2. Research Plan

2.1. State of Research

The three subprojects approach the normative relations (NR1) and (NR2) from different angles. Whereas the first subproject studies the factual issue of which specific norms are *de facto* in play in literary practice, the second asks the normative question of which specific norms *should* be followed, while the third addresses the foundational issue of where these norms derive their authority from.

Subproject 1: Factual Issues (Literary Studies / Fribourg)

The Emergence of 'Practice Analysis'. Inspired by the so-called 'practice turn' in science studies and the history of science, literary criticism has — in the course of the last two decades — developed a steadily growing interest in illuminating its own practices (cf., e.g., Brenner 1993; Schönert 2000; Martus/Spoerhase 2009; Albrecht et al. 2015). On the one hand, this trend has resulted in sociologically oriented investigations of different spheres of activity in literary studies; on the other hand, it has revived the endeavor that the subproject attempts to carry forward, namely, the endeavor of an empirical analysis of the practice of interpretation guided by philosophical and linguistical theories of speech acts and argumentation.

This manner of 'practice analysis' originated in the 1970s with a series of studies on 'expert interpretations' of literature that, for two reasons, are still an important point of reference for meta-critical investigations like the projected one. First, these studies have developed convincing basic accounts of the language and the speech acts used in literary criticism and, by doing so, of the different operations involved in the activity of scholarly interpretation (cf. Weitz 1964; Beardsley 1970; Fricke 1977). Second, the research in question has provided us with systematic models for analysis and with empirical insights into the argumentative structures of interpretations in literary studies (cf. Grewendorf 1975; Beetz/Meggle 1976; Kindt/Schmidt 1976; von Savigny 1978).

Relevant Recent Developments. In the line of the meta-critical studies of the 1970s, the last years have seen several approaches in literary studies to attain a refined analytical and empirical picture of the discipline's interpretive practices. Three strands of these approaches are of particular relevance for this subproject.

First, based on Toulmin's understanding of argumentation (Toulmin 1958), Winko has conceived of and compellingly exemplified a model for examining argumentative structures and procedures in scholarly interpretations that allows for the specifics of these structures and procedures in the field of literary studies (cf. Winko 2002, 2015a, 2015b).

Second, stimulated by speech-act- and action-theory, increased attempts have been made recently to advance the project of a pragmatics of interpretation that characterizes the practice of interpretation in literary criticism as an interplay of various basic critical operations related to specific aims, types of claims and conditions of success (cf. Zabka 2005; Dennerlein/Köppe/Werner 2008; Kindt 2015). By doing so, the contributions in question have elaborated a sophisticated scheme of categories suited to guide differentiated mata-critical analyses.

Third, one of the basic operations involved in scholarly interpretation, the act of evaluation, has found particular attention in newer approaches to illuminating elements and compositions of critical, scientific and other forms of specialized discourse: From the perspective of linguistic discourse analysis, Thompson and Hunston have analyzed evaluation as a 'stance taking' that is at hand if someone verbally expresses any kind of attitude towards an object (cf. Thompson/Hunston 2000). Following speech act-theoretical conceptions, Winko and von Heydebrand have proposed a more restrictive notion of evaluation; they have systematically explicated the operation as the

usage of 'value-terms' to ascribe or disavow value to objects, and they have exemplarily illuminated acts of evaluation in 'expert interpretations' of different critical schools from the 19th to the 20th century (cf. von Heydebrand/Winko 1996).

Subproject 2: Normative Issues (Literary Theory / Göttingen)

Theories of Truth in Fiction. Current theories of fiction maintain that what is the case in the story world of a literary work of fiction is centrally determined by what recipients are prescribed to imagine by the work (Evans 1982; Walton 1990; Everett 2013; Walton 2013). Thus, if it is the case in the story world of a Sherlock Holmes novel that Holmes is a detective, then the novel prescribes us to imagine that Holmes is a detective. Fictional facts are, in short, facts to be imagined. An indispensable part of most, if not all, interpretations as conducted in literary studies consists in determining what is the case in the story world of particular works of fiction. The philosophical debate on the determination of fictional content has identified several general difficulties for this interpretive endeavor. In particular, it is clear that the fact that a work contains 'p' is not necessary for p being the case in the story world. In the fiction, Sherlock Holmes has two lungs, although the novels do not say so explicitly. Readers draw all kinds of inferences from what is said in a story, and they assume that certain (but certainly not all) facts from the real world hold in the story world, whether the text says so or not (Currie 1990, 60; Bareis 2009). Yet there is a broad consensus that there are norms constraining content ascriptions. In particular, it seems that there are certain 'import rules' that govern what must or must not be imported from the real world to a given fictional world. However, there are different candidates for such import rules, and with respect to particular cases, they lead to more or less intuitively plausible, and sometimes conflicting, results (cf. Köppe 2014, for a recent summary). This has led some to maintain that there is no general 'principle of generation' for fictional facts (Walton 1990, ch. 4; Lamarque/Olsen 1994, 94; Zipfel 2001, 90), while others maintain that one may keep searching for a meta principle that allows us to choose among the existing principles (Petterson 1993, 91), or that such a principle would at least explain the sometimes considerable agreement amongst interpreters (cf. Livingston 2005, 192). Still others maintain that the search for overarching principles is misguided from the start, and that the principles invoked in the philosophical discussion are not what guides the interpretations that are actually being conducted by literary scholars (Lamarque 1990; 1996, ch. 4).

Theory of Fiction and Narratology. Philosophical and narratological research so far is just beginning to acknowledge the importance of the theory of fiction for our understanding of particular narrative features and the accordant narratological concepts (cf. Martínez/Scheffel 2003; Walsh 2007; Bareis 2008; Köppe/Kindt 2014). This is surprising given that many narrative features are defined in terms of what is the case in a fiction, and given that the notion of truth in fiction is elucidated in the theory of fiction in turn. An example that is gaining more and more attention in the literature is the notion of a fictional narrator (Kania 2005; Diehl 2009; Köppe/Stühring 2011; 2015). But, arguably, a similar case can be made for narratological notions such as *unreliable narration* (Köppe/Kindt 2011). Moreover, notions such as the distinction between *telling* and *showing* as modes of narrative presentation (cf. Klauk/Köppe 2015) seem to designate response-dependent phenomena such that their elucidation involves the evocation of particular attitudes on the part of the reader. Thus, the *showing* mode of presentation is often said to consist in the propensity of a text to give readers the impression to be imaginarily 'present on the scene' (cf. Martínez/Scheffel 1999, 47f.). Since large branches of the theory of fiction involve reference to the 'fictive stance', i.e. a particular reception mode on the part of the reader (cf. Wolterstorff 1980;

Walton 1990; Lamarque/Olsen 1994), it seems natural to inquire into the relationships between these aspects of the theory of fiction and of narratology. (Subproject 2 will pursue this line of reasoning.)

Appreciation and Interpretation. There is a debate on how the goals of interpretation should be conceived of. Some claim that literary interpretation is all about discovering meaning (cf. Stecker 2005, ch. 7); others claim that we have to distinguish between different types of meaning, or different meanings of 'meaning' (Stout 1982), while still others want to establish a difference between *understanding* what e.g. a sentence or utterance mean on the one hand and the *appreciation* of a work of fiction on the other (Lamarque/Olsen 1994; Lamarque 2009, 148-173). Also, since there is a plurality of types of interpretation that are prevalent in literary studies, it is not clear whether there are any general criteria that are applicable for all given interpretations (Dennerlein/Köppe/Werner 2008; Köppe/Winko 2011). Since interpretive disputes often concern what is the case in a given fiction, this debate has an obvious bearing on the debate on *truth in fiction* (see above).

Subproject 3: Foundational Issues (Philosophy / Fribourg)

On the views which say that fictional texts invite or prescribe us to imagine certain things (e.g. what makes up their content), the utterances constituting a work of fiction, and the contents they express, are more than mere psychological triggers of our imagination. They also provide normative guidance for, and put normative constraints, on the imaginative responses we give, determining which of them are correct and which are not. Much philosophical work in this area is devoted to characterizing what it is that guides and constrains our imaginative responses. Thus, many have offered a systematic account of (the principles that determine) the content of a work of fiction (see e.g. Lewis 19**78**; Currie 1990, **ch. 2**; Walton 1990, **ch.?**; Lamarque & Olsen 1994, **ch. 4**; Davies 2007, ch. 4) and of the kind of acts or utterances by which that content is expressed (Searle 1975a; Currie 1990, **ch. 1**; Lamarque and Olsen 1994, **ch. 2**; Davies 2007, ch. 3). But the underlying question of how utterances of that kind — with the sort of content they are presumed to have — could be apt to provide any normative guidance for imagination, and how various forms of imaginative thought (and possibly also experience) could be subject to normative directions and constraints in the first place, has received much less attention. Our research aims to address these foundational issues by elucidating the structural features that are presupposed by the idea that fictional utterances can serve as normative guides for imaginative thought.

The Seeming Analogy with Reports and Beliefs. A natural way of approaching the issues is suggested by how fictional utterances and the corresponding imaginative responses are usually characterized. What someone who tells a fictional story like a fairy tale, say, does is often described as resembling, or even being parasitic on, what is done in a factual report. More specifically, the person telling the fictional story is taken, not to report, but merely to pretend or make as if to report (Searle 1975a; Lewis 1978; Kripke 2011), to imitate reporting (Ohmann 1971), or to do what very much looks like reporting but is done with a different, distinctly fictive intent (Currie 1990**, ch. 1**; Lamarque & Olsen 1994, ch. 2; Davies 2007, ch. 3). Similarly, what the reader or hearer of a fictional story does when she adopts the 'fictive stance' and forms the relevant imaginative responses is often characterized as something that is closely connected to belief. In particular, she is sometimes taken not to believe, but instead to make-believe that what she is being told is the case (Currie 1990; Walton 1990), or to make-believe that it is being told with the standard

communicative commitments in force (Lamarque & Olsen 1994, ch. 2). Alternatively, she may be said to entertain contents as unasserted, rather than as asserted like in the case of belief **(Carroll 1997).**

Given these similarities in input and output, it is tempting to assume a similar parallel between the two forms of communication with respect to their underlying normative structure. Accordingly, we are supposed to imagine what is presented by a fictional story as much as as we are supposed to believe what is represented by a factual report. That is, the fictional utterances constituting a fictional story may be said to normatively guide and constrain what we imagine in a similar fashion as the assertive utterances constituting a factual report normatively guide and constrain what we believe. Indeed, the accounts that are offered in the fictional case are usually framed in the same terms as those given in the non-fictional case, namely in terms of speakers' communicative intentions and commitments (Currie 1990; Carroll 1997; Davies 2007), discourse-specific conversational rules and practices (Walton 1990), or combinations thereof (Searle 1975a; Lamarque & Olsen 1994). It is generally accepted that the intentions, commitments or rules that govern the non-fictional case are missing or somehow suspended in the fictional case. What is striking, though, is that the accounts remain remarkably unspecific when it comes to positively explaining how intentions, commitments or rules can endow fictional utterances with the normative authority over imaginative thoughts that they are supposed to have.

(*** Too long. ***) More precisely, fictional utterances are commonly said to lack the commitment to truth that is characteristic of assertive utterances (Ohmann 1971; Searle 1975a), just as imaginative thoughts are assumed to lack the sensitivity to truth that is exhibited by beliefs (Velleman 2000b; Searle 2002, ch. 2; Burge 2010, ch. 8). This shared indifference towards truth might be expected to explain why fictional utterances can serve as guides to imagination, just as the shared connection to truth helps to explain why assertions are apt to guide beliefs. But this expectation is misguided. We have a rough idea of the sense in which genuine assertions are said to guide or constrain what we believe: beliefs are cognitive states whose function it is to be true and which are sensitive to evidence in favor of (or against) their truth (Velleman 2000a; 2000b; Shah 2003; Burge 2010, ch. 8; McHugh 2012), while assertions are utterances that involve a commitment to truth and thus seem to provide evidence for the truth of, and hence for believing, what is asserted (cf. Burge 2013a; 2013b; **Owens 2006**). In the fictional case, by contrast, the appeal to truth only serves to indicate which fundamental features fictional utterances and imaginative thoughts do *not* possess, and it is difficult to see how the absence of these features could account for the normative relation that is supposed to hold between utterance and response: * That fictional utterances lack a commitment to truth only suggests that they lack the normative force that genuine assertions possess, not that they have any normative force of their own; and the observation that imaginative thoughts are insensitive to truth suggests only that they are insensitive to the evidential considerations that guide beliefs, not that they are sensitive to any other kind of normative considerations at all.

In their attempt to offer a more positive characterization of the normativity of fiction-based imagining, some accounts appeal to the notion of a fictional practice that is regulated by specific communicative rules according to which we are required to respond to fictional utterances by forming corresponding imaginative thoughts (Searle 1975a; Walton 1990, **ch.?**; Lamarque and Olsen 1994, ch. 2). But this idea is hardly any progress. For saying that there are rules that require us to imagine certain things in response to fictional utterances does not amount to more than saying that fictional utterances have normative authority with regard to our imaginative

thoughts. What we are trying to understand is why, or in virtue of what, these rules apply and what makes them normatively binding in the first place.

The most popular idea in this context is the assumption that fictional utterances are made with a specific communicative intent, namely the intention to get the reader or hearer to form certain imaginative thoughts, rather than to adopt certain beliefs as in the case of assertion (Currie 1990, ch. 1; Lamarque and Olsen 1994, ch. 2; Davies 2007, ch. 3; Stock 2011; Mikkonen 2013, ch. 2). Yet it is unclear how an intention like that could have any normative impact on its own. Intentions in themselves do not constitute normative reasons, and so there is nothing wrong or incorrect about not carrying them out (cf. Raz 2011, ch. 8; Kolodny 2014; or Scanlon 2004). In the case of assertions, it is not the intention that is of normative significance. As already indicated, what is significant is rather the fact that the intended beliefs are cognitive states which are sensitive to truth-supporting evidence, and the supposition that the assertions themselves provide such evidence (however weak or defeasible it may be). In the case of fictional utterances, by contrast, we merely know that these fundamental connections to truth and evidence are missing, which brings us back to the problem that we lack a positive account of the corresponding feature(s) that produce the normative force instead.

The Second Normative Relation. In contrast to the normativity of fiction-based imagining, the normativity of appreciative responses to fictional texts is relatively unproblematic. The main reason for this is that we already have a fairly good grasp of how aesthetic appreciation works (Goldman, Budd, *) and, in particular, of the fact that aesthetic judgements are structurally similar to perceptual or descriptive judgements in that both are experience- or evidence-based (* Sibley, McDowell, Goldman, Schellekens, Dorsch). Whenever the fact that a given fictional text invites a certain imaginative response gives us a prima facie reason to ascribe a certain aesthetic value to the text, this happens because — and to the extent to which — the fact contributes to the text's aesthetic value and thus ensures that our matching aesthetic evaluation is appropriate. For example, we are entitled to treat X as a great masterpiece partly because …helps to realize the aesthetic greatness of X. Of course, there is the factual issue of why certain prescriptions to imagine are merit-constituting properties, and others are not (see subproject %). But this issue has no bearing on the more general truth that our recognition of the aesthetic qualities of a fictional text – which typically includes its property of inviting us to imagine certain things — justifies us in ascribing a certain aesthetic value to the text precisely because the qualities partly constitute the value and thus render its ascription likely to be correct.

One might still doubt that imaginative responses could rationally ground aesthetic evaluations since, while imagining cannot provide support for the adoption of a judgement-like attitude (e.g. imagining p and *if p, then q* may license us only to imagine p, but not to judge q), aesthetic evaluation does involve such an attitude (Dorsch 2015). But this worry is misguided, given that our aesthetic assessment of a fictional work is not the result of reasoning the premisses of which comprise what we imagine. Rather, our appreciation is grounded in a special kind of feeling or sentiment in response to our partly imaginative experience of the work (Hume; Kant; Budd; Goldman; Walton; Levinson *); or, alternatively, in reasoning that starts off with considerations about the work's aesthetic qualities, among them facts about what the text invites us to imagine (Bender *; Dorsch 2013).

Accordingly, the foundational part of the research project focuses largely on the issue of how to best account for the first normative relation, as well as the issue of which implications such an

account has for our understanding of the link between the two normative relations (e.g. whether one can be derived from the other).

2.2. State of Own Research

Tilmann Köppe's work in literary theory has focused on several topics at the intersection of philosophical aesthetics and literary studies. In particular, he has worked on fiction as a source of knowledge (Köppe 2007; 2008; 2009; 2011), the methodological foundations of literary interpretation (Dennerlein/Köppe/Werner 2008; Köppe/Winko 2011; Köppe 2012a), and Problems in the theory of fiction Köppe 2005; Gertken/Köppe 2009; Köppe 2009a; 2014; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; Klauk/Köppe 2014b; Klauk/Köppe/Rami 2014). In his current research, Köppe focuses on the textual foundations of 'higher-order' narrative features such as *narrative closure*, *narrative unreliability* (Köppe/Kindt 2011) or the concept of a *narrator* (Köppe/Stühring 2011; 2015), and *narrative distance/telling* vs. *showing* (Klauk/Köppe 2014; 2014a; 2015). Importantly for the present research proposal, this research builds on the assumption that our understanding of the relation between higher-order narrative phenomena such as a 'narrator' can be enhanced by considering the theory of fiction.

The subproject in closely linked to some of the core areas of Tom Kindt's past and present research, especially, to the endeavors of a historical appraisal of literary studies' development since the 19th century and a systematic clarification of interpretation as one of the discipline's fundamental activities. Pursuing the first of these two enterprises, several of Kindt's publications examine instructive episodes of the history of the humanities and of literary criticism in particular, in order to illuminate the structural architecture of approaches to literature and their linkage to general cultural developments (cf., e.g., Kindt/Müller 2004, 2005, 2008). The second endeavor mentioned is reflected in the theoretical focal point of Kindt's publications: In a series of studies, he has, on the one hand, aimed to elucidate central aspects and traditions of scholarly interpretation. The publications in question explicate their object as a normative practice composed of different lower level operations (like description, classification, explanation, evaluation, etc.) and develop proposals for distinguishing between theories, methods and heuristics of interpretation (Kindt/Köppe 2008; Kindt/Müller 2003; Kindt 2007; Köppe/Kindt 2014; Kindt 2015a). A recent contribution of this type relates these distinctions to the interpretive debate about E.T.A. Hoffmanns "Der Sandmann" and outlines a text-based explanation of why the novella has induced such a long-standing succession of controversial statements (Kindt, in press). On the other hand, Kindt's emphasis on meta-theoretical issues becomes manifest in a couple of publications that analyze and attempt to optimize the interpretive usage of highly disputed critical concepts like 'implied author' (Kindt/Müller 2006, 2011), 'unreliable narration' (Kindt 2008; Köppe/Kindt 2014), 'fantasy' (Kindt 2011), or 'literary epoch' (Kindt 2015b).

* Dorsch / Bodrozic / Klauk

2.3. Detailed Research Plan

While Subproject 3 aims to uncover normative principles that (*de facto*) guide content ascribing interpretations as conducted by literary scholars, the Subproject 2 examines arguments in support of such principles.

Subproject 1: Factual Issues (Literary Studies / Fribourg)

The subproject will unfold in two stages: A brief first stage addresses the task of shaping an analytic guideline for the intended empirical exploration of interpretation practices in literary criticism. The following main stage of the project, divided into two steps, applies the guideline in

a detailed meta-critical study of about 60 contributions to the interpretive controversy about E. T. A. Hoffmann's 'Sandmann': In an initial step, the study aims to identify principles and rules that are at the bottom of the generation of fictive facts in literary studies, in an ensuing step, the examination will analyze the relations that are established in scholarly interpretations between the imagination of fictive worlds the attribution of appreciable aesthetic qualities.

An Analytic Guideline for an Exploration of Interpretive Practices. To instruct the meta-critical analysis of the 'Sandmann'-debate, the introductory part of the subproject will outline an 'analytic manual' for the illumination of argumentative and evaluative structures in 'expert interpretations'. With regard to *argumentation analysis*, the study will follow Winko's proposal to adapt the Toulminean model of argumentation for examining procedures of justification and generating plausibility in literary critics' approaches to texts (Winko 2002, 2015a, 2015b). Toulmin's core distinction between 'grounds', 'warrants', and 'backings' for 'claims' (Toulmin 1958), it will be argued, lays the ground for a precise description of the complex and rarely elaborated argumentative dimension of scholarly interpretations and helps keeping in mind that explicit reasons and implicit regularities in argumentative practices do not necessarily refer to rules and principles governing the practices in question (von Savigny 1976). The *evaluation analysis* of the corpus-texts will, in the line of von Heydebrand and Winko, build on the speech act-account of interpretive practices in literary studies (Zabka 2005) and conceive of evaluation as a specific illocutionary act characterized by the attributive usage of 'value-terms' (von Heydebrand/Winko 1996). Such a conception of evaluation draws a generally adequate picture of the ascription of aesthetic values in scholarly interpretations and has recently been the point of reference for a comprehensive catalogue of questions and procedures tailor-made to analyze evaluative practices in critical discourse (Worthmann 2013).

A Case Study on the Interpretive Debate about 'Der Sandmann'. Guided by the scheme of categories that have been clarified in the preliminary part of the subproject, its second and main part is devoted to a meta-critical appraisal of the long-standing and still ongoing interpretive debate on E.T.A. Hoffmann's novella 'Der Sandmann'. The corpus of the study will consist of about 60 contributions to the controversy that, by now, comprises approximately 100 elaborated scholarly interpretations; all elements of the analyzed sample have been published in the course of the last hundred years, i.e., after the formation of literary studies in its present disciplinary setup. Examining the argumentative structures in the corpus-texts related to the issues of 'world-construction' and 'work evaluation', the study aims to approach empirically underpinned answers to the guiding question (Q 1) and (Q 2) of the subproject and, thus, to exemplarily elucidate central dimensions of the normative practice of interpretation in literary criticism.

The controversy on Hoffmann's 'Sandmann' is ideally suited as a test case for the projected empirical study for at least three reasons: (1) The debate has already been the object of several survey articles (e.g. Kremer 2010) and some meta-critical appraisals (Tepe/Rauter/Semlow 2009; Detel 2014). Since these publications convincingly identify basic camps and lines of argument in the controversy but give no noteworthy attention to the key questions of the intended study, they can serve as an advanced starting point for the realization of the subproject. (2) The debate about Hoffmann's text differs from comparable controversies in one distinctive respect: While many scholarly discussions about fictional works do not address the problem of determining the outlines of the fictive world, let alone deal with it at length, the 'Sandmann'-debate is centered around that very problem: At the heart of the controversy, as the available surveys unanimously claim (Kindt,

in press), is the question whether the novella tells the story of a mental derangement due simply to psychic processes, whether it decribes a fatal life crisis brought about by demonic powers, or wether it does not supply sufficient evidence to determine what finally causes the death of the narrative's protagonist. In short, the interpretative debate about the text is essentially a dispute about the 'elucidation' (Beardsley 1970) of the text-world and, therefore, constitues a highly instructive text case for the subproject. (3) Meta-critical publications on the 'Sandmann'-controversy and random samples of the presumable corpus of the study indicate that many contributions to the debate – explicitly or implicitly – intertwine the task of determining the fictive world of 'Der Sandmann' with aesthetic judgements about (aspects of) the fictional work. Thus, the debate provides a rich collection of examples of how 'world-construction' and 'work evaluation' are related in scholary interpretations.

Subproject 2: Normative Issues (Literary Theory / Göttingen

The current subproject focuses on literary fiction and examines the influence of *literary appreciation* on what a work of fiction prescribes us to imagine. In particular, we want to contribute to answering the following question:

> (Q 1) Does appreciation influence what literary works of fiction prescribe us to imagine, and if so, how?

The subproject has three interrelated parts. The first part asks for the influence of literary appreciation on the determination of fictional *content*, i.e. on *what* to imagine. This part is mainly analytic in that it tries to uncover the structure and force of arguments in favor of the thesis that appreciation does play a role in the determination of content. The second part is constructive, arguing that the appreciation of certain *narrative-structural* features of literary fictions presupposes an imaginative involvement of a certain *kind*; in this part, we therefore aim at spelling out the influence of literary appreciation on *how* to imagine a particular content. The third part is mainly speculative in focusing on implications of both ventures for the very notion of prescribed imaginings.

In asking for the influence of literary appreciation on what to imagine, the **first part** of the subproject starts with a very general notion of aesthetic appreciation. According to a widely held view, aesthetic appreciation aims at the realization of aesthetic merit, and works of art have aesthetic merit if they allow for intrinsically valuable experiences (Budd 1995; Goldman 2006). This conception of aesthetic appreciation can easily be applied to literary fictions. Take the notorious debate about whether there are ghosts in H. James' *The Turn of the Screw* (Currie 1991). The claim that there are ghosts that are in contact with the children supposedly makes for a (more) scary reading than the claim that there are no ghosts in the story world, but rather a deluded governess. Other things being equal, the fact that the story is scary amounts to a merit-constituting property of a ghost story. Hence, it seems that the claim that 'in the fiction$_W$, p, makes for a more scary reading of work W' counts in favor of the claim 'in the fiction$_W$, p'. Generalizing over this particular case, we get something like the following hypothesis:

> (H1) A content-ascribing interpretation I_1 is (other things being equal) better than its alternative I_2, if imagining in accordance with it leads to an intrinsically more valuable experience. (Cf. Goldman 1995, 102)

However, both the details and the validity of (H1) are far from clear and need to be carefully scrutinized. For instance, the example discussed suggests that whether the dispositional quality of 'allowing for a scary reading' counts as a merit-constituting property of a work depends on

the genre (cf. Walton 1970). Suppose that we read *The Turn of the Screw* as a psychological novella instead. Doesn't, in the context of this reading, the claim that in the fiction, there is a deluded governess (q), rather than ghosts, constitute the more rewarding reading experience, and hence counts in favor of the claim 'in the fiction$_{\mathrm{W}}$, q? Also, (H1) seems to imply that aesthetic experiences can be compared (cf. Budd 1995, 42f., on the incommensurability of aesthetic value). And, given that the *appropriateness* of experiences of aesthetic value depends on the quality of the interpretations the experiences are based on, (H1) moreover seems to imply that the appropriateness of experiences of aesthetic value depends on the degree of value ascribed by the interpretation. Both implications of (H1) are clearly problematic. Our first sub-question, then, becomes:

> (Q 1.1) Does the realization of aesthetic merit help to determine which of two (otherwise equally well supported) content-ascribing interpretations I_1 and I_2 is to be preferred, and if so, how?

(H1) is concerned with the rather simple case of two alternative interpretations which are *ex hypothesi* equally well supported in all other relevant respects. However, interpretations can be more or less convincing according to several different criteria (Strube 1992). For instance, content-ascribing interpretations may be judged according to the purely formal criterion of how many (important) textual features they explain (Føllesdal et al. 2008). Now, suppose that we have two (otherwise equally well supported) incompatible interpretations, I_1 and I_2, such that I_1 ascribes a merit-constituting property as explained above (say, 'in the fiction$_{\mathrm{W}}$, p'), while I_2 ascribes another property (say, 'in the fiction$_{\mathrm{W}}$, q'), thereby having greater explanatory scope with respect to other (important) properties of the work than I_1. Which one should be preferred? Our second sub-question therefore becomes:

> (Q 1.2) Do merit-constituting properties trump other criteria for content ascriptions, and if so, how?

In the next step, we turn to another notion of appreciation, namely literary appreciation more narrowly construed, and its putative influence on content-ascriptions/prescriptions to imagine. Interpreters are not always guided by the goal of enabling readers to undergo experiences which are intrinsically valuable (Shusterman 1978). For instance, they may also aim at 'historical interpretation' (cf. Olsen 2004, 142; on different goals of interpretation in literary studies, cf. Kindt/Müller 2003, 212; Köppe/Winko 2013). Proponents of historical interpretation take seriously the idea that works of literary fiction are historical artifacts and try to uncover the ways the work was intended to be read by its historical audiences (or the ways it was actually read by these audiences). As we shall argue, appreciating a work of fiction as a historical artifact certainly amounts to appreciating the work *as* a work of fiction. Historical interpretation is not meant to merely *use* the work, say, in order to gain historical knowledge about the world (cf. Eco 1999, 35ff.), but rather the work itself and its properties are at the focus of interest. Thus it seems fair to say that historical interpretation amounts to a form of literary appreciation, and is in the business of uncovering *literary merit* (cf. Lamarque 2009, 171). Our third sub-question therefore becomes:

> (Q 1.3) How are we to decide between two (incompatible) interpretations, I_1 and I_2, of work W, such that I_1 involves the claim that 'in the fiction$_{\mathrm{W}}$, p', thereby giving rise to literary merit M_1, and I_2 involves the claim that 'in the fiction$_{\mathrm{W}}$, q', thereby giving rise to literary merit M_2?

In working on part one of the subproject, we need to keep two methodological points in mind. Firstly, one may be tempted to claim that (Q 1.1), (Q 1.2) and (Q 1.3) need to be answered on a case to case basis. Literary interpretation is often regarded as holistic insofar as one has to trade the total package of pros and cons of I_1 off against the total package of pros and cons of $I_2 \ldots I_n$ (Köppe 2008, 86f.). The results of Subproject 3 (#Tom#) will hopefully contribute to our understanding of the matter. But even if holism gives us the correct picture with respect to content-ascriptions (both *de iure* and *de facto*), we certainly want to know what types of reasons guide, and ought to guide, our decisions in typical cases. Secondly, maybe there is no best interpretation to be had, but rather only optimal ones (in the sense of Currie 2003, 293). We turn to some implications this may have for the notion of prescribed imaginings below, as part three of this subproject.

Part two of the current subproject asks for the influence of literary appreciation on *how* to imagine. It does so by identifying three narrative-structural features the appreciation of which will be argued to make special claims on the imagination. Thus a case will be made that certain narrative structural features not only normatively constrain the content of our imaginings but also *how* to imagine it. We focus on three such features, namely *unreliable narration*, the distinction between *telling vs. showing*, and *internal focalization*.

Unreliable narration comes in many forms (cf. Kindt 2008; Köppe/Kindt 2014, ch. 4.4). One form involves the reader's misinformation about the contours of the story world. Readers of Bierce's *An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge* are told that the protagonist escapes from a life threatening situation, only to learn later on in the story that the escape was nothing but the hallucinations of the dying man (Stühring 2011). This narrative strategy, then, centrally involves a distinction between what is the case in the fiction and what is but *seemingly* the case in the fiction. However, we surely cannot say that only the former is what is important to appreciating the work. For, arguably, appreciating the short story involves that you first faithfully follow the protagonist's hallucinations (without knowing that they are but hallucinations, that is), that you gain hope and be awaked, and probably disappointed, in the end. So, what do we have here in terms of prescriptions to imagine? In previous work, we have proposed to distinguish between prescriptions to imagine and *prima facie* prescriptions to imagine (Köppe/Kindt 2011). Readers are, in other words, mislead by the story concerning what it is that they are prescribed to imagine. This solution leaves untouched the idea that prescriptions to imagine establish fictional facts. But it does not seem to capture the idea that, in order to appreciate the story in accordance with its narrative strategy, one actually *needs* to be mislead concerning what is the case in the fiction. The work, as it were, prescribes us to imagine what it does not prescribe us to imagine. This needs explanation. A variant of this account has been proposed by Stühring (2011) who claims that passages of unreliable narration give readers a reason to imagine what (as might only be seen from an all things considered perspective) is not the case in the fiction. Again, however, the details are far from clear; in particular, it is not clear how the accounts relate to what has been identified as a major functional effect of the story, i.e. its propensity of elicit a particular emotionally qualified imaginative response (cf. Köppe 2012). Our research question thus becomes:

> (Q 1.4) How can we accommodate that in certain cases of unreliable narration literary fictions seem to prescribe emotionally qualified imaginings that, moreover, do not establish fictional facts?

Besides unreliable narration, we shall examine two more narrative-structural features of literary fictions and argue that they have a bearing on the *way* the works ask us to imagine what is the case in the fiction. The second feature under consideration is *internal focalization*, i.e. the telling of a

narrative from the perspective of one of its characters (Genette 1980, 185ff.; Klauk/Köppe/Onea 2012). Take the sentences 'Peter looked out of the window. The cars were green.' Presumably, readers are supposed to imagine that the focal character, Peter, sees the green cars, or that the cars looked green to Peter. Accordingly, we have a necessary condition for internal focalization, spelled out in terms of prescribed imaginings. We might, very roughly, represent it like this: 'If a passage of text t with a content c of a fictional narrative is internally focalized through a character C, then readers are prescribed by t to imagine that 'C perceives c'.' It is a common assumption, however, that the appreciation of internally focalized passages of text not only involves grasping what is the case in the story world. These passages rather invite you to imaginatively perceive the situation *from the character's perspective* (Lindemann 1987, 6; Habermas 2006, 505; Stanzel 2008, 16). The passages, in other words, invite you to put yourself, imaginatively, in the character's shoes. Thus for the Peter-case, you are invited to imagine seeing the green cars. But again, we need to spell out the details. Recently, the related claim that point of view shots in cinematic fiction prompt readers to imagine seeing things from the character's point of view has been put to criticism (Choi 2005), and a similar case can be made for the effects of internal focalization, it seems. Hence, our research question is:

> (Q 1.5) Do passages of internal focalization prescribe us to imagine the content of what is said from the point of view of the focal character, and if so, how?

A similar case will be made for the notorious distinction between *telling vs. showing* modes of presentation in a narrative (Klauk/Köppe 2014; Klauk/Köppe 2014a; Klauk/Köppe 2015). The gist of passages of *showing* seems to be that readers are invited to *vividly* imagine what the text is about. But this is not more than the beginning of an account of the narrative mode of showing. Obviously, any passage of narrative fiction could be said to invite a rich and multifaceted, hence vivid, imaginative engagement. So what is special about *showing*? Hence, our research question is:

> (Q 1.6) Are passages of *showing* special with regard to the way of the imaginings they prescribe?

The first two parts of the subproject identify a number of problems and research questions which have implications for the very notion of prescribed imaginings. Spelling out these implications, and arguing for their relevance to a general theory of prescriptions to imagine in the context of fiction constitutes **part three** of the subproject, which will be conducted in close cooperation with the first subproject on foundational matters.

If the picture of literary interpretation sketched above is correct, then it might turn out that prescriptions to imagine do not issue from works of fiction *tout court* but need to be construed as being somehow sensitive to types of interpretation. (We can think of an interpretation that seeks to promote intrinsically valuable experiences and 'historical interpretation' as two types of interpretation here). This gives rise to the following research question:

> (Q 1.7) Are prescriptions to imagine sensitive to types of interpretation, and if so, how?

There are at least three *prima facie* options to answer this question (cf. Lamarque 1996, 64): Firstly, what a work W prescribes to imagine could be said to have no unconditional validity, but may be represented as 'hypothetical imperatives': 'When you engage in an interpretation of type T of W, then you are prescribed to imagine … by W'. It is, however, unclear whether all prescriptions to imagine have this hypothetical form or only some. In other words, do we have different kinds of prescriptions to imagine in the appreciation of literary fictions, some with unconditional force

and others conditional upon types of interpretation? Secondly, we might opt for the de-emphasis of prescribed imaginings that are not 'apt' to a particular type of interpretation T, in the context of engaging in a T-type interpretation. Walton recommends to de-emphasize fictional facts that do not fit into certain games of make-believe, meaning that there is a prescription to imagine in these cases, but we somehow do not take it seriously (Walton 1990, 182). This strategy does not touch the unconditional force of prescriptions to imagine. However, it rearranges the relation of interpretation and prescriptions to imagine considerably, for interpretations here do not only aim at determining prescriptions to imagine, but also at their evaluation. As a third strategy, we might opt for a 'disjunction', claiming that work W may have different story worlds SW_1, SW_2, …, where each SW depends on the type of interpretation T adopted. In this picture, prescriptions to imagine have unconditional validity but are relativized to types of interpretation. The pros and cons of these alternatives need to be evaluated, and they need to be supplemented by further options.

In our exposition of part two of the current subproject, we have considered three examples of narrative-structural features that seem to have an influence on the way of imagining that is prescribed by works of fiction. The notion of 'way' here refers to a mixed bag of phenomena: *à propos* unreliable narration, we have considered the notion of imagining in an emotionally qualified way (such that we, say, are invited to *confidently* imagine that the protagonist escapes) as well as the distinction between *prima facie* and all-things-considered prescriptions, and the idea that imaginings may be supported with different strengths of reasons. /'*A propos* the narrative modes of internal focalization and showing (vs. telling), we have considered the ways of imagining something from a character's perspective, or imagining something in a vivid manner. Our final research question, then, generalizes over the particularities of these cases:

> (Q 1.8) How do prescriptions to imagine extend beyond the content of what is to be imagined to the *way* of imagining?

Subproject 3: Foundational Issues (Philosophy / Fribourg

The general goal of this subproject is to develop an account of the normativity involved in (NR1) by providing an answer to:

> (Q3) What is the source of the normative authority, with which fictional texts direct our imagination?

The resulting account need not be regarded as a rival to the accounts in terms of speech-act commitments and Gricean communicative intentions considered earlier (*). It may rather be thought of as a supplement to them. Still, what is problematic about those accounts is that, without relevant supplementation, they seem to suggest that the normative relation between fictional stories and imagination can be construed in parallel to that between factual reports and beliefs. So, a first task is to show why this suggestion is misguided. A fictional story is not simply a report that is stripped of its commitment to truth; nor is an imaginative thought simply a belief that is insensitive to matters of fact. The link to truth is not just a marginal aspect but a constitutive feature of reports and beliefs. Once that link is removed, we get something fundamentally different. It is therefore not entirely clear what we are supposed to do when asked to consider the normative relation between reports and beliefs *in abstraction from* their connection to truth.

To get a different perspective on the issue, we suggest to leave the standard comparison with reports and beliefs aside (*at least until later) and to try to understand the normative relation (NR1) between fiction and imagination in terms of the nature of imagining (first part). After that, we can ask what makes imagining susceptible to normative guidance in general (second part),

before addressing the more specific question of how it could be guided by fictional utterances in particular (third part).

Our focus is thereby on imaginative thoughts, given that they constitute our primary access to fictional worlds (e.g. when we imagine that Sherlock Holmes lives in Baker Street 221b). But we expect very similar considerations to apply also to imaginative experiences (e.g. visualising the appearance of a fictional character) and more complex imaginative projects (e.g. imaginatively adopting the perspective of a fictional character; see Dorsch 2012: ch. *).

The **first part** of the subproject is concerned with identifying the nature of imaginative thoughts. In general, thoughts are mental episodes in the stream of consciousness that constitute propositional attitudes. As such, they possess a propositional content which determines certain conditions that can be met or not, and which is true if and only if these conditions are actually met. The content of the thought 'it rains', say, is such that it is true just in case it does rain. But not all thoughts are imaginative. Our first research question is thus:

(Q3.1) How do imaginative thoughts differ from other thoughts?

In order to answer this question, we need to consider three important distinctions among thoughts. First of all, the propositional contents of thoughts may be entertained in either of two ways (Velleman 2000a; Stock 2011). On the one hand, if a content is entertained in a *presentational* way (as in the case of guesses or empirical judgments), it seems to the subject as if the conditions determined by the content are already met (somewhere, sometime). On the other hand, if a content is entertained in a *projectional* way (as in the case of wishes or occurrent desires), it seems to the subject as if the conditions determined by the content are still in need to be met. Our hypothesis is that our imaginative responses to fictional texts involve primarily presentational thoughts. For not only is it controversial whether there are any projectional forms of imagining in the first place (Kind *, Currie *, Doggett *). But even if, our main imaginative responses to fiction portray the respective fictional world as being a certain way, and not as to be made a certain way (Walton *; Martin *).

Then, only some propositional attitudes are such that their success constitutively depends on the truth of their contents. Cognitive attitudes like beliefs or judgments, for instance, have the function to be true — they are successful when they fit the world. Conative attitudes like desires or intentions, on the other hand, have the function to be made true — they are successful when the world is made to fit them. By contrast, imaginative thoughts seem to have neither a cognitive nor a conative direction of fit (Searle 2002). Although they have propositional contents, their success does not constitutively depend on whether their contents are (made) true or not; or so we would like to argue.

Finally, we want to defend the view that imaginative thoughts differ from other propositional attitudes in that we have direct voluntary control over them (* McGinn, Wittgenstein, Dorsch 2012, 2015). We cannot believe or desire something just because we want to do so (Williams *: Owens *; Pink *). But we are able to imagine something simply by deciding to imagine it. Of course, there are certain conceptual and psychological limits to what we can imagine (Gendler *; Dorsch 2012: ch. *). But, within these limits, we do have voluntarily control over those imaginative thoughts that we (can) actually form. Moreover, this control is direct in the sense that, once we have decided to imagine something, we do not have to do anything else to execute the decision: we can simply imagine what we want to imagine (Dorsch 2009, 2012: ch. *). Accordingly, our first working hypothesis is:

(H1) What is distinctive of imaginative thoughts is that they are presentational, without a direction of fit, and subject to direct voluntary control.

We would like to conlude the first part by arguing that, assuming that (H1) is indeed true, its truth is best explained by the following hypothesis:

(H2) Imaginative thoughts are intentional mental actions (Dorsch *).

To start with, only actions seem to allow for direct voluntary control (*). In addition, intentional actions arguably do not possess any direction of fit (*). For they are just the kind of entities that render conative attitudes successful by making the world fit them. For instance, while our action of raising our arm may satisfy our intention to raise our arm, it cannot itself be said to be successful (or unsuccessful) independently of the success of our intention. Finally, the idea that imaginative thoughts are mental actions is compatible with the observation that we sometimes imagine something 'against our will' (e.g. when we cannot banish a certain thought), given that there is room for akratic, obsessive and similarly irrational actions (Dorsch 2012: ch. *). What is special about the class of actions to which imaginative thoughts belong is, however, that they have propositional contents entertained in a presentational way.

The **second part** of the subproject uses the results from the first in order to answer the question about the source of the normativity of imaginative thoughts in general:

(Q3.2) How can imaginative thoughts, understood as intentional actions, be normatively guided?

That imaginative thoughts are intentional mental actions means that their normativity is linked to that of conative attitudes rather than to that of cognitive attitudes – despite the fact that imaginative thoughts are also presentational. What is sensitive to normative considerations in an intentional action is not the action per se but the underlying intention (or the desire that motivates it). Still, the normative considerations that intentions are sensitive to are essentially related to a feature that pertains to the intended actions, namely the value that the actions might serve to realize or promote. In other words, what generally guides us in forming our intentions and decisions are considerations that show the intended actions worth doing (Raz 2011, ch. 4; Shah 2008; Hieronymi 2014). So, given that imaginative thoughts constitute a particular form of intentional action, the following hypothesis needs to be discussed and evaluated:

(H3) We can understand the receptivity of imaginative thoughts to normative guidance in terms of the value(s) that they realize or promote.

It is commonly assumed that a given action can serve to realize more than one value at once (Raz 2003). This is so not only because an action can have several features that constitute mutually independent goods, but also because both actions and values can stand in various systematic dependency relations to other actions and values (for instance, one action can be part of another action, just as one value can be a species of some other, more generic value, etc. – cf. Raz 2003; Shpall & Wilson 2012; Schroeder 2012). Thus, a particular (string of) imaginative thought(s) may have features that render it both entertaining and instructive, say. But it may also be part of some broader activity which is worthwhile to pursue because it furthers a third value. Hence, there might be many values that are candidates for being normative guides for our imagination, given that they are promoted by imagining something. Given this context, it is necessary to ask:

(Q3.3) Is there a value that attaches to imagining as such, and which is common to all (and only) imaginative thoughts (as well as other forms of imagining)?

Our working hypothesis regarding this question is that there is indeed a value which any *successful act of imagining realizes or promotes:

> (H3) *Successful imaginative thoughts realize the value of (what may be called) *presentational liberty.*

This value is realized whenever one successfully exercises one's capacity to *autonomously/for oneself decide which presentational thoughts to entertain, unburdened by external evidential or perceptual restrictions. (H4) is controversial in a lot of respects and calls for many qualifications. In particular, provided that presentational liberty does indeed constitute a value for imagining, the following issue needs to be clarified:

> (Q3.4) Is presentational liberty an intrinsic or merely an instrumental value?

If it is intrinsic, then we should have a *default* reason to imagine something whenever we are in a position to do so – that is, a reason that holds unless there is more reason to do something else instead. But it is not obvious at all that this is indeed the case. On the other hand, although the claim that the value of presentational liberty is merely instrumental seems less controversial, it remains to be shown what other kinds of value the exercise of presentational liberty qua exercise of presentational liberty may help to realize.

We have to appeal to *extrinsic values, in any case, in order to answer another question, which concerns the value of specific imaginings rather than that of imagining in general. That our imagination can be subject to normative guidance does not only mean that we can have reason to *imagine* something rather than *doing something else.* It also implies that we can have reason to imagine *this* rather than *that.* So, it also needs to be queried:

> (Q3.5) Which value(s) normatively guide(s) our decision to imagine *this* rather than *that*?

Presentational liberty cannot be the answer to this question as well, given that it attaches to any imaginative thought, irrespective of its particular content, and thus cannot adjudicate between imagining p and imagining q. If values are to guide us not only in whether to imagine anything at all but also in *what* we imagine, they must somehow relate to the contents of our imaginings. The most simple way of construing the connection, we contend, is in terms of the extrinsic goals that particular imaginings serve to achieve:

> (H4) What normatively guides us in deciding *what* to imagine are the extrinsic goals that are instrumentally promoted by imagining.

According to this proposal, what we may have reason to imagine in a given situation depends on (a) how worthwhile it is to pursue the goal that this particular imagination serves to attain, and (b) how well the imagination is suited to attain that goal. Given the great variety of values that imaginative thoughts (like all kinds of action) can help us to attain, and given the variety of alternative ways in which each such value might be attained, it seems unlikely that a full systematic account of the reasons for particular imaginings can be provided. But the considerations adduced so far at least specify what shape such an account would have to take.

2.4. Time Schedule and Main Benchmarks

	Subproject 1	Subproject 2	Subproject 3
First Year (2016–17)			
Second Year (2017–18)			
Third Year (2018–19)			
Planned Output			

2.5. Importance of the Research & Planned Publications

Bibliography