**Vulnerability: Environment Variables and Set-UID Program** 

Environment Variable and Set-UID Program Lab:

#### **Environment Variables**

Environment variables are dynamic values that affect the processes or programs running on a computer.

# **Set-UID Programs**

Set-UID (Set User ID upon execution) is a Unix/Linux feature that allows users to run an executable file with the file owner's permissions rather than the permissions of the user running the executable.

The purpose of this lab is to understand how environment variables affect programs and system behaviors. I will be explaining how the environment variables work, how they are propagated from parent process to child, and how they affect system/program behaviors. It also explains how environment variables affect the behavior of *Set-UID* programs.

# **Task 1: Manipulating Environment Variables**

In this task, I am using different commands to see, set and unset environment variables. So for this purpose, we can use *printenv* or *env* command which would list all the environment variables of our system. To see the value of some particular environment variable, we write that variable's name right after the printenv or env command. We use *export* command to set and *unset* command to unset any variable's value.

```
eduardo-arqueta@seed: ~
                                                                            File Edit View Search Terminal Help
eduardo-argueta@seed:/home$ printenv USER
eduardo-argueta
eduardo-argueta@seed:/home$ env | grep PWD
WD=/home
OLDPWD=/
eduardo-argueta@seed:/home$ export PWD=/home/eduardo-argueta
eduardo-argueta@seed:~$ printenv PWD
/home/eduardo-arqueta
eduardo-argueta@seed:~$ unset PWD
eduardo-argueta@seed:/home$ printenv PWD
eduardo-argueta@seed:/home$ export PWD=/home/eduardo-argueta
eduardo-argueta@seed:~$ printenv PWD
/home/eduardo-argueta
eduardo-argueta@seed:~$
```

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Observation: printenv command showed all the environment variables. As did the env command. The printenv PWD showed the value of a PWD, an environment variable. Then, env | grep PWD command will search PWD variable from the list of all the environment variables and then prints its value. Using export PWD=/home command, the value of PWD variable is being changed which can then be seen. It has also been observed that unset command basically removes that variable but one can again set its value. So unset PWD unsets the PWD. After unsetting, when its value is printed, it showed nothing exists.

#### Task 2: Passing Environment Variables from Parent Process to Child Process

In this task, we are going to analyze how a child process gets its environment variables from its parent. So, we would observe whether the parent's environment variables are inherited by the child process or not. This is done by the use of the fork() which is used to make a new process referred to as child process.

```
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ gcc task2.c

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ ./a.out > child

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ gcc task2.c

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ ./a.out > parent

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ diff parent child

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$

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```

**Observations:** First of all, all the environment variables were printed in the child process of **task2.c** file and stored in child file. Then, all the environment variables were printed in the parent process of **task2.c** file and stored in parent file. To observe, **diff** command is used to compare the environment variables in both the child and parent process. It was observed that there is no difference in the values of the environment variables of the child and process file. Both of them were exactly same.

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*Conclusion:* It concludes that both child and parent process share the same environment variables. Hence, changing the value of environment variable in one process would also change to the other as well.

#### Task 3: Environment Variables and *execve()*

In this task, we would see how environment variables are affected when a new program is executed via *execve()*. We would also observe whether the environment variables will automatically be inherited by the new program or we would have to pass them to the new program.

```
eduardo-arqueta@seed: ~/Desktop
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ gcc task3.c
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ ./a.out
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ gcc task3.c
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ ./a.out
CLUTTER_IM_MODULE=xim
LS COLORS=rs=0:di=01;34:ln=01;36:mh=00:pi=40;33:so=01;35:do=01;35:bd=40;33;01:cd
=40;33;01:or=40;31;01:mi=00:su=37;41:sg=30;43:ca=30;41:tw=30;42:ow=34;42:st=37;4
4:ex=01;32:*.tar=01;31:*.tgz=01;31:*.arc=01;31:*.arj=01;31:*.taz=01;31:*.lha=01;
31:*.lz4=01;31:*.lzh=01;31:*.lzma=01;31:*.tlz=01;31:*.txz=01;31:*.tzo=01;31:*.t7
z=01;31:*.zip=01;31:*.z=01;31:*.Z=01;31:*.dz=01;31:*.gz=01;31:*.lrz=01;31:*.lz=0
1;31:*.lzo=01;31:*.xz=01;31:*.zst=01;31:*.tzst=01;31:*.bz2=01;31:*.bz=01;31:*.tb
z=01;31:*.tbz2=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.deb=01;31:*.rpm=01;31:*.jar=01;31:*.war=01;31:
*.ear=01;31:*.sar=01;31:*.rar=01;31:*.alz=01;31:*.ace=01;31:*.zoo=01;31:*.cpio=0
1;31:*.7z=01;31:*.rz=01;31:*.cab=01;31:*.wim=01;31:*.swm=01;31:*.dwm=01;31:*.esd
=01;31:*.jpg=01;35:*.jpeg=01;35:*.mjpg=01;35:*.mjpeg=01;35:*.gif=01;35:*.bmp=01;
35:*.pbm=01;35:*.pgm=01;35:*.ppm=01;35:*.tga=01;35:*.xbm=01;35:*.xpm=01;35:*.tif
=01;35:*.tiff=01;35:*.png=01;35:*.svg=01;35:*.svgz=01;35:*.mng=01;35:*.pcx=01;35
:*.mov=01;35:*.mpg=01;35:*.mpeg=01;35:*.m2v=01;35:*.mkv=01;35:*.webm=01;35:*.ogm
=01;35:*.mp4=01;35:*.m4v=01;35:*.mp4v=01;35:*.vob=01;35:*.qt=01;35:*.nuv=01;35:*
.wmv=01;35:*.asf=01;35:*.rm=01;35:*.rmvb=01;35:*.flc=01;35:*.avi=01;35:*.fli=01;
35:*.flv=01;35:*.gl=01;35:*.dl=01;35:*.xcf=01;35:*.xwd=01;35:*.yuv=01;35:*.cgm=0
1;35:*.emf=01;35:*.ogv=01;35:*.ogx=01;35:*.aac=00;36:*.au=00;36:*.flac=00;36:*.m
4a=00;36:*.mid=00;36:*.midi=00;36:*.mka=00;36:*.mp3=00;36:*.mpc=00;36:*.ogg=00;3
6:*.ra=00;36:*.wav=00;36:*.oga=00;36:*.opus=00;36:*.spx=00;36:*.xspf=00;36:
```


*Observations:* At first, the *execve()* is used but the environment or environment variables were not passed. It was supposed to print out all the environment variables but it didn't. Then, the *execve()* is used, now this time, it was passed with environment variables. When it's executed, it does print out all the environment variables.

*Conclusion:* It concludes that the new program doesn't automatically inherit the environment variables. We have to pass the environment variables if we are going to execute the new program through *execve()*.

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### Task 4: Environment Variables and system()

In this task, we would see how environment variables are affected when a new program is executed via the *system()* function. This function doesn't directly execute the command, instead, the command is further executed exec\* family functions which pass the environment variables when they execute *execve()*. So, we don't have to pass the environment variables. To verify:



*Verification:* It has been verified when we execute the new program using *system()* function, we wouldn't have had to pass the environment variables. It still prints out all the environment variables.

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# Task 5: Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs

In this task, we'll explore *Set-UID* programs. *Set-UID* is an important security mechanism in Unix operating systems. When these programs run, they assume the owner's privileges. We will see how users affect these programs via environment variables. First of all we would make our program to *Set-UID* program.

```
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop

File Edit View Search Terminal Help
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ gcc task5.c
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ sudo chown root a.out
[sudo] password for eduardo-argueta:
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ sudo chmod 4755 a.out
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$

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```

Now, we have made our executable file (prints all the environment variables) as *Set-UID* program. Then just open as a normal user (not *root*) and change the environment variables.

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```
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ export PATH=/home/eduardo-argueta/Desktop
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ export LD LIBRARY PATH=/home
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ export foo=eduardo
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ ./a.out
CLUTTER IM MODULE=xim
LS COLORS=rs=0:di=01;34:ln=01;36:mh=00:pi=40;33:so=01;35:do=01;35:bd=40;33;01:cd
=40;33;01:or=40;31;01:mi=00:su=37;41:sq=30;43:ca=30;41:tw=30;42:ow=34;42:st=37;4
4:ex=01;32:*.tar=01;31:*.tgz=01;31:*.arc=01;31:*.arj=01;31:*.taz=01;31:*.lha=01;
31:*.lz4=01;31:*.lzh=01;31:*.lzma=01;31:*.tlz=01;31:*.txz=01;31:*.tzo=01;31:*.t7
z=01;31:*.zip=01;31:*.z=01;31:*.Z=01;31:*.dz=01;31:*.gz=01;31:*.lrz=01;31:*.lz=0
1;31:*.lzo=01;31:*.xz=01;31:*.zst=01;31:*.tzst=01;31:*.bz2=01;31:*.bz=01;31:*.tb
z=01;31:*.tbz2=01;31:*.tz=01;31:*.deb=01;31:*.rpm=01;31:*.jar=01;31:*.war=01;31:
*.ear=01;31:*.sar=01;31:*.rar=01;31:*.alz=01;31:*.ace=01;31:*.zoo=01;31:*.cpio=0
1;31:*.7z=01;31:*.rz=01;31:*.cab=01;31:*.wim=01;31:*.swm=01;31:*.dwm=01;31:*.esd
=01;31:*.jpg=01;35:*.jpeg=01;35:*.mjpg=01;35:*.mjpeg=01;35:*.gif=01;35:*.bmp=01;
35:*.pbm=01;35:*.pgm=01;35:*.ppm=01;35:*.tga=01;35:*.xbm=01;35:*.xpm=01;35:*.tif
=01;35:*.tiff=01;35:*.png=01;35:*.svg=01;35:*.svgz=01;35:*.mng=01;35:*.pcx=01;35
:*.mov=01;35:*.mpq=01;35:*.mpeq=01;35:*.m2v=01;35:*.mkv=01;35:*.webm=01;35:*.oqm
=01;35:*.mp4=01;35:*.m4v=01;35:*.mp4v=01;35:*.vob=01;35:*.qt=01;35:*.nuv=01;35:*
.wmv=01;35:*.asf=01;35:*.rm=01;35:*.rmvb=01;35:*.flc=01;35:*.avi=01;35:*.fli=01;
35:*.flv=01;35:*.gl=01;35:*.dl=01;35:*.xcf=01;35:*.xwd=01;35:*.yuv=01;35:*.cgm=0
1;35:*.emf=01;35:*.ogv=01;35:*.ogx=01;35:*.aac=00;36:*.au=00;36:*.flac=00;36:*.m
4a=00;36:*.mid=00;36:*.midi=00;36:*.mka=00;36:*.mp3=00;36:*.mpc=00;36:*.ogg=00;3
6:*.ra=00;36:*.wav=00;36:*.oga=00;36:*.opus=00;36:*.spx=00;36:*.xspf=00;36:
```

Here, we have changed the *PATH*, *LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH* and *foo* environment variable. And then executed that *Set-UID* program.

*Observation:* It has been observed that all the environment variables we set in the shell process (parent) does get into the *Set-UID* child process. It was surprising that even though we have changed the value of *PATH* and *LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH*, still the *Set-UID* program executes (It must not as we changed the path).

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### Task 6: The PATH Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs

In this task, we would see how the use of *System()* in a *Set-UID* program can be dangerous due to the fact that *Set-UID* programs are affected by environment variables and *System()* executes a command via shell.

```
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop
                                                                           File Edit View Search Terminal Help
eduardo-arqueta@seed:~/Desktop$ gcc task6.c
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ sudo chown root a.out
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ sudo chmod 4755 a.out
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ ./a.out
a.out libmylib.so.1.0.1 mylib.o
                                                       task9.c
                                              task4.c
                                     parent
b.out ls.sh
                          myprog.c
                                     task2.c
                                              task5.c
child mylib.c
                          newprog.c task3.c
                                              task6.c
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ cat > ls
#!/bin/bash
echo Here I Am Manipulating
^C
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ chmod +x ls
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ printenv PATH
/home/eduardo-argueta/Desktop:/home/eduardo-argueta/Desktop:/usr/local/sbin:/usr
/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/usr/local/games
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ ./a.out
Here I Am Manipulating
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$
```

Observations: Yes, we can let this Set-UID program to run our code instead of /bin/ls (it is supposed to run this). We would simple make a bash file and change the PATH environment variable and we know that it does affect the Set-UID programs which would let our program to run instead of /bin/ls. We will keep the script (our code that we want to execute instead of /bin/ls) named "ls" in a current directory and then append at the start our current directory. It means that it would start looking for ls firstly in our current directory and because it's a script, it would execute it. So, this is how we can manipulate the Set-UID programs by varying the PATH environment variable knowing that it would affect our Set-UID program using our own script.

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# Task 7: The LD\_PRELOAD Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs

In this task, we would analyze how *Set-UID* programs deal with several environment variables like *LD\_PRELOAD*, *LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH* and say *LD\_\**. We would also analyze that how they influence the behavior of dynamic loader/linker. We are considering only *LD\_PRELOAD* for this task.

```
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop

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eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ gcc -fPIC -g -c myllb.c

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ gcc -shared -o libmylib.so.1.0.1 mylib.o -lc

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ gcc myprog.c

myprog.c: In function 'main':
myprog.c:4:1: warning: implicit declaration of function 'sleep' [-Wimplicit-func

tion-declaration]

sleep(1);

^~~~~

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ ./a.out

I am not sleeping!

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ sudo chown root a.out

[sudo] password for eduardo-argueta:
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$ sudo chmod 4755 a.out

eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop$

■
```

**Observations:** I observed that **LD\_PRELOAD**, **LD\_LIBRARY\_PATH** or other shared library variables do not apply to **Set-UID** programs/executables. When we made a regular **myprog.c** program and executes it, it runs fine and it does override the sleep function and print accordingly. But when we made it a **Set-UID** program, it never executes accordingly. The reason behind it might be that child process of a **Set-UID** program doesn't inherit **LD\_\*** environment variables. That's why these environment variables doesn't apply on **Set-UID** programs.

**Experiment:** I did an experiment to see whether **LD**\_\* environment variables are being inherited by child process or not. The hypothesis was true that **LD**\_\* are not being inherited by the child process of **Set-UID** program.

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# Task 8: Invoking External Programs Using System() versus execve()

In this task, we will be analyzing the difference between **System()** and **execve()**. We have seen that **System()** is quite dangerous as it executes the command through shell whereas on the other hand, in execve(), we must pass the program that must be a binary executable or a script.

```
eduardo-argueta@seed: ~/Desktop
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ gcc newprog.c
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ sudo chown root a.out
[sudo] password for eduardo-argueta:
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ sudo chmod 4755 a.out
eduardo-argueta@seed:~/Desktop$ ./a.out task2.c
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
extern char **environ;
void printenv()
        int i = 0;
        while (environ[i] != NULL) {
                printf("%s\n", environ[i]);
void main()
        pid t childPid:
        switch(childPid = fork()) {
        case 0: /* child process */
```

Observations: If I have used System(), then as a Bob, I can remove the file that is not writable to me. I can do manipulation by adding a script in which I can easily remove that file or manipulate it because *System()* invokes through shell. Hence, I can attack if System() is being used. On Contrary, my attacks won't work if execve() is being used because we must pass a program which is a binary executable or a script. Therefore, execve() must be used to fully protect the integrity of the system.