries of the West, I was able correctly to understand and become aware of the existence of a real and actual free world. The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the Communist movement are for me vivid examples and confirmation of the correctness of my own decision to break forever with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Government of the United States of America that I will devote all my strength and knowledge to the Government and people of the United States of America.

/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

4 February 1964

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UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECY

In consideration of arrangements being made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely acknowledge that I have no outstanding claims of any nature against the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there are no commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior associations with the Agency. I fully understand that the current arrangements between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

I acknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely, totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.

I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past, present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. 793, 794) and other applicable laws and regulations. I understand that this is a solemn and permanent undertaking which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition, I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.

I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal
this 21 day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1 _____ (L.S.)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21 day of April,
1969.

/s/ IDEN 7

✓ Notary Public

My commission expires September 24, 1969

(SEAL)