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Slogans and graffiti:

Postmemory among youth in the Italo–Slovenian borderland

A B S T R A C T
In this article, I look at the ways in which contested memories, imagined communities, and social ressentiment are embraced and filtered by Slovenian and Italian youth as postmemory and transformed into symbolic weapons that exclude, make demands, or simply provoke. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in the Italo–Slovenian border area of Trieste, I analyze two settings in which these symbols are used: a soccer match between Slovenia and Italy played in the summer of 2002 at which a mysterious banner provoked diplomatic tensions and the everyday graffiti war waged on the walls of the city of Trieste. [*political symbols, memories, youth, Italy, Slovenia, soccer match, graffiti*]

On a late summer evening in 2002, the Italian border city of Trieste hosted a "friendly" soccer game between Italy and Slovenia. The match was expected to be entertaining and not particularly risky in terms of its potential to incite hooligan violence. Yet something went awry. Tensions arose between Slovenian and Italian fans when a mysterious banner appeared in the stadium. The banner, which was put up by Slovenian fans, stated in English, "The IX Korpus is back." The majority of the Italian public watching the match on television was astonished and could not understand what triggered the ensuing uproar in the stadium. What exactly did the message mean? What did the banner evoke? What was the IX Korpus?

The answers to these questions are situated in the conflicts and struggles that have traversed the Julian region, a small and geopolitically important area in the south-central part of Europe, over the last century and that have transformed the multiethnic and multilingual city of Trieste into a lacerated space of contesting claims to nationalist sovereignty by Italians and Slovenes. These tensions escalated with the WWII Italo–Yugoslav border resolutions (1947–54), which brought about diplomatic contention over the city between war-victor Yugoslavia and defeated Italy and helped set the geopolitical stage for the Cold War (Rabel 1988). Trieste stayed under the Allies' control from 1945 until 1954, when it passed to Italy.

More than 50 years have passed since that era; socialist Yugoslavia does not exist anymore, and new nation-states such as Slovenia and Croatia have emerged that have intermittently sought membership within the European Union.[1] The traumatic memories of WWII linked to Fascist and communist violence are strikingly used by the region's inhabitants in oppositional ways. This use occurs despite, and simultaneously because of, a climate of historical revisionism and generalized reconciliation between Italy and Slovenia. During the Italo–Slovenian soccer game in the summer of 2002, the stadium itself became a space for referential play. At stake was not the game per se but the *représentance* of the two nations' past.[2] Soccer players were transformed into champions of the past or, using Walter Benjamin's (1969) allegory, into "angels of history." Old issues were

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rehearsed; memories of a critical historical moment became condensed and iconicized. Phantoms of a never-confronted angst were revitalized. But were these phantoms still threatening? And, if so, why?

In this article, I explore the larger issues of border demarcation, national identity, and traumatic events by investigating how youth in Trieste reinterpret and condense vicarious memories in the context of a soccer game and in the use of graffiti. In conjunction with the necessary historical elucidation, I look at how the younger generation takes possession of ideas of imagined community, "social ressentiment" in the Nietzschean sense, and victimhood.[3] I do not foreground the memories of those who actually lived through and experienced WWII and its aftermath, including the consequent, painful border demarcation. Instead, I am interested precisely in how those memories, which are still contested and crosscut ideological and ethnic divisions, are used vicariously by a younger generation as weapons to exclude, make demands, or simply provoke, and how, in the process, they become mediated and reshaped postmemories.[4]

Youth, individually or in groups or movements, appropriate these memories in selective and condensed forms that, as political symbols (Kertzer 1988, 1996) and with expansionary (Harrison 1995) and territorial goals, enter the public arena in the form of chanting, banners, and graffiti.[5] The youth's contestation is not about the past but the present, as they creatively reframe and reshape memory signs toward "the old enemies" as well as "the new ones." Traumatic pasts, political violence, and remembering are difficult topics to analyze. Whereas much literature has shown that language can be a venue to resituate one's individual and collective self and to remake a social world (Das and Kleinman 2000; Das et al. 2001), I point to how the reproduction of the language of past violence deepens divisions in the present. In his work on how traumatized societies remember, Antonius C. G. M. Robben suggests that the inability to either completely recall the traumatic experience or completely forget it is "what makes trauma indigestible and so obsessive" (2005:122). The difficulty of digesting a contested past is visible in the ways youth in this context vicariously appropriate the past by deploying oppositional political symbols to shape their own sense of belonging and social world.

The Julian region is the site of anthropological inquiry by Glenda Sluga (2001) and Pamela Ballinger (2003) that unravels the interconnections between borders, memories, and histories. Sluga's work analyzes the diplomatic negotiations over Trieste (1943–54) and voices alternative positions to the hegemonic and constructed idea of ethnonational sovereignty. In contrast, Ballinger focuses on the Italians in Trieste who left the territories that were handed over to Yugoslavia after WWII. She is particularly interested in how members of this group have shaped their memory identity as exiles *(esuli)* and in the long battle they undertook to have their memories of exile recognized by the Italian government and by "official history." Drawing on the thoughtful analyses of Sluga and Ballinger, my own research looks at how "the border," which continually shifts in space and meaning over time, is embodied in the everyday practices and discourses of the border people of the Julian region, in this particular article, by its youth.[6]

Anthropological interest is increasing in the role of youth as active agents of society (Bucholtz 2002; Durham 2004) and in the process of cultural transmission and memory persistence (Berliner 2005; Jewsiewicki and Letourneau 1998). Such interest ranges from how children of Holocaust survivors vicariously engage with the trauma and memory of their parents in their own subjectivity formation (Hirsh 1996; Kidron 2003) to the ways that saturated historical symbols are appropriated by youth subcultures through a process of decontextualization and erasure of referential meaning.

This article unfolds as follows: In the first section, I provide the historical tools needed to understand how and why Slovenian and Italian youth choose certain symbols and use them against each other as weapons. I introduce the contested history of Trieste through a review of the city's most important geopolitical changes and the political context of inter- and intranational reconciliation, which has recently been reinforced by a historical-revisionist attitude. Reconciliatory attempts at the state level make the sudden eruption of violence at the soccer stadium that much more remarkable. In the second section, I focus on the soccer match as a public event, the deployment of the banner reading "The IX Korpus is back," and the responses to it. In this way, I draw attention to the porous and intertwined aspects of language and memory in the border area of Trieste. By asking how the language of memory becomes slogan, I attempt to deconstruct the fabrication of slogans and their recursive use. In the final section, I provide snapshots, in the form of graffiti, of how contested memories circulate in the everyday space of Trieste's streets and are used to challenge multicultural cohabitation by targeting both the historical Slovenian minority and new immigrants.

Zooming in on the area

The Julian region is a small area that stretches over three states: Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia. It is positioned at the intersection of Mediterranean, German, and Slavic worlds and historically has been both a place of peaceful contact and cohabitation and a strategic location to be conquered and controlled. As a result, the region is politically complex and has an unparalleled "excess" of history. I attempt to provide at least a taste of this intricacy but cannot fully detail it in this article.

The diverse inhabitants of the Julian region share two intertwined elements: a common history and the landscape of the Karst region. The ethnic composition of the region is mixed and includes mainly Italians and Slovenes. Whereas the hinterland has historically been inhabited by Slovenes and Croats, the coastal area has an Italian population, which not even the WWII border demarcation could totally erase. Thus, a Slovenian minority now lives in Italy, and an Italian minority lives in the new states of Slovenia and Croatia.

For a long time, the area was part of the Habsburg Empire (1348–1918). Trieste, which is the historical center of the Julian region, became a "free harbor" in the 18th century, attracting, among others, Greek, Serb, Hungarian, and Jewish businessmen, entrepreneurs, and victims of religious persecution. Along with the Italian, Slovenian, and German populations that were already present, these newcomers helped transform Trieste into a cosmopolitan, multicultural, plurireligious city built on pragmatic mercantilistic values.

Peaceful cohabitation by different groups and a hybrid population has been one of Trieste's foundational myths. This myth has been used both to construct a sense of common belonging to the city—"We are all Triestines"—and to deepen alienation and incommunicability. The idea of the multiethnic empire started to dissolve in the mid-19th century, as the bourgeois concept of "nation" gained ground and made it more difficult to imagine that one territory, such as the one encompassing Trieste, could belong simultaneously to more than one "nation." The tension created by the city's de facto multiethnic composition and the emergence and implementation of nationalist concepts of sovereignty loomed over the epochal changes brought by the two world wars, fueling people's ethnic sentiments and political struggles.

The Karst (Slovene, *Kras*; Italian, *Carso*) gives a certain uniformity to the region. The Karst is a porous terrain with numerous caves, holes, and, underground rivers. This landscape, which has been the site of battles of empires, nations, and ideology, is indelibly engraved in the collective and contested memories of its inhabitants. These collective memories, however, are roughly divided along the lines of ethnicity (Italians–Slavs) and ideology (Right–Left). These divisions are carved from the violence of fascism and communism, which reached its apex with the end of WWII, particularly in the moment when Italy (aligned with Nazi Germany) pulled out of the war by signing the armistice of September 8, 1943. This was a critical moment in the unfolding narrative of Italian and Slovenian memories, both hegemonic and counterhegemonic.

An oversimplified view of history, in which fascism is equated with Italians and communism with Yugoslavs (Slovenes), is readily used by the "two communities of memory" to build social identities framed in oppositional terms. For Slovenes and Croats, fascism evokes memories of the harsh period from 1922 to 1943, when the Italian Fascist regime forced a process of Italianization on them,[7] imposing a blatant policy of erasure of Slavic identity: The Slav language was banned from the public space; last names were, by law, Italianized; and Slav dissidents were persecuted.

For Italians of the Julian region, communism brings to memory the Slav violence that occurred from 1943 to 1945 in the aftermath of Italian capitulation to the Allies. This period was characterized by the Slav targeting of Fascist supporters and Italians, both as unsystematic revenge for the oppression suffered by Slovenes and Croats under domination and as a planned strategy carried out by Josep Broz Tito's communist resistance movement. In both cases, the same technology of violence was employed, one provided by the Karst landscape: People were thrown into cone-shaped holes in the limestone bedrock, called "foibe," which became mass graves.

Soon after the armistice in 1943, Trieste was annexed to the German Reich. A death camp was soon operating within a former rice factory, the Risiera of S. Sabba, just outside the city. Here, Jews, Slavs, Roma, and communists were gassed by the thousands (Sluga 1996). In May 1945, the Yugoslavs claimed and "liberated" or "occupied," depending on one's point of view, the territory of Trieste. Their liberation–occupation lasted 40 days, leaving a scar that is still etched in the Italian collective memory as well as on the landscape: During this time, dissidents and collaborators, mainly Italians, were either deported or thrown into the foibe in the nearby Triestine Karst. After the Yugoslav liberation–occupation, Trieste came under Anglo-American administration (1945–54) and was eventually handed over to Italy in 1954.

The redrawing of borders after WWII (1947–54) resulted in massive population movement.[8] Around 350,000 people, mostly Italians, are believed to have fled the territories that became part of Yugoslavia. The border demarcation marked their status as esuli. Trieste became the shelter and the new home for many of them, and their presence in the city adds a further layer of complication to the stratified intersections among peoples, memories, and resentments (Ballinger 2003).

The impact of the postwar resolution on people's subjectivities in the Julian region may be compared to the effect of the 1947 Indian Partition on those living on either side of the new boundaries in that instance. The hiatus that separates the "before" and the "after" in the Julian region is understood not only in temporal but also in spatial and political–ideological terms.

Since the redrawing of the borders, the esuli and the autochthonous Slovenian minority have lived side by side in Trieste, sharing a disenchantment, albeit from opposite viewpoints, about "history." Whereas the esuli lost their

own imagined Italian territory in Istria and Dalmatia, the Slovenes lost the possibility of realizing a Yugoslav territory in Trieste. The border resolutions opened new wounds and deepened existing ones between Italians, Slovenes, and Croats and across families and generations.

Although the state border between Italy and Yugoslavia has always been porous, with the people of the Julian region working, visiting, and trading across it, the city of Trieste is traversed by thick, multiple "inner" boundaries that work to entrench ideological, linguistic, and ethnic differences among its mainly Italian and Slovenian inhabitants. In fact, Trieste embodies the two souls of its past: the multicultural and pragmatic aspect of the inclusive Habsburg Empire and the chauvinist, nationalistic aspect, which is defensive and exclusive. The two souls have not been reconcilable with each other. The situation has worsened in the last 15 years, since Trieste has become one of the gates through which illegal immigrants flow into an increasingly intolerant Europe. The presence of newcomers to the territory, mainly from former Yugoslavia, China, and North Africa, further complicates the boundaries between "us," "the Other," and "the other Others."

In this boundary making and boundary shifting (Barth 1969), memory plays a primary role as a means of representing the past (Passerini 2003). Thus, memory has become a constituent part of public discourse. It is a signifying practice that indexes identity and selfhood in relation to group affiliation and to Others. At the same time, it is objectified as part of truth-claiming discourses, which rely on condensed formulae and images. Memory can be conceived as a container from which one can select what to remember, what to forget, and what, eventually, to forgive. The mechanisms of selection, forgetting, and forgiving are not clear-cut and belong as much to the psychological domain as to the political one. In the crafting of a national history, how and what is represented has to do with access to means of persuasion and power and is often framed dualistically in terms of "winners and losers." A governmentality of memory that I have discussed elsewhere (Miklavcic 2006) produces a hierarchy of memories and sets the frame for speakability, legitimization, and recognition (Lambek and Antze 1996).

In the present European geopolitical scenario, which is characterized by the reconfiguration of postsocialist nation-states, the expansion of the European Union, and practices of exclusion toward an increasing flow of immigrants, the contentiousness of the past still plays an important role in both internal and international relations. *Historical revisionism* and *reconciliation* are increasingly familiar buzzwords in discourses of national belonging. The idea of "reconciliation" appeals to the demands for inclusion increasingly made by those marginalized groups whose memories have been obscured by post–WW II teleological and unilinear construction, epitomized by the myth of Resistance. On the international level, setting collective memories and historical contentions bilaterally is an indispensable condition for emerging postsocialist countries working to qualify for EU membership. In other words, this historical revisionism is characterized by a need for setting parameters of historical justice with the goal of "reconciling memories." The governmentality of reconciliation takes the form of a rhetorical mode of history making that is both crafted and highly contested. Both in Slovenia and in Italy, state-driven discourses of reconciliation in both interstate and intrastate relations employ the idea of comparable mutual culpability as a way of working through memories of suffering and violence.

In the next section, I analyze how Trieste's history was reenacted during the soccer match in the summer of 2002. At the time, Slovenia was steadily satisfying all the parameters necessary to join the European Union, and in Italy the second Silvio Berlusconi government was in place. It was the first Berlusconi government that vetoed Slovenia's accession to the European Union in 1994. The Triestine-based Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance [AN]) deputy, Roberto Menia, played a leading role in this decision by underscoring the esuli's traumatic memories, resentments, and calls for justice.[9] After Yugoslavia's disintegration, the MSI–AN party blatantly supported anachronistic demands for the return to Italy of those lands the esuli left behind.[10] After the fall of the first Berlusconi government in 1996, the Italian government supported Slovenia's entrance into the European Union, settling previous bilateral contentions, including the esuli's compensation for property abandoned in the Slovenian littoral as well as minority protection in Italy and Slovenia.

The stadium

Soccer: When memories become slogans

Although sport can be carefully orchestrated and monitored, it simultaneously shapes the existing social order. Commonly viewed as neutral and nonpolitical in a North American context, in Europe it provides a unique perspective from which to investigate how people negotiate, perform, and activate their own identities and, thus, transform the sport arena into a field of contestation over collective memories and political symbolism. In this regard, soccer matches have proven to be significant events for the display of nationalism (Danforth 2001; Duke and Crolley 1996) and the development of an international reputation for emerging nation-states (Sack and Suster 2000).

Whereas the interrelation between politics and war is well known (Clausewitz 1976), anthropologists have begun to explore the shifting domains of sport and politics and have shown, for instance, how soccer matches can be framed as the continuation of politics by other means. Likewise, in Italy, politics have also become the continuation

of soccer by other means. In fact, former Italian Premier Berlusconi's party is named after a soccer chant, "Forza Italia," and his members of parliament are known as Azzurri (Blue Ones), the name of the players on the national team.

The "friendly" soccer game between Italy and Slovenia came under the spotlight of political and diplomatic attention as it became a complex frame for a much more elaborate social ritual. The friendly match led to a victory (1:0) for Slovenia. Tensions arose between Slovenian and Italian fans. The competing banners, chants, and choruses formed a spectacular display. Relying on a condensed notion of history, slogans were used as symbolic "weapons" directed more at Trieste, where the game was played, than at the two nations as such. One Slovenian fan ran onto the soccer field with the Slovenian flag and was beaten by the Italian police. The match was interrupted three times because of the violent behavior of some Slovenian fans, whom the Italian press referred to as "Slovenian hooligans." After the match, Italian and Slovenian cars became targets in a war of petty vandalism. Eventually, six Slovenian fans were arrested and received an expedited trial in Trieste. The discussion that arose after the match offers a glimpse into the intricate and instrumental use of the shifting domains of sports, politics, and war.

Italian politicians and mass media allegorically read the behavior of some Slovenian fans as signifying the immaturity of the Slovenian nation-state, and they suggested the country was not ready to enter the European Union. Overall, the Italian audience outside Trieste was surprised by the highly charged nature of what appeared, to them, to be simply a typical end-of-summer match. Yet, in Trieste, the fear of a possible confrontation between fans had been latent. The day of the match, the city's Slovenian newspaper, the *Primorski Dnevnik,* even ran an editorial suggesting that the game's political outcome could be negative, primarily for the Slovenian minority in Italy (Brezigar 2002). Many people with whom I interacted in Trieste decided not to go to the stadium because they were afraid riots would erupt. I watched the game with a group of people in a house in the suburbs of Trieste, and reactions there were a mixture of shame and disenchantment. A few friends who had gathered in the house were Slovenes from Trieste, and they were extremely worried about the repercussions that this match would have on their everyday attempts to work toward a dialogue between Italians and Slovenes in Trieste.

The game: Ban the banners!

The staging of the match was similar to that of many low-profile international soccer matches, which require the presence of political representatives to give an official flavor to the event. In Trieste, the politicians who gathered were mainly local politicians of the Italo–Slovenian border area. Among them was local cultural deputy and parliamentarian Menia, who played a key role in vetoing Slovenia's 1994 membership bid to the European Union. Also present were the mayors of the neighboring border cities (Koper and Nova Gorica in Slovenia and Trieste and Gorizia in Italy), who are actively engaged in building a friendly cross-border relationship. The spectators varied in age, gender, and nationality and also differed in their location in the stadium depending on their affiliations. This latter point is important in that it distinguishes the different kinds of supporters. The layout of the huge new and seldom-filled stadium follows a modernist architecture of terraces, a main stand, and the field. Whereas the main stand hosts political and public figures, the most passionate fans sit at the foot of the stands. The militant supporters, mostly men, stand at the *curva* opposite each other. It is in the curva, the terrace for which the tickets are the cheapest, that organized supporter groups, which, in Italian, are called "ultras," make their home.[11] It was in this sector of the stadium in summer 2002 that sport was transformed into political confrontation and, eventually, turned to violence.

The match began with the ritual playing of anthems as a way to pay tribute to each team's nation. Italian and Slovenian ultras booed each other's anthems, and the atmosphere became very charged. Once underway, the match did not prove thrilling. Much more action was taking place in the stands among the fans, who engaged in their own "game" of loaded signs and slogans.

As condensed messages, slogans simplify communication. Yet the use of powerful images can often distort or channel certain meanings. In a stadium, slogans identify a particular fandom and are expressed both in utterances (chanting) and in written form (banners). The latter convey a direct and visual message, which speaks for itself. Banners are part of recursive systems in which the reader–viewer attempts to decode the meaning of the formal content.

Slovenian fans displayed a meter-long banner on which was written in English, "The IX Korpus is back" (see Figure 1). Decoding this message was a challenge for many who saw it; for most people, the message was harmless because the content was unclear.[12] Among the various erroneous interpretations I heard from Triestine youth was that it was the name of a Slovenian fan club, which demonstrates the heterogeneity of experience and historical knowledge among Italian youth in Trieste. The message also was not properly decoded by the antiriot police recruited for the occasion from the nearby city of Padua. During the match, Deputy Menia and Trieste's Mayor Roberto Dipiazza asked the police chief to give the order to remove the banner, as it had an "offensive political connotation." The police did not do so because they felt that removing the banner would nourish even more tension. Therefore, the deputy himself confronted the Slovenian fans. What was the IX Korpus?

The IX Korpus was the Yugoslav partisan group that entered Trieste on May 1, 1945, to free the city from Nazi

Figure 1. The Slovenian banner in the stadium. Photo by Denis Sarkić, courtesy of *Mladina*.

occupation and that then took over the area for 40 days. The Triestine population, especially Italians and those who did not support communism, remember this as a period of generalized fear and occupation. Many citizens were sent to jail or executed on the Karst and thrown into the foibe. For many Slovenes, however, the "liberation" of Trieste has a totally different connotation: It brought hope and self-dignity to the Slovenes living there in 1945 through the public recognition of their language and identity.

Not many people could identify the slogan with the historical event that it evoked. Their inability to do so highlights the inscrutability of the message, chosen for its ambiguity as "a weapon of the weak" and meant to provoke and attack those who did remember 1945. The slogan, thus, challenged the reconciliatory and good-neighboring practices of the Italo–Slovenian borderland. Memories of this event circulate in Trieste within families that experienced the occupation–liberation, and they are hyperbolized by local right-wing political movements in various venues and various forms.[13]

Yet it is not a subject addressed in the history curriculum in Italian schools and is, therefore, ignored by many Triestine Italian youth whose families came to Trieste later or who do not associate themselves with political movements. Slovenian youth, per contra, are more knowledgeable than their Italian counterparts about the history of the Julian region and the "liberation" of Trieste.

From a linguistic point of view, the slogan on the banner was short and effective. It embodied, to a certain extent, the poetic function described by Roman Jakobson (1960) that makes a message "catchy."[14] The subject "the IX Korpus" played a recursive and declarative role in asserting itself and its own statement. Moreover, the verb *to be* emphasized the constitutive and performative function. Finally, the spatial–temporal adverb *back* set the whole sentence in its chronotopic frame. The statement appeared horizontally on the banner, as if the flux of time were linear and straightforward.

The decision to use English as a medium to reach a wider, international audience prevented many people, those not familiar with the events to which it referred and those unable to understand English, from decoding the message. Why was the banner deployed? A plausible explanation is that soccer-fan groups are highly instrumentalized by extremist political parties or movements. Numerous cases can be cited of collusion between sports fans and politics. One of the most blatant cases was that of Serbian paramilitary leader Željko Ražnatović, better known as Arkan, who, during the infamous interethnic strife in Bosnia, recruited his militia from the official fan club of Belgrade's Red Star, Delije, soccer club. Although plausible, collusion with political factions downplays the fans' agency.

A second interpretation is that for many soccer fans, such as English hooligans, soccer matches offer an attractive opportunity to fight; they are war games in which war strategies are pursued. In this context history helps illuminate previous contentions and unhealed wounds. The past serves as a wonderful "container" of symbolic weapons. The deployment of postmemory as a symbolic weapon has been extensively used in postsocialist settings.[15] The extent to which slogans are expressions of political belief or ad hoc fabrications is debatable. Signs and their usage are extremely malleable and easily expropriated. In saying this, I suggest that an ongoing feedback process operates between political influences on fans and their own "creativity."[16]

Had the "friendly" match not been played in Trieste, would "The IX Korpus is back" banner have been used? I strongly believe its message was directed at the city of Trieste more than at Italy as a nation. Fans selected this slogan as an "invaders' weapon," a type often deployed by opposing fan groups. Patrick Murphy and colleagues explain the violence between competing hooligan groups in the United Kingdom in terms of territoriality:

> They attack opposing supporters because they see them as "invaders," and they attack them in pubs, city centres and on public transports as well as in and around the football ground itself. Related to this is the fact that groups of this kind see travel to away matches as providing an opportunity for "invading" the territory of others and for attempting to establish control over it for a while. [1990:11]

Conquering the opposing team's territory is, therefore, a common practice in the subculture of fandoms. The vocabulary of "conquering" was also deployed by the Slovenian press, which published articles with titles such as

"Courageous Fan," "Hot-Blooded Support of the Slovenian Fans," and "Italians Humiliated in Trieste" on the day following the match (*Dnevnik* 2002). Gennaro Gattuso, an Italian soccer player who took part in the game, described it with some humor to a television reporter: "They were playing like warriors, while we were like pin-ups walking on the stage."

The soccer forum: The past as language for war

When I checked an Internet forum for soccer fans, I learned that a verbal and symbolic war had been waged between Italian and Slovenian youth well ahead of the actual soccer match, thus, setting the scene for "the war."[17] The exchange of messages was in English, and the "past" was readily deployed in the form of postmemory. Claims over the territory of Trieste fueled the discussion in the forum, to which each faction brought its own evidence on the matter. Such evidence highlighted the participants' contrasting visions of the role of city and country in the construction of an imagined community and their differential access to the hegemonic authority of history.

The relationships between Italians, Slovenes, and Croats in Trieste and in the Julian region are grounded in a country–city economic and "cultural" distinction. The city dwellers, who, until the 18th century, were mainly Italian speakers in Trieste, looked down on the generically defined Slav inhabitants of the countryside who were seen as peasant, barbaric, and uncivilized. Moreover, the Slav language was considered a sign of primitiveness in opposition to the "civilized Italian language." This stereotypical image of "the Slav" is still present in Italian nationalist discourses and practices, and it appears on the city walls of Trieste as graffiti, which I discuss later in this article. In contrast, Italian city dwellers always perceived themselves, and were likewise perceived by the Slav population, as elegant and culturally refined. The "cultural hegemony" embodied by Italian dwellers is often legitimized by their genealogical link to the Romans, who are recognized as Italians' ancestors.

Besides the powerful inequality rooted in the country–city divide, Italians and Slovenes (Yugoslavs) also have diametrically opposite views on the relationships between country and city in the construction of the nation. Such beliefs have influenced how Italians and Slovenes each imagine Trieste as part of their own national community.

Italian historiography regards the city as the economic, political, and social force that controls the countryside. The "Italian urbe" is the center of civilization, and its importance is demonstrated by the role that city-states played in medieval and Renaissance Italy. In following this rationale, it seems natural to Italians that Trieste control the Slovenian hinterland and that the hinterland be part of Italy.

In the Slavic tradition, the country is considered to be the core of the nation, and it is the country that morally and economically sustains the city;[18] therefore, it is the city that belongs to the country. Taking this into account, it is possible to understand the emotionally loaded meaning of the postwar Yugoslav slogan "Trst je naš!" [Trieste is ours] and to contextualize the Yugoslav liberation of Trieste in 1945.

The soccer match between Slovenia and Italy in Trieste proved to be an opportunity for Slovenian fans to avenge the past, to "invade" the city. In what follows, I examine an exchange of messages in an Internet forum between a Slovenian and an Italian fan who use history to negate each other's presence. The first message reveals the profound sense of historical injustice felt by the Slovenian fan. The message contains a large number of condensed signs, such as Trst je naš [Trieste is ours], foiba, and Fascists. Here are excerpts:

> ***king italian fascists ... The coming of the slovenian hooligans down to TRST togheter with the fighters from the province itself will be far worse than the 40 days long time when our army rescued TRST ... Forget foibas ... This time it will be worse ... HELL IS COMING TO PUNISH YOU DIRTY FASCIST BASTARDS ... TRST JE NAS ... Slovenian people rules, this is our land!!!
>
> "Triestini, hell comes to your town"
>
> Trst. friendly match between Slovenia and Italy ... It will be played on the territory that historically belonged to Slovenia (Trieste, Trst in Slovene), but was stolen by Italy with the help from phuckin' USA and UK after the 2nd World War. Expect few thousands of crazy Slovene fans there and if our team will not exactly win the game, we hope that they will at least break some spaghetti legs. Price for bribery and stealing must be paid some day and we hope the day has come.[19]

The reply from the Italian fan uses historical authority as undisputable legitimation of the "Italianness" of Trieste. The fan confutes the Slovenian claims over the city by tracing the genealogy of the city to the Italian ancestors, the Romans. Roman origin is the most widely used narrative of Italian nationalism, one that Slavs, who arrived in southern Europe in the sixth century C.E., cannot assert:

> you make me laugh, "historically belonged" to slovenia ??? you don't even have more claim to the land then the austrians do, nevermind italy. the only time trieste belonged to YUGOSLAVIA was when you occupied it like a bunch of hyenas would do when italia was down in the gutter after WW2. before that though, even under austro-hungarian rule, it was always culturally italian. and before that ROMAN. go read a book because TRIESTE E' ITALIANO GUMBA !!!!!!IL CENTRO DEL IRREDENTISMO !!!!! if you know your history.

The banner not banned!

"The IX Korpus is back" was not the only banner exhibited at this "friendly" soccer match. It was, however, the only one that appeared on television and that became the subject of interrogation both in the press and in the Italian Parliament. The slogans on the Italian ultras' banners, such as "Bilinguismo Mai" [Bilingualism Never] and "Basta Bilinguismo" [Enough with Bilingualism] did not receive any coverage in Italy and were only mentioned by the Slovenian press. The slogans written in Italian were directed at a local and national audience and contested both the use of Slovenian in the city of Trieste and a current Italian law that extends the rights of the Slovenian minority in the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia to the entire Friuli-Venezia Giulia region. In fact, at the stadium, the Italian fandom was mainly composed of Triestine ultras who usually cheer for the Triestine home team.

On the peripheries of nation-states, multiple ethnic groups commonly live together and share the need to reinforce and hyperbolize their own national identities. Hence, not surprisingly, many of the Triestine ultras are associated with extreme Far-Right movements, which nurture the ideal of an essential "Italianness" of the people and territory, negating altogether any other presence. The IX Korpus banner's message, therefore, was a refusal to recognize the Slovenian minority in Italy and publicly doing so in the presence of the symbolic representative of that minority's "mother-country," Slovenia.

According to the international treaty resolutions that marked the border between Italy and Yugoslavia at the end of WWII, the Slovenian minority in Italy and the Italian minority in Yugoslavia were granted protection, and bilingualism was to be acknowledged in any area with a minority that constituted more than 25 percent of the population.

Although bilingualism is effective in four municipalities in the rural outskirts of Trieste, within the city the official use of Slovenian in the public sphere remains sanctioned by multiple forms of cultural prohibition. Many Italians still strenuously oppose its use, and many Slovenian speakers who have suffered from marginalization have internalized this opposition. The Slovenian minority has been the target of hatred by right-wing Italian groups who see the use of the Slovenian language as endangering the "Italianness" of this border area. Their long-standing slogan "Bilingualism Never" has appeared in a variety of settings, from wall graffiti and political rallies to the soccer stadium. The "Bilingualism Never" ideology goes against the grain of the EU policy of minority rights and recursively reenacts the Fascist period, when speaking Slovene in public was illegal. The use of the Slovenian language in Trieste has, therefore, been marginalized and has acquired an intrinsic identity connotation. The Slovenian minority in the city, although protected by laws, has so far lacked general recognition and lives "a parallel life" (Košuta 1997). This parallel life is traceable through the presence of signs written in Slovene at the underground–"submerged" level (Stranj 1992) of Slovenian cultural associations and other institutionally recognized spaces such as Slovenian schools and banks.

The slogan "Bilingualism Never" powerfully plays with the adverb's meaning and position. The semantic content of *never* transcends the chronotopic function of time and space, thus effectively negating any possible attempt to secure recognition of the Slovenian language as an official language of Trieste. Comparing the adverbs used on the two rival banners—the Slovene banner's *back* and the Italian's *never*—one might detect the paradoxical tension associated with what Slavoj Žižek (1992) calls "the return of the Real": It is a "never back" that is, indeed, constantly present. I wonder whether the Slovene Žižek watched the 2002 Italy–Slovenia soccer match from a comfortable couch at home, like I did, or if he was a spectator at the stadium.

The day after

After the game, two public discourses emerged: One in Italy affirmed the Slovenian fans' behavior as evidence that Slovenia was not ready to be part of the European Union; the second, in both Italy and Slovenia, affirmed that Trieste was not the right site for such a match. These discourses, fueled by political representatives, filtered into everyday discussions through the logic of soccer, in which players and spectators alike are taken as representatives of the nation as a whole. The events that occurred during the match became the subject of parliamentary discussion in Italy. Deputies inquired into a range of issues: from the harsh behavior of the policeman who beat the Slovenian fan who ran onto the field (but did not carry any weapon) to the Slovenian request for a public apology for the "disgusting anti-Italian" sentiment demonstrated at the stadium.[20]

I offer a few examples of the underlying hegemonic discourse that indexes the behavior of a small group of agitated Slovenian fans as a synecdoche of the Slovenian nation. The examples come from the Triestine local political representatives of the center-to-right government coalition and from an extremist right-wing movement, Forza Nuova, whose declarations were printed in various national newspapers. My main source is the local newspaper of Trieste, *Il Piccolo.* Trieste Mayor Dipiazza, commenting that Trieste had been ready to host the Italo–Slovenian soccer match, covertly shifts the focus to the Slovenian nation and its unreadiness to be part of the European Union: "È un problema di democrazia. Un Paese non può diventare un grande Paese democratico in dieci anni. Questa è la verità. E dunque chi sbaglia paga" [It is a problem of democracy. A country cannot become a good democratic country in just ten years; this is the truth. Those who made the mistake should pay]

(*Il Piccolo* 2002a:17). In his turn, the political representative of Forza Italia in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region, Maurizio Bucci, states, "Forza Italia è l'ala moderata, cerca la conciliazione. Ma la Slovenia è una nazione giovane che aspira all'Eu, e queste forme di intolleranza ci lasciano preoccupati" [Forza Italia is the moderate wing (in relation to AN), it seeks reconciliation. But Slovenia is a young nation aspiring to the European Union, and these forms of intolerance worry us] (*Il Piccolo* 2002b:17). In their turn, AN political representatives Alessia Rosolen and Claudio Giacomelli blatantly affirm: "Lo spettacolo che gli sloveni hanno dato ha fatto capire chi sono e soprattutto che cosa è stato per la Venezia Giulia e l'Istria questo lungo dopoguerra" [The spectacle that the Slovenes have given us has shown who they are and what this long postwar period has meant for Venezia Giulia and Istria] (*Il Piccolo* 2002b:17).

The extreme right-wing movement Forza Nuova went so far as to point out that Italy should not even have recognized Slovenia as an independent nation-state, as it stretches over "Italian soil": "Un governo serio non dovrebbe nemmeno riconoscere la Slovenia in quanto occupatrice di terre italiane" [A serious government shouldn't even recognize Slovenia as occupier of Italian soil] (*Il Piccolo* 2002b:17).

In offering a range of more or less extreme positions, the comments I have just cited make two very important political statements: first, that Slovenia is not ready to enter the European Union and, second, that it is not yet a democratic state and has not made a tangible effort to reconcile with Italy.

The soccer events have also been analyzed through the lens of conspiracy theory. For instance, a Slovene from Trieste wrote in the Slovenian weekly *Mladina* (2002) that the decision to play the match in Trieste had been a strategy orchestrated by the right-wing local and national governments, which wished to incite an ideological conflict with Slovenia, souring official relationships with the Slovenian minority in Italy and internationally validating the veto on Slovenia's entrance in the European Union.

Why this moral authority of Italy over Slovenia's entrance in the European Union? Italy was one of the founders of the European Union, whose creation goes back to the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957. Although the other leading European countries see Italy as politically and economically unstable, it is, using a family metaphor, nevertheless, a "sibling." With the expansion of the European Union to include previous socialist countries, the relationship becomes hierarchical, as Italy and Slovenia become first or second cousins.

In the end, the real loser of the soccer event was once more the city of Trieste and its border inhabitants, whether Italian, Slovene, or something else completely.

Snapshots of the graffiti war

The border area of Trieste is saturated with history, and its past is a highly valuable commodity over which no one can claim exclusive ownership. The ways in which the contested past is deployed by the younger generation were illustrated at the soccer match between Italy and Slovenia, when signs belonging to the past were dug up and deployed in a game that turned into symbolic war. From time to time, then, contestations over memories erupt during public events, but they also are expressed less dramatically in quotidian discourses and practices. In fact, the contested memories of Trieste's past revolve around two signs: Fascism and foiba impinge on the everyday life of Italian-majority and Slovenian-minority inhabitants. The embodied memories and practices of the inhabitants of this border area, which are rooted in historical power inequalities and struggles over territory, are being reinterpreted and played out in the midst of a wave of new immigrants. The new immigrants are former Yugoslav citizens, Albanians, Chinese, Romanians, and North Africans who have arrived in the last 15 years as a consequence of postsocialist disintegration and geopolitical global changes.

While doing fieldwork in the area in 2001–02 on the everyday embodiment of borders and memories, I soon became aware of the presence of political graffiti on the city walls. I was immediately intrigued by these spaces on the city's architectural surface, its skin, where the verbal and the written connect, where encounter is sought after and fought against. What struck me the most was not so much the graffiti artists and their messages, but people's reception of this visual speech.[21]

The analysis of the anonymous and politically motivated practice of graffiti (Phillips 1996) is a useful barometer of an area's political atmosphere (Peteet 1996; Sluka 1992). In the struggle over deterritorialization and reterritorialization, there is a constant negation of Otherness, of diversity. Graffiti messages, whether historical or new, consistently convey the discourse of exclusion, denying minorities their rights.

At the stadium, the war of memories was visible, pragmatically negotiated and based on verbal and nonverbal practices of ritualized communication occurring within the frame of the game. In contrast, the war of memories in the city takes the form of the metaencounter, in which the Other is indirectly targeted by signs that convey constant tensions between inclusiveness and exclusiveness, deterritorialization and reterritorialization. On another level, the slogans and banners at the stadium were ephemeral and reverberated afterward for a short period in discussions and discourses in the public domain, whereas the graffiti tends to be more "fixed": The longer it stays on the wall "untouched," the more it is legitimized and normalized.

The walls of the city constitute a multilayered site in which language–race micropolitics are played out. The encounter with the Other is not directly mediated but verbally expressed in visual signs. More often than not, the message etched on the city's surface is anonymous, or it might be tagged with the logo of a political organization or movement. Through a persuasive language, the signs claim ownership. They mark territory as either exclusively "mine" or "yours," yet the city's surface absorbs the tensions, shows its scars in a way that allows for a potential future to be written, a future that could differ from the present.

Below I analyze three examples of graffiti that target Trieste's Slovenian minority and immigrants.

The graffito "Basta s'ciavi" [Enough with Slavs] is one example. (See Figure 2.) *S'ciavi* is a derogatory term for Slovenes and other Slavs, in general. It is used pejoratively, connoting *villano* (rude), *bifolco* (plowman), and *zotico* (boor), and refers to an archetypal peasant character more than actual Slavic nationality. Toward the end of the 19th century, a racial dimension was added to the term's meaning, and, in the evolutionary hierarchy of the day, the Slav became associated with a lowly, servile status relative to that of the Triestine Italian urban dweller. The message or, more precisely, the threat, is directed against both the Slovenian minority and the new immigrants who come from the former Yugoslavia.

The other two examples show how the signs fascism and foiba are reused in relation to "the other Others": immigrants. Graffiti that are framed in short, threatening expressions, such as "Basta Immigranti" [Enough with Immigrants], target Others but do not confront them physically. For this reason, I call their use "metaencounters." Using the tool of ubiquity and playing on the production of fear, the anonymous interlocutors mark their territory through symbolic violence. Graffiti, however, does not stay mute or untouched. "Graffiti wars" are ongoing and signs are frequently transformed. (See Figure 3.)

For instance, I later returned to a spot where the graffito "Basta Immigranti" had been written and found, instead, two pieces of political graffiti, one drawn over the other. The latest message had become "Basta Fascisti" [Enough with Fascists]. The use of the word *Fascists* highlights an exclusionary and racist stance toward diversity.

A final example illustrates how the two major historical signs of contested memories, fascism and foiba, are reshaped in ways that create a discourse of exclusion toward immigrants: "Albanesi, Kosovari, tutti in foiba" [Albanians, Kosovars, all in foiba]. An analysis of this graffito highlights

Figure 2. Anti-Slav graffito in Trieste. Photo by A. Miklavcic.

Figure 3. Graffiti war. Photo by A. Miklavcic.

Figure 4. The resignifying of foiba. Photo by A. Miklavcic.

the political power of a word that is used to convey a threat in a different geopolitical situation. Symbolic violence is expressed by resignifying foiba as a space of ethnic abjection. (See Figure 4.)

The adverb *basta* (enough) figures strongly in these messages. To which domain of meaning does *basta* belong? How is it positioned in relation to the social body–nation? Uli Linke (1995) addresses this question in her analysis of the graffiti of unified Germany. Linke argues that the word *raus* (away), used repetitively in this graffiti, is not simply a spatial reference but one that embodies a linguistic ideology of denial of the Other through a process of expulsion and excorporation from the social body.

In the tradition of Italian-language political slogans, the word *basta,* which refers to quantity, is deployed more often than *via* (go away). One might, therefore, interpret it to mean that immigrants, historical minorities, and Others are accepted by the social body only in digestible quantities. *Basta, back,* and *never* are adverbs that reverberate in the slogans and banners of the youth of this border area. They represent the overwhelming fear and the overwhelming hope that reside in the conjunction of time (the past, the present, and the future) and the Other.

Conclusion

Slogans, banners, and graffiti, when used as political symbols, are highly malleable and powerful and have no ownership: They can create inclusion and strengthen solidarity or contribute to exclusion and deepen divisions. In national and bilateral relations, they can sustain the narrative of the nation (Danforth 2001), support reconciliatory attempts, or provocatively challenge them.

In this article, I focused on how popular youth-culture spaces—the stadium during soccer matches, the graffiti-covered walls, and Internet sites—become sites for représentance and confrontation between different and conflicting versions of the past in contemporary Trieste. The slogans about the past are deployed primarily by young people who do not directly remember the events concerned and whose historical knowledge about them varies greatly. By relying on postmemory, reproduced vicariously through family, school, and society, Slovenian and Triestine youth have drawn on a contested past to construct their own meaningful political symbols that they wield at the stadium and on the city walls as weapons in a ongoing symbolic conflict.

The symbols I analyzed function as a kind of "return of the repressed" in the framework of haunted deployments of national sovereignty. They are weapons saturated with the meanings of a repressed and never fully acknowledged past that has fueled the construction of marginalized collective identities through fear and victimization. In this sense, there is a persecutory, paranoid dimension to these symbols: They project outside, on the Other nation, what is not acknowledged inside, that is, within the nation itself. For these historical symbols to acquire a different kind of creative plasticity and potential, altogether different narratives of the past will need to be constructed.

Notes

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1. Slovenia entered the European Union on May 1, 2004, and Croatia is scheduled to join in 2009.

2. I borrow the term *représentance* (representation) from Paul Ricoeur's *La Mémoire, l'Histoire, l'Oubli, l'Ordre Philosophique* (2000). Ricoeur situates memory, history, and forgetting within a shared realm as a way to address the representation of the past as the presence of the absent. To explain the dialectic of remembering and historical epistemology, Ricoeur forges the word *représentance*: mimesis, an equivalence of the realities of history. It is "representation by replacement" (*lieutenance*; Ricoeur 2000:359–369), which does not end with the representation of bare facts but interprets them within a narrative framework. Therefore, "the past as absent" achieves a sense of presence only through interpretive acts, which take shape through mnemonic devices (such as the soccer-match banners and slogans I analyze in this article) that are often abused for political aims.

3. For Nietzsche, ressentiment, the blaming of an enemy to insulate oneself from culpability, is an important component in the creation of identities, value systems, and moral frameworks.

4. I apply Marianne Hirsch's definition of *postmemory* to the experience of vicarious memory. With this term, Hirsch describes the memories of the children of Holocaust survivors who "live at a further temporal and spatial remove from the decimated world of their parents. Still, the power of mourning and memory, and the depth of the rift dividing their parents' lives impart to them something akin

to memory" (1996:659). The important aspect of her analysis lies precisely in showing that postmemory is a powerful form of memory because its connection to its object or source is mediated.

5. Simon Harrison has analyzed four prototypical types of symbolic conflict: (1) valuation contests, in which symbols are used to show prestige, legitimacy, and sacredness and, therefore, are ranked, with the most prestigious symbols being those most valued and fought for; (2) proprietary contests, in which conflict arises over the control and monopoly of a symbol; (3) innovation contests, in which an array of symbols is created and pulled together to characterize an imagined community, a process that occurs in nation-state building; and (4) expansionary contests, in which a "group tries to displace its competitors' symbols of identity with its own symbols" (1995:263). In the final case, the contest is a conflict over survival, an either–or contention, in which one group suppresses or oppresses the other. Drawing on Harrison's four prototypical types of symbolic conflict, I suggest that the symbols the youth discussed in this article deploy are of the expansionary-contest sort.

6. My data come from dissertation fieldwork I conducted in the region in 2001–02. My research examined the circulation of memories and practices in the Italo–Slovenian borderland by looking at the intergenerational transmission of memories within families and households on both sides of the border.

7. At the end of WWI, both Italy and Yugoslavia were victorious. Yet a previous secret treaty signed in London on April 26, 1915, by the Kingdom of Italy, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, sanctioned Italy's sovereignty in Slav-populated areas, enabling Italian imperialistic policy along its eastern frontier. As a consequence, one-third of Slovenes, who were until that point Habsburg citizens, found themselves on Italian soil. Many Slovenes who had worked in the Habsburg administration either migrated abroad or moved to the newly founded Monarchy of Yugoslavia.

8. The border resolutions started with the Treaty of Paris, a peace treaty between the Allies and Italy signed on February 10, 1947. With this treaty, most of the Julian region (with the exception of Zones A and B of Trieste), Rijeka, Zadar, and Dalmatia passed under Yugoslav sovereignty. The esuli community still mourns this day, on which their land passed to the Yugoslavs.

9. AN is a right-wing party, an offshoot of the Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement [MSI]) party. In 1994, right-wing politician Gianfranco Fini led the transformation of MSI into a mainstream right-wing force by rejecting fascism from its statute.

10. It was after the disintegration of the socialist bloc and the fall of the first republic in Italy that marginal memories such as those of the foiba violence and the experience of the esuli became known and recognized in Italy.

11. An overview of the respective histories of the Italian and Slovenian soccer subcultures is useful for grasping the interconnectedness of fandoms and sociopolitical factors. The ultras youth movement in Italy—the ultras are often wrongly equated with English hooligans—is characterized by its heterogeneity of class, status, and political affiliation. Many ultra groups are politically involved across a broad range of camps, from the Far Right to the Far Left. The ultras, and their use of violence, began to develop in Italy during the economic crisis of the 1970s. Slovenian militant fans, also called "ultras," have roots in youth contestations of the 1970s with strong anti-institutional overtones. It was not unusual for punks to also be soccer fans. The scenario changed in the 1980s, when youth soccer fandoms were instrumentalized and hate toward the system was channeled in more sectarian and nationalist terms toward "the Serbs," "the Croats," and so on. Postsocialist Slovenian fans are divided in their allegiance to two main soccer teams, the one from Ljubljana, the capital, and the one from Maribor, the second largest city. The fans have a range of political affiliations.

12. Other studies have reported how, in historical multiethnic societies of southern Europe, the employment of ambiguous signs (flags and banners) in public spaces was simultaneously perceived as innocuous by outsiders and as highly provocative by locals who grasped the historical–ideological undertones (cf. Brown 2000; Cowan 2003).

13. During my fieldwork, I sometimes played soccer with the grandson of the family that I lived with in Trieste. This 12-year-old boy was very passionate about soccer and had joined a local soccer association. In the course of our games, he innocently sang songs and repeated slogans that had very ideological and racist undertones. I heard him repeat, for example, "Sciavi merda" [Slav shit], "Devi morire" [You must die], and "Boia chi molla" [*boia*; lit. executioner, hangman, headman; the slogan can be translated into English approximately as "He who abandons (the cause) is a lousy bum and traitor." Benito Mussolini used this slogan, and it still circulates in Italy among extreme right-wing movements]. He said that he did not know what these words meant but had heard them at the stadium, shouted by ultras fans, who, in his eyes, were the very embodiment of soccer support.

14. Jakobson describes six factors that determine different functions of language; the "poetic function" is oriented toward the message for its own sake. Jakobson states that "the poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination" (1960:358). I suggest that the banner embodied an unintended poetic function because it was produced by an empirical linguistic criterion of selection and combination of words in forms of equivalence. The principle of equivalence is illustrated in the sequence with the use of the letter K, which balances the sentence: The IX **K**orpus is BAC**K.**

15. One relevant example of the use of postmemory occurred during a match between two Croatian teams, the Zagreb-based team and the team from Rijeka (Italian, Fiume). The slogan chanted by the militant fans of the Rijeka Nogometni Klub, "Benito, Benito, Benito Mussolini," was strategically used to make the other team angry. By shouting the name of Benito Mussolini, Rijeka fans challenged their common Croatian sovereignty, activating a historical Italian and Fascist claim over the city. Rijeka is a city that has been highly contested by the Italian and Yugoslav states. After WWI, the Treaty of Versailles gave the city to Yugoslavia, opening up a debate known as the Question of Rijeka–Fiume. In this frame, it is worth remembering the march on Rijeka organized by the Italian soldier–poet Gabriele D'Annunzio. The Treaty of Rapallo (1920) solved the problem by giving Istria to Italy and Dalmatia to Yugoslavia. Rijeka became a free town. During the Fascist era, the area was returned to Italy, and in 1947 the Treaty of London returned the city again to Yugoslavia. The Italian-speaking population left the territory almost en masse.

16. In February 2001, another case related to a banner received the attention of the Italian media. The banner was directed at the fans of the Triestine team during a game played in the Italian city of Livorno. The Livorno fans displayed a banner that was extremely contentious and, yet, from the poetic point of view, extremely cunning: "Tito c' è l'ha insegnato, la foiba non è reato" [Tito has taught us foiba is not a crime], which incorporates the catchy rhyme *insegn-ATO re-ATO*.

17. My assumption that the soccer forum was youth oriented has to be taken in a very generic way. The Internet, in fact, provides the perfect means to conceal identity in terms of age, sex, and nationality.

18. This relationship is also part of the Anglo-Saxon and German traditions. See Schama 1995.

19. Posted by Animal, August 21, 2002, at http://forums.soccerfansnetwork.com/archive/index.php/t-11669.

20. In Italy, police behavior has been a very sensitive topic ever since the tragic death of a young activist at the WTO meeting in Genoa in July 2001.

21. Graffiti have been used extensively for expressing political ideas in Trieste since the post–WWII era of 1945–54, when rallies took place almost daily in the city's streets and squares, and banners, paraphernalia, and graffiti declared allegiance to an Italian Trieste, a Yugoslav Trieste, or a Free Territory of Trieste.

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