

# Sergio Armella

**Contact Information** 1450 Garden St Apt S710  
Hoboken, NJ 07030  
United States

Mobile: +1-224-717-9667  
E-mail: [sergioarmella@gmail.com](mailto:sergioarmella@gmail.com)  
Citizenship: Mexico, Spain

<b>Education</b>	Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University	2020
	Fields: International Finance, Macroeconomics, Finance	
	Dissertation: Three Essays in Sovereign Risk	
	Committee: Guido Lorenzoni (Chair), Martin Eichenbaum, Luigi Bocola	
	M.A., Economics, Northwestern University	2015
	B.A., Economics with Highest Honors, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)	2010

<b>Professional Experience</b>	NERA Economic Consulting, New York City <i>Consultant, Securities and Finance Practice</i>	Sept. 2020 - Present
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- Provided support for expert testimony including the analysis and estimation of future collateral losses, default likelihood, and loss severity using econometric models

Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, Mexico <i>Economic advisor to the Deputy Minister of Finance</i>	Dec. 2012 - June 2014
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- Contributed to macroeconomic analysis and applied economics research for the Deputy Minister of Finance
- Led the effort to prepare policy notes for Mexico's participation in top level global forums with the G20, IMF, Financial Stability Board, and the World Bank at the Minister and Deputy Minister of Finance level
- Participated in multiple drafting sessions for the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting Communiqué
- Managed a team of three junior analysts and helped them develop their skills in financial modeling and writing economic reports
- Played an important part in setting up CIEN, a quasi-sovereign financial structure to secure funds (1 billion USD) to invest in public education infrastructure without increasing the government's public debt

Evercore Partners, Mexico  
*Financial Analyst, Public Finance and Infrastructure*

- Advised State and Municipal governments in Mexico on local public finance
- Developed a carbon emission tax for a State Government boosting its environmental policy goals while underpinning its fiscal sustainability
- Led financial analysis for debt restructure operations of over 2 billion USD by estimating future cashflows, analyzing credit contracts, and forecasting interest payments on adjustable rate contracts
- Organized roadshows with more than 15 national and international banks, receiving offers 2.5x the sought amount and preparing the quantitative aspect of the pitch
- Organized auctions to purchase financial derivatives to hedge against variations in the interest rate (call options for a strike level of the Mexican interbank rate)
- Saved an estimated 10 million USD for a client after finding inconsistencies in the mechanism that determined the interest rate on a credit line

Research Papers      "Sovereign Risk and International Reserve Management"

Emerging market economies hold substantial amounts of international reserves. An open question is how a government should optimally manage these reserves when facing a debt crisis. The main contribution of this paper is to show that the answer depends on the nature

of the crisis. I build a model of sovereign debt and default in which multiple equilibria are possible. In the model, government borrowing costs can increase for two reasons: a productivity shock that leads to a transitory contraction in output, or a shock to lenders' beliefs that increases the possibility of a rollover crisis in the next period. The optimal reserve management policy for the government is to run down reserves in response to the first type of shock, and to accumulate reserves in response to the second. This is because reserves both help the government smooth spending when borrowing costs are high *and* reduce the effect that lenders' beliefs have on the possibility of a rollover crisis. I fit the model to match Argentine data and find that lenders' beliefs about the possibility of a rollover crisis are important for understanding the behavior of international reserves during the 2018 crisis.

#### **"Fiscal Multipliers and Sovereign Risk"**

Data shows that fiscal policy is mostly pro-cyclical in emerging market economies and counter-cyclical in advanced economies. I portray sovereign risk as the explanation. My model results from the combination of a simple model of a small open economy with nominal rigidities with the canonical quantitative sovereign default model. Importantly, I incorporate the passthrough of sovereign risk to the private sector. In equilibrium, the quantitative model features an inverse relation between spreads and the size of the fiscal multiplier. Hence, the cyclicity of fiscal policy is optimally state dependent. In particular, countries that experience a sharp increase in sovereign spreads after a shock, optimally prefer to follow a pro-cyclical fiscal policy as borrowing conditions deteriorate and the fiscal multiplier diminishes in size. In contrast, governments that continue to face good borrowing terms after a shock, are able to expand government spending, finance it with more debt, and have small movements in sovereign spreads. This creates little to no distortion on the private sector and has a larger impact on output.

#### **"Know Your Debtor: Political Uncertainty and Sovereign Spreads"** with Giacomo Magistretti

Sovereign debt spreads are very responsive to political uncertainty. We rationalize this empirical observation in a model where creditors learn the hidden propensity to honor debt obligations from government actions over time. We assume alternation in power of two types of government facing different costs of default on debt. Market participants do not know which type they are facing in each period. They form beliefs about it, which are updated according to observed fiscal policy decisions and political transition probabilities. We derive the conditions for the existence of pooling and separating equilibria on default and borrowing choices. As lenders beliefs about facing a government with low default costs strengthen, sovereign spreads increase, causing a contraction in public borrowing and spending. A version of our model calibrated to the Italian economy shows that the asymmetric information amplifies the increase in the level and the volatility of spreads stemming from political turnover, with negative implications for welfare.

#### **"Bankruptcy Costs and the Implications of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939: An Illustration from Sovereign Collective Action Clauses"**

Out of court restructuring is limited by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. If a firm wants to modify any core concept of a security it requires unanimity agreement of all bond holders. This represents a cost for firms in workout. Recent developments in sovereign debt practice involved the adoption of collective action clause (CACs) in debt contracts. I study price differentials for sovereign bonds that include CACs and those that do not include them. By studying sovereign bonds, I estimate the implications of the unanimity requirement that the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 imposes on issuing countries. There appears to be no significant effect of first generation CACs on bond yields. The inclusion of second generation Super-CACs, seems to increase yields. These illustrates that reducing the costs of bankruptcy is possible. However, tilting the balance in favor of borrowers too much could in fact translate into higher borrowing costs.

<b>Seminar Presentations</b>	Northwestern University, Rutgers University, Florida State University, Central Bank of Mexico, NERA Economic Consulting, Charles River Associates, Compass Lexecon, AQR Capital Management	
<b>Fellowships &amp; Awards</b>	Distinguished Teaching Assistant Award	2017
	XIX Ex-ITAM Prize in Research, First Place in Economics	2014
	Northwestern Graduate Fellowship	2015-2020
	Fellow of the National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT), Mexico	2014-2019
<b>Languages</b>	Spanish (native), English (fluent)	
<b>Programming Languages</b>	Fortran, OpenMP, Matlab, Stata, Python, SAS (basic)	