

CimpleDAO

Smart Contract Security Audit

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1 Introduction

CimpleDAO engaged ShellBoxes to conduct a security assessment on the CimpleDAO beginning on March 4th, 2022 and ending May 13th, 2022. In this report, we detail our methodical approach to evaluate potential security issues associated with the implementation of smart contracts, by exposing possible semantic discrepancies between the smart contract code and design document, and by recommending additional ideas to optimize the existing code. Our findings indicate that the current version of smart contracts can still be enhanced further due to the presence of many security and performance concerns.

This document summarizes the findings of our audit.

1.1 About CimpleDAO

CiMPLE is an easy way for people to multiply their crypto assets utilizing previously complex and relatively unknown strategies. There are 9 CiMPLE strategies to help users multiply their crypto assets. The primary CiMPLE strategy is to leverage against existing tokens to buy more tokens when the price dips and repay those loans when the price goes back up, netting additional tokens and allowing for a larger purchase on the next dip. This can compound over time and result in a multiple of the original token balance. Our platform will make it simple enough for users to utilise the power of Defi seamlessly.

Issuer	CimpleDA0
Website	http://www.cimple.cc/
Туре	Solidity Smart Contract
Audit Method	Whitebox

1.2 Approach & Methodology

ShellBoxes used a combination of manual and automated security testing to achieve a balance between efficiency, timeliness, practicability, and correctness within the audit's scope. While manual testing is advised for identifying problems in logic, procedure, and implementation, automated testing techniques help to expand the coverage of smart

contracts and can quickly detect code that does not comply with security best practices.

1.2.1 Risk Methodology

Vulnerabilities or bugs identified by ShellBoxes are ranked using a risk assessment technique that considers both the LIKELIHOOD and IMPACT of a security incident. This framework is effective at conveying the features and consequences of technological vulnerabilities.

Its quantitative paradigm enables repeatable and precise measurement, while also revealing the underlying susceptibility characteristics that were used to calculate the Risk scores. A risk level will be assigned to each vulnerability on a scale of 5 to 1, with 5 indicating the greatest possibility or impact.

- Likelihood quantifies the probability of a certain vulnerability being discovered and exploited in the untamed.
- Impact quantifies the technical and economic costs of a successful attack.
- Severity indicates the risk's overall criticality.

Probability and impact are classified into three categories: H, M, and L, which correspond to high, medium, and low, respectively. Severity is determined by probability and impact and is categorized into four levels, namely Critical, High, Medium, and Low.



Likelihood

2 Findings Overview

2.1 Summary

The following is a synopsis of our conclusions from our analysis of the CimpleDAO implementation. During the first part of our audit, we examine the smart contract source code and run the codebase via a static code analyzer. The objective here is to find known coding problems statically and then manually check (reject or confirm) issues highlighted by the tool. Additionally, we check business logics, system processes, and DeFi-related components manually to identify potential hazards and/or defects.

2.2 Key Findings

In general, these smart contracts are well-designed and constructed, but their implementation might be improved by addressing the discovered flaws, which include 3 critical-severity, 1 high-severity, 1 medium-severity, 10 low-severity vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities	Severity	Status
User Can Burn Anyone's Tokens	CRITICAL	Acknowledged
Voter Can Vote Infinitely	CRITICAL	Acknowledged
User Can Mint All the Supply	CRITICAL	Acknowledged
Take all the referral fees	HIGH	Acknowledged
Votables Can Add Users The votable list	MEDIUM	Acknowledged
For Loop Over Dynamic Array	LOW	Acknowledged
Missing Address Verification	LOW	Acknowledged
Renounce Ownership	LOW	Acknowledged
Floating Pragma	LOW	Acknowledged
Renounce Ownership	LOW	Acknowledged
Floating Pragma	LOW	Acknowledged
Missing Address Verification	LOW	Acknowledged
Floating Pragma	LOW	Acknowledged
For Loop Over Dynamic Array	LOW	Acknowledged

Missing Address Verification	LOW	Acknowledged
------------------------------	-----	--------------

3 Finding Details

A CimpleDAO.sol

A.1 User Can Burn Anyone's Tokens [CRITICAL]

Description:

The following functions are missing a critical verification in the address argument. Concerning the payFeeByToken function, the user can provide any address to be the spender, and therefore he can burn any amount of any user's tokens. For the createStake function, the user can provide any address to be the staker, which means another user's Cimple tokens will be burned.

Code:

Listing 1: CimpleDAO.sol

```
function createStake(address staker, uint256 stake) public payable
       \hookrightarrow returns (bool) {
       require( stake <= balanceOf(staker, Cimple), 'Error stake amount
266
          \hookrightarrow must be >= holding amount of Cimple Token');
       (bool isStakeholder, uint256 s) = isStakeholder(staker);
268
       if(! isStakeholder) addStakeholder(staker, block.timestamp);
269
       else {
270
           StakeHolder memory stakeholder = stakeholders[s];
271
           uint256 rewardOfCMPG = 0;
272
           (rewardOfCMPG, , ) = calculateReward(staker, stakeholder.
273
              → holdTimeStamp, block.timestamp);
           mint(staker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, "0x000");
274
           tokenSupply[CMPG] = tokenSupply[CMPG].add(rewardOfCMPG);
           stakeholders[s].holdTimeStamp = block.timestamp;
277
       }
278
```

```
_burn(staker, Cimple, _stake);
279
       _mint(staker, stCimple, _stake, "0x000");
280
       tokenSupply[stCimple] = tokenSupply[stCimple].add(_stake);
281
       tokenSupply[Cimple] = tokenSupply[Cimple].sub( stake);
282
       tokenBurn[Cimple] = tokenBurn[Cimple].add(_stake);
283
       _addOrUpdateUserInfo(staker);
284
       emit StakingCimpleToken(staker, stCimple, stake);
       return true;
286
  }
287
```

Listing 2: CimpleDAO.sol

```
function payFeeByToken(address spender, uint256 cimpleAmount) public

    returns(bool) {
      require(cimpleAmount > 0, "Error, amount of pay must be > 0");
       _burn(spender, Cimple, cimpleAmount);
415
       tokenSupply[Cimple] = tokenSupply[Cimple].sub(cimpleAmount);
416
       tokenBurn[Cimple] = tokenBurn[Cimple].add(cimpleAmount);
417
       addOrUpdateUserInfo(spender);
418
       emit PayFee(spender, Cimple, cimpleAmount);
419
       return true;
420
  }
421
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 5 Impact – 5

Recommendation:

The staker and spender addresses should be replaced with msg.sender to make sure that the user can only spend/burn his own tokens.

Status - Acknowledged

A.2 Voter Can Vote Infinitely [CRITICAL]

Description:

The requestVoteAction function use an address coming from the arguments to identify the voter, which leaves the possibility of someone calling the function with different addresses and therefore getting an infinite number of votes.

Code:

Listing 3: CimpleDAO.sol

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 5

Impact - 4

Recommendation:

The voteaddress should be replaced with msg.sender to make sure that the user can only vote for himself.

Status - Acknowledged

A.3 Take all the referral fees [HIGH]

Description:

Any user can call the createAccount function to create a new account with any address and put his address as referralID, in addition to that he can also update the existent accounts putting his address as referredByID. That will make him get a percentage of all the fees paid by the referrals.

Code:

Listing 4: CimpleDAO.sol

Listing 5: CimpleDAO

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 4 Impact – 3

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use msg.sender instead of the userAddress argument to ensure that the user can only create/modify his account.

Status - Acknowledged

The Cimple team has acknowledged the risk.

A.4 Votables Can Add Users The votable list [MEDIUM]

Description:

The users that are included in the votablelist can include other users by transferring enough tokens to them to meet the condition, and they will be added once the _addOrUpdateUser-Info function gets called. Also, the mintRoleList users can also include anyone in votablelist using the mint function.

Code:

Listing 6: CimpleDAO.sol m function mint(address account, uint256 id, uint256 amount) public check mintable {

```
_mint(account, id, amount, "0x000");
tokenSupply[id] = tokenSupply[id].add(amount);
_addOrUpdateUserInfo(account);
}
```

Listing 7: CimpleDAO.sol

```
function addOrUpdateUserInfo(address userAddress) internal {
       (bool isUser, uint256 s) = isUser(userAddress);
181
       if( isUser){
182
           UserDetail storage tempUser = usersInfo[s];
183
           tempUser.cimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress, Cimple);
           tempUser.stCimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress, stCimple);
           tempUser.CMPGValue = balanceOf(userAddress, CMPG);
           if ((tempUser.CMPGValue*100)/tokenSupply[CMPG] > 10) {
187
              votablelist[userAddress] = true;
188
           }
189
           else {
190
              votablelist[userAddress] = false;
191
           }
192
           if ((tempUser.CMPGValue*100)/tokenSupply[CMPG] > 1) {
              votecreatablelist[userAddress] = true;
194
           }
195
           else {
196
              votecreatablelist[userAddress] = false;
197
           }
198
       }else{
199
           usersInfo.push(UserDetail(userAddress, 0, 0, 0 , "", ""));
200
       }
201
  }
202
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 3 Impact – 3

Recommendation:

It is recommended to call the _addOrUpdateUserInfo function in the _afterTokenTransfer to ensure that the votablelist gets updated after every transfer.

Status - Acknowledged

The Cimple team has acknowledged the risk.

A.5 For Loop Over Dynamic Array [LOW]

Description:

When smart contracts are deployed or their associated functions are invoked, the execution of these operations always consumes a certain quantity of gas, according to the amount of computation required to accomplish them. Modifying an unknown-size array that grows in size over time can result in a Denial-of-Service. Simply by having an excessively huge array, users can exceed the gas limit, therefore preventing the transaction from ever succeeding.

Code:

Listing 8: CimpleDAO.sol

Listing 9: CimpleDAO.sol

```
tokenSupply[ids[i]] = tokenSupply[ids[i]].add(amounts[i]);

add0rUpdateUserInfo(to);

add0rUpdateUserInfo(to);
```

Listing 10: CimpleDAO.sol

```
function isUser(address _address) public view returns(bool, uint256) {
    for (uint256 s = 0; s < usersInfo.length; s += 1) {
        if (_address == usersInfo[s].userAddress) return (true, s);
    }
    return (false, 0);
}</pre>
```

Listing 11: CimpleDAO.sol

```
function claimFirstCimpleForNFT(address userAddress, uint256 tokenID)

    public payable returns(bool){
       (uint256[] memory _tokenIDs, uint256[] memory _prices, ) = nftUtils.
427

    filterNftDetail( userAddress);
       bool _flag = false;
428
       uint256 selectedTokenPrice;
429
       for (uint256 i = 0; i < _tokenIDs.length; i += 1){</pre>
430
           if(_tokenID == _tokenIDs[i]){
431
              _flag = true;
432
              _selectedTokenPrice = _prices[i];
433
          }
434
       }
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 3 Impact – 2

Recommendation:

Avoid actions that involve looping across the entire data structure. If you really must loop over an array of unknown size, arrange for it to consume many blocs and thus multiple transactions.

Status - Acknowledged

The Cimple team has acknowledged the risk.

A.6 Missing Address Verification [LOW]

Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the address, the address-type argument should include a zero-address test, otherwise, some of the contract's functionality may become inaccessible.

Code:

Listing 12: CimpleDAO.sol

```
constructor(address _nftUtils, address _voteUtils) ERC1155("") {
    deployedStartTimeStamp = block.timestamp;
    nftUtils = NFTUtils(_nftUtils);
    voteUtils = VoteUtils(_voteUtils);
}
```

Risk Level:

```
Likelihood – 1
Impact – 3
```

Recommendation:

It is recommended to undertake further validation on the user-supplied data. The concerns can be resolved by utilizing a whitelist technique or a modifier.

Status - Acknowledged

The Cimple team has acknowledged the risk.

A.7 Renounce Ownership [LOW]

Description:

Typically, the contract's owner is the account that deploys the contract. As a result, the owner can perform certain privileged activities. The renounceOwnership function is used in smart contracts to renounce ownership. However, if the contract's ownership has never been transferred before renouncing it, it will never have an Owner, which may result in a denial of service.

Code:

Listing 13: CimpleDAO.sol

ontract CimpleDAO is ERC1155, Ownable {

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

It is advised that the Owner cannot call renounceOwnership without first transferring ownership to a different address. Additionally, if a multi-signature wallet is utilized, executing the renounceOwnership method will require two or more users to sign the transaction. Alternatively, the Renounce Ownership functionality can be disabled by overriding it.

Status - Acknowledged

A.8 Floating Pragma [LOW]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.0. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version and flags that were used during the testing process. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts are not unintentionally deployed using another pragma, such as an obsolete version, that may introduce issues in the contract system.

Code:

Listing 14: CimpleDAO.sol

```
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2 Impact – 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Acknowledged

B NFT.sol

B.1 User Can Mint All the Supply [CRITICAL]

Description:

The user can mint NFTs as much as he wants without any condition or an amount of Ether that he needs to pay. Thus, anyone can mint all the tokens available in the supply.

Code:

Listing 15: NFT.sol

```
function mintTo(address recipient)
      public
36
      payable
37
      returns (uint256)
38
  {
39
      uint256 tokenId = currentTokenId.current();
      require(tokenId < TOTAL SUPPLY, "Max supply reached");</pre>
41
      currentTokenId.increment();
42
      uint256 newItemId = currentTokenId.current();
43
      safeMint(recipient, newItemId);
44
      return newItemId;
45
46 }
```

Risk Level:

```
Likelihood – 2
Impact – 3
```

Recommendation:

Restrict the mint access to a specific entity or add some conditions to prevent unlimited minting.

Status - Acknowledged

The Cimple team has acknowledged the risk

B.2 Renounce Ownership [LOW]

Description:

Typically, the contract's owner is the account that deploys the contract. As a result, the owner can perform certain privileged activities. The renounceOwnership function is used in smart contracts to renounce ownership. However, if the contract's ownership has never been transferred before renouncing it, it will never have an Owner, which may result in a denial of service.

Code:

Listing 16: NFT.sol

9 contract NFT is ERC721Enumerable, PullPayment, Ownable

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

It is advised that the Owner cannot call renounceOwnership without first transferring ownership to a different address. Additionally, if a multi-signature wallet is utilized, executing the renounceOwnership method will require two or more users to sign the transaction. Alternatively, the Renounce Ownership functionality can be disabled by overriding it.

Status - Acknowledged

B.3 Floating Pragma [LOW]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.0. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version and flags that were used during the testing process. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts are not unintentionally deployed using another pragma, such as an obsolete version that may introduce issues in the contract system.

Code:

Listing 17: NFT.sol

```
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2 Impact – 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Acknowledged

C NFTUtils.sol

C.1 Missing Address Verification [LOW]

Description:

Avoid actions that involve looping across the entire data structure. If you really must loop over an array of unknown size, arrange for it to consume many blocs and thus multiple transactions.

Code:

Listing 18: NFTUtils.sol

```
constructor(address nftaddress) {
    CiMPLENFTaddress = nftaddress;
    owner = msg.sender;
}
```

Listing 19: NFTUtils

```
function changeOwner(address _newOwner) public {
    require(msg.sender == owner, 'failed');
    owner = _newOwner;
}
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

It is recommended to undertake further validation on the user-supplied data. The concerns can be resolved by utilizing a whitelist technique or a modifier.

Status - Acknowledged

The Cimple team has acknowledged the risk.

C.2 Floating Pragma [LOW]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.0. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version and flags that were used during the testing process. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts are not unintentionally deployed using another pragma, such as an obsolete version that may introduce issues in the contract system.

Code:

Listing 20: NFTUtils.sol

```
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2 Impact – 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Acknowledged

D VoteUtils.sol

D.1 For Loop Over Dynamic Array [LOW]

Description:

When smart contracts are deployed or their associated functions are invoked, the execution of these operations always consumes a certain quantity of gas, according to the amount of computation required to accomplish them. Modifying an unknown-size array that grows in size over time can result in a Denial-of-Service. Simply by having an excessively huge array, users can exceed the gas limit, therefore preventing the transaction from ever succeeding.

Code:

Listing 21: VoteUtils.sol

```
66 function _checkVoteAddress(address p_voteaddress, address[] memory
    bool checkflag = false;
67
    for (uint i = 0; i 
68
    {
69
       if (p voters[i] == p voteaddress) {
          checkflag = true;
       }
72
    }
73
    return checkflag;
75 }
```

Risk Level:

```
Likelihood – 3
Impact – 2
```

Recommendation:

Avoid actions that involve looping across the entire data structure. If you really must loop over an array of unknown size, arrange for it to consume many blocs and thus multiple transactions.

Status - Acknowledged

The Cimple team has acknowledged the risk.

D.2 Missing Address Verification [LOW]

Description:

Avoid actions that involve looping across the entire data structure. If you really must loop over an array of unknown size, arrange for it to consume many blocs and thus multiple transactions.

Code:

Listing 22: VoteUtils.sol

```
function changeOwner(address _newOwner) public {
    require(msg.sender == owner, 'failed');
    owner = _newOwner;
}
```

Risk Level:

```
Likelihood – 1
Impact – 3
```

Recommendation:

It is recommended to undertake further validation on the user-supplied data. The concerns can be resolved by utilizing a whitelist technique or a modifier.

Status - Acknowledged

4 Best Practices

BP.1 Unnecessary variable initialization:

Description:

When a variable is declared in solidity, it gets initialized with its type's default value. Thus, there is no need to initialize a variable with the default value.

Code:

```
Listing 23: CimpleDAO.sol
 uint256 public constant Cimple = 0;
Listing 24: CimpleDAO.sol
uint256 public votablelistcounter = 0;
Listing 25: CimpleDAO.sol
uint256 public votecreatablelistcounter = 0;
Listing 26: CimpleDAO.sol
uint256 rewardOfCMPG = 0;
Listing 27: CimpleDAO.sol
uint256 rewardOfCMPG = 0;
Listing 28: CimpleDAO.sol
428 bool flag = false;
Listing 29: VoteUtils.sol
67 bool checkflag = false;
```

BP.2 Payable Functions That Do Not Require ETH transfer:

Description:

Functions that do not require ETH transfer should not be declared as payable.

Code:

Listing 30: CimpleDAO.sol

Listing 31: CimpleDAO.sol

Listing 32: CimpleDAO.sol

```
UserDetail storage tempUser = usersInfo[s];
214
         tempUser.cimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress, Cimple);
215
         tempUser.stCimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress, stCimple);
216
         tempUser.CMPGValue = balanceOf(userAddress, CMPG);
217
         tempUser.referredBy = referredByID;
218
         emit UpdatedUserInfo(userAddress, tempUser.cimpleValue, tempUser.
            \hookrightarrow referredByID);
      }
220
      return true:
221
222
```

Listing 33: CimpleDAO.sol

Listing 34: CimpleDAO.sol

Listing 35: CimpleDAO.sol

Listing 36: CimpleDAO.sol

Listing 37: NFTUtils.sol

Listing 38: NFTUtils.sol

```
function increaseNftAwardListCount() external payable isOwner {
    nftAwardListCount++;
}
```

BP.3 Two Loops Can Be Reduced to One

Description:

The _mintBatch and _burnBatch functions in the ERC1155 implementations contain a loop over the ids array. Here in the mintBatch and the burnBatch functions a loop over ids is added to the logic, meanwhile the logic can be implemented using one loop.

Code:

Listing 39: CimpleDAO.sol

Listing 40: CimpleDAO.sol

BP.4 Loop Can Be Avoided Using a Mapping:

Description:

The loop here is unnecessary, a mapping can be used instead to find out if a user has already created an account. The code in this case will be more efficient and consumes less gaz.

Code:

Listing 41: CimpleDAO.sol

```
function isUser(address _address) public view returns(bool, uint256) {
    for (uint256 s = 0; s < usersInfo.length; s += 1) {
        if (_address == usersInfo[s].userAddress) return (true, s);
    }
    return (false, 0);
}</pre>
```

BP.5 Add A Break When Address Is Found:

Description:

There is a missing break after finding the $p_voteaddress$ to reduce the number of iterations.

Code:

Listing 42: VoteUtils.sol

5 Static Analysis (Slither)

Description:

ShellBoxes expanded the coverage of the specific contract areas using automated testing methodologies. Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework, was one of the tools used. Slither was run on all-scoped contracts in both text and binary formats. This tool can be used to test mathematical relationships between Solidity instances statically and variables that allow for the detection of errors or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs throughout the entire codebase.

Results:

```
Compilation warnings/errors on contracts/CimpleDAO.sol:
Warning: Contract code size is 36349 bytes and exceeds 24576 bytes (a
   \hookrightarrow limit introduced in Spurious Dragon). This contract may not be
   \hookrightarrow deployable on mainnet. Consider enabling the optimizer (with a

    → low "runs" value!), turning off revert strings, or using

   \hookrightarrow libraries.
 --> contracts/CimpleDAO.sol:9:1:
9 | contract CimpleDAO is ERC1155, Ownable { // [+] Renounce Ownership
  | ^ (Relevant source part starts here and spans across multiple lines)
CimpleDAO.calculateCimpleIR(uint256) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#136-171)
   \hookrightarrow performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
       -temp = additionalDailyRatePerYear[i - 1] * 175 / 100 (contracts/
           \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#155)
       -temp = temp * 9810837779 / 1e10 (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#157)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #divide-before-multiply
```

```
CimpleDAO.isStakeholder(address) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#241-246) uses
   \hookrightarrow a dangerous strict equality:
       - _address == stakeholders[s].holderAddress (contracts/CimpleDAO.
          \hookrightarrow sol#243)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #dangerous-strict-equalities

Contract locking ether found:
       Contract CimpleDAO (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#9-475) has payable
          \hookrightarrow functions:
        - CimpleDAO.requestVoteProposal(address, string, uint256, uint256)
           - CimpleDAO.createAccount(address, string) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
           \hookrightarrow sol#201-208)
        - CimpleDAO.updateUserInfo(address, string) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
           \hookrightarrow sol#209-220)
        - CimpleDAO.createStake(address,uint256) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
           \hookrightarrow sol#265-287)
        - CimpleDAO.removeStake(address,uint256) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
           \hookrightarrow sol#288-314)
        - CimpleDAO.payFee() (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#399-412)
        - CimpleDAO.claimFirstCimpleForNFT(address,uint256) (contracts/
           \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#422-444)
        - CimpleDAO.claimRewardStreamingForNFT(address, uint256) (
           But does not have a function to withdraw the ether
Contract locking ether found:
       Contract NFTUtils (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#7-178) has payable
          \hookrightarrow functions:
        - NFTUtils.setNftAwardList(uint256,bool) (contracts/NFTUtils.sol
           \hookrightarrow #45-47)
        - NFTUtils.increaseNftAwardListCount() (contracts/NFTUtils.sol
```

```
- NFTUtils.addNFTUsersInfo(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/
          \hookrightarrow NFTUtils.sol#80-85)
      But does not have a function to withdraw the ether
Contract locking ether found:
      Contract VoteUtils (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#4-97) has payable
         \hookrightarrow functions:
       - VoteUtils.makeproposal(address, string, uint256, uint256) (
          But does not have a function to withdraw the ether
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #contracts-that-lock-ether

Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.createStake(address, uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#265-287):
      External calls:
      - mint(staker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #274)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - _burn(staker,Cimple,_stake) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#279)
             - _balances[id][from] = fromBalance - amount (node_modules
                \hookrightarrow #349)
      - stakeholders[s].holdTimeStamp = block.timestamp (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#277)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.createStake(address,uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#265-287):
      External calls:
      - mint(staker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #274)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
```

```
\hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      - mint(staker,stCimple, stake,0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
        \hookrightarrow #280)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - mint(staker,stCimple, stake,0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
        - balances[id][to] += amount (node modules/@openzeppelin/
               - tokenSupply[stCimple] = tokenSupply[stCimple].add( stake) (
        - tokenSupply[Cimple] = tokenSupply[Cimple].sub( stake) (
        Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.removeStake(address,uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#288-314):
      External calls:
      - mint(unstaker,Cimple, stake,0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
        \hookrightarrow #296)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      - mint(unstaker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
        \hookrightarrow sol#300)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - _mint(unstaker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
        \hookrightarrow sol#300)
            - balances[id][to] += amount (node modules/@openzeppelin/
               - removeStakeholder(unstaker) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#303)
```

```
- stakeholders[s] = stakeholders[stakeholders.length - 1]
               - stakeholders.pop() (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#255)
      - stakeholders[s].holdTimeStamp = block.timestamp (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#305)
      - tokenSupply[CMPG] = tokenSupply[CMPG].add(rewardOfCMPG) (
         Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1

ERC1155. doSafeBatchTransferAcceptanceCheck(address,address,address,

    uint256[],uint256[],bytes).response (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   \hookrightarrow never initialized
ERC1155. doSafeTransferAcceptanceCheck(address,address,address,uint256,
   \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476) is a local variable never
   \hookrightarrow initialized
ERC1155. doSafeTransferAcceptanceCheck(address,address,address,uint256,
   \hookrightarrow /ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#480) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155. doSafeBatchTransferAcceptanceCheck(address,address,address,

    uint256[],uint256[],bytes).reason (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
   \hookrightarrow never initialized
CimpleDAO.claimFirstCimpleForNFT(address,uint256). selectedTokenPrice (
   \hookrightarrow contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#425) is a local variable never
   \hookrightarrow initialized
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #uninitialized-local-variables

CimpleDAO.claimRewardStreamingForNFT(address, uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#445-473) ignores return value by nftUtils.

    addNFTUsersInfo( address, tokenID,block.timestamp) (contracts/
```

```
\hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#454)
ERC1155. doSafeTransferAcceptanceCheck(address,address,address,uint256,

    uint256,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/
   \hookrightarrow ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#467-486) ignores return value by

→ IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id, amount,
   \hookrightarrow .sol#476-484)
ERC1155. doSafeBatchTransferAcceptanceCheck(address,address,address,

    uint256[],uint256[],bytes) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/

   \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#488-509) ignores return value by

→ amounts,data) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155)

   \hookrightarrow /ERC1155.sol#497-507)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #unused-return

NFTUtils.changeOwner(address) (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#29-32) should emit
   \hookrightarrow an event for:
       - owner = newOwner (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#31)
VoteUtils.changeOwner(address) (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#29-32) should
   \hookrightarrow emit an event for:
       - owner = newOwner (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#31)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
   NFTUtils.constructor(address).nftaddress (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#24)
   \hookrightarrow lacks a zero-check on :
             - CiMPLENFTaddress = nftaddress (contracts/NFTUtils.sol
NFTUtils.changeOwner(address)._newOwner (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#29)
   \hookrightarrow lacks a zero-check on :
              - owner = newOwner (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#31)
VoteUtils.changeOwner(address). newOwner (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#29)
   \hookrightarrow lacks a zero-check on :
```

```
- owner = newOwner (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#31)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #missing-zero-address-validation

Variable 'ERC1155. doSafeTransferAcceptanceCheck(address,address,address
 \hookrightarrow ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#467-486) potentially used before declaration:

→ node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol

 \hookrightarrow #477)
Variable 'ERC1155. doSafeTransferAcceptanceCheck(address,address,address
 \hookrightarrow ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#467-486) potentially used before declaration:
 \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#481)
Variable 'ERC1155. doSafeBatchTransferAcceptanceCheck(address,address,

    address,uint256[],uint256[],bytes).response (node_modules/
 ⇔ @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#498)' in

→ address, uint256[], uint256[], bytes) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
 \hookrightarrow before declaration: response != IERC1155Receiver.

→ onERC1155BatchReceived.selector (node modules/@openzeppelin/
 Variable 'ERC1155. doSafeBatchTransferAcceptanceCheck(address, address,

→ address, uint256[], uint256[], bytes).reason (node modules/
 ⇔ @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#503)' in
```

```
    → address, uint256[], uint256[], bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/

→ before declaration: revert(string)(reason) (node_modules/
  Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #pre-declaration-usage-of-local-variables
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.claimFirstCimpleForNFT(address, uint256) (

    contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#422-444):
      External calls:
      - mint(userAddress,Cimple, rewardCimpleAmount,0x000) (contracts
        \hookrightarrow /CimpleDAO.sol#436)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
              \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - tokenSupply[Cimple] = tokenSupply[Cimple].add(

    rewardCimpleAmount) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#437)

      - addOrUpdateUserInfo( userAddress) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
        \hookrightarrow #438)
            - tempUser.cimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,Cimple) (
              - tempUser.stCimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,stCimple)
              - tempUser.CMPGValue = balanceOf(userAddress,CMPG) (
              - usersInfo.push(UserDetail(userAddress,0,0,0,,)) (
              - addOrUpdateUserInfo( userAddress) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
        \hookrightarrow #438)
            - votablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
              \hookrightarrow #186)
            - votablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/CimpleDAO.
              \hookrightarrow sol#189)
```

```
- _addOrUpdateUserInfo(_userAddress) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #438)
            - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/
               \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#192)
            - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/
               \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#195)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.claimRewardStreamingForNFT(address, uint256) (
  \hookrightarrow contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#445-473):
      External calls:
      - nftUtils.addNFTUsersInfo( address, tokenID, block.timestamp) (
         - nftUtils.setNFTUsersInfoByIndex(s,block.timestamp) (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#460)
      - mint( address, Cimple, amountOfReward, 0x000) (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#465)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - tokenSupply[Cimple] = tokenSupply[Cimple].add( amountOfReward)
         - _addOrUpdateUserInfo(_address) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#468)
            - tempUser.cimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,Cimple) (
               - tempUser.stCimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,stCimple)
               - tempUser.CMPGValue = balanceOf(userAddress,CMPG) (
               - usersInfo.push(UserDetail(userAddress,0,0,0,,)) (
               - addOrUpdateUserInfo( address) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#468)
            - votablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
```

```
- votablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/CimpleDAO.
                \hookrightarrow sol#189)
      - _addOrUpdateUserInfo(_address) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#468)
             - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/
                \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#192)
             - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/
                \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#195)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.createStake(address, uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#265-287):
      External calls:
      - mint(staker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #274)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - tokenSupply[CMPG] = tokenSupply[CMPG].add(rewardOfCMPG) (
         Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.createStake(address,uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#265-287):
      External calls:
      - mint(staker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #274)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      - mint(staker,stCimple,_stake,0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - tokenBurn[Cimple] = tokenBurn[Cimple].add( stake) (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#283)
```

```
- _addOrUpdateUserInfo(staker) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#284)
            - tempUser.cimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,Cimple) (
               - tempUser.stCimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,stCimple)
               - tempUser.CMPGValue = balanceOf(userAddress,CMPG) (
               - usersInfo.push(UserDetail(userAddress,0,0,0,,)) (
               - addOrUpdateUserInfo(staker) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#284)
            - votablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
               \hookrightarrow #186)
            - votablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/CimpleDAO.
               \hookrightarrow sol#189)
      - addOrUpdateUserInfo(staker) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#284)
            - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/
               \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#192)
            - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/
               \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#195)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.mint(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#110-114):
      External calls:
      - _mint(account,id,amount,0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#111)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - tokenSupply[id] = tokenSupply[id].add(amount) (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#112)
      - _addOrUpdateUserInfo(account) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#113)
            - tempUser.cimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,Cimple) (
               - tempUser.stCimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,stCimple)
```

```
- tempUser.CMPGValue = balanceOf(userAddress,CMPG) (
             - usersInfo.push(UserDetail(userAddress,0,0,0,,)) (
             - _addOrUpdateUserInfo(account) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#113)
           - votablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
             - votablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/CimpleDAO.
             \hookrightarrow sol#189)
     - addOrUpdateUserInfo(account) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#113)
           - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/
             \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#192)
           - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/
             \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#195)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.mintBatch(address,uint256[],uint256[],bytes) (
  External calls:
     - mintBatch(to,ids,amounts,data) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#116)
           - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155BatchReceived(operator,
             State variables written after the call(s):
     - tokenSupply[ids[i]] = tokenSupply[ids[i]].add(amounts[i]) (
        - _addOrUpdateUserInfo(to) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#120)
           - tempUser.cimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,Cimple) (
             - tempUser.stCimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,stCimple)
             - tempUser.CMPGValue = balanceOf(userAddress,CMPG) (
             - usersInfo.push(UserDetail(userAddress,0,0,0,,)) (
             - addOrUpdateUserInfo(to) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#120)
```

```
- votablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
               - votablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/CimpleDAO.
               \hookrightarrow sol#189)
      - addOrUpdateUserInfo(to) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#120)
            - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/
               \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#192)
            - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/
               \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#195)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.payFee() (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#399-412):
      External calls:
      - mint(msg.sender,Cimple,cimpleCountForValue,0x000) (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#407)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - tokenSupply[Cimple] = tokenSupply[Cimple].add(
         - _addOrUpdateUserInfo(msg.sender) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#409)
            - tempUser.cimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,Cimple) (
               - tempUser.stCimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,stCimple)
               - tempUser.CMPGValue = balanceOf(userAddress,CMPG) (
               - usersInfo.push(UserDetail(userAddress,0,0,0,,)) (
               - addOrUpdateUserInfo(msg.sender) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#409)
            - votablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
               \hookrightarrow #186)
            - votablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/CimpleDAO.
               \hookrightarrow sol#189)
      - addOrUpdateUserInfo(msg.sender) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#409)
```

```
- votecreatablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/
                \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#192)
             - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/
                \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#195)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.removeStake(address, uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#288-314):
      External calls:
      - mint(unstaker,Cimple, stake,0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #296)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.so1#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - tokenBurn[stCimple] = tokenBurn[stCimple].add( stake) (
         - tokenSupply[stCimple] = tokenSupply[stCimple].sub( stake) (
         - tokenSupply[Cimple] = tokenSupply[Cimple].add( stake) (
         Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.removeStake(address, uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#288-314):
      External calls:
      - _mint(unstaker,Cimple,_stake,0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #296)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      - _mint(unstaker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
         \hookrightarrow sol#300)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      State variables written after the call(s):
      - addOrUpdateUserInfo(unstaker) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#307)
```

```
- tempUser.cimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,Cimple) (
                - tempUser.stCimpleValue = balanceOf(userAddress,stCimple)
                - tempUser.CMPGValue = balanceOf(userAddress,CMPG) (
                - usersInfo.push(UserDetail(userAddress,0,0,0,,)) (
                - addOrUpdateUserInfo(unstaker) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#307)
             - votablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
                - votablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/CimpleDAO.
                \hookrightarrow sol#189)
      - addOrUpdateUserInfo(unstaker) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#307)
             - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = true (contracts/
                \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#192)
             - votecreatablelist[userAddress] = false (contracts/
                \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#195)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.claimFirstCimpleForNFT(address, uint256) (

    contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#422-444):
      External calls:
      - _mint(_userAddress,Cimple,_rewardCimpleAmount,0x000) (contracts
         \hookrightarrow /CimpleDAO.sol#436)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      - nftUtils.setNftAwardList(_tokenID,true) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
         \hookrightarrow sol#440)
      - nftUtils.increaseNftAwardListCount() (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #441)
      Event emitted after the call(s):
```

```
- ClaimRewardFirstCimpleForNFT( userAddress, tokenID,

    rewardCimpleAmount) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#442)

Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.claimRewardStreamingForNFT(address, uint256) (
   External calls:
      - nftUtils.addNFTUsersInfo(_address,_tokenID,block.timestamp) (
         - nftUtils.setNFTUsersInfoByIndex(s,block.timestamp) (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#460)
      - mint(address, Cimple, amountOfReward, 0x000) (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#465)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      Event emitted after the call(s):
      - ClaimRewardStreamingForNFT( address, tokenID, amountOfReward) (
         - TransferSingle(operator,address(0),to,id,amount) (node modules/
         ⇔ @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#281)
             - _mint(_address,Cimple,_amountOfReward,0x000) (contracts/
                \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#465)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.createStake(address, uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#265-287):
      External calls:
      - mint(staker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #274)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      Event emitted after the call(s):
      - TransferSingle(operator, from, address(0), id, amount) (

    → node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/ERC1155

         \hookrightarrow .sol#352)
```

```
- _burn(staker,Cimple,_stake) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
                 Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.createStake(address, uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#265-287):
      External calls:
       - _mint(staker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
          \hookrightarrow #274)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                 \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
       - mint(staker,stCimple, stake,0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
          \hookrightarrow #280)
             - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
                 \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
       Event emitted after the call(s):
       - StakingCimpleToken(staker,stCimple, stake) (contracts/CimpleDAO
          \hookrightarrow .sol#285)
       - TransferSingle(operator,address(0),to,id,amount) (node modules/
          - mint(staker,stCimple, stake,0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO
                 \hookrightarrow .sol#280)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.payFee() (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#399-412):
      External calls:
       - _mint(msg.sender,Cimple,cimpleCountForValue,0x000) (contracts/
          \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#407)
              - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,

    → amount, data) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/

                 \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
       Event emitted after the call(s):
       - PayFee(msg.sender,Cimple,cimpleCountForValue) (contracts/
          \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#410)
Reentrancy in CimpleDAO.removeStake(address,uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#288-314):
```

```
External calls:
      - mint(unstaker,Cimple, stake,Ox000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
         \hookrightarrow #296)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      - mint(unstaker, CMPG, rewardOfCMPG, 0x000) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
         \hookrightarrow sol#300)
            - IERC1155Receiver(to).onERC1155Received(operator, from, id,
               \hookrightarrow token/ERC1155/ERC1155.sol#476-484)
      Event emitted after the call(s):
      - TransferSingle(operator,address(0),to,id,amount) (node modules/
         - mint(unstaker,CMPG,rewardOfCMPG,0x000) (contracts/
               \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#300)
      - UnstakingCimpleToken(unstaker,Cimple, stake) (contracts/
         \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#308)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
   CimpleDAO.calculateCimpleIR(uint256) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#136-171)
   \hookrightarrow uses timestamp for comparisons
      Dangerous comparisons:
      - require(bool,string)(deployedStartTimeStamp < _currentTimeStamp</pre>
         \hookrightarrow ,Error, selected date is lower than token publish date) (
         - usedYearCount > 30 (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#148)
      - usedYearCount < uint256(1) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#151)</pre>
      - i <= usedYearCount (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#154)</pre>
      - cimpleIR >= 1e18 (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#167)
CimpleDAO.isStakeholder(address) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#241-246) uses
   Dangerous comparisons:
```

```
- s < stakeholders.length (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#242)
       - address == stakeholders[s].holderAddress (contracts/CimpleDAO.
          \hookrightarrow sol#243)
CimpleDAO.totalStakes() (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#258-264) uses timestamp
   \hookrightarrow for comparisons
       Dangerous comparisons:
       - s < stakeholders.length (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#260)
CimpleDAO.totalRewards() (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#315-321) uses
   Dangerous comparisons:
       - s < stakeholders.length (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#317)
CimpleDAO.calculateReward(address, uint256, uint256) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
   \hookrightarrow sol#322-351) uses timestamp for comparisons
       Dangerous comparisons:
       - nowTimeStamp > holdTimeStamp && holdTimeStamp >=

    deployedStartTimeStamp (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#323)

       - holdPeriodDayCount > 0 (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#335)
       - index < _holdPeriodDayCount (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#336)</pre>
CimpleDAO. calculateDailySupplyOfCMPG(uint256) (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol
   \hookrightarrow #365-377) uses timestamp for comparisons
       Dangerous comparisons:
       - _days >= 1 (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#370)
       - index < _days (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#371)</pre>
CimpleDAO. calculateDistributionPercentOfCMPG(address) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#378-387) uses timestamp for comparisons
       Dangerous comparisons:
       - stakeholders.length > 0 && _isStakeHolder (contracts/CimpleDAO.
          \hookrightarrow sol#380)
CimpleDAO.getStakeHolders() (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#388-398) uses

    → timestamp for comparisons

       Dangerous comparisons:
       - s < stakeholders.length (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#392)
CimpleDAO.claimRewardStreamingForNFT(address, uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#445-473) uses timestamp for comparisons
```

```
Dangerous comparisons:
       - rate > 0 (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#448)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #block-timestamp

Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
   - INLINE ASM (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.
          \hookrightarrow sol#213-216)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
   CimpleDAO.claimFirstCimpleForNFT(address, uint256) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
   \hookrightarrow sol#422-444) compares to a boolean constant:
       -require(bool, string)(nftUtils.getNftAwardList( tokenID) == false
          \hookrightarrow && flag, This user is not available for this rewards.) (
          CimpleDAO.claimRewardStreamingForNFT(address, uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#445-473) compares to a boolean constant:
       - isNftUser == false (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#453)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
   \hookrightarrow #boolean-equality
Different versions of Solidity are used:
       - Version used: ['^0.8.0', '^0.8.1']
       - ^0.8.0 (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#2)
       - ABIEncoderV2 (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#3)
       - ^0.8.0 (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#2)
       - ^0.8.0 (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#2)
       - ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol
       - ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/
          \hookrightarrow ERC1155.sol#4)
```

```
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/
         \hookrightarrow IERC1155.sol#4)
      - ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/
          - ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155/

    ⇔ extensions/IERC1155MetadataURI.sol#4)

      - ^0.8.1 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol
         \hookrightarrow #4)
      - ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol
      - ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/

    introspection/ERC165.sol#4)

      - ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/

    introspection/IERC165.sol#4)

      - ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/
         \hookrightarrow SafeMath.sol#4)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #different-pragma-directives-are-used
CimpleDAO.singleAddressToMintableRoleList(address) (contracts/CimpleDAO.
   \hookrightarrow sol#87-94) has costly operations inside a loop:
      - totalMintRoleList ++ (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#91)
CimpleDAO.removeAddressFromMintableRoleList(address) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#100-106) has costly operations inside a loop:
      - totalMintRoleList -- (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#104)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #costly-operations-inside-a-loop
Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   \hookrightarrow removed
Address.functionCall(address,bytes,string) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   \hookrightarrow removed
```

```
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (node_modules/
  \hookrightarrow and should be removed
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (
  → node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#128-139)
  \hookrightarrow is never used and should be removed
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
  ← contracts/utils/Address.sol#174-176) is never used and should be
  \hookrightarrow removed
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (node modules/
  \hookrightarrow and should be removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address, bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
  \hookrightarrow removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (node modules/
  \hookrightarrow and should be removed
Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts
  \hookrightarrow /utils/Address.sol#60-65) is never used and should be removed
Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
  \hookrightarrow removed
Context. msgData() (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.
  \hookrightarrow sol#21-23) is never used and should be removed
NFTUtils.removeNFTUsersInfo(address,uint256) (contracts/NFTUtils.sol
  \hookrightarrow #87-94) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
  \hookrightarrow should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256,string) (node modules/@openzeppelin/

→ contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol#217-226) is never used and

  \hookrightarrow should be removed
```

```
SafeMath.sub(uint256,uint256,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
   \hookrightarrow should be removed
SafeMath.tryAdd(uint256,uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
   \hookrightarrow utils/math/SafeMath.sol#22-28) is never used and should be
   \hookrightarrow removed
SafeMath.tryDiv(uint256,uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
   \hookrightarrow utils/math/SafeMath.sol#64-69) is never used and should be
   \hookrightarrow removed
SafeMath.tryMod(uint256,uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
   \hookrightarrow utils/math/SafeMath.sol#76-81) is never used and should be
   \hookrightarrow removed
SafeMath.tryMul(uint256,uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
   \hookrightarrow utils/math/SafeMath.sol#47-57) is never used and should be
   \hookrightarrow removed
SafeMath.trySub(uint256,uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
   \hookrightarrow removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
   Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/
   \hookrightarrow Ownable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155
   \hookrightarrow /ERC1155.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155
   \hookrightarrow /IERC1155.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155
   Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC1155

→ /extensions/IERC1155MetadataURI.sol#4) allows old versions
```

```
Pragma version 0.8.1 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address
   \hookrightarrow .sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context
   \hookrightarrow .sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
   \hookrightarrow introspection/ERC165.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
   \hookrightarrow introspection/IERC165.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/
   \hookrightarrow SafeMath.sol#4) allows old versions
solc-0.8.12 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #incorrect-versions-of-solidity
Variable CimpleDAO.calculateReward(address,uint256,uint256). stakeholder
   \hookrightarrow (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#322) is too similar to CimpleDAO.
   Variable CimpleDAO.removeStakeholder(address). stakeholder (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow CimpleDAO.sol#251) is too similar to CimpleDAO.stakeholders (
   Variable CimpleDAO.addStakeholder(address, uint256)._stakeholder (
   Variable CimpleDAO.testCalculateReward(address, uint256). stakeholder (
   \hookrightarrow contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#352) is too similar to CimpleDAO.
   Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #variable-names-are-too-similar

CimpleDAO.oneSecondTimeStamp (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#23) is never used
   Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #unused-state-variable
```

```
CimpleDAO.votablelistcounter (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#43) should be
  \hookrightarrow constant
CimpleDAO.votecreatablelistcounter (contracts/CimpleDAO.sol#45) should
  \hookrightarrow be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant

contracts/CimpleDAO.sol analyzed (14 contracts with 75 detectors), 96
  \hookrightarrow result(s) found
ERC721. checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) (

→ node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol

  \hookrightarrow #394-416) ignores return value by IERC721Receiver(to).

→ onERC721Received( msgSender(), from, tokenId, data) (node modules/)

  Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #unused-return

Variable 'ERC721. checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes).

    → retval (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.

⇒ sol#401)' in ERC721. checkOnERC721Received(address, address,

  \hookrightarrow /ERC721.sol#394-416) potentially used before declaration: retval
  Variable 'ERC721. checkOnERC721Received(address, address, uint256, bytes).

    → reason (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.

  \hookrightarrow /ERC721.sol#394-416) potentially used before declaration: reason.
  \hookrightarrow ERC721.sol#404)
Variable 'ERC721. checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes).
```

```
\hookrightarrow uint256, uint256)(32 + reason, mload(uint256)(reason)) (

→ node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#409)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #pre-declaration-usage-of-local-variables
Reentrancy in Escrow.withdraw(address) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   External calls:
      - payee.sendValue(payment) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/

    utils/escrow/Escrow.sol#63)

      Event emitted after the call(s):
      - Withdrawn(payee, payment) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/

    utils/escrow/Escrow.sol#65)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  ERC721. checkOnERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) (

→ node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol

  \hookrightarrow #394-416) uses assembly
      - INLINE ASM (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
        \hookrightarrow ERC721.sol#408-410)
Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
  - INLINE ASM (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.
        \hookrightarrow sol#213-216)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  Different versions of Solidity are used:
      - Version used: ['^0.8.0', '^0.8.1']
      - ^0.8.0 (contracts/NFT.sol#2)
```

```
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol
   \hookrightarrow #4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/security/
   \hookrightarrow PullPayment.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   \hookrightarrow ERC721.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   \hookrightarrow IERC721.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   \hookrightarrow IERC721Receiver.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/

    extensions/ERC721Enumerable.sol#4)

- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   - ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   - ^0.8.1 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol
   \hookrightarrow #4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Counters.sol
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol
   \hookrightarrow #4)
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/escrow/
   \hookrightarrow Escrow.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
   \hookrightarrow introspection/ERC165.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
   \hookrightarrow introspection/IERC165.sol#4)
```

```
Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
  \hookrightarrow removed
Address.functionCall(address,bytes,string) (node modules/@openzeppelin/

→ contracts/utils/Address.sol#95-101) is never used and should be

  \hookrightarrow removed
Address.functionCallWithValue(address, bytes, uint256) (node modules/
  \hookrightarrow and should be removed
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (

→ node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#128-139)

  \hookrightarrow is never used and should be removed
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (node modules/@openzeppelin/

→ contracts/utils/Address.sol#174-176) is never used and should be

  \hookrightarrow removed
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (node modules/
  \hookrightarrow and should be removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
  \hookrightarrow removed
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (node_modules/
  \hookrightarrow and should be removed
Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
  \hookrightarrow removed
Context._msgData() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.
  \hookrightarrow sol#21-23) is never used and should be removed
Counters.decrement(Counters.Counter) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
  \hookrightarrow removed
Counters.reset(Counters.Counter) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
  \hookrightarrow utils/Counters.sol#40-42) is never used and should be removed
```

```
ERC721. baseURI() (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   \hookrightarrow ERC721.sol#105-107) is never used and should be removed
ERC721._burn(uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721
   \hookrightarrow /ERC721.sol#303-317) is never used and should be removed
PullPayment._asyncTransfer(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
   \hookrightarrow should be removed
Strings.toHexString(address) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils
   \hookrightarrow /Strings.sol#72-74) is never used and should be removed
Strings.toHexString(uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils
   \hookrightarrow /Strings.sol#41-52) is never used and should be removed
Strings.toHexString(uint256,uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   \hookrightarrow contracts/utils/Strings.sol#57-67) is never used and should be
   \hookrightarrow removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #dead-code

Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/NFT.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/
   \hookrightarrow Ownable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/security/
   \hookrightarrow PullPayment.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   \hookrightarrow ERC721.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   \hookrightarrow IERC721.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   \hookrightarrow extensions/ERC721Enumerable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/
   \hookrightarrow extensions/IERC721Enumerable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/

    ⇔ extensions/IERC721Metadata.sol#4) allows old versions
```

```
Pragma version 0.8.1 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address
   \hookrightarrow .sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context
   \hookrightarrow .sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
   \hookrightarrow Counters.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings
   \hookrightarrow .sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/escrow/
   \hookrightarrow Escrow.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
   \hookrightarrow introspection/ERC165.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
   solc-0.8.12 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #incorrect-versions-of-solidity

contracts/NFT.sol analyzed (16 contracts with 75 detectors), 43 result(s
   \hookrightarrow ) found
Contract locking ether found:
       Contract NFTUtils (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#7-178) has payable
           \hookrightarrow functions:
        - NFTUtils.setNftAwardList(uint256,bool) (contracts/NFTUtils.sol
           \hookrightarrow #45-47)
        - NFTUtils.increaseNftAwardListCount() (contracts/NFTUtils.sol
            \hookrightarrow #50-52)
        - NFTUtils.addNFTUsersInfo(address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/
            \hookrightarrow NFTUtils.sol#80-85)
       But does not have a function to withdraw the ether
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #contracts-that-lock-ether
```

```
NFTUtils.changeOwner(address) (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#29-32) should emit
   \hookrightarrow an event for:
       - owner = _newOwner (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#31)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #missing-events-access-control

NFTUtils.constructor(address).nftaddress (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#24)
   \hookrightarrow lacks a zero-check on :
              - CiMPLENFTaddress = nftaddress (contracts/NFTUtils.sol
NFTUtils.changeOwner(address). newOwner (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#29)
   \hookrightarrow lacks a zero-check on :
              - owner = newOwner (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#31)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #missing-zero-address-validation

NFTUtils.removeNFTUsersInfo(address,uint256) (contracts/NFTUtils.sol
   \hookrightarrow #87-94) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
   Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/NFTUtils.sol#2) allows old versions
solc-0.8.12 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #incorrect-versions-of-solidity
contracts/NFTUtils.sol analyzed (2 contracts with 75 detectors), 7
   \hookrightarrow result(s) found
Contract locking ether found:
       Contract VoteUtils (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#4-97) has payable
          \hookrightarrow functions:
        - VoteUtils.makeproposal(address, string, uint256, uint256) (
```

```
But does not have a function to withdraw the ether
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #contracts-that-lock-ether

VoteUtils.changeOwner(address) (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#29-32) should
   \hookrightarrow emit an event for:
       - owner = newOwner (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#31)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
   VoteUtils.changeOwner(address). newOwner (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#29)
   \hookrightarrow lacks a zero-check on :
              - owner = newOwner (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#31)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #missing-zero-address-validation

Pragma version^0.8.0 (contracts/VoteUtils.sol#2) allows old versions
solc-0.8.12 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #incorrect-versions-of-solidity
contracts/VoteUtils.sol analyzed (1 contracts with 75 detectors), 5
   \hookrightarrow result(s) found
```

Conclusion:

Most of the vulnerabilities found by the analysis have already been addressed by the smart contract code review.

6 Conclusion

In this audit, we examined the design and implementation of CimpleDAO contract and discovered several issues of varying severity. CimpleDAO team has acknowledged all the issues raised in the initial report. Shellboxes' auditors advised CimpleDAO Team to maintain a high level of vigilance and to keep those findings in mind in order to avoid any future complications.



For a Contract Audit, contact us at contact@shellboxes.com