

Indian Politics: The “Criminals beget Criminals” Effect

Abstract

The last couple of decades have seen a disturbing trend of candidates with criminal backgrounds not only contesting but also winning elections in India at both state and federal level. This trend has prompted significant research to analyze the reasons why parties nominate and then voters vote for such candidates. Basing my reasoning on existing strand of literature, I create a research design that tries to causally prove that when the incumbent is a criminal, and the opposition party thinks that there is a high probability of the election being close, the opposition party also tends to nominate a criminal. To do this, I draw on a dataset that contains information related to the criminal, financial and education records of almost the entire universe of candidates to state and federal electoral jurisdictions from 2004 to 2012.

1. Introduction

Last couple of decades has seen a substantial increase in elected representatives with a criminal background in Indian politics. To estimate the size of the problem, out of the 7810 candidates for the current Lok Sabha (lower house of the Parliament), 1158 candidates or 15% declared pending criminal cases against them. Out of these 1158 candidates with pending criminal cases, 608 had serious criminal cases such as murder, attempt to murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion etc. pending against them. Out of 543 new Members of the Parliament (MPs), 162 (30%) have pending criminal cases against them. Within these 162 MPs, there are pending serious criminal cases against 76 MPs (14%). Contrasting this with Lok Sabha 2004, there were 128 MPs with pending criminal cases, out of which 58 MPs (11 %) had serious pending criminal cases.

“Criminal” in our context does not mean that these politicians are your typical murderers or rapists or extortionists. They are that, but on top of that these criminal candidates also tend to be folks who are strongly rooted to the villages and towns that make up their electoral jurisdiction. They have local networks which they use to obtain political support and to generate resources for their political ambitions. Presumably, they get interested in politics because of the opportunity it offers in rent seeking. I will try to offer an explanation of all this in the subsequent sections of this paper.

Anecdotal evidence of the “criminal-politician nexus” abounds in India. For example, Subhash C.

Kashyap writes in “Criminal-politician nexus getting stronger”:

“The role of criminals in politics began in a big way with the criminals needing the politicians’ protection against the processes of law and paying them for it in advance by helping them in elections and otherwise. Politicians needed huge sums of unaccounted money for political activities, for their parties, for elections and for themselves. Gradually, the politicians became subservient to the dons of the crime world. The latter soon realized that the elections were being won with their money and their muscle power. It was not any surprise when they themselves decided to enter politics.”

Increasing criminalization and corruption in Indian politics led to a landmark court judgment. Despite significant political opposition, the Supreme Court on March 13, 2003 made it mandatory for all the electoral candidates (at federal, state and district level) to disclose their criminal antecedents and financial records. As a result, Election Commission of India needs a candidate to file an affidavit disclosing criminal records (pending criminal cases) as well as information on his or her assets, liabilities and educational qualifications. Scanned affidavits of all candidates can be accessed on the Election Commission website.

The motivation behind this judgment was that it will lead to increased voter awareness about the profile of their potential representatives, thereby driving up candidate quality. Simultaneously, it may influence the political parties to be more prudent towards their candidate choices. It is yet to be empirically confirmed that this judgment has resulted in any such impact. However, it has made available significant amount of data on criminal, financial and educational background of electoral candidates in India, thereby kick starting an exciting phase of research and analysis.

Building on top of all the research that I describe below, my research design tries to prove a simple hypothesis: In close elections where the incumbent is a criminal, opposition parties also have a higher probability of nominating a criminal. This research design is important to current research in that it gives an insight into how political parties strategize on a phenomenon which till now has been largely considered as idiosyncratic.

Lately, there has been significant research which uses this data towards testing increased voter knowledge (Banerjee et al 2011) as well as towards analyzing corruption (Fisman et al 2012). The first paper (that I am aware of) which makes comprehensive use of the candidate self-reported data is Vaishnav (2011). Vaishnav tries to empirically prove that parties get tempted to nominate criminal candidates because these candidates have access to independent resources that allow them to not only function as self-financing candidates but also pump money into other functions of the party.

There has also been research analyzing the quality of politicians in India without using the self-reported data (Banerjee and Pande 2009). They show that greater voter preference for the party representing her ethnic group increases legislator corruption and criminality. Simultaneously, their results also indicate that candidates from a non-majority ethnic group have to be of much higher quality in order to have a chance of winning. Building on Banerjee et al (2009), Vaishnav also suggests that jurisdictions which are reserved for specific ethnic groups have much less criminality as the candidates have same ethnic background but majority of the voters are NOT from the same ethnic background.

Chermin (2008) uses regression discontinuity design to show that criminal politicians have an impact of reducing bribe taking behavior of law and order officials. His reasoning is that there is a convergence of interests of these politicians and the interest groups which generally offer bribes. Criminal elected representatives control the bureaucrats and that acts as a substitute for bribes from these interest groups. He goes on to say that this only implies that corruption is under-estimated if only measured by bribe taking.

According to Aidt et al (2011) Indian political parties are more likely to select alleged criminal candidates when the party is uncertain about the outcome and in jurisdictions where the voters exhibit lower levels of literacy. Interestingly, Aidt et al (2011) indirectly hypothesize the opposite of the effect that I am trying to prove: the authors say that there is no specific pattern when it comes to the number of criminal candidates observed in parliamentary jurisdictions. They offer empirical evidence by showing the distribution of the number of self-reported criminals across jurisdictions. However, in my opinion, they fail to offer convincing causal proof and I intend to correct this limitation.

Using a regression discontinuity design, this paper compares the probability of having multiple criminal candidates, amongst the electoral jurisdictions where a criminal politician barely won to jurisdictions where a criminal politician barely lost in the previous election cycle. Following an approach suggested by Lee (2008), I argue the selection of a winner in extremely close elections is sufficiently exogenous that if we observe a discontinuity between near-winners and near-losers, it implies a causal relationship. If parties facing a near-loser criminal are substantially more likely to nominate a criminal than those facing a near-loser non-criminal, we can reasonably infer that parties tend to match another party's decision to list a criminal by also selecting an alleged criminal.

The remainder of this paper is organized in 4 sections. In the next section I use existing strands of

literature to create the theory on Indian politics which then leads to my hypothesis. In the third section I explain the dataset that is needed for this analysis. I also clarify how I tackle the concerns with measuring our main variables of interest. In section 4, I describe the methodology that I suggest to prove the hypothesis. Finally and unsurprisingly, in section 5 - I conclude.

2. Theory

Political selection

Besley (2005) suggests that parties select criminal politicians because they depend on these candidates for rents. A lack of democratic selection procedures within these parties, which results in excessive control in the hands of party elites for deciding candidature, further magnifies this effect. Subsequently, rents do not have to imply illicit “acts” of corruption. They can be sufficiently explained in the context of election finance.

Elections cost money and parties often have to use money from their own account to subsidize a candidate’s expenditure. Correspondingly, if there is a candidate who can finance his campaign independently, not only does he not constitute a drain on party’s limited funds, but also enables the party to spend on other activities. On top of this, criminal candidates may be in a position to offer additional funds to the party to subsidize other candidates.

To create a foundation for my research question, I rely on the theoretical framework that has been created by Vaishnav (2011) which explains the evolution of criminals in Indian politics. Vaishnav suggests that compared to “clean candidates”, criminals have a 2:1 advantage in terms of winning elections. He further shows that as the definition of criminality is made more restrictive, the success rate of criminal candidates rises.

Money in elections

Although there is no dependable source of data, it is a widely held belief that costs of election campaigns in India have increased dramatically. Timmons and Kumar 2009 have quoted that roughly \$3 billion was spent in the 2009 national elections on campaign expenditures. Vaishnav has suggested possible explanations for the same.

1. Size of electoral jurisdictions: Due to increasing population, the size of political jurisdictions has grown manifold. This implies that candidates have to spend more money to attract

voters.

2. Competition amongst political parties: Sridharan (2009) writes that the number of national parties has gone down from 8 to 6 between 1989 and 2004. Simultaneously, the number of state parties has increased from 20 to 36.
3. Party financials: Due to their poor organization, parties are not able to generate sufficient campaign funds on their own. On top of this, there are legal limits on election expenditures which are unrealistically low (E.g. \$20,000 - \$50,000 for a parliamentary seat). The low limit along with poor implementation results in large inflow of illicit finance.

More on criminal candidates

Criminal candidates have a resource advantage and are willing to offer their services to political parties. Building on Besley (2005), the political parties in India lack intra-party democracy and rely excessively on the top leadership. (As an aside, nepotism is a fairly common feature). This, domination by a few, creates a channel for the entry of “bad” candidates who are willing to use political office for private ends.

Also, with the way we have defined these “criminal” candidates –as people that have a local illicit network of some sort - it is difficult to find such criminals with broad voter support in most urban jurisdictions. Banerjee et al. have further suggested that candidate quality decreases (probability of a criminal candidate succeeding increases) as the ethnical importance given by the voters increases. All this indicates that it is not possible for parties to field criminal candidates in all the jurisdictions.

Additionally, decline of ideology in Indian politics has resulted in parties prioritizing probability of winning over implementing preferred policies. This also prevents the criminals from having to associate themselves with a specific ideology, enabling them to shift between parties depending on which party gives them the best deal. By the very fact that these candidates are criminals, it seems safe to suggest that they might be less ethical than the average citizens and as a result would be able to raise significant funds through illicit means, becoming increasingly attractive to political parties.

Incentives to join politics

The last link, which completes the chain, is the explanation of the incentives of these “criminal” candidates to be involved in politics. Criminal candidates who seek office fear the retributive reach of the state so they may join politics to rely on the power of the office to control prosecution and derail

justice. Iyer and Mani 2011 have shown the ability of politicians to transfer bureaucrats on criteria not solely dependent on the performance of these officers.

Caselli and Morelli (2004) have suggested that one factor that motivates aspiring candidates is the psychological reward associated with holding office. And when low quality candidates contest elections they can generate negative externalities for high quality politicians (E.g. by having lower opportunity costs).

Finally, there is evidence (Khetan, Ashish 2012) which suggests that once these candidates get elected, they have sufficient opportunities to not only “recover” their investment but also make profits that are handsome enough to put any of the Silicon Valley companies to shame.

Hypothesis

These candidates tend to have significant hustling power – local goons - in their respective jurisdictions. They are capable of threatening non-criminal candidates and in some cases potentially also capable of altering the true outcome of the elections by selectively altering the vote counts. Under these circumstances it is not only difficult but also potentially hazardous for a non-criminal (even if corrupt) candidate to pose a serious challenge in these jurisdictions.

This leads to the hypothesis that in those jurisdictions where criminal candidates are politically viable, if the opposition party feels it has a significant probability to win or where it is not certain that the criminal incumbent will win, the party tends to nominate a criminal candidate. They do this because an opponent with a criminal background candidate will be able to counter the hustling tactics, both “muscular” as well as “financial”, of the criminal incumbent. It is crucial that the opposition party feels that it has a decent shot at defeating the incumbent; otherwise, the party would not want to put in scarce resources in jurisdictions where the party thinks it is sure to lose. Also, because of the same reasoning, it would be difficult to find a criminal candidate who would be ready to put in his own money on a campaign which he believes he has a very low probability to win.

If the above theory is true, then a question that naturally follows is: In those electoral jurisdictions which have criminal candidates and where election is expected to be competitive, why do all the parties not nominate criminal candidates? The explanation lies more on the supply side than on the demand side. When the motivation for a candidate to contest is the “psychological” reward that he gets from winning, there is also a “psychological” cost of losing. Besides this, the expectation from

these candidates is that they will self-finance their campaigns. When only one candidate can win, it is hard to imagine a situation where 6-7 such candidates are putting in their own resources and are harboring realistic aim of winning. An equilibrium where only 2-3 of such serious candidates exist in a jurisdiction seems more plausible.

3. Data

For my analysis, I use information drawn from the legal affidavits submitted by candidates to the Election Commission of India (ECI) at the time of their nomination. In 2003, a Supreme Court judgment mandated that all candidates to state and national office must publicly disclose information about any pending criminal cases; financial assets and liabilities (including those of spouse and dependents); and educational qualifications.

The ECI puts up these affidavits on its website but not in a format which makes it suitable for analysis (scanned images of the documents). However, Association for Democratic Reforms, an Indian NGO, has been diligently digitizing these affidavits during every election cycle. The result is that now I have access to already digitized records of all the candidates that contest either federal or state level elections in India from 2004 to 2012. Nine years should give us data on 2 election cycles for most Indian states. Considering that India has 28 states, I am hoping to have candidate information of more than 8000 (rough estimate) jurisdiction level elections.

The affidavit data provides details only on candidates' backgrounds. For our methodology, our unit of analysis is an electoral jurisdiction. I need data on the election results in each of the jurisdictions for which I have candidate level data. The ECI website makes available the details of all the elections that happen under its control. The information that is relevant for my design (and fortunately is available) is name of winner, name of runner up, and margin of victory. However, this information is made available in pdf files and converting the information into analyzable form would require some Perl coding.

There are a couple of concerns with a candidate's self-reporting of criminal records. The first concern is that the candidate may not be truthful and will under-report the charges that are filed against him, and second concern is that a significant number of the charges that are filed are politically motivated. Vaishnav 2011 presents an excellent analysis of these concerns and I have briefly summarized them below.

False reporting implies that candidates have an incentive to lie on their affidavits and thus hide or under-report pending criminal cases. But, it can be potentially suicidal to do this as criminal proceedings are a matter of public record and opposition candidates/political parties have an incentive to notify the concerned authorities in case something like this is happening. Basically, the ease with which this information can be verified should take care of the under-reporting concern. We should have been concerned in case we were relying heavily on the financials related data from these self-reported affidavits, as that is very difficult to verify. Fortunately for our analysis we only use the crime related information from the affidavit and we can bracket out the concern of under/false reporting.

It is trickier to get around the concern of politically motivated charges. Under the affidavit law, candidates have to disclose any pending criminal cases in which they stand accused. Pending does not imply conviction. However, under Indian law, a candidate cannot stand for elections if he has been convicted of a crime. Also, candidates are not required to disclose a mere filing of charges. They have to disclose only those charges which a judge has deemed credible and worthy of judicial proceedings after an independent investigation by the police has been carried out. It is important to keep this distinction in mind.

Using the methodology suggested by Vaishnav, I will also distinguish between “serious” and “frivolous” charges. Vaishnav classifies frivolous charges as those that are related to assembly, elections, speech. The rest are classified as serious. This helps in 2 ways. First, compared to frivolous charges it is more difficult to manufacture serious charges. Secondly, for our purposes we are interested in serious criminality as opposed to frivolous criminality. Therefore, I use a dummy variable – Serious Criminal (SC), which is 1 if the candidate has at least 1 serious charge against him and 0 if he faces only frivolous or no charges. Below is a table where I have listed which crimes will be serious and which ones will be frivolous.

IPC Section	Violation	Category
<i>Serious Charges</i>		
341	Wrongfully restraining any person	Human Body
353	Use of criminal force to deter a public servant from	Human Body

307	Attempt to murder	Human Body
342	Wrongful Confinement	Human Body
379	Theft	Property
<i>Frivolous Charges</i>		
147	Rioting	Public Tranquility
323	Voluntarily causing hurt	Human Body
149	Unlawful Assembly	Public Tranquility
148	Rioting armed with a deadly weapon	Public Tranquility
506	Criminal Intimidation	Intimidation

4. Methodology

Despite the increasing emergence of criminal candidates, they are still an exception than the norm. The majority of the jurisdictions in each election cycle still have no criminal candidates. So, one can argue that criminal candidates as well as jurisdictions with criminal candidates systematically differ from non-criminal candidates and jurisdictions with non-criminal candidates, respectively. Therefore, comparing jurisdictions which have criminal politicians to those which do not will not measure the causal impact of criminals in elections. In this case, the primary result of the paper might just end up being driven by unobservables.

A key question in this hypothesis is proving causation as jurisdictions which have criminal candidates may systematically differ from those which don't. To prove the causality, I suggest using a regression discontinuity design that compares jurisdictions where a criminal politician barely won an election to a non-criminal candidate, and hence barely became elected, to jurisdictions where the criminal politician barely lost the election to a non-criminal politician. Even though these criminal politicians can illegally alter electoral outcomes, I don't have any reason to believe that the winning candidates can do it more than the losing candidates. So, under the assumptions that the winning and losing criminal candidates are identical, and that both the jurisdictions are identical, the variation in electoral outcomes should be exogenous.

So, amongst these types of jurisdictions, I want to compare the number of criminal candidates in the next election cycle, therefore, I run the following regression

$$D_{is} = X'_{is} * \beta_0 + SC_{is} * \beta_1 + Z'_{is} * \beta_2 + q_s + r_i + \epsilon_{is}$$

Where, i indexes a constituency in state s,

- D_{is} is the dummy whose value is 1 if the number of criminal candidates is **strictly** greater than 1,
- SC_{is} is a variable taking the value 1 if the incumbent is a candidate with serious criminal charges and 0 otherwise,
- X_{is} (Z_{is}) is a vector of constituency (incumbent) characteristics, and
- q_s (r_i) is the state (constituency) level fixed effect.

β_1 is the coefficient of interest, and represents the discontinuity jump in D_{is} due to a criminal incumbent amongst constituencies which should be similar in all other regards. Standard errors will be clustered at the state level.

One concern might be related to the sample size that I can expect for such a design. All that I can say at this point is that Chermin in his 2008 paper also employs a regression discontinuity methodology but uses only state level elections that happened in the year 2004. For his analysis he is able to find 178 such constituencies. Since I am considering a much broader time frame (2004 to 2008), I am hoping to find at least double that number of relevant observations.

Assumption checks

To ensure that the dummy specification that I am using for the dependent variable is not biased against the jurisdictions with non-criminal incumbents, the assumption that I need to make is that the jurisdictions with non-criminal incumbents would still have criminal candidates. The number of jurisdictions with criminal candidates amongst those jurisdictions with non-criminal incumbents is not significantly different from the number of jurisdictions with criminal candidates and criminal incumbents. However, amongst the jurisdictions (with non-criminal incumbents) there won't be as many which have multiple criminal candidates. This assumption is easy to verify empirically.

On similar lines, another identification assumption that I have made is that there is no significant

difference between constituencies where a criminal candidate barely won and where he barely lost except that of the election result. I will verify this by fetching information from the National Sample Survey data to compare the various socio-economic indicators for these constituencies and show that there is no significant difference.

The critical identification assumption that I am making is that the election results around the discontinuity will be continuous. This implies that there is no sorting happening around the threshold. If only the winning criminal candidates (and not the ones who just lost) can control election results, regression discontinuity design will yield biased estimates. According to Chemin 2008, suppose a non-trivial number of criminal candidates had the capability to selectively invalidate ballots cast (of their opponents, obviously) and to perfectly predict what the true vote share would be without causing any interference, it is easy to see that this would lead to a violation of the identification assumption. However, it is straight forward to empirically test the validity of the regression discontinuity design.

I will look at the density function of margin of victory between criminal and non-criminal candidates at the threshold to check for any kind of discontinuity. And if this kind of fraud is happening in a non-trivial number of constituencies then the pre-determined characteristics of these constituencies should be different around the threshold. Also, for our purposes, it is also important to check that there is no significant difference between winning and losing criminal candidates in terms of their financial assets, educational backgrounds etc.

One final concern that we may have is that since for my analysis I am considering only close election results, the local effect that I am analyzing may not be representative of the typical criminal who is usually winning by much wider margins. However, the effect that I am trying to analyze should exist only in those jurisdictions where the elections are close. Therefore, it should not matter that the criminal candidates who win with wider margins are different from those whom we are analyzing. However, it would still be relevant to check whether this actually is the case. I can do that by comparing the characteristics (criminal, financial and educational) of criminal candidates who barely won with those who won by wider margins.

5. Conclusion

Through this paper I create a research design to test the hypothesis that in close elections when the

incumbent is a criminal, opposition parties also tend to nominate a criminal. I use data on candidates contesting elections in India at regional as well as federal level over the last 9 years to try and casually prove one possible strategy which the political parties employ while nominating criminal candidates. My contribution is unique in that it goes a step further than the usual correlation methods and tries to prove an effect that is highly relevant in the context of Indian politics, and until now has largely been considered as idiosyncratic.

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Saini Y. 500 305 in 8000 5000. 5000
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For whom
K RAMAKRISHNA
STAMP VENDOR
POMMUB -

ANNEXURE - 1

AFFIDAVIT TO BE FURNISHED BY CANDIDATE ALONG WITH NOMINATION PAPER
BEFORE THE RETURNING OFFICER

for election to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Name of the House)
from 97 Ponnur constituency
(Name of the Constituency)

I, Narendra Kumar Dhulipalla Son of Late Veeraiah Chowdary aged 36 years, resident of Chintalapudi Village, Ponnur Mandal candidate at the above election, do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as under :-
(Strike out whichever not applicable)

- (1) The following case is pending against me in which cognizance has been taken by the court.
- (i) Section of the Act and description of the offence for which cognizance taken :
Section 147 - roiting, 148-roiting armed with dedly weapon, 188- dis obedience to order duly promulgated by public servant, 427- mischief, R/W 149 unlawful assembly of I.P.C.
- (ii) The Court which has taken cognizance:
The court of Judicial Magistrate of I Class Ponnur
- (iii) Case No. :
CC 128/99 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of I Class Ponnur, later on tranfer to the Court of V Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur. The same was renumbered C.C. 46/2001 and the same is pending there.
- (iv) Date of order of the Court taking cognizance.:
7-8-1999.
- (v) Details of applicatins for revision etc., if any, filed against above order taking cognizance:
At the instance of one of the accused in the above case i.e., A4 Chittinani Pratap, the Honourable High Court of A.P. by its order dated 23-1-2003 and passed in Cr. M.P. 206/2003 in Cr. P. 332/2003 stayed all further proceedings in the above said case pending inthe court of V A.M.M. Court, Guntur.

P. Raja Kumar
P. JAYA RAJU M.Com., B.L.
ADVOCATE & NOTARY
Near Market
PONNUR - 522 124

Debra

(2) That I give herein below the details of eh assets (immovable, movable, bank balance, etc.) of myself, my spouse and dependents.

A. Details of Movable Assets :

(Assets in joint name indicating the extent of joint ownership will also have to be given)

S. No.	Description	Self	Spouse Name Jyothirmai D.	Dependent -1 Name : D. Vaishnavi	Dependent -2 Name : D. Vydespithi	Dependent -3 etc., name
1.	Cash					
2.	Deposits in banks, Financial Institutions and non Banking Financial Companies	Rs. 13,000 S.B.A/c. No. 600570, SBH, Assembly Ext. Counter, Hyderabad Rs. 6160 A/c. No. 01190005860, SBH, Ponnur. Rs. 11,000 A/c. No. 1, Chaitanya Grameena Bank, Ponnur. Joint A/c. with wife Rs. 11,012 A/c. No. 13115, Andhra Bank, Ponnur.				
3.	Bonds, Debentures and shares in companies	Rs. 10,000 shares in Dhulipalla Milk Line(P) Ltd. worth of Rs. 1,00,000.				
4.	Other Financial instruments NSS, Postal Savings, LIC Policies, Etc.,	LIC Policy No. 64165615 for Rs. 2,00,000 LIC Policy No. 672872728 for Rs. 5,00,000	LIC Policy No. 672872729 for Rs. 5,00,000			
5.	Motor Vehicles (details of make, etc.,)		Ambassador AP7F 9999 model 2000 value of Rs. 2,00,000			
6.	Jewellery (give details of weight and value)	30 gms. worth of Rs. 13,500	800 gms. worth of Rs. 3,60,000	50 gms. worth of Rs. 22,500	50 gms. worth of Rs. 22,500	
7.	Other Assets such as values of claims/interests					

Note :- Value of bonds / Shares / Debentures as per the latest market value in Stock Exchange in respect of listed companies and as per books in case of non-listed companies should be given.

*Dependent here means a person substantially depends on the income of the candidate.

[Handwritten Signature]

P. J. Raju
P. J. RAJU M.Com., B.L.
ADVOCATE & NOTARY
Near Market
PONNUR - 522 124

B. Details of Immovable Assets :

(Note : Properties in joint ownership indicating the extent of joint ownership will also have to be indicated.)

S. No.	Description	Self	Spouse Name Jyothirmal D.	Dependent -1 D. Vaishnavi	Dependent -2 D. Vydeepthi	Dependent -3 etc., name
1.	Agriculture Land Location(s) Survey Number(s) Extent (Total measurement) Current market value	Vallabharaopalem Vill. Ponnur Mdl. Survey Nos. 750-7, 0-34 Cents 750-9, 0.37 Cts. 750-4, 1.41 Cts. 750-1, 0.70 Cts. 750-6, 0.17 Cts. 750-10, 0.17 Cts. Total Acre 3.16 Cents worth of Rs. 6,00,000 Enguturu Vill. Amaravathi Mdl. Survey Nos. 271-1A, 271-1C Ac 1-65 Cts worth of Rs. 82,500	Marrupudi Vill. Bapatla Mdl. Survey Nos. 42/2, 0-67 Cts. 79/1, 0.06 Cts. 78/1, Ac. 4.09 Cts. Total Acre 4.82 Cents worth of Rs. 9,50,000 Pundla Vill. Bapatla Mdl. Survey Nos. 272-1 Ac. 2.93 Cts. 284-1, Ac. 1.10 Cts. 284-2, 0.92 Cts. 284-3, 0.80 Cts. 284-4, 0.97 Cts. 284-5, 0.80 Cts. 176-1,2 0.12 Cts. Total Acre 7.64 Cts worth of Rs. 12,00,000			
2.	Non-Agriculture Land Location(s) Survey Number(s) Extent (Total measurement) Current market value	Chintalapudi Vill. Ponnur Mdl. House site 2 Cts worth of Rs. 10,000	Sai Baba Road, Koretapadu, Guntur D. No. 42-43-44, Plot No.18, Yards 239 worth of Rs.3,00,000			
3.	Buildings (commercial and residential) Location(s) Survey/Door Number(s) Extent (Total measurement) Current market value					
4.	Houses / Apartments etc. Location(s) Survey/Door Number(s) Extent (Total measurement) Current market value					
5.	Others Such as interest in property					


Dubey

P. Jaya Raju
P. JAYA RAJU M.Com., B.L.
ADVOCATE & NOTARY
Near Market
PONNUR - 522 124

(3) I give herein below the details of my liabilities / overdues to public Financial institutions and Government dues :-

(Note : Please give separate details for each item)

S. No.	Description	Name and address of bank/ Financial Institution (s) / department(s)	Amount outstanding as on 31-03-2004
(a) (i)	Loans from Banks	1. Chintalapudi PACS	Ac.No. 249 Rs. 25,000-00
		2. S.B.H., Ponnur towards my share in Dhulipalla Milk Line P.Ltd., Mulukuduru	Rs. 16966
(ii)	Loans from Financial Institutions		
(iii)	Government dues :-		
(a)	Dues to department dealing with Government accommodation		
(b)	Dues to department dealing with Supply of water		
(c)	Dues to department dealing with Supply of Electricity		
(d)	Dues to department dealing with Telephones		
(e)	Dues to department dealing with Telephones		
(f)	Other dues if any		
(b) (i)	Income Tax including surcharge (Also indicate the Assessment year upto which Income Tax Return filed. Give also Permanent Ac- count Number (PAN)		
(ii)	Wealth Tax (Also indicate the as- sessment year upto which Wealth Tax return filed.)		
(iii)	Sales Tax (Only in case of Proprietory Business)		
(iv)	Property Tax		


 P. JAYA RAJU 24/4/05
 ADVOCATE & NOTARY
 Near Market
 PONNUR - 522 124

(4) My educational qualifications are as under :-

(GIVE DETAILS OF SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

(Name of School / University and the year in which the course was completed should be given.)

Z.P.H.S., Ananthavarapadu

from 1981 - 1982

S.S.C

Andhra Lyola College, Vijayawada

from 1982 - 1984

Intermediate

University of Mysore, Mysore

from 1984 - 1989


B. Tech.


DEPONENT

Verification

I, the deponent above named, do hereby verify and declare that the contents of this affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, no part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed therefrom.

Verified at Ponnur this the 24 day of April 2004


DEPONENT



P. Jaya Raju
P. JAYA RAJU M.Com., B.L.
ADVOCATE & NOTARY
Near Market
PONNUR - 522 124