Lattice-based Cryptanalysis:	Mar-17, 2011
Simultaneous Diophantine approximation (SDA): Laga	17.03 (82
* Diophantine Approx: Given a real x, approximate it as	ay
(with integer a,b), such that $\left[\chi - \frac{9}{6}\right] \approx \frac{1}{26}$	
* Simultaneous D. A: Given many x's, approximate al	el with
the same approximate-common-denominator 3 = 5 5.4	5- ×1/2 26
* If the Xi's are cational then there is an exact so	lution
~ - ai/ (b is the LCM of all the denominators)	
Lit we often want to approximate with denominato	125
* Dofintion: Let & x = = 1 ai, b = 2, i=1,2,n	s be an
instance of SDA. We say that an approximate-Comm	on-denominator
instance of SDA. We say that an approximate-comm q is of quality (ε, δ) if $9 \neq 0$, $9 \in \mathbb{Z}$ and the	tellowing
conditions hold	
$9 \leq \epsilon b$, and	
o gox; is within of of an integer for all i=1,2,	/ C
(namely IP: such that $\left \frac{a_i}{b} - \frac{P_i}{q}\right \leq \frac{\gamma_0}{q}$	
* Consider the lattice spanned by columns of Binnixi, (where c is a parameter).	1+/)
(where c is a parameter),	
Note: (det(B)= b.c) so by Minkowsky	we know
$B = \begin{bmatrix} a_1 & b \\ a_2 & b \end{bmatrix}$ that $\Lambda(B)$ has nonzero vectors of	leng th
$3 = \begin{cases} a_1 & b \\ a_2 & b \end{cases}$ that $\Lambda(B)$ has nonzero vectors of $ \leq \sqrt{n+1} \cdot \det(B)^{n+1} = \sqrt{n+1} \cdot b \cdot \binom{c}{b}^{n+1} $ Heuristically we expect $\Lambda(B)$ to have	
(an b) Heuristically we expect $\Lambda(8)$ to have	exponentially
many vektors (in n) of length & poly(n)	· b. ()
and for "random" SDA instance we exp	ect no
Vectors of length & b. (=) n+1 / poly (-)	
* Claim: From any vector in N(B) of length oxl	≤6 we
can compute efficiently an approx-common-denomina	tor q
K Claim: From any vector in $N(B)$ of length $0 \le l$. can compute efficiently an approx-common-denomina of quality (ℓ, δ) with $\ell \le l/b \cdot c$ $\ell \le 2l/b$	
0 = 22/6	

Proof: Let $\vec{\chi} \in \Lambda(B)$, $\phi \neq ||\vec{\chi}|| \neq b$, and we write $\vec{\chi} = B\vec{J}$ with \vec{Q} \vec{J} an integer vector

$$\vec{\chi} = \begin{pmatrix} c \\ a_1 & b \\ \vdots \\ a_n & b \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} q \\ -\rho_1 \\ \vdots \\ -\rho_n \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} eq \\ qa_1 - \rho_1b \\ \vdots \\ qa_n - \rho_nb \end{pmatrix} = b \begin{pmatrix} c \frac{1}{1}b \\ q\frac{a_1}{b} - \rho_1 \\ \vdots \\ q\frac{a_n}{b} - \rho_n \end{pmatrix}$$

Note that we cannot have q=0, or else we get $\|x\| \ge \max \{\|p_i\|^2\}$ and since the p_i 's are integers and $\|x\| \le b$ then it must be that all the p_i 's are zero (which is a Kontradiction).

· Hence we have eq < l so E = % < @ 1/60

o Also, for all i, the distance from $q \cdot \frac{a_i}{b}$ to the nearest integer is at most $|q \cdot \frac{a_i}{b} - p_i| \le l_b$, namely $\delta \le \frac{2l}{b}$

Note: If we want to set $\varepsilon = \delta$ then we need $c = \frac{1}{2}$, but usually (ε, δ) come from the application and then

we set $c = \frac{5}{2}\epsilon$.

Claim: From any approxo-common-denominator which is (ε, δ) -good we can compute a vector $0 \neq \tilde{\chi} \in \Lambda(B)$ of length at most $\|\tilde{\chi}\| \leq b \cdot \sqrt{(c \cdot \varepsilon)^2 + n \cdot \delta^2} \leq b (c \varepsilon + \sqrt{n} \delta)$.

Proof is essentially the same as above.

* Hence there is basically 1-1 correspondence between "good" approx.-common-denominators and "short" vectors in $\Lambda(B)$.

Note: This is an easy example of how lattice-based algorithms work: We look for ways to cast the problem at hand as consisting of linear relations with integer coefficients and finding small solutions.

Using SDA to solve approximate-GCD * We have parameters & < nex, We are given as input $\{ w_i = f_i p + r_i \}$ $i = 0, 1, ..., n_i \text{ where } p \in_R [2^{n_i} + 1, 2^n - 1], p \text{ odd}$ 4: er [20-1, 20-1], Vi er [-2+1, 20-1]. We can assume w.l.o.g. that wo > wi for all i => 90 > 9i . * Construct the SDA instance $\{x_i = \frac{w_i}{w_o} \mid i=1,\dots,n\}$ Claim: 4. is an approx. - common-denominator of quality (ε, δ) with $\varepsilon \leq 2^{-n+1}$ and $\delta \leq 2^{-n+3}$ Proof: $E = \frac{4}{\omega_0} = \frac{40}{90P+r_0} = \frac{90}{90(P+r_0)} \leq \frac{1}{P-1} \leq 2^{-n+1}$ To bound of, note that $\theta_0 \cdot \frac{\omega_i}{\omega_0} = \theta_0 \cdot \frac{\theta_i p_+ r_i}{\theta_0 p_+ r_0} = \frac{\theta_i p_+ r_i}{p_+ r_0 \theta_0} = \frac{\theta_i (p_+ r_0) - \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_0} r_0 + r_i}{p_+ r_0 \theta_0} = \theta_i + \frac{r_i - \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_0} r_0}{p_+ r_0 \theta_0}$ hence the distance between 40 wo and the nearest integer is $\sqrt[6]{2} = \left| \frac{\Gamma_i - \frac{4}{90} \Gamma_0}{\rho + \frac{4}{90} \Gamma_0} \right| \le \frac{|r_i| + |r_0|}{\rho - 1} \le \frac{2^{\rho + 1}}{2^{n - 1}} = 2^{\rho - n + 2}$ * We therefore use parameter $c = \frac{5}{2} = \frac{2^{9-n+3}}{2 \cdot 2^{-n+1}} = 2^{9+1}$ for the lattice $det(B) = \omega_o^{n+1} \cdot \frac{2^{g+1}}{\omega_o}$, if this was a $B = \begin{pmatrix} 2^{9+1} \\ \omega_1 & \omega_0 \end{pmatrix}$ "random instance" then we expect to find
in $\Lambda(B)$ vectors of size $N(\omega_0 \left(\frac{2^{9+1}}{\omega_0}\right)^{N+1} \sqrt{n+1})$ Where M_0 However, the vector corresponding to M_0 has Size \$ \(\int_1 \cdot 9 \cdot 2 \) Q4. When do we expect that the vector corresponding to go be the Shortest nonzero vector in N(B)? A: When n is large enough so that $9.2^{9H} \ll \omega_0 \cdot \left(\frac{2^{9H}}{\omega_0}\right)^{1/2}$ Recall that $90 \sim 2^8$, $60 \sim 2^{8+n}$, this means that we need $2^{8+9+1} \simeq 2^{8+n+((9+1-8)/n+1)} \simeq 8+9+1 \simeq 8+n+\frac{9+1-8}{n+1}$ $\langle = \rangle (n+1) \gg \frac{\chi - \beta - 1}{m - \beta - 1} \approx m$

* If we have enough samples (n >> 8/n) the the vector corresponding (y) to 90 will be the shortest nonzero vector in 1(B). We can then hope that running LLL on B will recover this vector, and thereby also go (and the secret p). Q2: Will this attack work? A: Depends on the sizes of n and & (recall pran, 9, 2). Example-1: Assume that we set $r = n^2$, and $n = 2 \frac{\pi}{n} = 2n$ The smallest vector in $\Lambda(8)$ is the one corresponding to 90 of size $\sim \sqrt{2n} \cdot 2^{8+9}$ are of size ~ \square \lambda \lambda \text{not multiples of the shortest} \ \ \text{are of size ~ \square \lambda n \text{wo} \cdot \lambda n \text{\square} \chi \square \lambda n \text{\square} \chi \lambda n \text{\square} \lambda \lambda n \text{\square} \lambda n \t ₹ Jan - 25+11/2 • Using LLL-like algorithm with approximation factor ≤ 2 1/8 = 2 12/4 we can find a vector in $\Lambda(B)$ of size at most $2^{m/4}$. $\sqrt{2m} \cdot 2^{8+9} = \sqrt{2m} \cdot 2^{8+m/4+9} \neq \sqrt{2m} \cdot 2^{8+m/2}$ Hence this must be a multiple of the vector corresponding to 90. Then we can find the vector itself, and therefore to and P. Example 2: Set $T = n^3$, and still $n = 2^{n} = 2n^2$ • Now any algorithm with approximation factor $2^{en} = 2^{en^2}$ will only be able to find vectors of size

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Hence it will almost surely find on of the exponentially many
auxiliary vectors, and not the one corresponding to 90

Trawing through the parameters, the safe region" is $\gamma = \omega(n^2)$.