

"What is in a name?" Effect of Name Order in Senate Roll Call

2012-09-12 Fri

1 Introduction

In this paper, we show that Senators' votes are determined, at least in part, by how their last names are spelled. This is because the sequence in which senators cast their votes is set by the alphabetical order of senators' last names. By investigating this relationship, we elucidate the conditions under which we may observe the influence of political parties on legislative floor votes.

Since senators cast their votes in a sequence, those that vote last are often certain that their vote is not pivotal. It is possible that since their vote often has little impact on whether a bill passes or fails, they are willing to go against the party mandate. Or since these senators are already certain of the outcome they realize that there is no incentive to go against the party and may chose to agree more with the party mandate.

Our results indicate that senators with last names that begin with letters at the end of the alphabet are more likely to agree with their party. In contrast, senators with last names that start with letters at the beginning of the alphabet cast votes when there is more uncertainty as to the outcome of the vote, they are less likely to agree with the party. In this paper, we try to explain why this may be happening.

Throughout its history, the Senate has cast votes using a roll call. Under this system, senators cast their votes according to the alphabetical order of their last names. Typically, models of dynamic voting suggest that first mover advantage exists where legislators who move first can essentially free ride on the votes of their colleagues moving later in roll call. In contrast with this baseline result, our model turns the first mover advantage on its head. Namely, that it seems that senators that vote later feed off the choices that their colleagues have already made and use those votes as a signal to determine their own preferences.

If our claim is correct, and we will present formidable evidence in favor of our hypothesis, then the theoretical result and empirical finding we present have deeper implications for literatures on the ways that legislative parties apply pressure and on the ways that legislative preferences are formed. In particular, we present evidence that belies claims that parties do not influence senators' floor behavior. To make these empirical claims we leverage a previously unexploited source of exogenous variance; first, we compare our effects of an exogenously (alphabetically) determined roll call order in the Senate; and second, to an endogenously determined order in the House of Representatives. The differences are stark in substantive and statistical terms.

2 Literature Review

The analysis in this paper focuses exclusively on roll calls, so we limit our discussion here to literature relevant to the influence of parties on how legislators cast their votes.

2.1 Partisan Pressure and Floor Votes

Poole and Rosenthal (1985; 1987; 1991; 1997) provide a robust challenge for empirical work that naively attribute voting patterns to partisan affiliation. Likewise, Krehbiel (1993; 1999a; 1999b) delineates the theoretic pitfalls associated with attributing party influence to legislators behavior. The message sent by both approaches is: at best, partisan affiliation and preferences are confounding variables, and it is very difficult to sort out when and how party might matter; at worst, parties are epiphenomenal to legislator preferences, so what appears to be partisan behavior is actually driven exclusively by legislators' preferences.

A rich theoretical and methodological literature has developed in an attempt to parse the effects of party and preferences on roll call votes (Schickler and Rich 1997; Jenkins 1999, 2000; Cox and Poole 2002; Sinclair 2002; Burden and Frisby 2004; and Krehbiel, Meirowitz, and Woon 2005). A subset of these studies has attempted to measure the magnitude of the party effect (Krehbiel 2003). Notably, Groseclose and Snyder assert that partisan influence is clearest in close votes in the House and Senate and present evidence in support of their claim (2000). In turn, this claim is disputed on methodological grounds by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2001).

These studies represent the considerable advances made by scholarship on the question of party influence; however, nearly all of the studies we have discussed here examine effects of party and preferences simultaneously. As Patty suggests, inferential leverage on the question of party influence can only be established if we use a predictor of party influence that occurs prior to an observed vote (2010).

In this paper, we propose a source of variation in party influence that is both prior and completely exogenous to a vote in the Senate; The alphabetically determined roll call used to cast votes in the United States Senate. Of course, this approach has the drawback that the same pattern will not be observable in the House where parties are generally thought to be more powerful (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005). It does have the appeal that the effect of of partisanship will "be observable in the movement of Congress's 'gears'" (Patty 2010, 5).

3 Theory

It might be interesting to discern the effect that we are analysing and see what other factors may be driving the results. A couple of possible factors seem worth exploring.

3.1 Decided

During voting, there is a strict discontinuity at the point when the vote gets decided. It seems reasonable to believe that parties do not have any major incentive to exercise their influence once the result is already known. So in a setting where order seems to matter, it may be that senators tend to agree more with the party before the outcome of vote has been decided than when the outcome has been decided.

At the same time, it may also be happening there is no incentive for a senator to go against the party mandate once the outcome is certain but it may count as a negative against her in the party dynamics. So she tends to agree more with the party.

To analyze this effect, we create a Decided variable which is a boolean whose value is 1 if the outcome is already certain before the senator gets to vote.

3.2 Bandwagon/Momentum Effect

The agreement levels may also be driven by the bandwagoning or momentum effect. For example, if the majority of senators before a specific senator have voted an aye, the senator who is about to cast a vote also has a greater probability of voting an aye. This effect should get stronger as the size of the majority count increases.

For every time that each of the senator gets to vote, we have calculated the running counts of the yes($running_{yes}$) and no($running_{no}$) votes at that instant. To assess the bandwagoning effect described above, we have created a running margin variable which is the absolute difference of $running_{yes}$ and $running_{no}$. This variable should give a measure of the variation there is in the voting pattern that has happened before the senators turn to vote. In this particular vote we do NOT control for the party.

3.3 Party Unity

Finally, agreement levels may also be dependent on how unified the party is on the concerned issue. It seems reasonable to believe that greater the unity within a party on the issue, greater the probability of the concerned senator agreeing with the party. To create a measure for party unity, we simply measure the absolute difference between total yes and total no votes for that particular vote for each of the parties.

4 Data

Our data consists of roll-call vote records for senate and house from 70th to 110th Congress. These records are available from the voteview website maintained by Poole and Rosenthal.

5 Tests

5.1 Variables of Interest

5.1.1 Dependent Variable

- Agree and Mean_agree

Agree is a simple dummy variable whose value is 1 if the politician agrees with the majority of her party for that particular vote.

Mean_agree is the mean of the agree variable defined above for a particular politician calculated over a particular congress.

5.1.2 Independent Variables/Controls

- Congress

Previous literature has indicated that there has been increased polarisation over time in both senate as well as the house. We control for this by having dummy variables for each of the congress in our regressions.

- Normalised order

Instead of using just the alphabetical order in each of the congresses, we have normalised the order by dividing it by total number of politicians for that congress. So normalised order varies from 0 for the first politician in that particular congress to 1 for the politician who supposedly votes last.

5.2 Regressions

5.2.1 Effect of Order

To ascertain that the effect of order is pervasive in the senate we run the following regressions:

$$magree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * norma_order + \beta_{2d} * Politician_d,$$

$$magree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * norma_order + \beta_{2d} * Politician_d + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * norma_order + \beta_{2d} * Politician_d + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i,$$

We cluster the standard errors at the politician level.

Results

As can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2. The effect of order is positive and significant in the case of the senators. As an added robustness check, we show that this effect is absent in the case of house representatives.

5.2.2 Is the result being driven by "decided"?

Regressions:

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * decided,$$

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * decided + \beta_{2i} * Cong_i,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * decided + \beta_{2i} * Cong_i + \beta_{3d} * Politician_d,$$

Results

Regression results(Table 3) indicate that the decide threshold just by itself is not very important. We lose significance as soon as we include controls for Congress and Politicians.

5.2.3 Decided and Party Unity

Regressions:

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * decided + \beta_2 * party_unity,$$

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * decided + \beta_2 * party_unity + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * decided + \beta_2 * party_unity + \beta_{4d} * Politician_d,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * decided + \beta_2 * party_unity + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i + \beta_{4d} * Politician_d$$

Results

In all the above regressions (Table 4), it seems that the results are being driven by the party unity variable rather than the decided variable. Coefficient for party unity is positive and significant. Coefficient for decided is insignificant.

5.2.4 Is the result being driven by momentum effects?

Regressions:

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_margin,$$

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_margin + \beta_{2i} * Cong_i,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_margin + \beta_{3d} * Politician_d,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_margin + \beta_{2i} * Cong_i + \beta_{3d} * Politician_d$$

Results

Table 5 indicates that in all the regressions, the coefficient of running margin is positive and significant. So at this point of time, bandwagon effect story seems to have a much stronger bite than the effect of decided threshold.

5.2.5 Bandwagon effects and Party Unity

Regressions:

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_margin + \beta_2 * party_unity,$$

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_margin + \beta_2 * party_unity + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_margin + \beta_2 * party_unity + \beta_{4d} * Politician_d,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_margin + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i + \beta_{4d} * Politician_d,$$

Results

Results can be seen in table 6. When we control for party unity then the overall bandwagon effect seems to lose significance. So it seems safe to say that bandwagon effect matters but party matters more.

5.2.6 Party Bandwagon Effect

Regressions:

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin,$$

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_{2i} * Cong_i,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_{3d} * Politician_d,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_{2i} * Cong_i + \beta_{3d} * Politician_d$$

Results

Table 7 indicates that in all the regressions, the coefficient of running party margin is positive and significant. The magnitude of the coefficient seems to be an order of magnitude higher than the case where we consider the overall running margin.

5.2.7 Party Bandwagon effect and Party Unity

Regressions:

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * party_unity,$$

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * party_unity + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * party_unity + \beta_{4d} * Politician_d,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * party_unity + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i + \beta_{4d} * Politician_d,$$

Results

The effect of party bandwagoning seems to be positive and significant even after we control for party unity. Results can be seen in Table 8.

5.2.8 Party Bandwagon and Decided

Regressions:

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * decided,$$

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * decided + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * decided + \beta_{4d} * Politician_d,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * decided + \beta_{3i} * Cong_i + \beta_{4d} * Politician_d$$

Results

When we consider the effect of party bandwagoning and decided simultaneously, the variable for running party margin continues to be positive and significant (Table 9). However, in basic regressions the coefficient for decided turns negative. This indicates that maybe after controlling for party

bandwagoning, the senators tend to agree less with the party after the vote has been decided. This result is not seen in all the regression types.

5.2.9 Party Bandwagon and Decided with Party Unity

Regressions:

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * decided + \beta_3 * party_unity,$$

$$agree = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * decided + \beta_3 * party_unity + \beta_{4i} * Cong_i,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * decided + \beta_3 * party_unity + \beta_{5d} * Politician_d,$$

$$agree_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * running_party_margin + \beta_2 * decided + \beta_3 * party_unity + \beta_{4i} * Cong_i + \beta_{5d} * Politician_d$$

Results

Finally, after controlling for party unity, when we consider the effect of party bandwagoning and decided simultaneously, the coefficient for party bandwagoning is positive and significant (Table 10). However, we lose significance for decided. Therefore, we have convincing evidence that between decided and momentum, momentum seems to be the larger of the two effects.

6 Conclusion

Based on all the above regressions the story seems to be that the order in which the senators vote matters. The agreement level of the senators with their party goes up as we go down the order. The major magnitude of the result is being driven by party unity. Senators also tend to take signal from the way in which senators from her party have already voted. At the same time, if the outcome of the vote is already certain that does not seem to majorly effect the way senators vote.

7 Tables

TABLE 1: Fixed Effects: Senate Roll-Call (Effect of Order on Agreement)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables	No Controls(M)	Include Congress(M)	Vote Level
Order(Normalised)	0.487*** (0.13)	0.296 (0.15)	0.328* (0.14)
70th Congress		0.118** (0.04)	-0.142 (0.11)
71st Congress		0.056 (0.04)	-0.201 (0.11)
72nd Congress		0.044 (0.04)	-0.218* (0.11)
73rd Congress		0.057 (0.04)	-0.205 (0.11)
74th Congress		0.038 (0.04)	-0.224* (0.11)
75th Congress		0.008 (0.04)	-0.255* (0.11)
76th Congress		0.037 (0.04)	-0.223* (0.11)
77th Congress		0.025 (0.04)	-0.239* (0.11)
78th Congress		0.021 (0.04)	-0.244* (0.11)
79th Congress		-0.015 (0.04)	-0.281** (0.10)
80th Congress		0.109*** (0.03)	-0.158 (0.10)
81st Congress		0.009 (0.04)	-0.259* (0.11)
82nd Congress		0.034 (0.03)	-0.235* (0.11)
83rd Congress		0.010 (0.03)	-0.263* (0.11)
84th Congress		0.102*** (0.03)	-0.169 (0.11)
85th Congress		0.068* (0.03)	-0.206 (0.11)
86th Congress		0.053* (0.03)	-0.222* (0.11)

	(0.03)	(0.11)
87th Congress	0.040 (0.02)	-0.235* (0.11)
88th Congress	0.022 (0.02)	-0.254* (0.11)
89th Congress	0.009 (0.02)	-0.268* (0.11)
90th Congress	-0.014 (0.02)	-0.292** (0.11)
91st Congress	-0.025 (0.02)	-0.303** (0.11)
92nd Congress	-0.042 (0.02)	-0.323** (0.11)
93rd Congress	-0.038 (0.02)	-0.320** (0.11)
94th Congress	-0.052* (0.02)	-0.336** (0.11)
95th Congress	-0.059** (0.02)	-0.347** (0.11)
96th Congress	-0.046* (0.02)	-0.335** (0.11)
97th Congress	0.017 (0.02)	-0.272* (0.11)
98th Congress	-0.019 (0.02)	-0.309** (0.11)
99th Congress	0.004 (0.02)	-0.286* (0.11)
100th Congress	0.015 (0.02)	-0.274* (0.11)
101st Congress	0.009 (0.02)	-0.281* (0.11)
102nd Congress	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.291** (0.11)
103rd Congress	0.026 (0.02)	-0.264* (0.11)
104th Congress	0.032 (0.02)	-0.258* (0.11)
105th Congress	0.042* (0.02)	-0.249* (0.11)

106th Congress		0.052*** (0.02)	-0.238* (0.11)
107th Congress		0.060*** (0.02)	-0.233* (0.11)
108th Congress		0.328** (0.11)	
109th Congress		0.037* (0.01)	-0.253* (0.11)
110th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)	-0.290* (0.11)
111st Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
108th Congress(Omitted)			0.000 (.)
Constant	0.457*** (0.06)	0.526*** (0.08)	0.831*** (0.13)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

TABLE 2: Fixed Effects: House Roll-Call (Effect of Order on Agreement)

Variables	(1) No Controls(M)	(2) Include Congress(M)	(3) Vote Level
Order(Normalised)	0.266* (0.11)	0.044 (0.11)	0.056 (0.10)
70th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
71st Congress		-0.013 (0.01)	-0.014 (0.01)
72nd Congress		-0.041*** (0.01)	-0.045*** (0.01)
73rd Congress		0.021 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)
74th Congress		-0.051*** (0.01)	-0.062*** (0.01)
75th Congress		-0.076*** (0.01)	-0.091*** (0.01)
76th Congress		-0.056*** (0.02)	-0.072*** (0.02)
77th Congress		-0.107*** (0.02)	-0.125*** (0.02)
78th Congress		-0.107*** (0.02)	-0.126*** (0.02)
79th Congress		-0.152*** (0.02)	-0.172*** (0.02)
80th Congress		-0.081*** (0.02)	-0.103*** (0.02)
81st Congress		-0.141*** (0.02)	-0.164*** (0.02)
82nd Congress		-0.149*** (0.02)	-0.173*** (0.02)
83rd Congress		-0.111*** (0.02)	-0.135*** (0.02)
84th Congress		-0.107*** (0.02)	-0.130*** (0.02)
85th Congress		-0.152*** (0.02)	-0.175*** (0.02)
86th Congress		-0.135*** (0.02)	-0.160*** (0.02)
87th Congress		-0.142***	-0.167***

	(0.02)	(0.02)
88th Congress	-0.150*** (0.02)	-0.178*** (0.02)
89th Congress	-0.183*** (0.02)	-0.215*** (0.02)
90th Congress	-0.191*** (0.02)	-0.224*** (0.02)
91st Congress	-0.240*** (0.02)	-0.276*** (0.02)
92nd Congress	-0.237*** (0.02)	-0.276*** (0.02)
93rd Congress	-0.219*** (0.02)	-0.262*** (0.02)
94th Congress	-0.215*** (0.02)	-0.263*** (0.02)
95th Congress	-0.212*** (0.02)	-0.264*** (0.02)
96th Congress	-0.228*** (0.02)	-0.282*** (0.02)
97th Congress	-0.229*** (0.02)	-0.284*** (0.02)
98th Congress	-0.215*** (0.02)	-0.268*** (0.02)
99th Congress	-0.209*** (0.02)	-0.262*** (0.02)
100th Congress	-0.201*** (0.02)	-0.253*** (0.02)
101st Congress	-0.210*** (0.02)	-0.262*** (0.02)
102nd Congress	-0.213*** (0.02)	-0.266*** (0.02)
103rd Congress	-0.201*** (0.02)	-0.253*** (0.02)
104th Congress	-0.204*** (0.02)	-0.257*** (0.02)
105th Congress	-0.207*** (0.02)	-0.261*** (0.02)
106th Congress	-0.197*** (0.02)	-0.251*** (0.02)

107th Congress		-0.190*** (0.02)	-0.245*** (0.02)
108th Congress		-0.179*** (0.02)	-0.234*** (0.02)
109th Congress		-0.187*** (0.02)	-0.243*** (0.02)
110th Congress		-0.183*** (0.02)	-0.239*** (0.02)
111st Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Constant	0.600*** (0.05)	0.864*** (0.06)	0.985*** (0.06)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

TABLE 3: Senate Roll-Call (Effect of Decided)

Variables	(1) No Controls	(2) Include Congress	(3) No Controls (FE)	(4) Include Congress(FE)
Decided	0.020* (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
70th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)		-0.197 (0.13)
71st Congress		-0.030 (0.02)		-0.258 (0.13)
72nd Congress		-0.021 (0.03)		-0.264* (0.13)
73rd Congress		0.040 (0.02)		-0.246 (0.13)
74th Congress		0.005 (0.03)		-0.258 (0.13)
75th Congress		-0.013 (0.03)		-0.290* (0.13)
76th Congress		0.035 (0.03)		-0.263* (0.13)
77th Congress		0.007 (0.03)		-0.286* (0.13)
78th Congress		0.022 (0.03)		-0.295* (0.13)
79th Congress		0.002 (0.03)		-0.337* (0.13)
80th Congress		0.160*** (0.02)		-0.212 (0.13)
81st Congress		0.054 (0.03)		-0.309* (0.13)
82nd Congress		0.102*** (0.02)		-0.283* (0.13)
83rd Congress		0.076* (0.03)		-0.300* (0.14)
84th Congress		0.193*** (0.02)		-0.207 (0.14)
85th Congress		0.164*** (0.03)		-0.246 (0.14)
86th Congress		0.170*** (0.02)		-0.257 (0.14)
87th Congress		0.161***		-0.273*

	(0.02)	(0.14)
88th Congress	0.146*** (0.03)	-0.301* (0.14)
89th Congress	0.148*** (0.02)	-0.315* (0.14)
90th Congress	0.135*** (0.02)	-0.336* (0.14)
91st Congress	0.118*** (0.02)	-0.349* (0.14)
92nd Congress	0.106*** (0.02)	-0.365** (0.14)
93rd Congress	0.122*** (0.02)	-0.360** (0.14)
94th Congress	0.118*** (0.02)	-0.378** (0.14)
95th Congress	0.100*** (0.02)	-0.389** (0.14)
96th Congress	0.137*** (0.02)	-0.385** (0.14)
97th Congress	0.213*** (0.02)	-0.316* (0.14)
98th Congress	0.181*** (0.02)	-0.354* (0.14)
99th Congress	0.204*** (0.02)	-0.329* (0.14)
100th Congress	0.225*** (0.02)	-0.323* (0.14)
101st Congress	0.241*** (0.02)	-0.319* (0.14)
102nd Congress	0.226*** (0.02)	-0.331* (0.14)
103rd Congress	0.256*** (0.02)	-0.301* (0.14)
104th Congress	0.270*** (0.02)	-0.293* (0.14)
105th Congress	0.300*** (0.02)	-0.285* (0.14)
106th Congress	0.301*** (0.02)	-0.276* (0.14)

107th Congress		0.306*** (0.02)		-0.268 (0.14)
108th Congress		0.318*** (0.02)		
109th Congress		0.296*** (0.02)		-0.286* (0.14)
110th Congress		0.258*** (0.02)		-0.332* (0.14)
111st Congress		0.228*** (0.03)		-0.331* (0.14)
108th Congress(Omitted)				0.000 (.)
Constant	0.730*** (0.01)	0.561*** (0.02)	0.731*** (0.00)	1.040*** (0.13)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

TABLE 4: Senate Roll-Call (Effect of Decided with Party-Unity Included)

Variables	(1) No Controls	(2) Include Congress	(3) No Controls (FE)	(4) Include Congress(FE)
Decided	0.009 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Party_Unity	0.009*** (0.00)	0.009*** (0.00)	0.009*** (0.00)	0.009*** (0.00)
70th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)		-0.051 (0.16)
71st Congress		-0.030 (0.02)		-0.112 (0.16)
72nd Congress		-0.013 (0.03)		-0.107 (0.16)
73rd Congress		0.016 (0.03)		-0.113 (0.16)
74th Congress		-0.025 (0.03)		-0.124 (0.16)
75th Congress		-0.048 (0.03)		-0.156 (0.16)
76th Congress		-0.001 (0.03)		-0.137 (0.16)
77th Congress		-0.041 (0.03)		-0.173 (0.16)
78th Congress		0.008 (0.03)		-0.153 (0.16)
79th Congress		-0.026 (0.03)		-0.206 (0.16)
80th Congress		0.091*** (0.02)		-0.133 (0.16)
81st Congress		0.009 (0.03)		-0.200 (0.16)
82nd Congress		0.066** (0.02)		-0.167 (0.16)
83rd Congress		0.013 (0.03)		-0.211 (0.16)
84th Congress		0.114*** (0.02)		-0.137 (0.16)
85th Congress		0.092*** (0.03)		-0.166 (0.16)
86th Congress		0.075**		-0.198

	(0.02)	(0.16)
87th Congress	0.071** (0.02)	-0.209 (0.16)
88th Congress	0.070** (0.03)	-0.219 (0.16)
89th Congress	0.058* (0.03)	-0.248 (0.16)
90th Congress	0.069** (0.02)	-0.247 (0.16)
91st Congress	0.067** (0.02)	-0.251 (0.16)
92nd Congress	0.058* (0.02)	-0.266 (0.17)
93rd Congress	0.064** (0.02)	-0.269 (0.17)
94th Congress	0.058* (0.02)	-0.284 (0.16)
95th Congress	0.044 (0.03)	-0.288 (0.17)
96th Congress	0.074*** (0.02)	-0.293 (0.16)
97th Congress	0.113*** (0.02)	-0.265 (0.17)
98th Congress	0.096*** (0.02)	-0.288 (0.17)
99th Congress	0.113*** (0.02)	-0.267 (0.17)
100th Congress	0.105*** (0.02)	-0.293 (0.17)
101st Congress	0.119*** (0.02)	-0.290 (0.17)
102nd Congress	0.108*** (0.02)	-0.297 (0.17)
103rd Congress	0.115*** (0.02)	-0.293 (0.17)
104th Congress	0.116*** (0.02)	-0.297 (0.17)
105th Congress	0.141*** (0.02)	-0.294 (0.17)

106th Congress		0.124*** (0.02)		-0.304 (0.17)
107th Congress		0.140*** (0.02)		-0.285 (0.17)
108th Congress		0.140*** (0.02)		
109th Congress		0.132*** (0.02)		-0.302 (0.17)
110th Congress		0.114*** (0.02)		-0.327* (0.17)
111st Congress		0.039 (0.03)		-0.365* (0.17)
108th Congress(Omitted)				0.000 (.)
Constant	0.442*** (0.01)	0.389*** (0.02)	0.452*** (0.00)	0.700*** (0.16)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

TABLE 5: Senate Roll-Call (Bandwagon Effect)

Variables	(1) No Controls	(2) Include Congress	(3) No Controls (FE)	(4) Include Congress(FE)
Running_margin	0.003*** (0.00)	0.002*** (0.00)	0.003*** (0.00)	0.003*** (0.00)
70th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)		-0.168 (0.13)
71st Congress		-0.023 (0.02)		-0.218 (0.13)
72nd Congress		-0.025 (0.03)		-0.242 (0.13)
73rd Congress		0.043 (0.02)		-0.216 (0.13)
74th Congress		0.006 (0.03)		-0.233 (0.13)
75th Congress		-0.010 (0.03)		-0.262* (0.13)
76th Congress		0.036 (0.03)		-0.237 (0.13)
77th Congress		0.002 (0.03)		-0.266* (0.13)
78th Congress		0.021 (0.03)		-0.269* (0.13)
79th Congress		-0.004 (0.03)		-0.314* (0.13)
80th Congress		0.153*** (0.02)		-0.191 (0.13)
81st Congress		0.054 (0.03)		-0.279* (0.13)
82nd Congress		0.101*** (0.02)		-0.256* (0.13)
83rd Congress		0.065* (0.03)		-0.291* (0.13)
84th Congress		0.176*** (0.02)		-0.203 (0.13)
85th Congress		0.147*** (0.03)		-0.243 (0.13)
86th Congress		0.152*** (0.02)		-0.258* (0.13)
87th Congress		0.149***		-0.263*

	(0.02)	(0.13)
88th Congress	0.131*** (0.03)	-0.293* (0.13)
89th Congress	0.133*** (0.02)	-0.307* (0.13)
90th Congress	0.116*** (0.02)	-0.334* (0.13)
91st Congress	0.101*** (0.02)	-0.344** (0.13)
92nd Congress	0.090*** (0.03)	-0.361** (0.13)
93rd Congress	0.106*** (0.02)	-0.356** (0.13)
94th Congress	0.104*** (0.02)	-0.370** (0.13)
95th Congress	0.086*** (0.02)	-0.382** (0.13)
96th Congress	0.122*** (0.02)	-0.377** (0.13)
97th Congress	0.193*** (0.02)	-0.316* (0.13)
98th Congress	0.162*** (0.02)	-0.353** (0.13)
99th Congress	0.188*** (0.02)	-0.325* (0.13)
100th Congress	0.196*** (0.02)	-0.334* (0.13)
101st Congress	0.215*** (0.02)	-0.331* (0.13)
102nd Congress	0.206*** (0.02)	-0.334* (0.13)
103rd Congress	0.241*** (0.02)	-0.300* (0.13)
104th Congress	0.262*** (0.02)	-0.283* (0.13)
105th Congress	0.280*** (0.02)	-0.292* (0.13)
106th Congress	0.285*** (0.02)	-0.276* (0.13)

107th Congress		0.282*** (0.02)		-0.280* (0.13)
108th Congress		0.305*** (0.02)		
109th Congress		0.281*** (0.02)		-0.285* (0.13)
110th Congress		0.244*** (0.02)		-0.329* (0.13)
111st Congress		0.222*** (0.03)		-0.316* (0.14)
108th Congress(Omitted)				0.000 (.)
Constant	0.678*** (0.01)	0.530*** (0.02)	0.668*** (0.00)	0.972*** (0.13)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

TABLE 6: Senate Roll-Call (Bandwagon Effect with Party-Unity Included)

Variables	(1) No Controls	(2) Include Congress	(3) No Controls (FE)	(4) Include Congress(FE)
Running_margin	0.000** (0.00)	0.000* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Party_Unity	0.009*** (0.00)	0.009*** (0.00)	0.009*** (0.00)	0.009*** (0.00)
70th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)		-0.050 (0.16)
71st Congress		-0.029 (0.02)		-0.111 (0.16)
72nd Congress		-0.014 (0.03)		-0.107 (0.16)
73rd Congress		0.017 (0.03)		-0.112 (0.16)
74th Congress		-0.024 (0.03)		-0.123 (0.16)
75th Congress		-0.047 (0.03)		-0.155 (0.16)
76th Congress		-0.000 (0.03)		-0.137 (0.16)
77th Congress		-0.041 (0.03)		-0.173 (0.16)
78th Congress		0.008 (0.03)		-0.152 (0.16)
79th Congress		-0.026 (0.03)		-0.206 (0.16)
80th Congress		0.091*** (0.02)		-0.132 (0.16)
81st Congress		0.010 (0.03)		-0.199 (0.16)
82nd Congress		0.066** (0.02)		-0.166 (0.16)
83rd Congress		0.012 (0.03)		-0.211 (0.16)
84th Congress		0.112*** (0.02)		-0.137 (0.16)
85th Congress		0.091*** (0.03)		-0.167 (0.16)
86th Congress		0.074**		-0.199

	(0.02)	(0.16)
87th Congress	0.071** (0.02)	-0.209 (0.16)
88th Congress	0.068* (0.03)	-0.220 (0.16)
89th Congress	0.057* (0.03)	-0.248 (0.16)
90th Congress	0.067** (0.02)	-0.248 (0.16)
91st Congress	0.065** (0.02)	-0.252 (0.16)
92nd Congress	0.056* (0.02)	-0.266 (0.16)
93rd Congress	0.062** (0.02)	-0.270 (0.16)
94th Congress	0.057* (0.02)	-0.285 (0.16)
95th Congress	0.043 (0.03)	-0.288 (0.16)
96th Congress	0.072** (0.02)	-0.294 (0.16)
97th Congress	0.111*** (0.02)	-0.266 (0.16)
98th Congress	0.094*** (0.02)	-0.289 (0.16)
99th Congress	0.112*** (0.02)	-0.268 (0.16)
100th Congress	0.102*** (0.02)	-0.294 (0.16)
101st Congress	0.117*** (0.02)	-0.291 (0.16)
102nd Congress	0.107*** (0.02)	-0.298 (0.16)
103rd Congress	0.115*** (0.02)	-0.293 (0.16)
104th Congress	0.117*** (0.02)	-0.296 (0.16)
105th Congress	0.141*** (0.02)	-0.294 (0.16)

106th Congress		0.124*** (0.02)		-0.304 (0.16)
107th Congress		0.139*** (0.02)		-0.285 (0.16)
108th Congress		0.141*** (0.02)		
109th Congress		0.133*** (0.02)		-0.302 (0.16)
110th Congress		0.114*** (0.02)		-0.327* (0.16)
111st Congress		0.041 (0.03)		-0.364* (0.17)
108th Congress(Omitted)				0.000 (.)
Constant	0.439*** (0.01)	0.387*** (0.02)	0.450*** (0.00)	0.699*** (0.16)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

TABLE 7: Senate Roll-Call (Party Bandwagon Effect without including Party-Unity)

Variables	(1) No Controls	(2) Include Congress	(3) No Controls (FE)	(4) Include Congress(FE)
Running_p_margin	0.008*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)
70th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)		-0.085 (0.10)
71st Congress		-0.028 (0.02)		-0.142 (0.10)
72nd Congress		-0.022 (0.03)		-0.156 (0.10)
73rd Congress		0.025 (0.03)		-0.164 (0.10)
74th Congress		-0.009 (0.03)		-0.176 (0.10)
75th Congress		-0.027 (0.03)		-0.202* (0.10)
76th Congress		0.021 (0.03)		-0.176 (0.10)
77th Congress		-0.016 (0.03)		-0.211* (0.10)
78th Congress		0.013 (0.03)		-0.191* (0.10)
79th Congress		-0.015 (0.03)		-0.241* (0.09)
80th Congress		0.128*** (0.02)		-0.151 (0.10)
81st Congress		0.034 (0.03)		-0.226* (0.10)
82nd Congress		0.083*** (0.02)		-0.203* (0.10)
83rd Congress		0.048 (0.03)		-0.250* (0.10)
84th Congress		0.155*** (0.02)		-0.172 (0.10)
85th Congress		0.130*** (0.03)		-0.200* (0.10)
86th Congress		0.126*** (0.02)		-0.238* (0.10)
87th Congress		0.120***		-0.244*

	(0.02)	(0.10)
88th Congress	0.107*** (0.03)	-0.256* (0.10)
89th Congress	0.109*** (0.03)	-0.269** (0.10)
90th Congress	0.105*** (0.02)	-0.278** (0.10)
91st Congress	0.094*** (0.02)	-0.281** (0.10)
92nd Congress	0.083** (0.03)	-0.301** (0.10)
93rd Congress	0.094*** (0.02)	-0.307** (0.10)
94th Congress	0.090*** (0.02)	-0.321** (0.10)
95th Congress	0.076** (0.02)	-0.325** (0.10)
96th Congress	0.106*** (0.02)	-0.328** (0.10)
97th Congress	0.167*** (0.02)	-0.306** (0.10)
98th Congress	0.143*** (0.02)	-0.328** (0.10)
99th Congress	0.163*** (0.02)	-0.307** (0.10)
100th Congress	0.171*** (0.02)	-0.319** (0.10)
101st Congress	0.189*** (0.02)	-0.327** (0.10)
102nd Congress	0.176*** (0.02)	-0.332** (0.10)
103rd Congress	0.195*** (0.02)	-0.330** (0.10)
104th Congress	0.204*** (0.03)	-0.338*** (0.10)
105th Congress	0.232*** (0.02)	-0.337*** (0.10)
106th Congress	0.226*** (0.02)	-0.340*** (0.10)

107th Congress		0.235*** (0.02)		-0.324** (0.10)
108th Congress		0.242*** (0.02)		
109th Congress		0.226*** (0.02)		-0.338** (0.10)
110th Congress		0.194*** (0.03)		-0.363*** (0.10)
111st Congress		0.148*** (0.03)		-0.386*** (0.10)
108th Congress(Omitted)				0.000 (.)
Constant	0.602*** (0.01)	0.492*** (0.02)	0.509*** (0.01)	0.792*** (0.10)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

TABLE 8: Senate Roll-Call (Party Bandwagon Effect after including Party-Unity)

Variables	(1) No Controls	(2) Include Congress	(3) No Controls (FE)	(4) Include Congress(FE)
Running_p_margin	0.001** (0.00)	0.001** (0.00)	0.004*** (0.00)	0.004*** (0.00)
Party_Unity	0.009*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)
70th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)		-0.051 (0.14)
71st Congress		-0.029 (0.02)		-0.111 (0.14)
72nd Congress		-0.014 (0.03)		-0.111 (0.14)
73rd Congress		0.015 (0.03)		-0.119 (0.14)
74th Congress		-0.025 (0.03)		-0.130 (0.14)
75th Congress		-0.048 (0.03)		-0.160 (0.14)
76th Congress		-0.001 (0.03)		-0.140 (0.14)
77th Congress		-0.042 (0.03)		-0.177 (0.14)
78th Congress		0.007 (0.03)		-0.154 (0.14)
79th Congress		-0.027 (0.03)		-0.207 (0.14)
80th Congress		0.090*** (0.02)		-0.133 (0.14)
81st Congress		0.008 (0.03)		-0.200 (0.14)
82nd Congress		0.065** (0.02)		-0.169 (0.14)
83rd Congress		0.012 (0.03)		-0.216 (0.14)
84th Congress		0.112*** (0.02)		-0.142 (0.14)
85th Congress		0.091*** (0.03)		-0.171 (0.14)
86th Congress		0.074**		-0.206

	(0.02)	(0.14)
87th Congress	0.070** (0.02)	-0.215 (0.14)
88th Congress	0.068* (0.03)	-0.224 (0.15)
89th Congress	0.057* (0.03)	-0.249 (0.15)
90th Congress	0.068** (0.02)	-0.250 (0.15)
91st Congress	0.066** (0.02)	-0.253 (0.15)
92nd Congress	0.057* (0.02)	-0.269 (0.15)
93rd Congress	0.063** (0.02)	-0.274 (0.15)
94th Congress	0.058* (0.02)	-0.289* (0.15)
95th Congress	0.044 (0.02)	-0.292* (0.15)
96th Congress	0.073** (0.02)	-0.297* (0.15)
97th Congress	0.111*** (0.02)	-0.274 (0.15)
98th Congress	0.095*** (0.02)	-0.295* (0.15)
99th Congress	0.112*** (0.02)	-0.275 (0.15)
100th Congress	0.104*** (0.02)	-0.298* (0.15)
101st Congress	0.119*** (0.02)	-0.299* (0.15)
102nd Congress	0.108*** (0.02)	-0.305* (0.15)
103rd Congress	0.114*** (0.02)	-0.303* (0.15)
104th Congress	0.115*** (0.02)	-0.310* (0.15)
105th Congress	0.140*** (0.02)	-0.307* (0.15)

106th Congress		0.123*** (0.02)		-0.317* (0.15)
107th Congress		0.139*** (0.02)		-0.298* (0.15)
108th Congress		0.139*** (0.02)		
109th Congress		0.132*** (0.02)		-0.314* (0.15)
110th Congress		0.113*** (0.02)		-0.338* (0.15)
111st Congress		0.038 (0.03)		-0.374* (0.15)
108th Congress(Omitted)				0.000 (.)
Constant	0.441*** (0.01)	0.389*** (0.02)	0.450*** (0.00)	0.704*** (0.14)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

TABLE 9: Senate Roll-Call (Party Bandwagon Effect and Decided without Party-Unity)

Variables	(1) No Controls	(2) Include Congress	(3) No Controls (FE)	(4) Include Congress(FE)
Decided	-0.053*** (0.01)	-0.050*** (0.01)	0.010* (0.01)	0.011* (0.01)
running_p_margin	0.008*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)
70th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)		-0.085 (0.10)
71st Congress		-0.028 (0.02)		-0.142 (0.10)
72nd Congress		-0.022 (0.03)		-0.156 (0.10)
73rd Congress		0.025 (0.03)		-0.164 (0.10)
74th Congress		-0.009 (0.03)		-0.176 (0.10)
75th Congress		-0.027 (0.03)		-0.202* (0.10)
76th Congress		0.021 (0.03)		-0.176 (0.10)
77th Congress		-0.016 (0.03)		-0.211* (0.10)
78th Congress		0.013 (0.03)		-0.191* (0.10)
79th Congress		-0.015 (0.03)		-0.241* (0.09)
80th Congress		0.127*** (0.02)		-0.151 (0.10)
81st Congress		0.034 (0.03)		-0.226* (0.10)
82nd Congress		0.083*** (0.02)		-0.203* (0.10)
83rd Congress		0.048 (0.03)		-0.250* (0.10)
84th Congress		0.155*** (0.02)		-0.172 (0.10)
85th Congress		0.130*** (0.03)		-0.200* (0.10)
86th Congress		0.126***		-0.238*

	(0.02)	(0.10)
87th Congress	0.120*** (0.02)	-0.244* (0.10)
88th Congress	0.107*** (0.03)	-0.256* (0.10)
89th Congress	0.109*** (0.03)	-0.269** (0.10)
90th Congress	0.105*** (0.02)	-0.278** (0.10)
91st Congress	0.094*** (0.02)	-0.281** (0.10)
92nd Congress	0.083** (0.03)	-0.301** (0.10)
93rd Congress	0.095*** (0.02)	-0.307** (0.10)
94th Congress	0.090*** (0.02)	-0.321** (0.10)
95th Congress	0.076** (0.02)	-0.325** (0.10)
96th Congress	0.106*** (0.02)	-0.328** (0.10)
97th Congress	0.167*** (0.02)	-0.306** (0.10)
98th Congress	0.143*** (0.02)	-0.328** (0.10)
99th Congress	0.164*** (0.02)	-0.307** (0.10)
100th Congress	0.171*** (0.02)	-0.319** (0.10)
101st Congress	0.189*** (0.02)	-0.327** (0.10)
102nd Congress	0.176*** (0.02)	-0.332** (0.10)
103rd Congress	0.195*** (0.02)	-0.330** (0.10)
104th Congress	0.204*** (0.03)	-0.338*** (0.10)
105th Congress	0.232*** (0.02)	-0.337*** (0.10)

106th Congress		0.225*** (0.02)		-0.340*** (0.10)
107th Congress		0.235*** (0.02)		-0.324** (0.10)
108th Congress		0.242*** (0.02)		
109th Congress		0.226*** (0.02)		-0.338** (0.10)
110th Congress		0.194*** (0.03)		-0.363*** (0.10)
111st Congress		0.148*** (0.03)		-0.386*** (0.10)
108th Congress(Omitted)				0.000 (.)
Constant	0.602*** (0.01)	0.492*** (0.02)	0.509*** (0.01)	0.792*** (0.10)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

TABLE 10: Senate Roll-Call (Party Bandwagon Effect and Decided with Party-Unity)

Variables	(1) No Controls	(2) Include Congress	(3) No Controls (FE)	(4) Include Congress(FE)
Decided	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)	0.004 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Running_p_margin	0.001** (0.00)	0.001** (0.00)	0.004*** (0.00)	0.004*** (0.00)
Party_unity	0.009*** (0.00)	0.008*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)	0.007*** (0.00)
70th Congress(Omitted)		0.000 (.)		-0.051 (0.14)
71st Congress		-0.029 (0.02)		-0.111 (0.14)
72nd Congress		-0.014 (0.03)		-0.111 (0.14)
73rd Congress		0.015 (0.03)		-0.119 (0.14)
74th Congress		-0.025 (0.03)		-0.130 (0.14)
75th Congress		-0.048 (0.03)		-0.160 (0.14)
76th Congress		-0.001 (0.03)		-0.140 (0.14)
77th Congress		-0.042 (0.03)		-0.177 (0.14)
78th Congress		0.007 (0.03)		-0.154 (0.14)
79th Congress		-0.027 (0.03)		-0.207 (0.14)
80th Congress		0.090*** (0.02)		-0.133 (0.14)
81st Congress		0.008 (0.03)		-0.200 (0.14)
82nd Congress		0.065** (0.02)		-0.169 (0.14)
83rd Congress		0.012 (0.03)		-0.216 (0.14)
84th Congress		0.112*** (0.02)		-0.142 (0.14)
85th Congress		0.091***		-0.171

	(0.03)	(0.14)
86th Congress	0.074** (0.02)	-0.206 (0.14)
87th Congress	0.070** (0.02)	-0.215 (0.14)
88th Congress	0.068* (0.03)	-0.224 (0.15)
89th Congress	0.058* (0.03)	-0.249 (0.15)
90th Congress	0.068** (0.02)	-0.250 (0.15)
91st Congress	0.066** (0.02)	-0.253 (0.15)
92nd Congress	0.058* (0.02)	-0.269 (0.15)
93rd Congress	0.063** (0.02)	-0.274 (0.15)
94th Congress	0.058* (0.02)	-0.289* (0.15)
95th Congress	0.044 (0.02)	-0.292* (0.15)
96th Congress	0.073** (0.02)	-0.297* (0.15)
97th Congress	0.111*** (0.02)	-0.274 (0.15)
98th Congress	0.095*** (0.02)	-0.295* (0.15)
99th Congress	0.112*** (0.02)	-0.275 (0.15)
100th Congress	0.104*** (0.02)	-0.298* (0.15)
101st Congress	0.119*** (0.02)	-0.299* (0.15)
102nd Congress	0.108*** (0.02)	-0.305* (0.15)
103rd Congress	0.114*** (0.02)	-0.303* (0.15)
104th Congress	0.115*** (0.02)	-0.310* (0.15)

105th Congress		0.140*** (0.02)		-0.307* (0.15)
106th Congress		0.123*** (0.02)		-0.317* (0.15)
107th Congress		0.139*** (0.02)		-0.298* (0.15)
108th Congress		0.139*** (0.02)		
109th Congress		0.132*** (0.02)		-0.314* (0.15)
110th Congress		0.113*** (0.02)		-0.338* (0.15)
111st Congress		0.038 (0.03)		-0.374* (0.15)
108th Congress(Omitted)				0.000 (.)
Constant	0.441*** (0.01)	0.389*** (0.02)	0.450*** (0.00)	0.704*** (0.14)

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1