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Table of Contents / Оглавление

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This essay provides readers with a critical analysis of the Congo Independence Day (June 30, 1960) addresses of the Belgian King Baudouin and the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. These speeches are widely regarded as two of the most famous African addresses that have ever been presented, and this essay focuses attention on the ways that Belgian territorials remember these controversial texts. The authors contend that a critical ethnographic approach can help scholars understand some of the traumatic realism of these turbulent decolonization periods, and this essay illustrates how these presentations have been remembered as speeches that offered audiences sublime and radical ways of framing the decolonization of the Belgian Congo. Congo Independence Day was supposed to have been a time of celebration, but Lumumba's address was contextualized as an inflammatory peroration that triggered violence and chaos.

However, given both legal constraints and salient social taboos against overtly stated racist argumentation in party politics, such arguments were not spelt out explicitly in the leaflets, but rather relied, in varying degrees, on their pictorial elements in advancing a coherent standpoint. Indeed, due to differing levels of tolerance and political correctness, the explicitness varies hugely between the two countries. We conclude by arguing that the analysis of complex rhetorical discourse requires precise examination of differing layers of text and context, in order to more fully draw out rhetorical insinuations, allusions and presupposition and their significance to specific national and historic contexts which differ significantly in the two countries.

Воздействие визуального расизма: Зрительные аргументы в политических листовках ультраправых партий Австрии и Великобритании

Джон И. Ричардсон и Рут Водак

В настоящей статье используется «исторический подход» при выполнении критического анализа дискурса в сочетании с теорией визуальной аргументации в процессе изучения предвыборных плакатов и брошюр двух ультраправых политических фракций в Европе. Мы анализируем мультимодальную литературу, подготовленную в ходе проведения двух предвыборных кампаний: фракции «Альянс за будущее Австрии» (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich [BZÖ]) в выборах в совет г. Граз в начале 2008г.; и «Британской национальной партии» (British National Party [BNP]) в выборах в Администрацию Большого Лондона (Greater London Assembly) в мае 2008г. Наш анализ сосредоточен, в основном, на визуальной аргументативной текстуре данных, а именно, на прямых и косвенных риторических и аргументативных средствах, применяемых для формирования чувства страха перед мусульманами, иммигрантами и лицами, ищущими убежища. Проанализированные листовки призывают к расовой и религиозной чистоте соответствующих национальных пространств. Тем не менее, учитывая законодательные ограничения и существенные социальные табу, направленные против откровенных расистских лозунгов в проведенном фракциями политическом дискурсе, такие аргументы не получали явного словесного выражения в листовках, а, скорее, в разной степени опирались на изобразительные элементы в отстаивании целостной, целенаправленной точки зрения. И в самом деле, в результате различного уровня терпимости и политической корректности в этих двух странах, откровенность образов разительно отличается. Настоящая статья завершается

тезисом о том, что анализ сложного риторического дискурса требует точного изучения различных слоев текста и контекста в целях выделения риторических намёков, аллюзий и пресуппозиций, а также их значимости для конкретных национальных и исторических контекстов, которые для этих двух стран в значительной степени разнятся.

Forum / Форум:

Book Reviews / Книжный обзор:

The Impact of Visual Racism: Visual Arguments in Political Leaflets of Austrian and British Far-right Parties

John E. Richardson and Ruth Wodak

Introduction

In this paper, we apply the Discourse Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (DHA; see Wodak 2001, 2004, 2008b) combined with argumentation theory and visual grammar (Kress & Van Leeuwen 1996, 2001) to visual texts. Specifically we examine election posters and brochures to investigate the explicit and indirect persuasive rhetorical and argumentative devices employed to construct fear of foreigners, migrants, and asylum seekers, and to convince voters of their potential danger. Our texts are drawn from recent election materials produced by Austrian and British right-wing parties with an explicit xenophobic agenda. Our analysis seeks to detect similarities and differences in these new-old 'law and order' campaigns. We claim that the methodology, which we first present, is adequate to deconstruct the implied racist visual meanings.

In the second section of the paper, we introduce the Austrian and British examples and locate them in their respective national and ideological contexts. Finally, we compare the British and Austrian rhetoric and relate the results to the different socio-political developments and traditions of the two EU member states.

Due to space restrictions, we focus mainly on the visual argumentative texture of the examples and necessarily have to neglect many other salient features of right-wing populist and fascist rhetoric.[1]

Methodology: Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA)

According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001:1), racism/discrimination/exclusion manifests itself discursively: 'racist opinions and beliefs are produced

1 See, for example, Krżyzanowski & Wodak 2008; Pelinka & Wodak 2002; Reisigl 2002, 2008; Reisigl & Wodak 2000, 2001, 2003; Richardson 2004, 2008; Rydgren 2005; van Dijk 1984, 1993; Wodak 2003, 2008b; Wodak & Iedema 2004; Wodak & Pelinka 2002; Wodak & Reisigl 2002; Wodak & van Dijk 2000; for more extensive analyses of the 'politics of exclusion' and 'othering' in right-wing populist rhetoric.

and reproduced by means of discourse… through discourse, discriminatory exclusionary practices are prepared, promulgated and legitimized'. Hence, the strategic use of many linguistic indictors to construct in- and out-groups is fundamental to political (and discriminatory) discourses in all kinds of settings. It is important to focus on the latent meanings produced through pragmatic devices (e.g. implicatures, hidden causalities, presuppositions, insinuations and certain syntactic embeddings), as frequently manifest in the rhetoric of rightwing-populist European politicians, such as Jörg Haider, Jean Marie Le Pen or Silvio Berlusconi (see Wodak and Pelinka 2002; Rydgren 2005). To be able to analyse our examples, it is important to introduce some analytic concepts of DHA:

Systematic qualitative analysis in DHA takes four layers of context into account:

- the *intertextual and interdiscursive relationships* between utterances, texts, genres and discourses,
- the extra-linguistic social/sociological variables,
- the *history and archaeology of texts and organizations*,
- and institutional frames of the specific *context of a situation*.

In this way, we are able to explore how discourses, genres, and texts change due to socio-political contexts.

"Discourse" in DHA is defined as being

- related to a macro-topic (and to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity which involves social actors who have different points of view).
- a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action;
- socially constituted as well as socially constitutive;
- integrating various differing positions and voices.

Furthermore, we distinguish between *"discourse"* and *"text"*: *Discourse* implies patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures, whereas a *text* is a specific and unique realization of a discourse. Texts belong to "*genres"*. Thus, a discourse on exclusion could manifest itself in a potentially huge range of genres and texts, for example in a TV debate on domestic politics, in a political manifesto on immigration restrictions, in a speech

by an expert on migration matters, and so forth (Wodak 2008a). A text only creates sense when its manifest and latent meanings (*inter alia*, implicature, presupposition, allusion) are read in connection with knowledge of the world.

In accordance with Bakhtin's (1981; 1986) seminal work, we take *"intertextuality"* to refer to the linkage of all texts to other texts, both in the past and in the present. Indeed, no text is ever isolated in space and time as many studies illustrate; thus, intertextuality is inherently part and parcel of meaning making in context (see, Van Dijk, 2008). Bakhtin's term 'hereoglossia' captures this point adequately: every text manifests and integrates many voices – the voice of the author as well as (possibly contradictory) voices of 'others' who are talked or written about (Lemke, 1995). Intertextual links can be established in different ways: through continued reference to a topic or to its main actors; through reference to the same events as the other texts; or through the reappearance of a text's main arguments in another text. The latter process is also labeled "*recontextualization"*. By taking an argument out of context and restating it in a new context, we first observe the process of de-contextualization, and then, when the respective element is implemented in a new context, of recontextualization. The element then acquires a new meaning, because, as Wittgenstein (1967) demonstrated, meanings are formed in use. Hence, arguments from parliamentary debates on immigration, from political speeches or in the mass media, are recontextualized in a genre-adequate way in the texts we analyse below through the use of salient visual and verbal features and elements.

The construction of in-and out-groups necessarily implies the use of *strategies of positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of others*. We are especially interested in five types of discursive strategies, all involved in positive self- and negative other-presentation, which underpin the justification/legitimization of inclusion/exclusion and of the constructions of identities. 'S*trategy*' generally refers to a (more or less accurate and more or less intentional) plan of practices, including discursive practices, adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal.[2]

First, there are *referential,* or *nomination, strategies,* by which social actors are constructed and represented, for example, through the creation of in-

2 All these strategies are illustrated by numerous categories and examples in Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 31-90). It would be impossible to present all these linguistic devices in this paper, owing to space restrictions.

groups and out-groups. This is done through a number of categorization devices, including metaphors, metonymies and *synecdoches*, in the form of a part standing for the whole (*pars pro toto*) or a whole standing for the part (*totum pro parte*).

Second, social actors as individuals, group members or groups as a whole, are linguistically characterized through predications. *Predicational strategies* may, for example, be realized as evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates. These strategies aim at labelling social actors in a more or less positive or negative manner. They cannot be neatly separated from the nomination strategies.

Third, there are *argumentation strategies* and a fund of *topoi* through which positive and negative attributions are justified. For example, it can be suggested that the social and political inclusion or exclusion of persons or policies is legitimate. We say more about such *topoi* below.

Fourth, one may focus on the *perspectivation*, *framing* or *discourse representation.* Through framing speakers express their involvement in discourse, and position their point of view in the reporting, description, narration or quotation of relevant events or utterances.

Fifth, there are *intensifying strategies* on the one hand and *mitigation strategies* on the other. Both of these help to qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances. These strategies can be an important aspect of the presentation inasmuch as they operate upon it by either sharpening it or toning it down.

Positive self and negative other-presentation requires justification and legitimation strategies, as elements of 'persuasive rhetoric'. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) define "*topoi*" as parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises. *Topoi* are the content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules' which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion or the central claim. As such they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion. Less formally, *topoi* can be described as reservoirs of generalised key ideas from which specific statements or arguments can be generated (Ivie, 1980, cited in Richardson, 2004: 230). As such, *topoi* are central to the analysis of seemingly convincing fallacious arguments which are widely adopted in prejudiced and discriminatory discourses (Kienpointner 1996: 562).

In Table 1, we list the most common *topoi* which are used when writing or talking about 'others', specifically about migrants. These *topoi* have

been investigated in a number of studies on election campaigns (Pelinka and Wodak 2002), on parliamentary debates (Wodak and van Dijk 2000), on policy papers (Reisigl and Wodak 2001), on 'voices of migrants' (Delanty, Jones, Wodak 2008; Krżyzanowski and Wodak forthcoming), and on media reporting (Baker et al 2008). Most of them are used to justify the exclusion of migrants through quasi-rational arguments ('they are a burden for the society', 'they are dangerous, a threat', 'they cost too much', 'their culture is too different', and so forth). In this way, migrants are constructed as scapegoats; they are blamed for unemployment or for causing general discontent (with politics, with the European Union, etc.), for abusing social welfare systems or they are more generally perceived as a threat for 'our' culture. On the other hand, some *topoi* are used in anti-discriminatory discourses, such as appeals to human rights or to justice.

Table 1: *List of Prevailing Topoi in Immigration Discourse*

1- Usefulness, advantage	9- Economy
2- Uselessness, disadvantage	10- Reality
3-Definition	11- Numbers
4-Danger and threat	12- Law and right
5-Humanitarianism	13- History
6- Justice	14- Culture
7- Responsibility	15- Abuse
8- Burdening	

Similarly there is a more or less fixed set of metaphors employed in exclusionary discourse (Reisigl and Wodak 2001), such as the likening of migration to a natural disaster, of immigration/immigrants as avalanches or floods, and of illegal immigration as 'dragging or hauling masses'.

Furthermore, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) draw on Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1994) and Kienpointner (1996) when providing the list of general common fallacies. Frequently employed fallacies include, first, *argumentum ad baculum*, i.e. 'threatening with the stick', thus trying to intimidate instead of using plausible arguments. Second, *argumentum ad hominem*, which can be defined as a verbal attack on the antagonist's personality and character

(of her or his credibility, integrity, honesty, expertise, competence and so on) instead of discussing the content of an argument. Finally, the *argumentum ad populum* or *pathetic fallacy* which consists of appealing to prejudiced emotions, opinions and convictions of a specific social group or to the *vox populi* instead of employing rational arguments. These fallacies frequently prevail in rightwing populist rhetoric (see Rydgren 2005).

Visual Rhetoric

As Willard (1979) argued, for too long the study of argument was unfortunately "coloured by the assumption that the claims and the reasons [of argumentation] must be linguistically serialised" (1979: 212). Adopting such a logocentric position when examining multi-modal discourse genres, such as political leaflets, will only ever provide an inadequate account of how their standpoints are advanced and/or derailed. In response, academic work on rhetoric and persuasion has recently taken a visual turn, expanding empirical and analytic foci from linguistic discourse (whether spoken or written) to include pictorial and visual artefacts in many disciplines and fields, from text linguistics and discourse analysis to literary criticism and rhetoric (Kostelnik & Hassett 2003; Hart & Daughton, 3rd revised edition, 2006; van Leeuwen & Jaworski 2002; Olsen et al, 2008b). This growth in visual rhetoric was driven by an "emerging recognition that such symbols provide access to a range of human experience not always available through the study of [linguistic] discourse" (Foss, 2004: 301). However, such preoccupations are hardly a new thing. Indeed, Gronbeck (2008: xxii) shows evidence, from a variety of Greek and Roman sources on rhetoric, for "knowing and believing grounded in seeing and the visualised." Yet, as he goes on to state, "scholars of communication have only begun to scratch the surface of the political and social implications" of the visual (Ibid.). The increasing attentiveness to the *analysis* of visual rhetoric has resulted in studies examining visual discourse as varied as fine art (Helmers, 2004; Willard, et al 2007), cartoons (Edwards & Winkler, 2008; Groarke, 2007) film (Alcolea-Banegas, 2007; Blakesley, 2004), advertising (Burridge, 2008, Ripley, 2007) political leaflets (Cairns, forthcoming; Richardson, 2008) and other visual artefacts.

However, there is still a great deal of debate regarding the possibility of visual rhetoric, and specifically whether it is possible for images to offer *arguments*. After all, we may agree that visual and multi-modal media – whether a photograph, a television documentary, a war memorial or a human body – can, and do, communicate meanings. We may equally agree that "visual-

ity" plays a powerful role in "shaping our public symbolic actions" (Olsen et al, 2008a: 1). But can we say that they advance standpoints and supply supporting arguments? Some readers may think it unnecessary to recount such debates, given the recent publication of several visual rhetoric anthologies (Handa, 2004; Hill & Helmers, 2004; Olsen et al, 2008b; Prelli, 206). However, such an account is useful to outline the position of our own work. As Blair (2004: 46) discusses, those who argue against the possibility of arguments being visual tend to base this claim on two reasons. The first "is that the visual is inescapably ambiguous or vague. The other is related to the fact that arguments must have prepositional content", or, more specifically, that images cannot assert and so cannot advance a standpoint. First, we would agree that the meanings of the visual are frequently ambiguous. However, ambiguity and vagueness are also a feature of verbal argumentation, which, when serious enough to breach the pragma-dialectical language use rule (which states 'Parties may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous'), can indeed be an obstacle for resolution. Hence, vagueness, on its own should not be viewed as a reason against the possibility of arguments being visual. Quite the contrary: we believe vagueness to be an inherent feature of political communication and also for advertising, particularly in images or metaphors (see Charteris-Black 2006 for a detailed discussion). As Wodak & de Cillia (2007: 335) also argue, commemorative speeches and accompanying iconic symbolism which are needed for the discursive construction of national identities, are also inherently vague to allow for a maximum of identification by as many people as possible (see also Billig 1995).

It is equally true that arguments advanced visually "are implicit and indirect in the sense that they are not explicit verbal statements of the sort that we typically take to be the paradigm instances of argumentative speech acts" (Groake, 2002: 144). However, in this way too, visual argumentation is comparable to its verbal counterpart, given that "in practice, the explicit performance of a speech act is the exception rather than the rule" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992: 44). As with verbal arguments, if we are to assess visual argument properly, we need to make an accurate extraction of the premises left implicit – that is, we should aim to offer a 'maximally argumentative interpretation' of the ways in which a standpoint is advanced, supported or defended visually. Indeed, we suggest that several interpretations could be offered due to the inherent ambiguity of visual arguments, where contextual information becomes decisive in opting for one or another reading. This is why we endorse the DHA as a specifically context-sensitive

discourse-analytic approach as will be illustrated below. Such a linguistic reconstruction cannot fully replace the original, given the evocative power of visual communication (Hill & Helmers, 2004), but rather is comparable to the translation of one language into another. It is only with a comprehensible and charitable reconstruction of the implicitly advanced argumentation that we can properly identify the argument scheme and implicatures employed, and hence the type of connection between premises and the standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002).

On this basis, in this article we maintain that it is possible to argue visually, since it is possible for images to advance and defend standpoints. More specifically, "visual arguments constitute the species of visual persuasion in which the visual elements overlie, accentuate, render vivid and immediate, and otherwise elevate in forcefulness a reason or set of reasons for modifying a belief, an attitude or one's conduct" (Blair, 2004: 50). Hence, if it is possible to reconstruct from an image, a reason for accepting or believing some proposition or for modifying a belief or action – that is, if the meaning of an image can be reconstructed as advancing or defending a standpoint – it should be regarded as a visual argument. We should also emphasise at this point that we are aware of the fact that visual texts which are used as advertisements or for political election campaigns also strongly address emotions and cause affective responses (as does pathos-oriented rhetoric in general). Such rhetoric and argumentation frequently relies on fallacies which try to evoke positive or negative responses by applying simplistic 'we-discourses' or seductive metaphors as unifying elements. Hence, we are dealing with patterns of argumentation which are very complex and integrate cognitive and emotional, rational and irrational (fallacious) elements. Moreover, 'unreasonable' argumentation strategies can also form an intentional and inherent part of rightwing populist rhetoric, frequently relying on pragmatic devices such as irony and sarcasm. We will point to such uses below.[3]

Only systematic reception studies would allow investigating the many and predictably systematically differing ways of understanding such images and slogans. Lutz and Wodak (1987), Wodak et al. (1999 [2009]) and Kovàcs and Wodak (2003), for example, were able to illustrate in large studies about media reception in various contexts that focus group participants offered

3 We are grateful to Michael Billig who pointed us in this direction when viewing our data and commenting on our paper.

different readings of the same text due to social class, previous experience, ethnic origin, and political affiliation. Unfortunately, no empirical study about the leaflets under investigation exists to date. However, opinion polls and election results are referred to whenever appropriate which, however, do not allow establishing any causal links between visual argumentation and political party preference (see also Krzyżanowski, 2008, for the use of focus groups in reception studies and the newly coined term 'dog-whistle' politics by Poynting and Noble, 2003).

Inclusion and Exclusion – The Examples

Austria: the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPÖ) and the Bundnis Zukunft Osterreich (BZÖ)

After the Second World War, in 1949, "liberals" with a strong German National orientation and no classical liberal tradition (see Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer 1993: 326), who felt unable to support the SPÖ or the ÖVP, founded the VDU ("*Verband der Unabhängigen*"). This party became an electoral home for many former Austrian Nazis. The FPÖ, founded in 1956, was the successor party to the VDU, retaining an explicit attachment to a 'German cultural community' (for further political and historical information about the FPÖ as successor party to the former NSDAP, see Scharsach 2000, Scharsach and Kuch 2000, DöW 1993, Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer 1997). In its more than 50-year-old history, the FPÖ has, therefore, never been a 'liberal' party in the European sense, although there were always tensions between more liberal and more conservative members of the party. For instance, in 1986, Haider was elected as leader of the party and unseated Norbert Steger, a liberal leader.

Since 1986, the FPÖ has gained many votes, peaking with 26.9% of all the votes cast in Austrian elections of October 1999 (1,244,087 voters). By 1993, the FPÖ's party policy and politics were conspicuously anti-foreigner, anti-European Union and widely populist, close to Le Pen's *FN* in France (Reisigl & Wodak 2000; Wodak & Iedema 2004; Wodak & Pelinka 2002). From the summer of 1995, the FPÖ almost completely ceased to stress the closeness between the Austrian and the German cultural community because opinion polls demonstrated that the majority of Austrian citizens no longer accepted such a self-definition. In the autumn of 1997, the FPÖ presented a new party programme, which, in its strategically employed 'calculated ambivalence' (see Reisigl & Wodak 2002), emphasizes Christian values.

From February 4th, 2000, the FPÖ constituted part of the Austrian government, having formed a coalition with the conservative ÖVP. This development caused a major upheaval internationally and nationally, and led to the so-called 'sanctions against the Austrian government' by the 14 other member states of the European Union (see Pelinka & Rosenberger 2001). In September 2000, the EU found an exit strategy and the sanctions were lifted due to a report of "Three Wise Men" (see Möhring ed. 2001). Nevertheless, the report stated that the FPÖ should be regarded as a "right wing extremist populist party, a right wing populist party with radical elements".

In May 2005, a section of the FPÖ splintered off to form a new party, the *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ)*. Haider, a chief architect of the creation of the BZÖ, remained regional governor in Carinthia, but Peter Westenthaler took over the leadership of the party. Heinz-Christian Strache, a kind of 'modern clone' of Haider, took over the more far right, traditional and less populist FPÖ (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*). The FPÖ still thrives on explicit xenophobia, pan-Germanic sentiments, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia in contrast to the BZÖ, which has continued its more populist programme with xenophobic and anti-Semitic subtexts (Turner--Graham 2007; Wodak 2007). However, the BZÖ continuously lost votes, as the governmental role does not seem to fit rightwing populist parties – their strength seems to lie in their oppositional role, not in taking over governmental responsibilities (Krżyzanowski and Wodak 2008). In the elections of October 1st 2006, the left Social-democratic Party (SPÖ) gained the majority in Austria after having been in opposition for six years. The BZÖ proportion of the vote was reduced to barely 5%, securing only 7 seats in parliament; the FPÖ attracted around 11% of the vote and is also represented in parliament.

In sum, for a considerable period of time, the FPÖ has, more than any other Austrian party, persuasively set a "xenophobic" anti-foreigner tone in Austrian domestic policies. For more than a decade, the FPÖ has almost always profited electorally from the populist business of sowing uncertainty and irrational xenophobic and anti-Semitic anxieties, which – as already mentioned above - have been harboured or willingly adopted, for different reasons, by a considerable proportion of voters. This mantle has now been adopted by the younger and more populist BZÖ, as we demonstrate below.[4]

4 In this paper, we focus mainly on xenophobic exclusionary meanings; however, the BZÖ attacks the Jewish community, specifically its president Dr. Ariel Muzikant, from time to time with different agenda and functions: 2001, in the regional election campaign in Vienna, Jörg Haider tried

In December 2007 and January 2008, both traditional and less known exclusionary discourses suddenly (re)appeared in the public sphere. This was triggered by three primary factors: the expansion of the Schengen area (border controls between Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia were abolished on December 21st, 2007); the possible accession of Turkey; and new and very strict immigration laws in Austria and in other EU member states. New xenophobic slogans from the FPÖ, such as '*Lieber Schweinskotelett statt Minarett*' ('Rather pork cutlets than minarets'), "decorated" the streets of Vienna. In the city of Graz, during its city council elections in early 2008, a great deal of exclusionary racist rhetoric was posted by the BZÖ, which focused on the term '*säubern*' (to clean/cleanse). This functions as an obvious allusion to Nazi propaganda and anti-Semitic ideology proposing 'cleansing cities of Jews' - a euphemism for ethnic cleansing and genocide ('*Säuberung von Juden; Judenrein*'). The images below, taken from leaflets and postcards distributed by the BZÖ, illustrate this exclusionary rhetoric and the many negative ethnic, religious, and national stereotypes which were (re)produced during this campaign, i.e. stereotypes of the 'Poles as thieves' and the 'drug-dealing African':

Figure 1: BZÖ, Graz Kampagne Aufsteller ('We are cleansing Graz' say Peter Westenthaler and Gerald Grosz; they are cleansing Graz of 'political corruption, asylum abuse, beggars, and foreign criminality')

to raise his chances by opposing restitution claims for Jewish victims of the Shoah (this restitution should compensate the so-called 'Aryanisation' of Jewish belongings, etc.). However, these agenda were opposed vehemently by the SPÖ and Haider lost many votes (see Pelinka and Wodak 2002, Wodak 2007). April 2008, the BZÖ started a new anti-Semitic campaign; this time solidarity with Palestinians is functionalised for sentiments against Austrian Jewish citizens. They are labelled as uncivilised and juxtaposed to the civilised Western (Christian) world.

Figure 2: BZO, Graz 'Postkarte Autoknacker' (Wojciech K., serial car thief, states: 'Do not vote for the BZÖ because I would like to continue with my business dealings')

Figure 3: BZÖ, Graz 'Postkarte Drogendealer' (Amir Z, asylum seeker and drug dealer, states: 'Please do not vote for the BZÖ because I would like to continue with my business dealings')

These three Austrian posters condense many features of racist and discriminatory rhetoric. Most importantly, the allusion to Nazi rhetoric is apparent both in the choice of words, and in the use of visual metaphors,

insinuations, and symbols ('cleansing the streets with brooms'). This also applies to the stereotypes of 'drug dealing black asylum seekers', and 'Polish thieves' (as nominations), which are common in Austria. In this way, by applying several visual and verbal *topoi*, the BZÖ attempts to construct itself as the "law and order" party that can save Austrians, and the citizens of Graz specifically, from 'immediate and huge threats'.

The posters employ many nominative and predicative strategies whereby the 'others' are named and certain generic characteristics are attributed to them. Both the men in Figures 2 and 3 are referred to by using the same combination of referential and predicative strategies:

Wojciech K, Serienautoknacker [Wojciech K, serial car thief]

Amir Z, Asylwerber und Drogendealer [Amir Z, asylum seeker and drug dealer]

The first component in each construction – providing their given name but only the initial of their family name – paradoxically acts to anonymise the two men – they are constructed as generic types. This strategy works in conjunction with the ways that both their faces are concealed, either by a balaclava in Figure 2 or the black censor's rectangle in Figure 3. Following their (foreign sounding) given names, the second component of the nominalization attributes negative generic characteristics to the men. The predicative strategy in each case is an intensified criminalisation. This, Wojciech K is not *just* a car thief, but is a serial, or *career*, car thief. In the case of Amir Z, this intensification is achieved through an additional negative actional anthroponym (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001): thus, he is not *just* a drug dealer, but is also an asylum seeker – that is, someone who, in the eyes of the BZÖ, is already 'burdening Our society' (*topos* of burden) and so should not be 'taking advantage of Our generosity' (*topos* of abuse).

The BZÖ leaders are also labelled and characterized, albeit contrasted in positive ways. They are not generic, but individuals, with full given and family names, colourful, handsome, and fore-grounded, whereas the 'others' are back-grounded through the dark – 'dirty' – colours used. In this way, even the colours are employed as part of the argument: cleaning the streets of dirt which is – conventionally – brown and black, not white and orange. The two men are also smiling while 'cleaning the street'. This ironic (or sarcastic) connotation can be viewed as integrating intentionally unreasonable argumentation strategies and part of 'calculated ambivalence'; in this way, they

are addressing viewers in multiple ways and also signal that they knowingly employ the embedded allusion to Nazi rhetoric.

Moreover, all posters utilize layout and fonts in black and white and explicit paradoxical statements which serve as *presuppositions* to contrasting latent meanings: the real and right norms and values are implied through the subtext – the opposite meanings. These persuasive strategies (*implicature by contrast*) all belong to the political sub-field of advertising; hence we are dealing with a case of hybridity, *mixing the genres* of advertising and political communication (Fairclough 2003).

If we continue briefly with a *multi-modal analysis*, we have to point to colours and contrast between dark and light which are salient features (see Kress and van Leeuwen 1996): dark for the 'others', the bad people who steal and deal drugs; light, white and orange for the 'good guys' who 'will cleanse' the city of threatening inhabitants. In this way, the images combine *metaphorical, metonymic, and pragmatic devices* in intricate ways. The latter devices are employed as *argumentation and intensification strategies*. The *topoi* range from 'abuse, criminality' to 'law and right' 'threat for our culture', and 'justice'.

Due to the fact that we are discussing images where the depiction of the 'others' employs biological characteristics, like skin colour, certain hairstyles, dark eyes, etc., we necessarily conclude that racist meanings are intentionally (re)produced as persuasive devices. At this point, we should explore the context of the election campaign in much greater detail, the history of the two parties involved, as well as the broader historical context in Austria, where similar slogans and meanings were employed by Nazi rhetoric before and during WWII. The *topos* of 'cleansing' streets/stores/towns of 'others' (Jews, Slavs, Roma, etc.) stems from such fascist rhetoric and has now been redeployed and recontextualized to apply to Poles and migrants from Africa, among others, for this context.

The concept of 'Säuberung' (cleansing; using precisely this wording in German) is readily notable in historical Nazi sources or reading old dictionaries.[5] Looking in in Nazi brochures, propaganda, Nazi editions of diction-

5 For example: *Meyers Lexikon*, 8th edition, Leipzig 1936-1942; *Duden*, 12th edition, Mannheim 1941, 13th edition, Mannheim 1947) or consulting specialist dictionaries of NS jargon (Leon Poliakov, Josef Wulf, *Das dritte Reich und die Juden*, Frankfurt: Athenaeum: 146-149, 179; Cornelia Schmitz-Berning 2007, *Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus*, 2nd edition, Berlin: De Gruyter: 333-334; 511-519.

aries, and even in Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (270, 359) the concept is frequently related to, or collocated with, 'Judenrein' as well as 'Rassenrein' (clean of Jews, pure race, respectively, again precisely this wording in German). There, the purity of blood depends on 'cleansing Germany and the German race from Jewish influence and destruction' (*Zersetzung)*. The 'cleansing' should, so Nazi ideology argues, lead to *Entjudung* (De-Judaification) (see Schmitz-Berning 2007: 189). Accordingly, Jews should, first, be removed from all professions and business; second, all alleged and so-called 'Jewish influence' should be destroyed; third, all Jewish possessions and properties should be taken over by force ('*Arisierung*'); and fourth, in the well-known so-called 'final solution' (*Endlösung*), Säuberung referred euphemistically to the policy of murder, deportation, and mass extermination (gassing). (See also *Duden*, 10th edition, 1929; 11th edition 1934, 12th edition 1941). In the 13th edition of *Der Duden* from 1947, these concepts were deleted – which provides even more evidence for the fact that everybody knew that these terms were part of Nazi jargon!

It should also be noted that 'cleansing the streets' in this leaflet does not only refer to the way the Nazis used the term '*Säuberung*'. It also implicitly indexes the material consequences of this policy, in the form of the Jews who had to kneel on their knees and wash the streets, often with their tooth brushes, while the SA and SS and many bystanders jeered and laughed. Thus, this image is doubly meaningful. On the one hand, the rather clear insinuation to Nazi jargon and cleansing. On the other hand there is the subtext, related to the 'washing and cleaning of Austrian streets by Jews'. Now 'the Aryans' are doing this themselves, though smiling cheerfully, standing, and with brooms.

We do not claim that everybody who views the above-depicted poster will be able to make these associations and be able to deconstruct the visual and textual insinuation (see above). However, many viewers certainly will be able to guess the latent meanings and the intended subtext as these terms are strongly and explicitly taboo in public and official discourses. Schoolbooks, films, and documentaries all contain pictures of Nazi times with such slogans – for example of Jewish shops where these words were painted on the windows, and or of Jews forced to wash the streets. Thus, one can assume a wide collectively shared knowledge of these historically connotated words in the Austrian context which politicians refer to intentionally – although they would, of course, always deny such intentions (see Wodak and Reisigl, 2002).

The argumentative chain that is implied runs as follows:

1) The BZÖ cleans the streets and keeps our city clean – they stand for 'law and order'
2) Wojciech, a Polish foreigner, steals cars as his daily business
3) If you vote for BZÖ, Wojciech will not be able to continue stealing
4) Hence, Wojciech (and all other criminals) oppose the BZÖ
5) Voting for the BZÖ will establish 'clean – orange- streets' once more;
6) BZÖ stands for law and order

Moreover, explicit actions are depicted. The BZÖ actually 'cleans' the streets which implies that they 'clean out' the – generically depicted - criminals and drug dealers. They do not have to promise or appeal for action in indirect or coded ways; they are, if one follows the very explicit metaphorical argument, already acting! Here, the broken, distressed font of the 'undesirable elements' being cleansed from the streets of Graz acts as an intertextual link between the Campaign Leaflet and the Postcards. For each of the four problems that the BZÖ will brush away, there is a more detailed postcard providing an exemplar or illustration. Thus, if we were in any doubts about Wojciech's nationality ('he sounds foreign, but he could be Austrian…'), the campaign leaflet provides "*Ausländer kriminalität*" as a transformed generalisation of his activities. Similarly, the transformed generalisation relating to "Amir Z" explicitly reiterates the interpretative gloss that draws on the *topos of abuse*, implicit in the postcard. These intertextual links, signalled visually through the use of the distressed font, function to project the exemplars, detailed in the postcards, into the principal Campaign Leaflet (*argumentum ad exemplum*): the visual rhetoric leads us to visualise 'undesirables' like Amir Z and Wojciech K being swept away by the cleansing broom of the BZÖ.

Debates about immigration and nationhood are also crucially linked to *assumptions about place,* thus to *deixis*. 'Our' culture belongs 'here' within the bounded homeland, whilst the culture of 'foreigners' belongs 'elsewhere' (*topos of culture*). The theme of place is particularly threatening to groups who are seen to have no 'natural' homeland, such as the Roma or other diasporic communities today, or the Jews in the first half of the twentieth century. Religion as a central condition for inclusion/exclusion, frequently triggered by indexical markers such as the 'headscarf' worn by Muslim women, has recently become dominant in some EU countries.

The United Kingdom: the British National Party

The British National Party (BNP) is currently Britain's largest far-right political party. The BNP was founded in 1982, through the merger of a faction of the neo-Nazi *British Movement* and John Tyndall's openly anti-Semitic *New National Front* (itself a splinter from the, at that time, larger *National Front*). Nick Griffin joined the BNP from the *International Third Position* in 1995. Soon after joining the party, in July 1998, he was charged with race hatred offences in connection with a magazine that he edited called *The Rune*. Issue 12 of the magazine (published in 1996) was judged to contain both anti-Semitic libel and Holocaust denial material, and Griffin was convicted and received a nine-month prison sentence, suspended for two years. Recently, the leadership of the BNP have argued that this anti-Semitism is a thing of the past, and are focusing instead on the putative threat posed by what they call the 'Islamification' of Britain. The extent to which anti-Semitism remains at the ideological core of the party is a matter of debate. There is evidence, for example, that the decline of anti-Semitic rhetoric in party literature is attributable to simple political opportunism rather than a genuine change of party ideology. Thus, in an article published in the magazine *Patriot,* soon after his trial (that is, before he deposed Tyndall as chairman), Griffin outlined to BNP activists his plans for the "modernisation" of the party. He wrote:

> As long as our own cadres understand the full implications of our struggle, then there is no need for us to do anything to give the public cause for concern […] we must at all times present them with an image of moderate reasonableness. […] Of course, we must teach the truth to the hardcore, for, like you, I do not intend this movement to lose its way. But when it comes to influencing the public, forget about racial differences, genetics, Zionism, historical revisionism [i.e. Holocaust denial] and so on – all ordinary people want to know is what we can do for them that the other parties can't or won't. (cited in Brown, 2007)

A racist anti-immigrant policy, based on nativist principles, remains unquestionably at the heart of the Party however. As the Party's Constitution states, they remain "committed to stemming and reversing the tide of non-white immigration and to restoring, by legal changes, negotiation and consent the overwhelmingly white makeup of the British population that existed in Britain prior to 1948."

In the 2005 General Election, the BNP polled 193,000 votes for the 119 candidates it fielded, significantly higher than the 47,000 amassed in

2001. Across the United Kingdom as a whole, they attracted 4.3 per cent of the vote, obtaining more than 5 per cent of the vote in 33 of the seats they contested and more than 10 per cent in three constituencies. The highest of these was the Barking constituency, its main target seat, where the party polled 16.9 per cent, its highest share of the vote anywhere in the country (John et al, 2006).

On May 1st 2008, local government elections took place in England and Wales, along with elections for the Greater London Authority and London Mayor. The BNP stood over 600 candidates across 74 wards in England and Wales – enough that they qualified for a party political broadcast. The BNP also entered 10 candidates for the GLA London-wide candidate list, one constituency candidate (for the London constituency of City and East) as well as Richard Barnbrook as their Mayoral Candidate. The London Assembly is made up of 25 members, and is a unique case in British politics, being decided by a partial system of proportional representation: 14 members of the Authority are elected via a 'first past the post' system to represent constituencies; these are supplemented by 11 London-wide members elected through PR. Political parties need 5% of the vote to get one of these 11 seats, 8% for two and 11% for three.

Their results were below what had been widely predicted and were judged a disappointment by the party (Lowles, 2008). Across the country, the party added 10 local councillors, significantly lower than the 40 they were reported as aiming for (Ibid.). Barnbrook came fifth in the Mayoral Elections, placing behind the three major Parties as well as the Green Party, with only 2.84 per cent of the first choice votes (69,710 votes).[6] This was down marginally on the percentage of first choice votes that the BNP candidate Julian Leppert received in the 2004 London Mayoral election.[7] In City and East, Robert Bailey came fourth with 9.82 per cent (18,020 votes) for the BNP, in a constituency that also saw sizable returns for the UK Independence Party (3,078 votes; 1.68%), the English Democrats (2,048 1.12%) and the National Front (2,350, 1.28%). However, the party attracted 5.33% of the vote for the London-wide candidate list (130,714), marginally more than the 4.8% share of the vote they achieved in 2004, and sufficient to elect Richard Barnbrook as a member of the GLA.

6 Barnbrook also received 5.23%, or 128,609 of the second choice votes.

7 In 2004 Julian Leppert (BNP) received 3.04% of the first choice votes, 0.20% higher than Barnbrook;

A BNP leaflet, headed The LONDONER was a prominent feature of the party's London campaign. During every weekend in the run up to Election Day, party activists leafleted a variety of London's boroughs, including the predominantly Jewish communities in the North of the city (Taylor, 2008). On their first 'National Weekend of Action' alone, the party apparently delivered over 100,000 leaflets across the capital (BNP, 2008). Laid out in the style of a newspaper – complete with a clear san-serif masthead – the remainder of front page is arranged under the headline "The Changing Face of London":

Figure 4: The BNP 'Londoner' campaign leaflet

Here, the expression 'Changing Face' is used both metaphorically, to refer to the ways that the character, persona or disposition of London has (apparently) changed, as well as literally, referring to actual faces of London's

inhabitants who metonymically represent the city. With this in mind, a productive initial analytic strategy may be to examine the ideational content of the images used on this front page.

The upper of two images shows white families – the vast majority of whom are women and children - out socialising on a terraced street; food and drink are clearly included on stalls in the foreground of the image and flag bunting between the housing. From this, and the fashions worn by the women and children, we can conclude that the photo was taken on the day of a significant social event during the late 1940s or early 1950s. A candidate example could be the Queen's Coronation in 1952, but given the almost total lack of men, we presume the event depicted is the 'Victory in Europe' Day Celebrations. It is therefore rather ironic that the BNP chose this image, given that a large proportion of the men 'missing' from the image would have still been stationed in Europe after fighting fascism (a war that the BNP maintains was unnecessary). Overall, the sense is of a happy occasion – a street Party – enjoyed by friendly, welcoming women. This is achieved in no small part due to the emphasis placed on a woman at the extreme left of the image, photographed with a large, open and welcoming smile. The arrow on the left – headed "From this…" – points the attention of the viewer directly at her, providing a welcoming entry point into the image.

The photograph has an open aspect, a light palette (which connotes an aged photograph as well as imbuing it with a clean, bright aesthetic) and is composed in such a way that the people only take up the lower half of the frame. The majority of remainder of the image is open sky, giving it the sense of space and liberty, into which is interspersed the Union Flags on the bunting. The combination of fun, friendliness and the place of the Nation (metonymically represented by the flag) in everyday life is highly conducive to the BNP constructing an idealised past for working class Londoners (this is a terraced street, not one filled with Georgian mansion houses). In addition, the event pictured is atypical. Street parties of this nature were rare, even during this period of time, and restricted to major Royal Weddings, Coronations and other events of high social significance. Opting to use such an image to represent the conviviality and social inclusiveness of London in the past is therefore misrepresentative and, potentially, counter-productive to the success of the BNP's argument.

The women in the image below are far less welcoming. It's immediately apparently that they're Muslim; wearing the *niqab* means that you can't see their faces, only their eyes, which look out at the viewer in an expressionless

way. Repeating the structure of the image above, the viewer's attention is directed by the use of the arrow on the left, this time pointing to a woman putting up two fingers – a gesture directed towards the photographer and hence transferred to the viewer. This is an interesting, and ironically rather English, gesture, usually taken as a sign of defiance or abuse – in effect meaning 'fuck off'. The palette of the lower image is much darker than the one above, predominantly the result of the black *niqabs* and dark clothing worn by each of the three women. Here, again in contrast with the image above, the composition is dominated by the three women, who practically fill both the height and width of the frame. The poor print quality and pixelation of the image suggests that it was enlarged from a much smaller image to create this looming presence of the women dominating the frame.

It is interesting that the BNP chose to use two pictures of women in this leaflet. This is an unusual approach for the party, and marks a shift compared to the pictorial content of their leaflets produced over the past two years, which tended to emphasise the threat of the *male* Other. In the case of this LONDONER leaflet, the more archetypally prejudicial image of 'the (male) Muslim horde', taken at a London protest against the publication of 'the Danish cartoons', is relegated to the back page (see Richardson, 2008, for an examination of the BNP's use of this image). On the front page, the party have set up a figure of contrast between the *women qua women* of London's past and women presented as more typical of London's present. The white women of the past are friendly and welcoming, pictured smiling with children and food, in an image that acts to domesticate them: they appear happy to be home, providing food for family and friends. This symbolic domestication is particularly significant historically, since this image would have been taken immediately after a period of intense involvement in the public sphere and with 'war effort' employment in particular. The selection of this image, therefore, at the very least represents a "modern traditional" patriarchal view, in which women may well be 'allowed' to work, but "remain primarily responsible for the family and the home" (Amesburger & Halbmayr, 2002, cited in Mudde, 2007: 93). In the lower image, the leaflet portrays a group of expressionless, but nevertheless *un*friendly Muslim women of the present. In contrast with the white women above, who were pictured with children of a variety of ages, a pram pushed by the woman in the middle, has been specifically cropped from the original image. This cut – which removed around a quarter of the original image – severed the woman from the domestic role *she* was performing when the photograph was taken. Along with the removal of social context from the image, this drastic edit further reduces

the woman's range of discernible social and personal roles – she is reduced to being only *a Muslim woman*, not a mother, sister, aunt, etc. The extent of the cut also required the BNP to stretch the image in order to fit the width of the page. As a result of this enlargement, the shape of the women has been distorted – they look more squat and dumpy than they are in the original.[8]

In fact, while tracing the origin of this lower photo, we were able to find out that the photograph wasn't taken in London at all, but rather in the Sparkhill area of Birmingham (UK) on 31 January 2007. The night before, eight Muslim men were arrested in Sparkhill, and neighbouring areas, as part of what Police and Security sources described as an alleged plot to kidnap and behead a British soldier; a further man was arrested the following day.[9] The Muslim Maktabah bookshop was also raided along with four further commercial premises. The social disruption this brought, along with the way that the news media widely described the region of the city as being a hotbed of radicalization, led some Muslims in the local community to feel angry at the way that they were being portrayed. The image has since been used in further news reports regarding the alleged self-imposed segregation of Muslims in the UK, as well as on the cover of the 2007 paperback edition of Melanie Philips' book *Londonistan*. This book appears to be the first instance where the image was used in direct reference to Muslims in London.

The layout of image and inference on this front page supports the ideal/real layout proposed in the multi-modal approach – the BNP's ideal picture of London positioned at the top of the composition, whilst their idea of the City's terrible reality underneath. The layout also implicitly indexes and plays on an inversion of the 'before and after' personal transformations used in adverts for cosmetics and other beauty products. This page layout, and rhetorical position, is also used in a leaflet distributed in Stoke-on-Trent.

The repeated use of "this" is a particularly effective rhetorical device on the front page, and the principal element that allows a rhetorical cross-fertilisation between visual and verbal components of the argument. The first

8 The original image, entitled 'Many British Asians don't feel British', taken by a Press Association photographer, is available to view here: http://prints.paphotos.com/pictures_679845/Many-British-Asians-dont-feel-British.html (accessed 19 May 2008).

9 Of the nine men arrested, two were released a week later with no charge; another of the nine was released in the month that followed. Of the remaining five men, only one – Parviz Khan – was charged, and found guilty, of charges relating to kidnapping; the remainder were convicted for offenses related to supplying materials to foreign fighters for terrorist purposes or for not informing the Police of Mr Khan's activities (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7246646.stm).

use ("CONSIDER THIS,") forms part of a directive to cue up the argument presented on the front page – "this" functions as a cataphoric pronoun, referring the reader 'forward' to the argument that the BNP wishes the viewer to consider. The second "this" is a far more complex pronoun, simultaneously referring to the image above, of the white street scene, as well as the qualities that London used to possess, listed in the sentences that follow. The pronoun is linked to the upper photograph through the semantic consonance between "the way London used to be", "From this…", as a starting point of a change of state used on the intrusive arrow, and the global topic of Change, introduced in the headline. The photo and the description of London-past that it is meant to represent, should be viewed and understood together: the street scene, depicting a universally white and predominantly female group of people, should be taken to denote a city "At ease with itself, friendly, happy and secure". Thus:

[this picture above depicts] the way London used to be

[London used to be] At ease with itself, friendly, happy and secure.

This indexical slippage, between image and description, allows the BNP to offer one account of the event taking place in the image. Specifically, how the "community values" of the past are something to be desired and which the BNP aims to encourage or reintroduce. However, the use of the second image, in opposition to the street party photographed, enables the BNP to project issues of race and religion onto this putative loss of "community values". The choice to depict Muslim women in *niqab*, the selection of this particular point in time (of someone making an abusive gesture) and the production decision to frame them in enlarged close up, thereby denying them a sense of place and context, makes it difficult to construct any interpretation of the image other than one that emphasises their Muslimness. In turn, this foregrounding of the women's Muslimness acts to emphasise the white, non-Muslimness of the women and children in the upper image. Hence, from this contrast, we can construe that London has changed:

"From this [white] to this [Muslim]"

and it is this change that has apparently brought with it the loss of a variety of positive social characteristics:

"From this [friendly] to this [abusive]"

"From this [happy] to this [unexpressive]"

"From this [secure] to this [insecure]"

"From [a sense of community values] to [anti-social]"

The leaflet doesn't go as far as to explicitly state that the presence of Muslims living in London resulted in the loss of these positive social characteristics, but then it doesn't have to. The standpoint is derived from the complex interplay of visual and verbal dimensions: that London has changed "From [Image 1] to [Image 2]"; and that London used to be at ease with itself [etc.]

The final use of "this" in the central verbal component of the front page – "If you would like London to be like this again…" – retains the complex way that this pronoun is used on the front page. Here, "this" refers anaphorically to the list of positive social and civic qualities listed immediately beforehand, as well as the image from London's past. Hence, to the uncritical eye, the leaflet could be proposing a return to the positive social values listed – a list that invokes certain bedrock values of contemporary liberal, social democratic political thought, that most people would have difficulty opposing. However, in concert with the images, the racialised assumptions of the proposition cannot be overlooked. Like the Austrian leaflets we examined above, this is an argument for the racial purification of a City. From this, it is possible to reconstruct a standpoint and its arguments.

1. London used to be white
2. When it was white, London was at ease with itself, friendly, happy and secure.
3. The BNP wants London to be at ease with itself, friendly, happy and secure.
4. Being at ease, friendly, happy and secure means being white
5. Therefore, the BNP will make London white again

Like with any reconstruction, ours involves the transformation of certain argumentative elements and the interpretation, clarification and substitution of others (principally, in this case, the visual elements). During our reconstruction, we considered using 'non-Muslim' rather than 'white' (thus: '(1) London used to be non-Muslim; (2) When it was non-Muslim…' etc.), given the way that the BNP are clearly making the 'Muslim-ness' of the women in the lower image the problematic aspect of their identity. By this alternative reconstruction, the BNP would be arguing to remove (only) Muslims from London and hence 'make London free of Muslims again'. However, the agenda of the BNP is significantly wider than this. As their

Party constitution, quoted in an earlier section, shows, they do not limit their discrimination to Britain's Muslim populations. They argue – and, with the advent of a BNP Councillor on the Greater London Authority will be *agitating for* – the widespread repatriation of Britain's non-White populations. Our reconstruction therefore takes into account this wider agenda, and reads the use of the Muslim women to metonymically stand in for Britain's non-white, that is, minority ethnic, communities in general.

Comparative Discussion

At this stage we can perhaps offer a comparative examination of the leaflets of these two political parties, and their relations to their respective national and ideological contexts of production and consumption.

Prejudicial topoi

As should already be clear, there are significant parallels and overlaps between the prejudicial *topoi* employed in the leaflets of both parties. In each, minority communities are positioned as objects the 'We' must deal with – explicitly as a form of polluting dirt in the case of the BZÖ, or as a vaguely delineated, but nevertheless socially disruptive (Muslim) community in the case of the BNP. The reader of each leaflet is placed in a position of power relative to these negatively described social groups and asked to grant each party the mandate to act on a shared sense of revulsion and deal with the problem communities in 'responsible ways'; i.e. both parties appeal to be trusted to change the current situation and transform it into a 'clean' community again. The BZO requests the reader grant them their vote so they can 'cleanse' Graz, whilst the BNP requires 'your support' to return London to the 'friendly, happy and secure' state of the pre-1950s through removing (that is, if their Constitution is anything to go by, the repatriation) of British Muslims. Thus, both leaflets are based on what one may term a *global*, or organising *topos of disadvantage*: that 'having these kind of people here, in Our city, is harmful and disadvantageous and, as such, they should be removed'. Connected to the macro *topos of disadvantage* is a second macro-*topos*: the *topos of threat* ('they bring insecurity and unhappiness').

In turn, these two macro-*topoi* are constituted by a series of supporting *topoi*, which draw variously on, the *topos* of law and justice ('they are drug dealers and criminals'), the *topos* of history ('things were better here before they arrived'), the *topos* of culture ('they don't have Our sense of community

values'; 'they are different'; 'they beg outrageously'; 'they do not want to integrate'), and the *topos* of abuse ('they abuse our asylum system'; 'they abuse our tolerance'). Singly, these *topoi* offer prejudicial, indeed racist, accounts of minority communities, as 'things which bring social problems and danger'. Collectively, each of these constitutive *topoi* contributes to a higher order rhetorical aim of the analysed leaflets: for the purification of the national space.

Visual argumentation

Given the focus of this article, it is pertinent to assess the role of the visual relative to linguistic aspects of the argument advanced. Specifically, we can ask to what extent do the visual, and particularly the pictorial, elements of the leaflets stand as independent arguments supporting the standpoints of each political party? The literature on argument structures is useful here, suggesting three types of argumentation:

- first, *subordinate argumentation*, in which "one of the reasons [or arguments] supports the other" forming a serial chain of reasons (Snoeck Henkemans, 2001: 101);
- second, *coordinate argumentation*, in which "each of the reasons given is directly related to the standpoint and the reasons work together as a unit" (Ibid.);
- and, third, *multiple argumentation*, in which "each reason separately supports the standpoint" (Ibid.).

Here, we suggest that these leaflets represent visual examples of co-ordinatively compound argumentation, given that the pictorial (and other visual devices) and linguistic elements "together constitute a defense [of their respective parties' standpoints] only in combination with one another" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 121). However, this does not mean that the visual elements of each leaflet perform an identical rhetorical function. In the case of the BZÖ, the *linguistic* aspect of the argumentation is explicit in the way that it advances the party's standpoint and proposed action to implement the standpoint– that the BZÖ stands for law and order and hence voting for the BZÖ will establish 'clean streets' once more. The verb '*säubern*' is a material verb (in Halliday's classification). The history of the term *Säuberung*, and the Nazis specific use of it, remain implicit and function pragmatically as insinuation. The image therefore in general functions as an enactment, or demonstration (in the non-logical sense) of the proposed

policy. This takes the form of a statement (or slogan), visual specification (what is being cleansed), and finally, explicit metonymic visual enactment. We say metonymic in the sense that two brooms and the two party leaders stand for the whole party and many brooms cleansing the whole city.

The linguistic element of the BNP leaflet, on the other hand, is more equivocal in what exactly it is arguing for (and, conversely, the problem that it is arguing against). In the absence of explicit elaboration, the two images fill in the referential blanks created through the repeated use of the indexical but vague and ambiguous 'this'. Thus:

This [Image 1] is how London used to be.

This [Image 2] is what London has changed into

The BNP intends to make London more like *this* [Image 1]…

…by cleansing the city of *this* [Image 2]

In this way, the images perform a double function: they, first, convey in a vivid and evocative way a putative change in the 'face of London', and they do this without explicitly raising the issues of race or religious difference in the text; they actually rely mostly on the difference in clothing and their presupposed religious significance. In fact, their implicit indexing of religion removes the need for the linguistic element of the leaflet to use these terms, thereby fulfilling their second function: they inject a degree of deniability to the argumentation – that is, the BNP could, conceivably (though rather implausibly) claim 'they weren't being racist'. Indeed, the linguistic element of the BNP leaflet carefully avoids the kind of explicit referential and predicative strategies used by the BZÖ. The 'good people' – that is, the people who the BNP is willing to represent and to whom they are hoping to appeal – are described using a proximate spatialisation "local people". According to their self-description, the BNP are "the party that puts local people first" rather than the party that wishes to purge a city of asylum seekers (negative actional anthroponym) and *Ausländer* (negative de-spatialised anthroponym), and only the inferential content of the two images exposes the chauvinistic implications of this partiality.

National contexts

The equivocal and indirect nature of the standpoint advanced in the BNP leaflet is no doubt due, in no small part, to the restrictions laid out in race relations legislation to avoid inciting racial and religious hatred. The BNP

are, of course, aware of the precise nature of these restrictions having had first hand experience of defending themselves against criminal charges. In addition to being found guilty of race hatred offences in July 1998 (discussed above), in April 2005, Nick Griffin was charged with four offences of using words or behaviour intended or likely to stir up racial hatred. During their trial in February 2006 (and subsequent re-trial in November 2006), both Griffin and his co-accused, Mark Collett, were found not guilty of all charges, given that their hatred had been directed at Muslims and Islam – described by Griffin as a "wicked and vicious faith" – and not against persons on racial grounds. Since the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2007 came into force at the start of October 2007, this loophole, which essentially allowed incitement to hatred against Muslims so long as they were defined by reference to their religious belief, has been closed.

However, the restrictions on visual communications in this legislation are vague. For example, Section 29B(1) of the Act states that a person is guilty of an offence if s/he uses "threatening *words* or *behaviour*, or displays any written material which is threatening" (emphases added) in order to stir up religious hatred. Similarly Section 29C(1) refers only to publishing or distributing "*written* material", and the only references to visual images are made in relation to broadcast, time-based programming (cf. Sections 29E-G). Given this lack of attention to visual communication in the Act, it is interesting that the BNP relied so centrally on visual elements, that rely so much on decoding and interpretation, to support their standpoint.

The context dependency on Austrian texts is equally salient, corresponding to the de-tabooization of xenophobia since 1989 and more specifically 1993. The recontexualization of anti-Semitic slogans, and recycling them for xenophobic purposes, originates about this period. So, suddenly, from 1989, we have anti-Semitism and xenophobia enacted in parallel and also merged ways. Old images have since been used to vilify new out groups as well as for the old out-group. Moreover, due to the six years rightwing government of ÖVP and BZÖ (FPÖ) from 2000 – 2006, and the BZÖs role in the government, a kind of normalization and accommodation to discriminatory linguistic practices has taken place in the Austrian public sphere. Since then, even explicit xenophobic and anti-Semitic utterances rarely cause any scandals (Pollak and Wodak 2001). Sanctions usually only occur if the international media (interestingly metonymically labelled as *Das Ausland* and frequently insinuating a World Jewish Conspiracy of the US media; see Mitten 1992; Wodak 2003, 2007) start writing about such incidents. The

level of taboo has fallen significantly. One absolute taboo, however, still persists: Holocaust Denial, which is punishable with sentences up to 10 years. Otherwise, the so-called *Verbotsgesetz* (Prohibition Law) which punishes all Nazi activities (in whatever form) defines these as 'gross trivialization of Nazi ideology' ('*gröbliche Verharmlosung')* which frequently – due to the coded character of racist discourse in Postwar Austria – needs linguistic expertise to decode systematically (Pelinka and Wodak, 2002).

Final Remarks

In this article we have used the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) to Critical Discourse Analysis to analyse the implicit and explicit argumentative structures and manoeuvres used in two election campaign leaflets. DHA maintains that the analysis of complex rhetorical discourse requires precise examination of differing layers of text and context and the theoretical and methodological contributions of cognate disciplines. The BZÖ and BNP are both political parties with a long and well-established record of xenophobic, racist and anti-Semitic rhetoric. In keeping with this record, we showed that the campaigns of both parties were based on two organising prejudicial macro-*topoi* – the *topos* of disadvantage and the *topos* of threat. These *topoi*, in combination, support the rhetorical standpoints of the analysed leaflets: for the purification, racial and religious, of the national space.

However, given both legal constraints and salient social taboos against overtly stated racist argumentation in party politics, such arguments were not spelt out explicitly in the leaflets, but rather relied, in varying degrees, on their pictorial elements in advancing a coherent standpoint. We suggest that, given that the pictorial and linguistic elements only constitute a defence in combination with each other, the leaflets represent visual examples of coordinatively compound argumentation. It is only when a thorough examination of the linguistic content – including their insinuations, allusions and presupposition and their significance to specific national and historic contexts – is offered in concert with a close reading of the pictorial and visual content of the leaflets, that the chauvinistic, racist and anti-Semitic implications of the visual standpoints can be fully appreciated.

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