

Default Data Manipulation in Marketplace Lending

Yutong Hu* Shasha Li†

Latest draft [here](#)

February 13, 2022‡

ABSTRACT

We detect loan repayment performance data manipulation in online marketplace lending and explore how information manipulation affects market outcomes especially market efficiency. Using a data set of peer-to-peer loans from a leading online lending platform in China, we find that the platform substantially under-report the default rate by cooperating with an offline sister company. Our baseline results suggest that the monthly default rates are on average under-reported by 14%. The data shows that the LGD-adjusted interest rate fails to predict the default, and the market is not efficient. Furthermore, hidden default data drives the online market further away from information efficiency. And liquidity plays an important role in the deviations of the market prices from the information-efficient level.

Keywords: Marketplace Lending, Information Manipulation, Market Efficiency

JEL classification: G14, G23, G33

*London Business School, yhu@london.edu.

†Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) and University of Magdeburg, shasha.li@iwh-halle.de.

‡The authors thank Julian Franks, Anna Pavlova and Stefano Rossi for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors remain ours.

1. Introduction

Technology-enabled innovation is affecting every financial sector. The dramatic growth and wide applications of financial technology, so-called FinTech, have attracted broad discussion among researchers, practitioners, and regulators. Barba Navaretti and Pozzolo (2021) has recently argued that the oversight of FinTech companies requires a good understanding of their complex and new business models. Following this thought, in this paper, we take a closer look at the lending activities conducted by FinTech credit companies and find evidences of strategic bad debt hiding.

FinTech credit companies are mainly online lending platforms such as LendinClub, which play as information intermediaries to facilitate transactions between borrowers and lenders. The rise of online lending platforms help surface a large amount of previous inaccessible data and share it with every deal participant. Consumers and investors saw FinTech lenders as more transparent option compared to the traditional lenders. However, due to lack of regulation and clear disclosure requirements, online marketplace lending is not as transparent as perceived. In 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department has released a white paper to call for greater transparency in online lending, including transparent loan performance metrics, standardized loan-level data, and clear pricing terms.

The important role of information design in online marketplace lending has been widely discussed in the literature (e.g. Iyer et al., 2016; Vallee and Zeng, 2019; Franks et al., 2021). Because marketplace participants rely on the visible information on the platform to make borrowing or investment decisions, the kind and the extent of information disclosed by the market organizers are crucial. Meanwhile, online lending platforms have the incentive to manipulate, and they can easily garble and obfuscate data. The primary goal of most online lending platforms is to bring liquidity and charge service fees from the successful match, proportionally on the amount of loan originated. The strategic window dressing by hiding information can alter how retail users aggregate the dispersed information to make entry and investment decisions, thereby affecting market outcomes. Furthermore, information manipulation has long been a topic in traditional financial markets, including the lending market. For example, banks strategically understate the risk, especially when systematic risk is high (Begley et al., 2017) or manipulate credit ratings before sharing with competitors to keep informational rent (Giannetti et al., 2017). FinTech lenders are no exception, and

this study provides a new piece of empirical evidence for the online lending platforms’ information hiding behaviour.

In this study, we detect the evidence of credit information manipulation in the online P2P lending industry in China and investigate its impact on market information efficiency. We use a data set of P2P loans manually collected from the Renrendai platform, one of China’s biggest online lending platforms. The data includes all loan applications applied from Oct 2010 to May 2018. The loan-level data of Renrendai shows a puzzling feature that the annual interest rate on average is more than 10%, about twice the bank rates, while the annual default rate on average is surprisingly lower than 3%. In some periods, default rates are even close to zero.

However, in contrast to the extremely low credit risk disclosed, Renrendai faced a massive risk of debt overdue in 2021. In 2021, a group of investors sued Renrendai for its non-transparent practices and lack of disclosure in operating status and financial condition.¹ All the evidence implies that Renrendai is hiding its actual performance.

We dig into data to unearth that Renrendai’s credit risk data manipulation started from November 2012, when Renrendai announced merging with UCredit (Youxin in Chinese), a financial services company founded by the same co-founders of Renrendai and focusing on offline debt services. After the consolidation, Renrendai was able to incorporate the information of online and offline loan services on the same platform. From Nov 2012, the default rates published by Renrendai suddenly went down, and strikingly, the default rates of loans coming from offline Youxin offices were reported to be zero. We find that, when an offline borrower defaults, Renrendai uses the money on their risk control account to repay the lender, and then its offline sister company will collect the repayment from the borrower later. The default record for the offline borrower will not appear in the published data. We suggest that the sudden drop in the default rate after Nov 2012 is because that Renrendai “manipulates” the default record of the offline borrowers. Since borrowers, lenders, and investors largely depend on Renrendai’s published data to make decisions, we also investigate how the default rates manipulation will affect the market efficiency on the platform. Our results suggest that the hidden default records drive the online market further away from information efficiency.

First, to detect default rate manipulation, we use borrower characteristics to forecast what the

¹<https://min.news/en/tech/6bbb31c76f39767719e5c46fb0fb769a.html>

default rates should be if there is no data manipulation. Renrendai collect borrowers' information when they request a loan, and lenders also observe these borrower characteristics when they decide whether to offer the fund. We specify a regression model using these borrower characteristics to predict default rates. The regression model is estimated in a 6-month pre window relative to Nov 2012, when Renrendai merged with Youxin and offline borrowers started to appear on the platform. The default rates predictions are mainly compared to the reported default rates in a 6-month post window relative to Nov 2012. The reasons for choosing a 6-month window are that the true model is not likely to change in a relatively short time and that we can have enough observations to estimate the model in a half-year window. Our results suggest that, based on the regression results estimated in the pre window, the predicted monthly default rates are on average 14% higher than the reported default rates.

We also consider that the high predicted default rates can be attributed to changes in overall borrower characteristics in the post window. To rule out the influence of changes in overall borrower characteristics, we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to match the borrowers in the post window to the borrowers in the pre window according to the borrower characteristics. By comparing a borrower in the post window to a similar borrower in the pre window, the matching results tell us whether a borrower with certain characteristics in the post window is likely to default without the event effect. We then run the regression on the matched sample and find that the predicted monthly default rate is on average 13.6% higher than the published default rates. To check for the robustness of the PSM results, we also change the matching criteria for PSM and compare the difference between the predicted and reported default rates. Meanwhile, we also use Rosenbaum Bound test to check whether our results are sensitive to hidden bias. The results show that the predicted default rates are consistently higher than the reported default rates.

In addition to detecting the default rate manipulation on all of the borrowers at the same time, we also separate online borrowers and offline borrowers to further trace the reason for the sudden drop of the default rates. By comparing the monthly default rates for online and offline borrowers, we find that the reported default rates for offline borrowers are almost always zero. Letting the accuracy of the default records for online borrowers be a benchmark, we find that, if the default records for offline borrowers were reported as truthful as for the online borrowers, the monthly default rates for offline borrowers should be on average 40% higher than the zero default rates.

The evidence suggest that Renrendai significantly under-reports the default rates for the offline borrowers, who start to exist on the platform after Nov 2012.

With clear evidence showing that the platform is indeed hiding real default rates, we further explore the consequences of the manipulation. Following Franks et al. (2021), we use the repayment performance monthly data of the loans originated on Renrendai in the window period between 2012 June and 2013 May and test the market efficiency by regressing the default dummy on LGD-adjusted interest rate. If the market is efficient, we expect a unit coefficient. We find that the online lending market is far from market efficiency, with coefficients very close to zero both in the periods with and without default data manipulation. And our results suggest that default data manipulation leads to further deviation from market efficiency as the coefficient becomes lower. Moreover, liquidity variation drives the market prices further away from the information-efficient level.

Although we examine the impact of default data manipulation in the Chinese online lending market, we believe our results and stories behind are informative about the optimal information disclosure of FinTech credit companies and how their misconduct in credit risk disclosure would affect the market efficiency and stability. More broadly, because the safeguard fund policy is not rare worldwide in the thriving FinTech credit industry, which can help Fintech lenders hide the real loan performance, it is worth noting that effective regulation and oversight in information disclosure, especially credit risk disclosure, is in need.

2. Literature Review

This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, our work relates to the literature on information efficiency in the FinTech industry. Iyer et al. (2016) find that online lending markets that rely on nonstandard information to screen the peer borrowers' creditworthiness can predict the likelihood of default 45% more accurately. Their study suggests that aggregating the views of peers and leveraging nonstandard information can enhance the efficiency of online lending. Vallee and Zeng (2019) investigate the importance of information distribution on marketplace lending platforms. They find that sophisticated investors systematically outperform, and the outperformance shrinks when the lending platform reduces information provided to investors. The closest work to our study is Franks et al. (2021). In their study, a leading British peer-to-business platform retreat

from auctions, and the platform sets prices and allocates credit on their own instead. The study shows that the change makes the platform vulnerable to liquidity shocks, which leads to deviations from information efficiency. Liao et al. (2021) use the same dataset from Renrendai and find that investors appear to mostly focus on interest rates to make their investment decisions and largely ignore the credit ratings.

Second, this research also speaks to information manipulation especially financial data manipulation literature. Most of the studies focus on fraudulent financial reporting (Kirkos et al., 2007; Kaminski et al., 2004; Gillett and Uddin, 2005; Ngai et al., 2011), and some study the lending industry especially bank lending. For example, Giannetti et al. (2017) find banks manipulate credit ratings before sharing with competitors. Murfin (2012) find that banks write tighter loan contract after perceiving higher default rate. Wang and Xia (2014) find that securitization-active banks exert less effort on ex post monitoring. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to look into data manipulation in the new booming FinTech industry.

3. Data and the Platform

3.1. Renrendai P2P Marketplace Lending Platform

Renrendai, founded in May 2010, is one of the leading P2P marketplace lending platforms in China. Since Renrendai was founded in 2010, the loan book of Renrendai grew rapidly. According to Renrendai’s 2012 annual report, the platform’s annual online trading volume grew by 803%, and the total amount was 354 million yuan (about \$52.8 million). At the end of 2012, Renrendai merged with UCredit (Youxin in Chinese), a company focusing on offline debt services and founded by the same co-founders of Renrendai. Renrendai switched from purely allowing online loan applications to allowing listings creation on the platform through both the online and offline channels. Renrendai planned for going public at the end of 2012, but the attempt failed. In Jan 2014, Renrendai successfully financed \$130 million, which was the biggest investment in the Chinese P2P lending market. Renrendai used the fund to improve internal operations, enhance risk control capabilities, and recruit talented employees. By the end of 2018, the cumulative trading volume of Renrendai exceeded 76.4 billion yuan (about \$11.11 billion).

A borrower who is a Chinese citizen between the ages of 22 to 55 can apply for P2P loans

without collateral on Renrendai online lending platform by providing documents including a credit report from the central bank, an income certificate, a work certificate, and a resident identity card. The borrower can also voluntarily provide other information like property ownership certificate, marriage certificate, education background or credit report from a third agent (e.g. Sesame credit score) to support the loan application.

The platform prescreen P2P loan applications and assign passed borrowers credit ratings of AA (low risk), A, B, C, D, F, to HR (high risk). The credit rating determines the interest rate and the maximum loan amount. A borrower with better credit rating can borrow more with a lower interest rate.

To apply for loans, eligible borrowers specify the contract terms including the loan amount, interest rate (determined by their credit ratings), and maturity and create detailed loan listings online. The loan request pages contain borrowers' self-reported information such as marital status, age, educational background, working years, working industry and company size, and borrowers' historical performance on the platform such as number of successful applications and repayment record. Renrendai will update the borrower's credit rating according to the borrower's successful application and repayment record on the platform.

In addition to borrowers directly applying for the loan online (denoted as "credit" type), borrowers can also apply for Renrendai P2P loans through the sister company Youxin's offline branches (denoted as "field" type). The "field" type borrowers visit the offices of Youxin with required documents. After verification and prescreening, Youxin's loan officers can create the listings on Renrendai platform on behalf of the borrowers. The credit rating for all "field" type borrowers is A, and the interest rate is usually a fixed rate offered by the loan officer.

Investors (i.e., lenders) observe the listings with detailed information posted on the platform and can offer bids (i.e., lend money) if they agree to the contract terms. Each investor can invest in part of a loan amount with minimum loan part RMB 50 and in multiple loans. Each listing is visible on the platform for a maximum of seven days. If a listing is not fully funded after seven days, the loan application fails and will be closed. The platform also offers automatic bidding facilities to lenders. Lenders are allowed to diversify their risk by offering bids to different borrowers.

Once the requested loan amount is fully met and the loan is issued, electronic loan agreements are automatically reached between the borrower and lenders. The Renrendai platform charges the

borrower a service fee from 0% to 5% depending on the credit rating and a management fee of 0.3% of the loan amount. Borrowers repay on a monthly basis.

3.1.1. Risk Control Account and Bad Debt Collection

Renrendai takes the safeguard fund policy first introduced by Hongling Capital in 2011 to Chinese P2P lending industry during the sample period². In the event of delinquency, Renrendai guarantees to repay the principal to lenders by using Risk Control Account and then tries to manage a resolution by collection calls or messages, in-person visits conducted by partner debt collection agencies, or litigating on behalf of all lenders. The Risk Control Account (feng xian pei fu jin in Chinese) aim to step in if borrowers are late in their repayments (30 days behind) and to secure investors' return. Renrendai uses the money in the Risk Control Account to cover lenders of the defaulted loans for the remaining capital outstanding.

The money of Risk Control Account comes from Renrendai's initial injection of RMB 210 Million and loan servicing fees. Higher risk of borrowers pay higher percentage of loan amount as loan servicing fees and the fees are pooled to the Risk Control Account.

3.2. Data

Our data include 1,327,957 loan applications on Renrendai P2P lending platform, applied between Oct 2010 and May 2018. The data is hand collected and is accessible to all users on the official site of Renrendai. For each borrower, we can observe the repayment flows, the loan status (normally repaid or default) for each loan, and characteristics of the borrowers.

Among these loan applications, 743,789 loans were accepted, which was 56.01% of the total applications. At the end of May 2018, the cumulative amount of loan applied was 91.51 billion yuan (about \$14.42 billion), and the cumulative amount of loan granted was 55.8 billion yuan (about \$8.79 billion). At the same time, the total loan outstanding is 36.9 billion yuan (about \$5.81 billion). The monthly average growth rate for the amount of loan applied is 11.78%, and the standard deviation is 14.2%. The monthly growth rate for the loans granted is 12.9% with a standard deviation of 11.94%. The average monthly loan applied is 994 million yuan (about \$157

²Zopa, the first ever P2P lending company in the world, has similar Safeguard Fund Policy. Please see <https://www.zopa.com/invest/risk/safeguard-policy>.

million) with a standard deviation of 972 million yuan (about \$153 million). The average monthly loan granted is 606 million yuan (about \$95 million) with a standard deviation of 819 million yuan (about \$129 million). We show in Figure 1 the cumulative loan applied from Oct 2010 to May 2018. Figure 2 shows the monthly total loan applied.

Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the loan characteristics and borrower characteristics. In our sample, the maturities of the loans range from 1 month to 48 months, with a median of 36 months. The maturities for 50% of the loans are 36 months. For the rest of the loans, most of them have maturities of 12, 18, or 24 months. The data also tracks the repayment flows and loan status for each loan. The borrower of a loan repay in Equated Monthly Installments and the platform documents the repayment status of each monthly flow. In this study, a loan is defined as default when any monthly payment are past due by three months or more. Default rates are measured at loan open time. The average monthly default rate according to our definition is 2.16% with a standard deviation of 0.07%. The annual interest rate for the loans granted ranges from 3% to 24.4% with an average of 10.51% and a standard deviation of 1.3%. The average loan size of a granted loan is 75,000 yuan (about \$11,811). The smallest loan size in our sample is 3,000 yuan (about \$456), and the largest loan size is 3 million yuan.

Most of the borrowers on Renrendai are individual borrowers. Our data for borrower characteristics includes information about the borrower’s age, working status, education, marital status, assets in possession, debts owed, and monthly income. The age of the borrower between Oct 2010 to May 2018 ranges from 19 to 76, and the average age is 36.68. 50% of the borrowers have at least one house property, and only 33% of the borrowers have at least one car. The borrowers have a median monthly income of 10001-20000 yuan (about \$1575 to \$3150). When applying for the loans, borrowers need to provide personal information and related documents to allow the platform to assess the risks of the borrowers. Based on the information provided, Renrendai platform gives each borrower a credit limit. The credit limits for the borrowers range from 0 yuan to 50 million yuan (about \$7.6 million) with an average of 68,000 yuan (about \$10,709).

3.3. Default Rate Manipulation

In the loan data published by Renrendai, we find that there is a sudden drop in the default rate reported by the platform starting from the end of 2012. In Nov 2012, Renrendai announced that

they merged with Youxin. Youxin is a financial services company founded by the same co-founders of Renrendai and focusing on offline debt services. The default rate published by Renrendai dropped at the same time. We find that the drop in default rate is mainly due to the zero default rates of “field type” borrowers.

As explained in Section 3.1.1, Renrendai holds a Risk Control Account to secure lender’s investment. For each loan granted, the platform will charge the borrower service fees equaling 0-5% of the loan amount granted. The percentage of the service fee charged depends on the borrower’s credit rating. The service fees are held in the Risk Control Account. If a borrower defaults, Renrendai will repay the lender using cash from the Risk Control Account. The platform will then try to collect the money from the borrower. If the borrower refuse to repay the debt, then he or she will be prosecuted.

The data published on the Renrendai website contains both online loans (“credit” type loans) and offline loans (“field” type loans)³. When a borrower defaults and the repayment is made from the Risk Control Account, the loan status are reported differently for “credit” type and “field” type borrowers. For the “field” type loans, the default record will not appear in the data published on the official website. This method is completely legal, but that will lead to “manipulations” in the default rates data. Lenders observe the data to help them make the investment decisions. However, the lenders cannot tell whether a normally repaid loan is repaid by the borrower on time or repaid by the Risk Control account, so the “manipulations” in the reported default rates can affect the market efficiency on the platform.

We first plot the monthly default rates for loans with different maturities in Figure 3. Note that in our data, 50% of the loans have a maturity of 36 months. For the rest of the loans, 7.81% loans have a maturity of 12 months; 16.53% of the loans have a maturity of 18 months; 18.15% of the loans have a maturity of 24 months. In Figure 3, the default rates for 18-month and 24-month loans drop suddenly after Nov 2012. For the rest of the loans, the default rates do not change much. The default rate for 9-month loans rises slightly after Nov 2012, but 9-month loans are only 0.72% of the total loans. For the loans that are processed through offline branches, 42.63% have a maturity of 18 months, and 50.17% have a maturity of 24 months.

In Figure 4, we plot the time series of monthly default rates for online borrowers and offline

³The loan application processes for both types of the borrowers are described in Section 3.1

borrowers separately. The plot shows that, for borrowers who post the listings through offline channels, the default rates are always zero from Oct 2012 to May 2018, which is unusual. In the meantime, the reported mean default rate for online borrowers is 13.97% with a standard deviation of 0.7%. The plots imply that, although the platform use the Risk Control Account to repay defaulted loans for both offline and online loans, the platform is not reporting loan default records on online and offline borrowers in a consistent way.

In the next section, we will show that, if the platform has reported the default records for both types of borrowers consistently, the actual default rates for the offline borrowers should be much higher than zero. Figure 5 shows the monthly numbers of loans granted for online borrowers versus offline borrowers. By comparison, the number of loan applications posted through offline branches are always roughly 20 times of the number of loans applied directly online. The plot indicates that most of the default records that are visible to the investors are under-reported. We will also explore the impact of the default rate “manipulation” on the platform’s market efficiency in the next section.

4. Empirical Analysis

In this section, we describe the method and results of empirical analysis.

4.1. *Detect Default Data Manipulation*

4.1.1. *Method*

Renrendai uses the borrowers’ characteristics to decide the risk level for the loans. We assume that if the default rate data is reported consistently before and after Renrendai merging with Youxin, borrowers’ characteristics should consistently predict loan default rates before and after the event. We set the end of Nov 2012 as the breaking point, when Renrendai finished merging with Youxin. To focus on the event effect of Renrendai merging with Youxin, we pick a 6-month window before the end of Nov 2012 to estimate the default prediction model and assume it to be the true model. The reasons for predicting a 6-month window are that the default prediction model is unlikely to change in a relatively short time, and that a 6-month window can provide us with enough observations to train the model. Then we use the true model to forecast the default rate

after Nov 2012 in a post window of 6-month based on the borrower characteristics.

The regression specification is:

$$\begin{aligned}
Default_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times CompanySize_{it} + \beta_2 \times MaritalStatus_{it} + \beta_3 \times Education_{it} \\
& + \beta_4 \times WorkExperience_{it} + \beta_5 \times Age_{it} + \beta_6 \times Property_{it} + \beta_7 \times HouseMortgage_{it} \\
& + \beta_8 \times Income_{it} + \beta_9 \times Car_{it} + \beta_{10} \times CarMortgage_{it} \\
& + \beta_{11} \times LoanAmount_i + \beta_{12} \times LoanMaturity_i + \eta_{it}
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $Default_{it}$ is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower defaults and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are borrower characteristics. $CompanySize_{it}$ is a categorical variable indicating the number of employers in the borrower's working company. $MaritalStatus_{it}$ is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is married and 0 otherwise. $Education_{it}$ is a categorical variable indicating the education level the borrower has. $WorkExperience_{it}$ is a categorical variable indicating the number of years the borrower has worked. Age_{it} is the age of the borrower. $Property_{it}$ is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower owns at least one property and 0 otherwise. $HouseMortgage_{it}$ is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower has at least one house mortgage and 0 otherwise. $Income_{it}$ is a categorical variable indicating the income level of the borrower. Car_{it} is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower owns at least one car and 0 otherwise. $CarMortgage_{it}$ is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower has at least one car mortgage and 0 otherwise. $LoanAmount_i$ is the amount of loan applied, and $LoanMaturity_i$ is the maturity of the loan. η_{it} is the error term. The detailed descriptions of the borrower characteristics can be found in Table 1.

Note that we do not control for the credit rating given by Renrendai in our regression, because offline borrowers are all assigned A ratings by the platform. The ratings assigned to the offline borrowers cannot distinguish the creditworthiness of the borrowers. While detecting the default rate manipulation, we control for monthly fixed effects to rule out the possibility that change in default rates could be due to industry trends or consumer awareness of the P2P lending industry, which may change over time.

We also consider that the quality of borrowers may change before and after the two companies

merge, which could cause changes in the default rates. The first half of Table 2 compares the changes in borrower characteristics in the pre window and post window. According to the difference test results on the borrower characteristics before and after the event, we find that, on average, borrowers in the post window have lower education level, work in smaller companies, and have less property. But in the meantime, the borrowers in the post window have higher income on average.

To rule out the effect of changed borrower characteristics, we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to match the observations before and after the event based on the borrowers' characteristics. PSM matches the borrowers in the post window to similar borrowers in the pre window. Using matching results, we can proxy whether a borrower in the post window with certain characteristics is likely to default if there is no treatment effect of the data "manipulation" in the borrowers' default rates after the company merge. Then we estimate the default rate prediction model based on the matched sample. Next, we use the estimated model to predict the default rates for the borrowers in the post window and compare the estimated default rates with the default rates reported. To implement PSM, we first match the borrowers based on all the characteristics included in Equation 1. We then change the matching criteria to ensure the robustness of the Propensity Score Matching results.

4.1.2. Main Results

Table 3 shows the OLS regression results using samples in the pre window and the post window. Column (1) shows the results of the regression on the loans from June 2012 to Nov 2012. Column (2) shows the results of the regression on the loans from Dec 2012 to May 2013. The regression results are very different before and after the event. Education and Income lose their prediction power in the post window. In the post window, whether the borrower owns a property becomes a significant predictor for the default rates. Moreover, the sign for the coefficient of Loan Maturity flips after the event but remains significant. The coefficient on Loan Maturity implies that, in the post window, loans with longer maturity are less likely to default. Interestingly, the positive coefficients on borrower income implies that borrowers with higher income is more likely to default on Renrendai platform.

In Figure 6, we plot the monthly default rates in the data together with the predicted monthly default rates. The predicted default rates are based on the regression results on the pre window

data. The red vertical line indicates the event time, Nov 2012. The plot shows that after Nov 2012, the predicted default rates are consistently higher than the published default rates. To compare the difference between the published default rates and the predicted default rates in the 6-month post window, we implement a t-test with the null hypothesis that the predicted default rates equal the published default rates. The mean of the difference between the predicted default rates and published default rates in the post window is reported in Table 3. The result indicates that the predicted monthly default rates are on average 14% significantly higher than the published default rates.

Column (3) of Table 3 reports the regression results on the propensity-score-matched sample using all borrower characteristics included in Equation 1. Figure 7 plots the predicted default rates based on the PSM results versus the published default rates. The predicted default rates are consistently higher than the reported default rates after Nov 2012. The results of the difference test show that, in the post window, the predicted default rates are on average 13.6% significantly higher than the published default rates.

Both the baseline regression results and the PSM regression results support that the default rates reported by Renrendai after Nov 2012 are substantially lower than it should be if they report the default rates as truthfully as before the company merge. Because PSM results largely depend on the variables that are used to implement the match, in the next subsection, we change the PSM matching criteria to test the robustness of the PSM regression results.

4.1.3. Robustness of PSM Results

To rule out that changing the matching criteria could influence the PSM regression results, we change the propensity score matching criteria in this section to check for the robustness of the PSM regression results. Table 4 and Table 5 show the regression results on samples matched using different criteria. For example, for column (1) of Table 4, which is labeled as “No Company Size”, the matched sample is matched on all the other 9 borrower characteristics except for *Company Size*. Similarly, “No Marital Status” means that the matched sample is matched on all the other 9 borrower characteristics except for *Marital Status* and so on and so forth.

In Figure ??, we plot the predicted default rates based on the regression results in Table 4 and Table 5 versus the published default rates. For all of the plots, we can see visually that the

predicted default rates are consistently higher than the published default rates. The t-test on the difference between predicted and reported default rates also consistently show that the predicted default rates are always higher.

In addition to testing the PSM results using different matching criteria, we also apply the Rosenbaum Bound Test to the difference between the reported default rates and predicted default rates using estimation in Column (3) of Table 3. Rosenbaum Bounds examines whether the average treatment effects on the treated is sensitive to hidden bias. Table 6 shows the Rosenbaum Bounds Test results. The table shows that the lower and upper bounds for predicted default rates minus reported default rates are significantly positive and insensitive to different levels of hidden bias measured by gamma.

These results support the robustness of our conclusion that, if Renrendai has reported the default rates as truthfully as before the platform merge with Youxin, the default rates after Nov 2012 should be significantly higher than the default rates currently reported in their data.

4.1.4. Offline Versus Online Borrowers

Before Nov 2012, the platform only allows borrowers to submit loan applications online directly. After Renrendai merged with Youxin in Nov 2012, Renrendai started to allow borrowers to visit their offline branches to submit certificates and create online listings. In Figure 4, we show that after Nov 2012, the default rates for offline borrowers are reported to be zero, while the average reported default rate for online borrowers is 13.97%. The plot implies that, while the default records for offline borrowers are “manipulated”, the default records for online borrowers are relatively more truthfully reported.

In this section, instead of examining the default rate “manipulation” for all of the borrowers at the same time, we assume that the default rates for online borrowers are correctly reported and focus on detecting default rate “manipulation” on the offline borrowers. We use the default records for the online borrowers and borrower characteristics to proxy the true default records for the offline borrowers. We first assume that the default rate prediction model for online borrowers is also true for offline borrowers. Since offline borrowers start to exist after Nov 2012, we only focus on the loan data after Nov 2012 in this section.

First, we run the regression specified in 1 on all the online borrowers after Nov 2012, and use

the regression results to predict the default rates for the offline borrowers. Column (1) in Table 7 shows the regression results. The difference test in the table shows the mean difference between the predicted default rates and the reported default rates for the offline borrowers after Nov 2012. The difference test shows that, assuming the default rates for online borrowers are truthfully reported, the default rates for the offline borrowers are under-reported by 44.7% on average. Figure 9 plots the predicted monthly default rates for the offline borrowers in the red line. The blue horizontal line plots the reported zero default rates.

In addition to directly estimating the default prediction model on the online borrowers, we also use Propensity Score Matching method to proxy the default rate for offline borrowers. In the second half of Table 2, we compare the characteristics of online and offline borrowers after Nov 2012. We find that offline borrowers on average have higher education level, higher income, and more of them have at least one car. Offline borrowers are also charged less guarantee fee on average. In the meantime, offline borrowers work in smaller companies and have less work experience. The difference test shows that the average characteristics for online and offline borrowers are significantly different.

To rule out the effect of changes in borrower characteristics, we match the offline borrowers to the online borrowers based on the borrower characteristics and use the default records for the matched online borrowers to proxy the true default records for the offline borrowers. Considering that the behavior of the borrowers with similar characteristics may change over time due to the impact of unobserved factors like economic trends, we match the online and offline borrowers from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013⁴. We then run the regression specified in equation 1 on the matched samples, and compare the predicted default rates with the reported default rates. The results are reported in column (2) of Table 7. The difference test shows that the predicted default rates are 40% higher than the reported default rates on average. Figure 10 plots the predicted monthly default rates. Table 8 shows the Rosenbaum bounds for the difference between the predicted and reported default rates for the offline borrowers. Both the lower bound and higher bound are significantly higher than zero and insensitive to unobserved bias.

To test the robustness of the PSM results, we change the matching criteria for PSM using the same methods as in Section 4.1.3. Table 9 and Table 10 show the regression results. Figure 11

⁴We also plan to test the results for matching the borrowers in the following years on a rolling basis.

shows the predicted monthly default rates. The difference tests in Table 9 and Table 10 show that the predicted default rates are consistently higher than zero.

The evidence above shows that, assuming the default rates for online borrowers are truthfully reported, Renrendai significantly under-reports the default rates for the offline borrowers after Nov 2012. In the next section, we will explore how the manipulation in the default rates impacts the market efficiency on the platform.

4.2. Market Efficiency Test

As shown above, the Renrendai platform hides the information about default rates and largely under-report its credit risk. This section further explores the consequences of default data manipulation. In particular, we would like to investigate the impact of default data hiding on market efficiency.

The direction of the effect is not straightforward. On the one hand, the disclosure of bad debts may trigger a fear run, and thus, hiding negative information would improve the market efficiency if market participants have fragile beliefs. On the other hand, platforms hide the actual financial condition and credit risk, which may bias market participants' decision-making.

To test market efficiency, we use stacked regression methodology following Franks et al. (2021) and estimate the periodic default probability conditioning on the loan's "life cycle". This methodology takes into account the timing of default and possible truncation problems. Because we observed the repayment performance of the loans until 2018 September and some loans were not matured by then. The longer the observation time, the less likely we would observe the loan's default status as the platform has a longer time to collect bad debts on behalf of lenders. The data set we use contains 205,278 monthly repayment performance of propensity-score-matched loans originated on Renrendai between 2012 June and 2013 May, among which 7,996 observations are in the pre-change period, and 197,282 observations are in the post-change period with offline loans. P2P loans drop out of sample one month after defaulting or when they mature. Note that we observe repayment performance until 2018 September.

4.2.1. Main Specification

As in Franks et al. (2021), the main Efficient Market Hypothesis specification is derived from the lenders' participation constraint. A risk-neutral lender makes participation decisions based on the following condition,

$$1 + \rho = (1 - \pi_i^e)(1 + r_i) + \pi_i^e(1 - LGD_i^e)(1 + r_i) \quad (2)$$

where ρ and π represent risk-free rate and loan i 's probability of default respectively. After liberalizing, we can get the one-to-one relationship between the Loss Given Default (LGD) adjusted interest rate and the expected probability of default, $\pi_i^e \approx \alpha^* + r_i^*$ where $\alpha^* = -\frac{\rho}{LGD_i^e}$ and $r_i^* = \frac{r_i}{LGD_i^e}$. In other words, if the market is efficient, a 1% increase in LGD-adjusted interest should predict a 1% higher probability of default.

The constraint gives us the benchmark regression equation for the market efficiency test,

$$\begin{aligned} Default_{it} = & \beta \times r_i^* + \theta \times FE_Rating_i + \gamma \times FE_MIssue_i \\ & + \lambda \times FE_SLife_{it} + \delta \times X_{it} + \lambda \times FE_Province_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where r_i^* is the LGD-adjusted interest rate. FE_Rating and FE_MIssue are fixed effects (FEs) for the borrower's credit ratings and the month of issuing loan i . FE_SLife_{it} are fixed effects of loan i 's life cycle, into three equal stages, *Early*, *Mid* and *Late*. For example, for an 18-month loan, the first six months are on its *Early* stage, the second six months are on its *Mid* stage, and the remaining six months are on its *Late* stage. X_{it} captures the platform's market performance at the loan's performance month t , including last month's trading volume in terms of the number of loan applications and the total value of the applied amount. We also incorporate borrowers' province fixed effects to eliminate all time-invariant unobservable or observable confounding factors related to the province's economic conditions and other factors. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the borrower level.

If the market is efficient, we expect to have a unit coefficient of the primary variable of interest, β ,

in regression (3). Table 14 shows the results of the market efficiency test. To reduce the concern that the LGDs are computed rather than observed, we test the robustness by bootstrapping standard errors, and we obtain the same main results as shown in Table 15.

4.2.2. LGD-adjusted Interest Rate, Periodic Default Dummy and Recovery Rate

To construct LGD_i^e , we start by estimating the pre- and post-default recovery rate. First, we estimate the default recovery rate by running the following regression with periodic default dummy as the dependent variable,

$$Default_{it} = \theta \times FE_Rating_i + \gamma \times FE_MIssue_i + \lambda \times FE_SLife_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

where $Default_{it}$ is loan i 's default dummy at performance month t . As before, FE_Rating and FE_MIssue are fixed effects (FEs) for the borrower's credit ratings and the month of issuing loan i . FE_SLife_{it} is loan i 's life cycle fixed effects.

Table 11 reports results. It shows that bad repayment performance is almost evenly distributed across three loan life cycle stages. AA or A rating loans have a significantly lower default probability.

Following Franks et al. (2021), we can compute the annualized unconditional default probabilities and also the pre-default recovery rates as shown in Table 13. Panel one is the estimated default probabilities for different ratings. AA or A rating borrowers have a default probability of 1.35%, while the HR rating borrowers have the highest likelihood of 15.7%.

Because P2P loans on Renrendai are fully amortized with equal monthly payments, loans that default early have already repaid one-sixth of the debt, that default middle has repaid 50%, and that default late has repaid around 83.3%. Thus we can calculate the pre-default recovery rates based on the life-cycle patterns we get from the regression (4), shown in the last column of Table 13. For example, for an HR-scored loan, we obtain the life-cycle pattern of default probabilities (33.08%, 33.59%, 33.33%) by normalizing the unconditional probabilities (1.3%, 1.32%, 1.31%) by the overall probability of default 3.93%. That is, the P2P loan has a probability of 33.08% that default early, a probability of 33.59% that default middle, and a probability of 33.33% that default late. We multiply the vector of the life-cycle pattern probabilities by a vector of conditional recovery

rates $(\frac{1}{6}, \frac{3}{6}, \frac{5}{6})$. The first column of Panel two on Table 13 shows the results of pre-default recovery rates for all credit ratings.

⟨insert Table 11 here⟩

Second, to get the post-default recovery rate, we now focus on 147 default events. We run the regressions for the sample in the whole window,

$$RRecoveryPost_i = \alpha + \theta \times FE_Rating_i + \psi \times MRecovery_i + \gamma \times FE_MIssue_i + \epsilon_i \quad (5)$$

where $RRecoveryPost_i$ is loan i 's post-default recovery rate, which equals to post-default recovered value at the end of the sample divided by balance remaining at the point of default. $MRecovery_i$ is the natural logarithm of the length of the recovery period, the number of months from the point of default to observation time 2018 September. FE_Rating and FE_MIssue are fixed effects (FEs) for the borrower's credit ratings and the month of issuing the loan i ⁵.

Table 12 reports results. Post-default recovery rates on Renrendai are around 13.7% to 1, with B rating loans having the lowest recovery rates and AA or A rating loans fully recovered.

⟨insert Table 12 here⟩

4.3. Results of Market Efficiency Test

Table 14 shows the results of market efficiency test (equation 3). Table 14 indicates that loan prices cannot significantly predict the default event, and the magnitude is far from 1. Though not statistically significant, the negative coefficients of the interaction term of LGD-adjusted interest rate and post dummy suggests that the deviation from information efficiency increases after introducing manipulated loans essentially originated through an offline sister company. The default manipulation drives the market further away from information efficiency. Thus, this online market is not informationally efficient ex-ante and even worse in terms of market efficiency after default data manipulation. The liquidity measures significantly predict the active loans' default instead

⁵ $MRecovery_i$ is omitted in the regression because of co-linearity

of borrowers’ credit rating or LGD-adjusted interest rate. We will discuss the effects of liquidity later.

4.4. Liquidity

In this subsection, we study the role of liquidity shock in market efficiency. Franks et al. (2021) finds that liquidity shocks can drive interest rates away from fundamental values. As they did, we augment the benchmark regression 3 with liquidity measures and other control variables such as active bid share. Column (2), (4) and (5) of Table 14 show the results.

We have two liquidity measures. One is the finishing time of the bids for a loan, denoted as *finit*, calculated by the difference between the first and last bidding. The shorter the finishing time, the more liquid the market is. The other proxy for liquidity is *agg-weekly-borrow*, the total value of the loans originated in the seven days that the loan request listing *i* is open, normalized by last month’s loan book. In addition, we also check the role of automatic bids and incorporate a loan’s active bidding share in the augmented regressions.

Similarly, we find that liquidity shocks further drive the prices away from the market-efficient level. The significant negative coefficient of finishing time implies that there’s high default probability when there’s high liquidity. It follows that the interest rate should be adjusted upward to restore market efficiency. In other words, liquidity shock drives down the interest rate on loans listed in that period below their market-efficient level. The direction of the effects of liquidity is different from that of Franks et al. (2021). One possible explanation is that higher liquidity comes from the higher risk-taking of the platform, and Renrendai introduced too many low credit quality borrowers to the market.

5. Conclusion

Puzzled by online lending’s extremely low default rate and relatively high-interest rate, we detect default data manipulation and study its impact on marketplace lending outcomes. In this paper, we find statistical evidences showing that the online platform largely under-reports monthly default rates by 14% on average. The loan repayment performance data manipulation drives the interest rate of online P2P loans away from market efficiency. And liquidity shock also makes the

prices deviate from information-efficient levels.

The latest wave of FinTech innovation brings modern and convenient business models never observed before, and it is important to keep up with the innovation. The most recent global financial crisis is a lesson about information transparency, and if this time we ignore again what's really going on in the new FinTech sector, we may put our financial system in danger again. This paper points out the existence of manipulative practices of FinTech platforms in terms of information disclosure and raises important policy questions with regard to consistent and transparent information disclosure of FinTech companies.

References

- Barba Navaretti, G. C., Pozzolo, A. F., 2021. Regulating fintech in europe: Lessons from the collapse of wirecard. VoxEU.org.22 November .
- Begley, T. A., Purnanandam, A., Zheng, K., 2017. The strategic underreporting of bank risk. *The Review of Financial Studies* 30, 3376–3415.
- Franks, J., Serrano-Velarde, N., Sussman, O., 2021. Marketplace lending, information aggregation, and liquidity. *The Review of Financial Studies* 34, 2318–2361.
- Giannetti, M., Liberti, J. M., Sturgess, J., 2017. Information sharing and rating manipulation. *The Review of Financial Studies* 30, 3269–3304.
- Gillett, P. R., Uddin, N., 2005. Cfo intentions of fraudulent financial reporting. *Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory* 24, 55–75.
- Iyer, R., Khwaja, A. I., Luttmer, E. F., Shue, K., 2016. Screening peers softly: Inferring the quality of small borrowers. *Management Science* 62, 1554–1577.
- Kaminski, K. A., Wetzel, T. S., Guan, L., 2004. Can financial ratios detect fraudulent financial reporting? *Managerial Auditing Journal* .
- Kirkos, E., Spathis, C., Manolopoulos, Y., 2007. Data mining techniques for the detection of fraudulent financial statements. *Expert systems with applications* 32, 995–1003.

- Liao, L., Wang, Z., Xiang, J., Yan, H., Yang, J., 2021. User interface and firsthand experience in retail investing. *The Review of Financial Studies* 34, 4486–4523.
- Murfin, J., 2012. The supply-side determinants of loan contract strictness. *The Journal of Finance* 67, 1565–1601.
- Ngai, E. W., Hu, Y., Wong, Y. H., Chen, Y., Sun, X., 2011. The application of data mining techniques in financial fraud detection: A classification framework and an academic review of literature. *Decision support systems* 50, 559–569.
- Vallee, B., Zeng, Y., 2019. Marketplace lending: A new banking paradigm? *The Review of Financial Studies* 32, 1939–1982.
- Wang, Y., Xia, H., 2014. Do lenders still monitor when they can securitize loans? *The Review of Financial Studies* 27, 2354–2391.

Figures




Fig. 1. Cumulative Loan Amount




Fig. 2. Monthly Loan Amount




Fig. 3. Monthly Default Rates for Loans with Different Maturities

The title for each subplot is the maturity of the loan type measured in months. For example, “18” in the subtitle means the loan maturity is 18 months. The blue line plots the default rates for the loans with maturity specified in the subtitle. The grey lines plot default rates with the other maturities.

Tables




Fig. 4. Monthly Default Rates




Fig. 5. Monthly Number of Loans




Fig. 6. Predicted v.s Published Default Rates, Baseline Results

This figure reports the default rates predicted using baseline regression results v.s. published default rates. The red vertical line indicates Nov 2012, the event time.




Fig. 7. Predicted v.s Published Default Rates, PSM Results

This figure reports the default rates predicted using PSM regression results v.s. published default rates. The propensity score matching is based on all the borrower characteristics included in Equation 1. The red vertical line indicates Nov 2012, the event time.




Fig. 8. Predicted v.s Published Default Rates, PSM Results Using Different Matching Criteria

This figure reports the default rates predicted using PSM regression results v.s. published default rates. The borrowers in the pre window and post window are matched on the different borrower characteristics sets. For example, the subplot “No Comp. Size” means that the propensity score matched sample is matched on the other 9 borrower characteristics except for *Company Size*. The subplot with subtitle “PSM all Characteristics” is included for comparison purpose, which is the same as Figure 7




Fig. 9. Default Rates Predicted: Regression on Online Borrowers

This figure reports the default rates predicted for offline borrowers using regression results on online borrowers after Nov 2012. The red line plots the predicted default rates for the offline borrowers using the regression results on online borrowers' data. The regression model is specified in 1. The blue line plots the reported zero default rates for offline borrowers.




Fig. 10. Default Rates Predicted: Regression on the Propensity Score Matched Sample

This figure reports the default rates predicted for offline borrowers using regression results on the propensity score matched sample between Dec 2012 and Dec 2013. The red line plots the predicted default rates for the offline borrowers. The regression model is specified in 1. The blue line plots the reported zero default rates for offline borrowers.




Fig. 11. Default Rates Predicted: PSM Results Using Different Matching Criteria

This figure reports the default rates predicted using PSM regression results v.s. published default rates. The offline and online borrowers are matched on different borrower characteristics sets. For example, the subplot “No Comp. Size” means that the propensity score matched sample is matched on the other 9 borrower characteristics except for *Company Size*. The subplot with subtitle “PSM all Characteristics” is included for comparison purpose, which is the same as Figure 10.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
A. Loan characteristics					
Loan size (applied) (thousand yuan)	68.9	50	73.9	0	3000
Loan size (granted) (thousand yuan)	75	66.7	51.8	1	3000
Total loan applied per month (million yuan)	994.74	802.05	971.91	0.14	4074.14
Total loan applied monthly growth (%)	31.09	10.29	115.84	-89.13	787.22
Total loan granted per month (million yuan)	606.48	232	819.22	0.06	3632.89
Total loan granted monthly growth (%)	44.59	12.44	183.24	-94.5	1510.28
Maturity (months)	31	36	9	1	48
Monthly default rate (%)	2.16	1.42	0.07	0	17.95
Annual Interest rate (%)	10.51	10.2	1.30	3	24.4
B. Borrower characteristics					
Company size	1.42	1	0.77	1	4
Marital status (0/1)	0.6	1	0.49	0	1
Education	2.07	2	0.96	1	4
Work experience	2.46	2	1.13	1	4
Age	36.68	35	8.42	19	76
Property (0/1)	0.5	1	0.5	0	1
Housing mortgage (0/1)	0.24	0	0.43	0	1
Income	4.66	5	1.19	1	7
Car (0/1)	0.33	0	0.47	0	1
Car mortgage (0/1)	0.09	0	0.28	0	1
Credit limit (thousand yuan)	68	58.9	102.12	0	50000

This table reports the summary statistics on the loans applied between Oct 2010 and May 2018. Panel A reports the summary for loan characteristics. *Loan size* applied and granted is reported in thousand yuan. *Total loan* applied and granted per month is measured in million yuan. *Maturity* of loans is measured in months. *Default rate* is measured at loan open time. Late and bad repayments are all viewed as defaults.

Panel B shows the summary statistics for borrower characteristics. *Company size* is a categorical variable describing the number of total employers in the borrower's working company. (*Company size* = 1: below 10 employers; 2: 10-100 employers; 3: 100-500 employers; 4: above 500 employers.) *Marital status* is a dummy variable equaling 0 for not married and 1 for married. *Education* is a categorical variable describing the level of education the borrower has. (*Education* = 1: junior college; 2: high school; 3: undergraduate; 4: graduate or above.) *Work experience* is a categorical variable describing the number of years the borrower has worked. (*Work experience* = 1: 1 year and below; 2: 1-3 years; 3: 3-5 years; 4: 5 years and above.) *Property* is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the borrower owns at least one property and 0 if the borrower has no property. *Housing mortgage* is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the borrower has at least one housing mortgage outstanding and 0 otherwise. *Income* is a categorical variable describes the monthly income of the borrower. (*Income* = 1: below 1000 yuan; 2: 1001-2000 yuan; 3: 2001-5000 yuan; 4: 5001-10000 yuan; 5: 10001-20000 yuan; 6: 20001-50000 yuan; 7: above 50000 yuan.) *Car* is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the borrower has a car and 0 if the borrower has no car. *Car mortgage* is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the borrower has at least one car mortgage outstanding and 0 otherwise. *Credit limit* describes the borrower's credit limit on Renrendai lending platform.

Table 2: Balance Tests

	Before			Post			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
companysize	14665	2.28	1.03	25273	2.26	0.98	-0.017*
marriage	14747	1.56	0.52	25428	1.68	0.57	0.119***
education	14743	1.86	0.77	25426	1.83	0.78	-0.035***
workexperience	14739	2.46	1.02	25417	2.46	0.99	-0.006
age	14747	35.41	7.47	25429	36.83	10.41	1.428***
property	14747	0.43	0.50	25429	0.33	0.47	-0.102***
housingmortgage	14747	0.12	0.32	25429	0.09	0.29	-0.026***
income	14741	3.95	1.32	25422	4.21	1.36	0.260***
car	14747	0.28	0.45	25429	0.30	0.46	0.022***
carmortgage	14747	0.05	0.21	25429	0.04	0.19	-0.009***

	Online			Offline			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
companysize	6432	2.84	0.99	636663	1.36	0.71	-1.483***
marriage	7011	1.68	0.57	636663	1.79	0.61	0.109***
education	7009	2.02	0.94	636663	2.09	0.96	0.065***
workexperience	7011	2.75	1.02	628560	2.43	1.14	-0.325***
age	7011	35.05	6.82	655179	36.36	11.28	1.302***
property	7011	0.51	0.50	636841	0.52	0.50	0.006
housingmortgage	7011	0.21	0.41	636841	0.25	0.43	0.033***
income	7011	4.09	1.15	636663	4.69	1.18	0.605***
car	7011	0.28	0.45	636841	0.34	0.48	0.064***
carmortgage	7011	0.07	0.25	636841	0.09	0.29	0.024***
group(guaranteefee)	7011	7.80	0.53	655179	2.80	1.02	-5.003***

The first panel of the table reports results of balance tests in the window period (2012 May to 2013 June). The second panel reports results of balance tests for the period after 2012 November. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Regression Results

Regression Results Before and After the Event			
VARIABLES	(1) Before	(2) After	(3) PSM
Company Size	0.013 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.025 (0.015)
Marital Status	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.034 (0.028)
Education	-0.012* (0.005)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.021 (0.013)
Work Experience	-0.009 (0.007)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.015 (0.020)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.001)
Property	0.033 (0.017)	0.063*** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.024)
House Mortgage	-0.016 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.061)
Income	0.017*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.002)	0.017* (0.008)
Car	0.013 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.008 (0.030)
Car Mortgage	0.014 (0.031)	0.027 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.066)
Log Loan Amount	-0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.013 (0.009)
Loan Maturity	0.008** (0.003)	-0.001* (0.000)	0.005 (0.004)
Constant	-0.026 (0.040)	-0.012 (0.052)	0.174** (0.044)
Difference Test	0.140*** (0.022)	N/A N/A	0.136*** (0.025)
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,683	9,093	9,093
R-squared	0.048	0.049	0.063

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

This table reports the regression results for the specification in Equation 1. Column (1) reports the regression results on the loans in the 6-month pre window (Jun 2012 to Nov 2012). Column (2) reports the regression results on the loans in the 6-month post window (Dec 2012 to May 2013). Column (3) reports the regression results on the propensity score matched sample. Observations are matched on the 10 borrower characteristics included in Equation 1. *Difference Test* reports the mean difference between the predicted default rates and the published default rates in the post window (Dec 2012 to May 2013). Standard errors are clustered at month level and displayed in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: PSM Regressions with Different Matching Criteria, Part 1

VARIABLES	(1) No Company Size	(2) No Education	(3) No Marriage	(4) No Work Experience	(5) No Age
Company Size	0.017*** (0.004)	0.032 (0.028)	0.014 (0.012)	0.020* (0.008)	0.044* (0.021)
Marital Status	0.031 (0.033)	0.030 (0.028)	0.012 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.024)
Education	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.008 (0.012)
Work Experience	-0.033 (0.022)	-0.039 (0.023)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.018)	-0.031 (0.019)
Age	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Property	0.012 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.052)	0.024 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.027)
House Mortgage	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.036)	0.004 (0.046)	-0.035 (0.036)	0.082 (0.084)
Income	0.019 (0.012)	0.000 (0.006)	0.009 (0.011)	0.013 (0.007)	0.008 (0.006)
Car	-0.006 (0.039)	0.045 (0.035)	0.036 (0.034)	0.037 (0.028)	0.017 (0.020)
Car Mortgage	0.010 (0.085)	-0.057* (0.025)	-0.019 (0.097)	-0.009 (0.042)	-0.065* (0.028)
Log Loan Amount	-0.010 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.000 (0.013)
Loan Maturity	0.008 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.008 (0.006)
Constant	0.126 (0.129)	0.021 (0.135)	-0.014 (0.063)	0.023 (0.062)	-0.040 (0.140)
Difference Test	0.145*** (0.024)	0.089*** (0.007)	0.094*** (0.008)	0.089*** (0.009)	0.138*** (0.021)
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,042	9,093	9,093	9,093	9,093
R-squared	0.073	0.075	0.050	0.038	0.092

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

This table reports the regression results on the samples matched using Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The matching criteria for different columns are different. The header of the column indicates which borrower characteristic is dropped out from the 10 borrower characteristics when conducting PSM. For example, *No Company Size* means that when matching the observations, we only match on the other 9 borrower characteristics except for *Company Size*. *Difference Test* reports the mean difference between the predicted default rates and the published default rates in the post window (Dec 2012 to May 2013). Standard errors are clustered at month level and displayed in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: PSM Regressions with Different Matching Criteria, Part 2

VARIABLES	(1) No Property	(2) No House Mortgage	(3) No Income	(4) No Car	(5) No Car Mortgage
Company Size	0.029* (0.012)	0.051** (0.017)	0.019 (0.013)	0.016 (0.015)	0.027 (0.014)
Marital Status	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.030 (0.026)	-0.034 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.024)
Education	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.017)
Work Experience	-0.043 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.024)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.029)
Age	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)
Property	0.001 (0.040)	-0.019 (0.036)	-0.022 (0.021)	0.009 (0.025)	0.007 (0.033)
House Mortgage	-0.029 (0.057)	0.040 (0.119)	-0.034 (0.024)	-0.068** (0.019)	-0.003 (0.045)
Income	0.023 (0.012)	0.008 (0.009)	0.005 (0.005)	0.015 (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)
Car	-0.006 (0.029)	0.034 (0.035)	0.039 (0.030)	0.041 (0.038)	0.039 (0.027)
Car Mortgage	0.080 (0.077)	0.077 (0.171)	0.069 (0.125)	-0.072** (0.022)	0.022 (0.105)
Log Loan Amount	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.014)
Loan Maturity	0.005 (0.004)	0.009 (0.006)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
Constant	0.194 (0.106)	0.080 (0.134)	0.143 (0.142)	0.242 (0.151)	0.176 (0.147)
Difference Test	0.116*** (0.018)	0.171*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.009)	0.096*** (0.011)	0.103*** (0.010)
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,093	9,093	9,093	9,093	9,093
R-squared	0.082	0.081	0.052	0.069	0.039

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

This table reports the second half of the regression results on the samples matched using Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The matching criteria for different columns are different. The header of the column indicates which borrower characteristic is dropped out from the 10 borrower characteristics when conducting PSM. For example, *No Company Size* means that when matching the observations, we only match on the other 9 borrower characteristics except for *Company Size*. *Difference Test* reports the mean difference between the predicted default rates and the published default rates in the post window (Dec 2012 to May 2013). Standard errors are clustered at month level and displayed in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Rosenbaum Bound Test

Gamma	sig+	sig-	t-hat+	t-hat-	CI+	CI-
1	0	0	0.1975	0.1975	0.1973	0.1976
1.5	0	0	0.1856	0.2085	0.1855	0.2087
2	0	0	0.1769	0.2159	0.1767	0.2160
2.5	0	0	0.1700	0.2213	0.1698	0.2214
3	0	0	0.1643	0.2255	0.1641	0.2257

The table report the Rosenbaum Bound Test on the difference between default rates predicted by the PSM regression results in column (3) of Table 3 and the default rate reported by Renrendai. Gamma is the log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors. Sig+ is the upper bound significance level. Sig- is the lower bound significance level. T-hat+ is the upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. T-hat- is the lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. CI+ is the upper bound confidence interval ($\alpha = .95$). CI- is the lower bound confidence interval ($\alpha = .95$)

Table 7: Online v.s. Offline Borrowers: Baseline Results

Regression Results for Online Versus Offline Borrowers		
VARIABLES	(1) Online	(2) PSM
Company Size	-0.017*** (0.003)	0.041*** (0.013)
Marital Status	-0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.024)
Education	-0.046*** (0.003)	-0.021 (0.018)
Work Experience	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.013 (0.023)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)
Property	0.015* (0.008)	0.103** (0.040)
House Mortgage	-0.069*** (0.008)	-0.085 (0.055)
Income	0.025*** (0.004)	-0.008 (0.018)
Car	-0.063*** (0.007)	0.050 (0.043)
Car Mortgage	0.011 (0.010)	0.099 (0.059)
Log Loan Amount	-0.018*** (0.004)	0.016 (0.022)
Loan Maturity	0.012*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.002)
Constant	0.180*** (0.032)	0.080 (0.215)
Difference Test	0.447*** (0.006)	0.399*** (0.004)
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	24,167	26,707
R-squared	0.107	0.061

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

The table reports the regression results for the specification in Equation 1. Column (1) reports the regression results on the online borrowers after Nov 2012. Column (2) shows the regression results on offline borrowers, and the default rates are matched from similar online borrowers using PSM. *Difference Test* reports the mean difference between the predicted default rates and the published default rates. Standard errors are clustered at month level and displayed in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Rosenbaum Bound Test

Gamma	sig+	sig-	t-hat+	t-hat-	CI+	CI-
1	0	0	0.406344	0.406344	0.406128	0.406561
1.5	0	0	0.389887	0.422732	0.389663	0.422953
2	0	0	0.378021	0.434387	0.377784	0.434618
2.5	0	0	0.368607	0.443431	0.368354	0.443671
3	0	0	0.360732	0.450803	0.360461	0.451053

The table report the Rosenbaum Bound Test on the difference between default rates predicted by the PSM regression results in column (2) of Table 7 and the default rate reported by Renrendai. Gamma is the log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors. Sig+ is the upper bound significance level. Sig- is the lower bound significance level. T-hat+ is the upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. T-hat- is the lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate. CI+ is the upper bound confidence interval ($\alpha = .95$). CI- is the lower bound confidence interval ($\alpha = .95$)

Table 9: Online v.s. Offline Borrowers: PSM Results, Part 1

PSM Regression Results for Online Versus Offline Borrowers, Part 1

VARIABLES	(1) No Company Size	(2) No Education	(3) No Marriage	(4) No Work Experience	(5) No Age
Company Size	-0.002 (0.023)	0.040 (0.024)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.046*** (0.012)	0.084*** (0.021)
Marital Status	-0.007 (0.029)	0.028 (0.034)	0.008 (0.029)	-0.078 (0.052)	0.027 (0.054)
Education	-0.035** (0.013)	-0.067*** (0.019)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.032 (0.021)	-0.094*** (0.026)
Work Experience	-0.019 (0.020)	-0.025 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.024)	-0.030 (0.026)	-0.018 (0.028)
Age	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.006)
Property	0.086* (0.040)	0.089** (0.039)	0.022 (0.042)	0.051 (0.033)	0.000 (0.029)
House Mortgage	-0.107* (0.053)	-0.097 (0.063)	-0.080 (0.047)	-0.086* (0.044)	-0.007 (0.068)
Income	-0.005 (0.023)	0.000 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.016)	0.017 (0.018)	0.025 (0.021)
Car	0.003 (0.039)	0.035 (0.049)	0.006 (0.047)	0.027 (0.031)	-0.069 (0.047)
Car Mortgage	0.048 (0.066)	0.046 (0.059)	0.041 (0.033)	-0.010 (0.047)	0.183 (0.145)
Log Loan Amount	0.011 (0.031)	0.018 (0.018)	0.041 (0.034)	0.008 (0.023)	0.046 (0.048)
Loan Maturity	0.012** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.007** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.003)
Constant	0.187 (0.238)	0.191 (0.185)	-0.189 (0.303)	0.044 (0.193)	-0.301 (0.504)
Difference Test	0.486*** (0.006)	0.485*** (0.005)	0.398*** (0.003)	0.330*** (0.002)	0.446*** (0.004)
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	25,172	26,679	26,707	26,477	26,707
R-squared	0.083	0.122	0.056	0.065	0.142

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

This table reports the first half of the regression results on the offline and online borrowers matched using Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The matching criteria for different columns are different. The header of the column indicates which borrower characteristic is dropped out from the 10 borrower characteristics when conducting PSM. For example, *No Company Size* means that when matching the observations, we only match on the other 9 borrower characteristics except for *Company Size*. *Difference Test* reports the mean difference between the predicted default rates and the published default rates after Nov 2012. Standard errors are clustered at month level and displayed in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Online v.s. Offline Borrowers: PSM Results, Part 2

PSM Regression Results for Online Versus Offline Borrowers, Part 2

VARIABLES	(1) No Property	(2) No House Mortgage	(3) No Income	(4) No Car	(5) No Car Mortgage
Company Size	0.048** (0.017)	0.033** (0.013)	0.062*** (0.013)	0.010 (0.026)	0.041*** (0.011)
Marital Status	-0.014 (0.036)	0.054 (0.033)	0.018 (0.042)	0.037 (0.039)	-0.018 (0.032)
Education	-0.050** (0.021)	-0.051*** (0.016)	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.051*** (0.016)	-0.032* (0.016)
Work Experience	-0.003 (0.032)	-0.021 (0.029)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.024)
Age	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)
Property	-0.011 (0.032)	0.091 (0.054)	0.046 (0.039)	-0.003 (0.022)	0.076* (0.043)
House Mortgage	-0.043 (0.046)	-0.116* (0.058)	-0.081* (0.042)	-0.071 (0.040)	-0.118 (0.070)
Income	0.048 (0.032)	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.008 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.019)
Car	-0.026 (0.039)	0.025 (0.049)	0.030 (0.036)	-0.045 (0.046)	0.055 (0.040)
Car Mortgage	0.008 (0.042)	0.016 (0.069)	0.029 (0.066)	0.119 (0.074)	-0.093 (0.059)
Log Loan Amount	0.001 (0.030)	0.035 (0.021)	0.014 (0.026)	0.018 (0.031)	0.014 (0.026)
Loan Maturity	0.011*** (0.003)	0.007** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
Constant	-0.122 (0.195)	0.145 (0.247)	0.072 (0.213)	-0.028 (0.200)	0.147 (0.293)
Difference Test	0.395*** (0.004)	0.373*** (0.003)	0.446*** (0.003)	0.394*** (0.004)	0.399*** (0.003)
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	26,707	26,707	26,707	26,707	26,707
R-squared	0.117	0.082	0.103	0.087	0.075

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

This table reports the second half of the regression results on the offline and online borrowers matched using Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The matching criteria for different columns are different. The header of the column indicates which borrower characteristic is dropped out from the 10 borrower characteristics when conducting PSM. For example, *No Company Size* means that when matching the observations, we only match on the other 9 borrower characteristics except for *Company Size*. *Difference Test* reports the mean difference between the predicted default rates and the published default rates after Nov 2012. Standard errors are clustered at month level and displayed in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11: Default Rate

	Default prob. , Online Matched	Default prob. , All
	default	default
CreditRating FEs		
AA/A	-0.0113*** (0.00225)	-0.0120*** (0.00169)
B	-0.0120 (0.00957)	-0.00563 (0.00857)
C	-0.00294 (0.00794)	-0.00508 (0.00485)
D	-0.00622 (0.00410)	-0.00203 (0.00411)
E	-0.00307 (0.00412)	-0.00315 (0.00270)
Loan Life-cycle FEs		
Early	0.00535 (0.00342)	0.0130*** (0.00268)
Mid	0.00817*** (0.00302)	0.0132*** (0.00267)
Late	0.00888** (0.00349)	0.0131*** (0.00269)
Year-Month FE	Yes	Yes
N	9625	205278
R ²	0.0150	0.0132

This table reports the estimates of the default equation (4) for 276,418 monthly repayment performance of propensity score matched loans originated on Renrendai between 2012 June and 2013 May. The repayment performance observation ends in 2018 September. The first column is the result of pure online matched sample, including manipulated offline loans and pure online loans. The second column is the result of all loans. The dependent variable, default dummy, equals to one if loan i defaults in the performance month t . The regressions include credit rating fixed effects, and the three-stage loan's life cycle fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust, and clustered by borrower user id. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12: Recovery Rate Regression

	RecoveryRate, Post online	RecoveryRate, Post All
	(1)	(2)
	rrecov	rrecov
CreditRating FEs		
B	0.123 (0.105)	0.137 (0.0964)
C	0.494** (0.229)	0.518*** (0.194)
D	0.511** (0.250)	0.573*** (0.140)
E	0.148 (0.117)	0.231** (0.108)
HR	0.140 (0.110)	0.210** (0.0850)
AA/A		1.044*** (0.152)
Year-Month FE	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes
N	111	147
R ²	0.416	0.406

This table reports the estimates of the recovery equation (5) using all 1,135 default events for loans originated on Renrendai between 2012 June and 2013 May. The dependent variable equals the fraction of post-default recoveries to the balance remaining at the point of default. The regressions include credit rating fixed effects, and loan issue time fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust, and clustered by borrower user id. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 13: Default Rate, Recovery Rate and Loss Given Default (LGD)

	Default prob., Online Matched	Default prob., All	
	(1) default	(2) default	
AA/A	0	0.0136	
B	0	0.0898	
C	0.0543	0.0963	
D	0.0150	0.133	
E	0.0527	0.120	
HR	0.0896	0.157	
	RecoveryRate pre-default, All	RecoveryRate post-default, All	LGD
AA/A	0.511	1	0
B	0.502	0.137	0.429774
C	0.502	0.518	0.240036
D	0.501	0.573	0.213073
E	0.501	0.231	0.383731
HR	0.501	0.210	0.39421

Panel 1 reports annualized probabilities of default based on estimates of monthly default probabilities reported in Table 11. Panel 2 reports pre-default recovery rate, post-default recovery rate, and estimated Loss Given Default (LGD) conditional on credit ratings.

Table 14: Market Efficiency Test

	Efficiency Test, All		Efficiency Test, Online		(5) default
	(1) default	(2) default	(3) default	(4) default	
intereststar	2.28e-10 (5.15e-10)	1.88e-10 (5.25e-10)	-3.41e-09 (6.80e-09)	-3.96e-09 (6.86e-09)	0.000973** (0.000442)
post	-0.00119 (0.00314)	-0.00322 (0.00348)	0.00865* (0.00486)	0.0142* (0.00792)	0.0154 (0.0102)
intereststar \times post	2.11e-11 (3.81e-10)	5.94e-11 (3.82e-10)	-4.37e-10 (3.25e-10)	-6.33e-10 (4.67e-10)	-0.000232 (0.000195)
AA/A	-0.0156*** (0.00365)	-0.0153*** (0.00380)	0.0462 (0.108)	0.0579 (0.108)	
B	-0.00456 (0.00814)	-0.00509 (0.00819)	0.0000567 (0.00908)	0.00102 (0.00908)	-0.000296 (0.00735)
C	-0.00712 (0.00524)	-0.00753 (0.00521)	-0.00841 (0.00983)	-0.00732 (0.0103)	-0.0353*** (0.0132)
D	-0.000358 (0.00439)	-0.000823 (0.00442)	-0.00512 (0.00492)	-0.00426 (0.00524)	-0.0300** (0.0151)
E	-0.00245 (0.00292)	-0.00289 (0.00292)	-0.000348 (0.00466)	0.000435 (0.00477)	-0.00408 (0.00327)
Early	0.0264** (0.0120)	0.0280** (0.0121)	0.00702 (0.00873)	0.0403 (0.0360)	-0.0108 (0.0235)
Mid	0.0266** (0.0120)	0.0282** (0.0120)	0.00990 (0.00857)	0.0433 (0.0371)	-0.00682 (0.0235)
Late	0.0266** (0.0120)	0.0281** (0.0121)	0.0113 (0.00891)	0.0446 (0.0358)	-0.00751 (0.0234)
finit		-0.00000215** (0.000000873)		-0.00000192* (0.00000104)	-0.00000234** (0.00000106)
activebid		0.000391 (0.000245)		-0.0403 (0.0395)	-0.00799 (0.0125)
agg_weekly_borrow		0.00108 (0.00474)		0.0277 (0.0575)	0.0296 (0.0459)
Year-Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CreditRating FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	204911	204911	9446	9446	11775
R ²	0.0152	0.0154	0.0200	0.0209	0.0199

This table reports the estimates of the market efficiency test equation (3) for monthly repayment performance of the P2P loans on the Renrendai platform originated between 2012 June and 2013 May, with the repayment performance observation ends in 2018 September. Column (1) and (2) are the results of all sample in the chosen window. Column (3) and (4) report the estimates for online sample. Column (5) is the online sample excluding AA and A rating loans. The dependent variable, default dummy, equals to one if loan i defaults in the performance month t . The regressions include credit rating fixed effects, the three-stage loan's life cycle fixed effects, loan issue year-month fixed effects and borrower province fixed effects. Control variables include liquidity measures and active bidding shares. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust, and clustered by borrower user id. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 15: Market Efficiency Test, Bootstrap

	Efficiency Test, All		Efficiency Test, Online		
	(1) default	(2) default	(3) default	(4) default	(5) default
intereststar	2.28e-10 (5.15e-10)	1.88e-10 (5.16e-10)	-3.41e-09 (6.93e-09)	-3.96e-09 (6.86e-09)	0.000973** (0.000442)
post	-0.00119 (0.00314)	-0.00322 (0.00305)	0.00865 (0.00803)	0.0142* (0.00792)	0.0154 (0.0102)
intereststar \times post	2.11e-11 (3.81e-10)	5.94e-11 (3.45e-10)	-4.37e-10 (3.97e-10)	-6.33e-10 (4.67e-10)	-0.000232 (0.000195)
AA/A	-0.0156*** (0.00365)	-0.0153*** (0.00295)	0.0462 (0.107)	0.0579 (0.108)	
B	-0.00456 (0.00814)	-0.00509 (0.00676)	0.0000567 (0.0143)	0.00102 (0.00908)	-0.000296 (0.00735)
C	-0.00712 (0.00524)	-0.00753* (0.00433)	-0.00841 (0.00650)	-0.00732 (0.0103)	-0.0353*** (0.0132)
D	-0.000358 (0.00439)	-0.000823 (0.00487)	-0.00512 (0.00357)	-0.00426 (0.00524)	-0.0300** (0.0151)
E	-0.00245 (0.00292)	-0.00289 (0.00237)	-0.000348 (0.00361)	0.000435 (0.00477)	-0.00408 (0.00327)
Early	0.0264** (0.0120)	0.0280 (0.0172)	0.00702 (0.00929)	0.0403 (0.0360)	-0.0108 (0.0235)
Mid	0.0266** (0.0120)	0.0282 (0.0171)	0.00990 (0.0103)	0.0433 (0.0371)	-0.00682 (0.0235)
Late	0.0266** (0.0120)	0.0281 (0.0172)	0.0113 (0.00998)	0.0446 (0.0358)	-0.00751 (0.0234)
finit		-0.00000215** (0.000000842)		-0.00000192* (0.00000104)	-0.00000234** (0.00000106)
activebid		0.000391 (0.000324)		-0.0403 (0.0395)	-0.00799 (0.0125)
agg_weekly_borrow		0.00108 (0.00371)		0.0277 (0.0575)	0.0296 (0.0459)
Year-Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CreditRating FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	204911	204911	9446	9446	11775
R ²	0.0152	0.0154	0.0200	0.0209	0.0199

This table reports the estimates of the market efficiency test equation (3) for monthly repayment performance of the P2P loans on the Renrendai platform originated between 2012 June and 2013 May, with the repayment performance observation ends in 2018 September. Column (1) and (2) are the results of all sample in the chosen window.

Column (3) and (4) report the estimates for online sample. Column (5) is the online sample excluding AA and A rating loans. The dependent variable, default dummy, equals to one if loan i defaults in the performance month t . The regressions include credit rating fixed effects, the three-stage loan's life cycle fixed effects, loan issue year-month fixed effects and borrower province fixed effects. Control variables include liquidity measures and active bidding shares. Standard errors are bootstrapped, and clustered by borrower user id. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.