



## Why advances in Automotive Driving Aids Systems (ADAS) + efficient C++ + meet safety concerns

Illya Rudkin Principal Engineer Safety Critical Software
Khronos Safety Critical Advisory Forum chairman
Khronos OpenCL Safety Critical WG
MISRA C++ WG

# Or a whistle stop tour of safety critical development

### Levels of vehicles' aids & autonomy





#### Software in a car is now the major component



Space Shuttle ~500K lines of code



Boeing 777 ~3M lines of code




Modern Automobile ~100M lines of code Up to 100 ECUs

And growing.....


But reduce ECUs!

And power requirements


### The reason you car is getting bloated



#### Critical and less critical vehicle items



#### Scale Down – Affordable and Reliable





...shrink systems to fit




### **Evolving Software Infrastructure**

**Traditional Automotive Approach** 





### Typical compute software stack



## Functional safety standards

Various industries have safety standards for items used in safety critical domains like:

- DO-178C Avionics
- ISO 26262 Automotive
- IEC 62304 Medicine
- IEC 62279 Railway
- IEC 61511 Process
- IEC 61513 Nuclear

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- CERT recommendations
- New standards emerging

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**Cybersecurity** standards to mitigate program and system vulnerabilities

- CERT recommendations
- New standards emerging



#### **Green programming**

- Embedded high compute low power devices
- Deterministic and timely
- Use of efficient algorithms
- Use the correct algorithms or library functions

## Perform hazard risk analysis

What is the use case for the safety critical item?

- Explorer and record all the scenarios where injury or death can occur due to item failure
- 2. For each hazard derive the mitigations action to take to get to a safe state safety goal
- 3. Verify the safety goals are met for all operational conditions

### What is ISO 26262?

#### What is ASIL?

**Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)** is a risk classification scheme **defined** by the **ISO 26262** - Functional Safety for Road Vehicles standard. This is an adaptation of the Safety Integrity Level used in IEC 61508 for the automotive industry.



### What is ISO26262?


At the beginning of the safety life cycle, hazard analysis and risk assessment is performed, resulting in assessment of ASIL to all identified hazardous events and safety goals.

Severity Classifications (S)	Severity of failure
S0	No (<10%)
S1	Light moderate injuries (>=10%)
S2	Severe to life threatening
S3	Life threatening

Exposure Classifications (E)	Probability of an issue
EO	Incredibly unlikely/Never/0%
E1	Very low/less than once a year
E2	Low/A few times a year/ <1% average operating time
E3	Medium/Once a month or more/ 1 – 10% average operation time
E4	High/Almost every drive/ >10%

Controllable Classifications (C)	Is Controllable
CO	In general
C1	Simply / 99% of drivers
C2	Normally / 90% of drivers
C3	With difficulty / <90% of drivers

### What is ISO26262?



The probability and risk acceptability criteria produce an ASIL level

### What is ISO26262?

For software product development ISO26262 supports the correctness of the design and implementation by stipulating guidelines for programming languages addressing

the following topics:

### Software implementation design:

- · Correct execution order
- · Interface consistency
- Unnecessary complexity
- · Correct data/control flow
- Simplicity
- Readability and comprehensibility
- Robustness
- Change suitability
- Testability
- Maintainability

Methods		ASIL			
		A	В	С	D
1a	One entry and one exit point in subprograms and functions <sup>a</sup>	++	++	++	++
1b	No dynamic objects or variables, or else online test during their creation <sup>a, b</sup>	+	++	**	.++
10	Initialisation of variables	++	++	++	+4
1d	No multiple use of variable names <sup>a</sup>	+	++	++	++
1e	Avoid global variables or else justify their usage <sup>a</sup>	+	+	++	++
1f	Limited use of pointers <sup>a</sup>	0	+	+	++
<b>1</b> g	No implicit type conversions <sup>a, c</sup>	+	++	++	**
1h	No hidden data flow or control flow <sup>b, d</sup>	+	++	++	++
11	No unconditional jumps <sup>8, 6, d</sup>	++	++	**	**
1i	No recursions	+	+	++	+-

Methods 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1g and 1i may not be applicable for graphical modeling notations used in model-based development.

- Methods 1g and 1i are not applicable in assembler programming.
- Methods 1h and 1i reduce the potential for modelling data flow and control flow through jumps or global variables.

b If these compiler features are "tool qualified" in accordance with ISO 26262-8:—, Clause 10, Method 1b need not be applied if a compiler is used which ensures that there will be enough program storage allocated for all dynamic variables and objects before run-time or which inserts run-time tests for correct online-allocation of program storage, i.e. stack bounds checking.

### How deep is your love for C++?

You are developing your application or library

### How deep is your love for C++?

You are developing your application or library

Std library

Safety critical library

**Gfx library** 

Library X

Library Y

Library Z

### Conclusion



# Not so fast ... we are not finished yet

### Tools

For most of the functional safety standards they ask you shall also validate your tools.

This means everything you did to create you program running on your devices needs to be applied to the tools that helped you create your program.



Thank you