

Q1

We have following propositions:

P1: mythical \rightarrow immortal

P2 : \neg mythical \rightarrow (\neg immortal \wedge mammal)

P3 : (immortal \vee mammal) \rightarrow horned

P4 : horned \rightarrow magical

\neg Immortal \rightarrow \neg mythical
 \equiv \neg Immortal \rightarrow (\neg immortal \wedge mammal)
 \equiv Immortal \vee (\neg immortal \wedge mammal)
 \equiv (Immortal \vee \neg immortal) \wedge (Immortal \vee mammal)
 \equiv (Immortal \vee mammal)
 \equiv horned
 \equiv magical

Therefore, it is magical and horned. There is no way to justify it is mythical.

Q2

Define vocabulary:

Student(x) : person x is a student

Take(x,y) : Student x take course y

Failed(x,y) : Student x failed course y

Person(x) : x is a person

Vegetarian(x) : x is a vegetarian

Like(x,y) : x likes y

Smart(x) : x is smart

Homework(x,y) : x do homework for y

- a. $\neg \forall x (\text{Student}(x) \rightarrow (\text{Take}(x, \text{history}) \wedge \text{Take}(x, \text{Biology})))$
- b. $\exists x (\text{Student}(x) \wedge \text{Failed}(x, \text{history})) \wedge \forall y (\text{Student}(y) \wedge \text{Failed}(y, \text{history})) \rightarrow x = y$
- c. $\forall x (\text{Person}(x) \wedge (\forall y \text{ vegetarian}(y) \rightarrow \neg \text{like}(x, y)) \rightarrow \text{smart}(x))$
- d. $\forall x \forall y (\text{person}(x) \wedge \text{vegetarian}(y) \wedge \text{smart}(y)) \rightarrow \neg \text{like}(x, y)$
- e. $\exists x \text{ student}(x) \wedge \forall y \text{ homework}(x, y) \equiv \neg \text{homework}(y, y)$

Q3

I. Begin with the rule true \rightarrow 1

II. $R_{\text{gpa}} = 4/7 = 0.57$ $R_{\text{ust}} = 1/3 = 0.33$ $R_{\text{hku}} = 2/4 = 0.5$ $R_{\text{cu}} = 1/4 = 0.25$ $R_{\text{rec}} = 4/8 = 0.5$
 $R_{\text{exp}} = 3/4 = 0.75$ Generating EXP \rightarrow 1

The rule covers negative instance, continue this rule.

III. $R_{\text{gpa}} = 3/3 = 1$ $R_{\text{ust}} = 0$ $R_{\text{hku}} = 2/2 = 1$ $R_{\text{cu}} = 1/1 = 1$ $R_{\text{rec}} = 3/3 = 1$
Generating EXP \wedge GPA \rightarrow 1

This Rule does not cover negative instance, we stop. Eliminate from the samples and continue to another rule

- I. Begin with the rule true $\rightarrow 1$
- II. $R_{gpa} = 1/4 = 0.25$ $R_{ust} = 1/3 = 0.33$ $R_{hku} = 0$ $R_{cu} = 0$ $R_{rec} = 1/5 = 0.2$ $R_{exp} = 0$
Generating GPA $\rightarrow 1$.
The rule covers negative instance, continue this rule.
- III. $R_{ust} = 1/2 = 0.5$ $R_{hku} = 0$ $R_{cu} = 0$ $R_{rec} = 1/3 = 0.33$ $R_{exp} = 0$
Generating GPA \wedge UST $\rightarrow 1$.
This rule cover negative instance, continue
- IV. $R_{hku} = 0$ $R_{cu} = 0$ $R_{rec} = 1$
Generating GPA \wedge UST \wedge REC $\rightarrow 1$.
This rule does not covers negative instance, stop

$(EXP \wedge GPA) \vee (GPA \wedge UST \wedge REC)$ covers all of the positive instances, we stop.

Q4

$$P(A) = .001 * .002 * .95 + .001 * .998 * .94 + .999 * .002 * .29 + .999 * .998 * .001 = 0.0025$$

$$P(\neg A) = 1 - P(A) = 0.9975$$

$$P(M) = .0025 * .70 + .9975 * .01 = 0.0117$$

$$\begin{aligned} P(J \wedge M) &= P(J \wedge M \wedge A) * P(J \wedge M \wedge \neg A) \\ &= P(J \wedge M | A) * P(A) + P(J \wedge M | \neg A) * P(\neg A) \\ &= .90 * .70 * .0025 + .05 * .01 * .9975 = 0.0020 \end{aligned}$$

$$P(J | M) = P(J \wedge M) / P(M) = 0.0020 / 0.0117 = 0.1709$$

Q5

1. Yes

All undirected paths from Test 1 to Test2:

(Test1, Disease2, Test2),

(Test1, Disease2, Symptom3, Disease3, Test3, Disease2, Test2),

(Test1, Disease1, Symptom2, Disease2, Test2),

(Test1, Disease1, Symptom2, Disease2, Symptom3, Disease3, Test3, Disease2, Test2).

For Disease 2, it is type head-to-head, block all the path

2. No

(Disease1, Test1, Disease2) is not block

3. Yes

Same as question1, For Disease 2, it is type head-to-head, block all the path

4. All paths from Disease1 to Disease2:

(Disease1, Test1, Disease2)

(Disease1, Symptom2, Disease2), which is block

Therefore, Test1 $\in E$ and Symptom2 $\notin E$.

5. $E = \{\text{Test1, Disease2, Symptom2, Symptom3}\}$

Q6

The unique Nash equilibrium point is (Pol:Expand, Fed:contract)

Q7:

A set of agents $N = (1,2)$

A set of actions of both agents: $A = (1,2,3,4,5,6)$

Utility function: $U_i(x_1, x_2) = 6 - x_i$ if agent I wins ($x_1 > x_2$) else 0

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2.5,2.5	0,4	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,0
2	4,0	2,2	0,3	0,2	0,1	0,0
3	3,0	3,0	1.5,1.5	0,2	0,1	0,0
4	2,0	2,0	2,0	1,1	0,1	0,0
5	1,0	1,0	1,0	1,0	0.5,0.5	0,0
6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0

Therefore three nash equilibria points: (4,4), (5,5), (6,6)