

-27-

j. Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques (Paris)	£ 4,800.00
k. Comité d'Entr'Aide Estonien (Paris)	3,000.00
l. Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois (Paris)	10,800.00
m. Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France (Paris)	3,000.00
n. Association Lithuanienne Bienfaisance (Paris)	3,000.00
o. GERMAN (Paris).	4,800.00
p. Estonian National Committee (Germany)	6,000.00
q. Hungarian Office and Hungarian Relief Action (Germany)	20,000.00
r. Latvian National Committee and Latvian Red Cross (Germany)	7,000.00
s. Lithuanian National Committee (Germany)	8,000.00
t. GERMAN (Trieste)	1,200.00
7. Material costs of Implementation of FECS Program (extra-curricular schools, reading rooms, meetings, subscriptions, charts, posters, publicity)	50,000.00
8. Welfare Fund	50,000.00

Total Annual Budget for FECS £417,695.00

Capital Outlay in Initial Years of Operation

a. purchase of 5 cars at £1000 each for use of 5 area assistants in frontier countries	5,000.00
b. 10 one-way trips U.S.-Europe for transpor- tation to job of American personnel (and wives and children where they exist at £500 each)	5,000.00
c. Furniture and equipment for Deputy Director's office	700.00
Total	£ 10,700.00

-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-

Mary Augustine

Roger L. Bull

Information

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Report of Ex-King Michael's Interest
in Rumanian Refugee Unity

1. Transmitted herewith is a report which will be of interest to the NCFE in its current negotiations with the Rumanian refugees.
2. The views of the King with regard to the Iron Guards and others listed, are in agreement with those of this Division.
3. It is requested that arrangements be made for representatives of the NCFE to meet with personnel of this Division to discuss the current negotiations and utilizing this recent information.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

Attachment

Orig - Bureau

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

24 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: G. Popescu-Botosani; J. Radovan;
J. Aron

1. This office has no objection, with respect to security, to the employment of the three subject Rumanians, who have requested State Department assistance in getting on the ECFE payroll.

2. However, it is recommended that no action be taken on their behalf until the present attempt to settle the refugee situation is completed, in order to avoid any appearance of ECFE's favoring one faction.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SB

4 Attachments
Biographies

SECRET

orig - Burke

625-1

SECRET
Security Information July 22, 1952

To: George Lofton
From: Leonard I. Stamm

For your information I enclose a copy of our contract letter with Leland Stowe. I send you this because of the considerable discussion of the case.

I can't tell you how much I appreciate your consideration and help in this whole affair. It really pulled us out of a deep, deep hole. My very best.

Leonard I. Stamm

Attachment in TONIC
ACFE files (att 17 July)

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

B.

File

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

Attached is a memorandum which it is suggested be shown to the Director of Central Intelligence in time for a scheduled meeting of the Director, members of CIA, and members of the Board of the National Committee for a Free Europe on Monday, 4 August.

L. K. WHITE
Acting Deputy Director
(Administration)

Attachment
As stated.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - ADD/A
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

DRAFT

SECRET

Security Information

Richard's memo

21 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: DCI

SUBJECT: Study of Working Relations Between NCFE and CIA by
IO and AS/S

1. Following upon its assumption of responsibility for the NCFE project, IO, aided by the AS/S, has undertaken over the past two months an investigation into the NCFE/CIA relations. It ^{has concluded} ~~is apparent~~ that these relations have deteriorated to a dangerous extent ^{that} ~~and~~ the Agency has lost control of the NCFE activity to a degree it can no longer ignore.
2. In general, the fundamental defect in the relationship is that the NCFE has refused to recognize the legitimate duties and responsibilities of CIA for the policies, financial administration, and security aspects of the NCFE, and the latter has persisted in regarding itself as virtually autonomous. The secondary weakness in the situation has been the inadequacy and confusion of the procedures which were developed to maintain control over ^{or} ~~and~~ evaluation of NCFE's activities.
3. As examples of the consequences to which these weaknesses have led, the following are cited: (here should be discussed illustrations of specific problems such as those in your para. a.)
4. The remedy which is being developed as a consequence of this investigation is the re-definition of the responsibilities of CIA and authorities of NCFE and the development of new procedures for the conduct of relations between NCFE and CIA. These definitions and procedures have been reduced to a Memorandum of Agreement which has been prepared by CIA and submitted to NCFE for study. A copy of this Agreement is attached as Appendix A. The Senior Vice President of the NCFE has ~~refused~~ reviewed this Agreement in detail and has prepared his comments thereon, a copy of

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Security Information

which is attached as Appendix B. In brief, these comments bear out in instance after instance the assertions set forth above as to the fundamental difficulties with which we are faced in the administration of this project.

5. The PRC already has reviewed this Agreement and the 1953 fiscal year budget submitted by NCFE. The Committee is so convinced of the weakness of the present situation and the need for its improvement along the lines suggested by the Memorandum of Agreement that it has refused to approve the budget of the NCFE until a satisfactory Memorandum of Agreement is concluded ^{and the budget resubmitted} in the manner prescribed therein.

6. There is, ~~thus~~, a choice between ~~basically~~ ^{only} two alternatives, viz.,

CIA either has a duty and responsibility to ensure, affirmatively, the conduct of the NCFE program in accordance with CIA's own special mission and general responsibilities as a Government agency, or

The NCFE is an autonomous organization operating independently of any Government direction and control, in which event this Agency should formally abdicate the responsibilities with which it has been charged in this connection.

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Security Information

13 July 1952

Dear Mr. Leat:

I would appreciate it if you would deliver
this envelope to Mr. John C. Hughes, 110 Worth Street,
New York.

Thanks,

/s/ Tom Braden

2203 Foxhall Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
17 July, 1952

Dear John:

I was glad of our meeting day before yesterday and I am looking forward to seeing you soon again.

Here is a memorandum I addressed to A. a short time ago which I would like you to read because it may give you some indication of how we are trying to get to work here. It is for your eyes only.

I talked to Min on the telephone this morning and he seemed in an extremely bellicose mood. This bellicosity, replete with references to "little people who get in his hair", "from now on I'm dealing only with the top", and "otherwise there are going to be some resignations here" is difficult for me because I am partly Irish, and as able to resign as the next man. I have succeeded, however, in maintaining my Scotch heritage to the fore so far, and since you assure me that none of this is personally directed at myself, or people like Bill Durkee whom I persuaded to come and help me or to the job that I am sincerely and honestly trying to do, I will try to keep it there. It was nevertheless awfully calming to have a chance for such a good talk with you.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

/s/ T

Mr. John Hughes
McCannell & Company
40 Worth Street
New York, New York

14-00000

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Security Information

~~EYES ONLY~~

3-5308

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. Admiral Miller will call upon the DDCI soon to request more funds for the Crusade for Freedom. At the present rate of expenditure, funds will run out on 31 December.
2. \$488,991 was budgeted for the Crusade this year. We have told Admiral Miller that since the Crusade was unable to live within this budget, we were certain that the Agency would appropriate more money to wind it up, although we have explained that his request was embarrassing because the PRC had expressly approved \$488,991 instead of a larger amount in the belief that less money should be expended this year. We have asked Admiral Miller to provide us with a financial statement of the Crusade cost to date as well as a breakdown of the further amount needed.
3. The Crusade this year has so far cost only a quarter of last year's expenditure and half of the amount expended in 1950. Receipts are up, 140% over last year at this date. On the whole, a much better job has been done to date than we anticipated -- and purely in terms of the amount raised the performance has been superior.
4. There is a good deal of gossip about the use of Crusade funds and I think you should be acquainted with it. Because the Crusade is a rather public enterprise, the gossip has occasionally been sounded not only within NCFE and this Agency but also among "semi-witting" private citizens who have been enlisted for short-term fund-raising on an unpaid basis. The gossip is that a good deal of money has found its way into the private hands of local Crusade chairmen and workers. In one instance, it is said, involving a local chairman in Minnesota, the amount which reached private hands was enough to build a new home. Another story I have heard repeated by different people on different occasions is that in the state of Nevada and certain other locales no money received by fund-raising chairmen last year was ever turned in to Headquarters, and no report ever made. Another item which some


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Security Information
~~EYES ONLY~~

SECRET ONLY

of the people in the New York office talk about is the payment of \$37,500 to Fred C. Smith, who worked for approximately one month in drawing up a Dimes for Freedom campaign which, as you recall, was rejected as a basis for this year's campaign.

5. No accounting of Crusade funds expended in the field has ever been made, and in a fund-raising campaign it is perhaps impossible to do so. Nevertheless, records involving payments for expense money to private citizens engaged for the duration of the campaign are chaotic. You will recall that Spencer Phenix, Treasurer of NCPE, refuses to have anything to do with expenditures for the Crusade.

6. Since we are winding up the Crusade this year and will attempt to place it on a more reliable basis through the Heritage Foundation, I suggest that you assure Admiral Miller that funds sufficient to wind up the Crusade will be forthcoming and that you instruct the IO Division to expedite a project granting these funds. I further suggest that in view of the allegations above, which I repeat for your private background information, you keep the position of the Agency faultless by requesting from Admiral Miller a budget in as much detail as possible for the amount necessary to liquidate the Crusade.


THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

SECRET

Security Information

17 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Deputy Director (Administration)
FROM: Acting Chief, Administrative Staff (Special)
SUBJECT: Conference with TPTONIC Management re TPTONIC/CIA Agreement

1. On 9 July 1952 Mr. Nichols and I conferred with the President and the Treasurer of the TPTONIC organization regarding the fiscal portion of the proposed Agreement to be reached between CIA and TPTONIC.

2. The purpose of the conference was to extend to the TPTONIC management an offer of aid in the interpretation and implementation of the fiscal phase of the Agreement in response to TONIC's request for assistance in this connection.

3. Our statement of the Agency's position may be summarized briefly as follows:

a. The Agency is insistent upon obtaining the detailed information regarding TONIC's activities which is essential in order to fulfill the Agency's fundamental policy, fiscal, and security responsibilities. The great size to which TONIC has grown makes it necessary for the Agency to take a closer interest in TONIC's activities than it has in the past.

b. Although final concurrence in an Agreement has not been reached by TONIC, it is necessary that revision of the financial budget be commenced immediately if PRC budget approval is to be obtained as soon as possible after a final Agreement has been reached. The budget document must be expanded in order to provide reasonably detailed information not only as to proposed changes from the previous year's activities but also regarding the continuing activities as well. Without this additional information there is lacking sufficient data on which to base the approval of any allotment of funds.

4. The President assured us that a revision of the budget would be undertaken immediately to provide not only the information the Agency requires but also to eliminate incompletely planned, vaguely foreseen requirements. He assured us that the revision would be completed in time to permit a review, prior to its presentation to the PRC, for the purpose of determining that the document attains the standards set forth in the Agreement. The Treasurer concluded that he was sufficiently familiar with the terms of the fiscal portion of the Agreement to be able to satisfy its requirements, but promised to call upon us if he should desire further clarification.

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Security Information

07/2601

- 2 -

SECRET

5. In order to avoid later misunderstandings we set forth briefly the concept of financial control contemplated in the budget section of the Agreement. We noted that the Agency must have confidence that the programs of the various TONIC divisions are carried out to the approximate extent proposed in the Agency approved budget since other Agency plans must be synchronized harmoniously with TONIC's approved program. Accordingly, the principle of establishing an expenditure ceiling for each of the TONIC divisions is regarded by the Agency as fundamental with which inter-division transfers without Agency approval would be incompatible. We assured the President it positively was not the intent of the Agency to lift managerial responsibility from TONIC's own hands, and that the controls contemplated by the Agreement are aimed not at stifling managerial activity but rather to the attainment of the minimum checks which the Agency feels it must insist upon in view of the scope and importance of the TONIC program in the fulfillment of the Agency's own responsibilities and mission.

6. The President expressed his appreciation of the Agency's viewpoint in the matter of financial control although he did not expressly commit TONIC to its adoption. He did, however, promise to undertake a point by point review of the terms of the Agreement immediately so that the specific areas of doubt or disagreement may be localized and disposed of in further negotiations.

7. This Staff feels that there is in reality no misunderstanding of the Agreement on the part of TONIC nor any lack of technical confidence to carry out its terms. The problem of attaining and understanding, therefore, comes to nothing more than a determination by TONIC management to accept the minimum of control upon which the Agency is insistent.

Frederick W. Richards
Acting Chief, Administrative
Staff (Special)

Distribution:

Acting DD/A - Orig.
CCC - 1
IO Division - 1 ✓
AS/S Chrono - 1

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

ER 3-0917

15 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe; proposed employment of Mr. Leland Stowe.

REFERENCE: Memo from Security Officer to DCI dated 12 January, and attachments.

1. As the result of an extensive consideration of the problem created by the NCFE offer of employment to Leland Stowe, and in light of the adverse information concerning Mr. Stowe's past connections and affiliations with certain organizations, it was decided by the Director upon the recommendations of Messrs. Dulles, Hedden and the undersigned that Mr. Stowe should not be employed by NCFE as Chief of the RFE information collection program.

2. When Admiral Miller was informed today of this decision, together with the reasons upon which it was based, he and his staff immediately proceeded to re-examine the entire problem and within an hour-and-one-half communicated to the undersigned an entirely new proposition concerning Mr. Stowe, of which the following were the principal elements:

a. In line with the Director's decision, Mr. Stowe would not be employed by NCFE as Chief of the information collection activity of RFE.

b. In lieu thereof he would be offered a contract as a "consultant and contributor of information" for a six-months term.

c. He would not be offered a salary but would be placed on a fee basis, and paid according to the amount of work and material which he contributes.

d. Thus he will not become an official of RFE or NCFE, and will not be in such a position as to enable anyone to maintain that he guides the policy of or controls the flow of information to Radio Free Europe.

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Security Information

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Security Information

- 2 -

e. Subject to prior approval from our security office, Admiral Miller and Mr. Lang will endeavor to secure the services of either Mr. Cy Burgin of the Time-Life organization, or Mr. Russell Hill of the New York Herald Tribune as Chief of the information collection activity of Radio Free Europe. They are both regarded as competent and experienced individuals, and Mr. Burgin has already indicated his interest in this position if it were open.

3. The proposal described in the preceding paragraph was submitted to Mr. Dulles and to Mr. Braden by the undersigned, and they both expressed their approval. Mr. Dulles said that, on the basis of our discussion with the Director, he felt certain that this arrangement would be acceptable from the standpoint of CIA. The Admiral was so advised by the undersigned and expressed himself as being entirely satisfied and very pleased. He undertook to check through Mr. Braden on the acceptability from a security standpoint of Messrs. Burgin and Hill.

4. One other aspect of this matter is worth recording for future reference: Mr. Hedden has stated that he has been well acquainted with Mr. Stowe for many years, having known him in college and having followed his career rather closely. On the basis of everything he knows about Mr. Stowe, Mr. Hedden is convinced that Mr. Stowe is a loyal American citizen and that there would be no real risk in his case on the issue of loyalty as such. In the opinion of Mr. Hedden, Mr. Stowe's past proclivity for becoming involved with left-wing movements (some of them presently regarded as subversive) is not a commentary on his loyalty but rather on his judgment. At times before and during the war he was prone to hop onto popular bandwagons and to take a line in his writings and broadcasts that seemed to be popular at the time. In other words, he is an opportunist by nature and prone to take up causes which appeal to him as having wide popular interest and support as of any given moment. This propensity on the part of Mr. Stowe is not without its professional and commercial aspects.

Encls
References.

FRANK C. WISNER

DD/P-FCW/bja

Distributions:

Orig. - DCI, DDCI, IG - with enclosures.

cc: - C/IO - 1

Security Officer - 1

ER - 1


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Security Information

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SECURITY INFORMATION



14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Papers on NCPE Views on Yugoslavia

1. Here are NCPE's views on Yugoslavia which you asked for.
2. I am worried about item d) in particular. The other items may be justifiable on the grounds that we have to take care of people in this country, but item d) may seem to be taking unnecessary forward steps.
3. As you suggested, we have asked the State Department for a review of the entire national council policy, and I am sure we will get State's views on Yugoslavia at this time.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

2 Attachments

1. Ltr to Allen Dulles from Leonard Stern dtd 7 July 52.
2. Memo dtd 2 July 52 re NCPE views on Yugoslavia.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee (thru DD/P)

- 1 cc - CIO
- 2 cc - IO/TO:IC
- 2 cc - RI

SECRET

30/P/1752

3-5643

16 December 1952

1 Jan 53

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Briefing of Secretary of the Army on 17 December
on NCFZ and CFA

1. On 17 December, I briefed Secretary of the Army Pace on the subjects of the National Committee for a Free Europe and the Committee for a Free Asia.
2. The briefing covered both physical assets and concepts. Secretary Pace asked many questions, for example:

- a. How did NCFZ handle the problem of Yugoslav exiles and at the same time use the Yugoslavian defection as an argument in its broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries?
- b. How much did the State Department have to say about the day-to-day operations?
- c. The duties of the President?

In addition, he expressed great enthusiasm over the concept of the two Committees and in general for the concept of covert psychological warfare. He interrupted at one point to talk at some length about his belief that while it was essential to continue to draft boys as soldiers and produce rifles, it was just as essential, and in the long run more conducive to ultimate peace, to wage the argument for democracy to a questioning world in a covert manner. He indicated that he thought very little of the government's overt propaganda program and that from what he knew about the government's covert program as conducted by CIA, it was the effective means to the end.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

72

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
TO:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS		
Sent to N. Y. 23 July 1952		
To Duane: I think the content of Wesner's memo, not ought to be relayed to Miller, Walsh et al.		
Return to E Hill for file		
FROM:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
FORM NO. 36-8 SEP 1946		

SECRET

Security Information

14 July 1952

For Miller

MEMORANDUM

I would certainly be inclined to agree with FCM on the importance of a dignified "worthy cause" sort of campaign. Moreover I would scrupulously avoid any activity which might cast doubt on the good faith of the Crusade (e.g., "We gave our money for balloons at Christmas — where are they?")

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REL

SECRET

Security Information

SECRET

Security Information

ER 3-0732

9 JULY 1952


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Campaign of the Crusade for Freedom
(ER 3-0686).

1. Please note the attached inquiry from Tom Braden, in which he raises two questions with respect to balloons. The following are my recommendations on the two questions, respectively:

a. I see no objection to reference by the Freedom Crusade campaign to the use of balloons, provided this is handled with care. By this I mean that it would be all right for the Crusade to refer to its former use of balloons and the effectiveness of this use, and also to say that the National Committee for a Free Europe will, on an appropriate occasion and at the right time, make further use of balloons. It would be wrong and unwise for many reasons to make a flat statement as to the exact time and content of further balloon operations. There is no point in thus telegraphing our punch to the opposition, and it would get us into trouble if we were to be too specific about the timing and subject matter of any new messages.

b. I would be very much opposed to the stunts such as dropping Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums. This is the kind of flamboyant publicity which we have agreed not to undertake this year, and incidentally which makes us look as though we were in the class with commercial advertisers or irresponsible and playful student ~~pranksters~~, or both. I thought Abbott Washburn had gone to help Ike!


FRANK G. WISNER

Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)

ER 3-0686, dtd 7 July

DD/P-PG/bjm

Distribution:

Orig. - addressee w/att

1 cc - ER

1 cc - DD/P chrono

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
Security Information

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

7 July 1952




MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Request for Decision as to whether Crusade for Freedom Campaign Beginning 15 November may use a Dropping of Leaflets Theme in its Propaganda.

1. Admiral Miller of NCFE has appointed a new head for Crusade for Freedom, Mr. Richard Walsh, formerly of the State Department. Mr. Walsh has submitted a new plan for the Crusade for Freedom campaign to begin November 15. The campaign will be based upon the idea of sending Christmas message leaflets behind the iron curtain with publicity that the Crusade for Freedom will use balloons among other methods for this purpose. It was originally contemplated that the Crusade would in fact send balloons as it did last year. Bearing in mind, however, the DCI's warning about using any propaganda device which might give the Soviet a weapon in its bacteriological warfare campaign, we have instructed the Crusade that there will be no actual transmission of balloons.

2. Will it be permissible for the Crusade to publicize the use of balloons, to employ such stunts as dropping the Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums in the United States and to give the general impression that balloons will be one of the ways to carry messages from the American people behind the iron curtain, even though they will in fact not be employed?

3. You will appreciate that an immediate decision is essential.


THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Distribution:

Original - DDCI through DD/P
cc: ADPC - 1
CIO - 1
IO/TOMIC - 2
RI - 2

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SECURITY INFORMATION

14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WALTER FORTZWEINER
Office of the General Counsel

SUBJECT: Follow-up on your report of 26 June 1952 re: Captain Stanislaw Oskierka.

1. The following report of 2 July 1952, is a reply to our presentation to the Admiral of the subject reports:

"I have questioned Tom about the matter cited in your letter of 30 June 1952, File Number 6-3639. Tom states that the facts are as follows:

1. By letter dated March 20, 1952, Congressman Robert Trip Rose requested consideration for the employment of Captain Oskierka. The latter was interviewed on several occasions, and prospects of his employment were fully examined. After careful consideration, it developed that Oskierka was not useful in any division of our operation, and there was no job for him. He was personally so informed by Tom in a subsequent interview on May 6, 1952, in which Oskierka expressed his understanding of the situation.

2. Under date of May 23, 1952, Congressman Ross again wrote us stating that Oskierka had contacted him again about the possibilities of a job with us. I wrote the Congressman under date of June 5, 1952, telling him that, although we had made every effort to place him, we were unable to offer Oskierka a position.

3. On or about June 25, 1952, Congressman Ross' local secretary telephoned my office inquiring about Oskierka. My secretary referred her to Tom who then talked at some length with Congressman Ross' secretary. He told the latter that we had no position for Oskierka and that we had so informed the Congressman by letter above cited. In the course of the conversation, the secretary inquired as to what suggestions we could offer relative to such a position for Oskierka as would be useful in procuring an extension of his visitor's visa. Tom stated that he might suggest to the Congressman that he might make inquiry in Oskierka's behalf in various Government agencies in Washington, stating that Oskierka seemed to have various useful talents which might interest someone other than us.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

4. Tom has never talked with Congressman Ross. Tom did not state to his secretary or to anyone else that Congressman Ross' candidate might be able to get a position with you. Tom states that he knows better for obvious reasons than to make any such suggestion to anyone.

For your more complete information in this matter, a copy of an internal memorandum is enclosed.

Sincerely

/s/ H. B. Miller "

2. We should like to know if the information you obtained from CIA personnel agrees with this report.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

Encl:-1 copy

IO/TOMIC : NBV/hka
Distributions:
Orig:- Addressee
2 cc - C/IO ✓
2 cc - IO/TOMIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET.

C O P Y

SECURITY INFORMATION

May 27, 1952

Memorandum

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Captain Stanislaw Oskierka

There are no prospects for utilizing Captain Oskierka's services by the Fund.

I must say that I do not like the behavior of Oskierka in again trying to pressure us via Congressman Ross. As the attached file shows, he has been most courteously treated here; every effort has been made to place him; and he has expressed himself as being pleased with the treatment and attention accorded him. I personally informed him and explained in great detail that his background made it impossible for us to use him here. He stated to me that he thoroughly understood this and that he was quite satisfied that we had examined the proposition thoroughly.

I don't suppose that it can be told to Congressman Ross, but Bernie Yarrow has taken his whole story to certain of our friends to explore the possibilities of their possible interest in him since he stated to me that he is single and willing to go anywhere in the world to get into the fight.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

7 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION/OPC
FROM: AC/RDD/OTS
SUBJECT: Evaluation of New Type of Air Leaflet
REFERENCE: (a) Memorandum for RDD/TES Subj: Request for
Appraisal of Weiss proposal to NCVE of
new type of air leaflet dtd 21 June 1952
(b) Telephone discussion between C/IOD/OPC
and AC/RDD/OTS on 3 July 1952

1. Subject proposal has been received and will be established as RDD Ad Hoc Project No. 23.

2. This project will be carried out along the lines discussed in Reference (b), which will require a number of field experiments; therefore, some additional time will be needed for the complete evaluation. Information will be forwarded to you on these trials as it becomes available.

3. It is noted that the samples attached to Reference (a) are approximately 1 1/4" by 8". It is requested that you advise whether or not this leaflet is large enough for applications you have in mind. In the event that it is not, trials will be conducted with larger size leaflets of the same pattern.

L. R. DAILLY
Acting Chief
Research & Development

LRD:hmg

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

"CS" RECORD MATERIAL

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM ~~6-13~~ ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED. 6-A-50
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(47)

3.	2D24			
4.	S. Corbet			
5.	06/07K			
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14.	RETURN TO 6-A-50			
15.	IP/ARD Rm 6-13			

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129
432393

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~~432393~~

FILE NO. 78-1129

DOCUMENT: _____

FOLDER: 12

PAGE: _____

BOX: 2

FORM 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

January 1953-December 1953

RETURN TO
IP/ARCHIVES
Rm 6-13

John H

CLASSIFIED

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

C/IO/1

NO.

10-4-7

DATE

31 Dec 53

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FW'D		
1. CIO				TWB	POW: I am sorry that through an oversight the 10 Dec 53 memo to DCI attached was neither routed through nor a copy sent to you. TWB DDIP <i>initialed</i>
2.					
3. DD/P		Dec 8 53	18 Jan	CF 7	
4. C-I-O					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

SECRET

1136


31 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Gregoire Gafencu

REFERENCE: Memo to DCI dtd 10 Dec'53, same subject

1. Both Whitney Shepardson and Bernie Yarrow were unable to persuade Gafencu to remain in the United States. He left for Paris 12 December 1953.
2. As a result of his own decision, Gafencu was informed it would not be possible for NCSE to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCSE policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to Gafencu will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.
3. All the meetings between Mr. Shepardson and Gafencu were entirely cordial.



THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief,

International Organizations Division

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

10 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Acting Chief, International Organizations
Divisions

SUBJECT: Grigore Gafencu

1. I have just spoken to Whitney Shepardson and he reports that he and Bernie Yarrow have been unable to persuade Gafencu to stay in the United States. Gafencu gave many reasons for wishing to live in Europe. He is leaving for Paris this Saturday.
2. As a result of his own decision, Gafencu was informed that it would not be possible for NCPE to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCPE policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to Gafencu will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.
3. Mr. Shepardson stated that all of the meetings with Gafencu were entirely cordial.

WILLIAM P. BURKE
Chief
IC/Branch 1

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1
IO/Branch 1 - 2cc
CIO - lcc
RI - lcc

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*Gafencu ltr 12 Dec & attachment
(ltr from 21 Nov 53 to
Gafencu) returned to DCI*

2044N
54

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP**

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief/IO Division		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Exec. Asst. to DCI	JSE/dr	12 Jan 54
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

Remarks: The Director has noted the attached memorandum. He indicated to me that he had seen "something else on this". Do you know what he refers to?


JSE
JSE/Arman

120.
6


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8079



30 December 1953



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report that Sensitive Files covering Emigre Activities may have been made Available to Senator McCarthy

1. The following report was made available to us by Eugene Lyons, former President of the American Committee, who still actively participates in Committee activities as a policy advisor. Mr. Lyons is a member of the Board of Directors of the American Friends for Russian Freedom, and he obtained this report from an unnamed source in the American Friends' organization.

2. A man named Verbitsky (fou), living in Munich, has somehow managed to obtain the personal files of Georgi Mueller, the NTS safe-house keeper who was arrested as a Soviet agent last fall. These files contain, among other things, a number of letters to Mueller from Gregori Klimov, an influential emigre who is head of the emigre group known as the League of Post War Defectors. These letters involve Klimov in Mueller's activities, and implicate many other emigres. Verbitsky attempted to turn these documents over to unnamed authorities in the field; when he was ignored by these authorities, he mailed the entire parcel to Senator Joseph McCarthy.

3. The American Committee naturally considers that this correspondence, which, if it exists, no doubt contains a great deal of that unfounded denunciation and allegation which is so typical of emigre expression, may involve the American Committee as well as other matters of particular concern to the Agency.

4. The Chief, SR Division, has been made aware of this report.

Thomas W. Budden
THOMAS W. BUDDEN
Chief/IO

SECRET

<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; font-weight: normal;"> CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET </div> <div style="text-align: center; font-size: small;">(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)</div>			
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>JC/NE</i>	<i>JRC</i>	<i>JAN 4</i>
2	<i>Mr. Thomas Braden - 1028 K. R. R.</i>	<i>K. R. R.</i>	
3	<i>Braden - Res.</i>		
4	<i>Braden with me</i>		
5	<i>Braden 1028 K</i>		
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>JC/NE</i>	<i>St/</i>	<i>31 Dec</i>
2			
3			
<div style="display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(3, 1fr); gap: 5px;"> <div><input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> ACTION</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> RETURN</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> FILE</div> </div> <p>Remarks:</p> <p><i>3 - 5. Have a paper shelved about them. Will put in Index. We are about to engage them in major search project in cooperation with Agency units which will include Hart. Will discuss with them.</i></p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; font-weight: normal;"> SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED </div>			

SECRET

30 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRADEN

1. Professor Richard V. Burke of Wayne University is chairman of a small team of scholars engaged in a study of the European satellites.
2. The findings of this team are being given as the content of a course on the mid-European area. They are also, I believe, being broadcast.
3. The time of Professor Burke and his group is being purchased by the Mid-European Study Center which is, as you may know, under Mr. Stetson Holmes.
4. As yet Burke has no definite plan for the publication of his findings. Manifestly, the kind of book which would emerge from his research would have to receive some sort of subsidy. As you know, books of this sort, if they are considered important enough, are published as loss leaders by university presses. Also, as you doubtless know, university presses are in pretty straitened circumstances these days. If the Wayne University Press -- the normal place for the publication of Burke's book -- were to consider publishing the book, it might be able to publish it only with outside assistance. The figure would run probably between \$1500 and \$2000.*
5. In my opinion Burke is one of the most competent, if not the most competent man in the United States in this general field of investigation. Anything he turns out will be about as good as it comes. Although I have not seen any of this most recent work, my hunch is that it will be enormously valuable to the policy-maker and us estimators when the time comes for some deep thinking and critical decisions about the European satellites.
6. I thought you might be interested in the above, and with a little poking around yourself might feel inclined to give the venture whatever kind of boost seems appropriate.

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

* P.S. The proven way to get the best work out of a scholar is to have him know that it will be published & in normal course of events submitted to the critical judgment of his peers.

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Security Information

DDP 7643

1 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Current activities and behavior of Grigore Gafencu.

REFERENCE: Paris 0615 (IN 37959) dated 28 November 1953

1. The reference telegram from Paris contains a recommendation that NCFE do what it can to prevail upon Gafencu to come back to the United States and engage himself in certain activities which may be of some use and value to NCFE. The following information was obtained yesterday from Mr. Tyler who is familiar with the background of the reference message.

2. Mr. Tyler stated that Mr. John Hughes has become somewhat concerned about the activities and behavior of Gafencu in Europe, and more especially in and around Paris, and although he does not believe that a major issue needs to be made of this matter, he is firmly of the opinion that Gafencu is not doing anything useful for the NCFE in Europe and that the net effect of his activities is somewhat to the disadvantage of the interests of the United States. Gafencu is believed to be maintaining a rather close association with Guy de la Tournelle (sp?) and his wife, who are described as "very sour apples and bitter opponents of EDC." Gafencu is also reported to have been involving himself with certain businessmen in France in a series of questionable oil promotion schemes. He is also reported to have been engaged in organizing a kind of information center in emigre circles and to be selling this information to Agence France Presse. Moreover, Gafencu has been selling himself and "throwing his weight around" on the basis of representations and strong intimations that he is a close and intimate friend of Mr. Allen Dulles. His utterances in this regard are regarded by Mr. Hughes as highly indiscreet, the more so since he appears to be living and entertaining on a scale sufficiently lavish to suggest that he is being provided with substantial funds -- well above the allowance granted to him by NCFE.

3. Mr. Hughes, as well as the Paris Station, fully appreciates that NCFE is not in a position to force the return of Gafencu to the United States. At the same time, he believes that NCFE should do

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all that it can to get him out of Paris and he recommends that a strong invitation be extended by NCPE to Gafencu to return to the United States, and that this invitation be coupled with a statement to the effect that in view of budgetary considerations and the very marginal value of Gafencu's activities in Europe, it will not be possible for NCPE to continue his stipend unless he returns to the United States and engages himself in activities more useful to the program of NCPE.

78W

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Original: C/IO ✓
cc: DCI
C/WE
C/SE

P. S. Since dictating this memorandum, I have received a report from a well-informed Rumanian source to the effect that Gafencu has returned to the United States within the past few days for the purpose of remaining here indefinitely. (The fact of Gafencu's return to the US has been positively established, and it is possible that within the next day or so confirmation will be obtained concerning his longer-range future intentions.) My Rumanian informant has told me that the real reason for Gafencu's return was an urgent request from Malaxa, who feels that he requires Gafencu's present in the United States to assist him (Malaxa) in government circles, etc. My Rumanian source is prejudiced against Malaxa, but has maintained contact with Gafencu notwithstanding this, and is convinced that Gafencu is still on Malaxa's pay roll and subject to Malaxa's demands for this reason.

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29 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: The League of Free Rumanians

1. Correct title: The League of Free Rumanians.
2. The League has no offices but Barbu Niculescu is using the late General Radescu's address at 47 East 61st Street, New York; telephone PLaza 9-5540.
3. Its officers and executive committee are attached under Tab A.
4. Barbu Niculescu is Secretary General.
5. The League now has no offices and insofar as we know has discontinued publication of its bulletin. It is generally rumored that the organization is supported by Malaxa and it is presumed by knowledgeable people that in particular Malaxa supports Niculescu and Mihail Farcasanu, the two most active League officers, as well as Malaxa's nephew George Palade, who is a doctor in scientific research with Rockefeller Institute in New York.
6. Attached is a letter from Panuch to yourself dated 2 November 1953, your memo to Chief, SE Division and his reply, which you requested, as Tab B.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments
Tabs A and B

CIC:TSB/eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/1
1 cc - CIC
1 cc - MI

SECRET

*Lang's file on this
has been in vef for
3 weeks. Do you
want to go ahead with
Rardwell?*

14 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Edward W. Barrett

1. I had a conversation with Ed Barrett on Friday, 11 December, who called to tell me about recent developments in respect to an Inter-European Radio Press Committee. He described the history of Hans Cohnsen's participation, with which you are familiar, and he went on to say that the two-fold objective at present is to get some sort of cooperation among European nations for broadcasting a frank discussion of foreign affairs in each other's countries, and secondly, to enlist the same sort of cooperation for a column which would appear in various countries, perhaps including this one, written by different people and discussing each week some aspect of foreign policy differences which might exist between and among countries.
2. The idea seems to me a pretty good one. Its principal asset is that it will allow the airing and discussion of issues among nations other than by diplomatic means.
3. Barrett pointed out that he is now putting Cohnsen definitely in a back seat, that he will soon come to us with a good responsible board of directors and officials. He said that he had enlisted Bob Lang's support and Bob had suggested to him that NCPB give the Institute a grant. Barrett said the Institute needs \$25,000 to keep it going while it finds suitable leadership. I said that I would discuss the above with you and I would look forward to hearing from Mr. Lang.

EDWARD W. BARRETT

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO:TVB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 cc - SCIO, C/IO/1

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - RI

14-00000

11 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

VIA: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMIN)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Lee Pennington

1. On Friday, 11 December, I had a conversation with Lee Pennington, formerly of the FBI and recently appointed director of the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion.

2. Pennington was most cordial. He showed me a letter which he had written to the members of the Americanism Commission of the Legion in which he dismissed charges against SPA based principally on an attack by Kurt Glaser. The arguments he used in his letter he had drawn from briefings by this agency. He thinks that this will be the end of the matter and that members of his Commission will no longer press for investigation of NCRA and SPA.

3. I took this opportunity to brief Pennington thoroughly on the World Veterans Federation which the Director had previously mentioned to him and about which he had had a little information, most of it false. He had been under the impression that we had something to do with it but that it was a left-wing outfit which we were investigating. At the end of our conversation he told me that he was thoroughly satisfied with the information I gave him and that he would take two steps in accordance with my request:

a. He would notify the Ford Foundation that the Legion looked upon the World Veterans Federation as a worldwide outfit and would certainly not criticize the foundation if it were to make a grant to the organization.

b. He said he would prevent any attacks on the organization coming from Legion members by being given serious consideration. He said that this could be taken care of by referring all such attacks to the Americanism Commission for study.

THOMAS M. GLASER
Chief

International Organizations Division

CIO:TSB/eh

Orig 2-1 - Addressee

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - C/IO/1

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - RI

SECRET

21 DEC 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION**SUBJECT:** RFE Summary Reports**REFERENCE:** Memorandum from C/IO, dated 17 November 1953,
Subject as above.

The appropriate SE Branches and Staffs have read the RFE Summary report for October 1953, which you forwarded to this Division as an attachment to referenced memorandum. We have found the report well prepared and useful, both for SE Headquarters and for our field personnel working on propaganda projects. We would therefore appreciate your sending this Division two copies of subsequent RFE monthly reports, one of which will be retained by SE, while the other will be sent to our Athens Station.

JON H. RICHARDSON
Chief, SE

Admuse: 2

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Security Information

4 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: "News from Behind the Iron Curtain" - Mail
Subscription for Mr. Arvo Tuominen

REFERENCE: a. OSSA-1638, 20 Nov 1953
b. Memorandum to WE/PP-1 from IO/Branch I, 8 Oct 53
c. Memorandum to IOB/TONIC from WE/PP-1, 28 Sept 53
d. Memorandum to IOB/TONIC from WE/PP-1, 6 June 53

1. A recent dispatch from the Stockholm Station (reference a) reports that Mr. Tuominen is not receiving Subject publication. In light of reference memorandum b, which states that he has been on the mailing list since June 1952, it is apparent that there has been some slip-up in the distribution channels of this publication. A check of address indicates that Mr. Tuominen's address is the same as given in reference d.

2. It is requested that appropriate measures be taken to insure that Mr. Tuominen will receive this publication in the future. Please inform WE/PP-1 of the action taken regarding this matter.

PAUL BIRDSALL
C/WE

*discussed orally (not written)
sent sterile version to
Whitney.*

Rivier End, c. Roberts Lane
W. Arlington, Virginia
4 December 1953

Dear D'Arcy:

This is in reference to your telephone call of this afternoon. I have just had a full report on the matter of the seven visitors.

I am afraid you have got yourself on the hook on this one and nothing can be done about it except to go through with the bargain you made. This bargain, the documents indicate, was to bring the seven Czechs over here and take the responsibility you assumed when you signed the seven declarations of support affidavits.

Now having gotten that bad news off my chest, I hasten to add that I do not think this is going to be burdensome to you. You are doing a real public service, as I shall explain in a moment, and all of us will do our level best to help you.

I realize that you did not think you were assuming the responsibility for seven people. It is clear, however, that everyone else thought you were, and I think it is simply too late to change it now. The Czech regime is attacking the United States for its handling of emigres; it is attacking the camps which you have seen; it is pointing up the general hopelessness of an emigre's lot and the dullness and dreariness which you have noted at first hand. This little trip of our seven friends has set all the refugee circles in Germany gossiping. It is exciting news. It is undoubtedly known behind the curtain. To call it off now would make a real difference -- not just in terms of the Crusade, but in terms of what refugees think about the United States and United States citizens.

The procedure from now on seems to lay itself out as follows: The seven refugees will arrive sometime during the month of December. This arrival date is important. WICOG has made every effort to expedite it so that they can come in December, and only overwhelming reasons ought to dictate a postponement. They will go to work and do whatever you, Clyde and Robb want them to do on behalf of the Crusade. After their work for the Crusade is over, all seven doubtless will wish to remain in the United States. We will all then jointly try to find jobs and places for them. The visas are good until next April, but if they can find jobs here it will probably be possible for us to secure special legislation for them to stay on indefinitely.

- 2 -

Now as to the questions you raise in your letter of November 24th. The National Committee for a Free Europe should certainly look after these people when they arrive and while they are here except insofar as they are directed by you to take up certain activities on behalf of the Crusade. The National Committee should also cooperate in trying to help you in your effort to find jobs for them when their tour is over, and I am sure the people there will do their best. I am sending a copy of this note to Whitney and I know that he will cooperate to the fullest.

As to your second question, I think the expenses of all seven ought to be paid for out of Crusade funds. They are over here on behalf of the Crusade and you are the one who asked them to come.

On the third question, as I indicated above, I think it would be a great blow to United States policies in this field if they were to turn around after their duties were over and limp back to a dusty refugee camp.

I think this is the way the whole thing ought to rest now and I do most earnestly urge you not to be too concerned about your personal responsibilities. We will all be lucky if we have to tackle no tougher problems.

Sincerely,

Mr. D'Arcy Brophy
American Heritage Foundation
345 E. 46th Street
New York 17, New York

cc: Mr. Whitney Shepardson

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee

1 cc - Mr. Shepardson

1 cc - IO/Brl

1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

11 10/1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Rumanian Emigre Organization

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, SE from Deputy Director (Plans),
dated 5 November 1953 - Subject: Rumanian National
Council

1. In agreement with Mr. William Durkee of International Organizations Division, I share your view, as stated in paragraph 3 of the referenced memorandum, that Mr. Anthony Panuch should discuss the problem of the organization of Rumanian refugees with the ECFE rather than with this Agency. We were informed by Mr. Durkee that Mr. Panuch is fully aware of the ECFE position that the refugees should resolve their own differences before presenting a solution for the consideration of the ECFE. Mr. Durkee also informed the Rumanian Branch on 13 November that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Whitney Shepardson who concurred in the view stated above.

2. With reference to Mr. Panuch's statement that the "League in its present state is a useful operational vehicle," name traces reveal that fourteen members are Iron Guardists, five are suspected communist agents and four admit that they are on Nicolae Malaxa's payroll. Because of this unsavory composition, it appears unlikely that the League as presently composed would be useful operationally.

JOHN H. RICHARDSON
Chief, SE

cc: C/PP
C/IO/PP
IC/PP (Mr. Durkee)
General Counsel

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Security Information

7267

5 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Southeastern European Division

SUBJECT: Rumanian National Council

1. The attention of the SE Division and Messrs. Braden and Burke is invited to the attached copy of a letter which I have just received from J. Anthony (Joe) Panuch concerning certain recent developments in the Rumanian empire situation and with particular reference to the "League." You will note that Mr. Panuch has indicated that if we are interested in the League and its possibilities, he would be glad to talk to us about it.
2. I believe that the addressees of this memorandum will recall the significance of Mr. Panuch and the role which he has played recently, including his visit to me of about two or three months ago. (I was annoyed by and considered as a minor breach of confidence the reference which was made to my name in the material which was published concerning a communication addressed to King Michael, although I did note that this contained no representation that I had taken a position one way or another concerning the League or the proposed formula for resolving differences between the two principal Rumanian empire factions.)
3. As regards the proposal of further conversations between Mr. Panuch and either myself or some other spokesman or representative of this Agency, I continue to be inclined to the view that these are matters which should be taken up by Mr. Panuch with Mr. Shepardon and not ourselves. If after consultation between the SE Division and ID Division it is agreed that this is the correct position, I should appreciate it if Mr. Braden or Mr. Burke could talk with Mr. Shepardon about this letter and obtain his views for my benefit. I would then be in a better position to reply to Mr. Panuch's letter -- presumably telling him that in line with my earlier advice to him, I still would recommend that he raise these matters with ECRK and not CIA. I could also add that I had been troubled by the appearance of my name in the published material referred

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- 2 -

to above and cite this as an example of why I would prefer to stay out of the matter directly.

h. A copy of this memorandum is furnished to Mr. Houston because of his knowledge of the background of the old Malaza allegations, and the difficulties which Malaza is capable of creating for the Agency in the future. It will be recalled that Malaza has charged that CIA has injected itself into the matter of his immigration status; that I have wrongfully involved myself in his affairs -- including some ridiculous charge that I kept him from getting a lucrative contract with the California Steel Company, etc., etc. -- none of which has any foundation in truth whatsoever.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)

Letter to Mr. Wisner from
Mr. Panuch dated 2 November 1953.

cc: C/PP
C/IO/PP
IO/PP (Mr. Darkee)
General Counsel

SECRET

Law Office of
J. ANTHONY FARUGH
60 East 42nd Street
New York 17, N.Y.

November 2, 1953

Hon. Frank Wisner
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Confidential

Dear Frank:

Re: Romanian National Council

This is to bring you up to date on the aftermath of our conference of June 17th with respect to the above. On my return to New York I took the following steps:

1. Personally submitted the settlement formula to Nica Georgescu for mediation with Visoianu and Cretzianu, and to Larry DeNeufville for the information of the NSCF. Nica, in my opinion unwisely, took the position that the formula was not negotiable.
2. Directed the League to transmit the formula to King Mihail for his information and action and, pending final acceptance or rejection to "lay off" visavis Cretzianu, Visoianu et al. This was done.
3. Summoned Malaxa and the officials of the League to
 - (a) inform them of the false charges made to the White House by Malaxa against you in 1951 and to demand their formal retraction; and
 - (b) insist that Malaxa immediately make good on his commitment to General Radescu that he set up an independent "no strings attached" budget for the League -- an undertaking, then six months in default. Malaxa agreed to comply with both demands and asked for time to the beginning of September when he hoped he would be released of the strain and mental anguish incident to his chronic immigration proceeding. Malaxa defaulted on both promises.
4. I issued an ultimatum to the leaders of the League to the effect that irrespective of my friendship with General Radescu, unless they disassociated themselves completely from Malaxa and any semblance of his influence -- direct or indirect -- I would resign as the League counsel. This severance of their relationship with Malaxa has been accomplished after a stormy showdown session between Farcasanu and Niculescu and Malaxa.

- 2 -

Mr. Frank Wiener

The League in its present state is in my opinion a useful operational vehicle in any Romanian situation in which the utilization of skilled and experienced personnel (notably Parcanaru and Niculescu) of conservative and non-Marxist political orientation is indicated. If you are at all interested in it as such, I should be glad to talk to you about it.

With best regards,

Faithfully,

/s/ Joe Farnoch

Honorary President
DR. PETER F. HLETKO
President
PHILIP A. HROBAK
P. O. Box 150
Middletown, Pa.

Vice-President
MICHAEL RINCHAK
333 Rehnsmaker Ave.
Monessen, Pa.

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Recording Secretary
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JOHN ROZBORIL
National President
Slovak Catholic
Cadet Union

The Slovak League of America

A Cultural and Civic Federation of Americans of Slovak Descent

Organized 1937 in Cleveland, Ohio

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

PHILIP A. HROBAK
P. O. Box 150
MIDDLETOWN, PA.

October 31, 1952

Mr. Kurt Glaser
1717 - 20th St., N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.


Dear Mr. Glaser:

I have read your article on Radio Free Europe - THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO "FREE EUROPE" - and I must say that it agrees with the facts as I know them. It is regrettable that such knowledge or information cannot get to the masses of the American public. I have visited the State Department and the National Committee for a Free Europe several times during the past two years to apprise them of the situation, but it seems they do not choose to do much about it. I had my information directly and indirectly from Slovak refugees in Germany and Austria....and London.

In December, 1951, the ASSOCIATION OF SLOVAKS IN GREAT BRITAIN, sent a "Memorandum" to the Nat'l Committee for a Free Europe in New York stating, in effect, the very things your article contains. The personnel of RFE in Munich was given in toto. At that time 51 program editors were employed by RFE - 29 Czechs and 2 Slovaks (renegades). Of the 29 Czechs employed - 27 were SOCIALISTS of one brand or another! The memo mentions who they were....and I still have that list. Should you want to use it, you are welcome to it.

I have long been convinced that it is not in the ~~interests~~ interests of America or other free countries to employ pseudo-~~experts~~ experts and left-wingers in the RFE, the Voice of America or in the governmental agencies. I simply would not trust them. Your article exposes the charlatans in RFE or used by the RFE and I certainly would recommend its publication. I, for one, certainly would!

Sincerely,


P. A. Hrobak

Statement.

I read with attention and interest the article "The Russia First boys in Radio 'Free Europe'", by Mr. Kurt Glaser.

Having no documentation on hand in order to verify all particular affirmations contained in this article, I can express my entire adhesion as to its general line. I lived in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1946 and I know the policy of the "National Front" Government in Prague at that time from my personal experience.

In order to understand the Marxist tendency of some present politicians grouped in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia", it is necessary to point out that the Czech National Socialist Party of Mr. Beneš, Mr. Zenkl, Mr. Ripka, Mr. Stran-sky, etc. formed, on June 25th, 1945, the "Front of Working People" with the pro-Communist Social Democratic Party of Mr. Fierlinger, Mr. Lauschman and Mr. Major and with the Communist Party of Mr. Gottwald. That "Front" constituted the closest ring of socialist solidarity and common action within the "National Front" Government composed of two more parties: the Czech Catholics and the Slovak Democrats. /See the article "Let us say the truth!", by Dr. Michal Zibrin, former Deputy of Slovak Democratic Party in Prague Parliament, published in "Jednota", on October 29th, 1952, Middletown, Pa. /This ring of the three Czech socialist parties is responsible for the evolution in the policy of Czechoslovakia until February 1946.

The Government of the "National Front", of which Mr. Zenkl was then Vice-Premier, Mr. Ripka Minister of Foreign

Courage; Mr. Secretary; Minister of Justice; Mr. Parnick Del. to
to 110, or named already in 1919 labor camps in Czechoslovakia.
In 1918, Mr. Courrier was President of the Slovak
National Council in Bratislava. I visited a great deal that was
being erected in North-Slovakia, Bratislava/Oravou. I met two of
my friends who were working there as political prisoners and
I managed to speak with them.

At about that time, Mr. Jan Parnick published in America
his book "Czechoslovakia"/International University Press, New York/.
On page 120 he says: "The so-called Bolshevik danger, a bogey for
many nations, was taken easily in Czechoslovakia, because the
latter was free of very vestige of feudalism and its democracy
was so all-embracing and successful, that there remained no class
whose dissatisfaction could lead to the acceptance of Communism
as a possible remedy for it."

Thus in the very time, when the "National Front" Govern-
ment was alluring Slovak and Czech patriots by mostly Communist
People's Courts and by imprisoning them in "Labor camps", Mr.
Parnick was playing in the USA the role White Washer of Communism.

For all these **Gentlemen** would like to change their tone.
Let the testimony of Czech Communists themselves are convincing
them of double dealing. Let the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia"
be infected even now by "fellow-travellers", it has been proved
by the "hearings before the Subcommittee to investigate the
administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal
Security laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 81st Congress, First and Second Session on Espionage

activities of personnel attached to Embassies and Consulates
under Soviet domination in the United States. July 9, 1951-
February 5 and 7, 1952. United States Government Printing Office,
Washington 1952. No. 97249.

On page 7 one can read the testimony of Mr. Joseph
Ignac Kolner, agent of F.B.I. Speaking of Mr. Edwin Munk, former
organizer of Czech Red Espionage network in USA, Mr. Kolner said:

"Mr. Munk told me that we had a very-well-organized
underground movement which was giving them a lot of headaches,
more than the National Council for Free Czechoslovakia, with
its political prestige and its chairman, Peter Zenkl.

"We are not afraid," he said, "of Zenkl and his organi-
zation because we have there our men who even hold higher po-
sitions and we can render them harmless whenever we wish."

The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia", against a strong
opposition of anti-Communist Czechs and Slovaks, has been
recognized by the National Committee for a Free Europe as
a representative body of Czech and Slovak refugees. In this
quality, it is a recruiting office for the personnel of the
Radio "Free Europe".

Washington D.C. November 1952

Joseph A. Mikul

former diplomat of the Czech-Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Prague /1939-1939/,
former Chargé d'Affaires of Slovakia in Madrid /1940-1944/,
former Counsellor of the "residency of the Slovak National Council
in Bratislava 1940-1946/.

Radio Europe 'Houses Reds'

Station Got Millions From Americans

By Dr. John B. Crane

Frankfurt, Germany.

"You would do well to make an investigation of Radio Free Europe," a prominent Washington lawmaker advised me a few weeks ago as we were having tea together near Heidelberg.

"I have just returned from Munich," he continued, "where I inspected both the facilities of the Voice of America and of Radio Free Europe. I was much impressed with the Voice of America set-up and find they are doing a very good job."

"But when I called at the plant of Radio Free Europe I got such a frosty reception I could hardly believe it. They tried to be polite but were obviously delighted when I left. I figured maybe they had heard of my vigorous anti-Communist campaign when I ran for re-election."

Makes Headlines

Within the past month at least three other visiting American officials have tipped me off that I ought to investigate Radio Free Europe. The climax was reached today when a Washington investigator suddenly appeared at my apartment for a chat and casually announced he was headed for Munich. When I inquired why, he replied:

"I want to inspect Radio Free Europe."

During the past week Radio Free Europe has twice made headlines in leading German periodicals. One important weekly paper, the Rheinischer Merkur, devoted an entire page to the problem of Radio Free Europe.

70 Millions from Americans

American readers will doubtless remember with what high hopes this radio broadcasting station was started two years ago under the sponsorship of outstanding private American citizens such as Gen. Lucius D. Clay, former American Military Governor in Germany.

The purpose of the new broadcasting station was to send programs behind the Iron Curtain to Poland, Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries to encourage them to hold out against their Communist Governments.

Millions of Americans welcomed this new weapon in the cold war against communism and contributed 70 million dollars for its support, according to the German press.

Anti-German Propaganda

The money was to be spent not only for building and equipping a broadcast station, but also for financing the escape of refugees from countries behind the Iron Curtain and giving them jobs at the new station in Munich.

Now come leading articles in the German press charging that Radio Free Europe is heavily infiltrated with Communists and that pro-Communist, anti-German propaganda is being fed to countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The well-known German weekly, Christ Un Welt, states that seven members of the Czech Department of Radio Free Europe have recently been arrested on suspicion of espionage, while one member, after working for several months, was found to be a Communist agent and fled over the border into Czechoslovakia with important personal records of Czech emigrants' families.

'Saw the Light'

The German paper names names and places. For example, it charges that the executive editor of the Czech Division of Radio Free Europe, Pavel Tigris, was editor of an illegal, Communist paper in 1932, known as Hallo Noviny.

It charges, further, that during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia Tigris co-operated closely with an important Communist leader, Fucik, who had become editor of the Communist paper Rude Pravo. Tigris was a contributor to the Communist Central Party organ when the war ended in 1945.

Shortly thereafter, however, he "saw the light" and fled to Germany as a refugee. Soon he was executive editor of the Munich radio station fighting communism.

Demand Shake-Up

The German paper further mentions by name five other prominent employees of Radio Free Europe who were, earlier, Communist Party members or who today have close relatives in important Communist Party posts in Czechoslovakia.

The Germans are demanding a drastic reorganization of Radio Free Europe. This seems to be on the point of being realized. It is reported that 25 employees of the organization have already resigned, and that Executive Editor Tigris (alias Paul Dittrich) has submitted his resignation.

It is to be hoped that the "housecleaning" now in progress will put an end to the many ugly rumors that have been floating around about Radio Free Europe for the last several months.

D-11 C

The document contains two columns of text, both appearing to be bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to the quality of the scan. It appears to be a formal letter or report, possibly dated "JAN 1960".

[The page contains two columns of extremely faint, illegible text, likely a scan of a document with poor contrast or a very low-quality reproduction. The text is too light to transcribe accurately.]

23 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Monseigneur John C. Kirk

1. You asked me by telephone for a report on subject, who is domestic prelate on leave from the Savannah-Atlanta diocese in Georgia.
2. Monseigneur Kirk was formerly secretary to Archbishop Gerald P. O'Hara, Bishop of the Savannah-Atlanta diocese, and also his secretary while Bishop O'Hara was Apostolic Nuncio to Rumania from 1946 until O'Hara's official expulsion in July of 1950. (NCFE has been reliably informed that Kirk remained behind in Rumania disguised as a Swiss tourist. He visited many of the imprisoned hierarchy but eventually escaped. This report is without objective verification.)
3. Because no single member of the Rumanian hierarchy escaped, Kirk was appointed as president of the Rumanian Catholic Mission for Europe. The headquarters of the Mission is now Passeggiata del Gianicolo 5, Rome. Monseigneur Kirk resides at Via Panama 110, Rome.
4. While in the United States in 1952 as personal delegate of Cardinal Tisserant to the convention of the association of Rumanian Catholics in America, Kirk visited the office of NCFE. Members of the staff met with him on five occasions and made the following estimate:

As a prelate on leave in a southern diocese, Kirk can be classified as a religious liberal interested in the betterment of various classes and, particularly the Negro. In Rumanian politics, he vigorously resisted the influence of the iron guard. Evidence of this is that in 1952 Kirk moved the headquarters of the Mission from Madrid, where it was located at Calle de Serrano 30, because of continuing attempts of the iron guardists to use him for political purposes.
5. A detailed account of the principal purposes and scope of the Rumanian Catholic Mission for Europe which Kirk heads is available

- 2 -

here. Highlights are:

- a. Roughly 150,000 people under his jurisdiction.
- b. Mission centers have been established in Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy, Argentina, Trieste, Spain and France.
- c. Kirk is assisted by thirty priests located in the above areas.
6. Kirk is now in the United States and intends to return early in November. He is visiting NCPE in New York next week. His former chief, Archbishop O'Hara is now Nuncio for Ireland with headquarters in Dublin.
7. Statements made by Monsseigneur Kirk in visits to NCPE together with extracts from correspondence are available if you should wish me to scan these and form an estimate of my own.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

IO/BRI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/BRI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT

SECRET

19 October 1953

Jamming of western broadcasts to Russia began sporadically in 1948 and was well established by early 1949, first against VOA then also against BBC. Satellite language program jamming began first from Russian stations and then from jamming stations located in the Satellites proper. When RFE transmissions began in 1950, the organization and equipment were available for the new target.

At the present time, the organization for jamming - including the transmitters, the monitoring stations to watch for the undesired programs, and the control network to direct the jammers to the target - is apparently integrated throughout the Bloc, with a certain amount of cooperation between countries. That is, programs directed to one Satellite country may be jammed not only from within the country but from Russia and from neighboring Satellites.

At least some of the jammers are closely controlled so that efforts to evade them by changes in frequency or schedules are frequently met by a prompt reaction on the part of the jammer -- within a minute or less.

The extent of integration of the total Bloc jamming system makes it very difficult to separate the effort contributed within the Satellites. However, it is presently estimated that about 900 transmitters are in the jamming effort within the Bloc, and these appear to be fairly well distributed throughout the total of the frequencies that are being used at any given time. Therefore, at times when RFE is broadcasting to the Satellite countries with a considerable number of frequencies, there are undoubtedly hundreds of transmitters jamming these frequencies.

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DRAFT

19 October 1953

The effectiveness of the jamming is difficult to assess quantitatively from the few available observation locations within the Orbit and from the fan mail received. However, in general, it is apparent that jamming is most effective in large cities: approaching 100%. In rural areas, the picture varies from time to time and from place to place, but it appears that a considerable proportion of the programs to the Satellites can be received. For example, the RFE monitor in Vienna reported that, at that location, the medium frequency Czech broadcast from Holzkirchen on 719 kc was practically 100% jammed while only about 50% of the shortwave Czech programs were not intelligible. The Embassy in Warsaw reported in May that while VOA programs were unintelligible, RFE programs were "often intelligible."

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SECURITY INFORMATION

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Salary Information on NCFE People

1. Subsequent to Mr. Durkee's memorandum to you of 1 September 1953, which we discussed this morning, I learned that Mr. Dulles discussed with Mr. Sheperdson the need for the information as to the salaries of NCFE people. Very likely this conversation was held pursuant to your own talk with the Director.

2. In any event, we have received precisely the information requested by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 6 October, and I have forwarded it to Win Scott.

3. I think your effort has been successful.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee

1 cc - IO/SrI

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 SUBJECT: Dr. Francis Kase
 REFERENCE: Letter from Dr. Karel Kase to Mrs. Dulles

1. Dr. Francis Kase has had the following relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency and National Committee for a Free Europe:

He has never been an agent of CIA, but has been used from time to time by CG/Contacts for translations etc., and is now being paid between \$150 and \$200 per month for subsistence by CG/C.

In December 1952, IO Division referred this man to the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe. Unfortunately, he did not fit into their research pattern, but they think he is an extremely capable man.

2. Unless the Director wishes to instruct NCPE to hire Dr. Kase, I suggest Mrs. Dulles send the attached reply.

Signed, THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
 Chief
 International Organizations Division

Attachment

Suggested reply
 to reference. *see chrono*

IO/BRI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
 2 cc - IO/BRI
 1 cc - CIO
 1 cc - RI

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14 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Vienna Conference with Ambassador Joseph Flack

1. On 2 September, representatives of RFE and VOA met with Ambassador Joseph Flack and solicited his comments on reported unrest in Poland, and the utility of RFE and VOA Polish broadcasts.

2. With reference to internal disturbances and partisan activities, Flack stated that there have been "absolutely none" in recent weeks, and added that earlier reports of unrest following the June uprisings in East Germany were proved to have been without foundation as a result of relatively unrestricted survey action then taken by numerous representatives of U. S., British and French diplomatic missions in Poland. He expressed his conviction that there is no significant underground organization in Poland which might be considered as an immediate asset by the West, and emphasized his belief that serious disturbances would not occur as long as the present Soviet control mechanism retains its power and the Soviet armies in Poland and East Germany go unchallenged. The bitter lessons of World War II, particularly the abortive Warsaw uprisings, and lack of confidence in the Polish emigration definitely discourage active resistance. The Poles increasingly tend to resent the action of the emigre leaders, regarding them essentially as symbols of failure, and, Flack feels, will undoubtedly develop new leaders from within the country when the time comes for action.

3. Flack carefully distinguished resistance as an immediate asset from resistance as a potential asset. He expressed the belief that the Catholic Church still offers the strongest and the best organized base of resistance in Poland as it is looked upon as the only symbol of continuity and solidarity with the past. To this he added his own appreciation for traditional Polish spirit of independence and Christian orientation, and emphasized his belief that Polish hatred of Russians and communism continues to mount. Unfortunately, similar sentiment persists with reference to Germany. Fear of German occupation or seizure of Polish territory continues to play a prominent part in Polish thought and is cleverly utilized by the Communist government in its propaganda effort.

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4. Flack expressed certain misgivings with reference to the character of RFE and VOA broadcasts, emphasizing his conviction that Western radio broadcasts should do nothing to compromise the position of the Catholic Church in Poland, always taking as guidance the attitude and statements of the Polish clerical leaders themselves. He strongly urged that all possible steps be taken to maintain the present volume of broadcasts into Poland as a means of preserving hope and belief in the inevitability of Soviet communism's collapse.

/s/

Sherman D. Larr
Executive Secretariat, DG/P

Attachment

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25 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT TO DCI

SUBJECT: Attached Letter from William H. Smyth

With reference to the second paragraph of the attached letter, the following information will answer the question:

Mr. Smyth's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Relations was reprinted by the National Committee for a Free Europe. It appeared in "Proglad", a monthly mimeographed newsheet, which is published in Serb, Croat and Slovene, and contains statements etc. made regarding Yugoslavia by prominent leaders, reprints from articles on Yugoslavia etc. It has a limited distribution (2-300) to Yugoslav emigres in this country, and its purpose is to keep the Yugoslav emigration in this country informed. It is indicated in the newsheet that the statements reprinted therein do not reflect the views or opinions of NCFE.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (Mr. Long)

1 cc - IO/BRI

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - RI

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET <small>(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)</small>			
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DD/P 5288 OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2			
3	CIO - 1028-K		
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	25 Sept
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

Remarks: The attached reply was received from Mr. Shepardson in response to my request for them to study prospects for broadcasts to the Baltics. Reference your letter of 30 July to G.D. Jackson.

SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL	RESTRICTED	UNCLASSIFIED
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September 14, 1953

917-1

Dear Mr. Hadwood:

A short time ago the question was asked of us whether NCFE would recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the Baltic states. The question was made the subject of several papers which were prepared for, and circulated to, and thereafter discussed at three meetings of the NCFE policy committee.

Following these discussions, the NCFE position is as follows:

Broadcasts of the RFE type (i.e. the type to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary), directed at the three Baltic countries, would be plainly advantageous to the United States in terms of NCFE's objectives. There are even stronger arguments for starting such broadcasts at once than there were for starting them two years ago. However, now, as during the 1951 discussions, the problem arises whether such broadcasts (Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) cannot -- without damage to diplomatic usage -- be handled by the Voice of America. The fact that Soviet occupation of the Baltic nations has never been recognized by the Government of the United States would appear to remove the restraints under which the Voice of America must operate where the local government has an American diplomatic mission accredited to it.

If the Voice of America can transmit Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, we would not want to compete with them and would consider it preferable that they should do the job with the whole prestige of the non-recognition policy of the United States Government behind them. If we knew for certain that the Voice was not going to handle the task (which would be a different one and in addition to what we believe to be their present transmissions in the Baltic languages) then we would add the Baltic nations to the list of unfinished business to which RFE must direct its attention whenever sufficient resources become available.

However, sufficient resources are far from being available at the present time, and, urgent as are the needs of the Baltic listening audience in the present period of fermentation of freedom throughout the Satellite area, our first task must necessarily be to hold the audiences we already have in the face of the electronic war that is being waged against our transmissions by enemy jamming. RFE's original budget for 1953-54 was based on an orderly program to maintain present gains in the three main targets (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary)

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Mr. Radwood
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and to develop our present scanty capabilities in Bulgaria, and the lesser targets of Romania, and Albania. The original budget cut of about \$1,500,000, now followed by a second cut of \$1,000,000, make it doubtful if RFE can even maintain full audience-reaching capabilities to all of its main target areas, let alone maintaining the scanty capabilities to the other targets mentioned above. Indeed, the RFE Board of Trustees will probably vote on September 15th (i) not to expand Bulgarian broadcasts, (ii) to shorten Romanian broadcasts, and (iii) to eliminate broadcasts to Albania.

To enter the Baltic area, as a real and not a token target, would (I am informed by RFE) cost additional sums of money several times greater than the cuts that have recently been made. Much as we would like to see this new area opened up in what is generally regarded as "RFE style", either by VOA or ourselves, I see no hope of RFE's being able to undertake the task until their budget allocations can not only reach, but substantially exceed, the amount needed to preserve existing programs (against enemy interference) at their existing audience-reaching level. And certainly if such budget additions were in sight, it would be necessary for us to consider, alongside the Baltic plan, the relative desirability of:

(a) Strengthening still further the signal to the three principal targets,

(b) Initiating the often discussed plan for installing transmitters in Turkey or Greece for reaching Romania and Bulgaria more effectively,

(c) Broadcasting to Albania as a more important target than the Baltic states.

Conclusion:

Unless it is regarded as of paramount national interest that RFE type broadcasts be made to the Baltic states; and

Unless it is clear that VOA is not in a position to provide such programs; and

Unless it is clear that such development by RFE is more important than;

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Mr. Hildwood
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(1) Additional signal strength to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary,

(11) Additional signal strength and programs to Bulgaria and Romania, preferably from a new transmitter installation, and

Unless an adequate sum of money for one or all of these operations is in sight, -

NORE does not recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the three Baltic states.

Sincerely yours,

Samuel Hildwood
Samuel Hildwood

14-00000

[Handwritten mark]

September 18, 1953

Memorandum for Messrs. Joseph B. Phillips
William Durkee
Thomas Braden ✓
George Morgan
Abbott Washburn

The attached memorandum is self-explanatory and was written to me by Mr. Jackson while he was away on vacation.

Could someone--perhaps Mr. Phillips--let us know when it has been decided how David will be handled?

Many thanks.

Marie McCrum
Marie McCrum
Secretary to C. D. Jackson

Attachments

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1953

Miss McCrum:

I have a feeling that no one on our side is prepared to keep a firm hand on the Jean Paul David trip.

David is himself a king-size free wheeler. Although he is unquestionably one of the French "doers," as opposed to "talkers," in this field, he is also quite a big-mouth and inclined to over-talk, over-promise and over-indulge in cloak-and-dagger stage setting. If he hasn't got a guard, armed to the teeth, with a beret and a half-burned cigarette glued to his underlip, lurking outside the dining-room, he can't enjoy his meal.

The plot is complicated by the fact that as far as the U. S. is concerned he has always been strictly covert. This time he arrives as strictly "overt" so no one on our side will really know how to behave since everyone will have to do and be the exact opposite of what they did and were during David's last trip.

I would suggest that you show the attached to Abbott Washburn, George Morgan, Tom Braden and/or Bill Durkee, and Joe Phillips (also this note) and suggest that they work out who should consider himself responsible. I personally hope Joe Phillips will be willing to take it on.

Incidentally, the American who handles David best is Helen Kirkpatrick. She might conceivably be drafted as chaperone for this trip.

C. D. J.

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The following is from a dispatch written by Mr. William Tyler, dated 22 June 1953.

1. After a recent conversation with Jean Paul David, at which time he outlined his activities and ideas in connection with the mission with which he is charged by Georges Bidault, I received a letter from him.
2. It will be seen from this letter that David is most anxious that the report which he will make on his survey should represent, without committing any one country, a synthesis of the views and the resources of the Western powers allied under NATO, in the broad field of propaganda and psychological warfare designed to build support for Western defense policy and to promote the achievement of the objectives of these policies.
3. It occurs to me that a difficulty which we have to face, and which we are probably unique in having to face, is due to the organizational structure within which we operate officially in the general field under discussion. In a country like Italy, for example, it is possible for David to have exchanges of views with high officials of the government and to feel reasonably sure that even though such views are not to be taken as a commitment, they do in fact represent the disposition of the government in question, or any government likely to succeed it, toward these problems. In our case, however, it seems to me that it will require careful preparation to determine with whom David should consult and to work out a constructive position which will influence his report and his recommendations in a direction which we approve.
4. It is particularly difficult for me to make specific recommendations, since developments in Washington in the last few months are difficult to keep up with from overseas. It would, therefore, be particularly helpful to have headquarters' views at this stage on the following points, assuming that David will go to the States in late September on the last leg of his survey:
 - a. With whom should he meet for basic discussions. (It occurs to me that a suitable body, if still in existence, would be the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.)
 - b. Within what limits at this time are we prepared to discuss the problem of concerted action for the psychological strength of the North Atlantic Community.
5. As headquarters is aware, C. D. Jackson knows David personally, and it would perhaps be useful to arrange for conversations with him and any group he might have in mind. It is true that the position of David with regard to this Agency is anomalous, since the survey on which he is engaged, far from relating to covert operations, is of the most official

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kind possible. As headquarters has pointed out, his interests in his present mission in reality pertain more to the State Department and NATO than to us, and it seems to me that we should not be in the direct line of fire except in the capacity of individual observers or participants in the conversations he will have. It would, therefore, seem to be all the more important that we arrive at a clear understanding among ourselves as to how David's trip to the States will be organized and what is to be the respective role of the component elements in the psychological effort with regard to his survey.

/S/ WILLIAM TYLER

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

ATTACHMENT #1

(TRANSLATION)

Translation of Letter from Jean-Paul David

June 19, 1953

My dear Bill,

You know that - probably toward the end of September - I am to leave for the United States on a mission entrusted to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Bidault is concerned - and justly so, about the problems connected with the objectives of my survey; and my desire is to produce a realistic report since I wish to avoid (you know my way of thinking) the traditional phraseology which generally takes the place of action.

To date, in Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway .. I have successively conferred with the Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, of the Interior, of Education. I have also sometimes met with the Chiefs of Staff, and specialists of information and of psychological warfare.

To all of them, I have said:

"Mr. Bidault has requested me to make this survey and you have before you the text of the French note which speaks for itself and seems to require no further comment. I want to ask you to state, in writing and without in any way committing your Government or your particular services, what solutions seem reasonable. I wish to gather all constructive ideas on this matter. Your ideas will be useful, perhaps, to other countries - even if you think them inapplicable in your own. Then, I shall make a synthesis of the reports so assembled - adding thereto the thoughts of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in this respect. And, at the (NATO) 'Conference of the 14' at the end of October, we shall have available a program on the basis of which constructive action can be taken."

There, in telegraphic style, is my argument. I should add that everywhere I found an excellent welcome, everyone accepted this method and promised me substantial reports.

But, in small or medium-size countries, I have encountered no major difficulties, I have no idea of the way of thinking of your compatriots on such matters. And this note is for no other reason than to ask you to express your thoughts, in view of the excellent advice you can give me.

-2-

I want to emphasize that, in my mind, the reports and suggestions gathered from all the specialists of all the ministries of any particular country will not commit any country in any way. I will name no one, compromise no one. I want to gather the sum of the ideas and resources of the Atlantic Community in this domain and add a few personal ideas which seem workable.

That is why, my dear Bill, I ask for your contribution as I would like to carefully prepare this trip across the Atlantic. Please forgive this long letter. Tell me what you think of all this.

s/ Jean Paul David

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4-6653

16 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Whitney Sheperdson Phone Call to You of Yesterday,
15 September, Concerning Forced Labor

1. The central facts in this business are as follows:

a. NCFE had a letter sent to the President of the United States signed by various individual exiles expressing their gratification to the United States Government for its "initiative in placing as an item for the agenda of the 8th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the matter of 'Evidence of Existence of Forced Labor',
...."

b. At this Division's direction the Department of State was asked to prepare an answer to this letter for the President's signature which NCFE could publicly exploit in cooperation with the United States Mission to the United Nations.

c. Late Friday afternoon this Division was informed by the Department that no answer could be forthcoming as the U.N. Delegation had decided not to push the forced labor matter at this time. NCFE was informed to this effect the same afternoon and again on Monday by this Division.

d. Because its letter was not being answered, NCFE erroneously assumed that the work it was doing on forced labor in cooperation with the U.N. Delegation was to be of no avail and in fact that it was the decided policy of the United States Government not to force this issue at this or any other time.

e. The net effect of this matter is as follows:

(1) The Department of State will draft an answer for the President's signature which will be transmitted to Secretary of State, Dulles for his personal approval after consultation with Ambassador Lodge. The approved answer will then be transmitted to President Eisenhower for his signature. Public exploitation

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- 2 -


SECURITY INFORMATION

of the letter by NCFE will be undertaken on the guidance of the United States mission of the United Nations. In the meantime, NCFE will continue to work with the United States Mission to the U.N. but the timing and use of the materials developed by NCFE is to be determined by the United States Delegation.


Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief,

International Organisations Division

SECRET



8 September 1953



MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning the tone and content of BBC broadcasting to the European satellites, and related matters.

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum of conversation prepared by Tracy Barnes, who sat in on a conversation which took place on 4 September in my office with Messrs Rob Scott and Adam Watson of the British Embassy. Tracy's memorandum covers the conversation quite fully, but I should like to point out certain impressions and conclusions of my own which I believe to be worthy of your consideration.

2. It was quite evident that Rob Scott, who, as you know, is the new Minister, and Watson had received some fairly strong prodding from Sir William Strang, and it was equally apparent that they were not particularly well prepared as they were somewhat embarrassed when called upon for specifications -- unable as they were to produce these. Three other features of the conversation which struck me rather forcibly were the following:

a. The fact that they placed primary emphasis on the absolute necessity at the present time of keeping the NS-UK copybook completely snitchless until such time as there shall (may?) have been a high-level four-power meeting, including the Soviets, and until such time as it shall have appeared clearly that the Soviet Government is not prepared to make concessions and otherwise adopt a conciliatory approach. This is a fairly evident British line which they have been paddling for some time and I do not doubt that you heard something of it while in London. If followed to the letter and permitted to order our conduct, the result would be that we would, ourselves, adopt a total "sweatness and light" program for an indefinite period of time.

b. The fact that the Embassy representatives said that they had no intention of speaking with the State Department about any of this aroused some slight suspicion on my part that they may have been deliberately bypassing

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the Department in the hope of getting a better deal directly with us. This is the more my impression, since if the British "sweetness and light" line is to be adopted and carried out in both letter and spirit -- then the State Department had better be got into line as well. Obviously the utterances of top State Department officials, both here and abroad, and State Department actions are much more important for the purposes of this particular British approach than are the actions and utterances of our unofficial gray and black media. I reported the substance of the conversation to General Cabell who authorized me to bring it to the attention of Doc Matthews, which I have done, and at the same time requested him to advise us if the Department hears anything about this from the British Embassy. 7

c. Finally, Adam Watson dragged in by the tail some questions about the so-called "Freedom Corps", and asked me whether I could confirm that there had been a substantial "heating up" of this old proposal within the past month or six weeks. I replied that if this idea -- which was a very old one indeed in US Government circles -- had reached any particular climax within the past month, I was not aware of it. I said that I had heard that the State Department was considering asking the Foreign Office what it thought about such a program. Mr. Watson then replied that the State Department had, in fact, submitted this question to the Foreign Office and that the Foreign Office had replied that it recommended most strongly against any broaching of this subject at least until after the German elections. I thanked Mr. Watson for bringing me up to date, and the point was not further pursued.

Frank G. Wisner

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)

Memo for Record dtd
3 September, sgd by
C/PP: Conv. betw. Messrs
Wisner, Scott, Watson and
Barnes.

cc: C/PP

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*detached 9/11 and
filed in RTTP's files*

14-00000

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5589

11 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Recent conversation with members of the FO staff of the British Embassy re RFE broadcasts, etc.

REFERENCES:

a. Memo dtd Sept 8 from DD/P to DCI; Subject: British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning tone and content of RFE broadcasting to the European satellites, and related matters.

b. Memo for Record dtd 8 September from C/PP: Subject: Conv. betw. Messrs Wisner, Scott, Watson and Barnes.

Don
1. I am returning to you the original of the Reference a. memorandum for the file. Mr. Wisner asked whether you had shown your copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden -- he thinks that both Mr. Braden and Mr. Durkee should see it.

2. Mr. Wisner asked me to tell you that his suspicions of Mr. Watson's sheepishness were rather fully confirmed by a subsequent conversation in which Mr. Watson admitted to Mr. Wisner quite frankly that neither he nor Mr. Rob Scott had had very much stomach for their mission that day. Mr. Watson rather doubted that we would hear any more about this.

BJW
BJW

Attached:

Ref. a. memorandum.

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25 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU Developments

The attached extracts from RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletin are evidence of the day to day coverage that RFE is giving to ICFTU decisions. In addition we are setting up an arrangement whereby RFE will have continuing liaison with a member of the special committee appointed by the ICFTU. Through this channel we hope to supply RFE with documentary material on workers' conditions in the satellites and to insure also that the line taken by RFE toward labor issues is not in conflict with the ICFTU position.

CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief
International Organizations Division

DCIO:CM/mf

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee via Jacobs
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - DCIO
1 cc - RI

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SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU

The following extracts of RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletins indicate the general guidance around which more complete coverages are prepared for broadcastings:

Daily Guidance 554, June 30, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph d:

Concerning forthcoming conference of ICFTU, attention is called to Christian Science Monitor of June 24, reprinted in today's Information Bulletin, and to Report on America #13. "American Labor's Wide Horizons" as published on June 26.

Daily Guidance 560, July 9, 1953, Page 4, Last two lines:

Remarks by George Meany, president of American Federation of Labor, before Stockholm meeting at International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; in addition to expressing the philosophy of free workers toward less developed areas, should have a special significance to our listeners at this stage of their struggle against Soviet colonialism. Meany declared that freedom to colonial peoples and inhabitants of protectorates was something democracies must take steps to insure as soon as possible. The Federation (ICFTU) should see to it that workers in such territories enjoyed trade-union organization liberty.

Daily Guidance 573, July 28, 1953, Page 3, Paragraph c:

As far as East Germany is concerned, most significant news is vote by International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to set up a fund "to support insurgent unions in East Germany and other satellite countries in their efforts to undermine communist control". George Meany, President of AF of L, predicted that substantial sums would be made available but "declined for obvious reasons" to say how they would be spent.

Meany's announcement would seem to be an event of major significance in which all target areas should be equally interested.

Latest reports on East German purge receive most of their meaning from fact that a faction presently losing out is said to be composed of communists who -- while not at all disloyal to the Kremlin -- are not Muscovites in the sense in which the victors are Muscovites. Chances are that all communist functionaries who did not spend the last war inside Russia are in danger of their jobs or, as the case may be, of their lives.

Human interest stories on recipients of food aid speak for themselves. However, emphasis might well be on fact that recipients are either primarily or exclusively unemployed workers -- and that communists deny the existence of unemployment.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Daily Guidance 590, August 20, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph f:

Note that ICFTU followed up on its promises reported here and created special fund for support of Soviet Zone workers.

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17 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Food Program for Eastern Europe

1. This proposed program supports a plan for limited food distribution to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

It is generally agreed that it is highly desirable honesty to attempt food distribution through regular open channels, before utilizing any unusual method such as balloons, even though it is highly ~~desirable~~ the offers to distribute food will be accepted. It is further felt that no food program of any kind should be commenced unless it is certain to culminate in actual deliveries.

2. Formal Offer: A group such as a Committee to Assist the Peoples of Eastern Europe would be formed, which would in turn make an offer of a definite amount of food to representatives of the satellite governments of Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, the Department of State would be requested to take up the food offer officially with representatives of the governments concerned. CIA will arrange for the composition and sponsorship of the proposed committee. The food offer of the committee, taking note of the official statements indicating that a food shortage exists in each of these countries, would propose the establishment of an international commission to supervise the distribution of food to the needy children of the areas involved. This food would come from U.S. surplus stocks and through contributions made by the sponsoring organizations.

3. Delivery of Balloons: In event of refusal by the satellite regimes of the food offer, the committee might turn to the American Heritage Foundation for help. The latter would be asked to utilize its primary project, the Crusade for Freedom, both in raising public funds and delivering food by balloons.

Crusade for Freedom (CCFE)

A. Capabilities:

1. The Crusade can deliver 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 lbs. of food by way of 200,000 to 400,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia,

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- 2 -

Hungary and Poland over a period of two to three weeks;

2. The Crusade can deliver 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 lbs. of food in 400,000 to 600,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland over a period of five to six weeks;

Capabilities (1) and (2) above, are possible within the time periods indicated only if U.S. military facilities and equipment for the necessary procurement and stand-by storage of the hydrogen gas for the balloons is available. (20,000,000 cubic feet of hydrogen gas will fill 200,000 balloons sufficient to lift 1,000,000 lbs.) If such storage facilities, etc. are not available, the time periods must be revised for (1) and (2) above to two months and three months respectively;

3. First balloon launching could commence within sixty days of project authorization;

4. Each food package, suspended to one balloon, would contain five lbs. of staples. (sugar, fat, flour, coffee, chocolate) Packages will be sealed and/or wrapped with polyethylene.

B. Costs:

1. Costs of operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland would be approximately \$1.15 per net pound of food delivered, or a total figure of \$1,166,000.00 for each 1,000,000 lbs. delivered.

2. Costs of operation into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Baltic areas would be greater, due to added technical factors, necessity of shipboard launchings, etc. The unit cost figure would be \$1.55 per net pound delivered.

C. Operational Considerations:

1. If delivery of food into satellite areas is considered feasibly, realistically sound, then entire operational effort must be centered at launching -- delivery of food in the shortest period of time. Counteraction to the impact of food deliveries will be immediate and sustained to include "tampering" with food packages, wholesale arrest, BW charges bolstered by staged photography.

2. Launching sites previously used by the Crusade for Freedom for balloon operations into Czechoslovakia were located along the Czech frontier between Cham and Hof. For launchings into Poland and Hungary, sites in Berlin and in and around Graz, Austria, respectively, would be the most operationally satisfactory.

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Concurrence of the proper Austrian, West German and British representatives as to use of launching sites in their jurisdiction areas must be secured well in advance through the appropriate channels.

3. There is no guarantee that the Adenauer Government will be favorably disposed towards this food delivery program, even if it wins the September 6 elections.

4. For an operation which envisions the launching of 200,000 balloons (1,000,000 lbs. of food) over as short a period as two to three weeks, a relatively large group of indigenous personnel must be hired, trained (four or five days) and supervised over a minimum five week period.

D. Psychological Considerations:

1. Most recent estimates indicate that the harvest in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland will be fair to average this year. Consequently, it would be a mistake to send food into these areas simply to alleviate a "desperate shortage" which might not in fact exist for workers in good standing. Rather, as a part of RFE's accompanying program exploitation, the population would be urged to conserve the packages as "iron rations" or "strike rations" against the day when they might not otherwise be able to afford absenteeism or loss of wages for other reasons.

2. One of the gravest risks to any food delivery program of this kind, especially should its launching interval be in excess of two weeks, is the systematic poisoning of food parcels by the communists. The only really effective way of safe guarding against this is by anticipating it and pre-conditioning the people, via RFE, against contaminated efforts.

3. During the time when, and at the places where the food is packaged, the Crusade should arrange for supervision of such packaging by acceptable humanitarian/religious international groups, such as the Quakers or the Red Cross, in order to neutralize EC charges and augment the bonafides of the committees and Crusade for Freedom.

4. The initial private and official offers of food to the satellite areas must be accompanied with certain conditions ensuring guarantees of delivery, in order to avoid communist acceptance of a bare-food offer as such, which would place us in the awkward position of having to subsequently request guarantees for proper distribution and delivery.

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Security

5. Type of HFE "running attack" during balloon operation is well illustrated by the following -- 'Czech workers would have to work 6.6 hours to earn enough money to buy one average pound of food parcels contents, whereas the American worker could earn the \$1.15 per net lb. delivered in 1.2 hours.'

D. Conclusions:

1. The operation is large and the resultant psychological gains and losses, depending on many variables, could be extensive. Needless to say, the operation should not be undertaken, even in part, as a 'gesture' or on a 'gamble'.

2. Balloons are not the most economical means of delivering food, in point of fact, the movement of items by balloon is at least twice as expensive as any regular means. However, to date, balloons are by far the most feasible way of diffusing a relatively large amount of food containers into an otherwise denied area.

3. Planning of the operation in all its phases should include the Director of HFE, in order to ensure a well coordinated political warfare program.

E. Recommendations:

It is requested that should authority be given to proceed on this balloon-borne food program, such authorization be contingent on the following recommendations:

1. That the commencement of the balloon launching be generally planned for the end of this year.

2. That no more than 400,000 balloons be released (2,000,000 lbs. of food) at a cost of approximately \$2,332,000.

3. That the balloon launching phase of the food delivery operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, not exceed ten full consecutive days from its date of commencement.

4. That \$50,000 be made available immediately for preparatory work.

5. That food deliveries into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and the Baltics not be considered until after the primary operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland has proved successful.

IO/BRI:MSD/ah
Orig - DD/P
2 cc - IO/BRI
1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

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10-3-2117

Executive Section
4-392-

22 July 1953

Spencer

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

I had a talk with Spencer Phenix about NCFE matters and the following points were discussed.

- (1) A Strategy Board to guide RFE. Spencer feels the need for some higher level political guidance than RFE is getting from their staff people and talked about getting together a board of people like George Kennan, etc. I told Spencer that I thought it unlikely that George would give very much time to this but might be willing to give them an occasional idea or suggestion.
- (2) Spencer asked me about the possibility of their finding some job for Sam Reber. I told him to wait on this until I had time to discuss it with FW.
- (3) Spencer seemed disturbed that the allocation of one million a month until our budget was passed would cramp their operations. I told him that if they had particular difficulties to let me know. He also asked what they should do about the proposed allocation of \$400,000 to help in the refugee situation. I told him I was not familiar with this particular issue.
- (4) He suggested that it would be well to have a meeting here with some of the members of the Board and the Executive Committee and suggested a date around the first week in August. I told him I would do it if I had not already left the country by that time.
- (5) Spencer is pleased with the better integration and coordination of activities between their shop and this office.

Allen W. Dulles
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

cc: DD/P

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SECURITY INFORMATION

JAN 1953

Executive Registry
3-6124

12 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


SUBJECT: Proposed U.S. Aid for East German Refugees

1. Last year you testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the U.S. "iron curtain escapees" care-resettlement program, and during the course of testimony I understand you stated that the program excluded aid to ethnic groups such as Germans in accordance with PSB recommendations.

2. Mr. George Warren (UNA/Refugees) of the State Department has proposed that \$300,000 be made available from his program for aid to selected East German refugee projects.

3. This proposal is being made as a gesture of aid to East Germans and has the support of HICOG, of James Reber, and of Representative Celler of New York, among other Congressmen. John Bross, CEZ, has no objection.

4. Frank Hand in my office is the liaison point; is following this closely, and will keep us thoroughly informed but I thought, in view of your testimony, you would want to know of the projected policy switch.



THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief

International Organizations Division

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22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations/Branch 1

SUBJECT: Coordination of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation

1. As both you and Mr. Slonick agreed in your informal conversation of yesterday, the present explosive situation in the satellite periphery and the Interia Psychological Strategy Board guidance on its exploitation necessitate closer cooperation between our respective facilities and branches. I want to thank you for offering to make it possible for us to gain further access to RFE libraries and open sources and for your offering us further technical assistance. I agree that it would be desirable to exchange a Branch officer so that we may have a better understanding of our respective assets and problems. SR/1 will provide one of your associates with a desk and complete access to our files at any time.

2. It may be well for us to discuss how we can best take advantage of further demonstrations and riots in the satellite areas. Should there be an uprising in Poland, for example, it may be desirable for RFE to place broadcasting time at the disposal of Radio Liberation so that the latter may address concentrated and repeated appeals to the Red Army not to fire on Polish workers and peasants, not to interfere in the Polish struggle for freedom, and to consider the Polish people as the allies of the Soviet people in their common struggle against Communism. It was this line that Radio Liberation followed during the East German uprisings. In the event of riots in Czechoslovakia where the Red Army is not present in force and where the satellite security forces may be unable to keep order, close cooperation will be even more desirable.

3. Consideration could be given to having RFE allot Radio Liberation regular time on its broadcasts to Poland and Bulgaria where there are large concentrations of Soviet troops so that Radio Liberation can further build up the idea of a free, Soviet anti-Communist moral and political authority and to express the solidarity of the Soviet peoples with the oppressed countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Radio Liberation could also allot regular time on its transmitters so that spokesmen of free Czechoslovakia and Poland could address the Soviet troops.

4. It will, of course, be necessary to discuss the divergent approaches of the two stations. Because of its sponsorship, its identity and its mission, Radio Liberation cannot treat the Soviet oppression of the Central and East European peoples in terms of nationalist domination and exploitation. Radio Liberation always distinguishes between the people on the one hand and the Party and Police on the other, and it is our policy to identify the Red Army with the people. ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

5. We will maintain close coordination on all matters relating to Radio Liberation broadcasts to the occupation troops and solicit your comments and suggestions on our broadcasts to the USSR proper and on all other matters.

ANDRE YEDIGAROFF
AC/LR/1

2 - Addressee
1 - C/IO

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

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JUL 22 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Branch One

SUBJECT: General Pavle Gruya Pavlovic (201 - 14578)

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE to IO, dated 16 July 1952. Subject as above

1. Although not initially responsible for recommending that the NCFE subsidize General Pavle Pavlovic, in referenced memorandum SE Division endorsed the continuation of payments by the NCFE to Subject on the basis of his ability to aid in research work being done for CIA at the Pentagon, as well as of his need as a meritorious exile. We have recently been advised by Miss Stern of your office that the NCFE wishes to discontinue this payment since Subject does not participate directly in the NCFE's activities. We have been further advised that if SE Division wishes General Pavlovic to receive a regular income from the NCFE, SE must provide the necessary funds.

2. It is believed that termination of the subsidy by the NCFE will result in real personal hardship to the General, who, at the age of seventy, has no other known source of income. SE Division, however, is not in a position to provide the necessary funds, since this would necessitate the initiation of what would essentially be a charity project, falling more properly within the purview of IO/Branch One. Neither can this Division justify continuation of payments on the basis of work performed for SE, since he has been working primarily for the Department of the Army during the past year. The arrangements for his work at the Pentagon are such, however, that CIA can place research requirements on General Pavlovic whenever desirable.

3. In reviewing the case this year, we have ascertained from the Department of the Army that Subject has worked diligently and contributed materially to the work of his office. He has been particularly commended for his adaptability and readiness to work, which have shown themselves in his efforts to learn English and typing.

4. It is the opinion

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4. It is the opinion of SE Division that the NCFM decision to terminate payments to General Pavlovic should be consistent with its policies vis-a-vis other Yugoslav emigres, many of whom receive regular stipends solely on the basis of "prestige". General Pavlovic's actual contribution to the efforts of the U.S. Government, if not of CIA or the NCFM directly, should be taken into consideration in addition to his very real need before halting payments to him. We would appreciate your informing us as to the final disposition of this case.

CHRISTIAN W. FIKER
Acting Chief, SE

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SECURITY INFORMATION

22 July 1953

7/23 F. G. W. saw
but decided
to take no
action.
Bgm

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Message from Whitney Shepardson

1. Whitney Shepardson cabled the following to his office with the request that they immediately give it to C. D. Jackson. This information and message was given to us today by Spencer Phenix.

"Report this morning Mrs. Hilde Benjamin new East German Justice Minister rescinded right to strike granted June 11 by predecessor.

Seems appropriate your boss Thursday press conference or perhaps more formally sum up recent Russian inspired communist actions behind curtain; in Czechoslovakia savings wiped out, future bleak, families, children bankrupt. In east Germany rescision of elementary right of labor to strike is again denied and will be ruthlessly crushed by force. Satellite states long deprived of their food and goods by most vicious practices of colonialism known for two centuries. This is no paradise for workers, this is hell. In the United States this capitalist society so often denounced by Soviet propaganda lines, the savings of the workers are protected in law and in fact, and the right to strike is protected in law and in fact also. After almost two hundred years of its national existence there can not be found in the US one trace of the colonial practices which characterize Soviet rule over its satellite colonies.

Condon asks that if such theme is used "give our boys a break so they can prepare and push home with background and variation."

Signed: THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

C

SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Meeting with PSB

1. I understand that two of the matters that have come up before your PSB luncheon are:

a. C. D. Jackson's proposal to send food to East Germany via balloon.

b. C. D. Jackson's proposal for a monument memorial to be put up near the Brandenburg Gate. I would like to comment on these two proposals for what use it may be to you.

2. It seems to me food shipment via balloon is a meaningless gesture. It will not do any positive good because it can't get enough food into East Germany to make any difference. Thus a negative result is fostered; it looks and appears to be psychological warfare of a rather obvious kind. The food offers by the U. S. Government and those by the ICFTU were, as the London Times pointed out last Monday, psychological victories, but the Russians are now moving food into Germany in far greater quantities than we can do via balloon. In addition, there are obvious dangers from the standpoint of a BW play-back as Mr. Wisner suggested. It would be much easier and much more effective for the Russians to use the BW threat on balloon shipments than on any quantities of food that the Government or the ICFTU are actually able to get behind the Iron Curtain. In sum, balloons are a trick and food doesn't lend itself to tricks.

3. I think the monument idea is a respectable one but not on the level that the PSB people seem to want to play it. They have in mind a world campaign to be conducted in all countries, particularly in this one and in South America with a distinguished body of citizens to lead the campaign here. I do not think the memorial idea is big enough for that (the best memorial so far erected was Berlin's own decision to change the name of the Unterlinden to Strasse June 17). I think the memorial idea ought to be left to the Germans. We can delicately suggest it and see that it is followed up with any support necessary in this country through already existing organizations such as NCFE or the Crusade for Freedom if this is necessary. These should play a minor role.

CIO:TWS/eh

Orig - Addresser

1 cc - CIO

1 cc - W.

SECRET

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Chief

International Organizations Division

14-00000

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

July 21, 1953

" PROSPERO "

Preliminary Report

The purpose of this operation was to exploit the present critical circumstances in the Communist empire and in Czechoslovakia in particular by bringing to the people of that country tangible evidence of the West's interest in and support for their resistance against the regime. There follows a brief summary of the salient facts about the operation:

1. 5402 rubber balloons and 1212 plastic balloons were launched from the primary site in Ellenfeld, a small German village on the Czechoslovak frontier and from the secondary site in Schönbach, some 40 miles to the south.
2. These carried a net total (after wastage) of approximately 10,000,000 messages of three types:
 - a. A likeness of the new 1-crown note issued by the Czechoslovak regime following the recent currency reform. The text of this note is attached as Appendix A.
 - b. A replica of the new 25-heller coin, bearing the words "All our people for freedom - All the free world for our people". The words "Free Europe" and the emblem of the Freedom Bell appeared in the center of the coin.
 - c. A leaflet bearing photographs of the East Berlin demonstrations on one side and a text describing recent events in East Germany and the Soviet Union (including the Beria purge) on the other. Copies of this message are attached as Appendix B.
3. The target areas for the operation were:
 - (a) the industrial and mining districts of northwest Bohemia; (b) the capitol of Prague and the heavily populated area north of Prague; (c) the city and environs of Pilsen; (d) the Ostrava region. (See display map.)

- 2.
4. The operation took place between 0800 Monday, July 13, 1953 and 2400, Friday, July 17. Balloons were in the air 15 working days after conception of the idea, and 3 working days after final approval. The third (Berlin-Berlin) message was sent to the printer on Saturday; on Monday 2,000,000 copies were at the site and on the way to their destination.
 5. A crew of 22 workmen was transported from Munich to the site. Including guards, drivers, and supervisory personnel, the total payroll for the operation was approximately 40. The crew was billeted in a small hotel in the nearby village of Tirschenreuth and was fed in a Gasthof at the site. Working time totalled approximately 3000 man hours. The operation entailed the use of 7058 cubic meters of hydrogen, representing 17900 lbs. of lift. The weight of the hydrogen cylinders was 102 tons.
 6. The rubber balloons carried an average payload of 2 lbs. and burst at an altitude of from 30,000 to 40,000 ft. They rose in the air at a rate of 100 to 500 ft. per minute. The total elapsed time from the leaflets' point of departure to arrival on the ground ranged from 2 to 5 hours. The plastic balloons carried a payload of from 1/10th to 4/10ths of a pound, travelled at an altitude of 30,000 ft., and penetrated from 60 to 300 miles, depending on the target desired. The plastic balloons do not burst but descend to the ground at a point determined by the amount of gas and weight of payload. At the peak of the operation well over one million messages were in the air at the same time.
 7. The wind speed averaged 40 miles per hour and ranged from 230° (blowing into Northern Bohemia) to 270° (blowing towards Prague and Ostrava). Pilsen was bracketed from both launching sites. Meteorological data was obtained from the Neubiberg air base and confirmed by radar facilities located 7 kilometers from the site. These facilities and the personnel necessary to man them were obtained from the U. S. Army. They were able to track target balloons deep into the country. The radar units were also able to detect Czechoslovak air activity and to establish that the other side was also using radar, presumably in connection with the balloons.
 8. Border activity was intensified during the period of operations. During 5 trips to the frontier (which was within sight of the launching location), it was observed that officers had replaced enlisted men on border patrols. On several occasions attempts were made by ground forces to shoot down

3.

the balloons, although only two hits were observed by border police.

On Wednesday, July 15, at 1400 hours, two Migs flew along the frontier over the site and were clearly observed by the working party. Subsequently that afternoon the theodolite was moved to a hilltop point (from which, incidentally, the hills around Pilsen could be discerned) and Migs attempting to shoot down balloons were viewed by members of the party as well as by the German border patrol. As many as 7 Migs were observed at one time. Three hits were witnessed, two of which appeared to cause the balloons to explode and one of which simply caused the balloon to disappear. On Wednesday night additional planes were reported by border police. Searchlights were also seen. On Thursday, 5 Messerschmitts 109Fs replaced the Migs and succeeded in destroying three balloons. No air action was observed on Friday, although at 1000 hours a jet vapor trail materialized directly above the launching site and was headed into Czechoslovakia. However, it was impossible to see the aircraft or to say for certain that this was a border violation.

9. On the last night of operations (Thursday) a procession of 80 plastic balloons with candle-lanterns was launched. Since the night was perfectly clear, the "torchlight parade" could be easily observed - the lights looked like stars marching quietly across the sky. No aircraft were seen.
10. The total cost of both the original operation and the supplementary Berlin-Beria message is estimated at less than \$25,000, or a unit cost of 1/5th of a cent per message sent. A substantial portion of this represents transportation and other non-recurrent expenses which would not be involved in a sustained operation.
11. Note must be made of the invaluable technical and operational assistance provided by the two General Mills personnel, Mr. C. B. Moore and Mr. Fletcher Bartholomew, who were present on the trip. It should also be mentioned that the help of RFE personnel was exceedingly valuable.
12. As of the date of this report, regime reaction includes:
 - a. Rude Pravo editorial read over Radio Prague on July 18 (Appendix C), plus supplementary articles in Svobodno Slovo and Mlada Fronta.

- b. Commentaries over Radio Moscow in Russian and Polish and over Radio Warsaw.
 - c. Articles in the Romanian and Hungarian press.
 - d. An article in Moscow Pravda.
13. In accordance with previous plans, Western publicity about the operation was discouraged.

Conclusions

The limited purpose of "Prospero" has, so far as we know, been substantially achieved. However, it must be acknowledged that an operation of this kind is both strongly provocative and (because of its tangible form) susceptible to dangers not risked by radio. There is the further complication that it is launched from German soil and could conceivably cause injury to RFE's position in Germany. All of these factors must be carefully weighed in considering any future action of this sort.

Further, this must be classified as a "crash action", as evidenced by the time elapsed between conception and termination. Crash actions are good once or twice, but are not to be recommended as a habit either from the point of view of cost or, even more important, in cognizance of the utter necessity of careful and thorough preparation of the best possible message.

On the positive side, this can be stated:

1. The message was timely, worth saying, and closely integrated with RFE policy.
2. Enemy reaction was immediate and sorely hurt.
3. Internal conditions and the world Communist situation suggest that the action was taken at an apt moment.

- 5.
4. Technically, with radar help it was proved that balloons could be launched carrying relatively heavy payloads on an assembly line basis with a high degree of target accuracy. This was not previously known.
 5. Aside from the impact of the messages, the very fact that the West was interested enough to go to the trouble and expense of penetrating the Iron Curtain by a means which the regime is powerless to prevent - by MiG or bullets - cannot be lost upon the captive peoples.

S. S. Walker, Jr.

MESSAGE ON LEAFLET

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS! HEAR THE MESSAGE WHICH COMES TO YOU TODAY FROM THE FREE WORLD!

THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER!

THE PEOPLES OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES ARE GROWING STRONGER!

The Soviet Union is getting weaker. The struggle for Stalin's heritage shakes the entire Soviet empire and fear creeps through the Kremlin. Who will fall with Beria and who will fall after Beria? How many millions will fall victims to the new purge which is now going to begin - the biggest purge which the Soviet Union has ever known?

How many victims will fall in the Soviet Union and how many in the occupied countries? Who will fall with Beria in Prague and who will be dragged down by his fall in Bratislava? Who will be the new Slansky and who the new Clementis? And when the purge spreads and broadens, down from the Politbureau to the lands and districts, to the offices and the factories - how many functionaries will safely survive?

Only those will survive who detach themselves from the sinking Communist boat in time. Only those who join the people and help the people's struggle against the oppressors.

The Soviets have trapped themselves in a blind alley. If the Moscow boot weighs even heavier on the necks of the oppressed people and if Moscow's demands upon the frightened puppet governments become more pressing, the resistance of the people will only grow: for the people will not return into submission. If the Communist regimes, in order to appease the wrath of the people, try to bribe their subjects by promising concessions - as in Hungary and in Eastern Germany - they will get nowhere: for the people will no longer be deceived by party concessions.

The people are growing stronger. The first flames of revolt have flared out in Czechoslovakia and in Eastern Germany. From Pilsen, from Moravia, Ostrava, from Oslavany, from Berlin, Dresden and Magdeburg the echo of this revolt has roared throughout the world and deeply shaken the entire Soviet realm: the people showed their strength.

The Communist regimes recognized the menace and became afraid. They started apologising. They started self-criticising. They started giving promises. In Germany the anti-labor decrees had to be revoked. In Czechoslovakia the frightened government was forced to desist from applying the penal laws concerning absenteeism. In Moscow, under the influence of the news of the peoples' revolt in Czechoslovakia and Germany, the internal struggle became sharper. Beria and his all-powerful police fell as victims. Your resistance has helped

to alter the course of history: new forces made their appearance on the battlefield, the people won their first major victory in their fight with the regime.

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS!

The more your oppressors are shaken by uncertainty, the greater is the certainty of your victory. The regime is afraid of you, it knows that power is fundamentally on your side. This is the time when people's unity, common agreement, and unity of purpose are capable of winning concessions. Your battlefield of labor is in the factories and in the fields. On this battlefield of labor you have the advantage of numbers. On this battlefield you cannot be vanquished. You will not be content with bribes, you will ask more and more from the exploiters. We do not presume to give you orders nor to give you advice. You and your new leaders who are being born in the struggle know best how and where to strike. But we want you to know that you are not alone: Among the masses of people behind the Iron Curtain the fire of revolt is smoldering and its sparks are flying from country to country. Everywhere in the free world your friends are with you. Their help will grow as your determination grows.

FREE EUROPE!

14-00000

MESSAGE ON BANKNOTE

On one side:

Czechoslovaks, know this:

The regime is weaker than you have dared to think!
Power lies with the people and the people stand opposed.
With unity and courage, organize your strength: Down
with the collective! Insist on workers' rights! Today
demand concessions; tomorrow - freedom!

On other side:

Men call this the hunger crown - gift of the Soviet
Union. It is the symbol of regime desperation, of
five-year failure: It is a challenge to fight, to meet
weakness with strength, to resist as you know best.

The other captive peoples are uniting and will join you
in your struggle.

The free world is with you!

All power to the people!