#### 1. Into

### 2. Symmetric crypto

Symmetric crypto relies on the fact, that two sides know the same key, which they obtain by another secure channel. The same key used for encryption and decryption.

Issues:

- 1. Key distribution problem
- 2. Number of keys on N users is n(n-1)/2
- 3. No protection against cheating between Alice and Bob

## 3. Asymmetric encryption.

Public key cryptography - is a method of encrypting, which allows individuals to securely communicate without sharing the secret key.

Trapdoor one way function - function that can be easily computed in one way, and hard in the inverse without special(secret) information(trapdoor). In this case forward -> encrypt. Inverse -> decrypt.

Private key - is key to decrypt message. Public key - is key to encrypt message. Or vice versa

For signatures private key enables to sign and public to verify this sign validity.

Arithmetic functions, that considered as a one way(not proofed)

- 1. Multiplication and factorization
- 2.  $x^y \mod n = z \Longrightarrow \text{ find } y$
- 3.  $x^y \mod n = z \Rightarrow \text{ find } x$
- 4.  $x^2 \mod n$ . n not prime,  $jacobi(z/n)=1 \Longrightarrow find x$
- 5.  $g^ab \mod p => find a$

Also use cases:

- 1. Key exchange
- 2. Identification

3. Signature to cannot deny having sent/received a message

# **Prime number** an integer P which has exactly two positive divisors(1 and P).

4. Prime numbers

5. Alternative problems

## 6. Group

Group is set of elements, that are related to each other according to certain well-defined rules.  $Z_p^*$  - is a group with nonzero integers between 1 and p-1 modulo some prime nomber p.

6.1. Axioms

Operation for example is a multiplication.

- 1. Closure  $a, b \in G, a * b = c \rightarrow c \in G$
- 2. Associativity a \* (b \* c) = (a \* b) \* c3. Identity existence a \* 1 = a
- 4. Inverse existence a \* b = 1
- A group is commutative if a \* b = b \* a A group is cyclic if there is generator g

 $g \in G, \forall x \in G, \exists n : g^n = x$ 

### 6.2. How to choose or check that a is a generator? **Theorem** $g \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ is a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ if and only if $g^{\frac{p-1}{q}} \neg \equiv 1 \mod p$ for all primes q such that $q \mid (p-1)$

#### 7. Diffie-hellman Protocol:

## РЕЗУЛЬТАТ: Користувачі А і В отримують однаковий таємний ключ

Протокол Діффі-Геллмана.

К. Користувач А ініціалізує процес. Дії А.

0.1. Вибрати велике просте число p і елемент a великого порядку в

- групі  $Z_p^*$ . 0.2. Повідомити B значення a і  $p, A \to B : (a, p)$ -відкриті ключи.
  - 1. Вибрати випадковим чином число  $x_1$ ,  $0 < x_1 < p 1$ . 2. Обчислити  $y_1 = a^{x_1} mod p$ .
  - 3.Передати *B* значення  $y_1 = a^{x_1} mod p, A \to B : y_1$ . Дії В

4. Вибрати випадковим чином число  $x_2$ ,  $0 < x_2 < p - 1$ . 5. Обчислити  $y_2 = a^{x_2} \mod p$ .

6. Передати до A значення  $y_2, B \to A : y_2$ . 7. Обчислити  $K = y_1^{x_2} mod p$ 

Дії А. 8. Обчислити  $K = y_2^{x_1} mod p$ 

число, яке обчислює користувач В (крок 7), співпадають. Дійсно  $K = y_1^{x_2} mod \ p = a^{x_1 x_2} mod \ p = y_2^{x_1} mod \ p.$ 

Зловмисник, який має доступ до відкритого каналу, бачить тільки  $y_1$  та

Неважко помітити що число K, яке обчислює користувач A (крок 8), і

лискретного логарифму або Ліффі-Геллмана. Зауважимо. що еквівалентність

 $y_2$ . Для того, щоб знайти K йому треба вміти розв'язувати важку проблему

# Public key can encrypt.

8. Rsa

Private key can decrypt. 1. Choose 2 prime int p,q

Target: send information from A to B securely.

2. Count n = p\*q3. Count Euler function  $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$ 

5. Solve  $ex = 1 \mod \varphi(n)$ , find x = dX represents a number in  $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ , binary value of X must be less than n.(also n and x are coprime, can just check

4. Count  $e : \gcd(e, \varphi(n)) = 1$ 

that  $\neg x|e$ Public key is a pair of (n, e)

Y is a ciphertext.  $Y = (x^e \mod n)$ Decryption: the private key is d.

 $y^d \bmod n = x$ 

 $x^{ed-1} \mod n = 1 \mod n$ 

 $x^{ed} \bmod n = x \bmod n$ 

 $x^{k\varphi(n)+1} \bmod n = 1x \bmod n$ 

 $k_{\mathrm{nub}} = (p, \alpha, B)$ 

Alice chooses ephemeral key  $K_E == \alpha^a \mod p$  Alice computes the "shared key" (private)  $K = B^a \mod p$ 

First, choose p and q, count n=p\*q, count  $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$ 

 $ed - 1 = k\varphi(n)$ 

happen-with-rsa

e, d

It's possible only when:

Second, choose 
$$e$$
 coprime to  $\varphi(n)$ . Solve equation  $ed = 1 \mod \varphi(n)$ .  $d = e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n)$ 

8.1. Rsa also vulnerable to man in the middle attack Example: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/189468/why-can-a-man-in-the-middle-attack-not-

#### 9. Elgamal encryption scheme 1. Perform DH

x, y, n, d are large numbers(1024 bits or more)

2. Use Key as a mask for the message modulo p 9.1. Elgamal protocol

# Done only once. Bob makes $p, \alpha, b$ . Compute $B = \alpha^b \mod p$

1. Set up phase

Bob publishes keys.

2. The encryption phase Executed every time

 $y - xK \mod p$ And sends  $K_E$  and y to Bob

$$X = YK^{-1} \bmod p$$

### 3. The decryption phase Executed every time

# 10. Hash functions 11. Lampart algorithm