


Introduction

This report will see me act as a security analyst to investigate a security incident. The objective is to identify the infected host, dictate how it occurred and classify the type of infection. This investigation was primarily conducted using Wireshark to filter, analyse and trace the infected traffic. The report is structured like so: Methodology will describe the tools and techniques used; the results section will showcase the key evidence of my findings; and the conclusion will highlight preventative measures and challenges faced.

Methodology

The analysis of the PCAP file was conducted using Wireshark as the primary tool while also using the Linux terminal when necessary. I performed intrusion analysis to identify the infected system by using a variety of Wireshark filters such as:

- http.request – Filter to only show http requests.
- Show HTTPS traffic (443); `tls.handshake.type == 1` reveals client hello and `frame.time` sets the time range (Figure 1).




The image shows a Wireshark packet capture with a filter bar at the top containing the expression: `tcp.port == 443 && tls.handshake.type == 1 && frame.time >= "2021-09-24 12:45:11" && frame.time <= "2021-09-24 12:45:30"`. Below the filter bar, a table of packets is displayed. The first row is highlighted in blue and represents a TLSv1.2 Client Hello packet.

No.	Time	Source	Source Port	Destination	Destination Port	Protocol	Length	Info
2427	2021-09-24 16:45:11.840716	10.9.23.102	63368	148.72.192.2...	443	TLSv1.2	247	Client Hello (SNI=finejewels.com.au)

Figure 1. Finding Malicious domains

- `Tls.handshake.certificate` – Filter to locate the certificate.
- `ip.addr == "185.106.96.158"` – Filter for specific IP address.
- Filter specific IP address and show only the server's name (Figure 2).



The image shows a Wireshark packet capture with a filter bar at the top containing the expression: `ip.addr == 185.125.204.174 && tls.handshake.extensions_server_name`. Below the filter bar, a table of packets is displayed. The first two rows are highlighted in blue and represent TLSv1.2 Client Hello packets.

No.	Time	Source	Source Port	Destination	Destination Port	Protocol	Length	Info
7112	2021-09-24 16:55:44.005043	10.9.23.102	63458	185.125.204.174	443	TLSv1.2	233	Client Hello (SNI=securitybusinpuuff.com)
10639	2021-09-24 16:57:02.838583	10.9.23.102	63508	185.125.204.174	443	TLSv1.2	265	Client Hello (SNI=securitybusinpuuff.com)

Figure 2. IP+Server Name Filter

- `http.request.method == "POST" && ip.src == "IP"` – Filter to show only post requests from a given IP.

- DNS filter for IP check request. Uses common IP address checkers (Figure 3)

No.	Time	Source	Source Port	Destination	Destination Port	Protocol	Length	Info
24147	2021-09-24 17:00:04.093354	10.9.23.102	61044	10.9.23.5	53	DNS	73	Standard query 0xc92c A api.ipify.org

Figure 3. IP check requests

- SMTP – A filter to show only Simple-Mail-Transfer-Protocol.

Using these filters, I was able to identify the first indication of infection, identify how much the infection has spread and what caused the system to be infected in the first place.

To identify the certification authority, I found the specific TLS handshake packet in Wireshark. The Transport Layer was expanded, and the certificate was now visible. Next, I had to export the packet bytes and save them to my system. Once opened the entire certificate was visible. This inspection of the CA proved that the attacker was using a trusted certificate to evade detection and blend into normal traffic (Figure 5).




Figure 5. TLS Certificate

To locate the downloaded file for inspection I went to the object list menu and found the corresponding file (Figure 6). Next, I needed to export it to my system without extracting as this is a malicious file. To see the contents inside the file without extracting I used the “uzip -l” command to view the contents (Figure 4).




Figure 4. Unzip -l Command

Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
2173	attirenepal.com	application/octet-stream	198 kB	documents.zip
3822	maldivhost.net	text/html	112 bytes	OQsaDixzHTgtfjMcGypGenpldWF5e\
3851	maldivhost.net	text/html	302 bytes	OQsaDixzHTgtfjMcGypGenpldWF5e\
3908	maldivhost.net	text/html	112 bytes	YXp6eQ==
3912	maldivhost.net	text/html	302 bytes	YXp6eQ==
3996	maldivhost.net	text/html	112 bytes	YXp6eQ==

Figure 6. Object list Menu

Throughout my inspection following the relevant streams was crucial in exposing the infection throughout the PCAP file (Figure 8). On the initial infection I followed the TCP stream which revealed more information about the infection like Host, File name, and Server name (Figure 7).

No.	Time	Source	Source Po	Destination	Destination Po	Protocol	Length	Info
1735	2021-09-24 16:44:38.998412	10.9.23.102	62245	10.9.23.102	80	HTTP	14	GET /incident-consequatur/documents.z
2173	2021-09-24 16:44:41.976037	85.187.128.24	80	Mark/Unmark Selected	Ctrl+M	80	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	
3822	2021-09-24 16:46:16.395000	10.9.23.102	63385	Ignore/Unignore Selected	Ctrl+D	81	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/QSaDixzHTgtfjMcGyp	
3851	2021-09-24 16:46:17.143575	208.91.128.6	80	Set/Unset Time Reference	Ctrl+T	34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
3908	2021-09-24 16:46:41.509097	10.9.23.102	63386	Time Shift...	Ctrl+Shift+T	85	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/Ask5Kx0SPR8lJJE5eTg	
3912	2021-09-24 16:46:42.285190	208.91.128.6	80	Packet Comments		34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
3996	2021-09-24 16:47:06.571342	10.9.23.102	63389	Edit Resolved Name		85	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/fXMKNg0nKzN/DA15Dgg	
4000	2021-09-24 16:47:07.287902	208.91.128.6	80	Apply as Filter		34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
4006	2021-09-24 16:47:31.584345	10.9.23.102	63390	Prepare as Filter		73	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/eDkkAA0bInx9Rnp6ZXV	
4010	2021-09-24 16:47:32.318466	208.91.128.6	80	Conversation Filter		34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
4017	2021-09-24 16:47:56.779130	10.9.23.102	63391	Colorize Conversation		93	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/LjI+JS0qJQ4lBiwyAhR	
4021	2021-09-24 16:47:57.518193	208.91.128.6	80	SCTP		34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
4027	2021-09-24 16:48:21.805873	10.9.23.102	63392	Follow		89	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/HDN9NScAAw8PKwEFMi0	
4031	2021-09-24 16:48:22.534972	208.91.128.6	80	Copy	Ctrl+Alt+Shift+H	34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
4037	2021-09-24 16:48:46.850457	10.9.23.102	63393	Protocol Preferences		73	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/CAsZDz1/MEJ9f2VzZX5	
4041	2021-09-24 16:48:47.677038	208.91.128.6	80	Decode As...		34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
4046	2021-09-24 16:49:11.959706	10.9.23.102	63394	Show Packet in New Window		85	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/DClzFTsJDgA/AicrERg	
4050	2021-09-24 16:49:12.707612	208.91.128.6	80			34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
4050	2021-09-24 16:49:37.041462	10.9.23.102	63396			85	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/CXwgNgIIIXMeeQkPPHy	
4094	2021-09-24 16:49:37.847526	208.91.128.6	80			34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
4099	2021-09-24 16:50:02.211046	10.9.23.102	63397			85	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/EgwSfKZ6emV1YX15ZX1	
4103	2021-09-24 16:50:02.948769	208.91.128.6	80			34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
4109	2021-09-24 16:50:27.298936	10.9.23.102	63398			85	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/CXwgNgIIIXMeeQkPPHy	
4113	2021-09-24 16:50:28.011866	208.91.128.6	80			34	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	
4118	2021-09-24 16:50:52.286135	10.9.23.102	63399			85	POST /zLIIsQRWZI9/CXwgNgIIIXMeeQkPPHy	

Figure 8. TCP Stream

```

GET /incident-consequatur/documents.zip HTTP/1.1
Host: attirenepal.com
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/53
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: Keep-Alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
X-powered-by: PHP/7.2.34
set-cookie: PHPSESSID=3de638a4b99bd63f8f7b0ca7e3b6f14c; path=/
content-description: File Transfer
content-type: application/octet-stream
content-disposition: attachment; filename=documents.zip
content-transfer-encoding: binary
expires: 0
cache-control: must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
pragma: public
transfer-encoding: chunked
date: Fri, 24 Sep 2021 16:44:06 GMT
server: LiteSpeed
strict-transport-security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
x-content-type-options: nosniff

```

Figure 7. TCP Stream details

Results

The initial HTTP connection occurred at **2021-09-24 at 16:44:38 UTC** when the host made a HTTP GET request to an external domain **attirenepal.com** (Figure 10). The file that the host downloaded was **documents.zip** and the contents of the file was a malware file named **chart-1530076591.xls**. The IP that delivered the malware is at **(85.187.128.24)** and is running the **LiteSpeed** web server with version **PHP/7.2.34** (Figure 9). It's clear at this point that the host fell victim to a type of Phishing attack.

No.	Time	Source	Source Po	Destination	Destination Po	Protocol	Length	Info	Source MAC	Destination MAC	Time Delta	TCP Stream	Host
1735	2021-09-24 16:44:38.990412	10.9.23.102	62245	85.187.128.24	80	HTTP	514	GET /incidunt-consequatur/documents.zip HT...	10.9.23.102	85.187.128.24	0.000000	73	attirenepal.com
2173	2021-09-24 16:44:41.976037	85.187.128.24	80	10.9.23.102	62245	HTTP	580	HTTP/1.1 200 OK	85.187.128.24	10.9.23.102	2.985625	73	

Figure 10. Initial HTTP connection

```
GET /incidunt-consequatur/documents.zip HTTP/1.1
Host: attirenepal.com
Connection: keep-alive
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.124 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/svg+xml,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: Keep-Alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.2.34
Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=3de638a4b99bd63f8f7b9ca7e3b6f14c;
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=documents.zip
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Expires: 0
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0
Pragma: public
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2021 16:44:06 GMT
Server: LiteSpeed
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubdomains
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
```

Figure 9. HTTP Stream

They were additional domains that played their part in infecting this system quickly after infecting the system.

The three additional domains were **finejewels.com.au**, **thietbiagt.com**, and **new.americold.com** all between **16:45:11–16:45:30 UTC** (Figure 11). The domain **finejewels.com.au** has an SSL certificate from **GoDaddy** which was extracted from the TLS handshake. The attacker utilised a legitimate certificate to evade detection as an unsigned or invalid certificate would typically be flagged.

No.	Time	Source	Source Po	Destination	Destination Po	Protocol	Length	Info
2427	2021-09-24 16:45:11.840716	10.9.23.102	63368	148.72.192.2...	443	TLSv1.2	247	Client Hello (SNI=finejewels.com.au)
2646	2021-09-24 16:45:17.228469	10.9.23.102	63369	13.69.109.131	443	TLSv1.2	242	Client Hello (SNI=self.events.data.m...
2909	2021-09-24 16:45:20.389994	10.9.23.102	63370	20.54.36.229	443	TLSv1.2	238	Client Hello (SNI=client.wns.windows...
3009	2021-09-24 16:45:21.314012	10.9.23.102	63375	210.245.90.2...	443	TLSv1.2	244	Client Hello (SNI=thietbiagt.com)
3229	2021-09-24 16:45:25.731116	10.9.23.102	63376	148.72.53.144	443	TLSv1.2	247	Client Hello (SNI=new.americold.com)

Figure 11. Additional domains

Once established the malware connected to two Cobalt Strike servers at the following addresses **185.106.96.158**, **185.125.204.174**. The first IP **185.106.96.158** has the domain name **survmeter.live** that was captured (Figure 13). The malware used a host header **ocsp.verisign.com** to try and masquerade as legitimate traffic to try and deceive anyone who looked at it (Figure 12). This is a technique called domain fronting which uses different domains on the same HTTPS traffic. (Arntz, 2023)

p.addr == 185.106.96.158												
No.	Time	Source	Source Port	Destination	Destination Port	Protocol	Length	Info	Source MAC	Destination MAC	Time Delta	TCP Stream
6323	2021-09-24 16:55:08.330879	10.9.23.102	63447	185.106.96.158	80	TCP	66	63447 → 80 [SYN, Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=	10.9.23.102	185.106.96.158	0.000000	163
6324	2021-09-24 16:55:08.592910	185.106.96.158	80	10.9.23.102	63447	TCP	58	80 → 63447 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=6424...	185.106.96.158	10.9.23.102	0.262031	163
6325	2021-09-24 16:55:08.593239	10.9.23.102	63447	185.106.96.158	80	TCP	54	63447 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=	10.9.23.102	185.106.96.158	0.000329	163
6326	2021-09-24 16:55:08.593562	10.9.23.102	63447	185.106.96.158	80	HTTP	306	GET /spfooh/cacerts.crl HTTP/1.1	10.9.23.102	185.106.96.158	0.000323	163 ocsp.verisign.

Figure 12. First Cobalt Strike Server

dns.a==185.106.96.158									
No.	Time	Source	Source Po	Destination	Destination Po	Protocol	Length	Info	
6511	2021-09-24 16:55:10.808336	10.9.23.5	53	10.9.23.102	58930	DNS	90	Standard query response 0xe5da A survmeter.live A 185.106.96.158	

Figure 13. DNS Response Packet

The second IP **185.125.204.174** had a domain **securitybusinpuff.com** and was captured by filtering to any TLS handshakes connected to that IP (Figure 14).

ip.addr == 185.125.204.174 && tls.handshake.extensions_server_name									
No.	Time	Source	Source Po	Destination	Destination Po	Protocol	Length	Info	
7112	2021-09-24 16:55:44.005043	10.9.23.102	63458	185.125.204.174	443	TLSv1.2	233	Client Hello	(SNI=securitybusinpuff.com)
10639	2021-09-24 16:57:02.838583	10.9.23.102	63508	185.125.204.174	443	TLSv1.2	265	Client Hello	(SNI=securitybusinpuff.com)

Figure 14. Second Strike Server

The victim host now acts as a beacon by sending frequent POST requests back to the command server. The domain that is used for the post infection traffic is **maldivehost.net** and is captured sending regular POST requests (Figure 16). The POST request is about 281 bytes and contains data such as “**zLIisQRWZI9**”. The malicious domain was hosted on a server running **Apache/2.4.49 (cPanel) OpenSSL/1.1.1l mod_bwlimited/1.4** (Figure 15). The malware performed a DNS query to determine the victims IP address at **2021-09-24 17:00:04 UTC**. The malware used a domain named **api.ipify.org** (Figure 17).

```
POST /zLIisQRWZI9/OQsaDixzHTgtfjMcGypGenpldwF5ewV9f3k= HTTP/1.1
Host: maldivehost.net
Content-Length: 112

Dw8YBxsEGmYFAAEJfR4NQkMmLTyqZDk5KyQmOyRGQglxEBo4Lzk/EyYrMi1h0T8vI

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 24 Sep 2021 16:46:15 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.49 (cPanel) OpenSSL/1.1.1l mod_bwlimited/1.4
```

Figure 15. POST Request HTTP Stream

http.request.method == "POST" && ip.src == 10.9.23.102												
Time	Source	Source Port	Destination	Destination Port	Protocol	Length	Info	Source MAC	Destination MAC	Time Delta	TCP Stream	Host
3822	2021-09-24 12:46:10...	10.9.23.102	63385	208.91.128.6	80	HTTP	261	POST /zLIisQRWZI9/OQsaDixzHTgtfjMcGypGenpldwF5ewV9f...	10.9.23.102	208.91.128.6	0.000000	104 maldivehost.net
3908	2021-09-24 12:46:41...	10.9.23.102	63386	208.91.128.6	80	HTTP	285	POST /zLIisQRWZI9/Ask5x8SPR8lJJE5eTg9GKN6fGfYZHL/Y...	10.9.23.102	208.91.128.6	25.114097	105 maldivehost.net
3996	2021-09-24 12:47:06...	10.9.23.102	63389	208.91.128.6	80	HTTP	285	POST /zLIisQRWZI9/fXMKNg8nKzN/DA15Dgg8I8N6fGfYZHL/Y...	10.9.23.102	208.91.128.6	25.062245	109 maldivehost.net
4006	2021-09-24 12:47:31...	10.9.23.102	63390	208.91.128.6	80	HTTP	273	POST /zLIisQRWZI9/eDkKAA8bInx9Rnp6ZXVheXllfX95 HTTP...	10.9.23.102	208.91.128.6	25.013903	110 maldivehost.net

Figure 16. Beaconing connection

[dns.flags.response == 0 && (dns.qry.name matches ".*ipify.*" dns.qry.name matches ".*ipinfo.*" dns.qry.name matches ".*ifconfig.*" dns.qry.name matches ".*icanhazip.*" dns.qry.name matches ".*checkip.*" dns.qry.name matches ".*whatismyip.*")										
No.	Time	Source	Source Po	Destination	Destination Po	Protocol	Length	Info		
24147	2021-09-24 17:00:04.093354	10.9.23.102	61044	10.9.23.5	53	DNS	73	Standard	query 0xc92c A api.ipify.org	
25279	2021-09-24 17:00:59.174080	10.9.23.102	53001	10.9.23.5	53	DNS	73	Standard	query 0x8eed A api.ipify.org	
26756	2021-09-24 17:02:17.477261	10.9.23.102	51366	10.9.23.5	53	DNS	73	Standard	query 0x8d97 A api.ipify.org	
27836	2021-09-24 17:02:35.839648	10.9.23.102	58967	10.9.23.5	53	DNS	73	Standard	query 0x5250 A api.ipify.org	

Figure 17. DNS Query

Within the PCAP file a significant vulnerability was present that saw email traffic in clear text. The first email address observed in the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol was farshin@mailfa.com (Figure 19). Following the SMTP stream, credentials were discovered encoded in base64. These credentials belonged to the user **ho3ein.sharifi** and the password used was “**13691369**” (Figure 18).

smtp										
No.	Time	Source	Source Po	Destination	Destination Po	Protocol	Length	Info		
28521	2021-09-24 17:02:46.192228	185.4.29.135	25	10.9.23.102	63686	SMTP	110	S: 250-mail.mailfa.com SIZE 30000000 A...		
28524	2021-09-24 17:02:46.198191	185.4.29.135	25	10.9.23.102	63678	SMTP	74	S: 235 authenticated.		
28576	2021-09-24 17:02:46.778017	10.9.23.102	63678	185.4.29.135	25	SMTP	86	C: MAIL FROM:<farshin@mailfa.com>		

Figure 19. SMTP Traffic

```

220 mail.mailfa.com
EHLO localhost
250-mail.mailfa.com
250-SIZE 30000000
250 AUTH LOGIN
AUTH LOGIN
334 VxN1cm5hbWU6
aG8zZWludnNoYXJpZmIAdWFPbGZlbnNvbGQ==
334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
NTR2OTEZnjk=
235 authenticated.
MAIL FROM:<ho3ein.sharifi@mailfa.com>
550 Your SMTP Service is disable please check by your mailservice provider.

```

Figure 18. SMTP stream

Conclusion

To prevent such an attack from happening again implementing additional security measures such as:

- Enforce encryption on sensitive data like email traffic this would have prevented the email leak.
- Implement logging and monitoring so that suspicious domains are reviewed. If logging was present the Cobalt Server may have been detected sooner.
- Training users to recognise patterns for phishing and other attacks such as the malicious file downloaded in the PCAP file.

By implementing these measures will reduce the vulnerabilities that led to this system being infected and will make the entire system more robust to future attacks.

GITHUB Link: <https://github.com/shane-thompson211/COMP3010---Set-Exercises.git>

YouTube Video Walkthrough: <https://youtu.be/nZYttKH08II>

Student Declaration of AI Tool use in this Assessment

Please indicate your level of usage of generative AI for this assessment - please tick the appropriate category(s).

If the “Assisted Work” or “Partnered Work” category is selected, please expand on the usage and in which elements of the assignment the usage refers to.

Solo Work	S1 - Generative AI tools have not been used for this assessment.	<input type="checkbox"/>
Assisted Work	A1 – Idea Generation and Problem Exploration Used to generate project ideas, explore different approaches to solving a problem, or suggest features for software or systems. Students must critically assess AI-generated suggestions and ensure their own intellectual contributions are central.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A2 - Planning & Structuring Projects AI may help outline the structure of reports, documentation and projects. The final structure and implementation must be the student’s own work.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A3 – Code Architecture AI tools maybe used to help outline code architecture (e.g. suggesting class hierarchies or module breakdowns). The final code structure must be the student’s own work.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A4 – Research Assistance Used to locate and summarise relevant articles, academic papers, technical documentation, or online resources (e.g. Stack Overflow, GitHub discussions). The interpretation and integration of research into the assignment remain the student’s responsibility.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A5 - Language Refinement Used to check grammar, refine language, improve sentence structure in documentation not code. AI should be used only to provide suggestions for	<input type="checkbox"/>

	improvement. Students must ensure that the documentation accurately reflects the code and is technically correct.	
	A6 – Code Review AI tools can be used to check comments within the code and to suggest improvements to code readability, structure or syntax. AI should be used only to provide suggestions for improvement. Students must ensure that the code accurately reflects their knowledge and is technically correct.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A7 - Code Generation for Learning Purposes Used to generate example code snippets to understand syntax, explore alternative implementations, or learn new programming paradigms. Students must not submit AI-generated code as their own and must be able to explain how it works.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A8 - Technical Guidance & Debugging Support AI tools can be used to explain algorithms, programming concepts, or debugging strategies. Students may also help interpret error messages or suggest possible fixes. However, students must write, test, and debug their own code independently and understand all solutions submitted.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A9 - Testing and Validation Support AI may assist in generating test cases, validating outputs, or suggesting edge cases for software testing. Students are responsible for designing comprehensive test plans and interpreting test results.	<input type="checkbox"/>
	A10 - Data Analysis and Visualization Guidance AI tools can help suggest ways to analyse datasets or visualize results (e.g. recommending chart types or statistical methods). Students must perform the analysis themselves and understand the implications of the results.	<input type="checkbox"/>

	<p>A11 - Other uses not listed above</p> <p>Please specify:</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<p>Partnered Work</p>	<p>P1 - Generative AI tool usage has been used integrally for this assessment</p> <p>Students can adopt approaches that are compliant with instructions in the assessment brief.</p> <p>Please Specify:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summarising and shortening sentences to meet word count. • Report guidance to ensure criteria met. • To help with understanding how a certain Wireshark filter works. • Clarifying errors such as why a certain filter shows no packets. • Researching new concepts like Cobalt Strike Servers. • Generate Readme file for Git repo 	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Please provide details of AI usage and which elements of the coursework this relates to:

Generative AI was used in a supportive role in the report section of this coursework. I leveraged AI to help summarise large sentences to lower word count. Provide guidance so that the report aligned with the marking criteria. Also, AI was used to help understanding certain Wireshark filters and troubleshoot any issues.

All the PCAP analysis, filtering, data extraction and interpretation was carried out independently by me.

I understand that the ownership and responsibility for the academic integrity of this submitted assessment falls with me, the student.



I confirm that all details provide above are an accurate description of how AI was used for this assessment.



References

Arntz, P. (2023, 12 01). *Explained: Domain fronting*. Retrieved from ThreatDown by Malwarebytes:
<https://www.threatdown.com/blog/explained-domain-fronting/>