

# Troubleshooting DNSSEC

a few handles to get you started


# Toolbag

- **dig**
- **drill**
- **unbound-host**
- **Packet analysis**
  - **wireshark**
  - **tcpdump**
  - **dnscap (in combination with the above)**

# Try to understand the wire

- A DNS Packet has a header and 4 sections:
  - Question
  - Answer
  - Authoritative
  - Additional

# HEADER



# Header

FLAGS



Query (0)  
Response (1)

Flag	Description
AA	Authoritative Answer
TC	Truncated Response
RD	Recursion Desired
RA	Recursion Allowed
	Reserved
AD	Authentic Data
CD	Checking Disabled

Hexadecimal	Name	Description
0	NoError	No Error
1	FormErr	Format Error
2	ServFail	Server Failure
3	NXDomain	Non-Existent Domain
4	NotImp	Not Implemented
5	Refused	Query Refused
6	YXDomain	Name Exists when it should not
7	YXRSet	RR Set Exists when it should not
8	NXRRSet	RR Set that should exist does not
9	NotAuth	Server Not Authoritative for zone
10	NotZone	Name not contained in zone
11-15	Unassigned	

0	Query	[RFC1035]
1	IQuery (Inverse Query, Obsolete)	[RFC3425]
2	Status	[RFC1035]
3	Unassigned	
4	Notify	[RFC1996]
5	Update	[RFC2136]
6-15	Unassigned	

```
; <>> DiG 9.7.0b2 <>> @a0.org.afilias-nst.info. org NS +dnssec
; (2 servers found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 49574
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 7, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 13
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;org.          IN NS
```

Request DNS information

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
org.          86400 IN NS b0.org.afilias-nst.org.
org.          86400 IN NS d0.org.afilias-nst.org.
org.          86400 IN NS a0.org.afilias-nst.info.
org.          86400 IN NS a2.org.afilias-nst.info.
org.          86400 IN NS b2.org.afilias-nst.org.
org.          86400 IN NS c0.org.afilias-nst.info.
org.          86400 IN RRSIG NS 7 1 86400 20100415154437 (
    20100401144437 47948 org.
    BSO2Encp2iwdCtgeKycjion-vvnu -1
    gGIpy7HRamerEg7fQ+PWvxr3F0k/zTUDFifRi1paOHbG
    MRFvOG9XHskSxoUqxwi2jRAIXWYmXz3A/NsjgoJVsIEj
    3DWGP43cTJM0sS68qmK7CbbbyLrSTRdg6/d/mK4= )
```

Question Section

Answer Section

```
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
a0.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN A 199.19.56.1
a0.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:e::1
a2.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN A 199.249.112.1
a2.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:40::1
b0.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN A 199.19.54.1
b0.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:c::1
b2.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN A 199.249.120.1
b2.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:48::1
c0.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN A 199.19.53.1
c0.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:b::1
d0.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN A 199.19.57.1
d0.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:f::1
```

Authority Section

```
;; Query time: 409 msec
;; SERVER: 2001:500:e::1#53(2001:500:e::1)
;; WHEN: Thu Apr  8 08:44:33 2010
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 597
```

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203 26.001005

213.154.224.48

194.85.252.62

DNS

Standard query A ns.majordomo.ru

- ▶ Frame 203 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured).....
- ▶ Ethernet II, Src: 3com\_bc:24:1b (00:10:4b:bc:24:1b), Dst: PcEngine\_15:9a:d4 (00:0d:b9:15:9a:d4)
- ▶ Internet Protocol, Src: 213.154.224.48 (213.154.224.48), Dst: 194.85.252.62 (194.85.252.62)
- ▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 50285 (50285), Dst Port: domain (53)
- ▼ Domain Name System (query)

[\[Response In: 204\]](#)

Transaction ID: 0x9a3a

▼ Flags: 0x0010 (Standard query)

0... .... .... = Response: Message is a query  
.000 0... .... .... = Opcode: Standard query (0)  
.... .0. .... .... = Truncated: Message is not truncated  
.... ..0 .... .... = Recursion desired: Don't do query recursively  
.... .... .0.. .... = Z: reserved (0)  
.... .... ...1 .... = Non-authenticated data OK: Non-authenticated data is acceptable

Questions: 1

Answer RRs: 0

Authority RRs: 0

Additional RRs: 1

▼ Queries

▶ ns.majordomo.ru: type A, class IN

▼ Additional records

▼ <Root>: type OPT

Name: <Root>  
Type: OPT (EDNS0 option)  
UDP payload size: 4096  
Higher bits in extended RCODE: 0x0  
EDNS0 version: 0

▼ Z: 0x8000

Bit 0 (DO bit): 1 (Accepts DNSSEC security RRs)  
Bits 1-15: 0x0 (reserved)

Data length: 0

OPT RR: EDNS

0000 00 0d b9 15 9a d4 00 10 4b bc 24 1b 08 00 45 00 ..... K.\$...E.  
0010 00 48 f2 cd 00 00 40 11 13 78 d5 9a e0 30 c2 55 H a x 0 11

# EDNS

- Communicate ability to deal with 512+ IP packets (fragmentation buffers)
- Communicate willingness to receive DNSSEC resource records
  - Space for much more resource

# Deeper Understanding?

- <http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters>
- follow the links to the RFCs

# What Can Go Wrong

# Possible Failures

- Local Configuration
- Secure Delegation Failure
- True validation failure
- Transport problems

# Local Configuration

- Time:
  - DNSSEC is critically dependent on time.  
Check your NTP configuration
  - use **date -u "+%Y%m%d%H%M%S"**
  - Check signature validity times

```

; <>> DiG 9.7.0b2 <>> @a0.org.afilias-nst.info. org NS +dnssec
; (2 servers found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 49574
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 7, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 13
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;org.          IN NS

;; ANSWER SECTION:
org.          86400 IN NS b0.org.afilias-nst.org.
org.          86400 IN NS d0.org.afilias-nst.org.
org.          86400 IN NS a0.org.afilias-nst.info.
org.          86400 IN NS a2.org.afilias-nst.info.
org.          86400 IN NS b2.org.afilias-nst.org.
org.          86400 IN NS c0.org.afilias-nst.info.
org.          86400 IN RRSIG NS 7 1 86400 20100415154437 (
    20100401144437 47948 org.
    BSO2Encp2iwdCtgeKXCyi0PsVZFU8ailzInCveqPxBuW
    gGIpy7HRamerEg7fQ+PWvxr3F0k/zTUDfifRi1paOHbG
    MRFvOG9XHskSxoUqxwi2jRAIXWYmXz3A/NsjgoJVsIEj
    3DWGP43cTJMoOsS68qmK7CbbbyLrSTRdg6/d/mK4= )

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
a0.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN A 199.19.56.1
a0.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:e::1
a2.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN A 199.249.112.1
a2.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:40::1
b0.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN A 199.19.54.1
b0.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:c::1
b2.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN A 199.249.120.1
b2.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:48::1
c0.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN A 199.19.53.1
c0.org.afilias-nst.info. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:b::1
d0.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN A 199.19.57.1
d0.org.afilias-nst.org. 86400 IN AAAA 2001:500:f::1

;; Query time: 409 msec
;; SERVER: 2001:500:e::1#53(2001:500:e::1)
;; WHEN: Thu Apr  8 08:44:33 2010
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 597

```

against authoritative server

SIGNATURE validity

```
$ date -u "+%Y%m%d%H%M%S"
20100408095947
```

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# Secure delegations

- Secure delegations: Look for the DS
  - Matching Key IDs?
  - NSEC proof?
  - Hard to do manually

# Looking at the chain of trust

- CLI based
  - `drill -T` or `drill -S` (trace or chace)
  - `dig +sigchace`
- Web Based
  - dnsviz: <http://dnsviz.net/>
  - debugger: <http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/>

# drill -S

```
; ; Chasing: example.net. SOA
```

```
DNSSEC Trust tree:
```

```
example.net. (SOA)
```

```
|---example.net. (DNSKEY keytag: 17000)
|   |---example.net. (DNSKEY keytag: 49656)
|   |---example.net. (DS keytag: 49656)
|       |---net. (DNSKEY keytag: 62972)
|           |---net. (DNSKEY keytag: 13467)
|           |---net. (DS keytag: 13467)
|               |---. (DNSKEY keytag: 63380)
|               |---. (DNSKEY keytag: 63276)
```

```
; ; Chase successful
```

# drill -T

**drill -T -k < root.ksk > example.net SOA**

```
; Domain: .
[T] . 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ;{id = 63380 (zsk), size = 1024b}
. 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Checking if signing key is trusted:
New key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQyahTOOaR/Pi6p ... Q== ;{id = 63380 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Trusted key: . 3600 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOv6tbkmW+ ... liY/ ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Trusted key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQyahTOOaR/ ... MiBmsMQ== ;{id = 63380 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Key is now trusted!
Trusted key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOv6tbkmW+1 ... liY/ ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
[T] net. 100 IN DS 13467 5 2 ec9b094786b82c46aa3054c7352b59904b697119d515b4ea536ec3dd9a10ed81
net. 100 IN DS 13467 5 1 de01426e08ddb9186502ccc1081390cd7da0e178
;; Domain: net.
[T] net. 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ;{id = 62972 (zsk), size = 1024b}
net. 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 ;{id = 13467 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Checking if signing key is trusted:
New key: net. 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPVP6Je ... 8h3J3Gw== ;{id = 62972 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Trusted key: . 3600 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOv6tbkmW+ ... liY/ ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Trusted key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQyahT ... msMQ== ;{id = 63380 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Trusted key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOv6tbkmW ... oewiliY/ ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Trusted key: net. 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPVP6 ... 3J3Gw== ;{id = 62972 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Key is now trusted!
Trusted key: net. 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOsAH77.... QuH ;{id = 13467 (ksk), size = 1280b}
[T] example.net. 100 IN DS 49656 5 1 3850efb913aec66275bca53221587d445702397e
example.net. 100 IN DS 49656 5 2 9e06b299abe811d699e077fff990ff5a1b496c914deb22697ba22a1da31f0a6e
;; Domain: example.net.
[T] example.net. 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ;{id = 17000 (zsk), size = 1024b}
example.net. 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 ;{id = 49656 (ksk), size = 1280b}
[T] example.net. 100 IN SOA ns.example.net. olaf.nlnetlabs.nl. 2002050501 100 200 604800 100
;;[S] self sig OK; [B] bogus; [T] trusted
```

# External views

- DNSVIZ:  
<http://dnsviz.net/>
- Verisign's DNSSEC Debugger:  
<http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/>
- Secspider:  
<http://secspider.cs.ucla.edu/>

# DNSViz

## A DNS visualization tool

Go to domain name...

Go »

**bert.secret-wg.org**

(Updated: Wed, 7 Apr 2010 12:54:05 -0700. [Update now](#))

DNSSEC

Servers

Analyze

— DNSSEC options ([show](#)) —

### Notices

#### Domain names

Untrusted (2)

#### DNSKEY/DS RRs

Trusted (7)

Untrusted (6)

#### Delegation status

Secure (1)

Insecure (2)


#### DNSKEY legend

Published only

SEP bit set

Revoke bit set

### DNSSEC authentication chain





Domain Name: bert.secret-wg.org

Detail: [more\(+\)](#) / [less\(-\)](#)

Time: 2012-02-03 15:18:01 UTC, NTP stratum 3

Analyzing DNSSEC problems for [bert.secret-wg.org](#)

.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>✓ Found 2 DNSKEY records for .</li><li>✓ DS=19036/SHA1 verifies DNSKEY=19036/SEP</li><li>✓ Found 1 RRSIGs over DNSKEY RRset</li><li>✓ RRSIG=19036 and DNSKEY=19036/SEP verifies the DNSKEY RRset</li></ul>
org	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>✓ Found 2 DS records for org in the . zone</li><li>✓ Found 1 RRSIGs over DS RRset</li><li>✓ RRSIG=51201 and DNSKEY=51201 verifies the DS RRset</li><li>✓ Found 4 DNSKEY records for org</li><li>✓ DS=21366/SHA1 verifies DNSKEY=21366/SEP</li><li>✓ Found 2 RRSIGs over DNSKEY RRset</li><li>✓ RRSIG=21366 and DNSKEY=21366/SEP verifies the DNSKEY RRset</li></ul>
secret-wg.org	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>✓ Found 2 DS records for secret-wg.org in the org zone</li><li>✓ Found 1 RRSIGs over DS RRset</li><li>✓ RRSIG=55440 and DNSKEY=55440 verifies the DS RRset</li><li>✓ Found 4 DNSKEY records for secret-wg.org</li><li>✓ DS=18786/SHA256 verifies DNSKEY=18786/SEP</li><li>✓ Found 1 RRSIGs over DNSKEY RRset</li><li>✓ RRSIG=18786 and DNSKEY=18786/SEP verifies the DNSKEY RRset</li><li>✓ bert.secret-wg.org A RR has value 213.154.224.48</li><li>✓ Found 1 RRSIGs over A RRset</li><li>✓ RRSIG=46673 and DNSKEY=46673 verifies the A RRset</li></ul>



Connection between  
secret-wg.or and org exist

Move your mouse over any or symbols for remediation hints.

Want a second opinion? Test bert.secret-wg.org at [dnsviz.net](#).

SecSpider

<http://secspider.cs.ucla.edu/>

SecSpider

## SecSpider the DNSSEC Monitoring Project

[Home](#) | [Blog](#) | [Documentation](#) | [Trust-Anchors](#) | [Pollers](#) | [GPG Key](#)

 Check out our new sister-project [Vantages](#) with libvdns, dnsfunnel, and vantaged!

 We now have TA files for both modern resolvers and older instances of BIND that don't support all key types on our [Trust Anchors Page](#)

To add a zone for monitoring, please submit below:

Zone to add:

[Vouch for or against a zone's production status](#)

For more information, questions, or comments please contact:  
Eric Osterweil ([eoster@cs.ucla.edu](mailto:eoster@cs.ucla.edu))  
Dan Massey ([massey@cs.colostate.edu](mailto:massey@cs.colostate.edu))  
Lixia Zhang ([lixia@cs.ucla.edu](mailto:lixia@cs.ucla.edu))


DNSSEC Deployment status as of: *Wed Dec 14 06:41:56 2011 UTC*


---


### Deployment Metrics:

[\[What are these?\]](#)

Availability Metric: 0.743	Verifiability Metric: 0.423	Validity Metric: < 0.932, 0.937 >
----------------------------	-----------------------------	-----------------------------------

  
Availability Dispersion

  
Degree of Coverage

  
Number of Zones

## DNSSEC Zone stats

12

Zone **secret-wg.org.** status as of: Wed Dec 14 06:41:56 2011 UTC  
Seen by 7/9 active pollers.

Reason for Monitoring this Zone:

DNSKEY Availability	Stale RRsets
1	0

Parent Zone: [org.](#)

Data files for:

[DS records \(signed\)](#)  
[DNSKEY records \(signed\)](#)

Trust Anchor:

Consistency:	Name:
6/9	-
1/9	<a href="#">org.</a>

Summary:

Property:	Status:
EDNS0 capable	Yes
DNSSEC deployed	Yes
Production zone	Yes
User Production	N/A

Name Servers:

Consistency:	Online:	NS Name:	NS IP:	Server Version:	First Queried:	Last Queried:	NS Serial Number:	EDNS0 Capable:	DNSSEC Deployed:	Pointed to by Which Zone (Parent/Authoritative/Both)?
7/9	Yes	mcvax.ninetlabs.nl.	192.16.197.229	NSD 3.2.8	Sun May 29 14:49:08 2011 UTC	Thu Nov 17 02:07:21 2011 UTC	501	Yes	Yes	Parent
7/9	Yes	sec2.authdns.ripe.net.	193.0.9.4	9.7.3-P3	Sun Jul 11 04:47:00 2010 UTC	Thu Nov 17 02:07:22 2011 UTC	501	Yes	Yes	Both
6/9	Yes	ns.secret-wg.org.	213.154.224.48	NSD 3.2.8	Tue Aug 22 19:15:39 2006 UTC	Thu Nov 17 02:07:24 2011 UTC	501	Yes	Yes	Both
7/9	Yes	open.ninetlabs.nl.	213.154.224.1	NSD 3.2.8	Wed Apr 26 22:11:23 2006 UTC	Thu Nov 17 02:07:23 2011 UTC	501	Yes	Yes	Both

DS Records from parent zone:

Consistency: 7/9

Key Tag:	Digest:	Verified (Yes/No):
SECRET-WG.ORG. 18786	6B4D61I52905I7C45086 8C44C905I3A3B59A5934 457I2I517I240E2D2I62 486C	Yes
SECRET-WG.ORG. 18786	BD9CB32D9C35DA3C4D60 C3314C4BD99I22F1B032	Yes

DNSKEYs:

Consistency: 7/9

Key Verified (Yes/No/Unknown):	Key Tag:	Key Type:	Algorithm:	Key:
Yes	secret-wg.org. 18786	KSK	RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1	AwERArwokJwQhDhIggch 97I7IISNbisKJ+YfitLe mnbU93IP26IpIGkpJdQ 0iMRdiIJt3W+IAuVNzUTm b2yZsL1QURl9Wds1W5L pVTjSWBn2C2D99X321IM hEvYT0Sztz6cBn5x1e3q 5VdvTBopo+zIDbhcoj+M07 Us3ke0Tfo/Bnmfaus2BD EtWCc7UE61A/KI+lwbjM p5044/nMY/BH7CxXv27s w5cH3Pw8K2V4LPj0ejG0 /qc+8TzIg2y7aslbYQZh Ffifi56Z35WWKj8x2HUI z8TB1qnqg5B30K2Xt0H7 szR0200EYWKBu7sm6Re PKvCMGTQs82+/mg2t0Rj kRn/sDc=
Yes	secret-wg.org. 39573	ZSK	RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1	AwERA25J25d6vBt5T2I qBiKnIsPbiKyH0Kfxzui tau06x40pJJ6MEHC1K5t CM16z2x1WfU0dtzWelch I16vye63oe/3bYHn20GF RQq3L9jx00noWSKGUYWV b33hb0PYR35ei6wQunJL SYmYbkjeTh0tv/luKVDD oyr170JRqu0WjrgI
Yes	secret-wg.org. 61595	ZSK	RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1	AwERArcG3G1Pcf0yRep40 Lxszyzy0+dIKoXs36w40f 120sV0I2CWencE3EfqfH YJN0e61PkaeYZJHFxIqF TbrP/t7vXf0yq0T0jXz2 fKUkltKWYog1Fe5323L6 95v4pGI49o865btY3gjD HbbIW43WgV/5IVwLfq8 5RlpjpH0Kw2xuJjH
RRSIGs	Key Used:	Inception:	Expiration:	
	secret-wg.org. 18786	Mon Nov 14 08:33:41 2011 UTC	Sun Nov 27 23:38:43 2011 UTC	

# Case Study

- NASA DS Rollover failure impacting Comcast:

[http://www.dnssec.comcast.net/  
DNSSEC Validation Failure NASAGOV 2  
0120118 FINAL.pdf](http://www.dnssec.comcast.net/DNSSEC_Validation_Failure_NASAGOV_20120118_FINAL.pdf)

# looking at a validating server

- So you got a SERVFAIL
  - dig +cd will disable checking
    - you get an answer?
    - likely validation failure

# Transport problems

- If responses grow beyond 512octets:
  - UDP may see fragmentation and dropped fragments (firewalls etc)
  - fragmentation problems on path?
  - Fallback to TCP
    - Port 53 TCP sometimes blocked

# Does the network support DNSSEC?

- One tool you could use for a quick assessment:
- <http://netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu/>
  - you contribute to good science too!

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "ICSI Netalyzr". The address bar contains the URL "http://netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu/". The page itself is titled "The ICSI Netalyzr" and features a sub-navigation bar with "Start", "Analysis", and "Results". A "Language" dropdown menu is also present. The main content area has a dark background with white text. It starts with the tagline "Debug your Internet." followed by three numbered steps: 1. "What's up with my network?", 2. "Run the Netalyzr.", and 3. "Understand your connectivity.". Each step is accompanied by a brief description and a right-pointing arrow. Below these steps is a paragraph encouraging users to learn more, including links to "example report", "NetaMap", "FAQ", and "commandline client". A large red button labeled "Start analysis »" is centered below this paragraph. At the bottom, there is a note about the tool being part of a measurement study and contributing to its quality. A footer navigation bar at the very bottom includes links for "FAQs", "Blog", "Links", and "ICSI".

ICSI Netalyzr

http://netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu/

RSS Google

ICSI Netalyzr

The ICSI Netalyzr

Start Analysis Results Language

Debug your Internet.

1 What's up with my network?  
Some services seem broken? Things are very slow? Is there something wrong?

2 Run the Netalyzr.  
We test your Internet connection for signs of trouble.

3 Understand your connectivity.  
A detailed report shows performance & security issues.

Learn more, see an example report, check out the NetaMap, look at the FAQ, or try the new commandline client. Netalyzr requires Java to operate.

Start analysis »

Please note: Netalyzr is not only a debugging tool — it is also the foundation of a comprehensive measurement study compiling a survey of the health of the Internet's edge. By running Netalyzr and helping us spread the word you are contributing crucially to the quality of our study. Thanks for your help!

FAQs + Blog + Links + ICSI


The screenshot shows a Java applet dialog box in the foreground and the ICSI Netalyzr website in the background.

**Java Applet Dialog:**

- Icon:** A lock icon with a coffee cup inside.
- Text:** An applet from "n2.netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu" is requesting access to your computer.
- Text (below):** The digital signature from "International Computer Science Institute" has been verified.
- Checkboxes:** Allow all applets from "n2.netalyzr.icsi.berkeley.edu" with this signature.
- Buttons:** ? (Help), Show Details..., Deny, Allow.

**Netalyzr Website:**

- Title:** The ICSI Netalyzr
- Header:** ICSI Netalyzr, Start, Analysis, Results, Language
- Slogan:** Debug your Internet.
- Callouts:** 2 Run the Netalyzr. (We test your Internet connection for signs of trouble.) 3 Understand your connectivity. (A detailed report shows performance & security issues.)
- Text:** For more information, check out the [Netalyzr](#), look at the [FAQ](#), or try [Netalyzr](#). Netalyzr requires Java to operate.
- Section:** Start analysis »
- Text (under analysis section):** not only a debugging tool — it is also the foundation of a research study compiling a survey of the health of the Internet's infrastructure and helping us spread the word you are contributing crucially to the quality of our study. Thanks for your help!
- Footer:** FAQs + Blog + Links + ICSI



# The ICSI Netalyzr

[Start](#) > [Analysis](#) > **Results**

## Result Summary [+/-](#) ([help](#))

**[REDACTED].nl / [REDACTED].83**Recorded at 04:14 EST (09:14 UTC), Feb 14 2012. [Permalink](#). [Client/server transcript](#).

### Summary of Noteworthy Events –

#### Minor Aberrations

- Network packet buffering may be excessive 
- We received unexpected and possibly dangerous results when looking up important names 
- The path between our system and your network does not appear to handle fragmented IPv6 traffic properly 

### Address-based Tests +

- NAT detection (?): No NAT Detected
- Local Network Interfaces (?): OK
- DNS-based host information (?): OK

### Reachability Tests +

- TCP connectivity (?): OK
- UDP connectivity (?): OK
- Traceroute (?): OK
- Path MTU (?): OK

## DNS Tests –

### Restricted domain DNS lookup (?): OK

We can successfully look up a name which resolves to the same IP address as our webserver. This means we are able to conduct many of the tests on your DNS server.

### Unrestricted domain DNS lookup (?): OK

We can successfully look up arbitrary names from within the Java applet. This means we are able to conduct all test on your DNS server.

### Direct DNS support (?): OK

All tested DNS types were received OK.

### Direct EDNS support (?): OK

EDNS-enabled requests for small responses are answered successfully.

EDNS-enabled requests for medium-sized responses are answered successfully.

EDNS-enabled requests for large responses are answered successfully.

### DNS resolver address (?): OK

The IP address of your ISP's DNS Resolver is 213.154.224.59, which resolves to alpha.nlnetlabs.nl.

### DNS resolver properties (?): Lookup latency 240ms

Your ISP's DNS resolver requires 240 msec to conduct an external lookup. It takes 200 msec for your ISP's DNS resolver to lookup a name on our server.

Your resolver correctly uses TCP requests when necessary.

Your resolver is using QTYPE=A for default queries.

Your host or resolver also performs IPv6 queries in addition to IPv4 queries.

Your DNS resolver requests DNSSEC records.

Your DNS resolver advertises the ability to accept DNS packets of up to 4096 bytes.

Your DNS resolver can successfully receive a smaller (~1400 byte) DNS response.

Your DNS resolver can successfully receive a large (>1500 byte) DNS response.

Your DNS resolver can successfully accept large responses.

Your resolver does not use 0x20 randomization, but will pass names in a case-sensitive

# On your server

- **val-log-level:**
  - **val-log-level: 0** - prints nothing
  - **val-log-level: 1** - print queries that fail
  - **val-log-level: 2** - print reason why it failed
- remember **unbound-control set\_option?**

Apr 08 12:31:06 unbound[853:0] info: validation failure  
<[dnssec1.gsa.dnsops.gov](http://dnssec1.gsa.dnsops.gov)>. A IN>: signature expired from 159.142.174.98  
for key [gsa.dnsops.gov](http://gsa.dnsops.gov). while building chain of trust

Apr 08 10:28:01 unbound[853:0] info: validation failure  
<[barney.llnl.dnsops.gov](http://barney.llnl.dnsops.gov)>. SOA IN>: No DNSKEY record from 128.115.249.61  
for key [barney.llnl.dnsops.gov](http://barney.llnl.dnsops.gov). while building chain of trust

# Unbound-host

- unbound-host tool is useful for taking a first stab
- Runs the unbound validator from the command line
  - `unbound-host -v -f trustanchor example.com`
  - prints the val-log-level 2 error message if it fails.
  - with `-C` it can read `unbound.conf` for settings.
  - with `-d (or -dddd)` you get a high verbosity trace

# Remedies

- Clean your cache in case of problems locally
- Bind:
  - `rndc flush`
  - `rndc flushname`
- Unbound
  - `unbound-control flush`
  - `unbound-control flush_zone`
  - `unbound-control flush_infra`