

Organized Crime, Local Politicians, and State Capacity

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Abstract

This paper examines how the assassination of mayors affects local government capacity, leveraging the quasi-random variation in the success of assassination attempts against Mexican mayors. Compared to municipalities with failed attempts, tax collection falls by 28% and public expenditures shift from essential services to construction investments in municipalities with successful assassinations. There is suggestive evidence that disruptions to local government personnel contribute to these outcomes. Productive municipal workers leave, and retaining them would require an 11% wage increase. More personnel are reassigned from public service delivery to security duties. Non-political violence, economic activities, demographics, electoral environment, and the temporary rise in organized crime do not fully explain these outcomes. The results highlight how the loss of decision-makers in violent environments undermines local state capacity.

Keywords: State capacity, local government, mayors, organized crime, assassinations

JEL Codes: D74, H11, H71, O17

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1 Introduction

Political violence, particularly the assassination of key officials by organized criminal groups, poses a serious threat to the development of local state capacity (Daniele 2019). Competent individuals may be deterred from political careers and electoral processes may be corrupted by illegitimate actors (Acemoglu et al. 2013). It also removes decision-makers responsible for essential bureaucratic functions of local government, such as managing public finances and recruiting personnel (Finan et al. 2017). These functions, which account for 24% of public expenditures and 35% of public employment globally, are increasingly pivotal to local development (OECD 2016; Bardhan 2002). The political effects of assassinations are well-documented at the national level (Jones and Olken 2009). However, the impact of successful assassinations on the bureaucratic and administrative capacity of local governments has received less attention.

This paper examines whether successful assassinations of leaders affect local governments' capacity to raise revenue, deliver public services, and retain bureaucratic personnel. I construct an original municipality-level dataset that combines information on local public finances, personnel, organized criminal group presence, and political assassinations in Mexico. I identify the causal effect of losing mayors by comparing local government performance in municipalities with successful assassinations to those where assassination attempts failed. The findings show that successful assassinations weaken local fiscal and bureaucratic capacity. Tax revenues and public service provision decline, and the difficulty of retaining productive personnel increases. Thus, assassinations disrupt not only electoral outcomes but also the core bureaucratic functions of local government.

I study how successful assassinations of local leaders affect state capacity focusing on mayors in Mexico. Mayors oversee personnel recruitment, provision of basic services, infrastructure, and tax collection (Dell 2015; Larreguy et al. 2020). They face persistent political violence, with ACLED reporting that Mexico has the highest number of attacks against local politicians globally.¹ At least 85 out of more than 15,000 mayors have been assassinated since 2000, making them at least 9 times more likely to be murdered than the general population (Calderón et al. (2019) and Figure 1).² These attacks are typically carried out by organized criminal groups seeking to influence local politics and

1. The statistics are obtained from the following online report: <https://acleddata.com/2023/06/22/special-issue-violence-against-local-officials/> (Accessed on October 28th, 2023)

2. There are 2,471 municipalities in Mexico, including 16 boroughs in Mexico City. Each municipality has had 6-7 different mayors since 2000.

extract resources from businesses, fiscal revenues, and construction projects.(Grillo 2011; Trejo and Ley 2021).³ Evidence demonstrates that the assassination attempts are driven by criminal group presence and competition, rather than general violence (Rios 2012).

I isolate the effect of losing a mayor to a successful assassination by comparing municipalities with successful and failed assassination attempts. To do so, I construct a dataset combining information on assassination attempts, organized criminal group presence, municipal public finances, and personnel. Assassination attempts and their outcomes are obtained through text-scraping online newspaper articles. I estimate the treatment effects using various event-study specifications, comparing changes in the outcomes across municipalities where mayors were killed and those where mayors survived uninjured. By restricting the sample to locations with at least one assassination attempt, I mitigate the selection bias stemming from differences between attacked and non-attacked areas (Brodeur 2018; Jones and Olken 2009). The regression design addresses confounders such as political violence by making comparisons conditional on the occurrence of assassination attempts. I control for demographics and crime statistics, though excluding these covariates does not affect the results. Municipality and year fixed effects are included to address imbalances in unobservable characteristics. Thus, the treatment effects are identified by comparing changes in local state capacity among municipalities with successful and failed assassination attempts.

The first set of results studies the effects of successful assassinations on the capacity of local governments to raise revenues and deliver public services. Municipalities where mayors are assassinated experience a sustained decline in revenue collection. Total tax revenues decrease by approximately 28% over the 6 years following assassinations. Tax revenue per capita falls at a similar rate. Intergovernmental grants that partially depend on local tax revenues also fall by approximately 10%, while revenues from non-tax sources remain unaffected. These estimates are robust to different choices of event-study estimators. Overall, affected municipalities lose their ability to collect taxes and obtain resources for their operations.

Furthermore, public expenditures shift away from essential services to investment in construction. The share of public investment expenditure on construction projects rises by 5 percentage points, or 20% increase in volume. This comes at the expense of funding for core local govern-

3. For news sources on organized criminal groups exploiting local governments for revenues and construction projects, see <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/05/11/mexicos-gangs-are-becoming-criminal-conglomerates> and <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/opinion/sunday/why-cartels-are-killing-mexicos-mayors.html> (accessed on September 5th, 2023)

ment functions, poverty reduction, and economic development. Spending on basic operations and allowances to municipal institutions providing essential services declines by 1.5 and 1 percentage points, respectively, corresponding to 45% and 40% reductions in volumes. These findings indicate that the capacity to provide public services deteriorates due to crowding out of funds for primary services towards construction by illegitimate entities, consistent with documented evidence reported in Grillo (2011), Liu and Mikesell (2014), and Mauro (1998).^{4,5}

Then, I examine changes in government personnel to explore potential mechanisms behind these outcomes. First, I develop a framework showing that assassinations reduce the supply of workers and raise retention costs, particularly for those with better outside options. This constrains the development of local fiscal capacity. I test this empirically by examining whether younger workers with higher private sector earnings potential are more likely to leave and more costly to retain. The share of these workers decreases by 11 percentage points in the affected municipalities. Applying the wage elasticity of labor supply analysis from Dal Bó et al. (2013), I find that retaining them would require an 11% increase in wages. There is also suggestive evidence that worker assignments shift from public service provision to security functions. Therefore, the loss of mayors undermines the capacity of local governments through difficulty in retaining young workers and shifting task allocations over time (Akhtari et al. 2022).

In the next part of the paper, I test whether alternative mechanisms drive the results. Specifically, I assess whether non-political violence, economic activities, demographics, and electoral environment confound the effects. An upsurge in violence may independently discourage economic activities and induce outmigration, thereby affecting tax revenues, the composition of the government workforce, and the demand for public services - regardless of assassinations. Furthermore, successful assassinations may reduce electoral competitiveness and voter interest which may lead to changes in the quality of mayors, separate from bureaucratic capability. Thus, assessing the changes in these factors after successful assassinations is important for ruling out possible alternate channels. I find no statistically significant changes in crime rates, nightlight intensities, individual-level economic activities, population composition, outmigration, electoral competitiveness, and voter participation. Thus, these alternative channels are unlikely to drive the findings.

Next, I check whether differences in the presence of organized criminal groups between treated

4. Liu and Mikesell (2014) and Mauro (1998) finds that corrupt politicians distort the allocation of government resources towards sectors with high rent-seeking potential, including construction, over social welfare.

5. In my dataset, the funds are aggregated at the municipal level without specifying the recipient of government funds.

and control municipalities account for the results. Treated municipalities experience a temporary increase in the presence of organized criminal groups, but this effect fades in the long run. The entry of new organized criminal groups rises only in the year of a successful assassination. These results suggest that organized criminal groups exploit the leadership vacuum in the short run but do not fully explain the persistent decay in local state capacity.

Last, I test whether the results are driven by the continued absence of mayors following assassination attempts. I do so by incorporating cases in which mayors were absent for other reasons, such as receiving treatment for injuries after failed attempts or dying from non-violent causes. If the mayoral absence is a pivotal driver, then the estimated treatment effects should weaken when such cases are included in the control group. I confirm this by re-estimating the main regression equation and the triple-difference specifications.

Overall, the results show that successful assassinations of mayors undermine the local state capacity beyond political consequences. The capacity to collect taxes and allocate public resources declines, and there is suggestive evidence that higher retention costs and shifts in personnel task allocations contribute to these outcomes. These effects are not driven by changes in non-political violence, economic activity, demographics, or electoral environment. These results highlight how the loss of local politicians to organized criminal violence weakens the effectiveness of local public organizations. More broadly, the results demonstrate that successful political violence can erode non-political dimensions of state capacity such as bureaucratic effectiveness and personnel retention. Finally, the study highlights the institutional vulnerabilities faced by decentralized governments in violent contexts.

The findings in this research contribute to three strands of literature. First, it speaks to the literature on the formation of the capacity of local governments. Origins of state capacity at the national level have been widely studied across many disciplines (Acemoglu 2005; Besley and Persson 2009, 2010; Finan et al. 2017; Tilly 1985). Recent works analyze the effectiveness of subnational public institutions (Dal Bó et al. 2013; Fenizia 2022; Marx et al. 2024). A growing literature examines how exogenous shocks and monitoring mechanisms shape the capabilities of local politicians (Daniele and Dipoppa 2017; Daniele 2019; De Feo and De Luca 2017; Larreguy et al. 2020; Vannutelli 2022). However, most of these works focus on electoral and political outcomes, with less attention to the bureaucratic capacity of local governments. I address this gap by using novel municipality-level data on public finances, personnel, and political violence to examine how violent disruptions to local lead-

ership weaken tax collection, public good provision, and the structure of the municipal workforce.

Second, this paper adds to the literature on the developmental costs of political violence. The economic consequences of violence are well-documented (Brodeur 2018; Dell 2015; Pinotti 2015; Sviatschi 2022; Velásquez 2020). A burgeoning body of research exploits political violence at the national or regional level to study cases where formal authorities are being contested by non-state actors (Alesina et al. 2019; Acemoglu et al. 2013; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Blattman et al. 2024; Dal Bó and Di Tella 2003; Dal Bó et al. 2006; Sánchez de la Sierra 2020). However, political violence that takes place at the most local levels of administration, where institutions remain most vulnerable, receives less attention. I advance this literature by focusing on direct attacks against local politicians and distinguishing political violence from broader crime trends using detailed data on criminal group presence. In doing so, I highlight that the consequences of political violence extend beyond electoral dimensions by degrading core bureaucratic functions.

Last, this paper contributes to research on how decision-making personnel shape organizational performance. Existing studies exploit unexpected transitions in national leadership (Blakeslee 2018; Iqbal and Zorn 2008; Jones and Olken 2005, 2009; Rommel and Schaudt 2020). Similar approaches have been applied to investigate the role of decision-makers on firm performance (Becker and Hvide 2022; Bennedsen et al. 2020; Fahlenbrach et al. 2017; Jaravel et al. 2018). These studies typically examine aggregate outcomes such as macroeconomic growth, firm profits, and institutional policy choices. Recent works focus more on the performance of bureaucratic personnel in local institutions using leadership turnovers and field experiments (Akhtari et al. 2022; Bazzi et al. 2025; Best et al. 2023). However, most of these studies examine contexts without violence directed at political figures. I expand this literature by leveraging detailed data at the local government level and the sudden involuntary loss of local leaders due to political violence. I provide novel evidence on how overt violence targeting decision-makers affects local state capacity in fragile environments, underscoring how core administrative functions are impaired.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the role of the municipal government and the political violence in Mexico. Section 3 describes the data and descriptive statistics. I provide explanations on the empirical strategy in Section 4. Section 5 reports key findings on the effects of losing leaders to successful assassinations on local fiscal capacity. In Section 6, I analyze whether local governments lose their capacity to retain productive personnel after successful assassinations. I establish the channel explaining the outcomes in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.

2 Background: Municipal governments and political violence in Mexico

Municipal governments in Mexico offer a compelling context to examine how the loss of leaders to successful assassinations affects the local state capacity. Mayors have authority over tax collection, public goods provision, and personnel decisions. Since the mid-2000s, they have become increasingly vulnerable to assassinations at the hands of organized criminal groups trying to capture local resources vital to their operations. Data show that mayors in municipalities with a high presence of organized crime are more likely to be targeted and killed, regardless of broader non-political violence. This section provides an overview of municipal governments and organized crime in Mexico.

2.1 The authority and characteristics of municipal governments

Mayors serve as heads of municipal governments for a limited term. There are 2,471 municipalities in 32 states, including the 16 boroughs in Mexico City. Each mayor serves a 3-year term and has been eligible for reelection since 2018.⁶ Mayors are elected with the vice mayor (*alcalde suplente*), one or two attorney generals (*sindicos*), and several councilors (*regidores*) as running mates.

When a mayor is unable to finish the term due to reasons including assassinations, a replacement is appointed to serve the remainder of the term. This individual is typically the vice mayor and is not selected through a make-up election (Esparza and Mancera 2018). The next formal mayor is chosen in the following regular election cycle. The replacement is often tasked with filling an unexpected governance vacuum, sometimes without adequate institutional support (Rios 2012; Trejo and Ley 2021). The other elected members of the municipal government retain their positions, according to Article 115 of the Constitution of Mexico.

Municipalities in Mexico finance their operations through local property taxes and intergovernmental transfers. Municipal governments gained fiscal autonomy in the middle of the 1990s, allowing them to collect property taxes independently (Careaga and Weingast 2003; Larreguy et al. 2020).⁷ However, grants from the central government still account for a significant share of the municipal government revenue (Careaga and Weingast 2003). These consist of earmarked (*aportaciones*) and non-earmarked (*participaciones*) transfers (INEGI 2016). The latter is partly determined by the taxes

6. Before 2018, mayors could not seek reelection (Larreguy et al. 2020). This ban was lifted as a result of the electoral reform in 2014 but only came into practice in 2018 due to the timing of election cycles (Enríquez 2022).

7. Property taxes are overseen by municipal governments, also clarified in Article 115 of Mexican Constitution. Other forms of taxation, such as income taxes, are levied by the federal or state government.

collected at the municipal level and takes up about one-third of the municipal revenues (Timmons and Broid 2013; INEGI 2016).⁸ Further details are in Appendix A.1.

Municipalities spend heavily on personnel payments, public investments, provision of public services, and transfers to internal institutions responsible for health and education (INEGI 2016). These expenditures typically cover water supply, waste management, infrastructure projects, and local health and education initiatives (Larreguy et al. 2020). These are mostly financed by local taxes and central government grants (Chong et al. 2015). As a result, reductions in such revenue stream can constrain the delivery of public services, which I verify in Section 5 (Careaga and Weingast 2003).

The personnel of the municipal government play a crucial role in financing and executing these operations. The heads of key municipal institutions are designated by mayors (Dell 2015; Grillo 2011). Mayors also have the final say in hiring and retention of bureaucrats, who comprise 21% of public sector jobs in Mexico and manage public service delivery, security, finances, and economic development (Dal Bó et al. 2013; INEGI 2022). The absence of mayors following assassinations can disrupt the recruitment and retention of workers, possibly undermining local government capacity. I examine this mechanism empirically in Section 6.

2.2 Organized criminals and the attacks on local officials

Organized criminal groups in Mexico were not always in conflict with local politicians. Until the 1990s, there was less violence against local politicians because criminal groups benefited more from cooperating with corrupt officials than from targeting them (Lessing 2015; Grillo 2011). Organized criminal groups engaged in inter-cartel wars to win control over key trade routes, such as the regions bordering the United States (Dell 2015; Trejo and Ley 2021). They bribed corrupt local government officials for cooperation in securing these routes and gaining an advantage over rival groups (Grillo 2011).

This dynamic has been shifting in the mid-2000s, when the federal government launched the "War on Drugs" and intensified efforts to curb drug trafficking and to dismantle major criminal organizations (Grillo 2011).⁹ The federal crackdown led to high-profile arrests but also unintentionally

8. The non-earmarked portion of the funds from the higher levels of government is a function of the municipal tax collection, economic growth, and previous *participaciones* (Timmons and Broid 2013). Part of the rationale for incorporating tax collection into the intergovernmental transfers is to incentivize the subnational governments to internalize local economic prosperity and to allow them to retain a higher share of revenues raised from growth (Weingast 2009). Further details, including the sample formula for these funds, will be included in the Appendix A.1.

9. The "War on Drugs", declared by President Felipe Calderón, involved the deployment of the federal military through-

resulted in fragmentation of large cartels into smaller ones (Magaloni et al. 2020). With narrower trafficking opportunities amidst heightening tensions, the fragmented groups sought alternative revenue sources and began targeting local officials who oversee access to valuable local resources (Trejo and Ley 2019).

As a result, an increasing number of local politicians are attacked by organized criminal groups, as seen in Figure 1. Organized criminal groups turned to alternative revenue sources such as ransoms, extortions, local fiscal funds, and construction projects since drug trafficking became difficult to sustain (Grillo 2011). Organized criminal groups often threaten mayors to access property tax registry and knowledge on construction projects, attacking those who are not cooperative (Lessing 2015; Trejo and Ley 2019). In other cases, criminals attack mayors to influence the electoral process to facilitate access to this information (Enríquez 2022; Magaloni et al. 2020).

This qualitative evidence corresponds with the descriptive results from the data. Mayors are the most vulnerable at the beginning and the end of their terms, coinciding with the election cycle (Appendix Figure B1). As attacks around elections facilitate involvement by illegitimate groups, this evidence aligns with the political motives of organized criminal groups seeking local resources (Enríquez 2022). In addition, mayors in locations with multiple criminal groups are retaliated for siding with rival groups or not cooperating at all (Lessing 2015). I explore this in the next section.

2.3 Which municipalities are more vulnerable?

This section studies whether the assassinations of mayors are more closely linked to criminal group presence rather than non-political violence. The effects of assassinations may simply reflect broad insecurity rather than targeted political violence if these events occur more in municipalities with high non-political crime rates. To attribute the effects of successful assassinations to political violence by organized criminal groups, the incidence of assassinations should correlate with criminal group presence but not with non-political violence.

I construct a municipality-by-year panel of criminal group presence using Coscia and Rios (2012), Osorio and Beltran (2020), and ACLED, which capture the presence of major criminal groups and unidentified organizations.¹⁰ Then, I use the following descriptive regression.

out Mexico's most contested regions. These strategies involved targeting the 'kingpins' of major criminal organizations (Magaloni et al. 2020). Despite some success, such as taking down the Beltrán-Leyva organization, others such as La Familia expanded their influence by retaliating against local politicians (Trejo and Ley 2019, 2021)

10. Coscia and Rios (2012) captures the presence of major criminal groups - such as but not limited to La Familia Michoacana, Los Zetas, and the Gulf Cartel.

$$y_{mt} = \alpha + \beta_{OCG} OCG_{mt} + \beta_{hom} Homicide_{mt} + \phi X_{mt} + \gamma_m + \delta_t + \epsilon_{mt} \quad (1)$$

y_{mt} is the dummy variable for assassinations. OCG_{mt} refers to the measures of organized criminal presence. I construct measures using both identified and unidentified criminal groups. Unidentified cases, where the affiliation of the criminal group is unknown, provide an upper bound of criminal group presence, while using only identified groups gives a lower bound. $Homicide_{mt}$ is the homicide rate proxying for non-political violence from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). X_{mt} is the set of municipal-level demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. I include municipality (γ_m) and year fixed effects (δ_t). The error is clustered at the municipal level. Further explanations of the data are found in Section 3.

The results in Table 1 show that assassinations are correlated with the presence of criminal groups but not with non-political violence.¹¹ When considering all of Mexico, the presence of an additional criminal group is associated with a 0.2%-0.3% increase in the likelihood of assassinations. A new criminal group is associated with a 0.3 - 0.4 percentage point increase in assassinations. These relationships remain constant when the sample is narrowed to municipalities with assassination attempts. In contrast, homicide rates show no significant relationship with assassinations, even when included alone. The results also align with previous evidence that mayors are attacked for siding with rival groups or not cooperating (Lessing 2015).

3 Data

I construct a novel municipality-level panel dataset combining information on assassination attempts against mayors with municipality-level state capacity indicators. Assassination attempts are identified using text-scraped data from online newspapers, which are matched to fiscal, personnel, demographic, economic, and crime data from multiple sources. This dataset allows me to leverage variation in the outcome of assassination attempts and measure local government effectiveness across municipalities over time. I provide a detailed explanation of the steps of constructing the dataset.

can, Sinaloa Cartel, Beltran Leyva Cartels. Other datasets identify both the local affiliates and their parent groups. For consistency across datasets, I aggregate the subsidiary groups to the higher level.

11. Conclusions are similar if I use the incidence of attacks on mayors for an outcome variable instead of assassinations. The results are in Appendix Table B1.

3.1 Assassination attempts against mayors: Sources and collection procedure

I use two types of sources for assassination attempts against mayors. First, I collect newspaper articles documenting attacks against mayors found in online archives such as *Newsbank* and *Proquest*. Second, I complement these with existing databases of events such as Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT), Data Civica, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), and reports by Esparza and Mancera (2018) and Magar (2018).

To collect information from the online archives, I generate a script that searches for articles mentioning keywords relevant to assassination attempts. Then, I extract the date of the attacks, the name and party affiliation of the victimized mayor, the municipality, and the outcome of the assassination attempt. The outcomes are categorized into assassinated, injured, and unharmed based on the language describing the status of the mayor. I also track the name of the publisher to ensure that a broad range of sources are used.¹² Further technical explanations will be included in Appendix A.2..¹³

The rationale for categorizing outcomes into successful, injured, and unharmed is as follows. A successful attack results in the death of a mayor within a few days. As mayors can no longer serve, these cases constitute the treatment group. Failed attacks include incidents in which the mayor, municipal office, or mayoral residence is targeted but the mayor survives. These are further disaggregated into unharmed and injured cases. Mayors who are not physically hurt and are either not present at the site of the attack or return to work immediately are categorized as unharmed. Because these incidents do not lead to disruption of mayoral presence, I use them as a control group. Cases in which mayors are injured - hospitalized or requiring medical attention - are excluded from the main analysis. This is because injured mayors do not cleanly fit into either treatment or control groups due to their temporary absence. However, the subsequent findings are robust to alternative classifications of failed attempts, as shown in Section 7. I explain the rationale for this design in Section 4.

Other forms of violence against mayors such as kidnappings that do not result in death, attacks on family members, and death threats are excluded from the main analysis. These acts may seek to coerce or intimidate rather than permanently remove mayors from office. Attacks at public events are also discarded, since whether the intended target is the mayor or not is unclear in many such

12. I include articles from nationwide sources such as *El Universal*, *La Jornada* and *Reforma* but also regional newspapers.

13. While many articles state the name of the culpable organized criminal groups, not all of them specify the identity of the attacker. This leaves me with the group affiliation of the attacker as the only proxy for the capacity of the attackers. I later show in Panel B of Table 2 that these are not different across treated and control municipalities. This suggests that given the available data, the differences in the capabilities of OCGs are unlikely to explain the results.

cases.¹⁴ Excluding these cases ensures that the treatment captures variation in the outcome of the attempts to permanently eliminate sitting mayors.¹⁵

I extract a total of 163 assassination attempts from these sources between 2002 and 2021. Of these, 85 were successful attempts. I record 69 failed attempts, further divided into 25 cases involving injuries and 44 in which mayors are unharmed. These events occurred in 138 municipalities.¹⁶ Figure 2 shows the geographic and temporal distribution of these events. The full lists of mayors targeted by assassination attempts are in Appendix A.3. (Tables A1 - A3)

3.2 Data on municipal fiscal effectiveness and local government personnel

To measure fiscal capacity and the composition of the municipal personnel, I combine several datasets from INEGI. I use the annual panel of municipal fiscal revenues and expenditures (EFIPEM¹⁷) to track the local fiscal capacity. For personnel, I use the biennial census of municipal governments (CNGMD) and quarterly National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE).¹⁸

The EFIPEM dataset includes various categories of revenues and expenditures. Revenues from taxes, intergovernmental transfers, service fees, and fines are included. I primarily use tax revenues as a measure of fiscal capacity, consistent with the literature on state capacity (Besley and Persson 2009, 2010). The data contains public expenditure on general service, construction investments, and transfers to municipal institutions. I use these to trace how the provision of various services and the scope of local government activities are affected. I use data from 1995 onward, when local governments gained more fiscal authority (Larreguy et al. 2020).¹⁹ Detailed explanations are in Appendix A.4. Summary statistics appear in Table A4.²⁰

The data on municipal personnel come from two sources. The CNGMD provides data on the total size and composition of the municipal workers by age group and task category, such as public service, security, and finance. These data are collected biennially by INEGI since 2010, resulting in a shorter timeframe than the fiscal data. The ENOE dataset provides nationally representative

14. In the earlier version of this draft, the cases where the mayors were attacked in the public ceremonies were included. The estimation results do not differ much from the current version.

15. Most results are robust to including these municipalities in the control group, as shown in Appendix Figure E1

16. There are also no less than 23 failed kidnapping attempts, 69 incidences of family members attacked, and 50 threatening messages directed at municipality presidents. These are excluded from the regression but included in Figure 1.

17. Estadística de Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales

18. CNGMD and ENOE stands for *Censo Nacional de Gobiernos Municipales y Demarcaciones Territoriales de la Ciudad de México* and *Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo*.

19. The raw data for EFIPEM dates as far back as 1989. Results are robust if all available EPIFEM data are used.

20. Summary statistics that include data from all municipalities in Mexico are in Appendix Table A5

sectoral earnings data that is used to establish a conceptual framework for analyzing how successful assassinations affect worker retentions in Section 6. Summary statistics are provided in Tables A4.

3.3 Data sources for outcome variables used in falsification tests

I obtain variables that may confound the estimated effects of assassinations to validate potential mechanisms. These include non-political crimes, economic activity, demographics, and electoral environments. If municipalities with assassinations experience differential changes in these variables, it may indicate that the estimated effects are attributable to broader factors beyond the loss of mayors. In that case, the true magnitude of the effects of assassinations may be biased. To address this, I test whether these potential confounders covary with successful assassinations.

I compile the data from these sources. The municipal statistics on criminal activities are from INEGI and the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SESNSP). For economic activities, I use the nightlight data from DMSP and VIIRS as well as individual-level economic indicators from ENOE (Donaldson and Storeygard 2016; Henderson et al. 2012).²¹

Data on population dynamics are from the Mexican Census, WorldPop, and the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME). WorldPop provides an annual estimate of the population based on satellite images and complements the intercensal gaps in the Mexican Census. These two data correlate strongly for years in which they overlap, as seen in Appendix Figure A2. I also use the data on outmigrants to the United States from each Mexican municipality measured by the number of Consular ID Cards (MCAS) issued to Mexicans residing in the United States.²²

To examine changes to the electoral environment, I draw on municipal election data from Magar (2018) and state electoral commissions.²³ I use the number of candidates (in levels and logs) to capture the supply of candidates. Vote share data are used to calculate the margin of victory and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to assess electoral competitiveness (Malhotra 2008). Lastly, I utilize both the total and the effective voter participation rates, where the latter excludes null ballots.

21. DMSP is available up until 2013 and is discontinued after. VIIRS data is only available from the year 2012. I generate a harmonized measure of nightlight data with a procedure detailed in Appendix Figure A1 in Appendix Section A.5.

22. MCAS and IME each stands for *Matrica Consular de Alta Seguridad* and *Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior*. Unlike most internal migration surveys that are limited in geographic scope, this measure covers all municipalities used in the study.

23. As municipal elections are administered by state-level bodies, the availability and format of data vary across states.

3.4 Data sources for covariates

To address omitted variable bias, I include covariates for criminal group presence, general criminal activity, and key demographic and geographic characteristics. The data on organized criminal groups are the same as those used in Section 2: Coscia and Rios (2012) for periods before 2000, Osorio and Beltran (2020) for 2000-2018, and ACLED for 2019 onward. I include municipality-level homicide rates from INEGI to account for general criminal activities and other factors associated with lack of state presence (Dal Bó et al. 2013).

For demographic and geographic characteristics, I use the Mexican Census data on the average years of schooling and the share of the Indigenous population at the municipal level. These variables proxy for structural marginalization and underdevelopment, which are often linked to limited state capacity (Dal Bó et al. 2013). Further details are in Appendix A.4.²⁴²⁵

4 Empirical strategy

I compare municipalities with successful assassinations to those with failed attempts that did not injure the mayors using event-study specifications. The treatment effect is identified by comparing changes in local government capacity indicators across the treated and control groups over time. This design addresses selection bias and controls for confounding factors such as the presence of political violence. I discuss the construction of the analysis sample and the main specification in this section.

4.1 Constitution of the treatment and control group municipalities

To isolate the effects of losing mayors to successful assassinations, I construct a counterfactual of the municipalities that lost their mayors to assassination with those whose mayors were unharmed after the attacks. The former group of municipalities is the treatment group while the latter is the control group (*near-miss*). I leave out municipalities whose mayors were injured since their temporary absence blurs the distinction between treatment and near-miss groups. I report that my findings are robust to including such cases in the control group in Section 7.

24. These census variables are available every five years. I fill gaps by linear interpolation. Results are robust to excluding these covariates.

25. While attacks may depend on mayors' political or educational backgrounds, such data are only available for select municipalities after the 2010s.

More importantly, municipalities without any assassination attempts against mayors are excluded. As organized criminal groups select targets based on strategic considerations, including non-targeted municipalities could introduce selection bias to treatment (Dell 2015; Enríquez 2022). This creates imbalances in unobserved and observed characteristics across municipalities and contaminates the treatment effect estimates. By making comparisons conditional on mayors being targeted, the design nets out confounders and ensures that the treated and near-miss groups are similar in their exposure to political violence and other pre-treatment characteristics (Brodeur 2018; Jones and Olken 2009). This allows identification of the effects of losing mayors to successful assassination attempts while ensuring balance in pre-treatment characteristics.

To improve balance further, I implement the following measures. First, I drop four municipalities ranked in the top 3% of the population distribution. These municipalities have disproportionately large budgets and crime levels. This leaves me with 82 municipalities in the treated and 31 in the near-miss group, although retaining these municipalities does not alter the results significantly. Then, I conduct a balance test with the remaining municipalities in Table 2 using observable pre-treatment characteristics one year before assassinations (the year of assassinations for political affiliations).²⁶ Overall, I find that the two types of municipalities are mostly comparable except for the average year of schooling at the municipality level and affiliation to one of the political parties. This shows that the success and the failure of assassination attempts are plausibly random within this sample,

For municipalities with multiple assassination attempts, I retain the first successful event. This follows a general setup of event study regressions where treatment status is nondecreasing over time (Sun and Abraham 2021; Callaway and Sant'Anna 2021). If all such attempts have failed, they belong in the near-miss group. There could be concerns that these cases may act as outliers that skew the estimation results I find that results are robust to excluding these municipalities entirely (Appendix Figure E2)

4.2 Model specifications: Measuring the effects of assassinations over time

To estimate the dynamic treatment effects, I employ an event-study regression that leverages temporal and geographical variation of assassination attempts. The model includes time-relative-to-

26. The rationale for setting the timing differently for political affiliations is that for some municipalities, the political party of the mayor may differ between the year of assassinations and the year before. This ensures that the attacked mayor's party affiliation is accurately reflected.

treatment indicators, municipality and year fixed effects, and observable municipal characteristics. The estimating equation is as follows.

$$y_{mt} = \alpha + \sum_{\substack{h=-6 \\ h \neq -1}}^6 \tau_h I[t - \text{assassination} = h]_{mt} + \tau_{7+} I[t - \text{assassination} \geq 7]_{mt} + \beta X_{mt} + \gamma_m + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{mt} \quad (2)$$

y_{mt} is the outcome variable of interest for municipality m and time t . I use annual municipal expenditures and revenues for fiscal outcomes and the biennial share of various groups of municipal workers for personnel outcomes. For regressions testing alternative mechanisms, I use nightlights, population, crime statistics, and electoral outcomes at the municipal level. Municipality fixed effects (γ_m) control for time-invariant imbalances at the municipality level, while year fixed effects (δ_t) capture common temporal shocks. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

The treatment indicators $I[t - \text{assassination} = h]_{mt}$ equal 1 if year t is h years since successful assassination in municipality m , and 0 otherwise. Near-miss municipalities are never assigned treatment τ_h captures the effect of assassinations on y_{mt} h years after successful assassinations. It is identified by comparing treatment municipalities h years since assassination against near-miss municipalities. I control for 6 leads and lags as this corresponds to two separate terms for mayoral positions before and after the event.²⁷ For normalization purposes, the year before the assassination ($h = -1$) is omitted (Borusyak et al. 2021). To isolate long-run effects, observations with $h \geq 7$ are grouped in to a single indicator $I[t - \text{assassination} \geq 7]_{mt}$ with coefficient τ_{7+} . This follows a dynamic event-study setup as defined in Borusyak et al. (2021).

X_{mt} denotes a vector of observable municipality-level characteristics to mitigate omitted variable bias and to improve the precision of the treatment effect estimates. These include homicides per 100,000 persons, the log(total homicides), the log(number of criminal groups), the share of the Indigenous population, the average years of schooling of the municipal population, and the number of years since the most recent election (in levels and squared terms). For post-attempt years, covariates are held fixed at their final pre-treatment years to prevent bad control problems (Callaway and Sant'Anna 2021). I also show that the results are robust to excluding all covariates.

The identifying assumption is that treated and near-miss municipalities follow parallel trends in the absence of treatment. This assumption is violated if τ_h for pre-assassination periods ($h \leq -1$) are

27. The signs and estimators remain similar if I include different numbers of leads and lags.

statistically different from zero. I test for pre-treatment outcome differences between the two groups by averaging the outcome variables across pre-assassination periods in Table 3. The results indicate no statistically significant differences, supporting the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption.

Because standard two-way fixed effects estimates may be biased in the presence of treatment effect heterogeneity across time and units (Baker et al. 2022; Sun and Abraham 2021), I also report results using three recently developed event study estimators: the stacked difference-in-difference estimator used in Cengiz et al. (2019), the imputation-based estimator developed by Gardner et al. (2024), and the 2×2 interaction-weighted estimator (Sun and Abraham 2021). The latter two maintain the same set of fixed effects structure as the baseline specification, while the stacked estimator additionally incorporates state-specific linear time trends to mitigate potential distortions arising from implicit weighting across event cohorts.²⁸

For robustness, I also report three versions of the baseline two-way fixed effects: with and without covariates, and with the inclusion of outlier municipalities with large populations.

5 Effects on local fiscal capacity

In this section, I empirically test whether local fiscal capacity declines following successful assassinations. Specifically, I examine the consequences of successful assassinations on the ability to raise revenues and allocate resources across various public services. Overall, findings indicate that affected local governments lose their capacity to maintain revenues and allocate public resources. The findings are robust across different specifications.

5.1 Negative effects on the municipal revenues

To assess whether tax collection deteriorates following successful assassinations, I examine changes in total and property tax revenues, both in levels and per capita terms. I also investigate whether the consequences also spill over to other revenue sources such as non-earmarked federal transfers (*fondos participaciones*²⁹) and earmarked transfers (*aportaciones*³⁰), revenues from public services (*derecho*) and

28. The state-specific linear yearly trends address potential differences in estimation results that may arise due to different weights across subdatasets (Baker et al. 2022). Estimation results are largely similar even without linear trends.

29. Non-earmarked funds are comprised of General participation fund (FGP) and Municipal Development Fund (FFM). While equity across regions is the main objective, the latter also takes into account local taxation efforts (OECD 2016).

30. Earmarked funds are broken down into Municipal Fund for Social Infrastructure (FISM) and Funds for Municipal Development (FORTAMUN). Both are granted conditional on infrastructural and development projects within the munic-

legal fines (*aprovechamientos*). As non-earmarked transfers are partially determined by municipal tax revenues, I expect them to follow the changes in municipal tax collection. Other sources are largely independent of taxation, thereby not likely to respond following successful assassinations (Careaga and Weingast 2003; Timmons and Broid 2013).

Figure 3 presents event-study estimates and Columns (1) - (4) in Table 4 report the average treatment effects following successful assassinations over the six years on tax outcomes. The results indicate that the loss of mayors to assassination undermines the capacity to collect taxes. Revenues from all local taxes decline by approximately 28% relative to near-miss municipalities, with most estimates statistically significant at the 1% level. The effects are realized immediately following assassinations and persist over six years. The fall in per capita tax revenue ranges from 67 to 105 pesos, or 18-28% relative to the control mean, albeit less precise. Property tax revenues decline, both in total (approximately 20%) and per capita terms (approximately 40 pesos, or 17% relative to the control mean).³¹ Estimates do not diverge significantly across different specifications.

Other sources of revenue determined by local taxation are also affected, as reported in Figure 4 and Columns (5)-(8) of Table 4. Non-earmarked funds decline by 9.7% to 12.7% compared to near-miss municipalities, all significant at 5% or 1% level (Column (5) in Table 4). As this fund is partially proportional to municipal tax collection, this result is explained by a fall in municipal tax revenues. Other revenue sources are largely unaffected, as they are determined by demographic factors, demand for public service, and legal fines. Results are robust to changes in estimation, exclusion of covariates, and inclusion of outlier municipalities.

Taken together, these results indicate that the loss of mayors to successful assassinations undermines local fiscal capacity to raise revenues relative to near-miss municipalities. Tax revenues decline, which spills over into other sources of revenue linked to taxation such as non-earmarked federal transfers. The findings are robust to alternative specifications and persist over time. These support the interpretation that the loss of leaders following assassinations weakens local fiscal capacity.

ipalities while taking poverty levels and demographic factors into account (Larreguy et al. 2020).

31. 73% of municipal tax revenues are from property taxes (OECD 2016). However, property taxes account for just 2% of all taxes paid by individuals in Mexico (World Bank 2016). Furthermore, the share of own-source tax on total revenues is small and has high variation across small and large municipalities (World Bank 2016). Thus, changes in tax revenue for municipal governments are large whereas per capita changes are small.

5.2 Diversion of government resources to select sectors

I examine how successful assassinations of mayors affect the composition and volume of local government expenditures. Specifically, I focus on public investments in infrastructure construction projects, general services expenditure, and transfers to municipal institutions providing educational and health services.³² The part of general services expenditure examined here (henceforth non-infrastructure expenditures) includes spending on general administrative services such as rents, maintenance, purchases, and travel expenses incurred by municipal workers. Other categories, such as basic services and personnel expenditures, are reported in the Appendix (Appendix Figure B2). I report the outcomes log of expenditure amounts and their shares relative to total expenditures. The former captures changes in expenditure volume, while the latter reflects shifts in budget allocation across different expenditure categories.

Figure 5 reports event-study estimates on spending outcomes, with the 6-year post-assassination average reported in Table 5. Since assassinations, the share of public investment expenditure rises by 5 to 5.6 percentage points relative to near-miss municipalities, with most results significant at 1% level (Column (1) in Table 5). The volume of public investment expenditure rises by roughly 20%, although the log level estimates are less precise (Column (2) in Table 5). In contrast, both the share and volume of non-infrastructure expenditure decline by 1.4-1.6 percentage points and around 45% relative to near-miss municipalities, respectively (columns (3) and (4) of Table 5). Similarly, transfers to municipal institutions fall by 1-2 percentage points in share and 40% in volume, respectively (columns (5) and (6) in Table 5). All results are robust to alternative specifications, the exclusion of covariates, and the inclusion of large municipalities.

These findings suggest a reallocation of resources toward sectors that may benefit criminal organizations, at the expense of essential services. The increase in public investments mirrors patterns of resource diversion to construction following criminal infiltration of local governments in Italy and Mexico (Calderón et al. 2019; De Feo and De Luca 2017; Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco 2022). Meanwhile, declines in non-infrastructure spending and transfers to municipal institutions indicate that fewer resources are directed towards key services dedicated to poverty reduction, development, and welfare (Liu and Mikesell 2014; Mauro 1998). Overall, these findings highlight how successful assassinations undermine the local state capacity to fulfill fundamental public functions.

32. Each are called *Inversión pública, servicios generales*, and *Transferencias, asignaciones, subsidios y otras ayudas* in EPIFEM.

5.3 Summary of findings

Municipalities with successful assassinations of mayors fail to maintain their fiscal capacity. Affected local governments cannot sustain the level of tax collection and redirect expenditures to construction investments, often at the expense of essential services. These patterns indicate that successful assassinations undermine the capacity to finance and deliver public services pivotal for local development. In the following sections, I explore mechanisms that highlight the importance of the presence of local leadership in maintaining local fiscal capacity in light of political violence.

6 Changes to the personnel capacity of local governments

This section explores how personnel capacity in local governments is affected by the successful assassination of mayors. I begin by outlining a conceptual framework that discusses how such events may disrupt the allocation of public workers and increase the difficulty in retaining them. Then, I empirically analyze the impact on worker departures and retention costs. The results indicate that young, productive workers with better outside options are more likely to leave, and the cost of retaining them increases. There is also suggestive evidence of shifts in task allocation within municipal governments. Taken together, these patterns point to personnel capacity as a key mechanism explaining how successful assassinations weaken local state capacity.

6.1 Framework for local state capacity

Consider an economy consisting of a continuum of individuals, normalized to 1, and a local government. Individuals choose between working at the local government or taking an outside option. The local government collects taxes and provides public goods using labor as an input to maximize social utility. Successful assassinations are modeled as exogenous shocks that reduce the attractiveness and productivity of working at the local government, thereby affecting the supply and allocation of labor. The framework helps rationalize empirical patterns observed in the previous section and generates testable hypotheses on the personnel dynamics of local governments.

Individuals choose the public sector if the utility it provides outweighs that of outside options. Utility from the public sector is the sum of the wage w and nonpecuniary amenity π . v represents gains from outside options. Individuals work for the public sector if $w + \pi \geq v$, and otherwise select

the outside option. Thus, the supply of local government labor (L) is a function of wages, amenities, and outside options, $L = L(w, \pi, v)$. The supply is increasing and concave in w and π , and decreasing in v . A more detailed explanation is provided in Appendix Section C.1.1.

The local government collects taxes and provides public goods to maximize social utility. Each consumes private goods out of income net of taxes. Individuals derive utility from public good G , weighted by α . Public sector workers earn a wage of w , while those on outside employment earn $E[v|v > w + \pi]$ on average. Local government pays each public worker out of taxes T and other revenues R . The social welfare function and the government budget constraint are given by

$$\alpha G + Lw + (1 - L)E[v|v > w + \pi] - T \quad (4)$$

$$R + T \geq wL \quad (5)$$

Local government capacity in this context is defined by its ability to produce public goods and collect taxes, each relying on allocated labor and task-specific productivity. Let $j \in \{T, G\}$ denote tax collection and public goods provision, respectively. Each task has a production function consisting of labor L_j and productivity A_j . Production functions are denoted as $t(\cdot)$ for tax collection and $g(\cdot)$ for the provision of public goods, respectively, with both increasing and concave in labor. Labor is fully allocated to either one of the two tasks. The production function and allocation constraints, with further details in Appendix Section C.1.2 are written as

$$T = A_T t(L_T), \quad G = A_G g(L_G) \quad (t' > 0, t'' < 0, g' > 0, g'' < 0) \quad (6)$$

$$L_T + L_G = L \quad (7)$$

The local government allocates labor to maximize social welfare (4) subject to constraints (5)-(7). Without external shocks, the local government equates marginal costs of taxation with the marginal benefit of public goods provision (Appendix Section C.1.3). Successful assassination disrupts this allocation through shocks to productivity and amenities, thereby affecting available labor supply (L) and allocation across tasks (L_T and L_G). Although public sector wages are inflexible in practice, I relax this condition for theoretical tractability. This setup allows for the derivation of the following comparative statics and facilitates a hypothetical exercise in which I estimate the counterfactual wage

increase required to retain workers following successful assassinations.

Proposition 1. The effects of successful assassination on local state capacity

1. A negative productivity shock ($\Delta A_T(A_G) < 0$) decreases L_T (L_G), leading to a fall in T (G).
If wages are flexible, w decreases due to decreased labor demand.
2. An negative amenity shock ($\Delta \pi < 0$) decreases labor supply, lowering both L_T and L_G downwards. This decreases T and G . If wages are flexible, w increases due to contracting supply.

Proof: Appendix Section [C.1.4](#).

The framework yields three important insights. First, it explains how tax revenues and public goods provision may decline following successful assassinations. Second, it predicts that younger and more productive workers with better outside options are more likely to depart, given their lower relative utility from local government employment. Third, the framework motivates a counterfactual exercise in which I estimate the hypothetical wage increase required to retain workers in the aftermath of assassinations. I test these predictions by estimating the departure rates and retention costs of various types of workers in the next section.

6.2 Loss of young and productive municipal personnel and subsequent costs

Based on the insights above, I test whether treated municipalities lose productive workers and estimate the wage increases required to retain them. I use age as a proxy for worker productivity, given its correlation with potential labor market earnings in the Mexican private sector. To support this approach, I construct wage profiles by age using the individual-level earnings data from ENOE. I use both hourly wages and monthly earnings to capture the relative returns to outside options v across different age groups.³³

I take the following two approaches to highlight the relationship between earnings and age. First, I compute average earnings by age group and find that individuals in their 30s and 40s have the

33. The educational attainment data for municipal workers are only available from the 4th wave of the CNGMD, limiting the statistical power. Age, on the other hand, is consistently available in this dataset.

highest earnings (Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 6). Second, I estimate the following regression to recover age-earnings profiles net of unobserved heterogeneity across industries, municipalities, and periods:

$$y_{imjt} = \alpha + \sum_G \beta_G I[i \in G] + \phi_j + \gamma_m + \delta_t + \epsilon_{imjt} \quad (G \in \{20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70s\}) \quad (8)$$

$I[i \in G]$ indicates that individual i belongs in age group G . Fixed effects for industries (ϕ_j), time (δ_t), and municipalities (γ_m) are included. The β_G coefficients capture average earnings differentials across age groups, holding sectoral, geographical, and temporal factors constant. The estimates show that those in their 30s and 40s are at the peak of the earnings profile (Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 6), supporting the use of age for proxies of higher productivity and stronger outside options.

Then, I examine whether workers in their 30s and 40s are more likely to leave following successful assassinations. The outcome variables are age-specific share of municipal workers - 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s or above.³⁴ I modify Equation (2) to accommodate biennial frequency and shorter timeframe of data availability by reducing lags and leads. Other features of Equation (2) are preserved.

Figure 7 presents the baseline two-way fixed effects estimates for worker departures, with post-assassination averages reported in Panel A of Table 6. The share of workers in their 30s drops by 8.7 percentage points, a 27.6% drop from the pre-assassination average. Similarly, the combined share of workers in their 30s and 40s falls by 13.3 percentage points. These findings are similar across alternative specifications (Figure 7 and Appendix Tables C1-C5), confirming the higher likelihood of departure following successful assassinations for younger and more productive workers.

With these estimates, I calculate the hypothetical retention cost of these workers following successful assassinations. The retention cost is defined as the (hypothetical) increase in wages required to retain municipal workers following the amenity shock from successful assassinations. Drawing from the labor supply framework discussed earlier, I assume that outside options v remain constant. Since v reflects nationwide averages, they are less likely to be directly affected by localized political violence. Using total derivatives, I model the trade-off in wages and amenities as follows:

$$\frac{dw}{d\pi} = \frac{-\frac{\partial L(w, \pi)}{\partial \pi}}{\frac{\partial L(w, \pi)}{\partial w}} \quad (9)$$

I use my estimates on the departure of workers along with labor supply elasticity from Dal Bó

34. The first two waves of CNGMD do not include distinct categories for the 60s and 70s

et al. (2013) to compute retention costs. In Equation (9), the numerator captures the reduction in labor following successful assassinations, as estimated in Panel A of Table 6. The denominator represents the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages. For this, I use the benchmark estimate of 2.15 from a field experiment with Mexican municipal workers conducted by Dal Bó et al. (2013).³⁵

The calculated retention costs for workers in their 30s are approximately 11% (Panel B of Table 6), and remain robust across alternative specifications (Appendix Tables C1-C5). Though hypothetical, these estimates help quantify the cost of political violence and the organizational disruptions that arise when a replacement mayor assumes office. In addition, retention costs are higher for workers in their 30s compared to other age groups, reflecting greater outside options and productivity. Overall, the findings suggest that the weakening local state capacity is driven in part by changes in personnel following successful assassinations.

6.3 Changes in allocation across different types of tasks

This section builds upon the analysis of retention costs and explores whether the composition of tasks within municipal governments shifts following successful assassinations. Local state capacity can be affected in the aftermath through changes in how municipal governments allocate workers across tasks. To test this, I examine the share of *total municipal workers* assigned to public service and public security. I further analyze changes in responsibilities within public security by comparing the share of *municipal public service workers* in operative duties and those in administrative support duties.

The results indicate a reallocation of tasks from public service toward more active public security efforts (Appendix Figure C1). The share of workers in public service tasks falls by approximately 6 percentage points, albeit less precise. While the share of *total municipal workers* in public security tasks remains unchanged, the proportion of *public security workers* engaged in operative duties increases by 15 percentage points. This suggests a shift from supporting roles to frontline responsibilities. These changes in worker composition across tasks could explain the lower capacity for public service and administrative tasks in affected local governments, similar to Akhtari et al. (2022).

35. The municipalities studied in Dal Bó et al. (2013) and mine differ. Using a different indicator of violence, Dal Bó et al. (2013) finds that labor supply elasticity could be lower in violent municipalities. Thus, the wage cost estimates presented here may be a lower bound of the true cost.

6.4 Takeaway: Increasing cost of retention and changes to task allocation

This section highlights how the loss of mayors to successful assassinations undermines the personnel capacity of local government. Young and productive workers are more likely to leave and are costlier to retain. There is suggestive evidence that affected municipalities reallocate workers away from public services to more active public security roles. These findings indicate that the absence of mayors in the aftermath weakens local state capacity by prompting productive young workers to leave, increasing retention costs, and distorting task allocations over time.

7 Discussion: Testing potential alternative channels

This section evaluates alternative explanations for the effects of successful assassinations. I first test whether economic activity, crime, demographics, and electoral environments confound the results. Then, I assess whether the presence of organized criminal groups drives the outcomes. Last, I employ several alternative control groups to isolate the role of mayoral presence after assassination attempts. The analysis reveals no meaningful differences in potential confounders across treated and near-miss municipalities. The increase in criminal group presence is short-lived and does not account for the lasting effects. Moreover, results using the injured-mayor control group validate that mayoral absence following attacks explains much of the observed effects.

7.1 Non-political violence, economics, demographics, and electoral environment

A key concern is that other factors such as non-political violence, economic activity, demographic trends, and electoral environments may confound the effects of successful assassinations. If treated municipalities have higher rates of non-political violence, the estimated impacts may merely reflect broader insecurity rather than the absence of mayors. Likewise, declines in economic activities and population could independently reduce tax collection and the supply of local government workers. Shifts in electoral competitiveness and voter interest could affect the quality of incoming mayors irrespective of bureaucratic personnel. Thus, it is necessary to rule out these potential confounders.

I use the following outcomes for this exercise. Non-political violence is proxied by Homicide rates (2005 and onward) and robberies (2011 and onward) per 100,000 people, with the former recalculated to exclude assassinated mayors. Economic activity is captured by the log of municipal

nightlight intensity and individual-level outcomes from the ENOE survey. Demographic variables include population density, the log of the working-age population (1995 and onward), and outmigration to the United States from each municipality (2008 and onward).³⁶ Last, I measure the electoral dynamics with the number of candidates, HHI index, margin of victory, and participation rates.

The results in Figure 8 and Appendix Figure D1-D2 show that none of these indicators exhibit significantly different post-assassination trends across treated and near-miss municipalities. Crime rates remain stable across the two types of municipalities. Nightlight intensities and outcomes from the ENOE survey do not show any significant changes. Demographic measures are largely unchanged. Finally, there are no shifts observed in electoral competitiveness and participation following successful assassinations. These findings are consistent across different specifications and estimation strategies. Therefore, these factors are unlikely to confound the results.

7.2 Changes in criminal group presence are unlikely to explain long-lasting effects

I examine whether the observed effects can be attributed to an increase in the presence of organized criminal groups. I use the log of numbers of criminal groups and dummies for any, new, and multiple criminal groups in the municipality. Unidentified groups are included when constructing dummies for any group presence. For others, I only use identified cases. If long-lasting effects in Sections 5 and 6 are driven by the presence of organized criminal groups, the outcomes measuring their presence should also exhibit persistent increases relative to near-miss municipalities.

Estimation results in Figure 9 suggest that increases in criminal group presence are short-lived. The number of criminal groups increases by roughly 15% in the year of assassinations, and the probability of new group entry increases by over 10 percentage points. However, these differences relative to near-miss municipalities dissipate over time. These findings are robust across alternative specifications. In addition, the average number of these groups in treated municipalities does not exceed those in near-miss municipalities in post-assassination periods (Appendix Table D1 and Figure D3).

These findings highlight two key points. First, the short-term increase in criminal group presence likely reflects their role in perpetrating assassinations and exploiting the temporary leadership vacuums. Second, the lack of divergence over time suggests that variation in criminal group activity is unlikely to account for the lasting impacts of successful assassinations on local state capacity.

36. The total population includes those aged below 15 and above 65 who are less likely than those aged 15-64 to participate in the local economy. As such, I use this group in this exercise.

7.3 Presence of mayors matters: Results using alternative control groups

To assess the role of the presence of mayors following assassinations, I re-estimate Equation (2) and apply triple-difference specifications using alternative control groups. While the main analysis uses control groups consisting of mayors who were unharmed and had no disruption in their duties, I now incorporate municipalities where mayors became absent for various reasons. This includes injuries from failed attempts and nonviolent deaths due to health reasons and accidents. This allows me to isolate the effect of mayoral presence from the assassination event itself.

The aim is to evaluate whether the estimated effects diminish as treated municipalities are compared to others that also experienced different forms of mayoral absence. The lists of mayors used in this exercise are found in Appendix Section A.3.³⁷ I first replicate key findings using three alternative control groups: (1) all failed assassination attempts, (2) failed attacks resulting in injury, and (3) nonviolent deaths. I also run a triple-difference estimation comparing successful assassinations to each of these control groups. As alternative control groups involve disruptions in the presence of mayors following the event, I expect the estimated effect to decrease compared to the main analysis.

Consistent with this hypothesis, the estimated effects diminish with greater mayoral absence in the control group across both event-study and triple difference designs (Appendix Figure D4 and Table D2). This reinforces the interpretation that the presence of mayors following the event plays a critical role in sustaining local state capacity.³⁸

7.4 Takeaway on alternative channels

This section rules out alternative factors and reinforces the central role of personnel changes following successful assassinations. Non-political violence, economic activity, demographic shifts, and electoral dynamics do not explain the observed patterns. Despite the short-run increase in organized criminal group presence, it does not fully explain the persistent decline in local state capacity. Furthermore, the diminishing effect sizes when mayors in the control group are absent for other reasons highlight the importance of sustained leadership. Taken together, the erosion of local state capacity is primarily driven by disruptions to municipal personnel rather than other confounding factors.

37. 50 mayors have passed away due to COVID-19 in 2020-2021. I exclude them from this exercise due to a lack of post-event observations.

38. Comparing injured (treated) to unharmed (control) mayors also yields a nonzero effect (Appendix Figure E3), suggesting the role of mayoral presence. However, the small sample (20 vs. 37 municipalities) limits statistical power.

8 Conclusion

This paper investigates how losing mayors to successful assassinations affects local governments' ability to conduct core bureaucratic functions. Using variation in the presence of mayors induced by the successful and failed assassination attempts, I find that municipalities with assassinated mayors face difficulties in sustaining their revenue stream, delivering public services, and retaining productive public workers. These outcomes are not driven by changes in non-political violence, demographics, economic activities, and electoral environment. Although the presence of criminal groups briefly increases, it does not account for the persistent erosion of local state capacity.

These findings highlight the broader institutional consequences of political violence and the critical role of local political leadership. Beyond electoral outcomes, political violence can stifle core bureaucratic functions such as tax collection, public goods provision, and personnel recruitment (Daniele 2019; Jones and Olken 2009). The results also demonstrate that personnel disruptions following the sudden vacuum in leadership drive much of the observed outcomes. This complements recent work documenting the role of individuals in shaping the institutional effectiveness of public organizations (Akhtari et al. 2022; Best et al. 2023).

These insights have important policy implications. Assassinations not only remove political figures but also undermine the bureaucratic basis of the local government (Dal Bó and Di Tella 2003; Daniele and Dipoppa 2017). Such disruption poses a challenge to local development and calls for remedies that protect the continuity of local governance. This is particularly relevant for countries suffering from internal conflicts and infiltration by illegitimate actors (Blattman and Miguel 2010).

There are further avenues for research on this topic. Future research could explore how political violence interacts with decentralization. While granting local autonomy promises responsiveness and efficiency, my results highlight its vulnerabilities in violent environments with inadequate central oversight (Bardhan 2002). Advances in text analysis and geospatial data now enable more detailed measurement of local state capacity and the presence of illegitimate actors. These tools open the door for a more detailed study of institutional fragility and resilience.

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Tables

Table 1: Determinants of assassinations on mayors in a given year, since 1995

	All of Mexico (Coeff $\times 100$)					Assassination and Near-miss				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A. Exclude unidentified groups										
log(# groups + 1)	0.208** (0.089)		0.050 (0.097)	0.044 (0.097)		0.015 (0.010)		-0.005 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.013)	
I(New group)		0.336*** (0.120)	0.297** (0.140)	0.331** (0.140)			0.033** (0.013)	0.037** (0.017)	0.041** (0.018)	
Homicide per million	0.006 (0.013)	0.005 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)	0.005 (0.013)		0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	
Panel B. Include unidentified groups										
log(# groups + 1)	0.329*** (0.075)		0.191** (0.075)	0.196** (0.074)		0.035*** (0.009)		0.012 (0.011)	0.013 (0.011)	
I(New group)		0.398*** (0.107)	0.296*** (0.110)	0.311*** (0.110)			0.049*** (0.013)	0.042*** (0.015)	0.044*** (0.015)	
Homicide per million	0.005 (0.013)	0.005 (0.013)	0.006 (0.013)	0.005 (0.013)		0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	
N Municipalities	59272 2198	59272 2198	59272 2198	59272 2441	60720 2198	3153 117	3153 117	3153 117	3153 117	3165 119
Municipal FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

The table shows the coefficient estimates from the regression of the incidence of assassinations on mayors on variables relevant to gang presence and crime at the municipality-year level. For the sample using all of Mexico, coefficients are multiplied by 100 for convenience. The homicide per million is recalculated by excluding cases of mayor assassinations. All regressions include municipality, year fixed effects, and controls. Control variables included are the average schooling of the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, the log of the total population, and the year since the election (level and squared). $\log(\# \text{ group} + 1)$ is the log of the number of criminal groups in the municipality, adjusted by adding 1 to account for municipalities with no presence of organized criminal groups. New group refers to the dummy variable for the existence of a criminal organization that newly began its activities within the municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Table 2: Balance table for covariates

Variable	(1) Near-miss			(2) Assassination			(2)-(1) Test for difference		
	N	Mean	(SE)	N	Mean	(SE)	N	Difference	[p-value]
Panel A. Municipality level control variables									
Total homicides	31	11.6	(28.8)	81	6.21	(15.3)	112	-5.44	[0.317]
log(Total homicides)	31	1.2	(1.45)	81	1	(1.22)	112	-0.197	[0.501]
Homicides per 100k	31	12.8	(24.8)	81	34.6	(156)	112	21.8	[0.226]
Tenure at attack (mths)	32	19.7	(14.4)	82	20.4	(13.3)	114	0.671	[0.819]
Avg Schooling	31	7.8	(1.52)	81	6.41	(1.44)	112	-1.39***	[0.000]
Share of indigenous pop.	31	11.7	(21.7)	81	17.8	(25.8)	112	6.13	[0.205]
Pop density	32	222	(515)	82	198	(916)	114	-24.3	[0.858]
# identified crime groups	32	0.531	(1.02)	82	0.524	(1.03)	114	-0.007	[0.974]
log(# identified crime groups)	32	0.283	(0.491)	82	0.278	(0.484)	114	-0.005	[0.955]
I(New Group)	32	0.156	(0.369)	82	0.146	(0.356)	114	-0.010	[0.896]
# New groups	32	0.250	(0.672)	82	0.244	(0.730)	114	-0.006	[0.966]
Panel B. Organized criminal groups									
Beltran Leyva	32	0.031	(0.177)	82	0	(0)	114	-0.031	[0.316]
CJNG	32	0.063	(0.246)	82	0.037	(0.19)	114	-0.026	[0.590]
Huachicleros	32	0.031	(0.177)	82	0.024	(0.155)	114	-0.007	[0.847]
Barbies	32	0	(0)	82	0.061	(0.241)	114	0.061	[0.024]
Familia	32	0.094	(0.296)	82	0.073	(0.262)	114	-0.021	[0.730]
Gulf Cartel	32	0.063	(0.246)	82	0.085	(0.281)	114	0.023	[0.668]
Juarez Cartel	32	0.031	(0.177)	82	0.024	(0.155)	114	-0.007	[0.847]
Sinaloa Cartel	32	0.063	(0.246)	82	0.073	(0.262)	114	0.011	[0.838]
Tijuana Cartel	32	0.031	(0.177)	82	0.037	(0.19)	114	0.005	[0.887]
Zetas	32	0.125	(0.336)	82	0.073	(0.262)	114	-0.052	[0.432]
Other Cartels	32	0	(0)	82	0.037*	(0.19)	114	0.037	[0.083]
Panel C. Political affiliation of mayors									
Partido Acción Nacional	32	0.125	(0.336)	82	0.171	(0.379)	114	0.046	[0.529]
Partido de la Revolucion Democrática	32	0.219	(0.42)	82	0.146	(0.356)	114	-0.072	[0.388]
Partido Revolucionario Institucional	32	0.344	(0.483)	82	0.390	(0.491)	114	0.047	[0.645]
Movimiento Regeneración Nacional	32	0.125	(0.336)	82	0.049	(0.217)	114	-0.076	[0.234]
Movimiento Ciudadano	32	0	(0)	82	0.061	(0.241)	114	0.061**	[0.024]
Partido Nueva Alianza	32	0.031	(0.177)	82	0	(0)	114	-0.031	[0.316]
Partido del Trabajo	32	0.063	(0.246)	82	0.024	(0.156)	114	-0.038	[0.414]
Partido Verde Ecologista de México	32	0.063	(0.246)	82	0.024	(0.156)	114	-0.038	[0.414]
Uso y Costumbres	32	0	(0)	82	0.110	(0.315)	114	0.110***	[0.002]

***<0.01, **<0.05, * <0.1

Variables in Panels A and B are based on the reported values from the year before the failed/successful assassinations. Party affiliations in Panel C are calculated based on the year of the failed attacks/successful assassinations. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, along with the p-value for the test of differences of group means in brackets.

Table 3: Pretrends for outcome variables

	Control mean	Pre-event difference	(SE)	[p-value]
Panel A. Fiscal capacity variables				
log(tax)	15.7	-0.111*	(0.063)	[0.080]
tax per capita	378	-37.7	(34.4)	[0.276]
log(property tax)	15.3	-0.051	(0.058)	[0.377]
property tax per capita	238	-17.6	(17.9)	[0.327]
log(nonearmarked funds)	17.3	-0.026	(0.033)	[0.439]
log(earmarked funds)	17.5	-0.016	(0.052)	[0.767]
log(service)	14	-0.210	(0.157)	[0.184]
log(legal)	15.4	0.033	(0.084)	[0.696]
log(public investments)	17.6	-0.056	(0.097)	[0.561]
% public investments	0.313	0.001	(0.014)	[0.947]
log(non-infra service)	16.2	-0.225	(0.174)	[0.199]
% non-infra service	0.081	-0.002	(0.005)	[0.682]
log(transfers)	15.9	-0.070	(0.090)	[0.439]
% transfers	0.077	-0.0003	(0.006)	[0.961]
Panel B. Personnel capacity variables				
% Personnel, ages 20-29	0.215	-0.008	(0.029)	[0.771]
% Personnel, ages 30-39	0.293	-0.002	(0.037)	[0.957]
% Personnel, ages 40-49	0.220	-0.009	(0.025)	[0.711]
% Personnel, ages 50-	0.156	0.049**	(0.023)	[0.036]
% Personnel, ages 20-39	0.508	-0.010	(0.045)	[0.816]
% Personnel, ages 30-49	0.512	-0.011	(0.037)	[0.765]
% Personnel, public service	1.070	-0.107	(0.334)	[0.748]
% Personnel, public security	0.211	-0.071	(0.050)	[0.161]
% Security Personnel, operative	0.787	0.011	(0.058)	[0.852]
% Security Personnel, admin	0.080	-0.013	(0.032)	[0.688]

***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1

Variables in Panels A and B are the outcome variables used in Sections 5 and 6. The control mean is obtained by averaging the variables over the near-miss municipalities for the 6 years before the failed attempts take place. Pre-event difference is obtained by regressing the outcome variables using Equation (2) and taking averages of the time indicators for the treatment group up until 6 years before the successful assassinations take place. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. p-values from testing the statistical significance of the pre-event differences are reported in the brackets.

Table 4: Changes in municipal fiscal capacity, 6-year post-event window across specifications

Estimation	Taxes				Non-taxes			
	(1) ln(tax)	(2) tax pc	(3) ln(prop.)	(4) prop. pc	(5) ln(non-mark)	(6) ln(mark)	(7) ln(serv.)	(8) ln(legal)
TWFE w/ controls	-0.280*** (0.101)	-83.5 (53.4)	-0.188* (0.100)	-39.1 (28.6)	-0.122** (0.054)	0.017 (0.082)	0.086 (0.126)	-0.107 (0.228)
N Clusters	2593 113	2593 113	2338 113	2338 113	2403 113	2182 113	2599 113	2470 113
TWFE w/ controls (no omitted municipalities)	-0.272*** (0.098)	-105** (51.7)	-0.181* (0.096)	-51.8* (28.0)	-0.127** (0.053)	0.039 (0.078)	0.118 (0.123)	-0.073 (0.220)
N Clusters	2701 117	2701 117	2441 117	2441 117	2502 117	2274 117	2706 117	257 117
TWFE w/o controls	-0.294*** (0.105)	-80.6 (54.0)	-0.213** (0.104)	-41.0 (30.5)	-0.110** (0.053)	-0.017 (0.080)	0.064 (0.127)	-0.101 (0.224)
N Clusters	2641 115	2632 115	2385 115	2376 115	2442 115	2215 115	2647 115	2517 115
Stacked DID	-0.228** (0.098)	-74.4* (44.2)	-0.121 (0.095)	-39.0* (22.4)	-0.096*** (0.037)	-0.045 (0.049)	-0.008 (0.116)	-0.248 (0.163)
N Clusters	22740 748	21870 748	20905 748	20135 748	16872 748	15397 748	22652 747	22212 748
Gardner (2024)	-0.255*** (0.085)	-67.9* (37.5)	-0.205** (0.083)	-37.0* (21.6)	-0.100** (0.040)	-0.004 (0.060)	0.059 (0.106)	-0.035 (0.189)
N Clusters	2641 115	2632 115	2385 115	2376 115	2442 115	2215 115	2647 115	2517 115
Sun-Abraham (2021)	-0.283*** (0.106)	-78.6 (56.3)	-0.209** (0.104)	-41.1 (32.2)	-0.112** (0.055)	-0.017 (0.084)	0.075 (0.131)	-0.086 (0.219)
N Clusters	2641 115	2632 115	2385 115	2376 115	2442 115	2215 115	2647 115	2517 115
Control mean	15.771	369.454	15.461	243.94	17.711	17.688	15.459	14.243
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

The table reports the average of the 6-year post-assassination indicators in Equation (2). Each row contains results from different estimation methods. The first three rows are results from two-way fixed effects with different sample restrictions and covariates. The last three rows are Stacked DID, Gardner (2024), and Sun and Abraham (2021) estimates. The outcome variables used in each regression are the log of total tax revenue, per capita tax revenue, log of total property tax, per capita property tax, log of non-earmarked grants, log of earmarked grants, log of service revenues, and log of revenues from legal affairs. Control mean reports the average of the outcome variables for the near-miss municipalities one year before the assassination attempts. All regressions include a binned indicator for municipalities experiencing assassinations 7 or more years ago, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Stacked DID regression includes state-specific yearly linear trends to account for different weights across yearly subdatasets used to create the estimator. Two-way fixed effect regressions with covariates include controls for log(number of criminal organizations + 1), homicide rates, log(total homicides + 1), average years of schooling for the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, and years since the most recent election (level and squared) fixed at the final pre-assassination attempt year. Other estimators do not include covariates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level for all regressions except Stacked DID, which is clustered on municipality-year level.

Table 5: Changes in municipal expenditure post assassinations, log of expenditures

Estimation	(1) Investment (share)	(2) Investment (log)	(3) Non-infra (share)	(4) Non-infra. (log)	(5) Allowances (share)	(6) Allowances (log)
TWFE w/ controls	0.053*** (0.018)	0.218* (0.120)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.489* (0.249)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.360** (0.145)
N Clusters	2649 113	2649 113	2510 113	2510 113	2653 113	2653 113
TWFE w/ controls (no omitted municipalities)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.264** (0.119)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.440* (0.243)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.418** (0.142)
N Clusters	2756 117	2756 117	2612 117	2612 117	2761 117	2761 117
TWFE w/o controls	0.055*** (0.018)	0.266** (0.120)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.410* (0.244)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.425*** (0.143)
N Clusters	2694 115	2694 115	2555 115	2555 115	2701 115	2701 115
Stacked DID	0.053*** (0.013)	0.168* (0.095)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.532** (0.234)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.407*** (0.093)
N Clusters	22777 748	22777 748	20627 748	20627 748	22513 748	22513 748
Gardner (2024)	0.053*** (0.017)	0.214* (0.113)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.395** (0.168)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.309*** (0.115)
N Clusters	2694 115	2694 115	2555 115	2555 115	2701 115	2701 115
Sun-Abraham (2021)	0.050** (0.020)	0.166 (0.138)	-0.016** (0.007)	-0.534** (0.247)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.359** (0.145)
N Clusters	2694 115	2694 115	2555 115	2555 115	2701 115	2701 115
Control mean	0.308	17.655	0.079	16.291	0.081	16.171
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

The table reports the average of the 6-year post-assassination indicators in Equation (2). Each row contains results from different estimation methods. The first three rows are results from two-way fixed effects with different setups for sample restriction and covariates. The last three rows are Stacked DID, Gardner (2024), and Sun and Abraham (2021) estimates. The outcome variables used in each regression are the shares and logs of investment in construction projects, general services expenditure not part of basic infrastructure spending, and allowances and transfers to municipal entities responsible for public service. Control mean reports the average of the outcome variables for the near-miss municipalities one year before the assassination attempts. All regressions include a binned indicator for municipalities experiencing assassinations 7 or more years ago, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Stacked DID regression includes state-specific yearly linear trends to account for different weights across yearly subdatasets used to create the estimator. Two-way fixed effect regressions with covariates include controls for $\log(\text{number of criminal organizations} + 1)$, homicide rates, $\log(\text{total homicides} + 1)$, average years of schooling for the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, and years since the most recent election (level and squared) fixed at the final pre-assassination attempt year. Other estimators do not include covariates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and clustered at the municipality level for all regressions except Stacked DID, which is clustered on municipality-year level.

Table 6: Hypothetical wage costs of retaining departing workers by age group, TWFE with covariates


	(1) 20s	(2) 30s	(3) 40s	(4) 50s	(5) 20-30s	(6) 30-40s
Panel A. Change in proportion of workers by age						
Change in share	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.086** (0.036)	-0.045 (0.036)	0.039 (0.033)	-0.099** (0.046)	-0.131*** (0.046)
Pre-event share (1=100%)	0.220	0.315	0.248	0.217	0.535	0.563
% change in size due to π (1=100%)	-0.059	-0.273	-0.181	0.179	-0.185	-0.233
Panel B. Wage-amenity tradeoff with Dal Bó et al. (2013) elasticity estimate (2.15)						
Trade-off rate	-0.028	-0.126	-0.084	0.083	-0.086	-0.108
N	651	651	651	651	651	651
Municipalities	113	113	113	113	113	113
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

This table reports the estimates of the rate of increase in wages required to retain different types of municipal workers, as explained in Section 6.2. The first row in Panel A reports the point estimates and the standard errors of the average post-assassination treatment effects for the proportion of each age group within municipal governments specified in the header of each column. Results are obtained using two-way fixed effects and covariates analogous to Equation (2). Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and reported in parentheses. The second row is obtained from taking the average of the proportion of these workers one period before the assassination attempt took place. Numbers in the third row are obtained by dividing the point estimates in the first row by the same in the second row. This represents the change in the number of workers in each category before and after the assassination attempts. In Panel B, the wage-amenity trade-off rate is calculated by dividing the percent change in size of workers obtained from Panel A with changes in labor supply with respect to wages from Dal Bó et al. (2013), 2.15. This represents the increase in wages needed to keep workers employed. Given that this cost arises from a decrease in amenities due to assassinations and the fear of political violence that follows it, it quantifies the cost of political violence to the local government.


Figures

Figure 1: Assassination against mayors, in total numbers and murder rate




Note: Figures above show the variation in the incidence of assassinations and murder rates across different years and municipalities. The figures in the top panel describe the number of assassinations against mayors from 2002-2021, based on the data collected by the author. The figures in the bottom panel present murder rates calculated as homicides per 100,000 people for mayors and all population. The numbers for the general population are represented by the left axis and the green dashed lines. The numbers for the mayors is displayed on the right axis and in a red solid line. This is calculated by dividing the annual number of mayors assassinated by the total number of municipalities and then multiplying by 100,000.

Figure 2: Temporal and Geographical variation in successful mayor assassinations vs near-misses



(a) Frequency of successful attacks and near-misses on mayors


Classification of municipalities, based on outcomes of assassination attempts in Mexico



(b) Geographical distribution of the outcome of attacks on mayors


Note: Panel (a) shows the variation of the results of attacks against mayors across time. Categories include successful attacks resulting in the death of a mayor (treatment), mayors who escaped unharmed (control), and those who were injured, but not killed. Panel (b) shows the results of these attacks at a geographical level. Municipalities in which both failed attacks and successful assassination has occurred is classified as a treatment group and appears as 'Assassinated' on the map. The data used for creating the figures are from various sources and the author's collection is based on the method described in Section 3. A full list of mayors who were victims of the attack and sources are in Appendix A.3.

Figure 3: Decreases in tax revenues after assassinations




Note: The figures report the event study regression on the different measures of tax revenues. The outcome variables used in each regression are listed below each graph. All regressions include a binned indicator for municipalities experiencing assassinations 7 or more years ago, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Stacked DID regression includes state-specific yearly linear trends to account for different weights across yearly subdatasets used to create the estimator. Two-way fixed effect regressions with covariates include controls for $\log(\text{number of criminal organizations} + 1)$, homicide rates, $\log(\text{total homicides} + 1)$, average years of schooling for the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, and years since the most recent election (level and squared) fixed at the final pre-assassination attempt year. Other estimators do not include covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure 4: Changes in revenues from other sources for the municipalities




Note: The figures report the event study regression on the different sources of revenues for the municipal government. The outcome variables used in each regression are listed below each graph. All regressions include a binned indicator for municipalities experiencing assassinations 7 or more years ago, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Stacked DID regression includes state-specific yearly linear trends to account for different weights across yearly subdatasets used to create the estimator. Two-way fixed effect regressions with covariates include controls for $\log(\text{number of criminal organizations} + 1)$, homicide rates, $\log(\text{total homicides} + 1)$, average years of schooling for the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, and years since the most recent election (level and squared) fixed at the final pre-assassination attempt year. Other estimators do not include covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure 5: Share and volume of expenditures across different categories




Note: The figures report the event study regression on the different measures of expenditures of the municipal government. The outcome variables used in each regression are listed below each graph. All regressions include a binned indicator for municipalities experiencing assassinations 7 or more years ago, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Stacked DID regression includes state-specific yearly linear trends to account for different weights across yearly subdatasets used to create the estimator. Two-way fixed effect regressions with covariates include controls for $\log(\text{number of criminal organizations} + 1)$, homicide rates, $\log(\text{total homicides} + 1)$, average years of schooling for the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, and years since the most recent election (level and squared) fixed at the final pre-assassination attempt year. Other estimators do not include covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure 6: Outside opportunities peak for those in 30s and 40s




Note: The figure depicts the summary statistics for labor earnings by each age group, sourced from the National Survey on Occupation and Employment (ENOE) from INEGI. Panels (a) and (b) report the average hourly wage and monthly earnings per age group whose municipality of residence is included in the same group of municipalities in the regressions. Panels (c) and (d) report the regression coefficients for the dummies in the age group from the regression that uses each labor earnings as an outcome and includes fixed effects for industry, year, quarter of survey, and municipality. Respondents in their 10s were used as a benchmark group. The figures in Panels (c) and (d) also include a 95% confidence interval with standard errors clustered at the municipal level.

Figure 7: Changes in the size and age composition of municipal workers




Note: The figures report the event study regression on the composition of workers by age group. The outcome variables are calculated relative to the total number of municipal workers. All regressions include a binned indicator for municipalities experiencing assassinations beyond the event timing window, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Stacked DID regression includes state-specific yearly linear trends to account for different weights across yearly subdatasets used to create the estimator. Two-way fixed effect regressions with covariates include controls for $\log(\text{number of criminal organizations} + 1)$, homicide rates, $\log(\text{total homicides} + 1)$, average years of schooling for the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, and years since the most recent election (level and squared) fixed at the final pre-assassination attempt year. Other estimators do not include covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure 8: Testing for alternative mechanisms



Note: The figures report the event study regression results to test for the existence of alternative mechanisms. The measures of homicides in Panel (a) are recalculated by omitting the assassination of a mayor. Panel (b) dates from 2011. Nightlight variables in panel (c) are sourced from harmonizing the nightlight intensities from DMSP (1995-2013) and VIIRS (2014-2021), as in Appendix Section A.5. The working age population in panel (d) and population density in panel (e) are from the WorldPop (2000 and after) and the Mexican Census (pre-2000). Outmigration data in panel (f) is from the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME) and dates from 2008. The regression setup and fixed effects are the same as Equation (2). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure 9: Further criminal organization presence in treated municipalities



Note: The figures report the event study regression on the different measures of gang presence. The outcome variables used in each regression are specified in the sub-caption for each figure. Outcomes in Panels (a) and (b) include unidentified armed groups. Panels (c) and (d) calculates new entries and multiple criminal groups using criminal groups that are identified (thus, unidentified criminal groups are excluded). Specifications used for each plot and 95% confidence intervals are listed in the bottom of each graph. Each regression includes fixed effects for years and municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Appendix A Further explanation on the background and the data

In this section, I will provide an additional explanation of the details of municipal finance in Mexico, the full procedure of collecting data on mayors who are victims of assassination attempts and the complete list, a further definition of key variables used in the research, and a detailed explanation on the composition of the nightlight dataset.

Subsection A.1 Additional details on municipal finance in Mexico

Municipalities in Mexico shoulder the work of providing key public goods to Mexico. The revenue required comes mainly from three sources - property taxes, non-earmarked funds (*participaciones*) and earmarked funds (*aportaciones*). Property taxes are purely determined by the tax collection at the municipal level, but they take up only about 15-20% of the municipal revenues (INEGI 2016). Others are from the two funds from the federal government, with the design following the principles of fiscal federalism (Weingast 2009). Earmarked funds are designed to correct for equity, while non-earmarked funds include components that emphasize fiscal incentives and efficiency of subnational governments(Weingast 2009; World Bank 2016).

- **Property taxation:** Municipalities are responsible for collection and keeping records of property owners and values (World Bank 2016). This takes up 70% of the total tax revenues (World Bank 2016; INEGI 2016). However, tax rates are subject to approval from the state legislature (OECD 2016).
- **Non-earmarked funds:** These are composed of General Participation Funds (FGP) and Municipal Development Funds (FFM), as well as transfers from taxes received by the federal government (Timmons and Broid 2013). Each of these categories includes proportions determined by past receipt of the same funds, demographics, and tax revenues generated within municipalities (Timmons and Broid 2013). The state government receives these funds from the federal government, which are then passed on to the municipalities at the discretion of the state.

The formula for FGP is as follows, according to SEGOB (2011). It is comprised of the fixed part derived from the nominal amount of transfers received from previous fiscal years and the variable part. The fixed prevents states and municipalities from suffering drastic adjustments to this transfer. The variable part provides additional funds to local governments that experience

an increase in the statewide GDP per capita, an increase in local tax revenues, and a high level of local taxes. The three components are weighed as follows

- 60% on increase in yearly statewide GDP per capita, weighted by population
- 30% on three-year moving average increase in tax collection, weighted by population
- 10% on the level of local tax collection, weighted by population

The shocks to tax collection may affect the FGP amount through the changes in the variable part that determines the amount. Once it receives the transfers based on the above formula, the state legislature determines the amount of FGP to each municipality.

- **Earmarked funds:** These include Funds for infrastructural development (FISM) and Funds supporting municipal development (FORTAMUN). The former is conditioned primarily for infrastructural development while the other can be more general in purpose (SEGOB 2011). In both, the amount of funds primarily depends on population and poverty indices (SEGOB 2011; World Bank 2016)

Subsection A.2 Data collection procedure for identifying mayors who are attacked

The collection of the information on mayors who are the victims of successful and failed assassination attempts is based on a semi-automated program written in Python and primarily uses `selenium` package. The `selenium` package is a collection of codes that automate the human interaction with the web interface.¹ Actions that can be performed with this package include clicking links, typing designated phrases, and storing blocks of text. However, for getting through some security features such as two-way authentication, automation is complicated and needs human intervention. Thus, the program I have devised is semi-automated.

The workflow designed in the program is as follows. First, the program accesses the online newspaper archives (*Newsbank* and *ProQuest*) using log-in credentials provided by the school library.² In using the school login credentials, I follow the default security settings for the school and use two-way authentication. Then, The program types in key phrases on the search box and filters search

1. Alternatives to scraping texts include `scrapy` and `beautifulsoup` packages. While they provide better performance in terms of speed, they are also likely to be subject to anti-scraping measures implemented by each website. Thus, I chose `selenium` as the primary package for this program.

2. Access to these online newspaper archives are mostly provided to libraries in many educational institutions in the US and other countries.

results based on newspaper source and date. Afterwards, the program collects the name of the publisher, date, title, and the full text of the article. Finally, I discard the unnecessary articles and categorize assassination attempts into successful and failed ones based on the texts in the article. This last step is not based on selenium, but done through reviewing the articles. The following diagram summarizes the process.



The key phrases used for the search are as follows

- Assassinated: *presidente municipal fue asesinado*, and *matan/asesinan/ejecutan a presidente municipal*
- Failed: *presidente municipal fue atacado/atentado* and *atentan/atacan a presidente municipal*
- Kidnapped: *presidente municipal fue secuestrado* and *secuestran a presidente municipal*
- Threats: *presidente municipal fue amenazado* and *amenazan/narcomensaje a presidente municipal*
- Family members targeted: Include the terms *esposo/esposa* (husband/wife), *hermano/hermana* (brother/sister), *hijo/hija* (son/daughter), *padre/madre* (father/mother), *primo/prima* (cousins), *tío/tía* (uncle/aunt), and *sobrino/sobrina* (nephews) to the key phrases used above
- Non-violent deaths: *presidente municipal fallecio/murio* and *fallece/muere presidente municipal*

Once the key phrases are entered, the program filters the articles based on the date of publication and source. Specifically, I select the dates up to Dec 31st, 2021 since I do not include cases from the year 2022 and onwards for the analysis due to the lack of data on key variables for this period. In addition, I limit the results to show just the newspaper articles, which rules out other types of sources stored in the online news archives such as books, and scholarly articles on the topic.

After filtering, the program collects information on the publisher, title, date, and text content of the article. The publishers used in this stage include *Reforma*, *El Universal*, *El Norte*, and *El Economista*, among others. The newspaper sources used to identify each case are contained in the list of mayors who are part of the study. Other information is used to identify whether the article is about attacks on mayors, as well as to pinpoint the date and location of the attacks.

Then, I discard the unrelated articles and categorize assassination attempts into successful and failed ones based on the information in the article text. Unrelated articles include all words in the key phrases but are not relevant to attacks on mayors, such as the article about a municipal president criticizing an assassination of other individuals. Based on the manual review and topic categorization using Latent Dirichlet Allocation, I narrow down the collection to relevant articles and determine the type of attacks carried out against a mayor. To distinguish between injured and unharmed mayors, I check for words such as *herido/lesionado/se translado al hospital* (injured) and *sale ilesa/ilesa* (unharmed).³

Subsection A.3 List of mayors included in the study

The table below is a list of mayors who are included in the study. The list includes information on the names, municipalities, and political parties that they represented at the time of the attack, the date of the attack, and whether this was a successful or failed assassination attempt.

3. Any cases which mention that the mayor was not present at the attacks on the office/residence is categorized as unharmed. Also, I check for similar verbs for female mayors, with *o's* in the end replaced with *a's*.

Table A1: List of mayors who were assassinated

	Name	Municipality and state	Date	Sources
1	Jaime Valencia Santiago	San Agustín Loxicha-Oaxaca	2002/01/13	Imparcial Oaxaca, La Jornada, El Universal
2	Mario Sostenes Lozano Camacho	San Sebastián Tecomaxtlahuaca-Oaxaca	2004/07/14	Proceso, Wradio, El Universal
3	Fernando Chavez Lopez	Buenavista-Michoacan	2005/07/09	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
4	Neguib Tadeo Manriquez Madriaga	Ciudad Ixtepec-Oaxaca	2006/01/13	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
5	Raul Delgado Benavides	Cuautitlán de García Barragán-Jalisco	2006/07/15	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Colima Noticias
6	Walter Herrera Ramirez	Huimanguillo-Tabasco	2006/11/15	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, El Heraldo de Tabasco
7	Juan Marcelo Ibarra Villa	Madero-Michoacan	2008/06/01	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
8	Manuel Angulo Torres	Topia-Durango	2008/06/03	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Proceso
9	Homero Lorenzo Rios	Ayutla de los Libres-Guerrero	2008/09/25	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
10	Salvador Christopher Vergara Cruz	Ixtapan de la Sal-Edomex	2008/10/03	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
11	Claudio Reyes Nunez	Otáez-Durango	2009/02/04	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
12	Octavio Manuel Carrillo Castellanos	Vista Hermosa-Michoacan	2009/02/24	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Vanguardia
13	Luis Carlos Ramirez Lopez	Ocampo-Durango	2009/06/01	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Vanguardia
14	Hector Ariel Meixueiro Muñoz	Namiquipa-Chihuahua	2009/07/14	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
15	Ramon Mendivil Sotelo	Guadalupe y Calvo-Chihuahua	2010/02/17	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Milenio
16	Manuel Estrada Escalante	Mezquital-Durango	2010/02/22	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
17	Vidal Olivera Cruz	San Lorenzo Albarradas-Oaxaca	2010/04/01	Esparza et al. (2018), Excelsior, AALMAC
18	Jose Santiago Agustin	Zapotitlán Tablas-Guerrero	2010/04/28	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, El Economista
19	Jesus Manuel Lara Rodriguez	Guadalupe-Chihuahua	2010/06/19	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, El Mañana
20	Oscar Venancio Martinez Rivera	San José del Progreso-Oaxaca	2010/06/20	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
21	Nicolas Garcia Ambrosio	Santo Domingo de Morelos-Oaxaca	2010/06/30	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Expansion
22	Alfonso Pena Pena	Tepehuanes-Durango	2010/07/26	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Expansion
23	Edelmiro Cavazos Leal	Santiago-Nuevo León	2010/08/18	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, LA Times
24	Marco Antonio Leal Garcia	Hidalgo-Tamaulipas	2010/08/30	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, LA Times
25	Alexander Lopez Garcia	El Naranjo-San Luis Potosí	2010/09/09	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Expansion
26	Prisciliano Rodriguez Salinas	Doctor González-Nuevo León	2010/09/24	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Vanguardia
27	Gustavo Sanchez Cervantes	Tancítaro-Michoacan	2010/09/27	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Informador
28	Jaime Lozoya Avila	San Bernardo-Durango	2010/11/05	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
29	Saúl Vara Rivera	Zaragoza-Coahuila	2011/01/05	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Excelsior
30	Abraham Ortiz Rosales	Temoac-Morelos	2011/01/10	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Excelsior

31	Pedro Luis Jiminez Mata	Santiago Amoltepec-Oaxaca	2011/01/13	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Excelsior
32	Saturnino Valdes Llanos	Tampico Alto-Veracruz	2011/02/23	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Expansion
33	Fortino Cortes Sandoval	Benito Juárez-Zacatecas	2011/07/28	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Vanguardia
34	Jose Eduviges Nava Altamirano	Zacualpan-Edomex	2011/08/19	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Expansion
35	Ricardo Guzman Romero	La Piedad-Michoacan	2011/11/03	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, El Pais
36	Rafael Landa Fernandez	Atzalan-Veracruz	2012/04/18	El Universal, Alcalorpolitico, Vanguardia
37	Marisol Mora Cuevas	Tlacojalpan-Veracruz	2012/06/29	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
38	Pedro Filemon Luis Hernandez	San Miguel Tilquiápam-Oaxaca	2012/08/02	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Libertad Oaxaca
39	Nadin Torralba Mejia	Técpán de Galeana-Guerrero	2012/08/05	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Vanguardia
40	Himeldo Rayon de Jesus	San Juan Juquila Mixes-Oaxaca	2012/08/24	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Diario Despertar de Oaxaca
41	Wilfrido Flores Villa	Nahuatzen-Michoacan	2013/02/04	El Universal, Justice in Mexico, La Jornada
42	Feliciano Martinez Bautista	San Juan Mixtepec Distrito 08-Oaxaca	2013/03/24	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
43	Jose Rene Garrido Rocha	San Salvador el Verde-Puebla	2013/04/21	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Ell Siglo de Torreon
44	Celestino Felix Vazquez Luis	San Miguel Tilquiápam-Oaxaca	2013/06/04	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Proceso
45	Geronimo Manuel Garcia Rosas	Aquila-Veracruz	2013/07/23	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, La Jornada
46	Ygnacio Lopez Mendoza	Santa Ana Maya-Michoacan	2013/11/07	El Pais, El Universal, Aristegui Noticias
47	Gustavo Garibay Garcia	Tanhuate-Michoacan	2014/03/22	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Justice in Mexico
48	Teodulo Gea Dominguez	Pánuco-Veracruz	2014/07/14	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Alcalorpolitico
49	Manuel Gomez Torres	Ayutla-Jalisco	2014/08/03	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Expansion
50	Mario Sanchez Cuevas	San Miguel el Grande-Oaxaca	2015/10/07	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, Presencia
51	Gisela Mota Ocampo	Temixco-Morelos	2016/01/02	Esparza et al. (2018), El Universal, NY Times
52	Juan Antonio Mayen Saucedo	Jilotzingo-Edomex	2016/04/22	Esparza et al. (2018), Aristegui Noticias, Mexico News Daily
53	Domingo López González	Chamula-Chiapas	2016/07/23	Esparza et al. (2018), El Pais, El Financiero
54	Ambrosio Soto Duarte	Pungarabato-Guerrero	2016/07/24	Esparza et al. (2018), El Financiero, The Yucatan Times
55	Jose Santa Maria Zavala	Huehuetlán el Grande-Puebla	2016/08/01	Esparza et al. (2018), Expansion, El Economista
56	Jose Villanueva Rodriguez	Ocotlán de Morelos-Oaxaca	2016/12/17	Esparza et al. (2018), AALMAC, El Imparcial
57	Antolin Vidal Martinez	Tepexco-Puebla	2017/01/24	Esparza et al. (2018), La Jornada, El Mineral
58	Alejandro Hernandez Santos	San Bartolomé Loxicha-Oaxaca	2017/04/28	Esparza et al. (2018), Imagen del Golfo, Proceso
59	Stalin Sanchez Gonzalez	Paracho-Michoacan	2017/10/06	Esparza et al. (2018), El Financiero, El Universal
60	Manuel Hernandez Pasion	Huitzilan de Serdán-Puebla	2017/10/10	Esparza et al. (2018), Animal Politico, Cronica de Chihuahua
61	Crispin Gutierrez Moreno	Ixtlahuacán-Colima	2017/10/20	Esparza et al. (2018), La Jornada, El Universal Queretaro
62	Victor Manuel Espinoza Tolentino	Ixhuatlán de Madero-Veracruz	2017/11/25	Esparza et al. (2018), Noroeste, El Financiero
63	Jose Santos Hernandez	San Pedro el Alto-Oaxaca	2017/12/09	Esparza et al. (2018), Telesur TV, AALMAC
64	Sergio Antonio Zenteno Albores	Bochil-Chiapas	2017/12/18	Esparza et al. (2018), Zeta Tijiana, Sin Embargo

65	Arturo Gómez Pérez	Petatlán-Guerrero	2017/12/28	Esparza et al. (2018), Mexico News Daily, Noroeste
66	Jose Efrain Garcia Garcia	Tlanepantla-Puebla	2018/04/12	Esparza et al. (2018), El Pais, Noticieros Televisa
67	Juan Carlos Andrade Magana	Jilotlán de los Dolores-Jalisco	2018/04/15	Esparza et al. (2018), Telesur TV, La Jornada
68	Alejandro Gonzalez Ramos	Pacula-Hidalgo	2018/05/03	Esparza et al. (2018), Proceso, El Piñero
69	Abel Montufar Mendoza	Coyuca de Catalan-Guerrero	2018/05/08	Esparza et al. (2018), Aristegui Noticias, Alcaldes de Mexico
70	Alejandro Chavez Zavala	Taretan-Michoacan	2018/06/14	El Universal, NPR, Dallas News
71	Javier Urena Gonzalez	Buenavista-Michoacan	2018/06/27	ACLED, El Norte, Noroeste
72	Victor Jose Guadalupe Diaz Contreras	Tecalitlán-Jalisco	2018/07/02	ACLED, El Financiero, El Economista
73	Genaro Negrete Urbano	Naupan-Puebla	2018/08/06	ACLED, El Financiero, Milenio
74	Olga Gabriela Kobel Lara	Juárez-Coahuila	2018/12/16	ACLED, El Universal, Milenio
75	Alejandro Aparicio Santiago	Heroica Ciudad de Tlaxiao-Oaxaca	2019/01/01	ACLED, El Universal, Milenio
76	David Eduardo Otlica Aviles	Nahuatzen-Michoacan	2019/04/23	ACLED, Mexico News Daily, Milenio
77	Maricela Vallejo Orea	Mixtla de Altamirano-Veracruz	2019/04/24	ACLED, Infobae, El Universal
78	Carmela Parral Santos	San Jose Estancia Grande-Oaxaca	2019/08/17	ACLED, El Pais, Reporte Indigo
79	Francisco Tenorio Contreras	Valle de Chalco Solidaridad-Edomex	2019/10/29	ACLED, La Jornada, El Universal
80	Arturo Garcia Velazquez	San Felipe Jalapa de Díaz-Oaxaca	2019/12/23	ACLED, Milenio, La Jornada
81	Carlos Ignaio Beltran Bencomo	Temósachic-Chihuahua	2020/09/29	ACLED, Infobae, El Financiero
82	Florisel Rio Delfin	Jamapa-Veracruz	2020/11/11	ACLED, e-Veraceruz, Proceso
83	Leobardo Ramos Lazaro	Chahuites-Oaxaca	2021/02/04	ACLED, El Pais, El Economista
84	Alfredo Sevilla Cuevas	Casimiro Castillo-Jalisco	2021/03/11	ACLED, Infobae, 24horas
85	Manuel Aguilar Garcia	Zapotlán de Juárez-Hidalgo	2021/06/09	ACLED, La Jornada Hidalgo, Noroeste

Note: The above list includes mayors who were assassinated. 3 Municipalities were subject to multiple assassinations against their mayors (San Miguel Tilquiápam-Oaxaca in 2012 and 2013; Buenavista-Michoacan in 2005 and 2018; Nahuatzen-Michoacan in 2013 and 2018). Thus, there are 82 unique municipalities that experienced at least one assassination. Full link to the articles are stored in the separate data file.

Table A2: List of mayors subject to failed attacks

	Name	Municipality, State	Date	Time away	Sources
1	Antonio Pouchoulen Cardenas	Las Choapas-Veracruz	2008/03/29		Alcalor Politico, Wradio, Proceso
2	Jesus Fernando Garcia Hernandez	Navolato-Sinaloa	2008/11/05	✓	La Jornada, El Siglo de Torreon, El Universal
3	Luis Carlos Ramirez Lopez	Ocampo-Durango	2008/11/18		El Siglo de Torreon, Wradio, El Universal
4	Arturo Bonilla Morales	Tlacoapa-Guerrero	2009/10/14	✓	El Siglo de Torreon, El Universal,
5	Maria Santos Gorrostietta	Tiquicheo de Nicolás Romero-Michoacan	2009/10/15	✓	Insight Crime, El Universal, Expansion
6	Maria Santos Gorrostietta	Tiquicheo de Nicolás Romero-Michoacan	2010/01/23	✓	Insight Crime, El Universal, Expansion
7	Raul Mario Mireles Garza	Sabinas Hidalgo-Nuevo León	2010/10/11		Expansion, Wradio, El Economista
8	Jose Eligio Moreno Martinez	Cuencame-Durango	2010/10/20		Reforma, El Siglo de Durango,
9	Jaime Heliodoro Rodriguez Calderon	Garcia-Nuevo León	2011/02/25		Expansion, La Jornada, Proceso
10	Ricardo Solis Manriquez	Gran Morelos-Chihuahua	2011/03/23	✓	El Mañana, Reforma,
11	Jaime Heliodoro Rodriguez Calderon	Garcia-Nuevo León	2011/03/29		Expansion, La Jornada, Proceso
12	Clara Luz Flores Carrales	General Escobedo-Nuevo León	2011/07/03		Expansion, La Jornada, El Economista
13	Eleazar Palacios Rojas	San Pedro Totolápam-Oaxaca	2011/07/08	✓	Quadratin Oaxaca, La Radio del Siglo XXI,
14	Julio Cesar Salmeron Salazar	Alcozauca-Guerrero	2011/08/04		Vanguardia, Informador,
15	Filiberto Martinez	Solidaridad-Quintana Roo	2011/09/14		Proceso, Noticaribe, EFE News
16	Alejandro Higuera Osuna	Mazatlan-Sinaloa	2011/11/08		Chicago Tribune, Wradio, El Universal
17	Miguel Hernandez Anaya	San Miguel el Alto-Jalisco	2011/12/18		Informador, Proceso,
18	Andres Cardenas Guerrero	Coahuayana-Michoacan	2012/03/09	✓	Arestegui Noticias, Quadratin Michoacan,
19	Francisco de Jesus Ayon Lopez	Guadalajara-Jalisco	2012/07/09		Informador, 24horas, El Economista
20	Francisco Omar Corza Gallegos	Vista Hermosa-Michoacan	2012/07/23		El Universal, Arestegui Noticias,
21	Alejandro Tejeda Lopez	Zacapu-Michoacan	2012/10/05		El Universal, Arestegui Noticias,
22	Gustavo Garibay Garcia	Tanhuate-Michoacan	2012/10/12	✓	El Pais, Excelsior, El Economista
23	Miguel Entzin Cruz	Pantelho-chiapas	2012/12/18	✓	Reforma, SDP Noticias, Proceso
24	Rocio Rebollo Mendoza	Gomez Palacio-Durango	2013/02/05		Vanguardia, El Siglo de Torreon, Excelsior
25	Feliciano Alvarez Mesino	Cuetzala del Progreso-Guerrero	2013/04/09	✓	Proceso, Diario,
26	Pedro Luis Jiminez Hernandez	Santiago Amoltepec-Oaxaca	2013/05/13	✓	Excelsior, La Jornada, Animal Politico
27	Cesar Miguel Penalosa Santana	Cocula-Guerrero	2013/06/06		La Silla Rota, Imagen Radio, Proceso
28	Pablo Rodriguez Santiago	San Miguel del Puerto-Oaxaca	2013/06/24	✓	Excelsior, Vanguardia, La Jornada
29	Feliciano Alvarez Mesino	Cuetzala del Progreso-Guerrero	2013/08/26	✓	Proceso, Diario,
30	Enrique Antonio Paul	Texistepec-Veracruz	2014/04/01	✓	El Universal, Reforma, El Economista

31	Elizabeth Gutierrez Paz	Juan R. Escudero-Guerrero	2014/05/19	✓	La Jornada, El Financiero, Notigodinez
32	Leopoldo Molina Corral	Guadalupe y Calvo-Chihuahua	2014/09/08		Milenio, Debate, Noroeste
33	Juan Raúl Acosta Salas	Choix-Sinaloa	2015/03/06	✓	The Guardian, Debate, Expansion
34	Leticia Salazar	Matamoros-Tamaulipas	2015/03/09		Expansion, Colima Noticias, Telesur TV
35	Miguel Antonio Castillo	Coahuiltecan-Veracruz	2015/03/13	✓	Costa Veracruz, El Heraldo de Poza Rica, Marcha
36	Mario de la Garza Garza	San Fernando-Tamaulipas	2015/05/30		El Siglo de Torreon, Aristegui Noticias, Reforma
37	Miguel Angel Castro Rosas	Amatlan de los Reyes-Veracruz	2015/07/19	✓	Quadratin Veracruz, El Siglo de Torreon
38	Romualdo Fuentes Galicia	Jantetelco-Morelos	2015/08/13	✓	Zona Centro Noticias, El Financiero, Reforma
39	Jose Santa Maria Zavala	Huehuetlán el Grande-Puebla	2015/09/01	✓	Expansion, El Pais, El Universal
40	Víctor Eduardo Castañeda Luquín.	Ahuatlalco de Mercado-Jalisco	2016/03/01		Excelsior, La Vanguardia, Alcaldes de Mexico
41	Israel Varela Ordóñez	Batopilas-Chihuahua	2017/01/17	✓	La Jornada, AM, Sin Embargo
42	Oscar Toral Rios	Asuncion Ixtaltepec-Oaxaca	2017/06/01	✓	El Universal, Corta Mortraja, ABC Radio
43	Jose Misael Gonzalez	Coalcomán de Vázquez Pallares-Michoacan	2017/10/20	✓	El Universal, Reforma, Aristegui Noticias
44	Andres Valencia Rios	San Juan Evangelista-Veracruz	2018/01/08		ACLED, Enlace Veracruz, El Sol de Puebla
45	Jose Rafael Nunez Ramirez	San Martín Texmelucan-Puebla	2018/02/01		ACLED, Milenio, Angulo7
46	Hugo Garcia Rios	San José Tenango-Oaxaca	2018/04/28		La Silla Rota, Vanguardia, El Sol de Mexico
47	Pablo Higuera Fuentes	Eduardo Neri-Guerrero	2018/06/26		ACLED, El Universal, El Financiero
48	Antonio Ramirez Itehua	Astacinga-Veracruz	2019/02/04	✓	ACLED, El Universal, El Economista
49	Emilio Montero Perez	Juchitan de Zaragoza -Oaxaca	2019/03/09		El Imparcial, Noticieros Televisa, Debate
50	Ernesto Quintanilla Villareal	Cadereyta Jiménez-Nuevo León	2019/03/10		ACLED, El Universal, Linea Directa
51	Domingo Cordoba Martinez	Chapulco-Puebla	2019/06/04		ACLED, El Popular, Milenio
52	Felix Alberto Linares Gonzalez	Ocuilan-Edomex	2019/07/03		Debate, De Paso Yucatan, La Jornada
53	Griselda Martinez Martinez	Manzanillo-Colima	2019/07/27		ACLED, Infobae, El Universal
54	Benito Olvera Munoz	Acatlan-Hidalgo	2019/07/31		El Sol de Hidalgo, El Reportero, AM
55	Eduardo Maldonado Garcia	San Felipe-Guanajuato	2019/08/22		ACLED, Milenio, El Siglo de Durango
56	Sara Valle Dessens	Guaymas-Sonora	2019/10/10		ACLED, El Imparcial, La jornada
57	Fernando Vilchis Contreras	Ecatepec-Edomex	2019/11/05		El Sol de Mexico, Noticias CD
58	Juan de Dios Valle Camacho	Ahumada-Chihuahua	2020/03/04		El Sol de Mexico, Reforma, El Norte
59	Abraham Cruz Gomez	Chenalho-Chiapas	2020/07/07	✓	ACLED, Excelsior, La Verdad Noticias
60	Aldo Molina Santos	Tenango de Doria-Hidalgo	2020/09/04		ACLED, Milenio, Quadratin Hidalgo
61	Cuitlahuac Contrado Escamilla	Acayucan-Veracruz	2020/11/17		Data Civica, Milenio, Infobae
62	Ponciano Gomez Gomez	Chamula-Chiapas	2020/12/05		El Siglo Coahuila, Proceso, La Jornada
63	Sinforiano Armenta Garcia	Tepetongo-Zacatecas	2021/04/08		La Jornada
64	Jorge Alberto Quinto Zamorano	Hueyapan de Ocampo-Veracruz	2021/04/22		Data Civica, Diario de Xalapa, El Sol de Mexico

65	Sandra Velazquez Lara	Pilcaya-Guerrero	2021/08/11	ACLED, Milenio, La Jornada
66	Carlos Alberto Paredes Correa	Tuxpan-Michoacan	2021/10/07	ACLED, Proceso, El Sol de Morelia
67	Geminiano Hernandez	Chiconamel-Veracruz	2021/11/19	ACLED, Milenio, Avi Veracruz
68	Calixto Urbano Lagunas	Atlatlahucan-Morelos	2021/11/19	ACLED, Diario de Morelos
69	Sinforiano Armenta Garcia	Tepetongo-Zacatecas	2021/11/24	Proceso, Excelsior, El Norte

Note: The above list includes mayors who were subject to failed attacks. 4 Municipalities were subject to multiple failed attacks against their mayors (Tiquicheo de Nicolás Romero-Michoacan in 2009 and 2010; García-Nuevo Leon 2011 Feb and March; Cuetzala del Progreso-Guerrero in 2013 Apr and Aug; Tepetongo-Zacatecas in 2021 Apr and Nov). In 7 of the municipalities listed here, a mayor was assassinated either before or after the failed attacks occurred (Ocampo-Durango in 2009; Vista Hermosa-Michoacan in 2009; Tanhuato-Michoacan in 2014; Santiago Amoltepec-Oaxaca in 2011; Guadalupe y Calvo-Chihuahua in 2010; Huehuetlán el Grande-Puebla in 2016; Chamula-Chiapas in 2016). Thus, 58 unique municipalities experienced at least one failed attack without experiencing successful mayor assassinations. These cases were separated into mayor spending time away from office due to being injured (*herido(a), lesionado(a), se translasdo(a) al hospital*) and returning due to being unharmed (*sale ilesa(a)*). These cases were categorized based on expressions appearing in the articles mentioned in the source column. In one case, a mayor (Ricardo Solís Manríquez) was unharmed from attacks but had to spend time away due to injuries he suffered during the election. Full links to the articles are stored in a separate data file.

Table A3: List of mayors who passed away in a non-violent manner

	Name	Municipality, State	Date	Reason of death	Sources
1	Oscar Zúñiga Quiroz	Mier y Noriega-Nuevo León	2002/03/15	car accident	Magar (2018), Proceso, Vlex
2	Carlos Filemón Kuk y Can	Motul-Yucatan	2003/07/28	car accident	Magar (2018), Proceso
3	Cecilio Amador Cuauhtle	Contla de Juarez Cuamatzi-Tlaxcala	2004/02/14	car accident	Magar (2018), El Siglo de Torreon, Proceso
4	Pedro Rojas Pérez	Santa Cruz Quilehtla-Tlaxcala	2004/02/14	car accident	Magar (2018), Proceso, Vlex
5	Delia Garza Gutiérrez	San Fernando-Tamaulipas	2007/07/20	cancer	Magar (2018), La Jornada, Cimac Noticias
6	Miguel Ángel Nicolás Mata	San Pedro Totolapan-Oaxaca	2009/08/06	car accident	Magar (2018) Panorama del Pacifico
7	José Manuel Maldonado	Piedras Negras-Coahuila	2010/07/07	plane crash	Magar (2018), El Economista, Plano Informativo
8	Rogelio Pérez Arrambide	Pesquería-Nuevo León	2010/07/25	heart attack	Magar (2018), Vlex, Presencia
9	Ignacio Rodríguez Villa	Nahuatzen-Michoacan	2012/09/29	respiratory disease	Magar (2018), Quadratin Michocan, TVNotas
10	Salomón Domínguez Jiménez	San Juan Lajarcia-Oaxaca	2012/11/19	car accident	Magar (2018), Libertad Oaxaca, Quadratin Oaxaca
11	Félix San Juan Rebollar	San Baltazar Chichicapam-Oaxaca	2013/01/06	unspecified illness	Magar (2018), Quadratin Oaxaca,
12	Leobardo Díaz Estrada	Urique-Chihuahua	2013/02/07	car accident	Magar (2018), Vanguardia, La Jornada
13	Joel Cebada Bernal	Nogales-Veracruz	2013/04/14	kidney failure	Magar (2018), Alcalor Politico, Orizaba en Red
14	Ernesto Rodríguez Rodríguez	Juchipila-Zacatecas	2013/08/16	heart attack	Magar (2018), Zacatacas Online, Vanguardia
15	Filimón Carlos Robles Díaz	Tepetongo-Zacatecas	2013/09/30	suicide	Magar (2018), Zacatacas Online, La Jornada
16	Eliud Cervantes Ramírez	Catemaco-Veracruz	2013/11/02	heart attack	Magar (2018), El Economista, Quadratin Mexico
17	Juan Ángel Castañeda Lizardo	Sombrerete-Zacatecas	2014/02/10	car accident	Magar (2018), Milenio, La Jornada
18	Sadot Bello García	Copala-Guerrero	2015/06/19	respiratory disease	Magar (2018), Expansion, Excelsior
19	Jesús Alvarado Hernández	San Pedro Sochiapam-Oaxaca	2015/11/03	Car accident	Magar (2018), El Universal, Excelsior
20	Alfredo Vizcarra Díaz	Concordia-Sinaloa	2016/09/20	stroke	Magar (2018), Noroeste, Proceso
21	Martha Elvia Fernández Sánchez	Cuautitlán-Edomex	2017/03/05	cancer	Magar (2018), MVS Noticias, Infobae
22	Fernando Álvaro Gómez	Tianguistenco-Edomex	2017/03/25	heart attack	Magar (2018), Proceso, El Sol de Mexico
23	Aurelio Cortez Aguirre	Santa Maria la Asuncion-Oaxaca	2017/05/17	gastric ulcer	Magar (2018), Legislador43, Tvbust
24	Irma Camacho García	Temixco-Morelos	2017/07/19	unspecified illness	Magar (2018), Proceso, Sinembargo
25	Edgar Gil Yoguez	Venustiano Carranza-Michoacan	2017/08/26	heart attack	Magar (2018), Notivideo, Mi Morelia
26	Salvador Aguilar García	Cohetzala-Puebla	2018/01/29	car accident	Magar (2018), Contrastes de Puebla
27	Jorge Luis García Vera	Villanueva-Zacatecas	2018/08/11	car accident	Magar (2018), El Universal, El Sol de Zacatecas
28	Zótico Gómez Bautista	Santiago Tetepec-Oaxaca	2018/09/20	car accident	Magar (2018), Debate, Excelsior
29	Jesús Bernardo Torres García	Santiago Suchiquitongo-Oaxaca	2018/10/30	pneumonia	Magar (2018), El Pinero, Imparcial Oaxaca
30	Raymunda Che Pech	Kantunil-Yucatan	2019/10/06	fainted at home	Magar (2018), El Financiero, El Universal

31	Félix Alberto Linares	Ocuilan-Edomex	2020/01/04	plane accident	Magar (2018), El Economista, Infobae
32	Óscar Gurría Penagos	Tapachula-Chiapas	2020/02/20	heart attack	Magar (2018), El Sol de Mexico, Milenio
33	Armando Portuguez Fuentes	Tultepec-Edomex	2020/05/23	heart attack	Magar (2018), Infobae, Excelsior
34	Sergio Anguiano Meléndez	Coyotepec-Edomex	2020/06/08	covid	Magar (2018), El Financiero, El Economista
35	Javier Santiago Ruiz	Reyes Etla-Oaxaca	2020/06/15	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal Oaxaca
36	Rigoberto González Pacheco	Bacoachi-Sonora	2020/06/16	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Reforma
37	José Humberto Arellano	Acaponeta-Nayarit	2020/06/17	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Infobae
38	Florencio San Germán Santiago	San Baltazar Chichicapan-Oaxaca	2020/06/28	covid	Magar (2018), La Razon, Central Municipal
39	Gerardo Tirso Acahua Apale	Coetzala-Veracruz	2020/06/28	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal
40	Josué Antonio García Rodríguez	Vanegas-San Luis Potosí	2020/07/08	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Sol de San Luis
41	Reyna Marlene de los Ángeles Catzín Cih	Maxcanú-Yucatan	2020/07/09	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal
42	Faustino Carín Molina Castillo	Amaxac-Tlaxcala	2020/07/13	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, La Jornada
43	Fernando Bautista Dávila	San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec-Oaxaca	2020/07/16	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal Oaxaca
44	Irma Delia Bárcena Villa	Miahuatlan-Veracruz	2020/07/16	covid	Magar (2018), El Sol de Mexico, Imagen del Golfo
45	Rigoberto Javier Tun Salas	Samahil-Yucatan	2020/07/19	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal
46	Artemio Ortiz Ricárdez	Tamazulapan del Espiritu Santo-Oaxaca	2020/08/05	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal Oaxaca
47	Victoria Rasgado Perez	Moloacan-Veracruz	2020/08/09	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Milenio
48	Alfredo Juarez Diaz	Matias Romero-Oaxaca	2020/08/18	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Excelsior
49	Pedro Escárcega Pérez	Santiago Jocotepec-Oaxaca	2020/08/21	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Infobae
50	Miguel Ángel Antonio Vázquez	General Felipe Ángeles-Puebla	2020/08/24	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Milenio
51	Victorino Gómez Martínez	San Bartolomé Quialana-Oaxaca	2020/08/25	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Milenio
52	Simón Ursino Barzán	San Simón Zahuatlán-Oaxaca	2020/08/26	car accident	Magar (2018), SDP Noticias, Milenio
53	Tomás Primo Negrete	Tonanitla-Edomex	2020/08/30	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal
54	Daniel Efren Hernández Hernández	San Miguel del Rio-Oaxaca	2020/09/13	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Quadratin Oaxaca
55	Pedro Modesto Santos	Santa Cruz Xitla-Oaxaca	2020/09/24	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Sopitas
56	Héctor Carrasco Márquez	Venustiano Carranza-Puebla	2020/10/03	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Milenio
57	Roberto Arriaga Colín	Ocampo-Michoacan	2020/10/05	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal Oaxaca
58	Carlos Mario Ortiz Sánchez	Salvador Alvarado-Sinaloa	2020/10/07	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal
59	Juan Manuel Rodríguez Rodríguez	Tulcingo del Valle-Puebla	2020/10/26	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Heraldo de Mexico
60	Carmen Prieto Mortera	Moloacan-Veracruz	2020/11/08	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, Milenio
61	Rubén Díaz Espinoza	Santo Domingo-San Luis Potosí	2020/11/09	covid	El Sol de San Luis, Quadratin Queretaro
62	Jorge Luis Peña Peña	Los Aldamas -Nuevo León	2020/12/14	heart attack	Magar (2018), El Norte, Reforma
63	José Rosario Romero Lugo	Jaltenco-Edomex	2020/12/17	covid	Magar (2018), El Economista, El Universal
64	Juan José Losoya Ponce	San Francisco de los Romo-Aguascalientes	2021/01/05	heart attack	El Universal, El Sol de Centro, La Razon

65	Efraín Lázaro	San Juan Tamazola-Oaxaca	2021/01/23	covid	Magar (2018), El Universal, Reforma
66	José Yolando Jarquín Bustamante	Xitlapehua-Oaxaca	2021/01/25	covid	Magar (2018), Proceso, Milenio
67	Filogonia Adorno Aragon	San Bartolo Cohuecan-Puebla	2021/01/27	covid	El Economista, El Sol de Puebla, Milenio
68	Maria de Jesús Chávez	Tasquillo-Hidalgo	2021/01/30	covid	Magar (2018), Excelsior, La Silla Rota
69	Aparicio Reyes Rojas	Santos Reyes Tepejillo-Oaxaca	2021/01/30	covid	Magar (2018), Excelsior, Proceso
70	Leonilo Ruiz Martínez	Santa Catarina Loxicha-Oaxaca	2021/02/02	covid	Magar (2018), Quadratin Oaxaca, Milenio
71	Fernando Raymundo Valeriano Rodriguez	San Simon Zahuatlán-Oaxaca	2021/02/05	covid	Nvinoticias, La Silla Rota
72	Misael Lorenzo Morales	Atzacan-Veracruz	2021/02/08	covid	Magar (2018), Infobae, Milenio
73	Jan Cruz Idiaquez	San Francisco Sola de Vega-Oaxaca	2021/02/08	unspecified illness	La Silla Rota, El Universa Oaxaca
74	Patricia González	Villa Tezontepec-Hidalgo	2021/02/18	covid	Magar (2018), La Jornada, Excelsior
75	Juvenal Garcia Hernandez	San Sebastian Rio Hondo-Oaxaca	2021/02/19	covid	El Economista, El Universal, El Imparcial Oaxaca
76	Amado Vasquez	San Pedro Mixtepec - Distrito 26-Oaxaca	2021/02/22	covid	El Economista, El Universal Oaxaca
77	Filadelfo Vergara Tapia	Petlalcingo-Puebla	2021/02/23	covid	El Economista, Reforma, El Sol de Puebla
78	Nicolas Galindo Marquez	Jalpan-Puebla	2021/02/25	covid	El Economista, La Jornada de Oriente, Milenio
79	Hugo García Ríos	San Jose Tenango-Oaxaca	2021/02/28	covid	El Economista, SDP Noticias, El Universal Oaxaca
80	Baltazar Gaona Sánchez	Tarimbaro-Michoacan	2021/03/05	covid	El Economista, La Jornada, El Sol de Morelia
81	Leobardo Aguilar Flores	Soltepec-Puebla	2021/03/31	covid	El Economista, Milenio, La Jornada de Oriente
82	Rogelio Torres Ortega	Tepoztlan-Morelos	2021/04/13	covid	El Economista, Infobae, Milenio
83	Jose Dolores Jimenez Lopez	Santa Maria Nativitas-Oaxaca	2021/06/09	covid	El Economista, El Universal Oaxaca
84	Trinidad Perez Coria	Mazatepec-Morelos	2021/07/20	heart attack	Milenio, El Sol de Cuernavaca, La Jornada
85	Evergisto Gamboa Diaz	Santiago Choapam-Oaxaca	2021/07/31	covid	El Norte, La Razon, Nvinoticias
86	Jorge Humberto Aguilar Perera	Kaua-Yucatan	2021/08/10	covid	Grillo de Yucatan, Diario de Yucatan
87	Carlos Manuel Calvo Martinez	Jiquipilas-Chiapas	2021/09/08	covid	La Jornada, Vanguardia Veracruz, Excelsior
88	Antonio Francisco Perez	Hermenegildo Galeana-Puebla	2021/09/15	covid	Municipios Puebla, Angulo7, El Sol de Puebla
89	Abel Sanchez Campos	San Antonino Castillo Velasco-Oaxaca	2021/12/28	natural	Meganoticias, El Universal Oaxaca

Note: The above list includes mayors who were subject to non-violent deaths. 3 municipalities experienced multiple non-violent deaths of their mayors (Moloacan-Veracruz in Aug and Nov of 2020; San Baltazar Chichicapam-Oaxaca in 2013 and 2020; San Simon Zahuatlán-Oaxaca in 2020 and 2021). In 2 municipalities, a mayor was also assassinated (Nahuatzen-Michoacan in 2013; Temixco-Morelos in 2016). Thus, 84 unique municipalities experienced non-violent deaths of the mayors without assassinations.

Subsection A.4 Definition of key variables from other datasets

A.4.1 Fiscal indicators: Revenues to municipal government

Following are the definitions of the fiscal variables used in the research. The definition and the categorization come from the INEGI's database (INEGI 2016).

- Tax revenues (*impuestos*): These are revenue that is paid by legal and natural persons under the relevant taxation law. At the municipal level, the following taxes are collected
 - Property taxes (*impuesto predial*)
 - Land tax revenues (*impuestos al patrimonio*): Summation of property taxes and sale tax on real estate. In some cases, this is translated as wealth tax
 - Other taxes include additional taxes on education (*impuestos adicionales para educación*) and public works (*impuestos adicionales para obras de públicas*)
- Non-earmarked funds from the federal government (*participaciones*): These are funds and resources given to the municipal governments, with no conditions specifically defined. The funds in this category depend both on demographic traits and local revenue-generating activities (SEGOB 2011)
 - General Participation Funds (*Fondo General de Participaciones*): This is also shared with the state governments, who must also share some of the amount they receive from this fund to municipalities according to the Financial Coordination Law (*Ley de Coordinación fiscal*)
 - Municipal Development Funds (*Fondo de Fomento Municipal*): There are more components determined by taxation in this category in general. This fund is exclusively destined to the municipalities and not the states (SEGOB 2011)
 - Other categories include transfers based on taxes collected at the federal or state level, such as vehicle taxes, gasoline taxes, and payroll taxes
- Earmarked funds from the federal government (*aportaciones*): These are funds and resources given to the municipal governments, with conditions on where these funds could be spent according to the Financial Coordination Law

- Municipal Fund for Social Infrastructure (*Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social Municipal*): Conditioned for the public projects and infrastructure development that benefits municipal population
 - Funds for Municipal Development (*Fondo de Aportaciones para el Fortalecimiento de los Municipios*): Conditioned for supporting municipal treasuries and other requirements of the municipalities, such as public security. Generally, the conditions on this fund are weaker than those of FISM (SEGOB 2011).
- Revenues from provision of public service (*derechos*): These are contributions to the municipal revenue through receipt of fees from servicing a public goods and services. The following are included
 - Registration services (*registro civil, registro público de la propiedad y del comercio*)
 - Certification and recording services (*certificaciones y constancias diversas*)
 - Licenses (*licencias al comercio ambulante, licencias de construcción*)
 - Water (*agua potable*)
 - Services related to urban development (*Servicios de desarrollo urbano y obras públicas*)
- Revenues from legal functions (*aprovechamientos*): Income received from public law functions.
 - Surcharges for interest payments (*recargos*), Fines (*multas*), Penalties for late payments of fees (*Rezagos*)

A.4.2 Fiscal indicators: Municipal government expenditures

Like the revenue variables, the definition and categorizations are from the INEGI (2016)

- Total payments to personnel (*Servicios personales*): Expenses towards the remuneration of personnel at the service of public entities. This includes wages, bonuses, and social security benefits.
 - General remunerations (*remuneraciones al personal*)
 - Others: Additional pay (*Remuneraciones adicionales y especiales*), Social security quotas (*cuotas de seguridad social y seguros*)

- Expenditures on general services (*Servicios generales*): Expenses designed to cover the costs of the services provided by the municipal government
 - Basic services (*servicios básico*): Includes expenses to water, electricity, telephone, and internet services
 - Those that are counted as other general expenditures include leases (*arrendamientos*), financial services (*servicios financieros, bancarios, y comerciales*), expenses on maintenance services including waste management (*servicios de instalación, reparación, mantenimiento y conservación*) and travel expenses for municipal personnel (*servicios de translado y viáticos*)
- Public investment (*Inversión pública*): Expenses on public projects and contracts on works related to municipal development and infrastructure.
 - Includes construction of residential and nonresidential buildings, schools, hospitals, and energy infrastructures on public and private domains
- Transfers and allowances to municipal institutions (*Transferencia, Asignaciones, subsidios y otra ayuda*): Allowances destined directly or indirectly to various entities to support economic and social policy, following the strategies for development and maintenance of the performance of the recipient entities
 - Transfers and allowances to internal public organizations (*transferencias internas y asignaciones al sector público*)
 - Subsidies to private entities (*Subsidios*)
 - Social assistance to individuals (*Ayudas*)

A.4.3 Variables on municipal personnel

- Committees mentioned in the Census of Municipal Governments: Among many others, the primary ones are treasury, internal control, public security, social development, and economic development. Other minor ones include committees for culture, municipal presidents, and others. (The categorization has changed in the 6th wave of the Census of Municipal Governments, published in 2021)

A.4.4 Further definition of the control variables used in the main specification

- Number of organized criminal groups: Calculated based on the number of organized criminal groups appearing in Coscia and Rios (2012) and Osorio and Beltran (2020) and ACLED. While Osorio and Beltran (2020) and ACLED also identifies subdivision of the major organized criminal groups, this is not the case for Coscia and Rios (2012). Thus, I use the number of major organized criminal groups and not their subdivisions for consistency.
- Homicide indicators: The total count of homicides is generated from the homicide records in INEGI, accessible with this link <https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est>. As for the homicide rate per 100,000 people, this is generated by dividing this with population measure
- Average level of schooling: Calculated based on response to year of schooling questions from the Mexican Census, with intercensal years calculated based on interpolation
- Share of indigenous population: Calculated based on response to year of schooling questions from the Mexican Census and population from census and WorldPop, with intercensal years calculated based on interpolation⁴
- Years since election: Number of calendar years passed since the most recent election
- Resource endowment: Amount of gold, silver, iron, copper, and zinc extracted in each municipality measured in tons. Data from 2000 and after uses a Mining-metallurgical industry survey from INEGI. Earlier data are from the mineral yearbook of the Council of Mineral Resources.

Subsection A.5 Creation of harmonized nightlight measures from DMSP and VIIRS

The two sources of the nightlight data primarily available for research purposes are the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and Visible and Infrared Imaging Suite (VIIRS).⁵ DMSP is available from 1992 to 2013, with multiple different satellites (F10, F12, F14, F15, F16, F18) covering different time periods.⁶ F10 satellite was operated from 1992-1994. F12 covers 1994-1999. F14 is

4. Results for homicides rates and share of population are robust to using either the Census or the combination of Census and WorldPop as population measures

5. Both datasets can be downloaded from the website for the Payne Institute for Public Policy under the Colorado School of Mines: <https://eogdata.mines.edu/products/dmsp/> (DMSP) and <https://eogdata.mines.edu/products/vnl/> (VIIRS)

6. As individual satellites were degrading in quality of measurements over time, multiple satellites were employed to make up for the shortcomings. (Yuan et al. 2022)

available from 1997-2003. F15 is used from 2000-2007. F16 runs from 2004-2009. For 2010-2013, F18 is used. VIIRS, on the other hand, is available publicly from 2012 and onwards, using a single satellite. The timeframe of this research spans from 1995 and 2021. With no single dataset having a time coverage that spans this period on its own, it is necessary to combine the two datasets to utilize the nightlight variables

However, two other differences complicate the combination of the two datasets. First, each pixel in the two datasets is measured in different geographic units. Each pixel of nightlight intensities in DMSP is measured in a 1km-by-1km unit, whereas the same for VIIRS is 500m-by-500m. Thus, I need to match the pixel units by aggregating the observations in the VIIRS to match the same unit of distance in DMSP.

More importantly, the measure of light intensity used in the two datasets is different. In DMSP, nightlight intensity is measured using ‘digital numbers’ (DNs), which is an arbitrary unit generated with a 6-bit quantization radiometric resolution over the nightlights (Yuan et al. 2022). The range for the DNs is 0 to 63, with extremely bright (dark) nightlights being topcoded (bottomcoded). For VIIRS, the nightlight intensities are measured in terms of the actual radiance and capture a wider range of nightlight intensities than DMSP. Furthermore, 1 value of DNs in DMSP can correspond to multiple values of nightlight intensities in the VIIRS dataset (Li et al. 2022; Yuan et al. 2022). Therefore, I create a unified light intensity measure by translating the VIIRS nightlight intensities to the corresponding DMSP DN values.

I take the following steps to create a combined dataset with an identical geographic pixel unit and consistent light intensity measure, based on the methods suggested by Li et al. (2022) and Yuan et al. (2022). I first create consistent nightlight intensity measures across all the different satellites in the DMSP sample. For years with multiple satellites, I averaged the different intensity values to represent the nightlight for each pixel. Then I generate a regression with the DN of each year t for each pixel i as an outcome variable, with the constant, DN, and DN-squared of the base year (2010) for the same pixel as an input (Yuan et al. 2022).⁷

$$DN_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DN_{i,2010} + \beta_2 DN_{i,2010}^2 + u_i \quad (\text{A1})$$

7. Base year of 2010 is suggested by Yuan et al. (2022) on the basis that the DN values for that year had the highest total and thus, a sufficient variation to be used as a reference year.

After the regression, I generate the fitted nightlight values for each year by fitting the estimated coefficients $\hat{\beta}_0$, $\hat{\beta}_1$ and $\hat{\beta}_2$ in the following manner

$$\widehat{DN}_{i,t} = \hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_1 DN_{i,t} + \hat{\beta}_2 DN_{i,t}^2 \quad (\text{A2})$$

I apply this to all for $t \leq 2013$. This generates a consistent nightlight measure for all DMSP samples.

Then, I generate a DMSP-like measure for the VIIRS data. For this, I use the two years for which both DMSP and VIIRS are available as references - 2012 and 2013. I start by aggregating the pixels in VIIRS resolution from the 500m-by-500m level to the 1km-by-1km level by taking averages across the 4 pixels making up the 1km-by-1km space. I denote the newly aggregated pixel values as $x_{i,t}$ for year t at point i . Then, I take the inverse hyperbolic sine on the aggregated pixel values to optimize the fitting procedure ([Li et al. 2022](#)).⁸ Then, I fit this measure with the nonlinear regression using the following sigmoid function to follow the idea that the DMSP is bottom-coded and top-coded.⁹ This step generates the DMSP-like nightlight values in DNs for all the VIIRS samples.


$$DN_{i,t} = \gamma_0 + \frac{\gamma_1}{1 + \exp(-\gamma_2(ihs(x_{i,t}) - \gamma_3))} + e_i \quad (2014 \leq t \leq 2021) \quad (\text{A3})$$

The resulting nightlight measures are summarized by Figure A1. The top panel reports the degree of fit between the DMSP and VIIRS nightlight intensities. The bottom panel shows the nightlight intensity measures across different satellites in the two datasets. The blue and red line represents the DMSP nightlight intensity values that fit across different satellites in the DMSP sample and the generated DMSP values for the VIIRS dataset. For the research, these two lines were used as the nightlight intensity measures.


⁸. This step is carried out to smooth out the coarse values that are calculated as a result of aggregating from 500m-by-500m level to the 1km-by-1km level. Further technical details are found in [Li et al. \(2022\)](#).

⁹. For this, I use the `n1` command in Stata with `log4` option, which fits the outcome and independent variables with a logistic function

Figure A1: Harmonizing nightlight intensity variables across DMSP and VIIRS



(a) Fitting VIIRS and DMSP for 2013 and 2013



(b) Measure of nightlight intensity variables in the two datasets

Note: The top panel describes the fit between DMSP and VIIRS nightlights matched with the logistic function in Equation (A3). The bottom panel maps out the nightlight values for all satellites in the data as well as the fitted DMSP values for all the DMSP datasets (in blue) and VIIRS dataset (in red).

Subsection A.6 Full summary statistics and balance tables

Table A4 provides summary statistics for the whole sample in the survey. Table A5 breaks down the summary statistics for key variables in the text by near-miss, assassination, and the rest of Mexico.

Table A4: Summary statistics for outcome variables at municipality-year level

Variable (unit)	N	Mean	St. dev.	10th pct.	Median	90th pct.
Panel A. Outcome variables for municipal government revenues						
Total income (th. Pesos)	2,867	201,212	674,966	4,462	46,033	365,208
Tax revenues (th. Pesos)	2,749	27,774	130,620	36	1,027	37,709
Tax per capita (Pesos)	2,740	165	388	3	49	349
Property Tax (th. Pesos)	2,488	17,609	85,108	35	721	25,016
Property Tax per capita (Pesos)	2,479	102	215	3	37	224
Non-earmarked Fund (th. Pesos)	2,541	65,761	230,756	3,280	16,627	104,933
Earmarked Fund (th. Pesos)	2,307	58,115	130,252	4,122	20,241	128,190
Usage Fee (th. Pesos)	2,754	13,016	63,695	38	1,037	17,181
Legal Service (th. Pesos)	2,625	6,072	27,879	10	340	9,296
Panel B. Outcome variables for municipal government expenditures						
Total expenditure (th. Pesos)	2,867	201,222	674,966	4,462	46,033	365,208
Personnel expenditure (th. Pesos)	2,858	69,677	280,919	962	11,225	110,376
Public Investment (th. Pesos)	2,801	42,410	92,226	517	14,077	98,426
Basic Infrastructure (th. Pesos)	2,657	8,441	27,620	118	1,631	14,282
Other General Services (th. Pesos)	2,657	22,995	94,658	323	2,887	28,632
Transfer/allowance (th. Pesos)	2,809	22,609	107,404	242	2,830	24,925
Internal transfers (th. Pesos)	2,281	14,127	70,042	125	1,672	17,007
Panel C. Outcome variables for municipal workers						
Total (Persons)	699	604	1,582	35	198	1,163
20s (Persons)	699	103	228	2	37	199
30s (Persons)	699	164	429	3	57	311
40s (Persons)	699	149	473	2	40	263
≥50s (Persons)	698	133	447	0	23	231
Panel D. Outcome variables for alternative mechanisms						
Fitted nightlights (DNs)	3,213	8.65	10.5	2.92	5.33	17.1
Total Outmigration (Persons)	1,666	611	1,845	24	251	1,078
Total population (Persons)	3,203	73,809	216,142	4,473	19,509	121,831
Population age 15-64 (Persons)	3,086	46,010	143,373	2,305	10,605	74,483
# Organized Criminal (Groups)	3,213	0.402	1.06	0	0	1
Total homicides (Cases)	3,159	12.9	53.5	0	1	21
Homicide per 100k (Rate)	3,159	17.4	43.7	0	5.55	44.4
Robbery (Cases)	1,150	669	3,478	1	27	963


The table lists the summary statistics for the variables in Section 3 at the municipal level. The statistics presented here are mean, standard deviation, 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile. For the units, "th. Pesos" refers to a thousand Pesos. The number of observations for each municipality is counted from 2011 for outcome variables in Panel C (biennially), and robbery and threat cases in Panel D (annually). Outmigration is counted from 2008 in Panel D (yearly). Other variables are included from 1995 (yearly). The most recent observations for all outcomes are from 2021.

Table A5: Summary statistics for outcome variables, per category of municipalities

Variable (unit)	(1) Near-miss			(2) Assassination			(3) Rest of Mexico		
	N	Mean	St. dev	N	Mean	St. dev	N	Mean	St. dev
Panel A. Outcome variables for municipal government revenues									
Total income (th. Pesos)	939	468,047	1,119,396	1,928	71,268	126,669	55,617	109,605	368,459
Tax (th. Pesos)	926	74,679	216,647	1,823	3,948	14,770	52,324	13,828	86,654
Tax per capita (Pesos)	922	278	528	1,818	107	276	51,305	108	267
Property tax (th. Pesos)	854	46,750	140,390	1,634	2,379	7,742	45,739	8,424	48,876
Property tax per capita (pesos)	850	167	302	1,629	68	139	44,875	68	144
Nonearmarked fund (th. Pesos)	843	149,626	382,926	1,698	24,126	41,433	48,659	37,383	114,899
Earmarked fund (th. Pesos)	770	109,325	204,544	1,537	32,460	50,504	43,991	35,214	79,165
Service Revenue (th. Pesos)	916	15,402	45,786	1,715	1,121	2,719	48,659	37,383	114,899
Legal functions (th. Pesos)	910	34,344	106,963	1,838	2,387	6,430	48,211	3,443	22,690
Panel B. Outcome variables for municipal government expenditures									
Total expenditure (th. Pesos)	939	468,047	1,119,396	1,928	71,268	126,669	55,617	109,605	368,459
Personnel expenditure (th. Pesos)	936	168,959	470,849	1,922	21,327	48,155	55,322	36,727	144,366
Public Investment (th. Pesos)	919	76,296	141,247	1,882	25,864	45,711	54,174	27,711	74,661
Basic Infrastructure (th. Pesos)	879	20,074	45,337	1,778	2,690	4,960	50,892	5,004	18,782
Other general service (th. Pesos)	879	59,021	157,961	1,778	5,095	9,732	50,892	11,178	50,235
Transfer/allowances (th. Pesos)	925	58,023	181,406	1,884	5,222	11,638	54,283	10,671	48,633
Internal transfers (th. Pesos)	777	35,343	116,705	1,504	3,167	7,554	44,743	7,130	33,917
Panel C. Outcome variables for municipal workers									
Total (persons)	218	1,365	2,609	481	259	425	13,770	398	1,000
20s (persons)	218	221	367	481	49.8	76.3	13,770	71.4	159
30s (persons)	218	361	709	481	74.9	119	13,770	111	269
40s (persons)	218	342	799	481	60.8	111	13,770	99.4	276
≥50s (persons)	218	322	753	480	47.2	101	13,628	95.3	333
Panel D. Outcome variables for alternative mechanisms									
Fitted nightlights (DNs)	999	12	14.6	2,214	7.14	7.55	63,126	9.03	10.7
Total outmigration (persons)	518	1,221	3,160	1,148	336	444	32,889	335	986
Total population (persons)	994	176,660	361,706	2,209	27,528	44,781	61,869	44,432	127,924
Population aged 15-64 (persons)	958	112,423	240,826	2,128	16,112	28,960	59,824	27,498	84,410
# Criminal groups (groups)	999	0.527	1.31	2,214	0.346	0.923	63,180	0.224	0.778
Total homicides (cases)	972	28.8	92	2,187	5.88	14.9	56,727	8.59	75.9
Homicide per 100k (rate)	972	11.1	17.6	2,187	20.3	50.9	56,619	10.9	36.6
Robbery (cases)	382	1,788	5,851	768	113	424	21,173	351	1,560

The table lists the summary statistics for the variables in Section 3 at the municipal level, broken down into three categories. The categories are defined depending on whether there were assassinations that failed to kill and injure a mayor (Column (1)), those that killed a mayor (Column (2)), and the rest of Mexico (Column(3)). The number of municipality-year observations, mean, and standard deviation are presented. For the units, "th. Pesos" refers to a thousand Pesos. The number of observations for each municipality is counted from 2011 for outcome variables in Panel C (biennially), and robbery and threat cases in Panel D (annually). Outmigration is counted from 2008 in Panel D (yearly). Other variables are included from 1995 (yearly). The most recent observations for all outcomes are from 2021.

Figure A2: Correlating Mexican Census and WorldPop estimates



Note: The Figure displays the correlates between WorldPop estimates (vertical axis) and Census counts (horizontal axis) for years in which both values are available - every year that ends with 5 or 0. Blue dots represent the values from sources. Black dotted line plots linear regression between the WorldPop estimates and Census counts. The regression results are reported in the box on the top left, with slope estimate being statistically significant at 1% level. R-squared from that regression and raw correlates between two data sources are also displayed in the box.

Appendix B Supplementary results and statistics for Sections 2 and 5


Table B1: Incidence of attacks on mayors in a given year, since 1995

	All of Mexico (Coeff × 100)					Assassination and Near-miss				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A. Exclude unidentified groups										
log(# groups + 1)	0.291** (0.120)		0.180 (0.150)	0.175 (0.140)		0.027** (0.011)		0.014 (0.017)	0.014 (0.017)	
I(New group)		0.347** (0.160)		0.210 (0.200)	0.246 (0.200)		0.036** (0.018)		0.025 (0.025)	0.029 (0.025)
Homicide per million	0.011 (0.013)	0.011 (0.013)	0.011 (0.014)	0.011 (0.013)		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	
Panel B. Include unidentified groups										
log(# groups + 1)	0.494*** (0.100)		0.360*** (0.110)	0.368*** (0.110)		0.053*** (0.011)		0.033** (0.013)	0.034*** (0.013)	
I(New group)		0.481*** (0.139)		0.287* (0.150)	0.303** (0.150)		0.055*** (0.017)		0.037* (0.021)	0.039* (0.021)
Homicide per million	0.010 (0.013)	0.011 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	
N Municipalities	59272 2198	59272 2198	59272 2198	59272 2198	60720 2441	3153 117	3153 117	3153 117	3153 117	3165 119
Municipal FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

The table shows the coefficient estimates from the regression of the incidence of attacks on mayors on variables relevant to gang presence and crime at the municipality-year level. For the sample using all of Mexico, coefficients are multiplied by 100 for convenience. Homicides per million is recalculated to exclude cases of mayor assassinations. All regressions include municipality, year fixed effects, and controls. Control variables included are the average schooling of the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, the log of the total population, and the year since the election (level and squared). $\log(\# \text{ group} + 1)$ is the log of the number of criminal groups in the municipality, adjusted by adding 1 to account for municipalities with no presence of organized criminal groups. New group refers to the dummy variable for the existence of a criminal organization that newly began its activities within the municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

Figure B1: Timing of the attacks on mayors




(a) Timing of attack, in terms of year in office



(b) Timing of attacks, in terms of months in office

Note: The graphs in this figure trace the timing of attacks that target mayors in terms of year and months in office for both cases where the assassination attempt succeeded and failed. Panel (a) traces the number of assassination attempts in terms of years while Panel (b) does so for each month in office. The notes in each paragraph show the t-test result of the difference in group-wise means. In both cases, there are no meaningful differences in the timing of the attacks against the mayors across cases where the assassinations were successful or not. The sources of the data used are based on the data collected by the authors, among others. A detailed explanation of the data is found in Section 3.

Figure B2: Shares of various expenditures across different categories



Note: The figures report the event study regression on the different measures of expenditures of the municipal government. The outcome variables used in each regression are listed below each graph. All regressions include a binned indicator for municipalities experiencing assassinations 7 or more years ago, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Stacked DID regression includes state-specific yearly linear trends to account for different weights across yearly subdatasets used to create the estimator. Two-way fixed effect regressions with covariates include controls for $\log(\text{number of criminal organizations} + 1)$, homicide rates, $\log(\text{total homicides} + 1)$, average years of schooling for the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, and years since the most recent election (level and squared) fixed at the final pre-assassination attempt year. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Appendix C Framework and supplementary results for Section 6

Subsection C.1 Full conceptual framework

In this section, I will provide a detailed explanation of the derivation of the key conditions stated in Section 6. I first derive the first-order conditions for the demand for public sector labor and the socially optimal allocation of workers across tax collection and public goods provision. Then, I show the comparative statics involving changes in productivity, value of public goods, and amenities for working in the public sector.

C.1.1 Individual choices and utility

Individual choice of labor: Individuals can earn income from two different sources. They can take an outside option with a realized income of v . This is drawn from a known distribution $f(v)$ with cumulative distribution $F(v)$. They can choose to work in the public sector if the wage w and amenities of working for the government π outweigh v . Wages are determined by the government through cost minimization and are publicly posted. π can be interpreted as the pro-social sentiment that motivates individuals to serve in the government sector, as in Dal Bó et al. (2013). It can also represent nonpecuniary amenities provided by the government, such as a sense of security. Combined, the proportion of the population working in the government can be expressed as

$$w + \pi \geq v \implies \Pr(v \leq w + \pi) = F(w + \pi)$$

This setup captures the idea that any decrease in w or π leads to a decrease in the supply of public sector workers.

Individual utility: Individuals gain income Y from working in either one of the two sectors outlined above and pay T in lump sum taxes to the local government.¹ The individual utility is linear in private consumption X and public goods G which is valued at rate $\alpha > 0$. Thus, individual utility can be written as the following indirect utility form

$$\alpha G + X \text{ s.t. } X \leq Y - T$$

1. The choice of lump sum tax follows from the observation that local governments primarily levy property taxes. Income taxes are collected by state or national governments in many countries (Weingast 2009). Furthermore, this setup is sufficient to capture the idea that tax collection depends on the amount of labor allocated.

For workers in the public sector, their income is a fixed wage w . The expected income for those taking outside options over the public sector is written as $E[v|v > w + \pi]$. When aggregating to the population level, the individual incomes are weighted by the share of the population taking the public and the outside options.

C.1.2 Outlining the problem faced by the local government

Role of local government: The goal of the government is to provide public goods and collect taxes to maximize social utility while complying with the budget and labor constraints. The social utility is obtained by summing over all individual utility functions. Thus, I obtain the following social utility function for individuals taking jobs in both public and outside options.

$$\alpha G + F(w + \pi)w + (1 - F(w + \pi))E[v|v > w + \pi] - T$$

Government gains revenues from taxes T and other sources, written as R .² The government uses the revenues to finance workers in the public sector. This gives the following equation for the budget constraint

$$R + T \geq wF(w + \pi)$$

The local government is responsible for providing public goods and collecting taxes. In this framework, this is modeled in ways similar to the production function of a firm. Labor in the public sector is split into those collecting taxes (L_T) and providing public goods (L_G).³ Production for taxes and public goods are written in $A_T t(L_T)$ and $A_G g(L_G)$, where $t(\cdot)$ and $g(\cdot)$ are increasing and concave in L_T and L_G respectively. Parameters $A_T > 0$ and $A_G > 0$ capture the productivity in these operations. Combined, the production of taxes and public goods, along with labor constraints are written as

$$T = A_T t(L_T)$$

$$G = A_G g(L_G)$$

$$L_T + L_G = F(w + \pi)$$

2. In this framework, R captures the grants from the central government. This is exogenously given in the current setup for analytical convenience. However, this amount is determined by the central government based on the revenues generated within the municipalities for places complying with fiscal federalism (Weingast 2009).

3. This is to ensure that every worker who prefers to work in the public sector gets assigned. Allowing non-assignment implies that there are unemployed workers in the model, which is the situation not addressed in this research.

C.1.3 Deriving the first order conditions

The problem of finding the allocation of labor across tax collection and public goods provision that maximizes social utility follows two steps. First, the local government determines the total amount of public labor that minimizes the cost of operations. In turn, wages w , which are assumed to be equal for both types of public workers, are determined. Then, the government maximizes the summation of individual utilities by optimally allocating workers across tax collection and public goods provision.

Cost minimization of the government: Here, the local government selects the total available labor for the public sector that minimizes its costs given its production function. In turn, this is where the wage w is determined. I use L to denote the total public sector labor, equivalent to $F(w + \pi)$. I assume that the wages across the tax collectors and the public goods providers are equal. Given this, the objective function and the production function are to minimize total expenditure on workers subject to the production function and labor allocation rule. This is written as

$$\min_L wL \text{ s.t. } T = A_T t(L_T), G = A_G g(L_G)$$

Here, the public sector is allocated to either one of L_T or L_G , so $L = L_G + L_T$. With this, the Lagrangian can be written as

$$wL + \lambda_T [T - A_T t(L - L_G)] + \lambda_G [G - A_G g(L - L_T)]$$

where λ_T and λ_G refer to the value of taxation and public goods to the government. Solving the first-order conditions with respect to L yields

- $[L]: w - \lambda_T A_T t'(L - L_G) - \lambda_G A_G g'(L - L_T) = 0$
- Complementary slackness: $\lambda_T [T - A_T t(L - L_G)] = 0, \lambda_G [G - A_G g(L - L_T)] = 0, \lambda_T, \lambda_G \geq 0$

Rearranging $[L]$ condition yields

$$w = \lambda_T A_T t'(L - L_G) + \lambda_G A_G g'(L - L_T)$$

In other words, public sector labor and wages are selected to satisfy the condition where the wage is equal to the weighted sum of marginal productivities across tax collection and public goods provision.

Allocating public labor to maximize social utility: Here, the local government maximizes the sum of individual utility. In the indirect utility form, this can be written as

$$\alpha G + Y - T$$

where Y is the labor income of the individual. This is equal to the public sector wage w for those who work in local government ($L = F(w + \pi)$) while others take the outside option.

The social utility is obtained by aggregating the individual utilities. Aggregating over public sector workers with income w and those accepting outside option with expected income $E[v|v > w + \pi]$, the social utility can be written as

$$\alpha G + F(w + \pi)w + (1 - F(w + \pi))E[v|v > w + \pi] - T$$

This is maximized subject to the production function and the government budget constraint.

$$R + T \geq wL \text{ where } F(w + \pi) = L$$

$$L = L_T + L_G$$

$$T = A_T t(L_T)$$

$$G = A_G g(L_G)$$

With this setup, the Lagrangian can be written as

$$\max_{\{L_T, L_G\}} \alpha A_G g(L_G) + [F(w + \pi)w + (1 - F(w + \pi))E[v|v > w + \pi]] - A_T t(L_T) + \lambda[R + A_T t(L_T) - wF(w + \pi)]$$

Taking first-order conditions with respect to L_T and L_G yields

- $[L_T]: (\lambda - 1)A_T t'(L_T) - \alpha A_G g'(L_G) = 0$
- $[L_G]: \alpha A_G g'(L_G) - (\lambda - 1)A_T t'(L_T) = 0$
- Complementary slackness: $\lambda[R + A_T t(L_T) - wF(w + \pi)] = 0$ with $\lambda \geq 0$

Combining the two first-order conditions yields

$$\alpha A_G g'(L_G) = (\lambda - 1)A_T t'(L_T)$$

Here, α is the value of the public good to the society. λ is the value of taxation, with 1 subtracted to reflect that tax collection comes at a cost to private good consumption. This implies that the L_G and L_T are selected to equate the value of marginal productivity of public goods and taxation from the societal point of view. In addition, for a nonzero amount of tax collection, the condition implies that $\lambda > 1$.

C.1.4 Comparative Statics

Now I incorporate the assassination into the framework by addressing how the allocation of labor, tax collection, and public goods provision respond to the changes in the key parameters. Assassinations can negatively affect tax collection and public goods provision by introducing various inefficiencies in these operations. This is captured by the decrease in productivity A_T and A_G . In addition, assassinations can increase fear of exposure to political violence among the workers, decreasing the amenity π . The comparative statics of the changes in these parameters lead to the following proposition.

Proposition 1. The effects of successful assassination on local state capacity

1. A productivity shock ($\Delta A_T(A_G) < 0$) decreases L_T (L_G), leading to a fall in T (G). If wages are flexible, w decreases due to decreased labor demand.
2. An amenity shock ($\Delta \pi < 0$) decreases overall labor supply, pushing L_T and L_G downwards. This decreases T and G . If wages are flexible, w increases due to contracting supply.

Proof: Appendix Section C.1.4.

Proof for part 1. To analyze how changes in A_T affect L_T and w , I start by applying the total derivatives to the two first-order conditions derived above.

$$w - \lambda_T A_T t'(L_T) - \lambda_G A_G g'(L - L_T) = 0$$

$$\alpha A_G g'(L - L_T) - (\lambda - 1) A_T t'(L_T) = 0$$

where I write L_G in terms of L_T by using the allocation restraint $L = L_T + L_G$. Taking total derivatives

with respect to changes in A_T yields

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dw}{dA_T} - \lambda_T A_T t''(L_T) \frac{dL_T}{dA_T} + \lambda_G A_G g''(L - L_T) \frac{dL_T}{dA_T} &= \lambda_T t'(L_T) \\ -\alpha A_G g''(L_T) \frac{dL_T}{dA_T} - (\lambda - 1) A_T t''(L_T) \frac{dL_T}{dA_T} &= (\lambda - 1) t'(L_T)\end{aligned}$$

In matrix form, this can be written as

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 & -\lambda_T A_T t''(L_T) + \lambda_G A_G g''(L - L_T) \\ 0 & -\alpha A_G g''(L - L_T) - (\lambda - 1) A_T t''(L_T) \end{bmatrix}}_{=X} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{dw}{dA_T} \\ \frac{dL_T}{dA_T} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_T t'(L_T) \\ (\lambda - 1) t'(L_T) \end{bmatrix}$$

From here, I invoke the implicit function theorem to get the solutions for $\frac{dw}{dA_T}$ and $\frac{dL_T}{dA_T}$. Obtaining the inverse function of X , I solve

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{dw}{dA_T} \\ \frac{dL_T}{dA_T} \end{bmatrix} = \frac{1}{\det(X)} \begin{bmatrix} -\alpha A_G g''(L - L_T) - (\lambda - 1) A_T t''(L_T) & \lambda_T A_T t''(L_T) - \lambda_G A_G g''(L - L_T) \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_T t'(L_T) \\ (\lambda - 1) t'(L_T) \end{bmatrix}$$

where $\det(X) = -(\alpha A_G g''(L - L_T) + (\lambda - 1) A_T t''(L_T)) > 0$ ($t''(\cdot) < 0, g''(\cdot) < 0$). From these, we can obtain

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dL_T}{dA_T} &= \frac{(\lambda - 1) t'(L_T)}{\det(X)} > 0 \\ \frac{dw}{dA_T} &= \frac{A_G (-g''(L - L_T)) t'(L_T) [\alpha \lambda_T + (\lambda - 1) \lambda_G]}{\det(X)} > 0\end{aligned}$$

since $\lambda > 1, \alpha > 0$ for nonzero taxation and public goods and the complementary slackness conditions implies $\lambda_T \geq 0, \lambda_G \geq 0$. Thus, changes in A_T shift L_T and w in the same direction, implying that negative shocks to A_T after successful assassination decrease L_T and w . Consequentially, tax collection decreases relative to the pre-assassination equilibrium (marked with asterisk)

$$T = A_T t(L_T) < A_T^* t(L_T^*) = T^*$$

Similar logic can be applied to identifying changes in L_G and w in response to exogenous changes

in A_G . Writing the total derivatives with respect to A_G for the first order conditions in matrix yields

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 & \lambda_T A_T t''(L - L_G) - \lambda_G A_G g''(L_G) \\ 0 & \alpha A_G g''(L_G) + (\lambda - 1) A_T t''(L - L_G) \end{bmatrix}}_{=W} \begin{bmatrix} \frac{dw}{dA_G} \\ \frac{dL_G}{dA_G} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_G g'(L_G) \\ -\alpha g'(L_G) \end{bmatrix}$$

Invoking the implicit function theorem, I can write

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{dw}{dA_G} \\ \frac{dL_G}{dA_G} \end{bmatrix} = \frac{1}{\det(W)} \begin{bmatrix} \alpha A_G g''(L_G) + (\lambda - 1) A_T t''(L - L_G) & -\lambda_T A_T t''(L - L_G) + \lambda_G A_G g''(L_G) \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_G g'(L_G) \\ -\alpha g'(L_G) \end{bmatrix}$$

with $\det(W) = \alpha A_G g''(L_G) + (\lambda - 1) A_T t''(L - L_G) < 0$. Given these,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dL_G}{dA_G} &= \frac{-\alpha g'(L_G)}{\det(W)} > 0 \\ \frac{dw}{dA_G} &= \frac{A_T t''(L - L_G) g'(L_G) [\alpha \lambda_T + (\lambda - 1) \lambda_G]}{\det(W)} > 0 \end{aligned}$$

With changes in A_G shifting L_G and w in the same direction, negative shocks to A_G from successful assassinations decrease wages and L_G . As a result, public goods are under-provided compared to pre-assassination equilibrium (marked with asterisk)

$$G = A_G g(L_G) < A_G^* g(L_G^*) = G^*$$

■

Proof for part 2. π enters the framework through the labor supply of the public sector. Specifically

$$L = F(w + \pi) = \Pr(v \leq w + \pi) = \int_{-\infty}^{w+\pi} f(v) dv$$

To differentiate this with respect to π , I use the fundamental theorem of calculus.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{d\pi} \int_{-\infty}^{w+\pi} f(v) dv &= \frac{d}{d\pi} [F(w + \pi) - F(-\infty)] \\ &= \frac{d}{d\pi} [F(w + \pi)] \\ &= f(w + \pi) > 0 \end{aligned}$$

This implies that public sector labor supply changes in the same direction as π . Thus, decreases in π due to successful assassinations decrease the labor supply.

To see how this changes the allocation of labor across L_T and L_G , I return to the first-order conditions from the social utility maximization problem

$$\alpha A_G g'(L_G) = (\lambda - 1) A_T t'(L_T)$$

By taking total derivatives with respect to π , I obtain

$$\alpha A_G g''(L_G) \frac{dL_G}{d\pi} - (\lambda - 1) A_T t''(L_T) \frac{dL_T}{d\pi} = 0$$

which can be written as

$$\frac{dL_G/d\pi}{dL_T/d\pi} = \frac{(\lambda - 1) A_T t''(L_T)}{\alpha A_G g''(L_G)} > 0$$

The last inequality is justified by the fact that $t''(\cdot) < 0, g''(\cdot) < 0$ from the concavity of the production functions and that $\alpha > 0, \lambda > 1$, a condition imposed for nonzero production of public goods and tax collection. This rules out the case where L_T and L_G change in the opposite direction with respect to π without any productivity changes. Thus, in the case of a successful assassination that drives the public sector labor supply downward, both L_T and L_G face downward pressure.

With fewer L_T and L_G compared to the pre-assassination equilibrium (denoted with an asterisk), the total tax collected and the public goods supplied decrease.

$$T = A_T t(L_T) < A_T t(L_T^*) = T^*$$

$$G = A_G g(L_G) < A_G g(L_G^*) = G^*$$

As for wages, I return to the first-order condition on the cost minimization problem.

$$w = \lambda_T A_T t'(L_T) + \lambda_G A_G g'(L_G)$$

Taking total derivatives with respect to π yields

$$\frac{dw}{d\pi} = \lambda_T A_T t''(L_T) \frac{dL_T}{d\pi} + \lambda_G A_G g''(L_G) \frac{dL_G}{d\pi} < 0$$

where the last inequality comes from the fact that $\frac{dL_j}{d\pi} > 0$ for $j \in \{T, G\}$, $t''(\cdot) < 0$, $g''(\cdot) < 0$, and $\lambda_T \geq 0$, $\lambda_G \geq 0$ from the complementary slackness conditions in the first order conditions. Thus, w and π move in opposite directions, implying that a decrease of π from successful assassinations induces upward pressure on w . ■

Effectively, changes in A_T and A_G act similarly to labor demand shock, whereas changes to π mimics labor supply shock.

Subsection C.2 Supplementary results

Table C1: Hypothetical wage costs of retaining departing workers by age group, TWFE with covariates and outlier municipalities

	(1) 20s	(2) 30s	(3) 40s	(4) 50s	(5) 20-30s	(6) 30-40s
Panel A. Change in proportion of workers by age						
Change in share	-0.015 (0.033)	-0.078** (0.036)	-0.041 (0.035)	0.043 (0.032)	-0.093** (0.045)	-0.120*** (0.045)
Pre-event share (1=100%)	0.209	0.311	0.252	0.228	0.520	0.563
% change in size due to π (1=100%)	-0.072	-0.251	-0.163	0.178	-0.179	-0.213
Panel B. Wage-amenity tradeoff with Dal Bó et al. (2013) elasticity estimate (2.15)						
Trade-off rate	-0.033	-0.117	-0.076	0.083	-0.083	-0.099
N	675	675	675	675	675	675
Municipalities	117	117	117	117	117	117
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

This table reports the estimates of the rate of increase in wages required to retain different types of municipal workers, as explained in Section 6.2. The first row in Panel A reports the point estimates and the standard errors of the average post-assassination treatment effects for the proportion of each age group within municipal governments specified in the header of each column. Results are obtained using two-way fixed effects and covariates analogous to Equation (2), without dropping outlier municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and reported in parentheses. The second row is obtained from taking the average of the proportion of these workers one period before the assassination attempt took place. Numbers in the third row are obtained by dividing the point estimates in the first row by the same in the second row. This represents the change in the number of workers in each category before and after the assassination attempts. In Panel B, the wage-amenity trade-off rate is calculated by dividing the percent change in size of workers obtained from Panel A with changes in labor supply with respect to wages from Dal Bó et al. (2013), 2.15. This represents the increase in wages needed to keep workers employed. Given that this cost arises from a decrease in amenities due to assassinations and the fear of political violence that follows it, it quantifies the cost of political violence to the local government.

Table C2: Hypothetical wage costs of retaining departing workers by age group, TWFE w/o covariates

	(1) 20s	(2) 30s	(3) 40s	(4) 50s	(5) 20-30s	(6) 30-40s
Panel A. Change in proportion of workers by age						
Change in share	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.070** (0.034)	-0.036 (0.033)	0.021 (0.029)	-0.087** (0.042)	-0.106** (0.044)
Pre-event share (1=100%)	0.220	0.314	0.252	0.214	0.534	0.566
% change in size due to π (1=100%)	-0.077	-0.223	-0.143	0.098	-0.163	-0.187
Panel B. Wage-amenity tradeoff with Dal Bó et al. (2013) elasticity estimate (2.15)						
Trade-off rate	-0.035	-0.104	-0.067	0.046	-0.076	-0.087
N	662	662	662	662	662	662
Municipalities	115	115	115	115	115	115
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

This table reports the estimates of the rate of increase in wages required to retain different types of municipal workers, as explained in Section 6.2. The first row in Panel A reports the point estimates and the standard errors of the average post-assassination treatment effects for the proportion of each age group within municipal governments specified in the header of each column. Results are obtained using two-way fixed effects without covariates analogous to Equation (2). Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and reported in parentheses. The second row is obtained from taking the average of the proportion of these workers one period before the assassination attempt took place. Numbers in the third row are obtained by dividing the point estimates in the first row by the same in the second row. This represents the change in the number of workers in each category before and after the assassination attempts. In Panel B, the wage-amenity trade-off rate is calculated by dividing the percent change in size of workers obtained from Panel A with changes in labor supply with respect to wages from Dal Bó et al. (2013), 2.15. This represents the increase in wages needed to keep workers employed. Given that this cost arises from a decrease in amenities due to assassinations and the fear of political violence that follows it, it quantifies the cost of political violence to the local government.

Table C3: Hypothetical wage costs of retaining departing workers by age group, Stacked DID

	(1) 20s	(2) 30s	(3) 40s	(4) 50s	(5) 20-30s	(6) 30-40s
Panel A. Change in proportion of workers by age						
Change in share	-0.043 (0.031)	-0.064** (0.032)	-0.010 (0.030)	0.039 (0.024)	-0.108*** (0.040)	-0.074** (0.038)
Pre-event share (1=100%)	0.220	0.314	0.252	0.214	0.534	0.566
% change in size due to π (1=100%)	-0.195	-0.204	-0.040	0.182	-0.202	-0.131
Panel B. Wage-amenity tradeoff with Dal Bó et al. (2013) elasticity estimate (2.15)						
Trade-off rate	-0.091	-0.095	-0.019	0.085	-0.094	-0.061
N	4341	4341	4341	4341	4341	4341
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

This table reports the estimates of the rate of increase in wages required to retain different types of municipal workers, as explained in Section 6.2. The first row in Panel A reports the point estimates and the standard errors of the average post-assassination treatment effects for the proportion of each age group within municipal governments specified in the header of each column. Results are obtained using stacked DID without covariates analogous to Equation (2). Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and reported in parentheses. The second row is obtained from taking the average of the proportion of these workers one period before the assassination attempt took place. Numbers in the third row are obtained by dividing the point estimates in the first row by the same in the second row. This represents the change in the number of workers in each category before and after the assassination attempts. In Panel B, the wage-amenity trade-off rate is calculated by dividing the percent change in size of workers obtained from Panel A with changes in labor supply with respect to wages from Dal Bó et al. (2013), 2.15. This represents the increase in wages needed to keep workers employed. Given that this cost arises from a decrease in amenities due to assassinations and the fear of political violence that follows it, it quantifies the cost of political violence to the local government.

Table C4: Hypothetical wage costs of retaining departing workers by age group, Gardner (2024)

	(1) 20s	(2) 30s	(3) 40s	(4) 50s	(5) 20-30s	(6) 30-40s
Panel A. Change in proportion of workers by age						
Change in share	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.042*** (0.016)	-0.073*** (0.017)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.057*** (0.022)	-0.115*** (0.021)
Pre-event share (1=100%)	0.220	0.314	0.252	0.214	0.534	0.566
% change in size due to π (1=100%)	-0.068	-0.134	-0.290	0.117	-0.107	-0.203
Panel B. Wage-amenity tradeoff with Dal Bó et al. (2013) elasticity estimate (2.15)						
Trade-off rate	-0.032	-0.062	-0.135	0.054	-0.050	-0.095
N	662	662	662	662	662	662
Municipalities	115	115	115	115	115	115
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

This table reports the estimates of the rate of increase in wages required to retain different types of municipal workers, as explained in Section 6.2. The first row in Panel A reports the point estimates and the standard errors of the average post-assassination treatment effects for the proportion of each age group within municipal governments specified in the header of each column. Results are obtained using Gardner (2024) estimates without covariates analogous to Equation (2). Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and reported in parentheses. The second row is obtained from taking the average of the proportion of these workers one period before the assassination attempt took place. Numbers in the third row are obtained by dividing the point estimates in the first row by the same in the second row. This represents the change in the number of workers in each category before and after the assassination attempts. In Panel B, the wage-amenity trade-off rate is calculated by dividing the percent change in size of workers obtained from Panel A with changes in labor supply with respect to wages from Dal Bó et al. (2013), 2.15. This represents the increase in wages needed to keep workers employed. Given that this cost arises from a decrease in amenities due to assassinations and the fear of political violence that follows it, it quantifies the cost of political violence to the local government.


Table C5: Hypothetical wage costs of retaining departing workers by age group, Sun-Abraham (2021)

	(1) 20s	(2) 30s	(3) 40s	(4) 50s	(5) 20-30s	(6) 30-40s
Panel A. Change in proportion of workers by age						
Change in share	0.014 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.048)	-0.020 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.031)	-0.004 (0.045)	-0.037 (0.046)
Pre-event share (1=100%)	0.220	0.314	0.252	0.214	0.534	0.566
% change in size due to π (1=100%)	0.063	-0.057	-0.079	-0.019	-0.007	-0.065
Panel B. Wage-amenity tradeoff with Dal Bó et al. (2013) elasticity estimate (2.15)						
Trade-off rate	0.029	-0.027	-0.037	-0.009	-0.003	-0.030
N	662	662	662	662	662	662
Municipalities	115	115	115	115	115	115
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

This table reports the estimates of the rate of increase in wages required to retain different types of municipal workers, as explained in Section 6.2. The first row in Panel A reports the point estimates and the standard errors of the average post-assassination treatment effects for the proportion of each age group within municipal governments specified in the header of each column. Results are obtained using Sun and Abraham (2021) estimates without covariates analogous to Equation (2). Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and reported in parentheses. The second row is obtained from taking the average of the proportion of these workers one period before the assassination attempt took place. Numbers in the third row are obtained by dividing the point estimates in the first row by the same in the second row. This represents the change in the number of workers in each category before and after the assassination attempts. In Panel B, the wage-amenity trade-off rate is calculated by dividing the percent change in size of workers obtained from Panel A with changes in labor supply with respect to wages from Dal Bó et al. (2013), 2.15. This represents the increase in wages needed to keep workers employed. Given that this cost arises from a decrease in amenities due to assassinations and the fear of political violence that follows it, it quantifies the cost of political violence to the local government.

Figure C1: Allocation of municipal workers by type of work



Note: The figures report the event study regression on the composition of workers by the type of duties they conduct. The outcome variables for Panels (a) and (b) are calculated relative to the total number of municipal workers. The outcome variable for panels (c) and (d) are measured relative to the total number of workers on public security duties, including, but not limited to the municipal police and relevant committee members. All regressions include a binned indicator for municipalities experiencing assassinations beyond the event timing window, municipality fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Stacked DID regression includes state-specific yearly linear trends to account for different weights across yearly subdatasets used to create the estimator. Two-way fixed effect regressions with covariates include controls for log(number of criminal organizations + 1), homicide rates, log(total homicides + 1), average years of schooling for the municipal population, the share of the indigenous population, and years since the most recent election (level and squared) fixed at the final pre-assassination attempt year. Other estimators do not include covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Appendix D Supplementary regression results for Section 7

Subsection D.1 Results from the individual level outcomes on ENOE surveys

In this section, we introduce some suggestive and descriptive evidence that supports the finding that differences in economic activities are not the alternative mechanisms behind the main findings in the paper. For this purpose, we use the individual-level responses from the quarterly ENOE surveys such as earnings, working hours, employment status, and sector of employment matched with the municipality of residence. Thus, the following equation that leverages variation at an individual-municipality-time period level is used.


$$y_{imt} = \alpha + \sum_{\substack{h=-24 \\ h \neq -1}}^{24} \tau_h I[t - \text{assassination} = h]_{mt} + \tau_{25+} I[t - \text{assassination} \geq 25]_{mt} + \gamma_m + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{imt}$$

y_{imt} are individual-level outcomes of interest. Treatment indicators now have 24 windows to measure the dynamic effects 24 quarters (6 calendar years, as in the main text) before and after the event. Treatment indicators equal 1 if individual i resides in municipality m that experienced successful assassinations at quarter t . The regression includes municipality fixed effects (γ_m) and quarter fixed effects (δ_t). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

It should be noted that the results presented in this section should be interpreted as descriptive and suggestive evidence, not causal. As this is a repeated survey of different individuals at the same municipalities over time, individual-level fixed effects cannot be included. Therefore, the regression does not take unobservable characteristics that may affect outcomes into account. Rather, the results are intended to provide descriptive trends to various economic activity indicators following successful assassination and complement the findings using nightlight data in Section 7.

In Figure D1, we report the outcomes on being economically active, working full-time, working in an informal sector, log(weekly earnings), log(working hours per week), and log(hourly wage). There are no significant changes in these outcomes following a successful assassination attempt. These suggest that the economic activities are not different among municipalities with successful assassinations relative to those experiencing near-miss events. Thus, the finding that there are minimal changes in economic activities stated in Section 7 still stands.


Figure D1: Changes in economic activity measured through individual ENOE survey results



Note: The figures report the event study regression using the equation mentioned in Appendix Section D.1. The outcome variables are specified as a caption for each picture. Regression includes fixed effects at the municipality and year-quarter level. The average effects of the assassinations 24 quarters after the event and their standard errors are also reported at the right-hand side in each figure. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Subsection D.2 Effects on electoral environment post-assassinations

Figure D2: Effects on electoral outcomes



Note: The figures report the event study regression on electoral outcomes using Equation (2) but with different binning of time indicators, as elections occur once every three years. HHI index captures how concentrated the vote shares are, with larger values indicating less competitive elections. Effective participation rates are calculated by measuring the share of voters whose votes were not null. Participation rates, by contrast, also takes into account those whose votes are null. Regression uses the same control variables and fixed effects as in Section 5. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.


Subsection D.3 Further descriptive statistics on organized criminal group presence

Table D1: Distribution of organized criminal groups across treated and near-miss municipalities

	Near-miss Pre-attempt	Near-miss Post-attempt	Treated Pre-attempt	Treated Post-attempt
W/ unidentified groups	0.393 (0.847)	1.421 (1.380)	0.266 (0.760)	1.315 (1.457)
Only identified groups	0.181 (0.616)	0.601 (1.270)	0.144 (0.571)	0.685 (1.269)

Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of the number of organized criminal groups across near-miss and treated municipalities before and after assassination attempts. The first row includes criminal groups that did appear in the organized criminal group datasets used in the text but has not been identified. In this case, unknown criminal groups are considered as a unique group different from identified groups. The second row only includes criminal groups that have been identified. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.

Figure D3: Trends in criminal group presence over time




(a) W/ unidentified groups

(b) Only with identified groups

Note: The figures report the changes in the mean of the number of criminal groups 6 years before and after assassination attempts. The choice of timeframe matches the timing indicators in the event study regression results. Red lines indicate averages for the treated municipalities, while blue ones represent those for near-miss municipalities. The graph on the left also includes cases where the criminal group is not identified, while the one on the right limits the calculation to those that have been identified.

Subsection D.4 Comparison across different control group setups: Regression-by-regression

Figure D4: Regression using all other possible control groups



Note: The figures report the event study regression using Equation (2) but with different sets of control variables for some of the outcome variables used in Section 5. The outcome variables are specified as a caption for each picture. The control groups reported are 1) the same control group in the main results, 2) municipalities with all failed assassination attempts, with injured and unharmed mayors, 3) only the municipalities with failed attempts that injured the mayors, and 4) municipalities whose mayors passed away for nonviolent reasons. The treatment group, fixed effects, and covariates are identical to the ones used in Section 5. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Subsection D.5 Comparison across different control group setups: Triple-differences

In this section, I run a triple-difference specification that estimates the changes in the local state capacity outcomes among municipalities with successful assassinations, those with failed attempts that injured the mayors for some time, those that failed to injure mayors, and those whose mayors passed away nonviolently (health reasons and accidents). This serves as a robustness check to confirm that

mayoral absence is the driving mechanism, stated in Section 7. I use the following specification.

$$y_{mt} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Post}_{mt} + \beta_2 \text{Violent injury}_m + \beta_3 \text{Death}_m + \beta_4 \text{Post}_{mt} \times \text{Violent injury}_m \\ + \beta_5 \text{Post}_{mt} \times \text{Death}_m + \beta_6 \text{Death}_m \times \text{Death}_m + \beta_7 \text{Post}_{mt} \times \text{Death}_m \times \text{Death}_m + \gamma X_{mt} + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{mt}$$

Post indicates attacks or nonviolent deaths taking place on or before year t and municipality m . Violent injury indicates that a mayor in municipality m is injured or killed as a result of violence. It equals 1 for municipalities with successful assassinations or failed attempts that injure mayors. Death equals 1 if a municipality loses a mayor to assassinations or nonviolent deaths at some point. Thus, municipalities with failed attempts that did not injure mayors are set up as a benchmark group.

The regression includes covariates defined and set up in the same manner as in the main text and year fixed effects. As indicators for violent injury and deaths are defined at the municipality level (not municipality-year), the fixed effects for municipalities are not included in this regression to avoid multicollinearity issues.

I test if the treatment effects are more pronounced when comparing treatment municipalities to those with failed attempts that did not injure mayors relative to other possible comparisons. Municipalities experiencing nonviolent mayor deaths and injuries following failed attempts both experience some degrees of absence following an event. Municipalities with no mayor injuries do not experience sudden absence of mayors. Thus, the difference in changes to local state capacity should be greatest when treated municipalities are compared against those with no mayor injuries following failed attempts. It should be noted that since the current regression does not test for the balance of observable characteristics across all four types of municipalities, the findings should be taken as descriptive.

Table D2 reports the estimation results from the triple-difference specification. Panel A reports individual coefficient estimates and Panel B presents changes in local state capacity measures across different types of municipalities obtained by linearly combining individual coefficients. As hypothesized, the treatment effects are largest in terms of absolute value when treated municipalities are compared against those with uninjured mayors following assassination attempts. The 95% confidence interval of these estimates contains the average 6-year post-assassination effects reported in Section 5. When treatment municipalities are compared with other types, the estimates are either smaller or statistically insignificant. Therefore, the claim that the difference in the presence of mayors following an event explains the effect size made in Section 7 holds.

Table D2: Difference across assassinations, failed attempts, and nonviolent deaths


	(1) Tax (log)	(2) Tax (per capita)	(3) Invstment (log)	(4) Invstment (share)	(5) Non-infra. (log)	(6) Non-infra. (share)	(7) Worker (30s) (share)	(8) Operative rank (share)
Panel A. Triple difference-in-difference results								
Post	0.020 (0.315)	121.8 (136.0)	-0.241 (0.224)	-0.047** (0.022)	0.831*** (0.281)	0.034*** (0.011)	0.042** (0.017)	-0.051 (0.037)
Violent injury	-1.122*** (0.337)	-93.57 (73.07)	-0.500** (0.208)	0.024 (0.020)	0.171 (0.377)	0.003 (0.007)	0.007 (0.029)	-0.049 (0.058)
Death	-1.054*** (0.312)	-121.7 (80.58)	-0.636*** (0.184)	-0.000 (0.018)	0.051 (0.297)	0.017** (0.007)	0.003 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.028)
Post × Violent injury	-0.565 (0.382)	-102.5 (122.5)	0.246 (0.291)	0.062 (0.038)	-1.085** (0.425)	-0.026* (0.015)	-0.020 (0.038)	0.033 (0.078)
Post × Death	0.057 (0.421)	-94.44 (125.6)	0.346 (0.264)	0.028 (0.026)	-0.703* (0.361)	-0.029** (0.014)	-0.061** (0.027)	0.053 (0.052)
Violent injury × Death	0.910** (0.418)	122.4 (79.31)	0.377 (0.255)	-0.017 (0.025)	-0.054 (0.445)	-0.011 (0.009)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.004 (0.068)
Post × Violent Injury × Death	0.226 (0.542)	108.0 (130.5)	-0.113 (0.353)	-0.008 (0.045)	0.754 (0.506)	0.0232 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.046)	0.016 (0.092)
Panel B. Differences in the changes in outcome variables across different categories of municipalities								
Killed - Nonviolent death	-0.338 (0.362)	5.502 (50.29)	0.133 (0.194)	0.054** (0.023)	-0.331 (0.271)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.029 (0.027)	0.048 (0.052)
Killed - Injury	0.283 (0.326)	13.55 (59.34)	0.233 (0.234)	0.020 (0.037)	0.051 (0.360)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.070* (0.038)	0.069 (0.078)
Killed - Unhurt	-0.281 (0.309)	-88.94 (128.3)	0.480** (0.238)	0.082*** (0.023)	-1.034*** (0.333)	-0.034*** (0.011)	-0.090*** (0.024)	0.102** (0.052)
Observations.	4675	3032	4818	4818	4314	4314	976	954
Municipalities	170	169	170	170	170	170	170	169

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

The table reports the triple difference-in-difference equation involving municipalities with successful assassinations, failed attempts that lead to injuries, failed attempts that did not lead to an injury, and non-violent deaths (diseases, accidents). Post is an indicator of an event (attacks or nonviolent deaths) taking place on or before that year. Violent injury indicates that a mayor in that municipality is hurt or killed as a result of violence and equals one if a municipality experiences assassinations or failed attacks that lead to injuries. Death equals 1 if a municipality loses a mayor to assassinations or nonviolent deaths at some point. Outcome variables are listed at the top of each column. Shares in columns (3) and (5) are measured relative to total expenditure. Outcomes in columns (7) and (8) are calculated relative to the total number of municipal workers and total number of municipal security workers, respectively. Panel A reports the coefficients and standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, from the triple difference-in-difference equation. Panel B reports the differences in changes in outcome variables following an event using linear combinations of the coefficients and their standard errors. The regression includes covariates and year fixed effects. Covariates vary across time before an event takes place in each municipality but are fixed at the last pre-event values for years in which an event takes place and afterward. As indicators for violent injury and deaths are defined at the municipality level (not municipality-year), the fixed effects for municipalities are not included in this regression to avoid multicollinearity issues.


Appendix E Event-study with alternative treatment and control groups

Figure E1: Regression with kidnappings, attacks on family members, and threats in control group




Note: The figures report the event study regression including places where mayors were kidnapped, threatened, or had family members attacks. “Full” refers to the these expanded set of municipalities. The baseline results with the main sample are replicated in green line for reference. The outcome variables used in each regression are listed below each graph. All covariates and fixed effect setups are identical to the main text. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure E2: Regression without municipalities experiencing multiple attacks against mayors



Note: The figures report the event study regression excluding places where multiple attacks against mayors were reported. “Reduced” refers to the restricted sample where municipalities with multiple attacks are omitted. The baseline results with the main sample are replicated in green line for reference. The outcome variables used in each regression are listed below each graph. All covariates and fixed effect setups are identical to the main text. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Figure E3: Comparing injured vs unharmed mayors



Note: The figures report the event study regression which compares municipalities with injured mayors to unharmed mayors. . The baseline results with the main sample are replicated in green line for reference. The outcome variables used in each regression are listed below each graph. All covariates and fixed effect setups are identical to the main text. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

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