



# Introduction to Cyber Security

Fall 2017 | Sherman Chow | CUHK IERG 4130

**Sampling this course**

# Today's Schedule

- What is meant by “secure communication”?
- What does probability have to do with security?
- RSA: a “simple” encryption scheme based on “number theory”
- DNS: spoofing, poisoning, packet, rebinding attack
- Privilege of a running program
- What happen when a function call is made?

# Sampling

- What is meant by “secure communication”?
  - Basic Cryptography
- What does probability have to do with security?
  - em... Not just about Cryptography
- RSA: a “simple” encryption scheme based on “number theory”
  - Some “Mathematics”

# Sampling continued

- DNS: spoofing, poisoning, packet, rebinding attack
  - Network security and Web security
- Privilege of a running program
  - System security
- What happen when a function call is made?
  - Application security

# Symmetric Key Encryption

- Alice wants to send a message to Bob, s.t. Eve cannot read.
- Eve can wiretap / eavesdrop the network connection.
- Alice encrypts a plaintext message such that Bob can decrypt but Eve cannot
- What differentiate Eve from Bob?
- Alice and Bob have a pre-established share secret.
  - E.g., a 56-bit key.

# Cipher: Terminology

- Encryption: converting **plaintext** to **ciphertext**
- Decryption: converting **ciphertext** to **plaintext**
- Cryptanalysis: to break the code by analyzing the **algorithm**

# Confidentiality vs. Authenticity


- Alice encrypted “I love you” to Bob.
- Eve knew that Alice loves Bob.
- Eve “changes” Alice’s ciphertext, sends it to Bob as if Alice sent it, s.t. Bob will eventually receive “I hate you” after decryption

# DES: The Data Encryption Standard

- Designed in the 1970's by IBM
  - with inputs from the NSA (National Security Agency) of US
- The most widely used encryption standard in the world
- 64 bits per block
- Use 56-bit key (7x8)




# Block Cipher by Iterations



# Mode of Operations


- What if I want to encrypt more than 1 block?
- Easy: just encrypt it “block-wise”
- What does “block-wise” really mean?

# ECB, depicted



# CBC w/ Random IV

➤  $c[0] = E(k, IV \oplus m[0]), c[1] = E(k, c[0] \oplus m[1]), \dots$




# Authentication

- Using a block-cipher as a mean for authentication?
- What if I want to authenticate more than 1 block?

# Hash Function for Message Digest

- Hash function accepts a *variable* size message  $M$  as input and produces a *fixed-size* **message digest**  $H(M)$  as output
- Message digest is sent with the message for authentication
- Produces a **fingerprint** of the message
- Authenticate just the hash of messages
  - instead of all the messages



# Let's play a game

- I randomly select a subset of size  $n$  of student from this class.
- I will pay you if no two of them share the same birthday.
- Otherwise you pay me.
- For what  $n$  you will enter this game?
- Wait, why I suddenly talk about this??


# Symmetric-Key vs. Asymmetric-Key

- How Alice and Bob have a shared secret at the first place?
- Bob has “secret knowledge” (*Decryption Key*) that Eve does not have.
- But Alice does not have Bob’s “secret knowledge”
- Wait... Alice only needs to perform Encryption but not Decryption
- Can Bob *publish* an encryption key, s.t. Alice (and Eve) will know, while only Bob can do the decryption?
- Answer: Public-Key Encryption (PKE)



# RSA Algorithm

- Most **widely accepted** and implemented approach to PKE
- “Block cipher” where  $0 \leq m, c \leq N - 1$  for some  $N$



# RSA Key Generation

- Choose two large prime numbers  $p, q$ . (e.g., 1024 bits each)
- Compute  $N = pq$ ,  $\Phi = (p-1)(q-1)$
- Choose  $e (< N)$  that has no common factors with  $\Phi$ 
  - i.e.,  $e, \Phi$  are “relatively prime”
- Choose  $d$  such that  $ed-1$  is exactly divisible by  $\Phi$ 
  - i.e.,  $ed - 1 = K\Phi$  for some integer  $K$
  - which means  $ed \bmod \Phi = 1$  // remainder of  $ed$  divided by  $\Phi$  is 1
- Public key is  $(N, e)$
- Private key is  $(N, d)$  // or just  $d$


# RSA Encryption and Decryption

- $\text{Enc}(m) \rightarrow c \text{ --- } c := m^e \bmod N$
- $\text{Dec}(c) \rightarrow m \text{ --- } m := c^d \bmod N$
- Fermat's Little Theorem: For any prime  $p$ , and any  $x$  such that  $p$  does not divide  $x$  (e.g.,  $1 \leq x \leq p-1$ ), we have  $x^{p-1} = 1 \bmod p$
- Euler's Theorem: For any integer  $N$ , and  $x$  in  $\mathbf{Z}_N^*$ ,  $x^{\Phi(N)} = 1 \bmod N$ 
  - Treat " $x$  in  $\mathbf{Z}_N^*$ " as " $x$  is relatively prime to  $N$ "
  - $\Phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$
- Correctness:  $c^d \bmod N = m^{(k\Phi+1)} \bmod N = m^{k\Phi} m \bmod N = m \bmod N$

# ElGamal Encryption (not Factoring-based)

- $(sk = y, pk = Y = g^y) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(q)$
- Pick  $1 \leq r \leq q - 2$
- Set  $C_1$  to be  $g^r \bmod q$
- Compute  $K = Y^r \bmod q$
- Set  $C_0$  to be  $MK \bmod q$
- i.e.,  $(C_0 = M(pk)^r, C_1 = g^r) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, M)$

# TCP Protocol Stack




# DNS Example

➤ **gateway.ie.cuhk.edu.hk**  
wants IP address of  
**access.cims.nyu.edu**

➤ Contacts its local DNS server  
**ieuga.ie.cuhk.edu.hk**

➤ **ieuga.ie.cuhk.edu.hk**  
contacts root name server  
➤ if necessary


➤ Root name server contacts  
authoritative name server,  
**dns1.noc.nyu.edu**  
➤ if necessary



# Spoofing

- Exploiting/altering mapping btw. domain name → IP → MAC address
  - IP Spoofing (e.g. attacker as sender)
  - DNS Spoofing (e.g. attacker as receiver)
  - ARP Spoofing (e.g. attacker as receiver)


# DNS Spoofing





# DNS Cache Poisoning

- As an attacker, I sit there and sniff DNS request from the line??
- To be more active, you need to know some details of DNS...



Clipart from <http://www.colsterworth.lincs.sch.uk>


# JavaScript Security

- There are no JavaScript methods that can directly access the files on the client computer
- There are no JavaScript basic methods that can directly access the network, although JavaScript programs can load URLs and submit HTML forms
- Protection via the “Same-Origin Policy”

# Same Origin Policy (SOP)

- the policy permits scripts running on pages originating from the *same origin* to access each other's methods and properties with no specific restrictions
- but prevents access to most methods and properties across pages on different sites

# DNS Rebinding Attack



# Privilege of a running program

- A running program/process “typically” inherits the access rights of the login-account through which a program is run
- Instead of inheriting the rights of the program’s **runner**, Unix is based on “**Setuid**” which may “inherit” the rights of the program’s **owner**
  - E.g., mkdir command in UNIX changes file-system data-structure
    - i.e., need “**root**” or **superuser** privilege,
  - Thus, mkdir is **owned by root but executable by users**.
  - If a user runs mkdir, its “effective userid” is switched to “root”
  - Setuid-programs are especially “dangerous” because if there is a flaw in such programs, attacker can exploit it to gain superuser privilege!
    - E.g., sendmail

# Buffer Overflow

- Memory errors in C and C++ programs are among the oldest classes of software vulnerabilities.
- Single biggest software security threat
- Even if we consider only classic buffer overflows, it has been lodged in the top-3 most dangerous software errors for years
  - CWE/SANS TOP 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
- Buffer overflow vulnerabilities dominate in the area of remote network penetration vulnerabilities

# Buffer Overflow in C/C++

- Store more data in the buffer (heap or stack) than it can hold
- The next contiguous chunk of memory is overwritten
- C/C++ language is inherently unsafe
  - i.e. it allows programs to overflow buffers at will
  - No runtime checks that prevent writing past the end of a buffer
  - `strcpy(buf, "this string takes 27 bytes");` // buf only has 12 bytes

# Stack depicted

