

Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution for  
Higher Education National Research University  
Higher School of Economics  
Tikhonov Moscow Institute of Electronics and Mathematics  
BSc Information Security

**BACHELOR'S THESIS**  
**Research project**  
**Security Hardening of Containerized Applications**

Submitted by Shadrinov Aleksei  
student of group BIB201, 4th year of study

Approved by Supervisor  
Assistant Professor, V. V. Bashun

Moscow 2024

# Contents

<b>Annotation</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2 Theoretical background</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1 Isolation features . . . . .	6
2.1.1 Chroot . . . . .	6
2.1.2 Cgroups . . . . .	6
2.1.3 Namespaces . . . . .	7
2.1.4 Capabilities . . . . .	8
2.2 Runtimes . . . . .	9
2.2.1 OCI specification . . . . .	9
2.2.2 Traditional runtimes . . . . .	11
2.2.3 Alternative runtimes . . . . .	18
2.3 Vulnerabilities and attack surface . . . . .	20
2.3.1 Insecure configurations . . . . .	20
2.3.2 Kernel vulnerabilities . . . . .	22
2.3.3 Runtime vulnerabilities . . . . .	23
2.3.4 Application-level vulnerabilities . . . . .	24
2.4 Container escape . . . . .	25
2.5 Security hardening . . . . .	26
2.5.1 Kernel security mechanisms . . . . .	26
2.5.2 Security features of non-traditional runtimes . . . . .	30
2.5.3 Scanning tools . . . . .	30
<b>3 Security analysis of hardening techniques</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>4 Vulnerability detection</b>	<b>34</b>
4.1 Previous studies . . . . .	34
4.2 Static analysis . . . . .	36
4.3 Existing tools . . . . .	38
4.3.1 Clair . . . . .	38
4.3.2 Trivy . . . . .	40

4.3.3	Docker Scout . . . . .	40
4.3.4	Anchore Grype . . . . .	41
4.3.5	Snyk . . . . .	43
4.3.6	Google Artifact Registry . . . . .	44
4.4	Methodology . . . . .	47
4.4.1	Images selection . . . . .	47
4.4.2	Tags selection . . . . .	47
4.4.3	Scan images . . . . .	48
4.4.4	Analysis of obtained scan reports . . . . .	48
4.5	Findings . . . . .	52
<b>5</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>55</b>
	<b>References</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>Clair docker-compose.yaml</b>	<b>68</b>

## Annotation

Container virtualization plays a significant role in modern software development practices. The combination of reduced overhead and faster startup time makes this technology advantageous for the industry. However, the growing adoption of containers raises concerns regarding the security of container solutions.

This study examines the issues of security hardening of containerized applications including an analysis of recent container architectures and their security aspects. Actual vulnerabilities and attacks such as container escapes will be discussed. Special attention will also be paid to hardening techniques that provide additional security as well as tools for automated detection and prevention of vulnerabilities.

## Аннотация

Технология контейнерной виртуализации прочно заняла лидирующее место в современных практиках разработки и эксплуатации приложений. Сочетание экономии ресурсов и скорости работы делают эту технологию привлекательной для программной индустрии. Однако с распространением контейнеризации вопросы безопасности встают всё более остро.

В данной работе будут рассмотрены вопросы усиления безопасности контейнеризованных приложений. В частности, будет рассмотрена архитектура современных решений в области контейнерной виртуализации и их безопасность. Будут проанализированы актуальные уязвимости и атаки (такие как побег из контейнера) и причины появления данных уязвимостей. Особое внимание будет уделено исследованию механизмов защиты, которые позволяют усилить безопасность контейнеризованных приложений, а также способам автоматизированного обнаружения и предотвращения данных уязвимостей.

## Keywords

Docker, Clair, Docker Vulnerability Scanner, Trivy, Container Escape, Container Security.

# 1 Introduction

The concept of containerization traces its origins back to 1979, when the `chroot` syscall was initially added to Version 7 Unix [1]. Containerization significantly increased in popularity since 2013, when Docker began to dominate the market, and now containers play an essential role in modern software development and distribution practices. Since the technology has become widespread, the security concerns became more evident. As a result, numerous vulnerabilities particularly related to containerized applications were discovered within the popular platforms, and various defensive mechanisms were proposed to address them.

The objective of this paper is to ....

The rest of the work is organised in the following way.

## 2 Theoretical background

A container is an isolated process that uses a shared kernel [1]. From the user's point of view, a container may appear similarly to a virtual machine, especially when the process inside the container is a shell. However, containers and virtual machines represent the opposite approaches to virtualization. While a virtual machine typically runs a guest kernel that is separate from the host kernel and resides on top of it, containerized applications usually share the host kernel with the host operating system, host processes and other containers. Nevertheless, containerized applications provide a several layers of isolation, including their own network stack, separate root directory and limited access to host resources. This isolation relies on several Linux kernel features including Linux namespaces, **chroot**, cgroups and capabilities [2].

### 2.1 Isolation features

#### 2.1.1 Chroot

The first attempts to create an environment similar to modern containers occurred when **chroot** system call was invented. This technology provides root directory isolation, as the process is unable to see or access files outside of the assigned part of file system.

More secure version of the same idea was implemented as **pivot\_root** system call and it is primarily used by container runtimes instead of **chroot** [2].

#### 2.1.2 Cgroups

Cgroups was the next feature added to the Linux kernel to achieve container isolation. Designed by Google in 2006, cgroups provide the segregation of computing resources. By assigning a control group to the process developers may limit available memory, CPU, disk and network bandwidth. Essentially, restricting a process inside certain limits prevents it from exhausting all available resources, which may lead to the denial of service attack.

Cgroups are organised in a hierarchy of controllers and could be interacted with by pseudo file system usually present at `/sys/fs/cgroup`. Files and subdirectories inside could be used to adjust limits, and writing process ID to `cgroup.procs` assigns the process to the group [2].

In 2006, version 2 of cgroups was merged to the kernel to address the inconsistency between various controllers. In version 2, process may no longer be assigned different cgroups for different types of resources (controllers), and all threads are grouped together [3].

### 2.1.3 Namespaces

Linux namespaces were added to the Linux kernel in 2002 in order to virtualize parts of the system as they appear to the groups of processes [4]. Parts of kernel resources can be abstracted by the namespace, and the processes within the namespace interact with their own isolated copy of the global resource. Current versions of the Linux kernel provide namespace isolation for eight types of resources, as described in Table 1 [5].

Table 1 – Linux namespaces

Namespace	Purpose	Version
Mount	Isolates filesystem mount points	2.4.19 (2002)
UTS (Unix Time-sharing System)	Isolates hostname and domain names independently of the hostname of the machine	2.6.19 (2006)
IPC (Inter-process Communication)	Isolate shared memory regions, message queues visible to processes	2.6.19 (2006)
PID (Process ID)	Isolate visible processes, allows PIDs duplication in separate namespaces (including PID 1)	2.6.24 (2008)
Network	Isolate network devices, addresses and routing tables	2.6.29 (2009)
User	Isolate User and Group IDs so that ID presented to process can be mapped to different ID on the host	3.8 (2013)
Cgroup	Isolate the subtree of cgroup hierarchy visible to the process	4.6 (2016)
Time	Isolate system time	5.6 (2020)

Each kind of namespaces may be used separately or in combination with others to provide necessary degree of isolation.

By using namespaces, developers can create environments that are isolated from the host and other processes, as the process cannot modify kernel resources and affect the processes outside the assigned namespace [6]. Furthermore, namespaces add very little overhead and use system resources more efficiently compared to virtual machines. For that reason namespaces are particularly useful for containerization [7].

#### 2.1.4 Capabilities

Finally, capabilities have brought a fine-grained division of privileges than in traditional dichotomy of privileged (User ID 0) and unprivileged processes. Since they were introduced in kernel 2.2, it is possible to assign a thread with required groups of privileges so that it may perform certain sensitive actions in necessary parts of the system [8]. Modern kernel versions provide about 40 capabilities, including possibility to control system time, interact with kernel audit system, manipulate other processes and file permissions or bind to ports with numbers less than 1024.

Containers as well as regular processes can be assigned with various capabilities. Typically, the set of required capabilities for container to successfully run could be significantly reduced, as containers do not need to run administrative tasks. Docker daemon spawns containers with limited privileges, and necessary ones could be added by developers [6]. In addition, Docker provides the `--privileged` flag which grants access to an extended range of privileged activities [9]. It was developed to support Docker-in-Docker scenarios, however, it imposes additional security risks.



## 2.2 Runtimes

As was shown before, containers are processes with added isolation features. Naturally, it is possible to create an isolated process manually, using `chroot` to isolate root directory and `unshare` to isolate assign new namespaces, as demonstrated in Listing 1 [2]:

```
mkdir alpine
cd alpine
curl -o alpine.tar.gz
      http://dl-cdn.alpinelinux.org/
      alpine/v3.10/releases/x86_64/alpine-minrootfs-3.10.0-x86_64.tar.gz
tar xvf alpine.tar.gz
cd ..
sudo unshare --user --map-user=0 --uts --mount \
      --net --ipc --pid --fork chroot alpine /bin/sh
/ # /bin/mount -t proc /proc /proc
/ # /bin/ps
PID USER  TIME COMMAND
1 root   0:00 /bin/sh
3 root   0:00 /bin/ps
/ #
```

Listing 1 – Isolated `/bin/sh` process

However, this approach is inconvenient for daily usage. Instead, containers are typically handled via container runtimes. As defined in [10], a container runtime is a software that runs the containers and manages container images on a deployment node. While this definition is generally true for popular utilities like `dockerd`, Open Container Initiative (OCI) Runtime specification regulates only the lifecycle of a container [11].

### 2.2.1 OCI specification

The OCI runtime specification was established in 2015 by Docker, CoreOS and other leaders in the container industry, and it currently includes image, distribution and runtime specifications [12].

According to OCI runtime specification, the user of a compliant runtime must be able to use standard operations, including querying the container state, creating a container from a special set of files (OCI bundle), starting, killing or deleting container [13]. Both compliant and non-compliant implementations exist in the wild, and `runc` is the reference implementation of the OCI runtime specification [10].

In his blog post, Ian Lewis suggests to differentiate runtimes on a spectrum from low-level to high-level according to additional functionality they are packed with [11]. Indeed, while some of them (`runc`) have only essential methods to manipulate containers, other

runtimes provide API, image management, and may, in fact, rely on runc internally. On this spectrum, we may explore such runtimes as runc, crun, youki, lxc, lmctfy, containerd, docker, podman, rkt and cri-o.

In addition to traditional containerization (isolation of a process using the kernel mechanisms), researchers distinguish several technologies that bring the strength of virtual machine isolation to process isolation. X. Wang et al. proposed at their study to divide such related technologies into the Unikernel-like and MicroVM-based sandbox container technologies, namely gVisor, Kata containers, Firecracker and Unikernels (Nabla) [14].

### 2.2.2 Traditional runtimes

#### **runc**

runc was initially introduced in 2015 as a separated part of Docker and was presented as “just the container runtime and nothing else” [15]. In fact, runc is a low-level container executor with a very limited set of available features, as runc controls only container lifecycle management. runc is a reference implementation of OCI runtime specification which makes it default choice for many high-level runtime engines.

To run a container with runc, a container bundle must be prepared. Container bundle is a directory which includes config.json file with specification and container root filesystem [16]. The specification file allows users to customize the process environment adjusting the command and arguments, user and group IDs, environment variables, Linux capabilities, mount points, namespaces and devices. runc has a **spec** command for generating this file. It is also possible to generate specifications for rootless containers, which creates a mapping between host and container User IDs [17].

The full list of commands supported by runc CLI tool is given below:

- **checkpoint** — checkpoint a running container;
- **create** — create a container;
- **delete** — delete any resources held by the container (often used with detached containers);
- **events** — display container events, such as OOM notifications, CPU, memory, I/O and network statistics;
- **exec** — execute a new process inside the container;
- **kill** — send a specified signal to the container’s init process;
- **list** — list containers started by runc with the given `-root`;
- **pause** — suspend all processes inside the container;
- **ps** — show processes running inside the container;
- **restore** — restore a container from a previous checkpoint;
- **resume** — resume all processes that have been previously paused;
- **run** — create and start a container;
- **spec** — create a new specification file (config.json);
- **start** — start a container previously created by runc create;
- **state** — show the container state;
- **update** — update container resource constraints.

Although `runc` has more commands implemented than it is defined in the OCI runtime specification, the implementations of state query, create, start, kill and delete commands are OCI compliant. To deepen the understanding of how runtime works, let us unpack the internals of `runc create` command.

### **runc create**

`runc create` command spawns a container instance from a OCI bundle. The bundle is a directory containing a specification file `config.json` and container root filesystem [18]. Next, we should break down the process of container creation, as implemented by `runc`. The source code of `runc` could be found in <https://github.com/opencontainers/runc>.

**Prepare container object** The code for the first step is mainly located in `runc/utils_linux.go`. Firstly, `runc` prepares the environment for fresh instance parsing container specification from `config.json` file in the bundle (`spec, err := setupSpec(context)`). Then, container object is instantiated with `libcontainer` config and `libcontainer.Create` method. This method places the container root filesystem in a new directory with `0o711` permissions, applies cgroup manager (v1 or v2) and returns `Container` object in stopped state.

Next, `startContainer` function starts the runner (`r.run`) with the process arguments defined in `config.json`. The runner is a struct which handles container object and other parameters like `detach` (true or false), `action` (`CT_ACT_CREATE` — create, `CT_ACT_RUN` — create and run) and `init` (false if process must be executed in the existing container).

`r.run` method creates a new `libcontainer.Process` object and initializes IO such as TTY (stdin, stdout, stderr). Finally, depending on the action parameter, the corresponding container method is called (Start, Restore or Run). `run create` calls the first of these methods.

**Prepare binary and the parent process** Code for the next step is located in the `runc/libcontainer/container_linux.go` file. `Start` function triggers process execution inside the container. Firstly, `c.createExecFifo` creates a FIFO in the root directory, the default path is `/run/runc/<container id>/exec.fifo` with `622` permissions. FIFO is a unidirectional interprocess communication channel that can be accessed as part of the filesystem [19]. Afterwards, the `process` object is passed to the internal container function `start`. This function basically creates a new parent process which helps to spawn a target child process defined in `config.json`. `newParentProcess` clones `/proc/self/exe` (`runc` binary) in order to protect the original binary from being overwritten. Then the path to `runc` binary and the first argument (`init`) are concatenated, so that the constructed command is

`runc init`. After that, `newParentProcess` calls `newInitProcess` to create an `initProcess` object and pass the namespaces further from `config.json`.

After `newParentProcess` returns the parent process object, `parent.start()` method is called to trigger the parent execution (`p.cmd.Start()`).

**Start parent and child processes** `p.cmd.Start()` executes a new process (`runc init`). This command argument is handled in the `runc/init.go` file. Firstly, `runc/libcontainer/nsenter` package is imported to handle low-level namespace operations [20]. This import implicitly calls `nsexec()`. This lengthy C function initially accesses the `init` pipe to read bootstrap data (namespace paths, clone flags, uid and gid mappings, and the console path) from the parent process. Then it creates a child process **stage 1: STAGE\_CHILD**. This first child process has to unshare all of the requested namespaces, possibly request parent for user mapping and finally spawn another child process **stage 2: STAGE\_INIT** (as mentioned above, pid namespace of calling process must not be changed, so new process is forked to actually enter the new PID namespace) [21]. Latter child process is actually assigned all the required namespaces and it is the only process to return to the Go runtime after final cleanup steps [22].

After stage 2: **STAGE\_INIT** child process is ready, `init.go` calls `libcontainer.Init()`, which consequently triggers `startInitialization()`. This function acquires `init` and `log` pipes and determines whether `runc exec (linuxSetnsInit)` or `runc create/run (linuxStandardInit)` was issued.

Next, `containerInit` and `linuxStandardInit.Init()` methods are executed. The last function actually does the initialization work such as networking and routing setup, SELinux labeling, console, hostname, AppArmor, `sysctl` properties, `Seccomp`. After that, `system.Exec` replaces the running binary image with the one from `config.json`.

Overall, `runc` is a lightweight, OCI compliant, high performance, and low-level container runtime which supports various security features including `seccomp`, `SELinux` and `AppArmor` [23]. `runc` relies on the Linux kernel features such as `cgroups` and `namespaces` to provide necessary degree of isolation. Although battle-tested, `runc` was discovered to be prone to vulnerabilities multiple times throughout its existence, for example, CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2016-9962 [24] [25].

## **crun**

`crun` is another low-level container runtime that fully implements the OCI runtime specification. Unlike `runc`, `crun` was written in C [26]. According to developers, C suits

better for lower level tools like container runtimes [27]. Although runc was written in Go, internally it still depends on a special C library, as was discussed previously, to perform low-level manipulations with system objects. On the contrary, JSON processing in crun is less elegant compared to the Go realisation.

crun is praised to be faster than other runtimes by the developers and researchers, namely Velp et al. [28]. It was demonstrated that crun is about 2 times faster than runc according to the performance test. crun is currently used as the default runtime in Fedora, because crun provides full support of cgroups v2, default version in Fedora distribution [29].

crun command supports the following arguments [30]:

- **checkpoint** — checkpoint a running container;
- **create** — create a container;
- **delete** — delete container definition;
- **exec** — execute a command inside the running container;
- **kill** — send signal to the container init process, **SIGTERM** by default;
- **list** — list containers known to crun;
- **pause** — pause all the container processes;
- **ps** — show the processes running in a container;
- **restore** — restore a container from a checkpoint;
- **resume** — resume the processes in the container;
- **run** — create and immediately start a container;
- **spec** — generate a configuration file;
- **start** — start a container that was previously created;
- **state** — output the state of a container;
- **update** — update container resource constraints.

It can be noted that the list of offered commands is equivalent to the one of runc, but crun omits **events** command, which can provide runtime information about container.

Overall, crun runtime provides the same functionality as runc. One of advantages of crun is its improved performance thanks to the choice of the programming language. Some vulnerabilities were discovered in crun, for example CVE-2021-30465 [31].

## LXC

Linux Containers (LXC) is another virtualization technology for running multiple isolated Linux containers sharing a single Linux kernel. It was introduced in 2008 after the appearance of isolation features in the Linux kernel. LXC precedes Docker, which also relies on the same kernel features and was initially built on top of LXC [32].

Unlike OCI-compliant container runtimes, LXC is suitable for running fully packed yet isolated Linux systems [33]. Although all of the LXC tenants share the same kernel and are only isolated by kernel features (cgroups, namespaces, root filesystem isolation, AppArmor and Seccomp), LXC containers resemble a traditional virtual machine. This advantage is beneficial in specific cases, for instance, running an Android emulator inside a container [34].

To spawn LXC containers, it is possible to use `lxc-create` command with the name of the selected Linux template. Other LXC utilities include `lxc-start` which executes the init process in the container and `lxc-attach` which provides a container shell [35].

As illustrated by Flauzac et al., there are a few differences between LXC and other runtimes [36]. LXC leverages User namespace by default to create unprivileged containers. Linux Containers also offer a broader selection of networking approaches, including allocation of physical interface to the container. However, it supports the same security features as runc, including Capabilities limitation, AppArmor and Seccomp filter.

### **containerd**

containerd is a high-level container runtime which manages both image and container lifecycle [37]. containerd became a separate runtime and replaced Docker Engine's built-in container execution module in Docker 1.11. Since then, containerd remains the default high-level runtime in Docker stack and it is also one of standard runtimes for Kubernetes [38].

containerd interacts with other software including Docker or with users via gRPC API and several command line tools such as `ctr`, `nerdctl` and `crictl` [39]. These tools support traditional operations like pulling or searching images, creating or deleting containers. However, the feature to build container is not included in containerd. To manipulate the containers, containerd relies on runc or other compatible low-level runtimes. For example, to run a container, containerd converts the image to OCI bundle and executes runc binary with necessary parameters [10].

### **Docker**

Docker is one of the most popular and widely used container runtimes. In fact, Docker provides a convenient platform for building, shipping, and running applications in containers. It was developed in 2013 as a container managing platform with LXC as its backend, which was replaced with `libcontainer` in 2014. In 2015, starting with Docker 1.11, Docker Engine was split into several parts:

- `dockerd` — the daemon handling REST API, auth, networking and storage;
- `containerd` — high-level runtime component managing container and image lifecycle;
- `containerd-shim` — a helper per-container component for handling the container pro-

cess decoupled from the containerd;

- runc — low-level runtime that manages OCI containers [32].

This division was performed in order to reduce the amount of platform-dependent code in Docker.

Alongside with the daemon, Docker usually ships with a docker client application that communicates with the daemon, typically through the socket `/var/run/docker.sock` [40]. Therefore, the ability to write to the socket is equivalent to having a full control over Docker daemon, which is a shortcut to attack at the host. For this reason, the access to the socket must be restricted.

As a high-level platform, docker is compatible with various high-level runtimes that act on the containerd-shim level (such as Wasmtime, gVisor and Kata Containers) and low-level runtimes that are runc replacements (crun, youki) [41].

## **Podman**

Podman is a daemonless container engine for developing, managing, and running OCI Containers on Linux. Podman avoids the client-server architecture implemented by Docker and relies on the classic fork-exec model. The absence of root daemon means that Podman has better support for rootless containers, which allows the execution of containers with user namespace functionality [42]. As a high-level runtime, Podman delegates container execution to runc or other OCI-compatible runtimes. For image building, Podman stack includes a separate tool called Buildah. This tool has ability to create OCI-compatible images defined by Dockerfile without root privileges or daemon [43].

## **CRI-O**

CRI-O is a Go implementation of the Kubernetes CRI (Container Runtime Interface) specification. It is a middle-level runtime similar to containerd and it acts as a middleware between Kubernetes and other OCI-compliant low-level runtimes that directly execute pod containers [10]. CRI-O fully supports runc and Kata Containers and potentially any other OCI runtime.

## **rkt**

rkt (Rocket) is a single-binary Docker alternative, initially released in December 2014 by CoreOS [44]. Designed with security in mind, rkt has several strong features available such as pulling images as a non-root user and image signature verification [45]. In addition, rkt can provision a special lightweight virtual machine for each pod and place the container inside. This approach provides stronger isolation than traditional kernel virtualisation used by other runtimes.



While rkt has several advantages compared to other runtimes, it has been discontinued since 2020 and receives no more development or maintenance [46].

### 2.2.3 Alternative runtimes

We have already observed various runtimes that provide containerization based on kernel security and isolation features such as cgroups, namespaces and root filesystem isolation. The common flaw of these runtimes is the shared kernel, which poses additional security risks. The following runtimes overcome this disadvantage by moving from host kernel to guest kernel in one way or another.

#### **gVisor**

gVisor is an open-source container runtime designed to add an extra layer of isolation between containerized process and the host system. gVisor consists of several components. One of them, Sentry, is the user space kernel. Sentry listens for incoming system calls from the application, intercepts and implements them by itself, relying on just a limited subset of system calls. Those calls are actually passed to the host. This way, the user application does not interact with the host directly [47].

The other components of gVisor are Gofer, which allows Sentry to access the file system resources, and Netstack, which handles the networking. Additionally, gVisor includes an OCI-compatible runtime called runsc. This runtime can be used by Docker and Kubernetes, making it simple to embed sandboxed gVisor containers into existing flows [48].

Although gVisor does not virtualize system hardware, it still creates an additional layer of protection. However, this approach decreases the performance of applications that frequently issue system calls. Another limitation is that applications which require any system calls not supported by Sentry cannot be ported to gVisor [10].

#### **Kata Containers**

Kata Containers is an open source project focused on lightweight virtual machines. Kata Containers feel and perform like containers, but provide the workload isolation and security advantages of VMs. They are designed to be compatible with the OCI specifications and are fully compatible with Docker [49].

Kata Containers run each application within its own lightweight, isolated virtual machine. Kata Containers are compatible with various hypervisors as backends for VMs and rely on several technologies to improve boot time and reduce memory footprint, such as a minimal set of supported devices and pool of pre-configured VMs.

#### **Firecracker**

Amazon Firecracker is an extremely lightweight hypervisor for sandboxed applications [50]. On top of this technology cloud services such as AWS Lambda and AWS Fargate were

developed. Firecracker uses KVM hypervisor to launch microVMs instances on a Linux host. These microVMs run a special Linux guest operating system with lightweight input/output services and a minimalistic set of software which results in the reduced overhead [47].

## **Nabla**

The Nabla container, developed by IBM, leverages Unikernel technology to minimize the number of system calls accessible. Unikernels are specifically compiled images that combine an application with only the necessary components of an operating system library. This enables the application to run directly on virtual hardware. Currently, Unikernels support a range of programming languages and are compatible with multiple common platforms [51].

To manipulate Nabla containers, a special OCI-compliant command line tool known as **runnc** could be used [52].

While Unikernels approach provides the desirable degree of isolation comparable to virtual machines, some researchers highlight several issues, such as incompatibility with current VM managing tools, difficulty to debug applications and excessive overhead of nested virtualization when running Nabla containers with hypervisors. A possible mitigation of these challenges was proposed by Williams et al [51]. They suggest a way of running unikernels as processes by leveraging existing kernel system call whitelisting mechanisms (seccomp).

## 2.3 Vulnerabilities and attack surface

As discussed previously, container virtualization is not a recently developed technology. The origins of containerization could be traced back to the previous century. Despite being battle-tested, containers are often targeted by various cyber attacks, as shown by several studies. Jian and Chen describe two possible attacks that exploit Linux namespace vulnerabilities and memory handling to perform what is known as container escape attack [53]. Another vulnerability mentioned by Bélair et al. allows privilege escalation to the host after rewriting runc binary from a maliciously crafted container [54].

In the context of container virtualization, possible attack vectors might be classified into different categories depending on the targeted components. Liz Rice classifies attack vectors based on the life cycle of containers [2]. Through this lens, the attack surface includes vulnerabilities in the application code, insecure configurations during the build and run stages, the security of the hosts where the build and execution stages take place, supply chain integrity, secret handling, container networking, and runtime escaping from their boundaries. Sultan et al. establish a threat model focused on host and container levels of the container life cycle [55]. This taxonomy is based on four directions: protecting container from malicious applications, container from other malicious containers, host and its software from compromised containers and, finally, containers from the host.

As researchers propose multiple taxonomies to understand the security landscape in the context of container virtualization, we will later consider the main sources of threats in more detail.

### 2.3.1 Insecure configurations

Even though it may seem counterintuitive, security misconfigurations are a major cause of system compromise. According to OWASP, security misconfiguration is among the top 10 security risks for web application [56]. The same conclusion applies to containers.

#### Root and privileged containers

The majority of container runtimes require root privileges to manipulate containers. Moreover, they instantiate containers with root user inside. For instance, runc and Docker are usually executed with elevated privileges either directly or via Docker daemon, because creating new namespaces in Linux requires the `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` capability [4]. This remains true for the regular configuration of LXC containers [57].

The primary security concern of this approach is that the root user inside the container is the same root user on the host. Because of that, an intruder who manages to move

beyond the container isolation will be instantly granted elevated privileges on the host. Another point to consider, in shared environments such as computing clusters in universities regular users should be deprived of elevated privileges and still be able to manage their containers [58].

To mitigate the risk of privilege escalation and establish an additional layer of protection in case of container escape, several approaches are possible.

### **Set User ID**

Firstly, it is possible to set a specific user inside the container with `process.user.uid` parameter (runc; other runtimes have similar options). This way, the containerized process is executed under the specified user and therefore has limited permissions.

### **Rootless containers**

However, in some cases, it is not possible to use a user other than the root user. For example, software designed to run directly on the host cannot be switched to another user ID. For such cases, a container can be deployed in rootless mode. When rootless mode is enabled, the user inside the container is assigned the UID 0 (i. e. considered to be the root) and, at the same time, it is a regular user on the host. This approach was developed on top of user namespaces — a special kind of Linux namespaces providing isolation for UIDs and GID, process root directory and capabilities. According to the documentation, creating a user namespace on recent Linux distributions is an unprivileged operation, and it effectively enables regular users to manage their containers without obtaining excessive privileges [59]. Currently, several runtimes could be installed and used by a regular root user, including Docker, runc, LXC, Podman and other runtimes [57, 60, 61]. However, the configuration for spawning rootless containers is less straightforward and has some limitations such as limited file systems support, Linux security features and networking [60]. Also, user IDs remapping implies that file permissions on the host must be configured more carefully, as the user inside the container is different from the one on the host [2].

It is worth mentioning that rootless mode in container deployment can successfully prevent the exploitation of certain vulnerabilities. To illustrate, vulnerability CVE-2019-5736 (“Runcescape”) discovered in the reference runtime implementation, runc, offered an intruder the possibility to override `runc` binary and execute arbitrary commands on the host. However, this vulnerability is mitigated by correct enforcement of user namespaces [62]. Other vulnerabilities that could be successfully addressed with rootless mode are mentioned in [58] and [63].

## Capabilities

In addition to the non-root/root dichotomy, there is also a way to control container permissions on a more granular level, which is based on Linux capabilities. For example, Docker flag `--privileged` assigns extended privileges to the container including an access to all host devices [9]. Although it may be necessary in certain scenarios such as running Docker inside Docker or passing a device to a container, `privileged` mode is sufficient to escape the container and compromise the host, as illustrated in [64]. To avoid such a risk, fine control of capabilities (when standard privileges are insufficient) is advisable. According to the principle of least privilege, all capabilities should be dropped and then only the necessary ones added.

Another option Docker and runc provide to secure the deployment is `--no-new-privileges` flag. This option prevents a process inside the container from gaining additional privileges after the container has started. For example, programs with the `setuid` option such as `sudo` will have no effect when this option is enabled [65]. Internally, to enable this feature runc enforces the `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` flag to the container process [66].

## Mounting directories

Another misconfiguration that could potentially lead to serious security issues is allowing containers to access sensitive directories. The NIST Application Container Security Guide states that directories containing system information, such as `/boot` and `/etc`, should never be mounted on a container, as these directories control basic system functionality [67]. To illustrate, the `/etc` directory contains system configurations such as user passwords and cron jobs. Access to the `/bin` directory allows an intruder to override system-wide executables. The `/var/log` directory may contain information about intruder activity. [2].

Mounting Docker daemon sockets is another potentially harmful practice. Sending requests to the Docker socket is equivalent to sending instructions to the daemon, which gives the user root privileges on the host. The CIS Docker Benchmark recommends auditing access rules and permissions for the socket, enforcing TLS authentication, and avoiding mounting it inside a container [68].

### 2.3.2 Kernel vulnerabilities

Container virtualization is essentially operating system virtualization when we refer to traditional runtimes like runc or LXC. This implies that the isolation between container processes is accomplished by kernel security measures, primarily namespaces and cgroups. It also implies that each container on the host has access to the same kernel as normal

applications.

These circumstances explain why vulnerabilities in the mechanisms involved in process isolation can lead to the container escape and affect the host and other containers. While the Linux kernel has been widely used up until now, it is complex software that is still under development. Several isolation features have been gradually added to the kernel, including the user namespace, which was introduced in version 3.8 of the kernel in 2013. The time namespace (which is not currently regulated by the OCI specification), was developed in version 5.6 of the kernel in 2020. Between these two events, there was also the release of version 4.5 of the kernel with support for cgroups v2 [69–71]. This rate of change exposes certain parts of the kernel to attackers from time to time.

To illustrate, the history of cyber attacks has seen several vulnerabilities that could be exploited to breach container isolation. One such vulnerability is CVE-2022-0492, which was discovered in cgroups v1. Essentially, under certain circumstances, containers can execute arbitrary code with full privileges on the host due to a misconfiguration of the release agent after the termination of a process in the control group [72].

Another recent kernel vulnerability, CVE-2022-0847 (“DirtyPipe”), affects read-only mounted volumes and containers created from the same image. This vulnerability arises due to incorrect access rules for memory page cache. Any unprivileged process can override any file that it has read access to [73].

While the first vulnerability can be addressed with layered security measures, such as activating the seccomp filter, the second vulnerability (“DirtyPipe”) can only be eliminated by updating the kernel and installing security patches [74].

### **2.3.3 Runtime vulnerabilities**

Another key component of container virtualization is the container runtime. This software manages isolated environments, manipulating container images and issuing system calls to create control groups, unshare namespaces and execute new processes.

Despite extensive usage over the years, container runtimes have not been without their share of vulnerabilities, as well as the Linux kernel. We have already mentioned the runc vulnerability CVE-2019-5736 (“Runcescape”), which affected runc, containerd, Docker and other runtimes.

Other runtimes are occasionally reported to be vulnerable, although not all vulnerabilities guarantee the ability for an attacker to escape the container.

### 2.3.4 Application-level vulnerabilities

Finally, the most common type of vulnerability to observe is at the application level, and these are continuously reported in every piece of software released into the wild. Typically, it is the application running inside a container that is accessible from the outside environment. While the purpose of exposing the application to the internet is to provide a service for external users, it also opens up the possibility for intruders to access the system.

The process of addressing software vulnerabilities involves continuously monitoring whether the software installed in a container contains any known and reported vulnerabilities. This process can be automated using various software scanners, which are typically integrated into the CI/CD pipeline that builds container images.

It is more efficient to scan container images rather than individual containers, as images include all the packages that will be executed in a container. Regular scanning and updating of images are essential for maintaining a secure environment.

The CIS Docker Benchmark suggests scanning images frequently and rebuilding them if necessary to apply security patches, upgrade package versions, and ensure compliance with best practices. This ensures that the containers are always running on the latest, most secure version of the software [68].

When developing containerized applications, special attention should be paid to third-party packages and dependencies. Vulnerabilities in widely used software can be particularly harmful, as they expose entire systems to exploitation. A well-known example of this is the Log4Shell vulnerability, which affected countless systems running Java applications to remote code execution attacks [75].

As can be seen, the process of scanning and updating is similar to a race against an intruder. In order to reduce the chances of a successful attack in the event of a possible breach, it is important to implement in-depth protection for the container environment and the host from compromised applications. Later, we will discuss various techniques for strengthening security in order to achieve additional protection.

Overall, a comprehensive approach to container security requires a multi-layered defense. An administrator must address both insecure configurations in the environment and keep track of emerging vulnerabilities, starting from the host kernel and finishing with the containerized applications.



## 2.4 Container escape

The container threat model cannot be reduced to a single vector of malicious processes escaping the container. As mentioned in [55], protection should be provided from the container to the host, to other containers, and vice versa. However, our particular interest lies in the case of a container escape, which can be considered as a violation of the core principles of containerization.

The NIST Application Container Security Guide defines a container escape as a situation in which a malicious application running inside a container can attack surrounding containers or the host system [67]. The aim of a container is to isolate the process running inside it from the rest of the system, so any breach of this isolation can have detrimental consequences.

Container escape scenarios may occur due to software vulnerabilities, primarily at the system level. We have previously discussed runtime vulnerabilities such as Runcescape and kernel vulnerabilities (“DirtyPipe”). Application-level vulnerabilities do not directly lead to container escape, as processes are restricted within the container. Nevertheless, these vulnerabilities provide an opportunity for an intruder to initiate an attack.

Another reason for container escapes is insecure configurations. As mentioned previously, running a container with the `--privileged` flag makes escaping trivial. Therefore, it is recommended not only to disable options that are considered risky, but also to harden the configuration in the event of an escape happening. Most importantly, this includes enabling user mapping (rootless mode) or setting user ID, so the process inside the container has limited privileges on the host system. For systems where running processes poses a high risk of escaping, it makes sense to strengthen container isolation and enforce additional security measures [2].

## 2.5 Security hardening

As can be understood from the above, container virtualization does not provide a perfect level of isolation. Due to the complex mechanisms involved, the entire system is prone to vulnerabilities and misconfigurations at every stage of the container lifecycle. In order to reduce the risk of compromising applications, the host or other containers, it is possible to utilize additional security measures provided by the Linux kernel, runtimes or third-party developers. In harsh environments, it may be reasonable to enhance protection even further by employing mixed, non-traditional forms of containerization.

### 2.5.1 Kernel security mechanisms

Most aspects of containerization are managed by the Linux kernel, which makes use of various kernel features to do so. We have already discussed some of these features, such as cgroups, namespaces, and Linux capabilities. Additionally, another important mechanism that helps to reduce the ability of processes to execute malicious instructions is the use of seccomp filters. Furthermore, Linux security modules (LSM) provide an additional layer of protection against potential threats. In addition to these software-based security measures, there are several hardware security technologies that can also be used in conjunction with containers to enhance overall security.

#### Seccomp

Seccomp (Secure Computing) is a Linux kernel feature that limits the set of system calls a process can execute. This security measure allows running a process in a restricted mode, where only a limited number of system calls are allowed: `read`, `write`, `exit` and `sigreturn` [76]. This way, the process can only read from and write to existing files, return from signal handling and exit (however, it is impossible to issue `open` system call to access new files). This restricted access to system resources prevents malicious software from causing harm to the system or the host.

As this set of system calls is not sufficient for most applications to operate normally, another mode of seccomp was developed. In filtering mode, a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program is used to determine whether a process should be terminated, logged or simply allowed to proceed with the system call [77].

BPF filters are a flexible tool that limits the instructions available to a process to a necessary subset according to a predefined process profile. This feature is particularly suitable for containerized processes, as containers typically perform fixed tasks that do not require the entire set of system calls.

Setting BPF profiles is supported by several container runtimes. Docker recommends using the default seccomp profile, which restricts 44 system calls out of more than 300 [78]. This profile prevents an isolated process from modifying the kernel keyring, adjusting the system time, loading kernel modules, mounting partitions, tweaking swap, rebooting the host and performing other actions that are not typical for containers. runc and crun both support the seccomp feature in OCI bundles [79], and it is possible to configure how to handle specific system calls and vary actions based on arguments of the call [80]. LXC has support for seccomp sandboxing as well [81].

To take the sandboxing process to the next level, it is recommended to create a customized profile that more strictly restricts system calls. Several tools may assist with this task, such as the `strace` command, `falco2seccomp` or Tracee, which are based on eBPF (Extended Berkeley Packet Filter).

Several security solutions based on the seccomp mechanism have been proposed in the literature. Lei et al. suggested a dynamic approach that automatically traces the system calls made by an application during the booting and running stages, and then applies restrictions in real-time. This approach significantly reduces the number of exposed system calls without causing noticeable performance degradation [82].

Another solution was described by Lopes et al. in 2020. The researchers developed a tool that integrates into the building pipeline and compiles a whitelist profile. It has been shown that implementing a seccomp profile can protect an application from several attacks, including zero-day vulnerability exploitation [83].

## **Linux security modules**

The Linux Security Module is a framework that allows developers to implement new kernel extensions that can perform additional security checks. This is achieved by inserting hooks when a user-space process makes a system call to sensitive kernel objects. The LSM framework is mainly used to enforce a security policy based on Mandatory Access Control (MAC). At the moment, the Linux kernel ships with the following security modules: AppArmor, SELinux, LoadPin, Smack, TOMOYO and Yama.

### **AppArmor**

AppArmor (Application Armor) is a security feature that implements path-based access control and is part of the Linux kernel since 2010. It is included in various Linux distributions, such as Debian and Ubuntu [84].

AppArmor assigns individual executables a policy that limits the set of files, capabilities, and network and memory that an application can access. AppArmor can be used in

two modes: learning mode, which traces all the rules in a given profile that an application violates, and enforcing mode, where it prohibits the actions forbidden by the profile. The logs from learning mode can help to adjust the profile so that it matches the typical execution activity. When there are no more violations, AppArmor can be switched to enforcing mode.

Similar to seccomp, AppArmor is a part of the OCI specification. This means that runc and crun, as well as Docker, can execute containers with AppArmor profiles. Docker even provides a default AppArmor profile that is moderately protective, but widely compatible with various types of software [85]. The same is true for LXC.

In addition to the default profile, there are predefined profiles for popular software prepared by the developers. Additionally, a custom profile can be created using specialized software. In 2021, Zhu et al. proposed an AppArmor profile generator called Lic-Sec. The researchers demonstrated the potential of their tool to protect against zero-day attacks [86].

## **SELinux**

SELinux is another security extension that was merged into the Linux kernel in 2003. This complex technology operates with several key concepts. Firstly, files, processes and applications are labelled with special context information that is stored either as a filesystem attribute or within the kernel. The labels are composed of SELinux users, roles, types and levels. In a basic scenario, only the type is used to determine access rules. Next, there is a policy that allows or denies a process access to other objects based on their shared labels. This allows an application to work with its own files without the permission to modify other parts of the system [87].

The security model described above is known as type enforcement. Another possible policy is multi-level security, although it is not as widely used. SELinux operates in three modes: enforcing, permissive and disabled. Enforcing mode restricts access to only what is permitted by the security policy. Permissive allows applications to bypass rules, but logs any errors, which can be used to adjust the security policy based on the environment. When SELinux is disabled, it is completely turned off.

It is possible to use SELinux with Docker containers, runc, crun and other OCI-compliant runtimes. OCI specifications include a setting for the SELinux label that the containerized process will use. In this case, SELinux must be enabled on the host as well [88]. LXC containers also support this feature.

## Other modules

Along with the most widely used security extensions (AppArmor and SELinux), the Linux kernel includes four other ones: LoadPin, Smack, TOMOYO, and Yama.

The LoadPin security module is designed to ensure that kernel files are loaded from the same file system, providing an additional layer of security when that file system is located on a read-only storage. This ensures that the kernel files remain immutable and therefore trustworthy. This approach is not directly related to containers, as it aims to secure the entire system. It is only applicable in simple situations, such as booting from a single read-only image [89].

Yama is another security module with a specific task. It can limit a process's ability to trace the execution of another process, its registers and memory. As a result, a compromised process cannot steal sensitive data from other processes that run with the same permissions [90]. Yama has also been mentioned among other mandatory access control tools that are suitable for securing containers [90].

Tomoyo and Smack are two alternative MAC implementations. Smack, or Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel, was released in 2018 and works similarly to SELinux. It also uses a labeling system, but has a simpler interface [91]. Tomoyo was integrated into the kernel in 2009. However, no integration with the OCI specification can be traced for either solution.

## Hardware modules

In addition to the software-based security solutions discussed above, literature also mentions hardware-based security features, such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and the Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX).

TPM (trusted platform module) is a hardware component that verifies the firmware and software running on a device. There are indications that this technology is being used in containerized environments. Benedictis et al. have proposed an integrity verification mechanism for Docker containers based on TPM and Remote Attestation technology [92]. Rocha et al. have also mentioned the possibility of using virtual TPMs in the kernel or in a separate container [93].

The same authors refer to a trusted execution technology on Intel platforms. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides a process with a dedicated area in memory that is protected from the kernel and other processes. This technology can be used as an extra layer of security when running containers in an untrusted environment.

### 2.5.2 Security features of non-traditional runtimes

Above, we have discussed additional kernel security features that can enhance the isolation of containers and protect against various, even currently uncovered vulnerabilities. However, when it comes to kernel vulnerabilities, these security techniques may be ineffective. In such cases, further protection can be found in technologies that blend the distinction between containers and virtual machines.

We have already mentioned several alternative runtime environments. gVisor is described as a user-space kernel because it intercepts system calls and implements them in the user space. Kata containers are executed within a QEMU virtual machine. This idea is further developed in Firecracker, which are lightweight AWS virtual machines with reduced boot times. Finally, Unikernels compile the application with its system library dependencies, so the resulting image can be run by a hypervisor.

Literature contains numerous studies on the performance of different runtimes, but there is a lack of security analysis in the context of runtimes. In 2020, Flauzac et al. compared LXC/LXD, Singularity, runc, Kata Containers and gVisor in terms of their isolation features. They found that runc and LXC both support all the security features, such as cgroups, capability management, AppArmor and seccomp, and even enforce some of these features by default. In comparison, Kata Containers and gVisor should be given more careful consideration.

Kata Containers support cgroups and capabilities, but other features are not possible or necessary due to the hypervisor virtualization Kata containers are based on. gVisor, on the other hand, uses seccomp-based isolation, so it enables seccomp and capability support by default. It does not support cgroups or AppArmor profiles, as it isolates containers from the host using virtualization of system calls and additional filtering would be redundant [36].

### 2.5.3 Scanning tools

In order to ensure safety inside the virtual environment, various automation tools can be implemented. As previously discussed, the sources of security threats include mistakes in configuration and vulnerabilities in software, which can reside in the kernel, runtime, or the containerized application itself. To address these aspects of the attack surface, different tools can be used.

#### Infrastructure benchmarks

To evaluate the security of the entire system, special benchmark tools were developed. These tools are based on the CIS Docker Benchmark, which provides secure configuration

guidelines for host configuration, the Docker daemon, configuration files, and images. They also provide guidelines for building and running containers, as well as optional guidelines for Docker Swarm [68].

`docker-bench-security` is an open-source project on GitHub that contains a script for evaluating the security of current configuration. This bash script checks the system against all recommended configurations in the relevant CIS publication and generates a security report for the user. The project is updated regularly and currently supports version 1.6.0 of the CIS Benchmark [94].

A similar project, `docker-bench`, is developed by Aqua Security company, which specialises in cloud-native security. This tool was written in Go and currently supports the CIS Docker Benchmark version 1.3.1 [95].

Overall, any of these tools are useful in ensuring that best practices are implemented and that no obvious security issues can be exploited by malicious actors.

The idea of self-assessment of the security of the deployment environment was further developed in 2021 by Sengupta et al. The researchers proposed a tool called Metapod that focuses on the usability and visibility of security measures [96]. The application consists of a backend and frontend, which together allow developers to monitor and adjust current security settings in deployments. For example, the application allows users to control resources, set process fork limits and check the health of containers. Additionally, this tool is integrated with the Snyk vulnerability scanner for checking container images and it also tracks compliance with the CIS Docker Benchmark.

## **Vulnerability scanners**

We have already mentioned Snyk, which is a vulnerability scanner. Scanning tools are an effective mechanism for assessing whether a running application has any known vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an intruder.

To successfully implement vulnerability scanning, several conditions must be met. Firstly, when scanning images and not running containers, it implies the immutability of the containers. This means that no software changes are made during runtime. All libraries, dependencies and code are installed during the build process. Secondly, images need to be scanned regularly, as the database of known vulnerabilities is continuously updated. This ensures that any new vulnerabilities are detected as soon as they are discovered.

There are a number of scanning tools available, both open source and commercial. Trivy, Clair and Anchore are some examples of open source solutions. Companies that offer proprietary solutions include JFrog, Palo Alto and Aqua. Additionally, image registries such

as Docker Trusted Registry and Harbor by the CNCF also provide scanning capabilities. Some of these scanners can also provide additional insights, such as detecting malware and identifying insecure configurations during the build process.

Along with static image scanning, researchers have proposed alternative approaches. In 2020, Brady et al. developed a dynamic analysis solution that starts an image for a certain period of time to monitor file changes, network traffic and running processes during container runtime. This allows researchers to detect abnormal behaviour patterns that may indicate potential malicious activity [97].



### **3 Security analysis of hardening techniques**

## 4 Vulnerability detection

### 4.1 Previous studies

The researches upon the quality and effectiveness of vulnerabilities detection tools have already been attempted. One of the most comprehensive works was published by Omar Javed and Salman Toor in 2021 [98]. The approach described in the paper was based on several open source scanners (namely, Clair, Anchore, and Microscanner). After inspecting 59 Docker images for Java-based applications, the authors calculated detection coverage and detection hit ratio metrics and concluded that the most accurate tool, Anchore, missed around 34% of vulnerabilities. The metric used in this study, detection coverage, is in fact a well-known metric in data analysis usually referred to as recall. However, a major limitation of their work is the small number of images used to evaluate scanning tool performance. Additionally, the limited range of scanners examined and the reliance on a single metric for evaluating quality are also limitations.

Another study conducted by Liu et al. revealed the concerning state of image security on Docker Hub [99]. The researchers analysed more than 2 million public images examining them for sensitive and potentially insecure parameters as well as malicious software and vulnerabilities. To detect malware, they used VirusTotal, and vulnerabilities were discovered using Anchore scanner. As a result, the researchers were able to detect several malicious images and discovered that vulnerability patching is often delayed, taking an average of about half a year for software developers to fix breaches. Despite its insightful revelations, this work relies solely on a single tool for static analysis.

In 2021, another vulnerability analysis of Docker Hub images was presented by Wist and her colleagues [100]. In this study, 2500 images were analyzed, which helped to reveal several interesting findings. The number of vulnerabilities in recent Docker Hub images has been on the rise compared to images published earlier. The authors investigated the susceptibility of four categories of Docker Hub images: verified, certified, official, and community. It was found that certified images were more vulnerable, while official images appeared to be less so. Finally, no clear correlation could be found between the number of vulnerabilities and other image features, such as the number of downloads or the last update date. In this paper, the only used tool was Anchore Engine.

Another paper by K. Brady et al. described the CI/CD pipeline which combined static and dynamic analysers [101]. A set of 7 images was submitted to Clair and Anchore scanners and original dynamic scanner based on Docker-in-Docker approach. The results

clearly show the importance of dynamic detection method, however, no direct comparison of Clair and Anchore was conducted. Similar research was conducted in 2021, however, a pair of SonarQube and VirusTotal was used [102].

Massive research was conducted in 2020 by security company Prevasio. As the report states, all 4 million of public images from Docker Hub were scanned with static analyser (Trivy) and dynamic analyser, and more than half of all images were discovered to have critical vulnerabilities [103]. Significant number of images were containing dynamically downloaded payload, cryptominers and other malicious software.

Upon the review of the literature on static analysis of containerized applications, we can conclude that most experiments either do not focus on comparing the performance of existing scanning tools or have a limited number of images or scanners examined. In the following sections, we describe our experiment, which addresses these limitations.

## 4.2 Static analysis

Vulnerability scanners are special tools that identify known software vulnerabilities inside containers. Two approaches to this issue are known. First, it is possible to analyse versions of all the software in container image and check its safety. This approach is called static analysis, as it does not require any container to run, which speeds up the process. However, static analysis has significant limitations, because the vulnerability databases take time to include recently discovered vulnerabilities, and container must not download any other packages besides what is included in the image. Finally, malicious but not yet reported packages cannot be discovered by static analysers. Nevertheless, this technology is extensively used in CI/CD pipelines to minimize risks of attack and container compromisation.

The opposite way to detect vulnerabilities in containers is to observe its runtime behaviour. Tools implementing this idea are called dynamic analysers. They may gather data about running processes, network and disk usage and discover suspicious activity patterns such as requests to C2 servers or compiling executables. This approach can effectively detect malicious images in the cases when static scanners are powerless. However, they require extensive resources and time usage, as each scan takes tens of seconds to complete, and may be unpredictable in special cases, when malicious applications disguise themselves and imitate normal behaviour unless started in the production environment. Further discussion will be held about static analysers.

The process of image attestation with static analyser may be described as following. First, the scanner compiles the list of all installed packages and libraries inside the image along with their versions. Next, each package is checked upon publically available vulnerability databases and marked as vulnerable or safe to use. This explains why various mistakes could easily occur during the detection process, or why reports from different scanners are not identical. Each scanner gets vulnerability information from various sources including per-distribution security advisories (Ubuntu Oval database, Debian Security Tracker, RHEL Oval database, to name but a few) or general vulnerability databases such as NVD (National Vulnerability Database). The information in these sources are of various degrees of relevance. Special treatment must be provided to the vulnerabilities that will not be fixed due to its negligibility. Finally, names of the packages may vary between distributions. All these reasons lead to false negative results, when a vulnerable package is marked as save. On the contrary, some packages are organised in groups, and incorrect treatment of the whole group because of one package can probably cause false positive results. Overall, the scanning

report should be carefully considered in each individual case [2].

## 4.3 Existing tools

The range of static vulnerability scanning tools available on the market is wide. From this extensive selection, we have chosen several for further evaluation. For the experiment, it was crucial that the scanning tool could run locally via the command line, as this allows for automation using Python scripts and the ability to process thousands of images for testing. Additionally, we wanted to ensure that the tool was either free or offered a sufficient trial period to meet our needs. After careful consideration, we selected the following tools: Clair, Trivy, Docker Scout, Anchore Gype, Snyk, and one provided by a cloud provider known as Google Artifact Registry.

### 4.3.1 Clair

Clair is a static analysis tool developed by CoreOS in 2015 to uncover vulnerabilities in containers that had previously remained unnoticed [104]. After CoreOS was discontinued in 2020, Clair can be used either as a standalone solution or as part of Project Quay, a container image registry that offers additional features such as image scanning [105].

Clair performs a static analysis of container images. It scans each layer of the container image and identifies the packages contained within it. These packages are then evaluated against public vulnerability databases to identify any known potential security breaches.

To identify vulnerabilities, Clair uses the following security databases [106]:

- Ubuntu Oval database
- Debian Security Tracker
- Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Oval database
- SUSE Oval database
- Oracle Oval database
- Alpine SecDB database
- VMware Photon OS database
- Amazon Web Services (AWS) UpdateInfo
- Open Source Vulnerability (OSV) Database

However, in local installations, Clair only receives information from Ubuntu, Debian, Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL), Alpine and the Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV) databases.

Structurally, the Clair backend, which is composed of several daemons, such as Indexer, Matcher, and Notifier, runs in the background [107]. Upon startup, it downloads and maintains a local list of vulnerabilities that is stored in a Postgres database. To interact

with the Clair backend, a special client tool called `clairctl` is used. `clairctl` pulls an image archive, pushes image layers to the Clair API, receives the results and presents them in a selected format. The results can be displayed on the screen or saved as a JSON file in a machine-readable format for later processing.

The latter feature simplifies the integration of Clair into the CI/CD pipeline for building and shipping containers. However, due to its design, Clair requires a significant amount of time to fully compile its vulnerability database, ranging from 20 to 30 minutes. To speed up this process, enthusiasts attempted to distribute preconfigured database images. A corresponding project can be found on GitHub (<https://github.com/arminc/clair-local-scan>). However, the feasibility of this approach is questionable due to the lack of support.

To run Clair locally, we used the Docker images from the official repository (<https://github.com/quay/clair>). A special docker-compose file, listed in Appendix A, helps to run the database and scanner containers. The `clairctl` command-line tool, which is included with the Clair package, pulls the image from Docker Hub and passes it to the Clair backend. The deployment process is described in the Clair documentation ([https://quay.github.io/clair/howto/getting\\_started.html](https://quay.github.io/clair/howto/getting_started.html)). An example of a command that needs to be executed to scan an image is provided below:

```
clairctl report --out json fluent/fluent-bit:2.0.8-debug > report.json
```

Listing 2 – Run Clair scanner

Upon completing the analysis, Clair generates a report that includes several sections, including information about the examined packages, the detected Linux distribution in the base image, and a list of vulnerabilities. For each vulnerability, Clair provides information about its identification in a database (for example, the CVE number), severity and the packages where the vulnerability was found. Additionally, the report indicates whether a fix for the vulnerability has already been released.

Overall, Clair is one of most established solutions for static container analysis and can be effectively used to gain insight into what is built and deployed in production systems. While its modular architecture may make the installation process more complicated, it provides a wide range of customization options for different environments and scalability for large-scale deployment systems. Later, we will explore the results of using Clair and compare them to other scanning tools.

### 4.3.2 Trivy

Trivy is an open-source scanner developed by Aqua Security, a cloud security company founded in 2015. It is a replacement for Microscanner, another vulnerability detector developed previously by the same company. The main advantage of Trivy over other scanning tools is the simplicity of installation. To begin scanning, developers simply need to download an executable file from the vendor’s website or the package manager. Trivy can scan not only container images, but also file systems, Git repositories, Virtual Machine images and Infrastructure as code files [108]. In addition to detecting vulnerabilities, Trivy also checks for misconfigurations, such as secrets or sensitive information stored in plain text.

To demonstrate the scanning process, the Trivy tool can be executed by using the command provided in Listing 3.

```
trivy image --format sarif -o report.json golang:1.12-alpine
```

Listing 3 – Run Trivy scanner

Internally, Trivy collects information about vulnerabilities from a wide range of sources, including security databases from major Linux distributions. It supports approximately 15 base images and, in addition, language-specific components such as libraries for approximately 12 programming languages, including Python, Go and C++ [109]. It is especially impressive considering that all these processes take place automatically and do not require any user intervention.

Trivy can also be used as part of a CI/CD pipeline. It is compatible with major continuous integration systems, such as GitHub Actions, GitLab CI and Travis CI. To facilitate integration with other tools and environments, Trivy provides various output formats, including human-readable text, JSON, and SERIF, which is a standard format for static code analysis. The JSON report contains information about the tool that was used for scanning, the vulnerabilities found their location in the image and the severity level.

In conclusion, Trivy is a recently developed and actively maintained open-source tool that focuses on the user-friendly approach. It provides wide support for various distributions, programming languages and platforms. With its extensive range of scanning features, Trivy makes it an ideal choice for setting up static analysis on containerized applications.

### 4.3.3 Docker Scout

Docker Scout is a new container security solution from Docker. It replaces the legacy Docker Scan tool and was made available to the general public in October 2023 [110].

Docker Scout can be used as a standalone plugin. To run Docker Scout plugin locally,



it must be installed and then invoked as shown in Listing 4. Alternatively, Docker Scout can be integrated with Docker Hub, where developers can view the results of scanning their images from the cloud. An example of the Docker Scout dashboard can be seen in Figure 1. It is also worth noting that the cloud version of Docker Scout requires a subscription to Docker. Otherwise, users can only use three repositories free of charge.

```
# installation
curl -fsSL \
    https://raw.githubusercontent.com/docker/scout-cli/main/install.sh \
    -o install-scout.sh
sh install-scout.sh

# usage
docker scout cves --format sarif --output report.json \
    stakater/reloader:SNAPSHOT-PR-586-UBI-0db6f802
```

Listing 4 – Run Docker Scout scanner

Otherwise, Docker Scout supports integrations with several third-party systems, such as container registries (JFrog Artifactory, Amazon and Azure container registries) and CI/CD platforms (GitHub Actions, GitLab and Jenkins).

As a data source, Docker Scout aggregates vulnerability information from various sources, including Linux distribution advisories, language-specific databases, GitHub and GitLab advisory systems as well as the National Vulnerability Database [111]. Unlike other scanner tools, Docker Scout utilizes Package URLs (PURLs) rather than the Common Product Enumeration (CPE) system, which, according to its developers, significantly reduces the likelihood of false positive results.

For the purposes of our evaluation, we primarily focus on the `docker scout cves` command, which generates a vulnerability report for a selected image. This command is not limited to images, but can also be used for OCI bundles and local files. The tool’s output can be generated in plain text, SARIF or SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) formats. The SARIF-formatted report is compatible with other tools.

#### 4.3.4 Anchore Gripe

Anchore Gripe is a vulnerability scanning tool for container images and file systems, maintained by Anchore since 2020 [112]. As a static analysis tool, Gripe examines the contents of container images to identify known vulnerabilities in all major operating system and language-specific packages [113].

To simplify the user experience, Gripe is distributed as a single binary from the release pages of package managers. Listing 5 demonstrates how Gripe can be installed and




Figure 1 – Docker Scout dashboard

used in a local environment. Additionally, Grype can also be used as part of a GitHub Actions pipeline.

```
# installation
curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh \
  | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
```

```
# usage:
grype stakater/reloader:latest -o json > report.json
```

Listing 5 – Run Docker Scout scanner

This command generates a compliance report that provides information about vulnerabilities found in the Grype database, as well as information about the image metadata and Linux distribution used to create the image. Each vulnerability is described with a CVE identifier, severity level, and CVSS score. The report also includes information on how to fix the vulnerability and links to additional resources. In some cases, related vulnerabilities may be included, such as when an advisory from GitHub has a corresponding CVE entry in the national vulnerability database. Another useful section of the report provides details about

each match, explaining the exact information about the package that led to the detection of the vulnerability.

Grype supports a variety of formats, including JSON, SARIF, and tabular or XML, as well as other formats. Grype collects data from various publicly available vulnerability sources, such as advisories for popular Linux distributions and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The local database is automatically maintained by the scanner. However, developers can also use special commands to update or manually check the database.

Anchore Grype is a great tool for both local development and in CI/CD pipelines. It is free to use and produces detailed and accurate results. we will evaluate the quality of Grype reports for Docker images that are used in our experiments.

#### 4.3.5 Snyc

Snyk is a comprehensive solution for securing open-source libraries, application code, container images and Kubernetes applications. It also provides infrastructure as code file protection, such as Terraform configurations. As a security company, Snyk was founded in 2015, during the rapid development of containerized technologies. Developers can access Snyk through a web UI or by using the snyk CLI tool [114]. A subscription is also available, which provides additional features such as private repository evaluation.

As other major scanning tools, Snyk can be integrated into the CI/CD pipelines of Jenkins and GitHub Actions, as well as popular IDEs such as VS Code and JetBrains. Additionally, Snyk supports Git repositories, cloud providers, and package managers, including npm and the Nexus repository. However, for the objectives of our evaluation, it is sufficient to run Snyk locally using the command line, as demonstrated in Listing 6. Unlike other scanning tools, Snyk requires authentication with a developer account using an API token.

```
# installation
curl --compressed https://static.snyk.io/cli/latest/snyk-linux -o snyk
chmod +x ./snyk
mv ./snyk /usr/local/bin/

# authentication
snyk auth de452e65-...

# usage:
snyk container test --sarif-file-output=report.json ubuntu:16.04 -d
```

Listing 6 – Snyk scanner

The results from Snyk can be presented in a serial format and easily processed by other tools. Snyk discovers vulnerabilities by relying on advisories from operating system

maintainers and detects vulnerabilities in images based on all major Linux distributions and a range of programming languages.

In addition to its image scanning capabilities, Snyk provides a range of tools to help ensure the security of the software development process at every stage of the lifecycle. Overall, Snyk is a valuable asset for both individual developers and teams.

#### 4.3.6 Google Artifact Registry

In the previous section, we discussed the tools that are used for scanning in a local environment or as a part of deployment pipeline. These tools are mostly open source (except for Docker Scout), and they operate with a local database of vulnerability detection rules. Next, we will discuss cloud-based scanning utilities. These are offered as SaaS platforms by cloud providers and have an operating cost, usually based on the number of scans.

Most providers offer such solutions, including image scanning in Amazon Elastic Container Registry, Azure Container Registry and Yandex Container Registry. We will be focusing on a specific cloud-based scanner that is integrated with Google Artifact Registry. Artifact Registry is a unified storage solution for images and packages from different sources. When vulnerability scanning is enabled, this service automatically scans images as they are pushed to the registry to detect known security vulnerabilities and exposures.

Static analysis provided by Google is an integral part of its registry. Therefore, Artifact Analysis scans for vulnerabilities, dependencies, and licenses only the images pushed or pulled to the cloud. To ensure a constant level of security, two approaches are used: on-push scanning and continuous analysis [115]. Firstly, each new image is analyzed upon uploading to Artifact Registry. After the scan is completed, the registry generates a report containing detected CVEs, their severity and CVSS scores, whether a fix is available and affected packages. The report also provides information about licenses and dependencies. The report can be accessed through the Google Cloud console, and an example is provided in Figure 2.

After the initial analysis, the registry will continue to update the image evaluation as new information becomes available from vulnerability sources every day. Google gathers information from Linux distributions advisories and the GitHub Advisory Database for language packages.

For convenience, the report can be retrieved using the CLI tool called `gcloud`. To obtain scan results for a set of Docker Hub images, we have implemented the following process. Firstly, we set up Artifact Registry as a proxy for Docker Hub, which means it downloads and caches images in the registry upon user request to Docker Hub. When an




Figure 2 – Google Artifact Registry

image is processed through the registry, it is scanned and a report is generated and saved in the cloud. Meanwhile, to release disk space, the image is deleted from the local machine as it is no longer needed. After a while, the second iteration is performed to query the results of the image evaluation using the `gcloud` tool. The entire process is illustrated in Figure #TODO add figure, and the necessary commands are given in Listing 7.

Overall, the Google Cloud Platform offers an easy-to-use tool for those who prefer sticking to cloud solutions. As part of its design, it provides continuous monitoring for the security of images stored in the cloud, which is an advantage over one-time scanning approach. Other tools are also striving to implement this feature, as was discussed by the example of Docker Scout, which has a similar feature when applied to cloud repositories.

After discussing the various scanning solutions available on the market and their capabilities and limitations, we can now proceed to describe how we collect data from each

```
# pull image
docker pull west1-docker.pkg.dev/proud/shadrinov/ubuntu:16.04

# retrieve security report
gcloud artifacts docker images describe \
    west1-docker.pkg.dev/proud/shadrinov/ubuntu:16.04 \
    --show-package-vulnerability \
    --format json > report.json

# remove image from local machine
docker image rm west1-docker.pkg.dev/proud/shadrinov/ubuntu:16.04
```

Listing 7 – Vulnerability scanning with gcloud tool

scanner report over a set of several thousand Docker Hub images.

## 4.4 Methodology

The process of data collection and analysis for this research project can be divided into several stages. First, a set of container images and tags were created for scanning. For this purpose, the Docker Hub API was used. Then, each image was submitted to a scanning tool, and the vulnerability report was saved in JSON format on the disk. After scanning, the reports were combined, and the number of vulnerabilities in each image was calculated. Based on these calculations, metrics for the detection quality of each scanner were calculated.

### 4.4.1 Images selection

To select the most popular (according to the number of pulls) images from Docker Hub, the following algorithm was developed.

At first, we composed a list of search queries. The list consists of all combinations of two latin letters starting from **aa** and finishing with **zz**. Each of  $26 \cdot 26 = 676$  combinations was then used to query the list of corresponding images from Docker Hub, as shown in Listing 8. The result was then saved to the JSON file.

```
1 def get_page(page, query):
2     url = "https://hub.docker.com/api/content/v1/products/search"
3     params = {
4         "page_size": 100,
5         "q": query,
6         "source": "community",
7         "type": "image",
8         "page": page
9     }
10    response = requests.get(url, params=params)
11    response.raise_for_status()
12    data = response.json()
13    return data["summaries"]
```

Listing 8 – Query images

The next step is to combine search results from each query and sample a reasonably sized subset of the most popular images. We parse each JSON file and drop duplicating images. After all, the set of 3694651 images is sorted by **popularity** parameter and approximately 1200 images were selected from the top of the list and saved for further processing.

### 4.4.2 Tags selection

Each image exists in multiple versions which are referred to as image tags. We have to select a number of tags for each image to scan. Tags could also be built for a specific architecture and OS platform. We are primarily interested in **amd64** and **Linux** tags.

The request used for generating the list of tags for each image is demonstrated in Listing 9. We randomly select 3 tags for each image that satisfies the mentioned requirements. As the result, the set of approximately 3200 tags is composed and stored in file.

```
1 pref, suf = image.split("/")
2 link = f"https://hub.docker.com/v2/namespaces/{pref}/repositories/{suf}/tags"
3 res = requests.get(link)
4 res = res.json()
5 up = res["count"]
6 iteration = 0
7 total = 0
8 while total < 3 and iteration < 100:
9     page_num = random.randint(1, up)
10    response = requests.get(link, params={"page": page_num, "page_size": 1})
11    tag = response.json()["results"][0]
12    if "amd64" in [i["architecture"] for i in tag["images"]]:
13        tags.append(tag)
14        total += 1
15    iteration += 1
```

Listing 9 – Query tags

#### 4.4.3 Scan images

This step was performed on a virtual machine with 16 virtual CPU cores and 32 GB of RAM. As a general rule, each scanning tool must be installed on the machine before each image is passed to the tool using a command line interface. The installation process was already mentioned in the previous section.

#### 4.4.4 Analysis of obtained scan reports

After submitting the set of images to each of scanning tool, the reports must undergo the further analysis to determine the effectiveness of the studied software. As the results are presented in JSON format, python libraries such as `json` and `pandas` provide us with enough features to calculate the desired quality metrics.

#### Data preparation

As each scanner produces results in a different format, the data needs to be prepared and combined for further analysis. First, we identified a list of tags that were reported by all the scanning tools. Then, 16 of these tags were excluded, leaving a total of 3191 scanned tags.

Then, each result from the scanner was reduced to the necessary information, creating a scan record. Each record is marked with "uid" field. The main issue is the need to identify vulnerabilities reported in the current entry. Therefore, we scan the report and try to find the mentioned CVE ID or ID of a GitHub Security Advisory or Red Hat Security Advisory. Next,



the severity category is extracted using the CVSS v3 scoring scale (None, Low, Medium, High, Critical) or another similar categorical system. Additionally, the package that contains the reported vulnerability is saved, along with the base layer distribution of the image. Finally, if such information is available, we obtain data about the available fixes. The exact steps for correctly processing the data from each scanner depend on the scanning report format. The example of scan record is provided in Listing 10.

```
{
  "id": "CVE-2023-20883",
  "cve_id": "CVE-2023-20883",
  "sas": [
    "GHSA-xf96-w227-r7c4",
    "CVE-2023-20883"
  ],
  "severity": "high",
  "package": "spring-boot-autoconfigure",
  "distro": [
    "alpine",
    "3.17.3"
  ],
  "fixed": true,
  "uid": "grype77"
}
```

Listing 10 – Format of scan record

## Data merging

The next task is to match the records from each tool. The obtained data demonstrated, that in case of certain scanners (namely, Clair) several records may point to the same vulnerability. The difference is only the reported packages, which in fact could be the chain of dependencies and be in fact the same place of the system. Such occurrences should be merged together. Then, using field **"sas"** which contains all the identifiers of vulnerability found in a specific record, record from different scanners should be compared and linked in case they are equivalent. The process of linking is demonstrated in Figure ?? #TODO figure. After all, we combine the set of aggregated records, where each record holds pointers to scan records of every scanning tool. The example is given in Listing 11.

After forming aggregated records, we need to determine if the vulnerability described in a record was detected by more than one scanner. We assume that the more tools detect a particular vulnerability, the more likely it is that it actually exists, and we can consider this report as the truth. For example, the record in Listing 11 contains the vulnerability that has been reported by every scanning tool. We mark the existence of the report as **True**

```

{
  "uid": "aggr10",
  "links": {
    "clair": ["clair10"],
    "gc": ["gc16"],
    "grype": ["grype67", "grype91"],
    "scout": ["scout16", "scout54", "scout55"],
    "snyk": ["snyk13", "snyk31", "snyk38"],
    "trivy": ["trivy44", "trivy57"]
  },
  "conf": {
    "clair": true,
    "gc": true,
    "grype": true,
    "scout": true,
    "snyk": true,
    "trivy": true
  },
  "conf_count": 6,
  "conf_count_others": 5,
  "conf_rate": 1.0
}

```

Listing 11 – Format of aggregated record

in the "conf" section. Next, we calculate the number of reports, which in this case equals to 6. Since at least one scanner must have reported a vulnerability in order to create an aggregated record, we can obtain the number of other scanners “confirming” the reliability of the report by subtracting 1 from the total number of confirmations. Lastly, the confirmation rate is calculated by dividing the number of other scanners that confirm the record by the total number of other scanners. In this example, 5 out of the 5 other scanners have validated the record, giving a confirmation rate of 1.0.

### Data validation

Firstly, each reported record from the scanner can be assigned to a category based on its validation by other scanners. The record falls into one of the following four categories:

- **True Positive (TP)** — a record is TP if reported by a scanner and confirmed by other scanners. This is the correct result (actually present vulnerability) that the scanner has successfully identified.
- **False Positive (FP)** — a record is FP if reported by a scanner and not confirmed by other scanners. This is an incorrect result that was mistakenly produced by the scanner.
- **True Negative (TN)** — a record is TN if not reported by a scanner and confirmed by other scanners. This is an existing vulnerability that should have been identified and

reported by the scanner, but was missed.

- **False Negative (FN)** — a record is FN if not reported by a scanner and not confirmed by other scanners. This is a correct result (non-existing vulnerability), which the scanner did not report and should not have reported.

In addition, we must also introduce the measure of sensitivity - the minimum number of other tools required to confirm the existence of a record. In the following analysis, we will use the minimum number of other scanners equal to 1 and 2.

So, now we can create a list of true positives, false positives, true negatives, and false negatives for each scanner. To do this, we compare the number of confirmations with the minimum requirement and see if the scanner detected this vulnerability. For example, if the number of confirmations is 4 out of 5, and the current scanner confirmed it as well, then it is a true positive. If the current scanner missed the vulnerability, it would be a false negative. If the vulnerability was confirmed by only one scanner, and that scanner is actually the one being evaluated, then it would be false positive. Otherwise, it would be true negative. This way, each scanner report is validated by other scanners.

### Quality metrics

Based on the classification of reports into the four categories described, it is possible to calculate metrics of accuracy for each scanner. In our work, we will use three well-known metrics from data analysis. First, we rely on precision and recall. Precision and recall are two of the most commonly used metrics to evaluate the performance of recognition tasks. They provide scores that are expressed as fractions [116].

Precision is the number of correct results (true positives) relative to the number of all results. It describes how many retrieved elements are relevant, or, in our case, how many reported vulnerabilities are actually present.

$$Precision = \frac{\text{Relevant retrieved elements}}{\text{All retrieved elements}} = \frac{TP}{TP + FP}$$

Recall is the number of correct results relative to the number of expected results. It describes how many relevant elements were retrieved, or how many of existing vulnerabilities were reported by the scanner.

$$Recall = \frac{\text{Relevant retrieved elements}}{\text{All relevant elements}} = \frac{TP}{TP + FN}$$

It is also known that these metrics are not independent. For example, as a general rule, the higher the precision of a tool, the lower the recall it exhibits. In other words, if a tool guesses all the relevant elements, it will miss some other relevant ones. Conversely, if a tool detects all existing elements, it may also detect some non-relevant ones. We will observe this pattern in our findings.

As we understand the specifics of both precision and recall and how they characterise the evaluated tools, it is hard to compare tools based on two values. The performance can be unified into a single value called  $F_1$  score.  $F_1$  score is defined as the harmonic mean of precision and recall:

$$F_1 = 2 \cdot \frac{Precision \cdot Recall}{Precision + Recall}$$

After calculating these metrics for each image, we can obtain the average results for each tool. The results of the evaluation will be discussed in the next section.

## 4.5 Findings

As we previously mentioned, we have collected 1,183 of the most popular images, based on the number of times they were pulled. The top 15 images are displayed in Table 2, and the distribution of images according to the number of pulls is shown in Figure 3. The distribution of images per Linux distribution of the base layer is shown in Figure 4




Figure 3 – Images distribution by number of pulls

For these images, 3207 tags were retrieved from Docker Hub. For each tag, the date

	Image	Description	Pulls
1	stakater/reloader		10B+
2	fluent/fluent-bit	Fluent Bit, lightweight logs and metrics collector and forwarder	10B+
3	istio/pilot	Istiod (formerly known as Pilot)	10B+
4	istio/proxyv2	Istio proxy	10B+
5	datadog/agent	Docker container for the new Datadog Agent	10B+
6	containrrr/watchtower	A process for automating Docker container base image updates.	1B+
7	curlimages/curl	official docker image for curl - command line tool and library for transferring data with URLs	1B+
8	istio/operator	Istio in-cluster operator	1B+
9	envoyproxy/envoy	Cloud-native high-performance edge/middle/service proxy	1B+
10	jenkins/jenkins	The leading open source automation server	1B+
11	grafana/grafana	The official Grafana docker container	1B+
12	bitnami/postgresql	Bitnami PostgreSQL Docker Image	1B+
13	timberio/vector	A High-Performance Logs, Metrics, and Events Router	1B+
14	bitnami/kubectl	Bitnami Docker Image for Kubectl	1B+
15	prom/node-exporter	prom/node-exporter	1B+

Table 2 – Top pulled images

of last update was obtained as well.

Both precision and recall may be useful in cases where there is imbalanced data. However, it may be valuable to prioritize one over the other in cases where the outcome of a false positive or false negative is costly. For example, in medical diagnosis, a false positive test can lead to unnecessary treatment and expenses. In this situation, it is useful to value precision over recall. In other cases, the cost of a false negative is high. For instance, the cost of a false negative in fraud detection is high, as failing to detect a fraudulent transaction can result in significant financial loss




Figure 4 – Images per Linux distribution

## 5 Conclusion

## References

- [1] R. Osnat, “A brief history of containers: From the 1970s till now,” *aquasec.com*, Jan. 10, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://www.aquasec.com/blog/a-brief-history-of-containers-from-1970s-chroot-to-docker-2016>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [2] L. Rice, *Container security: Fundamental technology concepts that protect containerized applications*. O’Reilly Media, 2020.
- [3] “cgroups(7) — Linux manual page,” *man7.org*, Dec. 22, 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/cgroups.7.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [4] “namespaces(7) — Linux manual page,” *man7.org*, Dec. 22, 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/namespaces.7.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [5] M. Kerrisk, “Namespaces in operation, part 1: namespaces overview,” *lwn.net*, Jan. 4, 2013. [Online]. Available: <https://lwn.net/Articles/531114>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [6] “Docker security,” *docs.docker.com*, Feb. 21, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://docs.docker.com/engine/security>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [7] N. Yang, C. Chen, T. Yuan, Y. Wang, X. Gu, and D. Yang, “Security hardening solution for docker container,” in *2022 International Conference on Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC)*, 2022, pp. 252–257.
- [8] “capabilities(7) — Linux manual page,” *man7.org*, Dec. 22, 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [9] “Running containers,” *docs.docker.com*, Feb. 21, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [10] L. Espe, A. Jindal, V. Podolskiy, and M. Gerndt, “Performance evaluation of container runtimes,” in *Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Science*, 2020.



- [11] I. Lewis, “Container runtimes part 1: An introduction to container runtimes,” *ianlewis.org*, Dec. 6, 2017. [Online]. Available: <https://www.ianlewis.org/en/container-runtimes-part-1-introduction-container-r>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [12] “Open Container Initiative.” [Online]. Available: <https://opencontainers.org/>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [13] “Open Container Initiative Runtime Specification,” *github.com*, May 16, 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/spec.md>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [14] X. Wang, J. Du, and H. Liu, “Performance and isolation analysis of runc, gvisor and kata containers runtimes,” *Cluster Computing*, vol. 25, pp. 1497–1513, 2022.
- [15] S. Hykes, “Introducing runc: a lightweight universal container runtime,” *docker.com*, Jun. 22, 2015. [Online]. Available: <https://www.docker.com/blog/runc>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [16] “runc(8) — System Manager’s Manual,” *man.archlinux.org*. [Online]. Available: <https://man.archlinux.org/man/extra/runc/runc.8.en>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [17] J. Gomes, E. Bagnaschi, I. Campos, M. David, L. Alves, J. Martins, J. Pina, A. López-García, and P. Orviz, “Enabling rootless linux containers in multi-user environments: The udocker tool,” *Computer Physics Communications*, vol. 232, pp. 84–97, 2018. [Online]. Available: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010465518302042>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [18] “runc-create(8) System Manager’s Manual,” *man.archlinux.org*. [Online]. Available: <https://man.archlinux.org/man/runc-create.8.en>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [19] “fifo(7) — Linux manual page,” *man7.org*, Dec. 22, 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/fifo.7.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [20] TheDiveO, “Libcontainer: What happens after the invocation of /proc/self/exe init,” may 10, 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://stackoverflow.com/a/76220640>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [21] “nsexec.c,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/main/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]

- [22] Terenceli, “runc internals, part 3: runc double clone,” *terenceli.github.io*, Dec. 28, 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://terenceli.github.io/%E6%8A%80%E6%9C%AF/2021/12/28/runc-internals-3>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [23] R. Kumar and B. Thangaraju, “Performance analysis between runc and kata container runtime,” in *2020 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT)*, 2020, pp. 1–4.
- [24] Y. Avrahami, “Breaking out of docker via runc — explaining cve-2019-5736,” *unit42.paloaltonetworks.com*, Feb. 21, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/breaking-docker-via-runc-explaining-cve-2019-5736/>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [25] “On-entry container attack - cve-2016-9962,” *access.redhat.com*, Jan. 11, 2017. [Online]. Available: <https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/cve-2016-9962>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [26] “opencontainers/runtime-spec — Implementations,” *github.com*, Sep. 28, 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/implementations.md>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [27] “containers/crun,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/containers/crun>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [28] G. E. de Velp, E. Rivière, and R. Sadre, “Understanding the performance of container execution environments,” in *Proceedings of the 2020 6th International Workshop on Container Technologies and Container Clouds*, ser. WOC’20. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2021, pp. 37–42. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3429885.3429967>
- [29] H. Gantikow, S. Walter, and C. Reich, “Rootless containers with podman for hpc,” in *High Performance Computing: ISC High Performance 2020 International Workshops, Frankfurt, Germany, June 21-25, 2020, Revised Selected Papers*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2020, pp. 343–354. [Online]. Available: [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59851-8\\_23](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59851-8_23)
- [30] “crun(1) — General Commands Manual,” *man.archlinux.org*. [Online]. Available: <https://man.archlinux.org/man/crun.1.en>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]

- [31] “CVE-2021-30465,” may 27, 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-30465>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [32] A. Randal, “The ideal versus the real: Revisiting the history of virtual machines and containers,” *ACM Comput. Surv.*, vol. 53, no. 1, Feb. 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3365199>
- [33] S. Senthil Kumaran, *Practical LXC and LXD: linux containers for virtualization and orchestration*. Springer, 2017.
- [34] A. Obradov, S. Usorac, and M. Antic, “Android runtime service optimization for execution inside lxc,” in *2021 44th International Convention on Information, Communication and Electronic Technology (MIPRO)*, 2021, pp. 995–997. [Online]. Available: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9597181>
- [35] “lxc(7) — Linux manual page,” *man7.org*, Jun. 16, 2022. [Online]. Available: <https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/lxc.7.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [36] O. Flauzac, F. Mauhourat, and F. Nolot, “A review of native container security for running applications,” *Procedia Computer Science*, vol. 175, pp. 157–164, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187705092031704X>
- [37] I. Lewis, “Container runtimes part 3: High-level runtimes,” *ianlewis.org*, Oct. 30, 2018. [Online]. Available: <https://www.ianlewis.org/en/container-runtimes-part-3-high-level-runtimes>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [38] B. Weissman and A. E. Nocentino, “Installing kubernetes,” in *Azure Arc-enabled Data Services Revealed: Deploying Azure Data Services on Any Infrastructure*, Berkeley, CA: Apress, 2022, pp. 65–87. Accessed: May 10, 2024. [Online]. Available: [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-8085-0\\_4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-8085-0_4)
- [39] “Getting started with containerd,” *github.com*, Feb. 28, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/containerd/containerd/blob/main/docs/getting-started.md>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [40] I. Miell and A. Sayers, *Docker in practice, second edition*. Shelter Island, NY: Manning Publications, 2019. Accessed: May 10, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://www.manning.com/books/docker-in-practice-second-edition>

- [41] “Alternative container runtimes,” *docs.docker.com*, Feb. 21, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://docs.docker.com/engine/alternative-runtimes>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [42] H. Gantikow, S. Walter, and C. Reich, “Rootless containers with podman for hpc,” in *High Performance Computing: ISC High Performance 2020 International Workshops, Frankfurt, Germany, June 21-25, 2020, Revised Selected Papers*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2020, pp. 343–354. [Online]. Available: [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59851-8\\_23](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59851-8_23)
- [43] “containers/buildah,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/containers/buildah>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [44] J. Struye, B. Spinnewyn, K. Spaey, K. Bonjean, and S. Latre, “Assessing the value of containers for nfvs: A detailed network performance study,” in *2017 13th International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM)*, 2017, pp. 1–7. [Online]. Available: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8256024>
- [45] A. Acharya, J. Fanguède, M. Paolino, and D. Raho, “A performance benchmarking analysis of hypervisors containers and unikernels on armv8 and x86 cpus,” in *2018 European Conference on Networks and Communications (EuCNC)*, 2018, pp. 282–9. [Online]. Available: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8443248>
- [46] “rkt,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/rkt/rkt>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [47] Anjali, T. Caraza-Harter, and M. M. Swift, “Blending containers and virtual machines: a study of firecracker and gvisor,” in *Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS International Conference on Virtual Execution Environments*, ser. VEE ’20. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2020, pp. 101–113. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3381052.3381315>
- [48] “google/gvisor,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/google/gvisor>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [49] A. Randazzo and I. Tinnirello, “Kata containers: An emerging architecture for enabling mec services in fast and secure way,” in *2019 Sixth International Conference on Internet of Things: Systems, Management and Security (IOTSMS)*, 2019, pp. 209–214. [Online]. Available: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8939164>

- [50] X. Wang, J. Du, and H. Liu, “Performance and isolation analysis of runc, gvisor and kata containers runtimes,” *Cluster Computing*, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 1497–1513, 2022. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-021-03517-8>
- [51] D. Williams, R. Koller, M. Lucina, and N. Prakash, “Unikernels as processes,” in *Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing*, ser. SoCC ’18. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2018, pp. 199–211. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3267809.3267845>
- [52] “nabla-containers/runnc,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/nabla-containers/runnc>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [53] Z. Jian and L. Chen, “A defense method against docker escape attack,” in *Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Cryptography, Security and Privacy*, ser. ICCSP ’17. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2017, pp. 142–146. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3058060.3058085>
- [54] M. Bélair, S. Laniepce, and J.-M. Menaud, “Leveraging kernel security mechanisms to improve container security: a survey,” in *Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security*, ser. ARES ’19. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3339252.3340502>
- [55] S. Sultan, I. Ahmad, and T. Dimitriou, “Container security: Issues, challenges, and the road ahead,” *IEEE Access*, vol. 7, pp. 52 976–52 996, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8693491>
- [56] “OWASP Top Ten,” *unit42.paloaltonetworks.com*, Oct. 1, 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [57] “Getting started,” *linuxcontainers.org*. [Online]. Available: <https://linuxcontainers.org/lxc/getting-started>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [58] A. Sarai and A. Suda, “The state of rootless containers,” presented at the Open Source Summit North America 2018, New York, NY, USA, Aug. 31, 2018. [Online]. Available: <https://ossna18.sched.com/event/FAPP/the-state-of-rootless-containers-aleksa-sarai-suse-llc-akihiro-suda-ntt>

- [59] “user\_namespaces(7) — Linux manual page,” *man7.org*, Dec. 22, 2023. [Online]. Available: [https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/user\\_namespaces.7.html](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/user_namespaces.7.html). [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [60] “Run the Docker daemon as a non-root user (Rootless mode),” *docs.docker.com*, Feb. 21, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/rootless>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [61] “opencontainers/runc,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/opencontainers/runc>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [62] A. Sarai, “CVE-2019-5736: runc container breakout (all versions),” *seclists.org*, Feb. 12, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2019/q1/119>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [63] “KEP-127: Support User Namespaces,” *github.com*, Feb. 8, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/blob/master/keps/sig-node/127-user-namespaces/README.md>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [64] “Understanding docker container escapes,” *blog.trailofbits.com*, Jul. 19, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://blog.trailofbits.com/2019/07/19/understanding-docker-container-escapes>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [65] R. McCune, “Docker capabilities and no-new-privileges,” *raesene.github.io*, Jun. 1, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://raesene.github.io/blog/2019/06/01/docker-capabilities-and-no-new-privs>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [66] “No New Privileges Flag,” *kernel.org*. [Online]. Available: [https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.19/userspace-api/no\\_new\\_privs.html](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.19/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html). [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [67] M. Souppaya, J. Morello, and K. Scarfone, “Application Container Security Guide,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, Tech. Rep., 2017. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-190>
- [68] “CIS Docker Benchmarks,” Center for Internet Security, Tech. Rep., 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/docker>
- [69] “KernelNewbies: Linux\_3.8,” *kernelnewbies.org*, Dec. 30, 2017. [Online]. Available: [https://kernelnewbies.org/Linux\\_3.8](https://kernelnewbies.org/Linux_3.8). [Accessed: May 10, 2024]

- [70] “KernelNewbies: Linux\_4.5,” *kernelnewbies.org*, Dec. 30, 2017. [Online]. Available: [https://kernelnewbies.org/Linux\\_4.5](https://kernelnewbies.org/Linux_4.5). [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [71] “KernelNewbies: Linux\_5.6,” *kernelnewbies.org*, Apr. 23, 2020. [Online]. Available: [https://kernelnewbies.org/Linux\\_5.6](https://kernelnewbies.org/Linux_5.6). [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [72] Y. Avrahami, “New Linux Vulnerability CVE-2022-0492 Affecting Cgroups: Can Containers Escape?” *unit42.paloaltonetworks.com*, Mar. 3, 2022. [Online]. Available: <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2022-0492-cgroups>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [73] R. McCune, “Dirty Pipe Linux Vulnerability: Overwriting Files in Container Images,” *aquasec.com*, Mar. 8, 2022. [Online]. Available: <https://www.aquasec.com/blog/cve-2022-0847-dirty-pipe-linux-vulnerability/>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [74] R. McCune, “Linux Kernel Vulnerability: Escaping Containers by Abusing Cgroups,” *aquasec.com*, Mar. 9, 2022. [Online]. Available: <https://www.aquasec.com/blog/new-linux-kernel-vulnerability-escaping-containers-by-abusing-cgroups>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [75] “CVE-2021-44228 Detail,” *National Vulnerability Database*, Apr. 25, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [76] “seccomp(2) — Linux manual page,” *man7.org*, Dec. 22, 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/seccomp.2.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [77] “Seccomp BPF (SECure COMputing with filters),” *kernel.org*. [Online]. Available: [https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.16/userspace-api/seccomp\\_filter.html](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.16/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.html). [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [78] “Seccomp security profiles for Docker,” *docs.docker.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/seccomp>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [79] “Linux Container Configuration,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/config-linux.md>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]



- [80] “lxc.container.conf,” *linuxcontainers.org*, Jun. 03, 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://linuxcontainers.org/lxc/manpages/man5/lxc.container.conf.5.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [81] “What is SELinux?” *redhat.com*, Aug. 30, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/linux/what-is-selinux>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [82] L. Lei, J. Sun, K. Sun, C. Shenefiel, R. Ma, Y. Wang, and Q. Li, “Speaker: Split-phase execution of application containers,” in *Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment*. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 230–251. [Online]. Available: [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1\\_11](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60876-1_11)
- [83] N. Lopes, R. Martins, M. E. Correia, S. Serrano, and F. Nunes, “Container hardening through automated seccomp profiling,” in *Proceedings of the 2020 6th International Workshop on Container Technologies and Container Clouds*, ser. WOC’20. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2021, pp. 31–36. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3429885.3429966>
- [84] “AppArmor — Linux kernel security module.” [Online]. Available: <https://wiki.apparmor.net/>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [85] “AppArmor security profiles for Docker,” *docs.docker.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/apparmor>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [86] H. Zhu and C. Gehrman, “Lic-Sec: An enhanced AppArmor Docker security profile generator,” *Journal of Information Security and Applications*, vol. 61, p. 102924, 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2021.102924>
- [87] T. Cameron, “Security Enhanced Linux for mere mortals,” presented at the Red Hat Summit 2018, San Francisco, CA, USA, May 10, 2018. [Online]. Available: [https://youtu.be/\\_WOKRaM-HI4](https://youtu.be/_WOKRaM-HI4)
- [88] “opencontainers/runtime-spec — Configuration,” *github.com*, Sep. 28, 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/config.md>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [89] J. Corbet, “The LoadPin security module,” *lwn.net*, Apr. 6, 2016. [Online]. Available: <https://lwn.net/Articles/682302>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]



- [90] S. Ruffell, “A brief tour of Linux Security Modules,” *starlab.io*, Nov. 21, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://www.starlab.io/blog/a-brief-tour-of-linux-security-modules>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [91] “Smack,” *kernel.org*. [Online]. Available: <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.18/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [92] M. De Benedictis and A. Lioy, “Integrity verification of Docker containers for a lightweight cloud environment,” *Future Generation Computer Systems*, vol. 97, pp. 236–246, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2019.02.026>
- [93] S. Martínez-Magdaleno, V. Morales-Rocha, and R. Parra, “A review of security risks and countermeasures in containers,” *Int. J. Secur. Netw.*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 183–190, Jan. 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1504/ijasn.2021.117867>
- [94] “docker/docker-bench-security,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-security>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [95] “aquasecurity/docker-bench,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/aquasecurity/docker-bench>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [96] R. Sengupta, R. S. Sai Prashanth, Y. Pradhan, V. Rajashekar, and P. B. Honnavalli, “Metapod: Accessible Hardening of Docker Containers for Enhanced Security,” in *2021 IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT)*, 2021, pp. 01–06. [Online]. Available: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9622572>
- [97] K. Brady, S. Moon, T. Nguyen, and J. Coffman, “Docker Container Security in Cloud Computing,” in *2020 10th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC)*, 2020, pp. 0975–0980. [Online]. Available: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9031195>
- [98] O. Javed and S. Toor, “Understanding the quality of container security vulnerability detection tools,” *CoRR*, vol. abs/2101.03844, 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.03844>
- [99] P. Liu, S. Ji, L. Fu, K. Lu, X. Zhang, W.-H. Lee, T. Lu, W. Chen, and R. Beyah, “Understanding the security risks of docker hub,” in *Computer Security — ESORICS 2020*, L. Chen, N. Li, K. Liang, and S. Schneider, Eds.

- Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020, pp. 257–276. [Online]. Available: [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58951-6\\_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58951-6_13)
- [100] K. Wist, M. Helsem, and D. Gligoroski, “Vulnerability analysis of 2500 docker hub images,” in *Advances in Security, Networks, and Internet of Things*, K. Daimi, H. R. Arabnia, L. Deligiannidis, M.-S. Hwang, and F. G. Tinetti, Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021, pp. 307–327. [Online]. Available: [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71017-0\\_22](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71017-0_22)
- [101] K. Brady, S. Moon, T. Nguyen, and J. Coffman, “Docker container security in cloud computing,” in *2020 10th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC)*, 2020, pp. 0975–0980.
- [102] M. K. Abhishek and D. Rajeswara Rao, “Framework to Secure Docker Containers,” in *2021 Fifth World Conference on Smart Trends in Systems Security and Sustainability (WorldS4)*, 2021, pp. 152–156.
- [103] R. Moshkovich, “Industry’s First Dynamic Analysis of 4 million Publicly Available Docker Hub Container Images,” *prevasio.io*, Dec. 1, 2020. [Online]. Available: [https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/609ccd86b14ba6e17f9fbce4/643ba6fc599bb82bfdea2456\\_Red\\_Kangaroo.pdf](https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/609ccd86b14ba6e17f9fbce4/643ba6fc599bb82bfdea2456_Red_Kangaroo.pdf). [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [104] I. Thomson, “CoreOS open sources Clair, the vulnerability scanner for your containers,” *theregister.com*, Nov. 13, 2015. [Online]. Available: [https://www.theregister.com/2015/11/13/coreos\\_open\\_sources\\_vulnerability\\_scanner](https://www.theregister.com/2015/11/13/coreos_open_sources_vulnerability_scanner). [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [105] “What is Clair?” *redhat.com*, Jan. 8, 2019. [Online]. Available: <https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/containers/what-is-clair>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [106] “Chapter 7. Clair Security Scanning,” *access.redhat.com*. [Online]. Available: [https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red\\_hat\\_quay/3.6/html/manage\\_red\\_hat\\_quay/clair-intro2](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_quay/3.6/html/manage_red_hat_quay/clair-intro2). [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [107] “Deploying Clair — Clair Documentation,” *quay.github.io*. [Online]. Available: <https://quay.github.io/clair/howto/deployment.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [108] “Getting Started,” *aquasecurity.github.io*. [Online]. Available: <https://aquasecurity.github.io/trivy/v0.51>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]

- [109] “Vulnerability Scanning,” *aquasecurity.github.io*. [Online]. Available: <https://aquasecurity.github.io/trivy/v0.51/docs/scanner/vulnerability>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [110] D. Team, “Announcing Docker Scout GA: Actionable Insights for the Software Supply Chain,” oct. 4, 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://www.docker.com/blog/announcing-docker-scout-ga>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [111] “Advisory database sources and matching service,” *docs.docker.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://docs.docker.com/scout/advisory-db-sources>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [112] “Anchore Unveils New Open Source Tools For Automated DevSecOps Pipeline Security,” *prnewswire.com*, Oct. 06, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/anchore-unveils-new-open-source-tools-for-automated-devsecops-pipeline-security-301145501.html>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [113] “anchore/grype,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/anchore/grype>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [114] “snyk/cli,” *github.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://github.com/snyk/cli>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [115] “Container scanning overview,” *cloud.google.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://cloud.google.com/artifact-analysis/docs/container-scanning-overview>. [Accessed: May 10, 2024]
- [116] P. Fränti and R. Mariescu-Istodor, “Soft precision and recall,” *Pattern Recognition Letters*, vol. 167, pp. 115–121, 2023. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2023.02.005>

## A Clair docker-compose.yaml

```
1 services:
2   postgres:
3     image: docker.io/library/postgres:12
4     networks:
5       - clair-local
6     ports:
7       - 5432:5432
8     environment:
9       POSTGRES_PASSWORD: clair
10      POSTGRES_USER: clair
11      POSTGRES_DB: clair
12    restart: unless-stopped
13  clair:
14    image: clair-local:latest
15    networks:
16      - clair-local
17    ports:
18      - 6060:6060
19    restart: unless-stopped
20    volumes:
21      - ./local-dev/clair:/config
22    environment:
23      CLAIR_MODE: combo
24      CLAIR_CONF: /config/config.yaml
25  networks:
26    clair-local:
27      driver: bridge
```