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What's "Advanced Cryptography"?

- Cryptography beyond encryption, signatures
 - -Protecting computation, not just data
 - I'll mention three technologies:
 - –Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP)
 - Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
 - Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)









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Not in this talk:

- Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
- Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE)

Advanced Cryptography is

Needed





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Fast enough to be useful





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Not "generally usable" yet








The Need for Advanced Cryptography

Your Privacy for Sale

- We give up privacy in return for services
 - location for directions, restaurant recommendation
 - health data for "personalized medicine"
 - financials for tax, investment services
 - purchace history for better ads, coupons
 - **—** ...
- Personalized services require personal information
 - or so we are told

Data Abuse in the New Normal

- The entire IT industry is busy making it easier
 - Larger collections, better ways to process them



- Make no mistake: it will only get worse
 - We cannot provide the opportunity for easy abuse, and seriously expect it not to happen

The Promise of Advanced Cryptography

Blindfold Computation



- The ability to process data without ever seeing it
 - Personalized services without access to private information


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
Blindfold Computation



- Also useful for more traditional security issues
 - E.g., key and credential management, many more ...
 - Not the focus of this talk, though










Types of Advanced Cryptography

Zero Knowledge Proofs

- I have a secret
 - I can convince you of some properties of my secret
 - Without revealing it



Available (in principle) since the 80's [GMR'85]

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- Example: my secret is my purchase history






Zero Knowledge Proofs

- I have a secret
 - I can convince you of some properties of my secret
 - Without revealing it
- Example: my secret is my purchase history
 - I can prove that I bought 10 gallons of milk this month
 - so I can get a coupon
 - Without revealing anything else

Secure Multi-Party Computation

- We all have our individual secrets
 - We can compute a function of these secrets
 - Without revaling them to each other (or anyone else)



Goal:

Correctness: Everyone computes $y=f(x_1,...,x_n)$

Privacy: Nothing but the output is revealed


Available (in principle) since the 80's [Yao'86, GMW'86]

Secure Multi-Party Computation

- We all have our individual secrets
 - We can compute a function of these secrets
 - Without revaling them to each other (or anyone else)
- Example: medical data
 - Evaluating the effectivness of a treatment f(patient1Data, patient2Data, ...) = effective/not-effective
 - Data for different patients held by different clinics
 - Can compute this with revealing any private data

Homomorphic Encryption

- Data can be processed in encrypted form
 - Result is also encrypted



Available (in principle) for <10 years [Gen'09]

Homomorphic Encryption

- Data can be processed in encrypted form
 - Result is also encrypted

- Example: location services
 - I encrypt my location, send to yelp
 - Yelp compute an encrypted table lookup
 - T[cityBlock#] = ads for nearby coffee shops
 - I get back encrypted recommendation for coffee shops within two blocks




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Fast Enough to be Useful

Performance of Advanced Cryptography

- Improving performence has been a major research topic over the last 30 years
 - Tremendous progress, many orders of magnitude
- For almost any realistic tasks, there is a cryptographic solution with adequate performance
 - Although designing it may take a team of experts




Speed Examples: Zero-Knowledge



- Digital currencies (zCoin, zCash, ...):
 - Proving that I have sufficiently many unspent coins on the ledger
 - Constructing proof in ~1min, verification in a few msec
- Anonymous credentials (idemix)
 - Proving that I possess a credential, takes 1-30 seconds
- Many other uses
 - Private payments in the Brave browser (using Anonize)

— . . .

Speed Examples: Secure MPC



- Biometric authentication in ~100ms
 - f(db, newSample) = match/noMatch
- Private set intersection in 1-30 seconds
 - Intersection of two sets with thousands of members
- Finding similar patients in a database in ~30sec
 - Best 5 (approx) matches against 4000 patients, 1000 markers
- "Generic computation": 1M gates in 1sec-5min
 - Depending on # of parties, LAN / WAN, adversary model

Speed Examples: HE

- Similarity of encrypted feature vectors
 - Computing similarity of two 1M-marker sequences in minutes
- Inference of simple NNets on encrypted data
 - Amortized 1000 perditions/minute on MNIST optical characters
- Computing a logistic-regression model on genome data
 - Under 10 minutes with 10-15 columns, ~1000 rows





Advanced Crypto Implementations

- Many software libraries for ZKP / MPC / FHE
 - Most of them open-source, a few proprietary
- Very hard to compare them, decide which technology/implementation to use for what purpose
 - Different tools, data & computation models, performance profiles, security guarantees, ...
 - Hardly any accepted benchmarks
- Most libraries are written for speed, not usability

Complexity of Advanced Cryptography

- Distributed computing is already complex
- "Advanced cryptography" also needs oblivious computation
 - Usually cannot do

```
if (secretCondition) then do X else do Y
```


- Instead must do both X, Y, then MUX (X, Y; secretCondition)
- Good performence requires extreme optimizations
 - Straightforward implementation will be exceedingly slow
- Tension between simplicity/usability and performance

Example: Communication in Secure-MPC

- Communication between parties is a bottleneck in many protocols for secure multi-party computation
 - To optimize, many MPC libraries work with sockets
 - The library expects to be "in charge" of IP-address:port
- What if my system has its own communication layer?
 - E.g. working over https, gRPC, ...
- Retrofitting existing libraries to use "abstract channels" is a lot of work, may degrade performance

Example: Data Encoding for FHE

- Ciphertext operations in contemporary FHE is slow
- "Ciphertext packing" to gain in performance
 - Each ciphertext encrypts a vector of plaintext element
 - Ciphertext operations effect element-wise operations



Vector-size is a parameter, depends on the algebra

Example: Data Encoding for FHE (2)

- Lots of flexibility in setting the parameters
 - Determine plaintext modulus, vector-size, more
 - Choosing the right parameters is an art form
- Even with parameters set, where to put each piece of data requires a careful design
 - Could get orders-of-magnitude performance difference between different packing schemes
- No tool support for making any of these choices

Taming the Complexity

- How to make advanced cryptography usable to non-expert programmers?
- Frameworks, compiler support
 - Initial research work along these lines (Fabric, Obliv-C)
- Usable "toolboxes" for common tasks
 - Low level: arithmetic, sorting, linear algebra, ...
 - Mid level: graphs algorithms, set intersection, ML tools, ...
 - Domain specific tasks (medical, financial, ...)
- We must shift focus from speed to usability

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We need engagement of cryptographers and system builders

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