

Electoral spillovers in Argentina [an attempt at an early draft]

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Correlations




Figure: Correlation of vote shares (vertical)

Correlaciones votos (cont.)





Figure: Correlation of vote shares (vertical)

Background

- Multi-tiered systems elect representatives at different levels of government and these elections may be concurrent or separate.
- If elected concurrently, a candidate for a given office may benefit from electoral spillovers arising from votes received by a same-party candidate in another election (*coattail effect*)
- If elected separately, electoral spillovers are still relevant?
 - Two cases: a) lower-level elec *after* upper-level elec; b) lower-level elec *before* upper-level elec

Where the literature stands

- Early work studied these electoral effects [Calvert and Ferejohn [1983], Ferejohn and Calvert [1984], Ames [1994], Shugart [1995]]
- More recent work has looked at more rigorous modelling of coattail effects Samuels [2000], Hogan [2005], Oliveros, Magar [2012], Meredith [2013]]

Some theoretical considerations

- Why do these effects arise?:
 - Due to institutional design → ballot designs that include a straight-ticket voting may induce larger spillovers (coattails)
 - Due to mobilization of party supporters → particularly relevant in separate elections Meredith [2013]
 - Due nationalization/congruence of party system → homogeneous votes across parties for different elections

Modeling

- We follow Shugart [1995] in modeling a delayed effect → only a empirical question [Theory is unclear, both arguments are likely]
- Controlling for this is possible and desirable in Argentina → normally the delay between elections is less than 6 months [average distance over three elections equals 80 days]
- Including a variable measuring for distance between different elections makes sense to capture this effect.

Modeling (cont.)

- Assume that there are n sub-national autonomous districts and *one* national government. The national government sets the election date exogenously. Each subnational government decides upon the date of election which can be: 1) before; 2) on the same date; 3) after the national date.
- The decision depends on two factors: 1) the observed intra-party “vertical” vote deficit in the previous election; 2) the observed inter-party district-level margin of victory.
- The timing of the game is as follows: 1) NatGov chooses elec date; 2) each LocGov sets its own elec date; 3) all elections take place; 4) each government gets payoff.

<i>Dependent variable: Presidential Vote Share [Pooled OLS]</i>				
shgob	-0.87*** (0.05)	-0.80*** (0.05)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.46*** (0.05)
core	-0.26*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)		-0.02 (0.03)
ENCPrez	-0.11*** (0.002)	-0.11*** (0.002)	-0.10*** (0.004)	-0.09*** (0.003)
conc		-0.07 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.06)	0.54*** (0.07)
days		-0.0004 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
shgob:core	1.00*** (0.05)	0.86*** (0.05)		0.45*** (0.06)
shgob:conc		0.12** (0.05)		-1.26*** (0.12)
core:conc				-0.83*** (0.07)
shgob:core:conc				1.56*** (0.13)
pubemp			0.003*** (0.0003)	0.003*** (0.0002)
conc:shgob			0.05 (0.06)	
Observations	1,390	1,301	1,240	1,240
Adjusted R ²	0.74	0.76	0.66	0.81
F Statistic	1,010.10***	596.12***	395.51***	545.26***
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

<i>Dependent variable: Presidential Vote Share [Panel FE, time effects]</i>				
shgob	-0.77*** (0.07)	-0.79*** (0.05)	-1.17*** (0.09)	-0.44*** (0.05)
core	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)	-0.41*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)
conc				0.54*** (0.07)
ENCPrez	-0.10*** (0.003)	-0.09*** (0.003)	-0.17*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.003)
PREZ_FPV_pre			0.26*** (0.04)	
days				-0.03*** (0.01)
pubemp				0.003*** (0.0002)
shgob:core	1.00*** (0.07)	0.94*** (0.05)	1.19*** (0.09)	0.44*** (0.06)
shgob:conc				-1.20*** (0.12)
core:conc				-0.82*** (0.07)
shgob:core:conc				1.53*** (0.13)
Observations	1,390	1,390	357	1,240
Adjusted R ²	0.49	0.54	0.80	0.64
F Statistic	684.62***	416.90***	309.84***	228.07***

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

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