# CS7NS5/CSU44032 Security & privacy

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#### Course materials:

https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/cs7053/

https://github.com/sftcd/cs7053

Slideware + some papers

## Computer and Network Security is...

- ...a good thing to study ("one born every minute", and some of those are programmers!)
- ...something with more and more impact (scaling factor is about the same as the Internet)
- ...a part of risk management

## Privacy is...

- ...nowhere near as well understood
- ...an issue for people and not companies
- ...not clearly a part of risk management, but related
  - I'm unsure if risk analysis is a good approach to address privacy

#### So-called "consent"

- Web sites/services/licensed things (like s/w) impose terms and conditions and require you "consent" to those (maybe via a "click-through")
  - Legal fiction, everyone knows people do not read T&C documents designed to obfuscate
  - Apparently, the legal fiction is still considered non-fiction by courts
- So-called "consent" is an awful model that only pretends to address privacy
- Good presentation on the so-called "consent" problem, with IMO less good (but worth exploring) ideas on HOWTO fix <a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-10-5-ietf-sesse-privacy-modern-concerns-steven-m-bellovin-00">https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/materials/slides-10-5-ietf-sesse-privacy-modern-concerns-steven-m-bellovin-00</a>

<u>.pdf</u>

## Privacy

- RFC6973 In addition to "normal" security threats we need to care about
  - Correllation
  - Identification
  - Secondary use
  - Disclosure
  - Exclusion
  - Re-identification

#### Privacy Puzzle

- Emails contain a Received header field which can contain the mail user agent IP address
  - What consequences?
  - Overall good or bad from a privacy perspective?

#### **Privacy Processes**

- Various have been proposed or are in use:
- Privacy by design
  - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy\_by\_design
- Data protection by design and default
  - https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-by-design-and-default/
- Data protection impact assessments
  - https://dataprotection.ie/en/organisations/know-your-obligations/data-protection-impact-assessments

## Privacy by design (PbD) Principles

#### 7 "foundational principles":

- Proactive not reactive; preventive not remedial
- Privacy as the default setting
- Privacy embedded into design
- Full functionality positive-sum, not zero-sum
- End-to-end security full lifecycle protection
- Visibility and transparency keep it open
- Respect for user privacy keep it user-centric

Not clear (to me) that incentives align here such that result will be a privacy "win."

## A few more thoughts on privacy

- Who cares? About what?
  - Governments, marketeers and large corporates do "care deeply" about your (lack of) privacy
- How can designers/implementers improve/protect privacy?
  - Behave as if your entire family will all be users
  - Encrypt things in transit and storage
  - Short-lived dynamic identifiers are better than long-lived static identifiers
  - Just don't (require) identification
  - Your idea here...
- How can you help yourself as a user?
  - Don't create more accounts
  - Target diversity
  - Your idea here...
  - Also see https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/witidtm/

## Risk Management

- Risks (bad things)
  - Disclosure of trade secrets
  - Sabotage (information or hardware)
  - Denial of service
  - Accidents (fire, flooding, earth quakes, ...)
- Solutions (not always good things)
  - Security policies and mechanisms
  - Physical security (locks, guards, CCTV, ...)
  - Formal specification/verification of software
  - Halon, UPS, off-site backups

#### **Vulnerabilities**

- Many risks arise due to the existence of vulnerabilities in computer systems
- All systems have vulnerabilities, our goal is not to remove absolutely all of them, but to control their impact
  - Reducing numbers is good
  - Can also isolate parts of the system (e.g. Firewalling)

#### **Vulnerabilities**

- Very common:
  - Scripting user agents
  - Buffer overruns
  - –XSS & Injection (e.g. SQL injection)
    - https://owasp.org/www-community/at tacks/xss/
  - Insecure default settings
- Uncommon, but interesting:
  - Acoustic side-channel key extraction,
    - Genkin, Shamir & Tromer
  - https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/857.pdf



Figure 6: Parabolic microphone (same as in Figure 5), attached to the portable measurement setup (in a padded briefcase), attacking a target laptop from a distance of 4 meters. Full key extraction is possible in this configuration and distance (see Section 5.4).




Figure 7: Acoustic measurement frequency spectrogram of a recording of different CPU operations using the Brüel&Kjær 4939 microphone capsule. The horizontal axis is frequency (0–310 kHz), the vertical axis is time (3.7 sec), and intensity is proportional to the instantaneous energy in that frequency band.

#### Good/Bad Actors

- Systems have users
  - Normal, administrative, "root"
- Networks have nodes
  - -"Inside", "outside", trusted...
- Attackers
  - –Can be one of the above, or not…
  - Hijacked ISP router, compromised SIM card factory, bot etc.

#### Possible Bad Actors

- Disgruntled employees (plenty)
- Crackers (hackers)
- Script-Kiddies (cracker wannabes)
- Spies (industrial and military)
- Criminals (thieves, organized crime)
- Terrorists
- Governments
- Bait'n'switchers

## Possible Exploits

- Force legitimate user to reveal passwords
- Social engineering
- Recruit legitimate user
- Sabotage (fire, electricity, ...)
- Sifting through garbage
- Attacking the network (network threats)
- Install malware

#### Active/Passive Attacks

- Active attacks
  - Fabrication, modification, deletion, replay of messages
- Passive attacks
  - –eavesdropping/traffic analysis
  - -can be off-line (e.g. if weak encryption)
- Different protocol mechanisms are used to counter these

#### Risk Analysis Process

## Many variations exist, mostly they resemble:

- Identify assets
- Identify risks and vulnerabilities
- Consider probabilities
- Consider consequent costs/losses
- Rank risks
- Develop mitigation(s) for highest ranked risk(s)
- Iterate, until effort exhausted or time up
  - All the time recording what you've done

## Summing up risk

- Risk is a function of the cost of threats and their probability of occurrence
  - Which function can be debated
  - –High/Medium/Low
    - For both costs and probabilities
- Threats occur when a vulnerability is exploited