Network Traffic Analysis and Security Assessment

Objective:

The objective of this study is to investigate and evaluate manual classification techniques utilizing protocol headers for in-depth analysis of network traffic patterns, including potential security threats and attack simulations. This study aims to refine existing methodologies, conduct comprehensive data collection and statistical analysis, and document findings to enhance understanding and proactive management of network security risks. Specifically, the objectives include:

- 1. Refinement of existing methodologies to focus on using protocol headers for manual classification and analysis of network traffic.
- 2. Capture live network traffic using Wireshark, targeting a diverse range of protocols and traffic patterns, to ensure representation of both normal network behavior and potential security threats.
- 3. Manual analysis of captured packets to extract protocol headers and classify each packet based on identified protocol headers into predefined types, including simulations of various cyber attacks such as SYN flood attacks and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
- 4. Aggregation and organization of classified packets into respective traffic types, followed by statistical analysis to determine distribution and characteristics of different protocol types within captured traffic. Additionally, analysis of attack simulations to understand their impact on network traffic.
- 5. Documentation of the experimental setup, procedures, and findings in a structured manner, preparing comprehensive reports detailing the classification process, results, insights gained from the analysis, and observations from attack simulations.


Experimental Design and Methodology:

- 1. **Objective Refinement**: Refine the objective to focus on using protocol headers for manual classification and analysis of network traffic.
- 2. **Data Collection**: Capture live network traffic using Wireshark, targeting a diverse range of protocols and traffic patterns. Collect sufficient data to represent both normal network behavior and potential security threats.
- 3. **Manual Classification**: Manually analyze captured packets to extract protocol headers (e.g., source and destination IP addresses, port numbers, protocol types). Classify each packet based on the identified protocol headers, categorizing them into predefined types (e.g., HTTP, FTP, DNS, SSH, ICMP).
- 4. **Data Analysis**: Aggregate and organize the classified packets into respective traffic types. Conduct statistical analysis to determine the distribution and characteristics of different protocol types within the captured traffic. Analyze the frequency, volume, and patterns of each traffic type to identify anomalies or potential security threats.
- 5. **Documentation and Reporting**: Document the experimental setup, procedures, and findings in a structured manner. Prepare comprehensive reports detailing the classification process, results, and insights gained from the analysis.

Data Collection:

For the purpose of this experiment, network traffic data was captured using Wireshark. The following steps were taken to capture network traffic:

- 1. **Opening Wireshark Application**: The Wireshark application was launched by clicking on the icon, initiating the capture process.
- 2. **Selecting Network Interface**: From the welcome screen of Wireshark, the appropriate network interface was selected to capture traffic. This selection was based on the network interface through which the desired traffic was flowing.
- 3. **Starting Packet Capture**: Double-clicking on the selected capture interface initiated the packet capture process. This action began capturing packets flowing through the specified network interface.
- 4. **Stopping Packet Capture**: The packet capture process was halted by clicking on the red Stop Capture button once sufficient data had been captured for analysis.
- 5. **Saving Packet Capture**: The captured packet data was saved into a specific file by selecting File > Save As. A location and name for the file were specified to facilitate further analysis.
- 6. **Repeat Capture for Discrepancy Data**: To capture data with discrepancies or potential anomalies, the above steps were repeated, capturing another set of network traffic data.




Data Analysis:


Statistical Analysis Record:

Upon capturing network traffic data using Wireshark, statistical analysis was performed to gain insights into the characteristics and patterns of the captured traffic. The following steps were taken:

- 1. **Accessing Statistical Analysis Tools**: The "Statistics" menu in Wireshark's main menu bar was accessed to explore options for summarizing network traffic.
- 2. **Protocol Hierarchy Analysis**: The "Protocol Hierarchy" option was selected to identify the protocols used within the captured network traffic. This provided a summary of network protocols used at each TCP/IP stack layer.
- 3. **Endpoint Examination**: The "Endpoints" option was utilized to identify unique endpoint devices communicating within the network packets. Information such as Ethernet address, IP address, and TCP/UDP port was examined to understand the network topology and communication patterns.
- 4. **Network Conversations Analysis**: The "Conversations" option was selected to analyze network traffic traveling between endpoints. This facilitated the identification of significant data exchanges between specific IP addresses, aiding in the understanding of network behavior.

By leveraging Wireshark's statistical analysis features, valuable insights were obtained into the distribution, communication patterns, and outliers within the captured network traffic data.





			Wiresh	ark · Protoco	l Hierarc	thy Statistics · ti	hreat.pcapng		0.0
Protocol	Percent Packets	Packets	Percent Bytes	Bytes	Bits/s	End Packets	End Bytes	End Bits/s	PDUs
* Frame	100.0	20240	100.0	19768014		0	0	0	20240
* Ethernet	100.0	20240	1.5	293440	14 k	0	0	0	20240
* Logical-Link Control	0.4	88	0.0	4583	220	0	0	0	88
Spanning Tree Protocol	0.4	85	0.0	2975	143	85	2975	143	85
Cisco Discovery Protocol	0.0	3	0.0	1329	64	3	1329	64	3
Internet Protocol Version 6	1.6	317	0.1	12680	610	ő	0	0	317
User Datagram Protocol	1.3	256	0.0	2048	98	o	0	0	256
Simple Network Management Protocol	0.3	55	0.0	3163	152	55	3163	152	55
Multicast Domain Name System	0.7	146	0.3	64125	3,089	146	64125	3.089	146
Link-local Multicast Name Resolution	0.0	8	0.0	204	9	8	204	9	8
DHCPv6	0.1	12	0.0	1027	49	12	1027	49	12
Data	0.2	35	0.1	22960	1,106	35	22960	1.106	35
Internet Control Message Protocol v6	0.3	61	0.0	1896	91	61	1896	91	61
 Internet Protocol Version 4 	95.6	19348	2.0	386960	18 k	0	0	0	19348
 User Datagram Protocol 	64.0	12947	0.5	103576	4,989	ō	o	0	12947
Simple Service Discovery Protocol	1.4	290	0.3	50358	2,425	290	50358	2.425	290
Simple Network Management Protocol	0.1	27	0.0	1439	69	27	1439	69	27
Service Location Protocol	0.0	2	0.0	88	4	2	88	4	2
▼ Remote Procedure Call	0.1	23	0.0	2072	99	1	48	2	23
Yellow Pages Service	0.0	2	0.0	20	0	2	20	0	2
Portmap	0.1	20	0.0	652	31	20	652	31	20
QUIC IETF	59.1	11963	67.4	13327770	642 k	11963	13044278	628 k	12247
Network Time Protocol	0.0	2	0.0	96	4	2	96	4	2
NetBIOS Name Service	0.3	51	0.0	2586	124	51	2586	124	51
 NetBIOS Datagram Service 	0.0	4	0.0	819	39	0	0	0	4
 SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) 	0.0	4	0.0	491	23	0	0	0	4
 SMB MailSlot Protocol 	0.0	4	0.0	100	4	0	0	0	4
Microsoft Windows Browser Protoco		4	0.0	147	7	4	147	7	4
Multicast Domain Name System	0.7	144	0.3	57020	2,746	144	57020	2,746	144
Link-local Multicast Name Resolution	0.0	8	0.0	204	9	8	204	9	8
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol	0.2	36	0.1	11482	553	36	11482	553	36
Domain Name System	0.3	51	0.0	5968	287	51	5968	287	51
Data	1.7	346	0.3	51589	2,485	346	51589	2,485	346
 Transmission Control Protocol 	31.6	6386	27.7		263 k	4622	3436685	165 k	6386
Transport Layer Security	6.0	1218	26.8		254 k	1218	3979376	191 k	1374
SSH Protocol	0.1	14	0.5	91260	4,396	14	91260	4,396	14
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol	0.0	2	0.0	116	5	2	116	5	2
Microsoft Delivery Optimization	0.0	2 48	0.0	119	5	2	119		2
 Hypertext Transfer Protocol Online Certificate Status Protocol 	0.2 0.2	48 34	0.1 0.0	26236 9442	1,263 454	8 34	1528 9442	73 454	48 34
HTML Form URL Encoded Domain Name System	0.0	6 480	0.0 0.2	449 37990	21 1.830	6 480	449 37990	21 1,830	6 480
Internet Control Message Protocol	0.1	480 15	0.2	4470	215	480	37990	1,830	480 15
OUIC IETF	0.1	13	0.0	3850	185	13	3850	185	13
Domain Name System	0.0	2	0.0	565U	3	2	66	3	2
Address Resolution Protocol	2.4	487	0.1	22366	1.077	487	22366	1.077	487
Address Resolution P100000	2.4	407	0.1	22300	1,011	407	22330	1,077	101

nvers a	ation Settings	Ethernet · 281	IPv4 · 261 IPv6 ·	56 TCP · 1	54 UDP	_	Wileshalk - Conv	ersations - threat.	pcaping					
			Address B	Packets	Bytes	Packets A → B	Bytes A → B	Packets B → A	Bytes B → A	Rel Start	Duration	Bits/s A → B	Bits/s B → A	
Nam	ne resolution	00:17:61:12:6a:10	90:77:ee:97:0b:c4	19	2 kB	10	1 kB	9	1 kB	103,492571	30.0346	273 bits/s	314 bits/s	
Absr	olute start time	00:18:23:65:c4:aa	33:33:00:01:00:02	2 2	28 bytes	2	228 bytes	0	0 bytes	22.730652	73.1037	24 bits/s	0 bits/s	
		00:18:23:65:c4:aa	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:	79	5 kB	79	5 kB	0	0 bytes	16.168835	148.8824	256 bits/s	0 bits/s	
Limit	it to display filter	00:24:c3:f0:b3:07	01:00:0c:cc:cc:cc	3	1 kB	3	1 kB	0	0 bytes	27.789554	120.0009	92 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			01:80:c2:00:00:00	85	5 kB	85	5 kB	0		1.568103	163.9897	248 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			01:00:5e:00:00:fb		26 bytes	1	326 bytes	0		112.953849	0.0000			
			01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	12	3 kB	12	3 kB	0		2.261592	123.0384	169 bits/s	0 bits/s	
		00:68:eb:96:0f:b8		15	1 kB	15	1 kB	0		0.146037	165.7586	66 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	8	2 kB	8	2 kB	0		66.268954	11.5047	1,207 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			5 01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	12	3 kB	12	3 kB	0		17.235625	123.0213	169 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			7 01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	5	1 kB	5	1 kB	0		0.608708	119.9883	72 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			7 33:33:00:00:00:16		80 bytes	2	180 bytes	0		21.109289	0.1036	13 kbps	0 bits/s	
			01:00:5e:00:00:fb		62 bytes	2	162 bytes	0		103.030924	0.0000	a near blood	0.616-4	
			01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	8	2 kB	8	2 kB	0		138.518514	8.8503	1,569 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	Copy -		33:33:00:00:00:fb		02 bytes	2	202 bytes	0		103.030924	0.0000	70 bibs fo	O hilbs /-	
		00:68:eb:9e:e0:8	33:33:00:01:00:02		114 bytes	2	314 bytes	0		103.062250	32.0093 54.7896	78 bits/s 108 bits/s	0 bits/s 0 bits/s	
			00:68:eb:9e:fe:33		41 bytes 70 bytes	4	741 bytes 270 bytes	0		0.102389	125,1126	108 bits/s	0 bits/s	
		00:68:eb:9e:ee:ei		18	3 kB	18	270 bytes 3 kB	0		8.836120	150.1472	17 bits/s 136 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			01:00:5e:00:00:fb	6	5 kB	6	5 kB	0		18.998897	144.6061	256 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			33:33:00:00:00:fb	6	5 kB	6	5 kB	0		18.998898	144.6061	263 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			33:33:00:01:00:02		18 bytes	1	118 bytes	0		93.129056	0.0000	203 Dicsys	o bics/s	
		00:80:91:d3:7d:3			60 bytes	- 1	60 bytes	0		1.036345	0.0000			
			01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	8	2 kB	8	2 kB	0		83.004407	13.0211	1.066 bits/s	0 bits/s	
			01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	8	2 kB	8	2 kB	0		35.525931	123.0085	112 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	Protocol *		01:00:5e:00:00:fb		46 bytes	3	246 bytes	0		113.322474	3.0177	652 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	Bluetooth		01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	8	2 kB	A A	2 kB	0		9.124307	122,9798	112 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	BPv7		33:33:00:00:00:fb		06 bytes	3	306 bytes	0		113.322475	3.0177	811 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	DCCP	04:0e:3c:2f:89:17			124 bytes	2	424 bytes	0		40.798674	63.9973	53 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	Ethernet		01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	8	2 kB	8	2 kB	0		35.761255	123.0192	112 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	FC	04:0e:3c:2f:89:91		69	4 kB	69	4 kB	ō		0.382217	165.4991	204 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	FDDI		01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	8	2 kB	8	2 kB	0		51.994748	3.0267	4,588 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	IEEE 802.11		01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	33	17 kB	33	17 kB	0		31.207538	123.0164	1,122 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	IEEE 802.15.4		33:33:00:00:00:0c	21	15 kB	21	15 kB	0	0 bytes	52.756752	26.7994	4,500 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	IPv4		84:69:93:d7:b9:e6	46	5 kB	46	5 kB	0		0.078769	165.4861	256 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	IPv6	04:0e:3c:2f:8a:b3	a8:b1:3b:bd:6b:61	9	1 kB	9	1 kB	0	0 bytes	25.392301	140.1750	71 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	IPX	04:0e:3c:2f:8a:b3		56	3 kB	56	3 kB	0		0.763224	164.7993	163 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	JXTA		33:33:00:00:00:fb		83 bytes	1	183 bytes	0		149.154143	0.0000			
	LTP		7c:57:58:c2:8d:b1	25	93 kB	13	92 kB	12		90.928866	74.5888	9,876 bits/s	88 bits/s	
	MPTCP		01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa	7	1 kB	7	1 kB	0		7.372554	78.9521	142 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	NCP		80:22:a7:fb:6b:ab		60 bytes	1	60 bytes	0		125.815197	0.0000			
	openSAFETY	3c:28:a6:00:c4:2c			20 bytes	2	120 bytes	0		53.029070	61.2867	15 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	RSVP	3c:28:a6:00:c4:5d			80 bytes	3	180 bytes	0		12.112953	122.5640	11 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	SCTP		80:22:a7:fb:6b:ab		20 bytes	2	120 bytes	0		8.669427	5.0075	191 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	SLL TCP	3c:28:a6:00:c4:90			80 bytes	3	180 bytes	0		23.266359	122.5913	11 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	Token-Ring		80:22:a7:fb:6b:ab		20 bytes	2	120 bytes	0		1.105909	91.4972	10 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	UDP	3c:28:a6:00:c4:bf			20 bytes	2	120 bytes	0		51.812724	61.2837	15 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	USB		80:22:a7:fb:6b:ab		60 bytes	1	60 bytes	0		7.039194	0.0000	an bib-1	a bib-i	
	ZigBee	3c:28:a6:00:c6:19			80 bytes	3	180 bytes	0		33.435245	122.5667	11 bits/s	0 bits/s	
	Ligoee	3c:28:a6:00:c7:0d			80 bytes	3	180 bytes	0		18.235294	122.5900	11 bits/s	0 bits/s	
		3c:28:a6:00:c7:1f			80 bytes	3	180 bytes	0		17.322294	122.5886	11 bits/s	0 bits/s	
ilter liet	t for specific type	3c:28:a6:00:c7:30			20 bytes	2	120 bytes	0		58.759293	61.2876	15 bits/s	0 bits/s	
meet tist	cros specific type	3c:28:a6:00:c7:36	mmmmmm	3 1	80 bytes	3	180 bytes	0	o bytes	20.122431	122.5804	11 bits/s	0 bits/s	

Techniques:

TCP Stream Analysis Record:

For comprehensive network analysis, Wireshark provides the capability to follow TCP streams, enabling visualization of the communication between devices and the data exchanged. The following steps outline the process:

- 1. **Selecting Packet for TCP Stream Analysis**: Identify a packet within the Wireshark packet list pane that represents the beginning of a TCP conversation.
- Following TCP Stream: Right-click on the selected packet and choose the option "Follow > TCP Stream." This action prompts Wireshark to generate a summary view of the TCP stream in a new window.
- 3. **Analysis and Visualization**: Wireshark automatically applies a display filter to show packets only from the selected TCP stream, facilitating focused analysis. Additionally, the generated summary view highlights the HTTP messages exchanged between the client and server, providing insights into the nature of the communication.

By following TCP streams in Wireshark, users can effectively troubleshoot network issues, uncover hidden information, and gain a comprehensive understanding of network communication patterns.

In the process of network security monitoring, Wireshark proves instrumental in detecting cyber attacks, including brute force attempts, port scans, and data exfiltration. The following steps outline the identification of an FTP brute force attack using Wireshark:

- 1. **Initial Filter for FTP Traffic**: Apply the Wireshark display filter ftp.response.code == 530 to isolate FTP traffic indicating authentication failure (FTP response code 530, "Not logged in"). Repeated occurrences of this error with the same username but different passwords suggest a brute force attack targeting FTP authentication.
- 2. **Examination of Password Attempts**: To assess the variation in password attempts, right-click on a network packet and select "Follow > TCP Stream." This action allows the visualization of multiple password attempts made by the same user during the authentication process.
- 3. **Analysis of Attack Pattern**: Observation of the TCP stream reveals repeated attempts by the same user to log in using different passwords, indicative of a password spraying attack against the user account "stationx-admin."
- 4. **Verification of Login Success**: To ascertain the success of any login attempts, employ the display filter ftp.response.code == 230 to identify FTP responses indicating successful authentication ("User logged in, proceed"). In the analyzed scenario, no successful login attempts were detected.

Through the meticulous examination of network traffic using Wireshark and appropriate display filters, the identification of FTP brute force attacks and other malicious activities becomes feasible, empowering blue teams to proactively defend against cyber threats.

ARP Poisoning & Man In The Middle:

In the investigation of ARP poisoning and man-in-the-middle attacks using my pcap file, the focus is on determining the number of ARP requests crafted by the attacker. The following steps were taken to analyze the network traffic:


- 1. **Identification of ARP Requests Crafted by Attacker**: The command arp.duplicate-address-detected or arp.duplicate-addressframe was executed to identify ARP packets related to duplicate address detection. Subsequently, the Sender MAC Address was selected for further analysis.
- 2. **Filtering ARP Requests Crafted by Attacker**: The command eth.src == sender mac and arp.opcode == 1 was executed to filter ARP requests crafted by the attacker. This filter specifically targets ARP packets with the Sender MAC Address matching and ARP opcode indicating ARP request (opcode 1).

By executing these commands and applying the specified filters, the number of ARP requests crafted by the attacker can be accurately determined, providing crucial insights into the extent of ARP poisoning activity and potential man-in-the-middle attacks within the network.

normal pcap



threat pcap



Username & Password Sniffing Analysis:

To determine the number of sniffed username and password entries, the following steps were undertaken:

- 1. **Selection of TCP Stream**: The command tcp.stream eq 4 was executed to isolate TCP stream number 4.
- 2. **Examination of HTTP Requests**: Packet number 1107 was selected, and the option "Follow -> TCP Stream" was chosen to inspect the HTTP stream content.
- 3. **Identification of HTTP POST Requests**: In the TCP stream window, the command http.host == and http.request.method == "POST" was applied to filter HTTP POST requests targeting the specified hostname.
- 4. **Verification of Passwords**: Each packet within the filtered HTTP POST requests was meticulously examined to identify any transmitted passwords.

By meticulously analyzing the HTTP stream content and verifying the HTTP POST requests targeting the designated hostname, potential instances of username and password sniffing within the network can be identified and further investigated for security implications.



Analysis of SYN Flood Attack

A SYN flood attack is a type of DDoS attack where the attacker floods a victim server with a large number of SYN packets, overwhelming its resources and disrupting normal operation. The objective is to exhaust the server's capacity to handle incoming connections, rendering it unable to service legitimate requests.

To analyze a SYN flood attack using Wireshark alongside the hping3 tool, the following steps were taken:

1. Preparation:

- The hping3 tool was used to generate a flood of SYN packets directed towards the victim's IP address.
- Simultaneously, Wireshark was started to capture and analyze the incoming network traffic.

2. Filtering SYN Packets:

- In Wireshark, the filter tcp.flags.syn == 1 was applied to isolate and focus on SYN packets specifically.
- This filter allows for the identification of SYN packets within the captured traffic, which are indicative of the initiation phase of the TCP handshake.

Observations: The captured traffic revealed a significant influx of SYN packets directed towards the victim server. These SYN packets were observed to be of the same size, indicating a consistent pattern in the attack. Additionally, there was a notable absence of lag time between successive SYN packets, suggesting a rapid and continuous flood of SYN requests.

Impact: The SYN flood attack effectively inundates the victim server with a barrage of connection requests, causing it to expend resources on processing incomplete connection attempts. As a result, the victim server's processor and memory usage escalate rapidly, eventually leading to resource exhaustion and service degradation or outage.

By analyzing the characteristics of the captured traffic, including the volume, consistency, and timing of SYN packets, it becomes evident how a SYN flood attack can disrupt network services and compromise the availability of targeted servers. Such insights are crucial for implementing effective mitigation strategies and bolstering network defenses against DDoS attacks.

```
### Season | Pro-Tower-400-09-PCI-Desktop-PC:-$ sudo apt install hping3
#### Reading package lists... Dome
### Reading package swill be installed:
#### Reading Note: Information... Dome
#### Reading Note: Information... 263 kB of additional disk space will be used.
##### Reading Note: Information... 263 kB of addition... 263 kB o
```

Time		Source	Destination		Length Info
		10.23.16.32	10.101.1.10	TCP	78 33324 53 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSVal=606378408 TSecr=0 WS=128 TF0=R
		10.101.1.10	10.23.16.32	TCP	74 53 - 33324 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 SACK_PERM TSval=719124329 TSecr=606378408
		10.123.167.13	10.23.12.30	TCP	66 56768 7680 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
		10.123.167.13	10.23.12.30	TCP	66 [TCP Retransmission] 56768 → 7680 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
		10.23.16.32	10.101.1.10	TCP	78 42088 - 53 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=606393643 TSecr=0 WS=128 TFO=R
332 25.6	51590339	10.101.1.10	10.23.16.32	TCP	74 53 - 42088 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 SACK_PERM TSval=672975298 TSecr=606393643
351 26.7	28254707	10.123.167.13	10.23.12.30	TCP	66 [TCP Retransmission] 56768 - 7680 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
375 29.9	10317971	10.123.170.153	10,23,12,30	TCP	66 52464 - 7680 [SYN] Seg=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
383 30.7	37299324	10.123.167.13	10.23.12.30	TCP	66 [TCP Retransmission] 56768 - 7680 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
		10.123.170.153	10.23.12.30		66 [TCP Retransmission] 52464 - 7680 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
		10.123.170.153	10.23.12.30		66 [TCP Retransmission] 52464 7680 [SYN] Seg=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK PERM
		10.123.170.153	10.23.12.30	TCP	66 [TCP Retransmission] 52464 - 7680 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS-256 SACK_PERM
		10.23.16.32	104,18,32,115	TCP	74 42570 - 443 [SYN] Sec=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK PERM TSVaL=1366591045 TSecr=0 WS=128
		104.18.32.115	10.23.16.32	TCP	74 443 - 42570 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=14480 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSVal=2299052635 TSecr=1306591045 WS=128
		10.123.167.13	10.23.12.30	TCP	66 [TCP Retransmission] 56768 7680 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
		10.101.1.10	10.23.13.16	TCP	74 53 - 47728 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 SACK_PERM TSval=2639902193 TSecr=1459666443
		10.23.16.32	10.101.1.10	TCP	78 53376 53 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=606408647 TSecr=0 WS=128 TF0=R
591 40.6	54864929	10.101.1.10	10.23.16.32	TCP	74 53 53376 [SYN, ACK] Seg=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 SACK PERM TSval=1311839606 TSecr=606408647
		10.123.170.153	10.23.12.30	TCP	66 [TCP Retransmission] 52464 - 7680 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
		10.123.170.153 10.23.16.32	10.101.1.10	TCP TCP	66 [TCP Retransmission] 52464 - 7680 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM 78 52452 - 53 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSVal=606425462 TSecr=0 WS=128 TFO=R
795 57.4 796 57.4	68825212 69774856	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32	TCP TCP	66 [TCP Retransalesion] 52464 _ 7690 [SYM] Seg=0 Min=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK PERM 78 52452 _ 55 [SYM] Seg=0 Min=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK PERM TSVml=606425462 TSecr=0 MS=122 FTO=R 74 53 _ 52452 [SYM, ACK] Seg=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1400 WS=64 SACK PERM TSVml=2040000499 TSecr=006425462
95 57.4 96 57.4 e 113: rnet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$2464 . 7690 [SYM] Seq=0 Min=26420 Len=0 MSS=1460 MS=258 GACK PERM 78 52452 . 53 [SYM] Seq=0 Min=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK PERM TSVal=690425462 TSecr=0 MS=128 TFO=R 74 53 . 52452 [SYM, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=64 SACK PERM TSVal=2040000499 TSecr=608425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:02:44) 0000 bc 8d 1f 61 02 44 e0 73 e7 0d 74 8b 08 09 45 09 a.b.s.tE. 0010 00 40 42 6c 40 90 40 96 d2 ad 9a 17 10 20 9a 65 (BRO) @
795 57.4 796 57.4 me 113: ernet II ernet Pr	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
795 57.4 796 57.4 me 113: ernet II ernet Pr	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retrains163401] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-26420 Lenie NSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64240 Lenie NSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVml-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lenie MSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVml-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000 bc 8d 1f 61 02 44 e0 73 e7 0d 74 8b 00 09 45 00a.D.s.t.E. 0010 60 40 42 6e 40 90 40 96 d2 44 9a 17 10 29 0a 65 .@Banb.0e. 0020 61 0a 82 2c 00 35 01 03 0a 10 00 00 90 00 00 90 00 24 04\$\$
795 57.4 796 57.4 ne 113: ernet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
795 57.4 796 57.4 ne 113: ernet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
95 57.4 96 57.4 e 113: rnet II rnet Pr	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
95 57.4 96 57.4 e 113: rnet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
95 57.4 96 57.4 e 113: rnet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
95 57.4 96 57.4 e 113: rnet II rnet Pr	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
95 57.4 96 57.4 e 113: rnet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
95 57.4 96 57.4 e 113: rnet II rnet Pr	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
95 57.4 96 57.4 e 113: rnet II rnet Pr	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
95 57.4 96 57.4 e 113: rnet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
795 57.4 796 57.4 ne 113: ernet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
795 57.4 796 57.4 ne 113: ernet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
795 57.4 796 57.4 ne 113: ernet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
795 57.4 796 57.4 ne 113: ernet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
795 57.4 796 57.4 ne 113: ernet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000
795 57.4 796 57.4 ne 113: ernet II	68825212 69774856 78 bytes 7, Src: HP	10.23.16.32 10.101.1.10 on wire (624 bits) 2.0d:74:8b (e0:73:e'rsion 4, Src: 10.2	10.101.1.10 10.23.16.32 , 78 bytes captured (7:0d:74:8b), Dst: Cis 3.16.32, Dst: 10.101.	TCP TCP (624 bits) on 600_61:02:44	66 [ICP Retransission] \$5464 - 7690 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-2440 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-265 SACK PERM 76 52452 - 55 [SVI] \$60-0 Min-64250 Lene DMSS-1460 SACK PERM TSVm1-600425462 TSecr-0 WS-120 TFO-R 74 53 - 52452 [SVI, ACK] \$eq=0 Ack=1 Win-65535 Lene DMSS-1460 WS-64 SACK PERM TSVm1-2040000499 TSecr-600425462 1 interface enoi, id 0 (bc:8d:1f:61:92:44) 0000

Packets: 919 - Disolaved: 21 (2.3%) - Drooned: 0 (0.0%) Profile: Default

Analysis of DOS Attack

In the simulated Denial of Service (DoS) attack scenario, the macof tool from the Dsniff suite toolkit was utilized to flood a surrounding device's switch with MAC addresses, generating excessive network traffic. The analysis was performed using Wireshark to inspect the traffic patterns and characteristics.


1. DoS Attack with Standard Network Traffic:


The observed traffic consists of repeated requests originating from one IP address to another
device with consistent data size. This pattern indicates a standard network DoS attack, where the
attacker overwhelms the target device with a high volume of legitimate-looking requests,
thereby disrupting its normal operations.

2. DDoS Attack with Fake Source and Destination IP Addresses:

 For the DDoS attack simulation, the macof tool was employed again to generate traffic. This time, the traffic includes packets with fake source and destination IP addresses, sending numerous packets with similar data sizes. Such a traffic pattern is characteristic of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, where multiple compromised devices (botnets) inundate the target system with malicious traffic, making it difficult to mitigate the attack and causing severe service disruption.

By analyzing the traffic patterns observed in Wireshark, it becomes evident whether the attack is a traditional DoS attack or a more sophisticated DDoS attack, allowing for appropriate mitigation strategies to be implemented to defend against such malicious activities.





Results and Interpretation

Result:

- Utilized Wireshark to perform live packet capture of two pcap files, representing normal and potentially threatening network scenarios.
- No findings of brute source or other attacks were observed, as the search for ftp.response.code == 530 yielded no results.
- In the analysis of ARP and Man-in-the-Middle attacks, no threats or vulnerabilities were identified in the normal pcap file. However, duplicate requests were detected in the threat pcap file, indicating a potential security concern.
- Attempted to analyze HTTP stream and post content for further insights.
- Conducted a SYN flood attack simulation using the hping3 tool and captured the traffic in Wireshark.
- Simulated a Denial of Service (DoS) attack using the macof tool, observing similar requests with fake source and IP destination addresses.

Interpretation:

- The absence of findings in the normal pcap file suggests that the network was operating within expected parameters, with no evident signs of malicious activity or anomalies.
- Detection of duplicate requests in the threat pcap file during the analysis of ARP and Man-in-the-Middle attacks raises concerns about security threats, possibly indicating ARP poisoning or unauthorized network activity.
- Further analysis of HTTP stream and post content could provide insights into potential data breaches or unauthorized access attempts.
- The SYN flood attack simulation demonstrated the ability to overwhelm a server with a large volume of SYN packets, highlighting the importance of robust network defense mechanisms against DDoS attacks.
- Observation of similar requests with fake source and IP destination addresses in the DoS attack simulation indicates a deliberate attempt to flood the target device with malicious traffic, underscoring the need for proactive security measures to mitigate such threats.
- Overall, the results suggest a proactive approach to network security monitoring and threat detection, emphasizing the importance of continuous monitoring, analysis, and response to safeguard against potential cyber threats and attacks.

Conclusion

- Demonstrated critical thinking skills by refining the project objectives to focus on protocol-based classification techniques for network traffic analysis.
- Successfully collected live network traffic data using Wireshark, showcasing problem-solving abilities in selecting appropriate capture interfaces and managing packet capture processes.
- Applied manual classification methods to extract protocol headers and categorize network packets, indicating analytical thinking in identifying and organizing data for analysis.
- Conducted statistical analysis of network traffic to identify patterns and anomalies, highlighting the ability to interpret data and draw meaningful insights.
- Utilized Wireshark's features effectively, such as protocol hierarchy analysis and TCP stream analysis, demonstrating proficiency in leveraging tools for in-depth network analysis.
- Detected and interpreted potential security threats, such as ARP poisoning and SYN flood attacks, showcasing problem-solving skills in identifying and addressing network vulnerabilities.
- Demonstrated innovation by simulating various types of attacks, including DoS attacks, and analyzing their impact on network traffic, highlighting proactive measures in network security management.