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**[github.com/severin-lemaignan/lecture-hri-symbolic-reasoning](https://github.com/severin-lemaignan/lecture-hri-symbolic-reasoning)**



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Bristol**

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West of  
England



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**BRISTOL**


# Human-Robot Interaction

## Symbolic Reasoning for HRI

Séverin Lemaignan

**Bristol Robotics Lab**

University of the West of England



## IN THIS LECTURE

- Lecture on speech: NLP down to syntax parsing

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### Semantics vs Pragmatics


*Semantics* is the (conventional) meaning attached to words and sentences; *Pragmatics* study the actual meaning coming out of the context: who speaks? how they speak? what common knowledge between the speaker and the listener? what is the situation? etc.

## IN THIS LECTURE

- Lecture on speech: NLP down to syntax parsing
- Today: **meaning** (both semantics and pragmatics)
  - How to attach *meaning* to perceptions & natural language?
  - What are ontologies?
  - How is 'meaning' represented and used within the robot?
  - How does it relate to *mental models*?

### Semantics vs Pragmatics


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## **Situated dialogue** effectively evidences the challenges

How can the robot make sense of and act upon a sequence of letters like:

**“Can you give me that book?”**





# THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM

How to attach meaning to a symbol?


# THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM

Google Translate translates French "*Il pleut comme vache qui pisse*" into English "*It's raining cats and dogs*".

...no peeing cow?? Does Google Translate *understand* French and/or English?

# THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM

The mind as a computer:  
*functionalism* & Searle's **Chinese Room Argument**



Read more on Wikipedia

# THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM

How to attach meaning to a symbol?


Is it possible at all? Is it actually necessary?

# THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM


**Embodiment** is part of the answer. In robotics,  
we talk of **Situated AI**.

# SITUATED, GROUNDED, SYMBOLIC SOCIAL COGNITION


# SITUATION ASSESSMENT





# VISUAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING



allocentric



egocentric





Subject	Predicate	Object
Location	isAt	Location
	→ isOn	
	→ isIn	
	→ isNextTo	
Location	isAbove	Location
Location	isBelow	Location
Location	hasRelativePosition	Location
	→ behind	
	→ inFrontOf	
	→ leftOf	
	→ rightOf	
Object	farFrom	Agent
Object	near	Agent
Agent	looksAt	SpatialThing
Agent	sees	SpatialThing
SpatialThing	isInFieldOfView	xsd:boolean
Agent	pointsAt	SpatialThing
Agent	focusesOn	SpatialThing
Agent	seesWithHeadMovement	SpatialThing
Agent	canReach	Object

## STATEMENT, BELIEFS

human\_1 sees teddybear

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teddybear isOn table\_1

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teddybear type Toy

teddybear isOn table\_1

human\_1 scaredOf robot\_1 (in the human's model only!)

## STATEMENT, BELIEFS (2)

human\_1 sees teddybear

Triplet  $\langle S, P, O \rangle$ : subject, predicate, object



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$P$  is a predicate of **arity** 2:  $P(S, O)$

## STATEMENT, BELIEFS (2)

`human_1` sees teddybear

Triplet  $\langle S, P, O \rangle$ : subject, predicate, object

$P$  is a predicate of **arity** 2:  $P(S, O)$

Some logic language (like Prolog) allows arbitrary arities:

`give(robot_1, human_1, teddybear)`

## STATEMENT, BELIEFS (2)

human\_1 sees teddybear

Triplet  $\langle S, P, O \rangle$ : subject, predicate, object

$P$  is a predicate of **arity** 2:  $P(S, O)$

Many do not (like the OWL language). In this case, **reification**:

give\_act\_1 type Give

give\_act\_1 performedBy robot\_1

give\_act\_1 receivedBy human\_1

give\_act\_1 actsOnObject teddybear

# TOWARDS ONTOLOGIES

The robot's newly acquired beliefs typically have to be **anchored** in pre-existing knowledge.


→ We usually endow the robot with **background knowledge** (also known as **common-sense knowledge**) with statements like:

```
Object rdfs:subclassOf PhysicalThing
```

```
Location rdfs:subclassOf SpatialThing
```

```
sky hasColor blue
```

# TOWARDS ONTOLOGIES



Example of an **upper ontology**

# ONTOLOGIES

An **ontology** encompasses a representation, formal naming, and definition of the categories, properties, and relations between the concepts, data, and entities that substantiate one, many, or all domains.

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(also known as a **knowledge graph**)

Ontologies often have close relationships with **first-order logic (FOL)** – more about that later.



# ONTOLOGIES

- **T-box** statements: the *conceptualisation* of the domain, for instance in terms of *categories* (classes):

Dog is a class

Dog `rdfs:subClassOf` Animal

- **A-box** statements: (T-box compliant) statements about *individuals* (instances) in the ontology:

SPOT is an instance

SPOT `rdf:type` Dog

# ONTOLOGIES

- **T-box** statements: the *conceptualisation* of the domain, for instance in terms of *categories* (classes):


```
Dog rdfs:subClassOf Animal
```

- **A-box** statements: (T-box compliant) statements about *individuals* (instances) in the ontology:


```
SPOT rdf:type Dog
```

Ontologies are represented using a **knowledge description language**. The **Web Ontology Language (OWL)** is a common choice that uses a XML encoding.


# EXAMPLE




# EXAMPLE



# EXAMPLE



# EXAMPLE




The robot starts with some manually provided commonsense knowledge (encoded in T-Box + A-Box) and initial knowledge about the environment (in A-Box), and instantiate itself additional concepts and relations on-line, based on its perception.

Back to our initial example:


**Give me that book!**

# DIALOGUE GROUNDING







# DIALOGUE GROUNDING



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


# DIALOGUE GROUNDING



# DIALOGUE GROUNDING

“Give me the book on the table”



# DIALOGUE GROUNDING


**“Give me the book on the table”**



me → human\_1

find(?obj type Table) → ikea\_table

find(?obj type Book, ?obj isOn ikea\_table) →  
harry\_potter



# DIALOGUE GROUNDING

**“Give me the book on the table”**




me → human<sub>1</sub>

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human<sub>1</sub> desires give\_act<sub>1</sub>,  
give\_act<sub>1</sub> type Give,  
give\_act<sub>1</sub> performedBy myself,  
give\_act<sub>1</sub> actsOnObject harry\_potter,  
give\_act<sub>1</sub> receivedBy human<sub>1</sub>



# MULTI-MODAL INTERACTION



What about  
**“Give me that book”?**  
(or even: **“Give me that!”**)

LAAS-CNRS





# EXAMPLE OF FIRST-ORDER LOGIC REASONING

"Where is the other DVD?"



`find(?obj isAt ?loc, ?obj type Dvd, ?obj differentFrom WALL_E)`



```
SELECT ?loc
WHERE {
  ?obj oro:isAt ?loc .
  ?obj rdf:type oro:Dvd .
  ?obj owl:differentFrom oro:WALL_E
}
```

Using SPARQL query language

## EXAMPLE OF FIRST-ORDER LOGIC REASONING

"Where is the other DVD?"



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
```
SELECT ?loc
WHERE {
  ?obj oro:isAt ?loc .
  ?obj rdf:type oro:Dvd .
  ?obj owl:differentFrom oro:WALL_E
}
```

Symbolic approaches effective at dealing with this kind of semantics.

# INTERACTION EXAMPLE: I SPY WITH MY LITTLE EYE



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


## INTERACTION EXAMPLE: I SPY WITH MY LITTLE EYE

human		It is a tableware.
robot		<i>[retrieves possible objects: blue-bottle, yellow-bottle, orange-bottle, cup-with-handle]</i> <i>[keeps human-visible objects: blue-bottle, yellow-bottle, cup-with-handle]</i> <i>[obtains discriminants: type, color.]</i> Which type of object is: bottle or cup?
human		Bottle.
robot		<i>[obtains possible objects: blue-bottle, yellow-bottle.]</i> <i>[obtains discriminants: color.]</i> What color the object is: blue or yellow?
human		Blue.
robot		<i>[obtains possible objects: blue-bottle.]</i> The object is the blue-bottle!

# ONE STEP FURTHER: THEORY OF MIND

# 1ST ORDER TOM: THE FALSE-BELIEF EXPERIMENT





What if I ask for the DVD in the box, but the robot previously moved it somewhere else?








What if I ask for the DVD in the box, but the robot previously moved it somewhere else?

**False-belief situation**

# PARALLEL MODELS: TOWARDS THEORY OF MIND



...

## THE SYMBOLIC VS SUB-SYMBOLIC DEBATE

- Symbolic approaches assume a well-ordered, 'regular' world  
→ not often the case + world full of exceptions! (`Bird`  
`subclassOf FlyingThing?`)
- Symbolic learning is possible, but not nearly as powerful as  
sub-symbolic machine learning
- How to bridge the epistemic gap between symbolic and  
sub-symbolic AI?

That's all for today, folks!


Questions:

**[severin.lemaignan@brl.ac.uk](mailto:severin.lemaignan@brl.ac.uk)**


Slides:

[github.com/severin-lemaignan/lecture-hri-symbolic-reasoning](https://github.com/severin-lemaignan/lecture-hri-symbolic-reasoning)

## REASONING EXAMPLE: BEST DESCRIPTOR FOR A CONCEPT



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
**Algorithm 3.1:** CommonAncestors(*concept1*, *concept2*)

---

$$\begin{cases} \mathcal{I} \leftarrow \text{Superclasses}(\textit{concept1}) \cap \text{Superclasses}(\textit{concept2}) \\ \textbf{return } \{c \in \mathcal{I} \mid \text{Subclasses}(c) \cap \mathcal{I} = \emptyset\} \end{cases}$$

---

## REASONING EXAMPLE: BEST DESCRIPTOR FOR A CONCEPT



---

**Algorithm 3.2:** FirstDifferentAncestors(*concept1*, *concept2*)

---

$$\begin{cases} \mathcal{C} \leftarrow \text{CommonAncestors}(\textit{concept1}, \textit{concept2}) \\ \mathcal{S} \leftarrow \text{Superclasses}(\textit{concept1}) \cup \text{Superclasses}(\textit{concept2}) \\ \textbf{return } (\forall \mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}, \text{DirectSubclasses}(\mathbf{c}) \cap \mathcal{S}) \end{cases}$$

---