Hodge decomposition in data analysis

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objectives

- Hodge decomposition and cohomology in data applications
- present cohomology in the simplest possible way
- why?
 - everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler
 - facilitate creation of novel applications
 - facilitate communication with engineers
- examine two applications
 - ranking: web search, recommendation systems, crowd sourcing
 - game theory: ad auction, happiness index, social networks
- cursory treatment here, detailed treatment in PSAMP lecture notes

applications of Hodge theory

- numerical analysis D. Arnold, R. S. Falk, and R. Winther, "Finite element exterior calculus: from Hodge theory to numerical stability," *Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.*, **47** (2010), no. 2, pp. 281–354.
 - peridynamics Q Du, M. Gunzburger, R. Lehoucq, and K. Zhou, "A nonlocal vector calculus, nonlocal volume-constrained problems, and nonlocal balance laws," *Math. Models Methods Appl. Sci.*, **23** (2013), no. 3, pp. 493–540.
- topological data analysis V. De Silva, D. Morozov, and M. Vejdemo-Johansson, "Persistent cohomology and circular coordinates," *Discrete Comput. Geom.*, **45** (2011), no. 4, pp. 737–759.
- computational topology J. Friedman, "Computing Betti numbers via combinatorial Laplacians," *Algorithmica*, **21** (1998), no. 4, pp. 331–346.
 - graphics Y. Tong, S. Lombeyda, A. Hirani, and M. Desbrun, "Discrete multiscale vector field decomposition," *ACM Trans. Graph.*, **22** (2003), no. 3, pp. 445–452.
- image processing S. Yu, "Angular embedding: a robust quadratic criterion," *IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell.*, **34** (2012), no. 1, pp. 158–173.

applications of Hodge theory

- ranking X. Jiang, L.-H. Lim, Y. Yao, and Y. Ye, "Statistical ranking and combinatorial Hodge theory," *Math. Program.*, **127** (2011), no. 1, pp. 203–244.
- game theory O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, and P. Parrilo, "Flows and decompositions of games: harmonic and potential games," *Math. Oper. Res.*, **36** (2011), no. 3, pp. 474–503.
 - multimedia Q. Xu, Q. Huang, T. Jiang, B. Yan, Y. Yao, and W. Lin, "HodgeRank on random graphs for subjective video quality assessment," *IEEE Trans. Multimed.*, **14** (2012), no. 3, pp. 844–857.
 - robotics P. Kingston and M. Egerstedt, "Distributed-infrastructure multi-robot routing using a Helmholtz-Hodge decomposition," *Proc. IEEE Conf. Decis. Control Eur. Control Conf.*, **50** (2011), pp. 5281–5286.
- sensor networks A. Tahbaz-Salehi and A. Jadbabaie, "Distributed coverage verification in sensor networks without location information," *IEEE Trans. Automat. Control*, **55** (2010), no. 8, pp. 1837–1849.
 - neuroscience W. Ma, J.-M. Morel, S. Osher, and A. Chien, "An L_1 -based variational model for retinex theory and its applications to medical images," *Proc. IEEE Conf. Comput. Vis. Pattern Recognit.*, (2011), pp. 153–160.

Cohomology for Pedestrians

explaining cohomology

question: how would you explain cohomolgy to an engineer? my answer: de Rham cohomology and Hodge decomposition

- all engineers know basic fluid mechanics and electrodynamics
- more generally, they know vector calculus
- they probably watch movies too

de Rham cohomology

$$V = \{F : \mathbb{R}^3 \setminus X \to \mathbb{R}^3 \mid \nabla \times F = 0\}; \quad W = \{F = \nabla g\}; \quad \dim(V/W) = ?$$

Laplace equation

• Laplace or homogeneous Poisson equation in \mathbb{R}^3 :

$$\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x^2} + \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial y^2} + \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial z^2} = 0$$

more generally

$$\Delta f = \nabla^2 f = \nabla \cdot \nabla f = \operatorname{div} \operatorname{grad} f = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x_i^2}$$

electrostatics: electric potential in free space with no charge fluid mechanics: velocity potential of incompressible fluid thermal conduction: stationary heat equation without a heat source

Laplace equation to cohomology

usually stated as boundary value problem

$$\begin{cases} \Delta f = 0 & \text{in } \Omega \\ f = g & \text{on } \partial \Omega \end{cases} \quad \text{or} \quad \begin{cases} \Delta f = 0 & \text{in } \Omega \\ \partial f / \partial n = g & \text{on } \partial \Omega \end{cases}$$

- ullet tells us about the topology and geometry of Ω
- solution $f: \Omega \to \mathbb{R}$ called harmonic function
- 0-cohomolgy is the study of solutions to Laplace equation with no boundary conditions
- 0-cohomology class is harmonic function
- 0-cohomology group is set of all harmonic functions

vector Laplace equation

• vector Laplace or homogeneous vector Poisson equation in \mathbb{R}^3 :

$$\begin{cases} -\operatorname{grad}\operatorname{div} f + \operatorname{curl}\operatorname{curl} f = 0 & \text{in } \Omega \\ f \cdot n = 0, & \operatorname{curl} f \times n = 0 & \text{on } \partial\Omega \end{cases}$$

ullet Helmholtz operator or vector Laplacian in \mathbb{R}^3

$$\Delta_1 f = \operatorname{curl} \operatorname{curl} f - \operatorname{grad} \operatorname{div} f = \nabla(\nabla \cdot f) - \nabla \times (\nabla \times f) = \nabla^2 f$$

- solution $f: \Omega \to \mathbb{R}^3$ is vector field on Ω , call this harmonic 1-form
- 1-cohomolgy is the study of solutions to vector Laplace equation with no boundary conditions
- 1-cohomology class is harmonic 1-form
- 1-cohomology group is set of all harmonic 1-form

cohomology for pedestrians

0th cohomology classes are solutions to scalar Laplace equation

$$H^0(\Omega) = \ker(\Delta) = \{f : \Delta f = 0\}$$

1th cohomology classes are solutions to vector Laplace equation

$$H^1(\Omega) = \ker(\Delta_1) = \{f : \Delta_1 f = 0\}$$

• for k=0

$$\Delta_0 = \operatorname{div}\operatorname{\mathsf{grad}}$$

is our usual Laplace operator or scalar Laplacian Δ

• for k=1

$$\Delta_1 = -\operatorname{\mathsf{grad}}\operatorname{\mathsf{div}} + \operatorname{\mathsf{curl}}\operatorname{\mathsf{curl}}$$

is our usual Helmholtz operator or vector Laplacian

but we may also define 'higher-order Laplacians'

$$\Delta_k = \delta_{k-1}\delta_{k-1}^* + \delta_k^*\delta_k$$

three approaches

ordinary: $\delta_k : C^k(X) \to C^{k+1}(X)$ coboundary operators,

$$H^k(X) = \ker(\delta_k) / \operatorname{im}(\delta_{k-1})$$

generalized: $\{(E_k, \varepsilon_k) \mid k \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ spectrum,

$$H^k(X) = [X, E_k]$$

Hodge: $\Delta_k = \delta_{k-1}\delta_{k-1}^* + \delta_k^*\delta_k$ combinatorial Laplacian,

$$H^k(X) = \ker(\Delta_k)$$

Hodge approach


cons

- not functorial
- metric dependent
- does not work over rings or fields of positive characteristics

pros

- each cohomology class has unique harmonic representative
- ullet works in noisy setting: eigenfuctions of Δ_k with small eigenvalues
- easily accessible to practioners

easy to visualize



Globally consistent

Globally inconsistent

Figure: cartoon of Hodge decomposition (courtesy of Pablo Parrilo)

easy to apply

fluid mechanics

 $fluid flow = irrotational \oplus solenoidal \oplus harmonic$

ranking

 $\textit{pairwise ranking} = \\ \textit{consistent} \oplus \textit{locally inconsistent} \oplus \textit{globally inconsistent}$

games

 $multiplayer\ game =$ $potential\ game \oplus nonstrategic\ game \oplus harmonic\ game$

comes in several flavors

- differentiable F. W. Warner, Foundations of differentiable manifolds and Lie groups, Graduate Texts in Mathematics, **94**, Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 1983.
 - continuous L. Bartholdi, T. Schick, N. Smale, and S. Smale, "Hodge theory on metric spaces," Found. Comput. Math., 12 (2012), no. 1, pp. 1–48.
 - discrete J. Dodziuk, "Combinatorial and continuous Hodge theories," *Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.*, **80** (1974), no. 5, pp. 1014–1016.
- graph theoretic X. Jiang, L.-H. Lim, Y. Yao, and Y. Ye, "Statistical ranking and combinatorial Hodge theory," *Math. Program.*, **127** (2011), no. 1, pp. 203–244.

why important


- unlike physical problems (e.g. continuum mechanics or electromagnetics), problems coming from data analytic applications are far less structured
- often one could at most assume (i) some notion of proximity of data points and (ii) some knowledge of the distribution of the data set
- i.e., continuous, discrete, graph theoretic versions usually more useful for data applications

Ranking

ranking problems

- static ranking (Google problem)
 - alternatives: football teams, websites
 - one voter: entire season of games, hyperlink structure of WWW
 - one ranking: number of matches won by each team, PageRank of each website
 - no paradox, impossibility, chaos, NP-hardness
- collaborative filtering (the better known Netflix problem)
 - alternatives: movies, drugs
 - many voters: movie viewers, patients
 - many rankings: ideally one for each viewer, patient
 - no paradox, impossibility, chaos, NP-hardness
- rank aggregation (our Netflix problem)
 - alternatives: colleges, candidates
 - many voters: academics surveyed, electorate
 - one ranking: order all alternatives globally
 - Condorcet's paradox, Arrow's impossibilty, McKelvey's chaos, NP-hard

the Netflix problem in this talk



rank aggregation

- many voters, each rated a few alternatives, want global ranking
- averaging over scores doesn't work: one movie receives one $5 \, \text{$\frac{1}{10}$}$ and no other ratings, another receives $10,000 \, 5 \, \text{$\frac{1}{10}$}$ and one $4 \, \text{$\frac{1}{10}$}$
- should be invariant under monotone transformation:

$$1 \stackrel{\wedge}{\Rightarrow}, \ldots, 5 \stackrel{\wedge}{\Rightarrow} \longrightarrow 0 \stackrel{\wedge}{\Rightarrow}, \ldots, 4 \stackrel{\wedge}{\Rightarrow}$$

- basic unit of ranking: pairwise comparison or pairwise ranking
- ullet take average over pairwise rankings instead, get $Y \in \mathbb{R}^{17770 imes 17770}$
- for Netflix data, user-product rating matrix $Z \in \mathbb{R}^{480189 \times 17770}$ has 98.82% missing values, Y has 0.22% missing values

linear model: average score difference between i and j over all who have rated both,

$$y_{ij} = \frac{\sum_{h}(z_{hj} - z_{hi})}{\#\{h \mid z_{hi}, z_{hj} \text{ exist}\}}$$

invariant under translation

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averaging over pairwise rankings

log-linear model: logarithmic average score ratio of positive scores,

$$y_{ij} = \frac{\sum_{h} (\log z_{hj} - \log z_{hi})}{\#\{h \mid z_{hi}, z_{hj} \text{ exist}\}}$$

invariant up to a multiplicative constant linear probability model: probability *j* preferred to *i* in excess of purely random choice,

$$y_{ij} = \Pr\{h \mid z_{hj} > z_{hi}\} - \frac{1}{2}$$

invariant under monotone transformation

Bradley-Terry model: logarithmic odd ratio (logit),

$$y_{ij} = \log \frac{\Pr\{h \mid z_{hj} > z_{hi}\}}{\Pr\{h \mid z_{hj} < z_{hi}\}}$$

invariant under monotone transformation

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difficulties with rank aggregation

- Condorcet's paradox: majority vote intransitive $i \succeq j \succeq k \succeq i$ [Condorcet, 1785]
- Arrow/Sen's impossibility: any sufficiently sophisticated preference aggregation must exhibit intransitivity [Arrow, 1950], [Sen, 1970]
- McKelvey/Saari's chaos: almost every possible ordering can be realized by a clever choice of the order in which decisions are taken [McKelvey, 1979], [Saari, 1989]
- Kemeny optimal is NP-hard: even with just 4 voters [Dwork-Kumar-Naor-Sivakumar, 2001], quadratic assignment problem [Cook-Kress, 1984]
- empirical evidence: lack of consensus common in group decision making (e.g. US congress)

what we want

ordinal: intransitivity, $i \succeq j \succeq k \succeq i$

cardinal: inconsistency, $X_{ij} + X_{jk} + X_{ki} \neq 0$

- want global ranking of alternatives if a reasonable one exists
- want certificate of reliability to quantify validity of global ranking
- if no meaningful global ranking, analyze nature of inconsistencies

Graph Theoretic Hodge Theory

graph

- G = (V, E) undirected graph
- V vertices
- $E \subseteq \binom{V}{2}$ edges
- $T \subseteq \binom{V}{3}$ triangles or 3-cliques, i.e.,

$$\{i, j, k\} \in T \quad \text{iff} \quad \{i, j\}, \{j, k\}, \{k, i\} \in E$$

• more generally $K_k \subseteq \binom{V}{k}$ *k*-cliques, i.e.,

$$\{i_1,\ldots,i_k\}\in K_k$$
 iff it is a complete subgraph of G

- nonempty family K of finite subsets of a set G is abstract simplicial complex if for every set X in K, every $Y \subseteq X$ also belongs to K
- \bullet K(G) clique complex of a graph G is an abstract simplicial complex

functions on graph

function on vertices: $s: V \to \mathbb{R}$

edge flows: $X: V \times V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, X(i,j) = 0 if $\{i,j\} \notin E$,

$$X(i,j) = -X(j,i)$$
 for all i,j

triangular flows: $\Phi: V \times V \times V \to \mathbb{R}$, $\Phi(i,j,k) = 0$ if $\{i,j,k\} \notin T$,

$$\Phi(i, j, k) = \Phi(j, k, i) = \Phi(k, i, j)
= -\Phi(j, i, k) = -\Phi(i, k, j) = -\Phi(k, j, i) \text{ for all } i, j, k$$

physics: s, X, Φ potential, alternating vector/tensor field

topology: s, X, Φ 0-, 1-, 2-cochain

ranking: s scores/utility, X pairwise rankings, Φ triplewise rankings

operators on graph

gradient: grad : $L^2(V) \rightarrow L^2(E)$,

$$(\operatorname{grad} s)(i,j) = s_j - s_i$$

curl: curl: $L^2(E) \rightarrow L^2(T)$,

$$(\operatorname{curl} X)(i,j,k) = X_{ij} + X_{jk} + X_{ki}$$

divergence: div : $L^2(E) \rightarrow L^2(V)$,

$$(\operatorname{div} X)(i) = \sum\nolimits_{j:\{i,j\} \in E} w_{ij} X_{ij}$$

graph Laplacian: $\Delta_0: L^2(V) \to L^2(V)$,

$$\Delta_0 = \operatorname{div}\operatorname{\mathsf{grad}}$$

graph Helmholtzian: $\Delta_1: L^2(E) \to L^2(E)$,

$$\Delta_1 = \operatorname{curl}^*\operatorname{curl} - \operatorname{grad}\operatorname{\mathsf{div}}$$

generalization: cochains

- ullet A abstract simplicial complex with vertex set V
- alternating functions on k+1 arguments, i.e. k-forms or k-cochains:

$$C^k(K;\mathbb{R}) = \{u : V^{k+1} \to \mathbb{R} \mid u(i_{\sigma(0)}, \dots, i_{\sigma(k)}) = \operatorname{sign}(\sigma)u(i_0, \dots, i_k)\}$$

for $(i_0, \dots, i_k) \in K_{k+1}$, where $\sigma \in \mathfrak{S}_{k+1}$

- most interesting for us K = K(G), clique complex of graph G
- may put metrics/inner products on $C^k(K(G); \mathbb{R})$
- e.g. following metric on 1-forms, is useful for imbalanced ranking data:

$$\langle w_{ij}, \omega_{ij} \rangle_D = \sum_{(i,j) \in E} D_{ij} w_{ij} \omega_{ij},$$

where

 $D_{ij} =$ number of voters who rated both i and j



generalization: coboundary maps

• k-coboundary maps $\delta_k: C^k(K;\mathbb{R}) \to C^{k+1}(K;\mathbb{R})$ are

$$(\delta_k u)(i_0,\ldots,i_{k+1})=\sum_{j=0}^{k+1}(-1)^{j+1}u(i_0,\ldots,i_{j-1},i_{j+1},\ldots,i_{k+1})$$

- fundamental theorem of topology: $\delta_{k+1}\delta_k=0$
- for k=0,

$$\begin{array}{c} C^0 \xrightarrow{\delta_0} C^1 \xrightarrow{\delta_1} C^2 \\ \text{global} \xrightarrow{\delta_0} \text{pairwise} \xrightarrow{\delta_1} \text{triplewise} \\ \text{global} \xleftarrow{\delta_0^*} \text{pairwise} \xleftarrow{\delta_1^*} \text{triplewise} \end{array}$$

- we have $\delta_1 \delta_0$ (global rankings) = 0, i.e.,
 - global rankings are transitive/consistent
 - no need to consider rankings beyond triplewise

combinatorial Laplacian and Hodge theory

k-dimensional **combinatorial Laplacian**, $\Delta_k: C^k \to C^k$ by

$$\Delta_k = \delta_{k-1} \delta_{k-1}^* + \delta_k^* \delta_k, \qquad k > 0$$

call u a **harmonic form** if $\Delta_k u = 0$

Theorem (Hodge)

- $C^k(K;\mathbb{R}) = \operatorname{im}(\delta_{k-1}) \oplus \ker(\Delta_k) \oplus \operatorname{im}(\delta_k^*)$

follows from fundamental theorem of topology and Fredholm alternative:

$$\mathbb{R}^n = \ker(A) \oplus \operatorname{im}(A^*), \quad \mathbb{R}^m = \ker(A^*) \oplus \operatorname{im}(A)$$

for $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$

special case: Helmholtz decomposition

Theorem (Helmholtz decomposition for graphs)

G = (V, E) graph. The space of edge flows, $C^1(\mathcal{K}(G), \mathbb{R})$, admits an orthogonal decomposition into three subspaces

$$C^1(\mathcal{K}(G),\mathbb{R}) = \mathsf{im}(\mathsf{grad}) \oplus \mathsf{ker}(\Delta_1) \oplus \mathsf{im}(\mathsf{curl}^*)$$

where

$$\ker(\Delta_1) = \ker(\operatorname{curl}) \cap \ker(\operatorname{div}).$$

Application to Ranking

X. Jiang, L.-H. Lim, Y. Yao, and Y. Ye, "Statistical ranking and combinatorial Hodge theory," *Math. Program.*, **127** (2011), no. 1, pp. 203–244.

Helmholtz decomposition applied to rankings

pairwise comparison graph G = (V, E); V: set of alternatives, E: pairs of alternatives compared

Theorem (Helmholtz decomposition for pairwise rankings)

The space of pairwise rankings, $C^1(\mathcal{K}(G),\mathbb{R})$, admits an orthogonal decomposition into three

$$C^1(\mathcal{K}(G),\mathbb{R}) = \mathsf{im}(\mathsf{grad}) \oplus \mathsf{ker}(\Delta_1) \oplus \mathsf{im}(\mathsf{curl}^*)$$

where

$$\ker(\Delta_1) = \ker(\operatorname{curl}) \cap \ker(\operatorname{div}).$$

our approach: HodgeRank

Hodge decomposition of ranking:

 $aggregate\ pairwise\ ranking =$ $consistent \oplus locally\ inconsistent \oplus globally\ inconsistent$

- consistent component gives global ranking
- total size of inconsistent components gives certificate of reliability
- local and global inconsistent components tell us about nature of inconsistencies
- quantifies Condorcet paradox, Arrow's impossibility, McKelvey chaos, etc
- numerical, not combinatorial, so not NP-hard

properties

- im(grad): pairwise rankings that are gradient of score functions, i.e. consistent or integrable
- ker(div): div X(i) measures the inflow-outflow sum at i; div X(i) = 0 implies alternative i is preference-neutral in all pairwise comparisons; i.e. inconsistent rankings of the form $a \succeq b \succeq c \succeq \cdots \succeq a$
- ker(curl): pairwise rankings with zero flow-sum along any triangle
- $\ker(\Delta_1) = \ker(\text{curl}) \cap \ker(\text{div})$: globally inconsistent or *harmonic* rankings; no inconsistencies due to small loops of length 3, i.e. $a \succeq b \succeq c \succeq a$, but inconsistencies along larger loops of lengths > 3
- im(curl*): locally inconsistent rankings; non-zero curls along triangles
- div grad is vertex Laplacian, curl curl* is edge Laplacian

analyzing inconsistencies

- locally inconsistent rankings should be acceptable
 - inconsistencies in items ranked closed together but not in items ranked far apart
 - ordering of 4th, 5th, 6th ranked items cannot be trusted but ordering of 4th, 50th, 600th ranked items can
 - e.g. no consensus for hamburgers, hot dogs, pizzas, and no consensus for caviar, foie gras, truffle, but clear preference for latter group
- globally inconsistent rankings ought to be rare

Theorem (Kahle, 2007)

Erdős-Rényi G(n, p), n alternatives, comparisons occur with probability p, clique complex χ_G almost always have zero 1-homology, unless

$$\frac{1}{n^2} \ll p \ll \frac{1}{n}.$$

relates to Kemeny optimum

- ranking data live on pairwise comparison graph G = (V, E); V: set of alternatives, E: pairs of alternatives compared
- ullet optimize over model class ${\cal M}$

$$\min_{X \in \mathcal{M}} \sum_{\alpha,i,j} w_{ij}^{\alpha} (X_{ij} - Y_{ij}^{\alpha})^2$$

- Y_{ij}^{α} measures preference of i over j of voter α . Y^{α} skew-symmetric
- w_{ij}^{α} metric; 1 if α made comparison for $\{i,j\}$, 0 otherwise
- Kemeny optimization:

$$\mathcal{M}_K = \{X \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n} \mid X_{ij} = \operatorname{sign}(s_j - s_i), \ s : V \to \mathbb{R}\}$$

relaxed version

$$\mathcal{M}_G = \{X \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n} \mid X_{ij} = s_j - s_i, \ s : V \to \mathbb{R}\}$$

- rank-constrained least squares with skew-symmetric matrix variables
- solution is precisely consistent component in HodgeRank

comparisons with other methods

analytic hierarchy process (AHP): take

$$a_{ij} = \begin{cases} \exp(y_{ij}) & \text{if } y_{ij} \text{ exists} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

A reciprocal matrix, i.e. $a_{ji} = 1/a_{ij} > 0$. Principal eigenvector of A gives global scores [Saaty, 1978].

- **tropical AHP:** principal max-plus eigenvector of *Y* gives global scores [Elsner–Driessche, 2006]
- suppose n = number of alternatives grows with m = number of voters; when does

$$P(\text{recover top } k \text{ rankings}) \rightarrow 1 \text{ as } m, n \rightarrow \infty?$$

Theorem (Tran, 2013)

Under mild assumptions, HodgeRank recovers true ranking of top k items in the above sense. AHP and tropical AHP do not.

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online version

Robbins-Monro (1951) algorithm for $A\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{b}$

$$\mathbf{x}_{t+1} = \mathbf{x}_t - \gamma_t (A_t \mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{b}_t), \quad \mathbb{E}(A_t) = A, \quad \mathbb{E}(\mathbf{b}_t) = \mathbf{b}$$

now consider $\Delta_0 \mathbf{s} = \delta_0^* \hat{Y}$, with new rating $Y_t(i_{t+1}, j_{t+1})$

$$\mathbf{s}_{t+1}(i_{t+1}) = \mathbf{s}_t(i_{t+1}) - \gamma_t[\mathbf{s}_t(i_{t+1}) - \mathbf{s}_t(j_{t+1}) - Y_t(i_{t+1}, j_{t+1})]$$

$$\mathbf{s}_{t+1}(j_{t+1}) = \mathbf{s}_t(j_{t+1}) + \gamma_t[\mathbf{s}_t(i_{t+1}) - \mathbf{s}_t(j_{t+1}) - Y_t(i_{t+1}, j_{t+1})]$$

note:

- updates only occur locally on edge $\{i_{t+1}, j_{t+1}\}$
- initial choice: $\mathbf{s}_0 = \mathbf{0}$ or any vector $\sum_i \mathbf{s}_0(i) = 0$
- step size

 - $ightharpoonup \gamma_t = \operatorname{constant}(T)$, e.g. 1/T where T is total sample size

averaging process

a second stage averaging process, following \mathbf{s}_{t+1} above

$$\mathbf{z}_{t+1} = rac{t}{t+1}\mathbf{z}_t + rac{1}{t+1}\mathbf{s}_{t+1}$$

with $\mathbf{z}_0 = \mathbf{s}_0$ note:

- ullet averaging process speeds up convergence for various choices of γ_t
- one often choose $\gamma_t = c$ to track dynamics
- in this case, \mathbf{z}_t converges to $\hat{\mathbf{s}}$ (population solution), with probability 1δ , in the (optimal) rate

$$\|\mathbf{z}_t - \hat{\mathbf{s}}\| \leq O\left(t^{-1/2} \cdot \kappa(\Delta_0) \cdot \log^{1/2} \frac{1}{\delta}\right)$$

Application to Games

O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, and P. Parrilo, "Flows and decompositions of games: harmonic and potential games," *Math. Oper. Res.*, **36** (2011), no. 3, pp. 474–503.

noncooperative strategic-form finite game

- finite set of players $V = \{1, \dots, n\}$
- finite set of strategies E_i , for every $i \in V$
- joint strategy space is $E = \prod_{i \in V} E_i$
- utility function $u_i : E \to \mathbb{R}, i \in V$
- a game instance is given by the tuple $(V, \{E_i\}_{i \in V}, \{u_i\}_{i \in V})$

strategy

- $\mathbf{p}_i \in E_i$ denotes strategy of player i
- collection of players' strategies is $\mathbf{p} = \{\mathbf{p}_i\}_{i \in V}$, called strategy profile
- collection of strategies for all players but the ith one denoted by $\mathbf{p}_{-i} \in E_{-i}$
- $h_i = |E_i|$, cardinality of the strategy space of player i
- $|E| = \prod_{i=1}^{n} h_i$ for the overall cardinality of the strategy space
- ullet enumerate the actions of players, so that $E_i = \{1, \dots, h_i\}$

Nash equilibrium

- Nash equilibrium is strategy profile from which no player can unilaterally deviate and improve its payoff
- ullet formally strategy profile $oldsymbol{p}:=\{oldsymbol{p}_1,\ldots,oldsymbol{p}_n\}$ is Nash equilibrium if

$$u_i(\mathbf{p}_i, \mathbf{p}_{-i}) \ge u_i(\mathbf{q}_i, \mathbf{p}_{-i}),$$
 for every $\mathbf{q}_i \in E_i$ and $i \in V$

ullet strategy profile $oldsymbol{\mathsf{p}} := \{oldsymbol{\mathsf{p}}_1, \dots, oldsymbol{\mathsf{p}}_n\}$ is arepsilon-equilibrium if

$$u_i(\mathbf{p}_i, \mathbf{p}_{-i}) \ge u_i(\mathbf{q}_i, \mathbf{p}_{-i}) - \varepsilon$$
 for every $\mathbf{q}_i \in E_i$ and $i \in V$

ullet pure Nash equilibrium is an arepsilon-equilibrium with arepsilon=0

potential game

ullet a potential game is a noncooperative game for which there exists a function $\varphi: E o \mathbb{R}$ satisfying

$$\varphi(\mathbf{p}_i, \mathbf{p}_{-i}) - \varphi(\mathbf{q}_i, \mathbf{p}_{-i}) = u_i(\mathbf{p}_i, \mathbf{p}_{-i}) - u_i(\mathbf{q}_i, \mathbf{p}_{-i}),$$

for every $i \in V$, $\mathbf{p}_i, \mathbf{q}_i \in E_i$, $\mathbf{p}_{-i} \in E_{-i}$

- ullet φ is referred to as a potential function of the game
- proposed in seminal paper [Monderer-Shapley, 1996]
- widely studied in game theory
- preferences of all players aligned with a global objective
- easy to analyze
- pure Nash equilibrium exists

harmonic games

Helmholtz decomposition applied to space of game flows


game flow =

potential game \oplus nonstrategic game \oplus harmonic game


- first defined in [Candogan–Menache–Ozdaglar–Parrilo, 2011] but similar ideas appeared in game theory literature [Hofbauer–Schlag, 2000]
- generically no pure Nash equilibrium
- essentially sums of cycles
- e.g. rock-paper-scissors, cyclic games

example: road sharing game

- proposed in [Candogan–Menache–Ozdaglar–Parrilo, 2011]
- three-player game: $V = \{1, 2, 3\}$
- each player choose one of two roads $\{0,1\}$
- player 3 tries to avoid sharing the road with other players: its payoff decreases by 2 with each other player who shares its road
- ullet player 1 receives a payoff of -1 if player 2 shares its road and 0 otherwise
- payoff of player 2 is equal to negative of the payoff of player 1, i.e., $u_1 + u_2 = 0$
- intuitively, player 1 tries to avoid player 2, whereas player 2 wants to use the same road with player 1



(a) flow of road-sharing game



Thank You