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Question 1: Shor's Algorithm Threat to RSA and ECC:

- Threat: Shor's algorithm efficiently factors large elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (breaking ECC) on quantum computers.

Consequences:

- > RSA and ECC-based encryption, key exchange, and digital signatures become insecure.
- > critical systems (e.g., banking, TLS, cryptocurrencies) relying on these algorithms would need post-quantum replacements (e.g., lattice-based cryptography).

Question 2: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

- Role: QKD uses quantum mechanics (e.g., Photon Polarization) to securely distribute keys, providing unconditional security against eavesdropping (detected via quantum state disturbances).
- Difference from classical Encryption.
 - > Classical PKI relies on physical laws (e.g., no-cloning theorem).

(2)

Question 3: Lattice-Based vs Traditional Encryption

- Lattice-Based: Uses hard problem like Learning With Errors (LWE) or Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). Resistant to quantum attacks.
- Traditional (RSA/ECC): Relies on factoring or discrete logarithms, vulnerable to Shor's algorithm.
- Advantage: Lattice-based schemes offer quantum resistance and simpler operations (e.g., matrix multiplications).

Question 4: Python PRNG with System Time and Seed.

Python

```
import time
```

```
def custom_prng(seed):
```

```
    current_time = int(time.time())
```

```
    combined = (current_time * seed) % 2**32
```

```
    return combined
```

(3)

seed = 42

random_number = custom.Prng(seed)

Print(f"Generated number: {random_number}")

Output:

text

Generated number: 123456789# Example output
(Varies with time)

Question 5: Sieve of Eratosthenes

- Algorithm: Iteratively marks multiples of primes starting from 2.

- Primes < 50:

2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43,

47

- Time complexity: $O(n \log \log n)$

(faster than trial division's $O(n^2)$).

4.1

Question 6: Carmichael Numbers

• Conditions: A composite n is Carmichael if:

1. n is square-free.
2. For all a coprime to n , $a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.

• Verification:

-> 561: Meet conditions (smallest Carmichael number).

-> 1105: $1105 = 5 \times 13 \times 17$; Passes tests.

-> 1729: $1729 = 7 \times 13 \times 19$; Passes tests.

Question 7: Algebraic Structures

1. \mathbb{Z}_{11} with $(+;)$:

-> yes, a ring (modular arithmetic)

Satisfies ring axioms.

2. $(\mathbb{Z}_{37}, +)$:

• yes, Abelian group (inverses exist, commutative).

3. $(\mathbb{Z}_{35}, \times)$:

4-2

-> NO, not a group (element without inverses e.g., 5).

Question 8: Remainder of $-52 \bmod 31 = 52 \bmod 31$

• Calculation:

$$-52 \bmod 31 = (-52 + 2 \times 31) \bmod 31 = 10 \bmod 31 = 52 \bmod 31$$

$$31 = (-52 + 2 \times 31) \bmod 31 = 10 \bmod 31.$$

Answer: 15.

Question 9: Multiplicative Inverse of 7 mod 26

• Extended Euclidean Steps:

$$26 = 3 \times 7 + 5$$

$$7 = 1 \times 5 + 2$$

$$5 = 2 \times 2 + 1$$

$$\text{Back-substitute: } 1 = 5 - 2 \times 2 = 5 - 2 \times (7 - 1 \times 5) =$$

$$3 \times 5 - 2 \times 7 = 5 - 2 \times 2 = 5 - 2 \times (7 - 1 \times 5) = 3 \times 5 - 2 \times 7.$$

$$1 = 3 \times (26 - 3 \times 7) - 2 \times 7 = 3 \times 26 - 11 \times 7 = 3 \times (26 - 3 \times 7) - 2 \times 7 = 3 \times 26 - 11 \times 7.$$

$$\text{Inverse: } -11 \bmod 26 = 15$$

$$-11 \bmod 26 = 15$$

Answer: 15

5

Question 10: Negative Modular Multiplication

• Calculation:

$$(-8 \times 5) \bmod 17 = (-40) \bmod 17 = 40 + 3 \times 17 =$$

$$11 \quad (-8 \times 5) \bmod 7 = (-40) \bmod 17 = -40 + 3 \times 17 = 11.$$

• Simplification Rule: Convert negatives to Positives by adding multiples of the modulus.

Question 11: Bézout's Theorem

• Theorem: For integers a, b , there exist x, y such

$$\text{that } ax + by = \gcd(a, b) \quad ax + by = \gcd(a, b).$$

• Proof: uses Euclidean algorithm back - Substitution.

• Inverse of 97 mod 385:

$$\gcd(97, 385) = 1, \text{ so inverse exists.}$$

$$\text{Solution: } x = 317 \quad x = 317 \text{ (or } 68 \bmod 385 \text{ or } 58 \bmod 385).$$

Question 12: Bézout's Identity and solution

• Proof: Follows from Euclidean algorithm.

• Solve $43x \equiv 1 \pmod{240}$ $43x \equiv 1 \pmod{240}$

• $\gcd(43, 240) = 1$ and $(43; 240) = 1$,

so $x = 67$ (since $43 \times 67 = 2881 \equiv 1 \pmod{240}$).

Question 13: Fermat's Little Theorem

• Theorem: If p is prime, $a^p \equiv a \pmod{p}$ and $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$.

• Primality test for 561:

Test $2560 \pmod{561}$. Fails (561 is Carmichael, not prime).

• Compute $5123 \pmod{175}$ $5123 \pmod{175}$:

$175 = 25 \times 7$. Use CRT:

$5123 \pmod{25} = 0$ $5123 \pmod{25} = 0$.

$5123 \pmod{7} = 5(123 \pmod{6}) \pmod{7} = 53 \pmod{7}$

$= 6$ $5123 \pmod{7} = 5(123 \pmod{6}) \pmod{7} = 53 \pmod{7} = 6$.

7

Solve $x \equiv 0 \pmod{25}$, $25x \equiv 0 \pmod{25}$, $x \equiv 6 \pmod{7}$, $x \equiv 6 \pmod{7}$.

7:

$$x = 25k, x = 25k \equiv 6 \pmod{7} \Rightarrow k \equiv 4 \pmod{7}, 25k \equiv 6 \pmod{7}$$

$$\Rightarrow k \equiv 4 \pmod{7}.$$

$$x = 25 \times 4 = 100, x = 25 \times 4 = 100.$$

Answer: 100.

Question: 14: Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT).

CRT statement: If moduli are coprime, a unique solution exists modulo their product.

Solution:

$$1. \text{ Solve } x \equiv 2 \pmod{3}, x \equiv 2 \pmod{3}, x \equiv 3 \pmod{5}$$

$$5x \equiv 3 \pmod{5}.$$

$$x = 5k + 3, x = 5k + 3. \text{ Substitute into}$$

$$\text{first: } 5k + 3 \equiv 2 \pmod{3} \Rightarrow k \equiv 1 \pmod{3}, 5k + 3 \equiv 2 \pmod{3}$$

$$\Rightarrow k \equiv 1 \pmod{3}.$$

$$k = 3m + 1, k = 3m + 1, \text{ so } x = 15 + 8x = 15m + 8.$$

2. Solve $x \equiv 8 \pmod{15}$ and $x \equiv 2 \pmod{7}$.
 $x \equiv 8 \pmod{15}$ and $x \equiv 2 \pmod{7}$.

$$x = 15n + 8$$

$$\text{Substitute: } 15n + 8 \equiv 2 \pmod{7} \Rightarrow n \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$$

$$\text{Final Answer: } x \equiv 23 \pmod{105}$$

Question 15: CIA Triad

- Confidentiality: Encryption (e.g., AES).
- Integrity: Hashing/MACs (e.g., SHA-256).
- Availability: Redundancy / DoS Protection.

Question 16: Steganography vs. Cryptography.

- Steganography: Hides data existence (e.g., in images, LSB manipulation).
- Cryptography: Scrambles data (e.g., AES).
- Techniques: LSB, frequency domain masking (DCT).

Question 17: Phishing, Malware, Dos

- Phishing: Deception (e.g., fake emails).
- Malware: software harm (e.g., ransomware).
- Dos: overloads resources (e.g., SYN floods).

Question 18: GDPR and Cyber Attacks

- Role: Mandates data protection (e.g., encryption, breach reporting), reducing attack impact via accountability.

Question 19: DES Algorithm Overview

1. Initial Permutation (IP): Rearranges

(64-bit) Plaintext.

2. 16 Rounds: Feistel network with XOR

S-boxes and Permutations.

3. Final Permutation (FP): Inverse of IP.

Example: Plaintext 0x0123456789ABCDEF,

key 0x133457799BBCEDEFF.

Question 20: DES Round Function

Given: $R_0 = 0xFOFOFOFO$, $K_1 = 0x0F0F0F0F$

$R_0 = 0xFOFOFOFO$, $K_1 = 0x0F0F0F0F$

$0x0F0F0F0F$

$= 0x0F0F0F0F$, $L_0 = 0xAAAAAAAA$

$AAAAAAAA$

steps:

1. $f(R_0, K_1) = R_0 \oplus K_1 = 0xFFFFFFF$

$K_1) = R_0 \oplus K_1 = 0xFFFFFFF$

$$2. L1 = R0 = 0 \times F0F0F0F0L1 = R0 = 0 \times F0F0F0F0.$$

$$3. R1 = L0 \oplus f(R0, K1) = 0 \times AAAAAAAAAA \oplus 0 \times FFFF$$

$$FFFF = 0 \times 55555555 R1 = L0 \oplus f(R0, K1)$$

$$= 0 \times AAAAAAAAAA \oplus 0 \times FFFFFFFF = 0 \times 55555555$$

Question 21: AES SubBytes

• Input: $[0 \times 23, 0 \times A7, 0 \times 4C, 0 \times 19]$ $[0 \times 23, 0 \times A7, 0 \times 4C, 0 \times 19]$.

• S-box Lookup:

$\rightarrow 0 \times 23 \rightarrow 0 \times 23 \rightarrow$ Row 2, Col 3 $\rightarrow D4$ (from table).

$\rightarrow 0 \times A7 \rightarrow 0 \times A7 \rightarrow$ Row A, Col 7 $\rightarrow 0 \times 63$.

$\rightarrow 0 \times 4C \rightarrow 0 \times 4C \rightarrow$ Not in table (hypothetical: assume $0 \times 4C$ maps to $0 \times 2E$).

$\rightarrow 0x19 \rightarrow 0x19 \rightarrow$ Not in table (hypothetical:
assume $0x19$ maps to $0xC6$).

• Output: $[0xD4, 0x63, 0x2E, 0xC6][0xD4, 0x63, 0x2E, 0xC6]$.

Question 22: AES AddRoundKey

• Input: $[0x14, 0x2B, 0x3C, 0x4D][0x14, 0x2B, 0x3C, 0x4D]$

• Round Key: $[0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88][0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88]$

• XOR Result:

$$0x14 \oplus 0x55 = 0x41 \quad 0x14 \oplus 0x55 = 0x41$$

$$0x2B \oplus 0x66 = 0x4D \quad 0x2B \oplus 0x66 = 0x4D$$

$$0x3C \oplus 0x77 = 0x4B \quad 0x3C \oplus 0x77 = 0x4B$$

$$0x4D \oplus 0x88 = 0xC5 \quad 0x4D \oplus 0x88 = 0xC5$$

• Output: $[0x41, 0x4D, 0x4B, 0xC5][0x41, 0x4D, 0x4B, 0xC5]$.

Question 23: AES MixColumns

• Input Column: $[0x01, 0x03, 0x04][0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04]$.

• Matrix Multiplication ($GF(2^8)$):

• $0x01 \times 0x02 = 0x02$, $0x01 \times 0x03 = 0x03$, $0x02 \times 0x03 = 0x06$, etc.

• Sum: $0x02 \oplus 0x06 \oplus 0x03 \oplus 0x04 = 0x07$, $0x02 \oplus 0x06 \oplus 0x03 \oplus 0x04 = 0x07$.

• Output Column: $[0x07, \dots][0x07, \dots]$ (complete similarly for other rows).

Question 24: AES-OFB Mode

• Working: Encrypts an IV to produce a

keystream, XORed with Plaintext. Self-Synchronizing (errors in ciphertext affect only corresponding plaintext bits).

• Synchronization: IV must match; Keystream regenerates identically.

Question 25: Error Propagation in AES

Modes: $P \oplus M = C$ $C \oplus M = P$

• CBC: Errors Propagate to subsequent blocks (corrupts entire block + next block's same bit).

• CFB: Affects current and next block's same bit position.

• ECB: No Propagation (independent blocks).

Question 26: AES Mode for Large Files

- Recommendation: CTR mode.
- Why: Parallelizable (nonce + counter), no error propagation, efficient for bulk data.

Question 27: RSA Encryption / Decryption

- Encrypt $M=11$
 $C = M \bmod n = 11 \bmod 14 = 11$
 $11 \bmod 14 = 1$.

- Decrypt $C=11$
 $M = C^d \bmod n = 11^3 \bmod 14 = 11 \bmod 14 = 11$
 $11^3 \bmod 14 = 1$.

Question 28: RSA Digital Signature

- Given: $H(M)=5$, $d=3$, $n=33$
 33 .

- Signature: $S = H(M)d \bmod n = 53 \bmod 33 = 125 \bmod 33 = 26$
 $S = H(M)d \bmod n = 53 \bmod 33 = 125 \bmod 33 = 26.$

Question 29: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- Aleya's Public

Key: $A = 8 \bmod P = 34 \bmod 17 = 81 \bmod 17 = 13A =$

$$8 \bmod 17 = 81 \bmod 17 = 13.$$

- Badol's Public:

Key: $B = 8 \bmod P = 35 \bmod 17 = 243 \bmod$

$$17 = 5B = 8 \bmod P = 35 \bmod 17 = 243 \bmod 17 = 5.$$

Question 30: Simple Hash Function

- Hash of "AB":

ASCII of 'A' = 65, 'B' = 66

$$\text{Sum} = 66 + 65 = 131$$

$$H("BA") = 131 \bmod 100 = 31$$

- Collision: Both messages produce the same hash (31), demonstrating weak collision resistance in this hash function.

Question 31: Simple MAC

- MAC Calculation:

$$\text{MAC} = (15 + 7) \bmod 17 = 22 \bmod 17 = 5$$

$$\text{MAC} = (15 + 7) \bmod 17 = 22 \bmod 17 = 5$$

- Forgery Attempt:

Attacker changes message to 10 but doesn't know the key.

without the key, they cannot compute the correct MAC (which would be $(10+7) \bmod 17 = 0$ ($(10+7) \bmod 17 = 0$)).

Conclusion: Forgery is not possible without the key.

Question 32: TLS Handshake Process

1. ClientHello: Client sends supported cipher and a random number.
2. ServerHello: Server chooses cipher suite, sends its certificate; and a random number.
3. Key Exchange: Client verifies the certificate, generates a Pre-master Secret, encrypts it with the server's

Public key and sends it.

4. Session keys: Both sides derive symmetric keys from the pre-master secret and random numbers.

5. Finished: Encrypted "Finished" message confirms handshake success.

Symmetric Key Establishment: Asymmetric cryptography (e.g., RSA or ECDH) securely exchanges the pre-master secret, which is used to derive symmetric keys.

Question 33: SSH Protocol stack

1. Transport Layer: Handles encryption,

integrity and host authentication (e.g., Diffie-Hellman key exchange).

2. Authentication Layer: Manages user authentication (e.g., password, public key).

3. Connection Layer: Multiplexes channels (e.g., shells, file transfers).

Question 34: TLS Handshake (Repeated)

Same as Question 32.

Question 35: Elliptic curve Equation

• General Form:

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p} \quad y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$$

Use in cryptography: Provides hard problems (e.g., ECDLP) for secure key exchange with smaller key sizes than RSA.

Question 36: ECC vs. RSA

• Smaller Key Sizes: ECC relies on the hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), which is computationally harder than factoring (RSA). A 256-bit ECC key \approx 3072-bit RSA key in security.

Question 37: Point on Elliptic curve?

• Check: substitute $P = (3, 6)$ into

$$y^2 \equiv x^3 + 2x + 3 \pmod{97}$$

$$6^2 \equiv 36 \pmod{97}$$

$$3^3 + 2(3) + 3 = 27 + 6 + 3 = 36 \pmod{97}$$

$$+3 = 27 + 6 + 3 = 36 \pmod{97}$$

Result: $36 \equiv 36$, So P lies on the curve.

Question 38: ElGamal Ciphertext

• Given: $p=23$, $g=5$, $h=8$, $m=10$, $k=6$, $p=23$,
 $g=5$, $h=8$; $m=10$, $k=6$.

• Steps:

$$1. c_1 = g^k \bmod p = 5^6 \bmod 23 = 15625 \bmod 23$$

$$23 = 8 \quad c_1 = g^k \bmod p = 5^6 \bmod 23 = 15625 \bmod 23 = 8.$$

$$2. c_2 = m \cdot h^k \bmod p = 10 \cdot 8^6 \bmod 23 \quad c_2 = m \cdot h^k \bmod p = 10 \cdot 8^6 \bmod 23.$$

$$8^6 \bmod 23 = 262144 \bmod 23 = 12 \quad 8^6 \bmod 23 = 262144 \bmod 23 = 12.$$

$$c_2 = 10 \cdot 12 \bmod 23 = 120 \bmod 23 = 5 \quad c_2 = 10 \cdot 12 \bmod 23 = 120 \bmod 23 = 5.$$

$$\text{• Ciphertext: } (c_1, c_2) = (8, 5) \quad (c_1, c_2) = (8, 5).$$

Question 39: Lightweight cryptography for IoT

- Importance: IoT devices have limited resources (CPU, memory, Power). Lightweight algorithms minimize overhead while maintaining security.
- Example: ChaCha20 (stream cipher) or PRESENT (block cipher).

Question 40: Common IoT-Specific

Attacks and Mitigations

1. Firmware Hijacking

- Explanation: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in IoT device firmware to inject malicious code (e.g., via unsecured OTA updates).

• Mitigations:

- Code signing: Require cryptographically signed firmware updates.

- Secure Boot: Ensure only trusted firmware executes.

- Regular Patching: Maintain firmware updates from vendors.

2. Physical Tampering

- Explanation: Attackers gain physical access to extract data, modify hardware, or bypass security (e.g., UART Pin access, JTAG debugging).

- Mitigation:

→ Tamper-Proof Enclosures: Use anti-tampering hardware seals.

→ Secure Storage: Encrypt sensitive data (e.g. TPM/HSM modules).

→ Zeroize on Tamper: Wipe memory if tampering is detected.

3. Botnets (e.g., Mirai)

• Explanation: Compromised IoT devices are enlisted in DDoS botnets via default credentials or exploits.

• Mitigations:

→ Change default credentials: Enforce strong unique passwords.

→ Network segmentation: Isolate IoT devices from critical networks.

Traffic Monitoring: Detect abnormal traffic (e.g., sudden spikes in outbound requests).