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country, he could well have had questions about his reception after serving in the CASTRO government.)

d. His resentment against the confining nature of a Communist State. (Since he never stayed in one place more than a short time in his entire life, to have been restricted to Cuba must have seemed a punishment.)

5. RABEL was used to pitch ~~Dora Marta FRAYDE Barran~~ in ~~Paris~~ in ~~July~~ 1963, and to check out leads for the AMTRUNK Operation. One of his leads led to the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10. Later, in early 1964, RABEL was leader of the Rebel Army Group supported by the American Legion in Miami and was involved in the Rebel Army Radio program.

6. There is no specific evidence (except the accusations below) that RABEL was involved in a suspicious way with the CASTRO regime during this period, but his desire to exfiltrate his wife and children was a constant source of difficulty between him and the Station. This problem led to his eventual termination in July 1964 and to a great deal of resentment on his part. He conspired constantly, from mid-1963 until his capture in Cuba in September 1965, to get into Cuba to exfiltrate his wife and children.

7. RABEL was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967, which is a strong indication that the charges that he worked for the DSE while in prison were true. Moreover, there is some indication that he may have attempted a provocation at Cuban behest immediately after his capture. There are two firm accusations that RABEL was a

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Cuban agent as early as July 1963 (which would have been when he was screening names for the AMTRUNK Operation), [one from ~~LITAMIL-9~~, and the other from Fernando REY reported by ~~WASLOUCH-1~~]. As mentioned above, these charges could well be true; yet RABEL could have fulfilled his duties for CASTRO superficially, for his own purposes, and not necessarily have compromised his work with the Agency until he was captured. The difficulties he had in exfiltrating his wife could have been, partially, punishment by CASTRO for not fulfilling his duties as an agent; otherwise, had his work in the U.S. been valuable, CASTRO could have facilitated the exfiltration of RABEL's wife so that RABEL could continue his work as an agent undisturbed.

LAD/JFK Task Force 1977/~~Marty Miller~~rp

Copy filed: 201-249386

Attachments: 4

- A- 10 Feb 1964 Memo for the Record
- B- 6 Mar 1963 dispatch [UFGA-7998] with Att.
- C- 20 Feb 1963 cable WAVE 4730 (IN 71127)
- D- 30 Sep 1963 dispatch [UFGA-11375]

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1983
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

7-71 MFG. 10/75

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C/C13						2
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ACTION #						4
						5
						6

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TOR:181831Z FEB 76[MADR] 30177

SECRET 181900Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE [MADRID] 30177

TO: DIRECTOR INFO [LONDON] [LISBON]

RYBAT (PHMH) LANKET KMSTONE

*CABLE SEC SUGGESTS DISSEM TO: C/LA IF DESIRED, SEND FORM 1004 TO CABLE SEC

1. NICKY SZULC STILL IN MADRID AS OF 17 FEB. SHE TOLD [QUCOMUMN/1] SHE HAS BEEN IN CUBA THREE TIME, LAST TIME DURING INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S CONFERENCE. WHILE THERE SHE CLAIMED BE WORKING AS ADVISOR FOR MINREX COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SECTION. SHE SAID CUBANS GAVE HER ACCESS TO ALL INFO THEY HAD ON CIA ACTIVITIES AROUND WORLD. SAID SHE WAS PAID SALARY AND HAD CAR AND CHAUFFEUR AT HER DISPOSAL.

2. SZULC ALSO TOLD [Q/1] SHE HAD WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH AGEE ON PREPARATION HIS BOOK. SAID SHE AND WEISSMAN AND AGEE VERY ANGRY WITH JOHN MARKS FOR PUBLISHING HIS BOOK "HOW TO SPOT A SPOOK". THEY TOLD HIM THIS WOULD ONLY ALERT CIA TO CHANGE ITS TACTICS, BUT MARKS PUBLISHED BOOK ANYWAY AND THEY NOW CONSIDER HIM TRAITOR.

3. FILE: [73]-6-46/3. E2 IMPDET

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CI Staff Action

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19 FEB 1976

7/PD

N.B.

↑

(ex.B.F. 14 Feb. 77 Szulc memo)

Art. B.

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

24 February 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Estimate of Damage Which Could Accrue to CIA
Miami Through Prosecution of the Rolando
Masferrer Haitian Invasion Group

1. The decision by the Justice Department to seek a Grand Jury indictment against Rolando Masferrer and certain of his associates is a potentially explosive matter which could result in extensive damage to CIA activities in Miami. Recent adverse publicity on the national scene and in the Miami area have added substantially to the already sizeable embarrassment potential. Some of the main sectors of danger to CIA equities are described below.

2. Basic national publicity regarding student and foundation topics have already attracted attention of the local press to the CIA in general. Usually any reference to CIA covert activities leads the press to check files for references to any such activities locally. However, before this action could be taken, the story regarding the Pan American Foundation and the University of Miami broke, and the press immediately concentrated on this topic. The CIA Chief of Station learned through personal press contacts that this was partly a matter of luck and partly because of the friendly and cooperative attitude of these press contacts. Although several editorials highly critical of CIA have been published and the replay of wire service stories has been given much space, as yet there has been no local follow-up aimed at putting CIA or the CIA Station on the spot. However, the situation remains delicate, since, even with much good will, local newsmen cannot afford to let themselves be scooped by outsiders concerning stories in their own back yard.

3. Any new story, such as the 22 February story in World Journal Tribune on suspected CIA connection with recruitment of Cuban pilots for the Congo, the possible results of inquiry made on 21 February by three students connected with the University of Miami newspaper The Hurricane, or further revelations concerning the Pan American Foundation, could easily trigger publicity with an inevitable focus on the South Campus of the University of Miami and on the Miami Station cover firm.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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06,08 4. As has been the case for the past six years, (Dr. Henry King Stanford, President) and (Dr. Eugene Coker, Vice President and Treasurer) of the (University of Miami,) 29 have extended their fullest cooperation concerning the Miami Station and overall CIA interests and it is anticipated they will continue to do so. However, we believe there is a practical limit to the amount of pressure they could stand from (their trustees) and from certain public quarters if there is a flood of publicity regarding CIA activities allegedly centered in or controlled from the (Zenith Technical Enterprises Inc.), or its accused successor, the (Holmar Corporation). If such a situation arises, it is conceivable that (Dr. Stanford) would feel impelled to take some action aimed at disassociating the (University of Miami) from any contact with the (Holmar Corporation). 29 Since the (Holmar Corporation) is ostensibly the tenant of the (University of Miami) although on Federal property, the resulting action might involve a request for the termination of the tenancy agreement.

5. Even if the above circumstances did not exist, we would remain concerned regarding the possible effects of the prosecution of the Masferrer group. Although no Station agents or persons with whom the Miami Station has contractual arrangements are among the persons arrested or those who will be prosecuted, it will be very easy for the defense to drag CIA Miami into the case. The defense has only to obtain testimony (true or perjured) from one of the defendants, or to summon as defense witness one or more disaffected former agents of the CIA Station, in order to begin a chain reaction surfacing much detail and rumor concerning CIA operations against the Cuban target. Given the sizeable reduction of infiltration and Covert Action agents during the past year, a general feeling of frustration and lack of support for Cuban freedom attributed to passive U.S. policy and reduction in CIA support in all sectors, the long standing animosity of certain exile circles against U.S. Government, notably CIA, and the evaluation that CIA now is the most vulnerable of Federal Agencies confronting them, exiles will be tempted to see an attack against CIA as accomplishing several purposes, that is, gaining acquittal, blackening CIA, and exerting pressure on the U.S. Government for a policy change.

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11/21

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION		PROCESSING			
		SECRET		PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED	
TO	Chief, WH			XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING attachment		
INFO.					NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
FROM					ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING		
					ABSTRACT		
SUBJECT	TYPIC						
	Contact Report - IDEN *A						
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES							
ACTION REQ: See Para 4							
<p>1. IDEN A, a wealthy and prominent New Orleans businessman, was recommended to JMWAVE and made available by Headquarters. He had been cleared by Headquarters for JMWAVE use under date of 15 December 1962 in DIR-05291.</p> <p>2. IDEN A was initially contacted for JMWAVE by Eli A. SACHTSCHALE, who was introduced to him by the New Orleans KUJUMP office on 27 December 1962. The JMWAVE cover situation was discussed with IDEN A by SACHTSCHALE and IDEN A's assistance was requested. IDEN A was first enlisted as the President of YOCOUGH, a JMWAVE cover company. Also cleared and used as officers of YOCOUGH are IDEN D and IDEN E. Although cleared and witting, these individuals are contacted only when their signatures on YOCOUGH documents are required, all contact normally being with IDEN A. IDEN A also permits use of his own company as a funding mechanism for YOCOUGH. He has acted as a spotter for JMWAVE and has recommended several other businessmen who are being used by JMWAVE. He has also made available several oil companies in which he owns interests for use in back-stopping cover of JMWAVE operational vessels. It is known that he is used by Headquarters for several JBECHO activities. IDEN A is contacted several times each month by JMWAVE.</p> <p>3. IDEN A has met Rufus E. MANGROLL and Colin R. HOWGRIND as well as Eli A. SACHTSCHALE. He knows YOCOUGH, YOAPT and the JMWAVE operational vessel IDEN B. He knows that Miami attorney IDEN C participates in JMWAVE activities. So far as is known, he knows no other JMWAVE personnel or assets.</p> <p>4. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned IDEN A and that it be made known to JMWAVE.</p>							
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN							
ATTACHMENT;		<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;"> RECEIVED MAY 19 1965 DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER </div>		DATE TYPED		DATE DISPATCHED	
Identities u/s/c				12 May 65		MAY 19 1965	
DISTRIBUTION:		CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
3 - C/WH/C w/att u/s/c				UFGA-21422			
		CLASSIFICATION		201-			
		SECRET					

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UNDER SEPARATE COVER

TO: UFGA-21422

IDENTITIES

IDEN A:

Alfred J. *Moran

DPOB: Not available

Res: 8422 South Claybourne Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana

Bus: 909 South Broad Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

IDEN B:

M/V BARB

IDEN C:

James Costello

IDEN D:

Glean E. Magnuson

IDEN E:

Robert T. Nieset

Slane

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☐ INTERNAL
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

*File: Kennedy
Assassination - Garrison
Indefinite*

FROM:

E/BC

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

20 DEC 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

AC/EURBC

20 Dec 67

[Signature]

06C67-2367

2.

3.

Office of
General Counsel
John Greaney

[Signature]

1-3: Per our conversation
incidentally, Jim still
under ²⁴State cover with my
⁰⁸daughter! ⁰³[Line Fencing]

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Passed oral info to
Mr Kossack that FBI was
given report in London by
²⁴MI-5 about Garrison &
Russell Foundation, on
2 Jan 1968

J.K.T.

file

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06C 67- 2367

Indefinite

20 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel
ATTENTION : Mr. John Greaney
SUBJECT : James Garrison

1. Per our conversation in the environs of the DD/P's office on 19 December, we have just received from [London] Station a scrap of information on Subject's activities. [MI-5,]²⁴ the [British] Security Service, has provided the following in a report on Americans who are in correspondence with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation:

"Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans, Louisiana

A secret and reliable source has reported that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has been in touch with Jim Garrison. Our source states that the initiative in this contact appears to have come from the Foundation and the purpose of it seems to be to persuade Garrison to write an article about the late President Kennedy's assassination which presumably the Foundation could use in some way."

2. [MI-5]²⁴ has also passed this information to the Legal Attache (FBI representative) in [London].⁰³ I would stress that [MI-5's] source is very sensitive and request that this office be advised in advance if any executive action is to be taken on the basis of the above information.

[Signature]
Philip R. Fendig
AC/EURBC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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[Handwritten mark]
7/ML

JMWAVE COVER FACILITY

- A. NAME : Ace Marine Survey, Inc.
- OFFICE ADDRESS : Room 214, 2525 S.W. 3rd Street, Miami, Florida
- MAILING ADDRESS : P. O. Box 1337, Main Post Office, Miami, Florida
- LOCATION : Office of Attorney Norman S. Pallot
- B. TYPE OF FACILITY: This is a Florida Corporation established by and under the control of JMWAVE and certified to do business in Florida. Ace Marine Survey, Inc. was formerly known as Ace Cartography Company, a corporation which had been certified to do business in Florida on 11 July 1962. This Corporation was amended on 4 November 1966 to its new name, Ace Marine Survey, Inc.

The President of the Corporation is Alfred J. Moran of New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Moran is a very prominent businessman in the New Orleans area. He is head of Kalvar and has investments in a variety of businesses which include many oil interests. He is known to Headquarters representatives particularly in Logistics.

- C. OSTENSIBLE BUSINESS: Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged primarily in marine research including the study of marine life and testing of marine equipment. However, its general provisions permit it to perform almost any corporate function.
- D. USE : JMWAVE use of the Corporation is to provide cover for a maritime vessel, the M/V SONORA. The Corporation provides status cover and payrolling of the agents assigned to the M/V SONORA and the safe area or berthing site from which the vessel operates in the performance of its ostensible business.
- E. FUNDING : Method - This account is funded through the [Bank and Hall covert account at the First National Bank of Miami] by the following method: A check in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips for the various corporations is then turned over to a teller, where it is combined with all other transactions which are processed by that particular teller on the given business day. Since the number of transactions handled by a given teller may go as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of the deposits being attributed to the particular credit ticket which accompanied these deposits.

Overt Attribution or Source - [Offshore Navigation Company, 3503 Fern Street, New Orleans, Louisiana]

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F. TAX STATUS

: This is a profit-making corporation and has met Federal and State requirements as follows:

- 1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Returns.
- 2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes.
- 3) Florida State Unemployment Tax.
- 4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return.
- 5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return.

G. AGENT IDENTIFICATION: The Corporation was providing status cover and payrolling for 10 Cubans as of 31 January 1967.

II. ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967:
This cover company should be affected little by a flap. However, because of the berthing location within largely tourist or recreation areas, its commercial activity has been noted.
2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967:
A successor to Ace Cartography Company, Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is currently used in connection with the leasing of a waterfront berthing site for the berthing of M/V SONORA, which is registered under this firm. The firm also provides cover and serves as well as the vehicle for payrolling the agent crew.

Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged in the field of marine research, including the study of marine life as well as the testing of marine equipment.

In view of the current limited use of this cover, the likelihood of exposure is considerably reduced. However, if such an exposure did occur, it is felt that the damage to either WOFACT or the officers of Ace Marine Survey, Inc., would be of no great import. The major likely "injury" that would be sustained would be the denial of further use of the berthing site and the need for re-naming/re-registering the M/V SONORA.

In order to add depth and lend further substance to the cover story, the officers of a legitimate firm, [Offshore Navigation Company, New Orleans, Louisiana, which is engaged in marine research and off-shore oil exploration activities, have agreed to backstop the activities of Ace Marine Survey, Inc. and to recognize the latter firm as a client.] 24

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JMWAVE COVER FACILITY

: Ceres Enterprises, Inc.

ADDRESS : Suite 1409 Biscayne Building, 19 West Flagler Street,
Miami, Florida 33101

ADDRESS : P. O. Box 5045, Main Post Office, Miami, Fla. 33101

: Office of Attorneys George E. Brown and Thomas B. Duff

FACILITY: This corporation was established in Florida and
certified to do business on 10 March 1964. It was
established by and is under the control of JMWAVE.

The President of this corporation is Mr. Richard W.
Freeman, who is the retired Chairman of the Board
of Delta Airlines. He is also the principal owner
of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in New Orleans.
In addition he has many other varied interests
including investments in oil ventures. He is ex-
tremely prominent in the New Orleans civic and
social structure.

THE BUSINESS: This corporation was established ostensibly to
maintain and operate boats for all types of marine
research.

: This corporation provided cover for maritime
vessels, the M/V BARB and the M/V JADE, and served
as the status and payroll mechanism for the agents
employed by this corporation.

: Method - This account is funded through the [Bank
and Hall covert account at The First National
Bank of Miami] by the following method: A check
in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on
this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our
cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit
ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips
for the various corporations is then turned over
to a teller, where it is combined with all other
transactions which are processed by that particular
teller on the given business day. Since the number
of transactions handled by a given teller may go
as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of
the deposits being attributed to the particular
credit ticket which accompanied these deposits.

Overt Attribution or Source - [Peterman & Peterman 24/
Associates, P. O. Box 8103, Main Post Office,
Chicago, Illinois]

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TAX STATUS : This is a corporation for profit. It has met federal and state tax requirements as follows:

- 1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Return
- 2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes
- 3) Florida State Unemployment Taxes
- 4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return
- 5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return

AGENT IDENTIFICATION: None at this time.

ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - The cover mechanism established by the Ceres Enterprises, Inc. was very secure during the period of its operation and remained so until the loss of one of its agents who was captured in Cuba. This made it necessary to terminate the activities of this corporation and transfer its activities to another entity. This was accomplished without any unusual events or actual public exposure. If any should occur at this late date, the damage would be minimal.
2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - This corporation is currently inactive and will become legally dormant after three years. It was placed in this status due to an operational flap which could have exposed the corporation. The last active tax return was filed at the tax year ending March 31, 1966. An additional tax return will be filed for the past tax year which will indicate no financial transactions.

Its assets and activities were transferred to other JMWAVE entities. This corporation was established to provide cover for a Maritime Branch vessel and status and payroll cover for the agents assigned to it. The corporation is inactive and will be allowed to remain so. It was placed in this status due to a flap wherein an agent was captured in Cuba who had knowledge of this vessel and its ownership. There was no public exposure in the Miami area. However, because of the past incident the corporation should not be used in the future under its current name. While in use the corporation served very satisfactorily for the purpose for which it was established.

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1 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
FROM : (Sherwood R. Bosworth)⁰³
External Activities Branch
SUBJECT : Manuscript by David Phillips

1. Attached herewith is a proposed letter to Mr. David A. Phillips outlining deletions which the Agency would like made from his book. The general tone of the responses from Agency components was that, if possible, this book should not be published. In the view of most, it dangerously reveals sources and methods, internal organization, missions, and functions. It also provides public confirmation of covert Agency activities and the disruption and reduced morale created by Agee and others.

2. However, on the assumption that publication could not or would not be blocked, the operating components catalogued their most serious concerns. The attached letter to Mr. Phillips includes many of these reservations. The chapter by chapter review, which appears later in this memorandum, contains those recommendations for deletion which, for various explained reasons, should not be forwarded to Mr. Phillips.

3. Before proceeding with the manuscript review, we would like to advise that Mr. John Greaney of OGC has volunteered his services to accompany you or Mr. Stembridge when our proposals are placed before Mr. Phillips. Due to time limitations, he has not had a chance to review this memorandum or the proposed letter to Mr. Phillips as of this date.

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4. The following is a compilation of items of concern to Agency components which were not included in the letter to Mr. Phillips. This does not include chapters one and six which have been previously reviewed and returned to Mr. Phillips.

5. Chapter two: Guatemala

a. Several offices expressed concern that this book, for the first time, confirms the CIA's role with Col. Armas and the coup. However, since it would be difficult to defend a classification on this, it was not included in the letter to Mr. Phillips. The same was true of the reference to the coup in Iran (p. 43).

b. Another area of concern was our relationship with the FBI in connection with his arrest and our use of false identity papers in the U. S. Of particular concern was mention of a capability to alter FBI criminal records. Again, we don't believe we can prove classification.

c. The one item which could have been deleted was a footnote on page 35 which inferred that the CIA had indemnified Lloyd's of London for a sunken ship. LA Division was able only to ascertain that no payment had been made as of August 1960. Since the footnote begins "press reports claimed that . . ." without further specifying the source, we felt it best to make no comment to Mr. Phillips on this point.

6. Chapter three: Havana and Beirut

a. Some concern was expressed regarding the paragraph on page 13 explaining salary off-set for deep cover officers. Although this may be truly classified, it might be best to let it remain as is, to dissuade readers that the Agency or its officers are making extra money on the side.

b. Other comments related to the details of Mr. Wisner's death (p. 5); connecting Ernest Hemmingway with the Havana COS (p. 21); and confirming that an

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American executed by the Cubans was a CIA NOC (p. 48). The latter point, while clearly sensitive, was not raised to Mr. Phillips as LA Division posed no specific objection.

7. Chapter four: Bay of Pigs

a. Some objection was raised to Mr. Phillips citing the Gulf Steamship Company as a cover for the broadcasting aspect of the Bay of Pigs operation. However, in checking this out, it was learned that the cover was the Gibraltar Steamship Company so no objection is made to the use of Gulf.

b. SSU also raised questions regarding the confirmation of assassination planning against Castro (p. 12) and the use of the Alban Towers Hotel as a temporary lodging facility for Agency personnel (p. 17). Since no one else raised an objection on these points, they were not relayed to Mr. Phillips.

8. Chapter five: Mexico City

a. In addition to all the comments directed to Mr. Phillips (see attached letter), the SSU objected to discussion of the purchase of scotch (p. 15), the specifics associated with the Cuban missile crisis (pp. 25-27), and the handling of "walk-ins" (pp. 33-35). LA Division also objected to the Agency's role in name tracing (p. 8).

b. In view of the considerable deletions requested of Mr. Phillips, the above were not included as their sensitivity and justification for classification appears to be marginal.

9. Chapter seven: Washington, D. C.

a. Several offices took exception to some items in this chapter which were not passed on to Mr. Phillips.

b. The SSU objected to the mention of liquor in the Director's dining room and the footnote confirming

a CIA role in the Glomar Explorer (p. 26). In view of the fact that GSA is now trying to rent or sell the ship, we don't feel we can justify a classification on these items.

c. The DDO objected to the general discussion of cover starting on page 29, but we could not pin the objection down to specifics. SSU commented that Mr. Phillips reveals the location of many stations around the world (including (Brazzaville) on page 31), but deletions of the names would be difficult to justify legally.
12-32

d. Both the SSU and LA Division objected to Mr. Phillips mention of assassination attempts on Castro (pp. 42-44), but, again, we would have trouble defending the classification of the information presented.


10. Chapter eight: Rio de Janeiro and Caracas

a. The most sensitive objections to this chapter involved the information on pages 15 to 20 of our role in Chile - Track II. These included the allegation of back-channel correspondence and the fact that the information could distort the public's view of the whole affair. Unfortunately, no one could tie it to the sources and methods or classification questions and therefore it was not included in the Phillips letter.

b. Other items of concern were the discussion of cover in Brazil (pp. 2-3); the operational use of women (p. 23); the employment of blacks (p. 26), especially the revelation that two black officers in Brazil were CIA officers, jeopardizing their cover, and that Army commo went through the Agency during the Dominican crisis (p. 31). While all of these could cast us in a questionable light or make operational life more difficult, it would be difficult to justify their deletion on legal grounds.

11. Chapter nine: LA Division

a. Although the requested deletions from this chapter are rather lengthy, they do not include all reservations raised by our offices.



b. Several offices objected to references to the assassination of President Kennedy and the Watergate affair (pp. 5, 16, 30). These were rather innocuous and could probably not be justified on legal grounds.

c. The second objection was the author's general verification of the information in the Agee book and the impact of this book on the Agency. Again, deletion would be difficult to justify, but you may wish to discuss the damage potential with Mr. Phillips directly.

12. Chapter ten: Retirement

The DDO raised the question that Mr. Phillips statement on page 12 that he knew Agee has been to Cuba five times betrays knowledge he gained either from travel programs or liaison services. This would be a difficult point to argue in any confrontation with Mr. Phillips.

13. Epilogue

a. The SSU questioned whether this manuscript is the proper vehicle to surface the fact that two cables sent to Santiago in May 1973 established our non-involvement in the overthrow of Allende (p. 6). We could see no justification to strike this.

b. The SSU further believes that revelation of friction between Mr. Colby and Dr. Kissinger (p. 13) is also improper. Perhaps so, but difficult for us to press for deletion.

c. And last, the SSU objected to comments on pp. 14-18 which are suggestive of Agency judgements and evaluation regarding the conduct and success of the investigative efforts as well as other personalities critical of the Agency.

03
(*Sherwood R. Bosworth*)
Sherwood R. Bosworth

Att

Distribution:

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Page 13 - Refers to deep cover personnel income offset against CIA salary and to CIA officers under light cover protected by diplomatic or official passports.

Page 14 - Refers to laundering of CIA salary before deposit to personal bank account.

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- 4 -

Chapter 5

Contains detailed references throughout to Winston Scott, identified as chief of station, Mexico City. Central Cover Staff points out that Mr. Scott, who was never officially acknowledged as a CIA employee, retired under State Department cover in Mexico, where he subsequently died and where his widow and children still reside.

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- 5 -

Chapter 7

Page 29 et. seq. - Discussion of cover

Pages 44-49 - Identifies^{qq}("Camp Perry") as a CIA training establishment, discusses training cover and Department of Defense cover. Central Cover Staff asserts^{qq} that while the CIA auspices of (Camp Perry) has been often alleged in the press, the Agency has never confirmed it as a fact.

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- 6 -

Chapter 8

Pages 2, 3 - Discussion of cover.

Page 4 - Reference to CIA/State ground rule
that ambassadors are not necessarily
informed about deep cover officers.

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- 7 -

Chapter 9

Page 37 - As written, passage in first full paragraph could endanger a particular source, according to NE Division, which suggests the following modification:

...unexpected development. From surveilling the group's movements it was established that the intention was to travel to an adjoining area, where a major energy installation, we assumed, might be their target. CIA, through liaison, warned the authorities of that country and appropriate defense measures were taken. I instructed the CIA Station in (Costa Brava) to advise the president that the terrorists might be using his country as ¹⁶⁻⁴²...

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- 8 -

Pages 38-41:

LA Division recommends that the passage on the terrorist kidnapping in the Dominican Republic be deleted for the following reasons:

1) This incident is still fresh in the minds of most Dominicans and it is unrealistic to assume that it will not be picked up and published in the local press. Barbara Hutchison, USIA, one of the people kidnapped, is still in the Dominican Republic and, according to two recent reports, is again being considered as a target for kidnapping. The potential for terrorist acts against US citizens continues; three leaders of terrorist-oriented groups are in prison and publication of this item could propel the terrorists into action.

2) The close link between the ambassador and the station, as portrayed in the book could be prejudicial to his public image and might even provoke the terrorists to target against him.

3) The station has renewed a ²⁴(liaison) relationship and much effort is being directed toward developing mutual confidence. Revelation of details of a ²⁴(joint operation) by a former division chief might lead the increasingly friendly ²⁴(liaison contact) to wonder whether we can maintain confidence on future operations and thereby throw the new relationship into jeopardy.

4) Although the bugging of the thermos was discovered and appeared in the press, the use of the Coca Cola case was not exposed and therefore continues to be an operational possibility, at least as far as the Dominican Republic is concerned. Revelation of the technique by Agee should not be a criterion for further disclosure.

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DD/O 76-3962

S E C R E T

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23 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Julian Fox

FROM: Clifton R. Strathern
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT: General Comments on Mr. David Phillips' Manuscript

REFERENCE: C/LAD Memorandum dated 22 June 1976, Citing Specific
Objections to Mr. David Phillips' Manuscript

1. The general tenor of the manuscript leaves much to be desired from both an operational and security viewpoint. The author in numerous instances specifically discloses sources, methods, cover arrangements and liaison relationships. Various LA Division officer who have reviewed portions of the manuscript pertinent to their areas have commented negatively on the revelations of tradecraft and identification of numerous overseas Stations and operations.

2. Other objectionable items in the manuscript concern the confirmation of Agee's effectiveness in neutralizing Agency efforts abroad by publishing lists of CIA personnel in specific Stations; revelation of (Office of Communications) personnel in (every Embassy abroad); the Agency role in countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking and training provided other services to counteract these activities; and, the specific identity of liaison relationships, particularly, (the Israeli service.)

3. The overall consensus of this Division is that publication of this manuscript in its present form would be detrimental to the Agency and this Division in particular.

Clifton R. Strathern
Clifton R. Strathern

S E C R E T

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CL BY 009560

3/12/76

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

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FROM:

Robert R. Kierce
Chief

Special Security Unit, DDO

EXTENSION

1015

NO.

DATE

14 June 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/EAB/SSD

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

PRIORITY

Form No. 1 Dec 56

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(13)

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14 JUN 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Activities Branch, SSD

SUBJECT : Manuscript by David Phillips

1. The following passages are a compilation of observations made by the SSU regarding Mr. Phillips' manuscript. The comments are by no means a total list of reservations concerning the submitted chapters but those noted from the perspective of the SSU.


2. In general the undersigned felt somewhat enlightened but rather uncomfortable in reading the submitted manuscript. This uneasy feeling appears to be based upon two impressions. Throughout the text, there is an obvious effort on the part of Mr. Phillips to "set the record straight" with regard to events, techniques and activities involving the CIA. Regrettably, as is often the case when one attempts to clarify and present the real facts, there is a possibility of further compounding a confused and ambiguous circumstance. Because of the various ramifications of the activities of the Agency, the SSU gained the feeling that more was lost rather than won in Mr. Phillips' efforts. The second disarming impression is that because an individual has proved to be an effective and successful CIA operations officer, there is no clear-cut assurance that he can achieve the same success as an author. The SSU was continually pained by Mr. Phillips' efforts to employ certain techniques often seen in spy fictions. The problem with author Phillips is that he is not writing fiction and has been identified as a former CIA employee with over 25 years in intelligence service. Although Mr. Phillips labored to introduce some humor into his manuscript, some of his anecdotes appear to be in bad taste.

3. The following comments are codified to complement those parts of the manuscript reviewed in this reading.

Epilogue

Page 6: Although Mr. Phillips makes a considerable effort to conceal the true identity of "Abe", there is a question as to whether the fact that two cables were sent from Headquarters to (Chile) in May 1973, and if this manuscript is the proper vehicle to surface such information.

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Page 13: Mr. Colby is quoted by the author indicating certain information revealing complications between Mr. Colby and Dr. Kissinger. In addition to breaching personal confidences, the author contradicts what he had indicated earlier to be an intent to permit Mr. Colby to speak for himself.

Page 14-18: Mr. Phillips again refers to "Abe" and his evaluations of the various congressional select committees investigating the CIA. In effect these comments are suggestive of Agency judgments and evaluation regarding the conduct and success of the investigative efforts as well as other personalities critical of the Agency.

Chapter 3

Page 5: Have the circumstances regarding Mr. Wisner's death ever been surfaced with such particulars as provided in this text?

Page 14: The information regarding the "laundering of money" as set forth in the first paragraphs of this page serves as a confirmation of official involvement in such activities. This should be deleted.

Page 21: There is a serious question raised regarding the author connecting Ernest Hemmingway and the Havana Chief of Station implying the prospect of a professional as well as personal affiliation.

Page 48: If it is in fact correct, has it ever been officially acknowledged that a U.S. citizen, a businessman in Havana, implied by the author as being a CIA agent was executed? Note: This chapter is replete with a profusion of illustrations of tradecraft and operational activities too numerous to set forth.

Chapter 5

Page 1: Mr. Phillips in his writing provides a historical chronology of senior assignments within the Agency with particular reference to the LA or WH Division. This is illustrated on this page in his reference to Colonel King "regaining leadership of the WH Division". Anyone interested in noting the organizational hierarchy and key personalities in the WH or LA Division during the period of Mr. Phillips' tenure with the Agency, would be aided considerably on page 2 and further as the author proceeds to identify Mr. Winston Scott as the Chief of Station Mexico.

Page 3: Although it has been publicly surfaced that Mr. William F. Buckley had worked for CIA in the past, the author on this page now ties him in with Howard Hunt and Mexico City and further as an American contract agent. The best interests of the Agency are not served nor for that matter the interests of Mr. Buckley and Mr. Hunt are not served by such revelations.

Page 4-6: The SSU believes it is totally unwise to have the mission and organization of the Mexico City Station outlined as explicitly as contained in these pages.

Page 5-6: The above observation is further complicated by the author's remarks regarding operations levied against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

Page 8: The SSU further challenges the information set forth on this page regarding the biographic details of Mr. Winston Scott's assignments in Cuba, (London), Eur Division and Mexico City.

15-1

Page 15: The undersigned does not believe the content of the information set forth regarding the Agency's procedures associated with the purchasing of scotch liquor. He is implying things which may perhaps have been unique to that station but certainly has not been a worldwide practice. Mr. Phillips' anecdote about the prospects of the Agency printing counterfeit tax stamps and the details involved in such planning, even though perhaps presented in jest would not be viewed as such in the eyes of many individuals in the United States today.

Page 16: Because Philip Agee has revealed the secret of the camera operation in his book, is it necessary for Mr. Phillips to repeat and in effect collaborate what a disaffected employee of the Agency is purporting? From a friendly alumnus of the Agency, this serves as a verification of Agee's statements and provides a violation of sources and methods of this organization.

Page 18-19: Pursuing the aspect of sources and methods, the SSU questions the author's anecdote regarding the identification and employment techniques of the material "why me". It would seem that in so far as any chemical or technical devices of this nature used by the Organization should not be surfaced in a book such as this.

Page 25-27: The specifics associated with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 involving former Director John McCone and others are subject to strong question as to whether they should be included in this text. Again, what is provided by Mr. Phillips in this manuscript is drawn from such personal experiences realized in his Agency duties.

Page 33-35: The SSU takes exception to the information presented regarding "walk-ins" based upon the same rationale as contained above. It also flirts with the concerns of sources and methods of this Agency.

Page 46-48: All remarks concerning technical operations such as hidden microphones, quick plants, etc, are out of order particularly with reference to the development of a microphone in the armchair. This again violates the Agency's concern regarding sources and methods.

Page 55-61: Considerable inside information is provided regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his activities in Mexico. The SSU defers to LA Division, SE Division and OS regarding the advisability of inclusions of this material in this manuscript.

Chapter 7

Page 26: Although there is a legal basis for the serving of alcoholic beverages in the DCI dining room, is it appropriate to include such "tidbits" providing the news media with grist to conjure up stories of senior CIA executives making critical decisions following an alcoholic luncheon. This implication is synonymous with the problem of beer being available to the Secret Service when they are on assignment with the President.

Page 31: Throughout the manuscript the author in his narration confirms the fact that CIA has stations located around the world and in his writing proceeds to verify the location of these stations. The comments relating to where he was assigned and where others in the Agency have been or are assigned, not only relates to the South America area but on this page the author confirms the fact that there was a CIA station in 12-32 (Brazzaville.) Other than in the change in name there is no effort made to dispel the prospect that the station continues.

Page 42-44: Although it is a most timely subject, information regarding any U.S. Government effort to assassinate Castro is highly explosive. Mr. Phillips is reporting information which he has privy to as a direct result of his Agency experiences. These should not be contained in this book.

Page 44: Although (Camp Peary)⁹⁹ has unfortunately been identified as a CIA facility, is it necessary for the author to reinforce media articles regarding this establishment by spelling out the cover background and other "chapter and verse" items regarding this facility. I believe comments regarding firearms training, counterterrorism training should be avoided.

Chapter 8

Page 7: The author's remarks concerning CIA support to the Elbrick kidnapping again is a violation of sources and methods, and should be deleted.

Pages 13-21: It is understandable but regrettable that the author continues to single out sensitive issues; i.e., assassination and in this instance CIA involvement in Chile. The information contained in these pages are volatile and should not be included in such a commercial venture. Any such information is liable for quotations out of context warping or reinforcing the involvement that the Agency did have in the political activities of Chile.

Page 25: For the first time the SSU was made aware of the daughter of a CIA officer who was stripped naked and held with a knife at her throat by political assassins. If this is in fact a true statement, I question the value of such an inclusion in this text particularly in light of the terrorism problems that this Agency and other elements of the U.S. Government are experiencing around the world.

Page 27: The statement the author makes with regard to promotion to GS-17 is not correct.

Page 31: I believe that Office of Communications should be consulted on the entire section relating to communications, communications personnel and the Office of Communications, however, the SSU raises the question concerning the inclusion of teletype decoding speeds on this particular page.

Chapter 10

Note: Chapter 10 continues in the same vein as all of the other chapters. It further reinforces the earlier remarks that the more one tries to explain and clarify a point the more confusing it becomes. The remarks contained in pages 23 and 24 regarding Chile are illustrative of this.

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4. In summary, the SSU joins those who feel that this book would better have been left unwritten. It is a text replete with names, details, operational information and close personal privileged information based upon the author's assignments which has been rendered into a commercial version of Mr. Phillips' affiliation with this agency for over 25 years. This manuscript reinforces the difficulty of a retired operations officer to develop a non-fiction text which is attractive to the public but does not contain information regarding intelligence personalities, organization and sources and methods.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Robert R. Kierce". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name and title.

Robert R. Kierce
Chief
Special Security Unit, DDO

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P. 1000 INTO CIA
P. 1000 INTO CIA

3 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Activities Branch
Office of Security

FROM : John H. Stein
Deputy Chief, Soviet/East European Division.

SUBJECT : Manuscript by David Phillips.

1. At the risk of tilting continually at windmills, it is the undersigned's view, and that of innumerable colleagues, that Mr. Phillips' book should not be published. In the first instance, those portions we have read are superficial and give the reader the impression that the profession which Mr. Phillips practiced so well is one of derring-do, frivolity and foolishness. More seriously, the entire book is based on knowledge acquired by Mr. Phillips during his career in the Agency. Whether a given sentence is in the public domain or not, Mr. Phillips should not put his stamp of authenticity on that sentence. If publish Mr. Phillips must, and if the Agency cannot legally stop him, then so be it. Hopefully, while there is still time, someone will push for appropriate legislation to stop this foolishness.

2. While it is perhaps fruitless, we have attempted to identify some of the more damaging items in the text as drafted. These are cited below:

a. Page 15: Discussion of back channel communications used to circumvent the Secretary of State seems to be ill-advised and not designed to enhance Agency relations with State.

b. Page 23: There begins here a discussion of the use of women by the DDO. While I understand Mr. Phillips' desire to indicate that the DDO does in fact hire women and minorities, this section causes some anguish. At the present time, certainly in the Near East, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, the

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use of women provides us an operational flexibility which we would not otherwise have. It is quite evident, furthermore, that the local security services have not focused on the extent to which we do use women. We would like to keep it that way as long as we possibly can, and it is the undersigned's firm belief that statements from Mr. Phillips, obviously authentic, will rather quickly bring the women we do use under increased scrutiny of hostile intelligence services. Further, in opening the Pandora's box of the use of women and minorities in the DDO, Mr. Phillips may be opening both himself and the DDO to unjustified criticism that we are either exploiting women or not hiring enough of them; similarly the minorities.

c. Page 25: I have known personally for 17 years the girl who, although stripped naked by burglars, managed to save her mother and father from harm. There are others elsewhere in the government and probably outside who are knowledgeable about the incident. The girl, now a lovely lady, is about to be dispatched under very sensitive cover abroad. Mr. Phillips would do well to delete reference to her as being an Agency employee.

d. Page 26: I think it is unwise for Mr. Phillips to conjecture on the reason why there are few blacks employed in the DDO. His reasoning may be correct, but I would venture that not everyone who reads his book will believe so, and the Agency may come under unfortunate pressure because of it. The specific black cited on page 27 as having removed a flag from the hands of demonstrators is a personal friend of mine. He is under cover. By citing the incident, Mr. Phillips removes that cover, for the black retrieved the flag as an American citizen, not as a CIA officer. In sum, I would suggest the deletion of the section involving women and minorities because it opens a Pandora's box and because, as written, the cover of two highly effective officers is placed in jeopardy.

e. Page 36: The anecdote on page 36 should at least be modified. The person referred to is the undersigned. I am the only Agency and (State) officer who owns a Chow dog. All my acquaintances abroad

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
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know I own the Chow dog. To avoid damaging further
what cover I have left, I would appreciate Mr. Phillips
simply citing "dog" or calling it a "poodle."


John H. Stein

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Manuscript by David Phillips

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FROM:

John M. Reeves, Jr. *JMR*
C/EAB

EXTENSION

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24 May 76

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. DDO/SS/Sec
3D00(H. Keough)

2. ** see comments

3. John M. Reeves Jr.
C/EAB

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Attached are Chapters 3, 5, 7, 8, 10 and the Epilogue to David Phillips' book "The Night Watch." Previous chapter numbers are changed as follows: 5 (Bay of Pigs) is now 4; 8 (Dominican Crisis) is now 6; and 11 (Washington 1973-74) is now 9.

Please review these chapters for material that: (1) is classified, (2) was learned while the author was a CIA employee, and (3) has not been placed in the public domain by the Agency.

Concurrent review is being conducted by LA Div., CI Staff, CCS, DDO/SS/SOG, OGC DDO/SU, O/Commo (Chapter 10) and SE Div (Chapter 8).

The author must meet a publishing deadline within the next few weeks. In order to negotiate deletions before the deadline, your review and comments should be returned no later than 11 June 1976.

Only comment by C/SOG re Chapter 7, p 44 re (Camp Peary) being CIA installation. To our understanding, this base has never been officially acknowledged as a CIA installation. C/SOG also suggest NE Div and CAG may wish review. This package given to C/CAG and returned with no comments.

FORM 3-62

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Manuscript Submitted by David A. Phillips

RETURN TO CIA
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FROM:

C/SS/SC

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Chief, EAB,
Office of Security

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Attached are the comments of Acting Chief, SOG, regarding subject manuscript. All three comments fall within caveats 2) and 3) cited in your Routing and Record Sheet.

H.R. Keough

Chapter XI

Page 10: Though ⁹⁹ Camp Perry ^(sic) has received much publicity, there appears no good reason to confirm the use of this facility by the Agency. Unless we plan on officially opening ⁹⁹ Camp Perry ^(sic) as a CIA training facility, it should not be mentioned. (Check OTR)

Page 15: The "Phoenix Program" originated before William Colby became DEPCORDS, COMUSMACV. Ambassador Komer started the program and asked that Colby replace him as DEPCORDS so that there would be some continuity in the effort to deal with criminal elements of the Viet Cong infrastructure. It is unfair to subjectively state that the "Operation Phoenix" was Colby's own albatross. Certainly Colby doesn't believe this though he is receiving considerable flack from those who would like others to believe that the whole program was one of assassination of which Colby, as head of the CIA, was in charge.

Page 39: We're still putting audio devices in coke bottles -- all these techniques and methods should not be discussed since we may very well want to use them again in the future.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Review for Approval - Manuscript Submitted by
Mr. David A. Phillips

FROM:

J. F. Meehan
C/EAB, 4E33 Hq.

EXTENSION

7770

NO.

DATE

5 Jan 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building).

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INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/CCS
GH-44, Att: Mr. H. Schor

8 JAN

[Handwritten initials]

Subject, a retired Agency staff employee and former C/LA Div., has submitted the attached manuscript containing three (3) chapters of a book he has in preparation. Coordination for review and comment is requested to determine if the material: (1) is classified, (2) was learned while the writer was employed by the Agency, or (3) has not been placed in the public domain by the Agency.

Please note author's query for information contained in paragraph 3 of his letter FYI. The author had previously submitted Chapters I and VIII which were security approved with deletions.

Coordination for review is being conducted with LA Div., CI Staff, CCS, DDO/SS/SOG, and DDO/SSU.

It would be appreciated if this office could have your comments before COB 16 Jan 1976.

CCS
7 JAN 1976

1 TO 9

SEE CCS COMMENTS EN

REVERSE SIDE

1 to 9:

CCS recommends deletion of that part of the last sentence, following the semi-colon⁹⁹ of the first paragraph on page 10 of Chapter XI, which⁹⁹ identifies (Camp Perry) as the site of Agency training courses. (Camp Perry) is an Agency training installation (under DOD cover), and while its CIA affiliation has been alleged numerous times in the press, no confirmation of this affiliation has been made by the Agency. Mr. Phillips' comments as a former senior Agency officer can be interpreted as constituting official acknowledgement of the CIA/CAMP PERRY relationship.

99



HCS

4/17/74

104-10105-10210

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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Remarks: John - the attached is all we can contribute. Jim			
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Terms of Privacy Act
FR - 57 Sept

Gene Wilson : All records system which
could logically be
concerned of human channels

8/27

Fred Randall

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356-8204

Every place -

① STAR System
Computer Trace DDO

Main file

② Central Cover Staff

③ C I / STAFF

a. HT Lined

b. Watch Cuts

c. etc

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ACCOUNTING SECTION

MRS. FAVUCCIN

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Robert Bayard -

John Muldon

Mania D. Mangum - Seeking for IGO
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Central Investigative Agency, Inc. -

Security Consultants International, Inc. -

Defense Systems International, Inc. -

Defense Service Company -

Research Corporation of America

Mills & Raymond Research Projects -

No Records - 17.

Known opp. Contact

Sup DOT. '1970

SI cl. official 1974.

Muldon - Leave w/o pay 19 NOV 71. 19 NOV 72

GS-12 19 NOV 72 - Disability
Pension

8/27

(CKS)

Werbelle - CI/Staff.

7 FBI reports

CI Staff

+ 4 docs.

Cable to A/H

① Dir 375530 (17 Jul 74) 6 Rtr

② AH IN 304568 74.
11 July 74.

③ Teleprint to Bureau
23 Jun '69

④ Subj: Sionis (To file)

④ To FBI 27 Jun 74.

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
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Mullenberg, Kurt

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5th Circuit

Kench Conf planned

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Def. ~~re~~ Citation

- Opinion of Ct 3
- Marger, Atty Δ

Co min has been Subpoenaed

Charles Jaffer *

Govt. Case

CRIMINAL DIVISION

Assistant Attorney General, Richard L. Thornburgh, Rm. 2107	2601
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John C. Keeney, Rm. 2107	2621
Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Robert L. Keuch, Rm. 2113	2333
✓ Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jay C. Waldman, Rm. 2113	2636
Special Assistant, James M. Seif, Rm. 2208	4676
Special Assistant, William Brady, Rm. 2209	2825
Executive Assistant, James W. Muskett, Rm. 2119	2641
Appellate Section, Chief, George Gilinsky, Rm. 2216	2657
Fraud Section, Acting Chief, Mark Richard, Rm. 764, SAFE Bldg.	2648
General Crimes Section, Acting Chief, Alfred Hantman, Rm. 504, FTRI Bldg.	2624
Government Regulations and Labor Section, Acting Chief, Philip Wilens, Rm. 808 SAFE Bldg.	3761
Internal Security Section, Chief, John H. Davitt, Rm. 200 FTRI Bldg.	2307
Legislation and Special Projects Section, Acting Chief, Philip White, Rm. 2714	2613
✓ Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, Acting Chief, Kurt Muellenberg, Rm. 408, SAFE Bldg.	3971
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Chief, William Lynch, Rm. 2521	3516
Public Integrity Section, Acting Chief, Thomas Henderson, Rm. 868 SAFE Bldg.	2676
Special Litigation Section, Acting Chief, George Calhoun, Rm. 216, FTRI Bldg.	3885

LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION

Assistant Attorney General, Peter R. Taft, Rm. 2143	2701
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Walter Kiechel, Jr., Rm. 2143	2718
Legislative Assistant, Martin Green, Rm. 2607	2736
Administrative Section, James F. Hickey, Rm. 2610	2721
Appellate Section, Edmund B. Clark, Rm. 2339	2748
Appraisal Section, Norman E. Lauer, Rm. 500, SAFE Bldg.	5054
General Litigation Section, Floyd L. France, Rm. 2133	2704
Indian Claims Section, A. Donald Mileur, Rm. 604, SAFE Bldg.	5069
Land Acquisition Section, Anthony C. Liotta, Rm. 504, SAFE Bldg.	5092
Marine Resources Section, Bruce Rashkow, Rm. 2646	2750
Pollution Control Section, Alfred T. Ghiorzi, Rm. 2625	2707
Indian Resources Section, Myles E. Flint, Rm. 4710	4241

Del. William Bell
Del. Gerald Cuyler
Wagner

Martin
Cushing ~~RE~~ Bell
Gerald Wagner Cuyler

6/27/28

8/18

CIA

Mud.


DEA

Customs

Work ; DEA Sp
Job - Sp Enforced
Dis data

- Reporting of past history

- Did you send



Magan
Plot Con

Sam Shares

Do

AH

Stan a down

Conf w/ John M on line

*

Under

3971

187-


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8/19.

Morton, Silver - DoJ

~~Robert~~ Robert Richardson

Charles Joffe



Mod on Van Clieve incident

Crom Queen - Put a form

#

WTC

Conf @ DEA/DOJ

mat also attended

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W-11

Aug 56 - going back to USA for 20 yrs See Aug 56

Dec 48.

Moved Carmen Adkison on 25 Dec 48

Divorce - Sept 56

Detained to Dep of State 8/11/65

How Com Not DAC

- Prob. Diskey Mar 67 Thruing photo
- Small Prob July 67 Returned home

Tenured Contract 24 May 1968

Back to Amy to complete 20 yrs

Amy + all
73-75
minus pd.

Chuck Juffer Corp.

Confidentiality of Burely Material:

① What Money, paid

Central Intelligence Agency, Inc.
Security Council Intelligence Company
Defense Services
Defense Systems Int'l Inc.
Residual Corp of America
Miller & Raymond Research Projects

5	def.
3	others
6	Cos.

Workcell
Lorne Martin Bell 27 June 25
John NORD 24 Jan 16
Morton Frankel 1 Nov 26
Gerald Wayne Cuyler 24 May 3
② John
③ Concern. - Muldoon.
Robert BAYARD, Col.
Mannan;
D. Mangum.

② What Contracts with these
resulting in purchase of Info.?

③ Only Meeting for hr.

④ found release of Security Agt.

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W-1

Wm ~~DA~~ Kinn
Wasthuse

Pr Trail
file is open

DDDD
2000

2:00

Rpt

- Take home out
- Run home thru RI

USV.

Shere

8/18

~~Harley Berg~~
Mrs. ~~mullerberg~~
Mullerberg

C/ Nocturne Sink, DOW.

739-3928

Plus
This & Next

Def (?)

good 5th unit

Judge

Foy

Motion to

Nixon

Kings - King

Colby

Calson

Connin

Reed Kennedy

talk in favor of P.

Grot Com

Sam Shere

Eckman
Iglar

Refute

Watterman

Printer interview

Party <

Bell Morgan
Cole

✓ Bell M

Mont. ~~Not~~ Silver
739-3971
8/17.

Robert Richardson - 128-6175

Chief Counsel, DEA.

AG meeting to today.

in center areas.

w/ Wagbell

Whether looking into him.

Not nothing.

Q - DEA assassination

Justice
in Div

Just Cause

350-4136

14-00000

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Death of Cel Robert F. Bayard '56.
Atlanta Ga.

July 75

Jack

8/23
Wm. Warner

{ Sam Shers.
Wm. Warner. }

Bernstein. dead!! (FBI)

* Emp records of Cornin -

* Release from Security Cl. -
Copy

* CIA letter head

Behind Braywell
Atty Bell

[NC]

* Witness (?) ident ?

The L.P. w/ Fox & devises

RETURN TO CIA
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Southern Air Transport

of date of Sale

Juror 11
00

8/24
W. H. H.

Concin, Lucien Emile.

June 1943 invent. - Surg from Paris. (Points french)
~~divorced wife~~ - Owen Axson girlfriend -
divorced wife. Rose Marnin - Sept 21, 41
dis. 3/31/42

brought to U.S. as child - Naturalized 1942

Dob. Nov 29, 1919. Paris.

ASN - 01322768.

} live from 1919-1925

enter U.S. 9/1/1925 - Naturalized 8/11/42.
Divorced - ?

Don't need

AS - Kansas City. 1935-36.

French Army. 1940-41.

Type Setter
1936-39.

2nd enter U.S. Apr 41.

overseas. entangled w / french girl - enter USA.
Sept 41.

App for entry OSS. June 43

(48 recorded he stayed in USA States not Army)

July

Monique Vebor
on Apr 23, 46

Richard Helms required power of 10-2 (for relatives)
Surg with french - as the divorced

Feb 48 - 2 Dec 23, 1947

EOD w/ CIA on Mar 51

5th from is-oh

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"Communist
China Intel Study"

23 Sep 73

Lucian E Conner

Richard L. Kobakoff

75 docs

all sent to
another copy type

1945-1972

Richard L. Kobakoff

Mackem, Walter Long

Omaha Neb

13 Dec '37

Reed College grad

wife of
Stanley

Kasnow

B. R. Fox Co. of to Abx, Va.

Michael John Morrissey - in C Informant

Route gum - Pro Demon

Subject was the prefix Von Mackem

5 Nov 69 gum SI data (Communist)

Served in VN under (AID Cover) 32

* 3 Feb '72 made avail able to Bureau of Narcotics & Dangerous
for 2 yrs Drugs

TK Briefing 20 Mar '72

1/10

31 Aug 61 - 13 Mar 62 FBIS (Copy)

Apr 62 - Dec 63 Hq. "

Dec 63 Aug 64 149 DAZ.

Aug 64 Feb 67 VN - DAC

May 67 - Feb 72 Hq. DAC.

1 Feb 72 - returned to BNDD for CIA (Cover)

Terminated BNDD - 7 months 31 Oct '73

declassified
to CIA.

Interviews - Said Thai desk must have sent the
i.e. ban (LNU).

~~for~~ DEA of CIA interview.

30 now does. in Pres paper

TK. detail Riffled.
2 5 Oct '73

~~SI~~ SI/Comm. 5/10/73

2 Control of _____ - Con office in WH.

Also _____ (from CIP) W/DEA

Report on Macker in FOIA & permissible
TA.

lots of studies as DOT

Warbell

Dot. ~~8/18/59~~ 18 Mar 1918.

Secrecy Agt. 7 July 59.

J.
(Tom Flores)
L

Phoned Gen Costa ||
on 5 July 59.
Tr. Dominican Republic.
San Pedraza.

OSS July 45 - Dec 45 ✓

Enlisted 20 Apr 43. 2nd Lt. 21 Jun 44. ✓

Burma & China - -

Soldiers Medal. presented. BG. John Magruder 18 Dec 45 ✓

POB - 4 Aug 59.

Oct '59 - decision to drop -

①. Motivation to use A for source of
funds to fin his personal plans

②. His access to data of value limited
always 2 or 3rd hand.

on 20 Oct 59.
Tx advise - Suggested to lift data to FBI

Feb '63 [Guatemala, Nicaragua & El Salvador.]

Art Smith

"United Organization for the Liberation of Cuba"

YPU

Andrew St. George -

Haitian invasion of Government of Duvalier
July 8 1966

Haitian Counsel. Maximilien.

Arms to Rolando Masferrer Rojas
Cuban senator to Batista Govt.

Connections in Dominican Republic -

May 69

Ops proposed to Thailand

Sionics, Inc.

Atlanta Ga.

Fred W. Brown pres.

Export license to Thailand

Jan '70

- rpt of ops against Duvalier for Combs
to FBI & treas

Feb '71

DoD CL Problems

Mar. 71

Long distance Call from Subj re CL Problems

27 Apr 73

State: Bahamas effort.

Edwin Marger. Atty.
"Council for a free Abaco"

Subject

Military Amusement Corp. - Abaco park

Jan '74 . DCD review

Take into - Stay away
from him -

TO FBI may '74,

Van Cleave to FBI from on Azt. July '74.

Aug '74 - deal with Arms to Druck but

to a Control of Agency - see if "frank agree"

Jan '75 . DEA Concern - B.R. For Co.

& Michael Morrissey

w. Ann Ball

Jul '75
(July 75)

- DEA. Narcotics & overthrow Gov. of
Grenada

Frank's of H to
FOA Muldoon, Russos & Hacken (out as expected
Oct '73)

Lucien E. Conner.

8/13

Muldoon, John Patrick.

detached to DCA Feb:
Oct '7

3 Feb '58

DOB: 25 Aug '37

Cove - USA. Staff Map:

Cove back stop - fictional - intelligence system
Feb 58 - Apr 59 - Hqts
Apr 59 - Aug 61 - Frankfurt Ger
Aug 61 - Feb 64 - Seoul Korea
Feb 64 - Oct 64 - Hqts
Oct 64 - Sept 66 - Saigon
Sept 66 - Dec 68 - Bangkok
Dec 68 - ?
Hqts

} Malaysia
Bangkok
& Indonesia
24
(4305 Kent Ave)
Bethesda, Md.

SI Cl 12 Feb 68

24 (Security Consultants
Int'l)

Ann Perm It . Apr 70 (FBI) (Wyc Det Re)

Ret ent - Polycythemia (Blood disease) May 70

✓ Sec ry o all or Perm It . 19 Nov '71

Comm SI - (18 USC 798) (See this)

✓ Ret ent Med ical 19 Nov '72

Involved w/ Werbell - Trend of Abaca.

RETURN TO CIA
Background

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	OGC Fu-2 AHn: Walter Lloyd	8/9	20
2			
3	file <u>Wierbell</u>		
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
03 (A.F. Addona) C/DDO/PIC/AL			6 Aug
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

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4/74

Richardson - Counsel / Chief 8/12

128-5295

128-6175

Minor Prob -

John Muldown
Krogh

Wen Bell

Low Cornen

Sup.

Kennedy

Shelton - Print AG

Robert?

or Craig?

RETURN TO
Background Check Unit
L-93761 Response

14-00000
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Coheen -

(19th) * (25th)
or less

(To DeA < Sent by WH

Bel Kroy - Purp

CIA Testing

a Dug Traff

Shaw Coheen - used Webb

we invested

History

WWII - OSS

13/74.

1969 - CIA

Central Am & FE

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SPEED LETTER		REPLY REQUESTED		DATE
		YES	NO	6 August 1976
TO : Office of General Counsel		FROM: DDO/PIC 03		
ATTN: Walter Lloyd		(A. F. Addona)		
SUBJECT: Privacy Act Case 74-328--Werbelt				
<p>I understand you requested the status and date of completion of the above Privacy Act case. DDO/PIC estimates that the case will be completed by 20 August 1976. If there are further questions, would you please call either Hal Matter, DDO/PIC, or myself.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(A. F. Addona) A. F. Addona 03</p> <p>cc: Ernie Laverfeld, GGC Hal Matter, DDO/PIC</p>				
REPLY				SIGNATURE
				DATE
				SIGNATURE
RESPONDER'S FILE				

2/RJ

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL SECRET		
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	OGC Attn: Ernie Mayerfeld		<i>[Signature]</i>
2			
3	Walt Lloyd		
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
(A.F. Addona), C/DDO/PIC/AK			6 Aug
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions

(40)

14-00000
FBI Docs incl in WERBELL FILE 1974-

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

ORIGIN: Atlanta, Georgia
DATE : 8 July 1975
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Atlanta, Georgia
DATE: 9 August 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: San Diego, California
DATE: 7 August 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Director, FBI
DATE: 6 August 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Internal Security - ABACO
Neutrality Matters - ABACO
BUREAU FILE: 62-108665
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Atlanta, Georgia
DATE: 22 July 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: New York, New York
DATE: 19 July 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Internal Security - Abaco
Neutrality Matter - Abaco
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

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ORIGIN: Las Vegas, Nevada
DATE: 24 July 1974
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Director, FBI (Cable)
DATE: 25 June 1975
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell III
William Martin Bell Neutrality
Matters - Grenada
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Director, FBI (Cable)
DATE: 24 January 1975
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

ORIGIN: Director, FBI (Cable)
DATE: 16 January 1975
SUBJECT: Aladdin N, Al-Tayyar Internal Security
- Iraq
BUREAU FILE: None Given
FIELD FILE: None Given

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PS

X 9291

Wilton

Gene

Karen Atkinson.

8/4.

~~Robert~~

- Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs.

Trial. - Miami

"Conspiracy to import & distribute
Marian"

①. Aff'd not one of people.

②. Notes - Pete KINSEY.

with

Chas Colson

Lucien ~~CON~~^E CONVIN

from CIA - VN.

White H. - DEA.

CIA/DEA.

Chair - introduction

Pres N.

Produce by

Narcotics

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AH -

Conversations -

74 - 75

"Looking for"

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Judge. Search 74 - July 75

*

Pete Fay.

Narcotics info.

USDC,

*

Nothing on FOIA.

Southern Dist
Fla.



Motion for discovery.

Formal written request.

HA - FE.

Colp

350 - 4443

Tox
HAI

Dudley
LIVELY

7
Central Invest Agency (CIA)

FBI

Long Brown - OS

1968

4400 BK

Karen - in Miami
391-4870

DEA

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Hole Matter - DDO/FOIA Cred
Wolkey - Disclosed 8/4.
1313


~~Lee Barker~~
 5:30

REPRODUCTION
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Notes JWH/lyl

8/10

REPRODUCTION
 ON HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM



Military Ser 1943, 2nd Lt. i
 Signal Corps June 44
 assigned to China Burma Theater.
 to OSS from Apr to Dec 45.
 Returned to US & discharged as
 1st Lt.

8/11
 DA Conf
 W/ Atkinson

~~Colneer~~
 Moldura

- Colson
- Kroeg
- Nixon

↑ A Council
 may be called
 to testify

305-591-4910

☒ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ INTERNAL
USE ONLY

☐ CONFIDENTIAL

☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Mitchell Livingston WER BELL III

FROM:

Nestor D. Sanchez
Acting Chief
Latin America Division

EXTENSION

1884

NO.

DATE

3 MAR 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. ADDO
7E26

2.

3. DDO

3 MAR 1976

4.

5. Associate General
Counsel, OGC 7D01

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

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INTERNAL
USE ONLY



UNCLASSIFIED

DD 76-1261

OGC 76-1072
315176

3 MAR 1976

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate General Counsel, OGC

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations *CHB*

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WER BELL III

REFERENCE : Your memorandum of 24 February 1976,
Subject as above

1. Per reference request, we are forwarding information in our files concerning contacts that have taken place between this Agency and WER BELL.

2. The following is a summary of all DDO contact directly with WER BELL which took place in 1959:

a. A 6 July 1959⁰³ Memorandum to C/WH Division signed by (Thomas J. Flores) stated that General Cabell called (Flores) to report that WER BELL had called him. ⁰³WER BELL discussed with General Cabell a trip WER BELL had taken to the Dominican Republic and offered to come to Washington at his own expense to discuss the trip. No commitments were made to WER BELL by General Cabell.

b. A 7 July 1959⁰³ Memorandum of Conversation signed by (T. J. Flores) stated that WER BELL was met in Washington, D.C., by (Flores) who discussed with WER BELL information concerning the Dominican Republic, Fidel Castro, Fulgencio Batista and General Pedraza.

c. A 8 July 1959⁰³ Memorandum of Conversation signed by (T. J. Flores) stated that on 8 July 1959 ⁰³(Flores) called WER BELL to set up an appointment. During the meeting, WER BELL was told that the United States would not support any revolutionary activities by General Pedraza. He was also told that the U.S. will observe its international obligations concerning Cuba and Pedraza, and that

C/pv

SECRET

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the U.S. would not overlook any violations by Pedraza or his followers of the neutrality laws. 03 (Flores) said that the Agency had some interest in the possibility of his (WER BELL's) working for us as an intelligence gatherer under terms to be negotiated after we obtained a security clearance on him. 03 (Flores) pointed out that the Agency was not attempting to limit his actions in connection with the Dominican Republic, nor was it assuming any responsibility for those matters he carried out in his own behalf. 03 (Flores) dictated a Secrecy Agreement to him and had him sign it.

d. A 9 July 03 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) reported that Subject called him on 9 July 1959 from New York. WER BELL gave (Flores) further information on Loos, fnu, the representative of a Colonel Frei, fnu, of the Swiss army who had 1,000 men available for duty as soldiers.

e. A 20 July 03 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) reported that WER BELL called (Flores) from Miami on 20 July to ask about the Agency picking up the tab for his forthcoming trip to the Dominican Republic. They discussed his clearance which had not come through.

f. A 3 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by Martha R. Tharpe reported that on 24 July 1959 WER BELL called for Mr. (Thomas J. Flores). Since (Flores) was on leave, Tharpe took the call. WER BELL gave Tharpe further information concerning Pedraza and Batista. Tharpe called WER BELL back that evening to tell him that if he obtained further information to report it to Mr. Justin Gleichauf, OO Contacts Representative in Miami, until Mr. (Flores) returned to Washington. 03

g. A 503 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) stated that WER BELL phoned him on 5 August 1959 to ask if there was any news on his clearance. WER BELL said he wanted to go to the Dominican Republic soon, and would like CIA to pick up his expenses. He was told there was no

11/28
SECRET

SECRET

-3-

news. (Flores) and WER BELL discussed the Dominican Republic and Cuba. On 3 August (Flores) phoned WER BELL and told him that his clearance had not been granted and that he should not predicate his activities on the expectation of the clearance at any given time. WER BELL said that the Pedraza group was air lifting and dropping material into Cuba.

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h. A 9 September 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) reported that WER BELL called (Flores) on 9 September 1959 to provide information on Cuba. He was told by (Flores) that his clearance had not yet been processed.

i. According to a 23 September 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) WER BELL called (Flores) on 9 September 1959 to ask if his clearance had come through since he wanted the Agency to finance his trip to the Dominican Republic. He was told it had not. WER BELL told (Flores) about some people who had been discussing the counterfeiting of U. S. dollars and Cuban pesos for use in connection with Cuban revolutionary activities. He was told by (Flores) to contact the FBI. On 13 September WER BELL had phoned (Flores) at home to say that the FBI had referred him to the Secret Service on the counterfeiting aspect, and that no one seemed particularly interested in the gun running. The Secret Service asked him to go to Miami at his own expense to obtain further information on the matter and WER BELL asked (Flores) advice. (Flores) said that he could not influence him one way or the other since he was not in a position to direct his activities, but felt he might be better off to take no action. He was told that (Flores) would be in touch with him as soon as he had any further information concerning our possible use of him.

j. A 13 October 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (Thomas J. Flores) states that WER BELL phoned him on 25 September 1959 to report on Cuba. On 2 October 1959, (Flores) talked with WER BELL by phone and terminated the relationship.

3. The following undated memorandums are also contained in WER BELL's file:

15/PV
SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

03 a. A Memorandum for the Record signed by 03
(T. Flores) reports that WER BELL called (Flores) on
13 August 1959 to discuss Cuban activities in Miami. RETURN TO CIA
This memorandum also records that WER BELL phoned Background Use Only
03 (Flores) again on 26 August 1959 at which time activities Do Not Reproduce
in the Dominican Republic and Cuban activities in
Miami were discussed. WER BELL also asked about the
status of his clearance, and was told it had not yet
come through.

b. A letter signed "W" addressed to ("Tom")
gave "W's" location and some information concerning
Batista and Castro. (This letter is probably in
the 1959 time frame.)

03 c. A Memorandum of Conversation signed by 03
(T. Flores) reports that WER BELL called (Flores) and
gave his location. The status of WER BELL's
clearance was discussed and (Flores) told him it
had not yet come through. 03 WER BELL gave (Flores) 03
some information concerning Batista. (This
memorandum probably is in the 1959 time frame.)

d. An unsigned report, apparently from
WER BELL, gave a summary of his contacts and
activities during a trip to the Dominican Republic.
(This report is probably in the 1959 time frame.)

4. A 17 December 1963 dispatch from Station Santo Domingo
reported that Station (NOC Officer Joseph Luna) recently met
WER BELL in Santo Domingo. 24, 03 No further details of the meeting
were reported.

5. According to the CS file on WER BELL, three former
Agency employees were contacted in 1974 by WER BELL and other
representatives of a group called "Friends of Abaco (FOA),
a group allegedly advocating the secession of the island of
Abaco from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. The three former
employees contacted are:

a. John Patrick Muldoon, retired from
CIA on 20 March 1972.

03
b. (Theodore John Roussos), retired from CIA
09 (on 31 July 1970.) He was rehired on a
contract in February 1971. His contract
was terminated in September 1973.

9/2
SECRET

SECRET

-5-

- c. Walter Joseph Mackem, separated from CIA on 31 October 1973.

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6. Mr. Muldoon contacted Agency employee (E. James McTighe)⁰³ on 22 May 1974. Mr. Muldoon told Mr. McTighe that he was nominal Vice President of a Washington-based firm called "Security Consultants International." He presented Mr. McTighe with a report containing the essential data he possessed concerning WER BELL and other members of FOA whom he had met on 17 and 20 May 1974 in Washington, D.C. According to Mr. Muldoon, WER BELL had hopes of establishing gaming casinos, hotel and other tourist facilities in Abaco catering to the U. S. tourist crowd. As a consequence of some run-in with Prime Minister Pindling of the Bahamas, however, WER BELL is apparently persona non grata in the Bahamas; hence his ambitions appeared to be contingent on Abacan independence. Mr. Muldoon reported that at least on two occasions WER BELL made a concerted effort to involve persons formerly affiliated with the Agency in the activities of the FOA in support of its independence. On several occasions, WER BELL introduced Mr. Muldoon and Mr.⁰³ (Roussos) as active Agency officials, implying that either the Agency or the United States Government supported the aims of the FOA. WER BELL also proposed to Messrs. Muldoon and (Roussos) in separate conversations that they conduct a study, involving a⁰³ visit to Abaco, to determine the feasibility of Abaco's independence in political and economic terms. The study was to include interviews with citizens of Abaco prior to an alleged "plebiscite" on independence to take place in Abaco on 28 June 1974.⁰³ In default of the collaboration of either Muldoon or (Roussos), WER BELL hired Mr. Walter Joseph Mackem, a former Agency friend of both Muldoon and (Roussos).⁰³ According to WER BELL's file, Mackem later in 1974 contacted the Agency in an attempt to get an official policy on the activities of the FOA. Mackem was informed that the case comes under FBI jurisdiction, that this Agency has no official involvement, and that all information we had on the matter had been made available to the FBI. He was advised at that time to report his contacts and any information he had to the FBI.

7. On 24 March 1975, Mr. (Joseph P. Hayes)⁰³ assigned to SE/PCH, reported that during the week of 9 March 1975, he talked with Mr. Wesley Dyckman. Mr. Dyckman is a former Agency employee employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency. According to Dyckman, former Agency employee Walter Mackem was employed in the Washington area as a private investigator. He is also involved with a paramilitary activity funded by some unnamed British source. The activity, which Dyckman referred to as

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"the new land project" sought to establish a tax shelter on one of the out-islands of the Caribbean by forcefully taking over the island and establishing a government there. Mackem is supposedly involved in the paramilitary training of forces who would participate in this adventure. According to Dyckman, the paramilitary training supposedly was to take place in Georgia, where WER BELL is based.

8. On 31 August 1974, Mr. (Roussos)⁰³ met with Mr. K. Michael Absher, who at that time was AC/E/GC, and told him that WER BELL was leaving for Athens on 31 August⁰³ to sell arms to the Greek Government. WER BELL wanted (Roussos) to be his advisor in this venture and to go to Athens.⁰³ (Roussos) told WER BELL that he would check with CIA before giving him an answer. WER BELL asked (Roussos) to see if the Agency was in favor of such an arms deal or not. Mr. Absher strongly advised against (Roussos) getting involved in this deal.⁰³ (Roussos) told Mr. Absher that he understood and agreed not to get involved. (Roussos)⁰³ said that WER BELL would probably call him from Athens and he would give WER BELL a final negative reply.

9. On 22 July 1974, the FBI reported that WER BELL may be in possession of a one-line note from former CIA Director William Colby stemming from a chance meeting with the Director at an OSS alumni dinner, reading something like "Good to see you again." This note was apparently used by WER BELL to suggest that he and Mr. Colby were good friends. This information was passed on to Mr. Colby on 9 August 1974.

10. According to reporting from several Stations, WER BELL and Arthur L. Smith (a cohort of WER BELL's) were in several Central American countries during August and early September 1962. Their principal activity appeared to be contacting officials of the governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador for the purpose of obtaining recognition of a de facto Cuban Government in exile called the "United Organization for the Liberation of Cuba." In discussions with Nicaraguan Government representatives, WER BELL claimed the proposed Cuban Government in exile had the support of 90 separate Cuban exile organizations and 186,000 Cuban exiles. WER BELL offered a representative of the Nicaraguan Government \$100,000 to obtain that government's recognition of the Cuban Government in exile. The group claimed to have its headquarters at 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C. While in Guatemala, Smith claimed that the group had a man in the Department of State in Washington, D.C., whom they pay \$6,000 per year "to keep them advised."

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11. In December 1965 WER BELL contacted a Miami DCD asset and told him that he and six Cuban exiles in the U. S. had organized a group, including approximately 20 Cubans inside Cuba, to perform a commando operation in Cuba during early January 1966.. Their primary mission was the assassination of Fidel Castro, with the secondary mission of blowing up the generators that supply electricity to Havana, Cuba. WER BELL, at the time, stated that he was trying to get a "green light" from CIA to proceed with the mission, and inferred that the mission would be called off if such approval was not obtained.

12. On 7 February 1966 the Miami office of the FBI reported that WER BELL had been in contact with various news agencies concerning an alleged plan to assassinate Fidel Castro, and reportedly also had discussed the plan with Mr. Richard Phillips, Public Affairs Officer, Department of State, Washington, D.C. WER BELL claimed to have a group of some 500 men infiltrated into Cuba and said that they were ready for action to overthrow the regime immediately following the assassination of Castro. According to the FBI, WER BELL gave the impression that he is acquainted with many high government officials, both in the U. S. and other countries, and implied that his assassination plan had been approved by CIA.

13. According to a memorandum in WER BELL's file, on 7 February 1968, one Bruce Arman Baker telephoned an employee of this Agency and said he had been in contact with WER BELL. Mr. Baker said that WER BELL was in the weapons manufacturing business and delivered them by air throughout the world. Mr. Baker said that he understood that WER BELL does this for CIA. Mr. Baker said that he understood from WER BELL that he would have to get a CIA security clearance to fly for WER BELL. Baker said that he was afraid that his past smuggling record might keep him from getting a CIA clearance.

13-5

14. WER BELL came to the attention of the (Bangkok Station) in early 1969 when he went to Thailand representing himself as Vice President of Sionics, Atlanta, Georgia. He described himself as a counterinsurgency expert, had a variety of weapons to display, claimed to be a retired colonel, and introduced himself at a local nightclub as Chief of CIA in Thailand. WER BELL attempted to sell arms to the Thais and also to a variety of U. S. military elements. (Station Bangkok) passed the gist of his reputation to key personalities in the U. S. mission and the Thai Government stressing that he was not sponsored in any way by the U. S. Government.

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15. WER BELL was also the subject of two memorandum signed by Lawrence R. Houston. Mr. Houston, answering a request from Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, on 23 February 1971, denied WER BELL's alleged affiliation with the CIA. On 28 October 1971, Mr. Houston wrote Mr. David H. Henretta, Jr., of the Industrial Security Clearance Review Division, to return notarized Interrogatories previously sent by Mr. Henretta.

16. We have no information on Colonel Bayard except news articles reporting his death which were forwarded by the FBI.

17. Per your request, we have sent instructions to the LA/Miami Station that there should be no contact with WER BELL.


Nestor D. Sanchez
Acting Chief
Latin America Division

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CL BY 012913

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

RETURN TO CIA
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SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Seymour R. Bolten
2 E 14

EXTENSION

7520

NO.

DATE 19 September 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Mr. John Morrison
OGC 7 D 01

9/19/74

2.

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1. Attached is an advance informal copy of our proposed security deletions and revisions of the Hunt galley proof. Please note that this list has not yet been reviewed by Mr. Blee and is, therefore, still subject to change.

2. The DDO panel that reviewed the Hunt manuscript has designated items, numbered 12, 14, 19, 21, 24 and 25, as "hard core," by which we mean that the Agency should insist on their deletion or revision and be prepared to obtain an injunction and engage in litigation should Hunt refuse to cooperate.

Seymour R. Bolten
Seymour R. Bolten
SAB/DDO

APPROPRIATE FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

C/O

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SUBJECT: Manuscript and Galley Proof of Undercover:
Memoirs of an American Agent by E. Howard Hunt

- NOTES: A. Pages and lines underlined and appearing at the beginning of the items below refer to the galley proof.
- B. Corresponding page and line listings as they appear in the manuscript are provided in brackets at the end of each item.

1. Page 57, line 6 from bottom of page; the name ("Henry Pleasants") Mr. [Pleasants] retired under cover and his past relationship should not be exposed. It is also recommended that efforts be made to have the name "John Richardson" also removed from the same sentence containing Mr. [Pleasants] name. (Page 96, line 17.)

2. Page 59, line 38 beginning with "However" and ending on page 60, line 2 with "milieu". Rutherford T. "Pinky" Walsh retired under cover and his CIA relationship should not be exposed. His assignment in [Paris under student cover] is similarly classified. The description of this activity just a couple of pages before the author gratuitously mentions the lack of an agreement between the Agency and the [French barring unilateral operations in France] (Item 4 below) is potentially an additionally damaging blow to liaison relationships. (Page 100, lines 10-14.)

other members

under review (D.A.)

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3. Page 63, line 21; the name "Frank Holcomb"
Mr. Holcomb retired under cover and his past relationship with the CIA should not be exposed. It is additionally recommended that the entire paragraph wherein Mr. Holcomb's name appears (lines 21-24) should be deleted because it acknowledges CIA operations in support of anti-communist political operations in Italy. (page 105, lines 18-21.)

4. Page 63, line 30 beginning with "By" and ending with "arrangement" on line 33, page 63. It is recommended that this passage be deleted since its inclusion not only is not pertinent to the narrative but it unnecessarily jars ²⁴liaison with the ²⁴British and is an implied insult to the ²⁴French liaison services. (page 106, lines 4-7.) U.A.

5. Page 66 beginning with "Finis" on line 24 and ending with "world" on line 27. This passage describes a specific CIA operation which resulted in the production and distribution of an animated cartoon based on George Orwell's Animal Farm. (Page 111, lines 6-9.)

6. Page 68, the pseudonym "John F. Rittenhouse" on line 34. The author's original CIA pseudonym was classified, and even though compromised, never appeared in the press and still exists on various currently classified documents. (page 114, line 23.) (copy of page 114)

7. Page 71, beginning with "Spanish" on line 28 and ending with "America" on line 20, page 72, and including the footnotes on pages 71 and 72. This passage should be deleted because it describes the Agency's role in ²⁴subsidizing, producing and distributing "El Campesino's" book, Life and Death in the USSR. (pages 120 [lines 4-20, including footnote] - 121 [lines 1-16, including footnote.])

8. Page 72 beginning with "Eudocia" on line 21 and ending with "Scribner's" on line 32. This should be deleted because it describes the Agency's role in the translation, ²⁴publishing and distribution of Eudocio Ravines' book, The Yenan Way. It also describes William Buckley's role in that operation as a CIA officer. (Page 121, lines 17-23 and page 122, lines 1-6.)

9. Page 73 beginning with "Mexican" on line 5 through "Rivera" on line 8. This should be deleted because it not only describes sources and methods but also identifies a specific CIA operation. (Page 122, lines 19-21 and page 123, line 1.)

10. Page 73 beginning with "Communism" on line 14 and ending with "reputation" on line 15. This passage could serve to identify a former asset in Mexico who is still living. (Page 123, lines 7-8.)

11. Page 73 beginning with "cover" on line 17 through "legend" on line 19. This should be deleted because it identifies a CIA-sponsored cover arrangement in Bangkok. Furthermore, this particular type of cover, the movie industry, has figured in earlier unfavorable publicity to CIA in other Southeast Asian countries and thus serves to further render suspect the use of such cover in still other areas. (Page 123, lines 10-12.)

12. Page 73 beginning with "planned" on line 22 through "authentic" on line 5 of page 74 and including the footnote on page 74. This should be deleted because it describes a specific operation involving the forgery of a page of the [Shanghai Post], and also includes descriptions of sources and methods. (Page 123, lines 15-23 and all of page 124 including footnote.)

13. Page 77 beginning with "technical" on line 19 through "station" on line 21. This should be deleted because it describes and authenticates a CIA operation. (Page 131, lines 2-4.)

14. Page 80 beginning with "surreptitious-entry" on line 9 through "Embassy" on line 12, page 82. This should be deleted because it describes a specific, sensitive operation as well as sensitive sources and methods including the [acquisition of code materials]. (Page 136, line 3 through page 139, line 20.)

15. Page 86 beginning with "Greek" on line 18 through "countries" on line 20. This should be deleted because it identifies a specific operation and the foreign assets involved in its support. (Page 147, lines 6-8.)

16. Page 95 beginning with "quasi-military" on line 11 through "East" on line 16. This should be deleted because it describes various cover and support facilities used in Far East Asian countries. (Page 163, lines 6-11.)

17. Page 95 beginning with "Hong Kong" on line 16 through "Branch" on line 19. This should be deleted because it describes an operation conducted [jointly with a liaison service in Hong Kong targeted] against mainland China and as such is not only damaging to current American detente efforts but is particularly menacing to Hong Kong authorities in view of their proximity and susceptibility to potential Chinese retaliatory pressures. (Page 163, lines 11-14.)

substitute

"For HK we have no independent operation"

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18. Page 99 beginning with "disrupting" on line 5 through "display" on line 27 and including the footnote on page 99. This passage describes specific CIA operations [in Tokyo targetted against China and as such are not only damaging to current detente efforts but are also disruptive to liaison relationships with the Japanese.] (Page 169 line 23 through page 170, line 22, including footnote.)

19. Page 102 beginning with "Despite" on line 6 through "returned" on line 10. This should be deleted because it describes a specific and sensitive CIA operation including [code materials]. (Page 175, lines 10-15.)

20. Page 105 beginning with "wiretap" on line 6 through "surreptitious-entry" on line 7. Ought to be deleted since it refers to sensitive Agency sources and methods. (Page 181, lines 2-3.)

21. Page 108 beginning with "tap" on line 17 through "Embassy" on line 7, page 109. This passage deals intermittently with various operational proposals, activities including a recruitment of an identifiable individual, as well as with sensitive methods of operation, e.g., surveillance teams. (Page 187, lines 6-24 through page 188, lines 1-15.)

22. Page 109 beginning with "FBI" on line 21 through "station" on line 26. The "Ramirez" operation. Describes an operation which began with the FBI's spotting of a possible Soviet intelligence agent. Since this information was then turned over to the Agency, a question arises concerning the need to seek the FBI's prior comments. (Page 189, lines 6-11.)

23. Page 111 beginning with "The" on line 22 through "triumvirate" on line 23. It would seem that an effort ought to be made to have this passage deleted or changed since its damage potential to [liaison relationships with the Uruguayan services] is considerable, and it does jeopardize the current careers and livelihoods of the Agency's contacts who are referred to by date and position and thus, are identifiable. (Page 192, lines 21-22.)

24. Page 115 beginning with "I" on line 23 through "department" on line 35. This passage should be deleted because it describes Agency methods of operation --- acquisition and passage of information to and from a liaison service --- as well as an overall Agency program of operational activities within Uruguay involving the [monitoring of forty-two telephone lines]. Page 200, lines 6-18.)

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✓ 25. Page 116 beginning with "technical" on line 10 through "secrets" on line 29. This passage should be deleted because it describes a sensitive operation conducted (jointly) with a liaison (Uruguayan) service (which involved code materials). (Page 201, lines 12-23 and page 202, lines 1-9.) 24

26. Page 122 beginning with "The" on line 8 through "Djilas" on line 9. This passage should be deleted because it attests to the Agency's subsidization of publication of Djilas' book. In addition an effort ought to be made to have the author remove or appropriately alter the rest of the paragraph wherein he refers to an Agency news service located in "Washington's National Press Building". (Page 211, line 4.)

27. Page 122 beginning with "from" through "Gaines" on line 31. It is recommended that OGC's attention be called to this passage in order that they be made aware of its possible interpretations. (Page 212, lines 4-5.)

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C. G. G.
Hunt?

28. Page 123 beginning with "Soon" on line 12 through "Madrid" on line 35. This passage deals with the author's work on several "Peter Ward" books and, later, his assignment to Madrid. It is recommended that OGC's attention be called to this passage. (Page 212, last line through page 213, lines 1-23.)

29. Page 126 beginning with "Chief" on last line through "officers" on page 127, line 5. This passage should be deleted because it specifies the classified activities of a CIA officer, [Roger Goiran^{03, 04}, His assignments in Tehran and Brussels], as well as his involvement in the compilation of a classified "encyclopedia study" are unwarranted disclosures of Agency methods. (Page 219, lines 8-13.)

30. Page 130 beginning with "Free" on line 20 through "CIA" on line 21. This phrase should be deleted because it could serve to affect the life of one of the principals of the Free Cuba Committee, [Mrs. Mari⁰⁵eda Bourgin], a former witting contact, who is now employed by the State Department. (Page 225, lines 10-11.)

31. Page 150, all of lines 14 through 16. It would appear that this description of the author's contact with Dr. Barney Malloy of CIA is very unfair to the latter. It implies that Hunt had a special relationship with Dr. Malloy and an effort ought to be made by OGC to have the author rewrite this version in order to reflect Dr. Malloy's true role in this affair. (Page 260, lines 22-23 through page 261, lines 1-2.)

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32. Page 220, lines 5 through 10. This passage concerning the use of CIA alias documentation by Hunt and others includes loose language which implies that still another set of documents was prepared by the CIA for Hunt's use --- i.e., a set of documents which was not mentioned during the recent Congressional "Watergate hearings". As such this is misleading and could serve to create additional difficulties for the Agency. It is recommended that the OGC make an effort to have the author rewrite this paragraph in order that this potentially damaging language be removed from his manuscript. (Page 387, lines 4-9.)

add "old"
+ "once"
to description of
documents.

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OGC 74-1755

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDRETURN TO CIA
Reg. Mail 15, 16, 17
2017-10-10**SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"**

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff, and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt, his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know. We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974. These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation, the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the use of electronic surveillance.

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3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.


4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassified items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his advertising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.

5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

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manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.


JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS

OGC:JDM:sin
Original - OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 - Chrono

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DD/O 15-0223

14 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: (Ed Pechous)
SA/ADDOSUBJECT : Name Trace - Henry L. BRETTON and PRAEGER,
Publishing Corporation

REFERENCE : OGC 75-0088, 10 January 1975

1. In response to the referent request, we have checked IP, OSG/OC, FR, DCD, ITG, and CI files with the following results:

- a. IP -- 201-153109
- b. OSG/OC -- no record
- c. FR -- no record
- d. DCD -- see attachment
- e. ITG -- no record
- f. CI -- no record
- g. CCS -- see below

A. The IP 201 file indicated Subject was a former OSS man who had used the name Henry BISMARCK. He was met by Contact Division in 1964, apparently on several occasions, due to his plans to accept a position with the University of Accra, Ghana. At that time he indicated he did not want to get involved with the Agency. There is no paper in the file after 1964.

B. CCS reported various agency contacts with PRAEGER but CCS itself has had no such contacts. (Mr. Arthur V. Cox (retired 1962) used PRAEGER as cover while on project ZPEVADF. 03, 24)


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Subject: Name Trace - Henry L. BRITTON and BRACOR Publishing Corporation (Con't)

2. The results of this check are forwarded in this format to allow you to respond as you may wish to OCC who had requested an answer by 13 January. This confirms my phone conversation of this date.


Lee F. Patton
Chief, OSC/OC

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