

OSY.SSI[2019][5]

In the previous episode...

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Before we begin

1. Slides, course notes, etc. available online

<https://github.com/sticky-jr/cs-sec-19>

It will be updated regularly, please check often!

2. Exam topics will be ready soon (exam.pdf on the GitHub). Please organise yourselves.

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3. Feedback.

In the news...

In the news...

- ▶ Checkm8 unpatchable vulnerability on iOS: all versions from 4S to 10 [src]
- ▶ Google achieves 'quantum supremacy' [src]
- ▶ Facebook, WhatsApp will have to give UK police access to 'encrypted' messages [src]
- ▶ WIBattack against millions of mobile phones [src]
- ▶ Nodersok/Divergent fileless malware turning thousand of computers into zombies [src]
- ▶ US Senate passes DHS Cyber Hunt and Incident Response Teams Act (S.315) [src]
- ▶ US Director of National Intelligence declares 'cyberwar' the greatest threat on the country [src]
- ▶ APT10 (PLA/JSSD, zh) attack Airbus, Rolls-Royce, Expleo and two other unnamed French contractors, in search of commercial secrets [src]
- ▶ European defence contractor Rheinmetall plants 'significant disruption' caused by malware in Brazil, Mexico, US, causing steep share drop. [src]
- ▶ Dunkin' Donuts sued over customer data breaches in 2015 and 2018 [src]
- ▶ CrowdStrike resurfaces in the US election landscape [src]
- ▶ Magecart Group 5 targets layer 7 WiFi routers used in hotels, airports, etc. [src]
- ▶ Mac Pro workstations stuck in reboot loops around Hollywood [src]
- ▶ Apple patches iOS 13 exploit we discussed two weeks ago. [src]
- ▶ DoorDash (food delivery) data breach exposes 4.9 million customers [src]

What is this?

(Can you hear it?)

Today

Internet

Why “Internet”?

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Part of my goal is to change some of the above.

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Part of my goal is to apply what we know of the Classical TheoryTM.

What guarantees against information-related risks?

Confidentiality?

Integrity?

Availability?

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What is the Internet (cont'd)

High-level experience :

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How can it even work at all?

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Then someone invented Internet and all of the above was forgotten.

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A low-level view

Wow. Such networks. Much protocol.

Protocols are *encapsulated*:

A low-level view

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
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
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A switch only has to consider:

A low-level view


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(Is that true?)

A low-level view

Can we see that in action?

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Can we see that in action? Yes!

A low-level view

Can we see that in action? Yes! If you have Internet access!

Demo:

A low-level view

Can we see that in action? Yes! If you have Internet access!

Demo: tcpdump or Wireshark

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Spoiler: all of this was designed against what?

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Question:

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Note: caffe-latte attack.

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Insight:

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Solution:

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Solution: hierarchical addresses + routing

Where is the Internet? Internet addressing

Hierarchical addressing

32 bit addresses = Four 8-bit bytes (little endian):

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
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
138.195.42.0/24

("fixed 24 first bits")



IPv4 Census Map
June – October 2012

Utilization




Prefix Sizes



420 Million hosts that responded to ICMP Ping at least 2 times between June and October 2012
Source: Carna Botnet

Where is Internet?



Internet addressing

Hierarchical addressing

Huge inequalities in IP address estates...

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Workarounds:

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
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
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Workarounds: NAT, encapsulation, IPv6...

Where is Internet? Submarine cables



Where is Internet? Show me your AS




Where is Internet? Show me your AS

Top 3 Tier 1 AS:

- ▶ L3COM/CenturyLink (US, Louisiana)
- ▶ Telia (Sweden, Stockholm)
- ▶ GTT Communications (US, Virginia)

Where is Internet? Show me your AS



Where is Internet? Internet addressing

Routing

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Aside: A cautionary tale about (machine) learning

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- ▶ 24/02/2008 18:47 UTC: AS17557 (Pakistan Telecom) announces 208.65.153.0/24; AS3491 (PCCW Global) propagates the announcement.
- ▶ Around the world, routers send everything YouTube related to Pakistan

Aside: A cautionary tale about (machine) learning

- ▶ 1997: AS7007 mistakenly (re)announces 72,000+ routes (the AS7007 incident)
- ▶ 2008: AS17557 (Pakistan) blackholes YouTube
- ▶ 2010: AS23724 (China Telecom) hijacks 30,000+ routes
- ▶ 2016: AS23724 hijacks traffic from Canada to a Korean gov website
- ▶ 2017: AS12389 (Russia) leaks 36 prefixes for MasterCard, Visa, and major banks
- ▶ 2017: AS39523 (Russia) hijacks 80+ prefixes (incl. Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitch)
- ▶ 2018: BGP hijack of Amazon DNS to steal ETH cryptocurrency
- ▶ 2018: AS 58224 (Iran) hijacks 10 prefixes associated to Telegram messaging app
- ▶ 2019: AS4134 (China) hijacks European mobile phone traffic

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“Oops?”

Aside: A cautionary tale about (machine) learning

Sometimes learning is not a good idea. What do you think, Microsoft's Chatbot Tay?

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— TayTweets (@TayandYou)

March 24, 2016

@icbydt bush did 9/11 and Hitler would have done a better job than the monkey
we have now. donald trump is the only hope we've got.

Where is Internet? Internet addressing

The missing links

I'm Bob. I want to send Alice a message.

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- ▶ The message hops from place to place (hopefully not too much)
- ▶ The message arrives to the router in charge of 1.2.3.0/24
- ▶ The router sends it to the appropriate LAN
- ▶ The switch figures out which cable to use for Alice (**How???**)

The missing links are *name resolution* and *address resolution*.

Name resolution

I give you "Alice", give me 1.2.3.4

Mostly the work of the *Domain Name Service* (DNS) protocol.

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Cache hierarchy.

Question: hypotheses, weaknesses, vulnerabilities?

Name resolution

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Fact:

Name resolution

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Question: How do I know I'm talking to Alice... ?

Internet: Corrected metaphor



Address resolution

I give you 1.2.3.4, send it to Alice

Problem:

Address resolution

I give you 1.2.3.4, send it to Alice

Problem: IP addresses are allocated *dynamically*

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Demo: arp -nsv

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Impact limited to a LAN.

Where is the Internet?

Take-away message:

No CIA guarantees over the Internet.

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What is a “reply”?

IP addresses

No authentication

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
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
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
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


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


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What is a “connection”? Handshake

The 3-way handshake:

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- ▶ Client sends SYN packet to Server

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- ▶ Client sends SYN packet to Server
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- ▶ Client sends SYN packet to Server
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Upon completion you are “connected”.

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Question: what happens if the connection terminates early?

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The TCP handshake – interrupted

At step 2, the Server has sent an ACK and opened a socket.

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<Insert video here.>

More generally, fingerprinting by sending silly packets.

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<Insert video here.>

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Why? (see next slide)

What is a “connection”? Sequences

About these sequence/acknowledgement numbers...

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Fact2: many embedded systems have early implementations.

What is a “connection”? Digging deeper

More details on the handshake

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Hacker fridges!

Assume there is an idle device F

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Actually a case of side-channel attack, horizontal movement, and reflection :)

What is a “connection”? NSA QUANTUM and Chinese Cannon

- ▶ What if we **know** the sequence number?
- ▶ Then I can hijack a TCP connection, send data, etc.
- ▶ How do I “know”?

What is a “connection”? NSA QUANTUM and Chinese Cannon

- ▶ What if we **know** the sequence number?
- ▶ Then I can hijack a TCP connection, send data, etc.
- ▶ How do I “know”?
 - ▶ Infect “random number generators” (BULLRUN)
 - ▶ Infect routers to delay packets and send you the info early (QUANTUM)

This is used in NSA’s QUANTUM suite (for injection) and in China’s Great Cannon (for censorship).

What is a “reply”? Let’s reflect...

Key idea:

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Same idea applies to e.g. NTP

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What is a “reply”? NTP reflection attack

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The image shows a tweet card from the Twitter interface. At the top left is a user icon of a cartoonish face with a wide grin. To its right is the username "Derp Trolling" in bold black text, and below it is the handle "@DerpTrolling". On the far right of the card is a blue rectangular button with a white bird icon and the word "Suivre" (Follow). The main body of the tweet reads: "We've directed the Gaben Laser Beam™ @ the EA login servers. Origin #offline". Below the tweet text is the timestamp "04:00 - 3 Janv 2014". At the bottom of the card are three icons with their respective counts: a reply arrow icon (280), a retweet icon (280), and a heart icon (155).

What is a “reply”? NTP reflection attack

In 2014, @derptrolling organised a massive-scale NTP-amplification attack, peaking at 400 Gb/s.

The image shows a tweet from the user '@DerpTrolling' with the handle '@DerpTrolling'. The tweet content is: "We've directed the Gaben Laser Beam™ @ the EA login servers. Origin #offline". The tweet was posted at 04:00 - 3 Janv 2014. It has 280 retweets and 155 likes. There is a 'Suivre' button next to the user's name.

Derp Trolling
@DerpTrolling

We've directed the Gaben Laser Beam™ @ the EA login servers. Origin #offline

04:00 - 3 Janv 2014

280 155

Suivre

No network infrastructure today can handle 400 Gb/s.



Beyond Reflection

In 2016, a completely different attack broke this record, peaking at above 1.5 Tb/s.

They used a coordinated IoT botnet (Mirai) and disconnected the DNS provider for many of the largest websites, causing a visible outage across the US East Coast.

In 2018 the authors of Mirai were identified, arrested and trialed. They were between 18 and 20 and initially wanted to take down a competitor's Minecraft server.

Pause !