Project 1 Report

CS 4371

Group 2:

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Introduction

In this project, we learned how to use the security tools, WireShark and NMap. We also learned configuring and setting up networking systems. After familiarizing ourselves with these networking systems we implemented a security policy and created an Access Control Matrix (ACM) to represent the security policy. The group primarily communicated through Slack, an online messaging application, and documented what was done through a collaborative Google Doc. We met primarily on Thursdays after 3:30pm and Fridays from 10am - 3pm. Task 2 was the most significant of the joint efforts by the members, with Sarah, Casey, Nick, and Peter all contributing to the completion of the task. Casey largely handled management of the Cisco firewall, Kaleb and Sarah were largely responsible for implementation and testing of the iptables, Kaleb created the original version of the ACM and was responsible for subsequent edits, and all members contributed to the composition and editing of this final report. Sarah was responsible for the completion of the initial slate-clearing tasks in Task 1.

Task II

Task II was completed by Casey, Sarah, Nick and Peter. Casey and Sarah removed the configuration on Router F via Cisco Control Panel on computer F.1. Nick ran NMap to scan the computers and services on Network F (F.1 and F.2) from server A.F and recorded the results. For task 2.4, Peter executed the experiments specified below to check the default security configuration of the firewall, with all rules removed:


- Ping each computer from each other computer
- Navigate to the web server of each computer from each other computer, internal or external

All of the experiments were recorded via Wireshark and the relevant data shown below.

Peter executed the following commands to scan the network F: \$ nmap -sV 172.60.50.3

\$ nmap -sV 172.60.100.4

Below are the labeled examples from Peter's experiments.



F.1 to F.2 Webservice



F.1 to A.F web Service


41 27.573884716 172.60.100.4	172.10.30.15	HTTP	239 GET / HTTP/1.1
43 27.575788734 172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	TCP	1506 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
44 27.575801255 172.60.100.4	172.10.30.15	TCP	66 43538 > http [ACK] Seq=174 Ack=1441 Win=17536 Len=0 TSval=1286242360 TSecr=2431327489
45 27.575860036 172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	TCP	1506 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
46 27.575863033 172.60.100.4	172.10.30.15	TCP	66 43538 > http [ACK] Seq=174 Ack=2881 Win=20480 Len=0 TSval=1286242360 TSecr=2431327489
47 27.575990515 172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	HTTP	2345 HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden (text/html)

F.2 to A.F Web Service



F.2 to F.1 Web Service

(Note: There is no web server on F.1)



A.F to F.2 Web Service

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
	1 0.000000000	172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	TCP	74 47070 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Win=14600 Len=0 MSS=146
	2 0.001256243	172.60.50.3	172.10.30.15	TCP	60 http > 47070 [RST, ACK] Seg=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0

A.F to F.1 Web Service


(Note: There is no web server on F.1)

As shown in these experiments showing the connectivity between the various computers and the other computer's web servers, the default configuration of the router allows all attempts from a computer to any valid web server through. This is, obviously, not optimal from a security perspective.


Below are shown the pings from each computer to each other computer, including external to internal. Sans security policy, this is permitted, but ultimately undesirable.

3 0.467178214 4 0.467330622	172.60.50.3 172.60.100.4	172.60.100.4 172.60.50.3	ICMP ICMP		id=0x8057, seq=5/1280, ttl=64 id=0x8057, seq=5/1280, ttl=64			
F.1 to F.2 Ping								
6 4.651158550	172.60.50.3	172.10.30.15	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request	id=0x6e57, seq=1/256, ttl=64			
7 4.652417961	172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply	id=0x6e57, seq=1/256, ttl=62			

F.1 to A.f Ping



F.2 to F.1 Ping



F.2 to A.F Ping

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Length Info				
	7 11.115092918			ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request id=0x3811, seq=1/256, tt			
	8 11.116389288	172.60.50.3	172.10.30.15	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply id=0x3811, seq=1/256, tt	l=62		

A.F to F.1 Ping

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol I	Length Info				
	5 3.750678866	0678866 172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping	request	id=0x4a11,	seq=1/256,	ttl=64
	6 3 751076186	172 60 100 4	172 10 30 15	TCMP	98 Echo (ping	renly	id-0v4a11	sen-1/256	++1-62

A.F to F.2 Ping

It is evident that the default policy on the Cisco Firewall is overly permissive. It allows all ICMP and HTTP traffic, and even allows vulnerabilities to be discovered via NMap.

Task III


The third task in this project involved the creation and implementation of a new security policy. The policy created specifies that external computers should not be allowed to ping any computers on the internal (F) network, internal computers should be allowed to ping any computer, internal servers should allow internal and external access to their HTTP servers, internal servers should allow only internal access to SSH services, internal servers should not be allowed to access

external web servers, and internal computers should not be allowed to access any external SSH service. The internal workstations should be able to access external HTTP servers. That results in the Access Control Matrix below:

	Internal Workstation (F.1)	Internal Server (F.2)	External Computer (A.F)
F.1	Owns +Ping	+HTTP +Ping +SSH	+HTTP +Ping
F.2	+Ping	Own +HTTP +Ping	+Ping
A.F		HTTP	Own +HTTP +Ping

Matrix of Allowed Actions Between Group F Computers

Not all of the requested policies are possible to implement via the Cisco Firewall, however, as the firewall only checks traffic passing between zones. Traffic between F.1 and F.2, which are on the same interface on the router and thus the same zone, is not able to be secured by the router. Additionally, this traffic never reaches the router as it is directed by the intermediary switch. Because of this, rule of the policy, "Internal servers provide only SSH and web service to internal workstations" cannot be implemented at the router level. Additionally, rule D, "Internal workstations shall not provide any service" can only be partially implemented.



CISCO Firewall Policies Between Internal and External Computers

Of note, while the Firewall Configuration does not reflect it, Casey added an additional rule via Telnet into the router to block all non-matching traffic (access-list 101 deny ip any any).

Because the router-level firewall cannot enforce internal network rules, we need specific policy implementation on each internal computer. For the policy "Internal workstations shall not provide any service" we can simply write an IPtable rule "IPTABLES -A OUTPUT -j DROP" meaning all outgoing signals are blocked from leaving the machine. In the case of the internal server we want to block most traffic but allow specific request. We can achieve this by ordering our IPtables to place specific allowances before a general block.

Our server's IPtable input chain should consist of commands to allow SSH, HTTP and Ping from the internal workstation, as well as HTTP and ping from the external computer, before blocking all other inputs. However, we cannot use a general block for the output chain without limiting the servers ability to respond to request. Instead, we can use a pattern argument to allow all traffic with the ESTABLISHED state to go out from the machine. In practice, this means that only the allowed input


services will be able to establish a connection with our server and receive traffic in response.

```
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 172.60.50.3 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
[sudo] password for User02:
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 172.60.50.3 -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 172.60.50.3 -p icmp --icmp-type 8 ACCEPT
Bad argument 'ACCEPT'
Try 'iptables -h' or 'iptables --help' for more information.
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 172.60.50.3 -p icmp --icmp-type 8 -j ACC
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 172.10.30.15 -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -s 172.10.30.15 -p icmp --icmp-type 8 -j AC
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables -j DROP
iptables v1.4.7: no command specified
Try 'iptables -h' or 'iptables --help' for more information.
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables -A INPUT -j DROP
[User02@F ~]$ iptables --policy FORWARD DROP
iptables v1.4.7: can't initialize iptables table `filter': Permission denied (yo
u must be root)
Perhaps iptables or your kernel needs to be upgraded.
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables --policy FORWARD DROP
[User02@F ~] sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -m state --state RELATED, ESTABLISHED -j AC
[User02@F ~]$ iptables -A OUTPUT -j DROP
iptables v1.4.7: can't initialize iptables table `filter': Permission denied (yo
u must be root)
Perhaps iptables or your kernel needs to be upgraded.
[User02@F ~]$ sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -j DROP
[User02@F ~]$ sudo service iptables start
iptables: Applying firewall rules:
                                                           [ OK ]
[User02@F ~]$
```


Programming the Internal Server IPtable

Task IV

In order to test the firewall configuration completely, we disabled the iptables firewall on all workstations and servers. The policy was then tested by performing an additional NMap against the internal (F.1, F.2) network. The results of this test are shown below.



A.F to F.1 NMap: Blocked



A.F to F.2 NMap: Blocked

Web service availability was tested using curl -X GET from the command line of each computer. Packet captures from each mapping of computer to computer are shown below. These show that F.1 is able to access the web service on F.2 and A.F, and A.F can access the web server on F.2, but no other combinations are allowed.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
	18 3.072564716	172.60.50.3	172.60.100.4	HTTP	378 GET / HTTP/1.1
	24 3.073802343	172.60.100.4	172.60.50.3	HTTP	2329 HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden (text/html)
	32 3.103907105	172.60.50.3	172.60.100.4	HTTP	359 GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
	34 3.104401785	172.60.100.4	172.60.50.3	HTTP	533 HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)


F.1 to F.2 Web Server Test (Success)

120 45.439714694 172.60.50.3	172.10.30.15	HTTP	239 GET / HTTP/1.1
126 45.441873929 172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	HTTP	2345 HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden (text/html)


F.1 to A.F Web Server Test (Success)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
	15 2.043827847	172.60.100.4	172.60.50.3	TCP	74 36890 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Win=14600 Len=0 MSS=1460
	16 2.043966912	172.60.50.3	172.60.100.4	TCP	60 http > 36890 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0

F.2 to F.1 Web Server Test (Fail)



F.2 to A.F Web Server Test (Fail)



A.F to F.1 Web Server Test (Fail)



A.F to F.2 Web Server Test (Success)

The security policy stated earlier disallows the external computers to ping the internal computers, but the internal computers should be allowed to ping all computers. The screenshots below show the successful and unsuccessful pings across the network

22 5.596848117 172.60.50.3 23 5.597002977 172.60.100.4	172.60.100.4 172.60.50.3		8 Echo (ping) request 8 Echo (ping) reply	id=0xdb55, seq=1/256, ttl=64 id=0xdb55, seq=1/256, ttl=64
F.1 to F.2	Ping Test	(Successi	ful, shows	Reply)
172 68.744288210 172.60.50.3	172.10.30.15	ICMP	98 Echo (ning) reques	t id=0xa755, seg=1/256, ttl=64
173 68.745749956 172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply	
F.1 to F.2	Ping Test	(Successi		
29 16.751070417 172.60.100.4	172.60.50.3	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reque	est id=0xff4f, seq=1/256, ttl=64
30 16.751177286 172.60.50.3	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply	

F.1 to F.2 Ping Test (Successful, shows Reply)

ilter:	icmp Save							
lo.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Leng	th Info			
	36 22.073375460	172.60.100.4	172.10.30.15	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request id=0x1f50, seq=1/256, ttl=64			
	37 22.074845543	172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply id=0x1f50, seq=1/256, ttl=62			
	38 23.074914737	172.60.100.4	172.10.30.15	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request id=0x1f50, seq=2/512, ttl=64			
	39 23.076265824	172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply id=0x1f50, seq=2/512, ttl=62			
	41 24.076376287	172.60.100.4	172.10.30.15	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) request id=0x1f50, seq=3/768, ttl=64			
	42 24.077731681	172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping) reply id=0x1f50, seq=3/768, ttl=62			

F.1 to F.2 Ping Test (Successful, shows Reply)

172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xe925, seq=31/7936, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xe925, seq=32/8192, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xe925, seq=33/8448, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xe925, seq=34/8704, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.100.4	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xe925, seq=35/8960, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xeb25, seq=1/256, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xeb25, seq=2/512, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xeb25, seq=3/768, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xeb25, seq=4/1024, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xeb25, seq=5/1280, ttl=64
172.10.30.15	172.60.50.3	ICMP	98 Echo (ping)	request	id=0xeb25, seq=6/1536, ttl=64
	172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15 172.10.30.15	172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3	172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 ICMP 172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 ICMP 172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 ICMP 172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 ICMP 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 ICMP	172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 ICMP 98 Echo (ping) 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 ICMP 98 Echo (ping)	172.10.30.15 172.60.100.4 ICMP 98 Echo (ping) request 172.10.30.15 172.60.50.3 ICMP 98 Echo (ping) request

A.F to F.1 and F.2 Ping Test (Failure, no Reply received)

Despite our attempts to secure the confidential information stored on computer F.1, including barring the use of flash drives, it is still wholly possible to exfiltrate confidential information from the company's network, given certain conditions. As server F.2 hosts a web server of unknown security measures, it may be possible to POST arbitrary information to the web server via CURL or web server. This information may then be extracted by the same person or by an especially clever

outsider, could retrieve that information by similar method. This issue can only be resolved through clever configuration of deep packet inspection, firewall, iptables, and/or web server configuration to disallow the types and content of connections so proposed. There may exist other vulnerabilities to the network not determined at this time.